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to be confused with <a href="/wiki/Theory_of_mind" title="Theory of mind">Theory of mind</a>.</div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1129693374">.mw-parser-output .hlist dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist ul{margin:0;padding:0}.mw-parser-output .hlist dd,.mw-parser-output .hlist dt,.mw-parser-output .hlist li{margin:0;display:inline}.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline ul,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl ul,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol ul,.mw-parser-output .hlist ul dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist ul ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist ul ul{display:inline}.mw-parser-output .hlist .mw-empty-li{display:none}.mw-parser-output .hlist dt::after{content:": "}.mw-parser-output .hlist dd::after,.mw-parser-output .hlist li::after{content:" · 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3.3em}@media(max-width:640px){body.mediawiki .mw-parser-output .sidebar{width:100%!important;clear:both;float:none!important;margin-left:0!important;margin-right:0!important}}body.skin--responsive .mw-parser-output .sidebar a>img{max-width:none!important}@media screen{html.skin-theme-clientpref-night .mw-parser-output .sidebar:not(.notheme) .sidebar-list-title,html.skin-theme-clientpref-night .mw-parser-output .sidebar:not(.notheme) .sidebar-title-with-pretitle{background:transparent!important}html.skin-theme-clientpref-night .mw-parser-output .sidebar:not(.notheme) .sidebar-title-with-pretitle a{color:var(--color-progressive)!important}}@media screen and (prefers-color-scheme:dark){html.skin-theme-clientpref-os .mw-parser-output .sidebar:not(.notheme) .sidebar-list-title,html.skin-theme-clientpref-os .mw-parser-output .sidebar:not(.notheme) .sidebar-title-with-pretitle{background:transparent!important}html.skin-theme-clientpref-os .mw-parser-output .sidebar:not(.notheme) .sidebar-title-with-pretitle a{color:var(--color-progressive)!important}}@media print{body.ns-0 .mw-parser-output .sidebar{display:none!important}}</style><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1234152309">.mw-parser-output .philosophy-sidebar{max-width:22em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-phi-pre{padding-top:0.8em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-phi-title{font-weight:bold;padding-bottom:0em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-phi-title a{color:black}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-phi-img{padding:0.8em 0.8em 1em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-phi-above{padding:0.5em 1.5em 0.5em;display:block;background-color:#efefef}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-phi button{padding:0 0.2em}</style><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1246091330"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1129693374"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1246091330"> The philosophy of mind is a branch of <a href="/wiki/Philosophy" title="Philosophy">philosophy</a> that deals with the nature of the <a href="/wiki/Mind" title="Mind">mind</a> and its relation to the <a href="/wiki/Human_body" title="Human body">body</a> and the <a href="/wiki/Reality" title="Reality">external world</a>. The <a href="/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem" title="Mind–body problem">mind–body problem</a> is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind, although a number of other issues are addressed, such as the <a href="/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">hard problem of consciousness</a> and the nature of particular mental states.<a href="#cite_note-Kim1-1">[1]</a><a href="#cite_note-ReferenceA-2">[2]</a><a href="#cite_note-Macpherson,_F._2008-3">[3]</a> Aspects of the mind that are studied include <a href="/wiki/Mental_event" title="Mental event">mental events</a>, <a href="/wiki/Mental_function" class="mw-redirect" title="Mental function">mental functions</a>, <a href="/wiki/Mental_property" class="mw-redirect" title="Mental property">mental properties</a>, <a href="/wiki/Consciousness" title="Consciousness">consciousness</a> and <a href="/wiki/Neural_correlates_of_consciousness" title="Neural correlates of consciousness">its neural correlates</a>, the ontology of the mind, the nature of <a href="/wiki/Cognition" title="Cognition">cognition</a> and of <a href="/wiki/Thought" title="Thought">thought</a>, and the relationship of the mind to the body. <a href="/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)" class="mw-redirect" title="Dualism (philosophy of mind)">Dualism</a> and <a href="/wiki/Monism" title="Monism">monism</a> are the two central <a href="/wiki/Schools_of_thought" class="mw-redirect" title="Schools of thought">schools of thought</a> on the mind–body problem, although nuanced views have arisen that do not fit one or the other category neatly. <ul><li>Dualism finds its entry into <a href="/wiki/Western_philosophy" title="Western philosophy">Western philosophy</a> thanks to <a href="/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a> in the <a href="/wiki/17th_century" title="17th century">17th century</a>.<a href="#cite_note-De-4">[4]</a> Substance dualists like Descartes argue that the mind is an independently existing <a href="/wiki/Substance_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Substance (philosophy)">substance</a>, whereas <a href="/wiki/Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">property dualists</a> maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that <a href="/wiki/Emergentism" title="Emergentism">emerge</a> from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.<a href="#cite_note-Du-5">[5]</a></li> <li>Monism is the position that mind and body are <a href="/wiki/Ontology" title="Ontology">ontologically</a> indiscernible entities, not dependent substances. This view was espoused by the 17th-century rationalist <a href="/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Spin-6">[6]</a> <a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">Physicalists</a> argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that mental processes will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Physicalists maintain various positions on the prospects of <a href="/wiki/Physicalism#Reductionism" title="Physicalism">reducing mental properties to physical properties</a> (many of whom adopt compatible forms of property dualism),<a href="#cite_note-Schneider2013-7">[7]</a><a href="#cite_note-DePaulBaltimore2013-8">[8]</a><a href="#cite_note-GibbLowe2013-9">[9]</a><a href="#cite_note-Demircioglu2011-10">[10]</a><a href="#cite_note-Francescotti-11">[11]</a><a href="#cite_note-Gibb2010-12">[12]</a> and the ontological status of such mental properties remains unclear.<a href="#cite_note-Francescotti-11">[11]</a><a href="#cite_note-McLaughlinAndBennett-13">[13]</a><a href="#cite_note-Megill2012-14">[14]</a> <a href="/wiki/Idealism_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Idealism (philosophy)">Idealists</a> maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. <a href="/wiki/Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">Neutral monists</a> such as <a href="/wiki/Ernst_Mach" title="Ernst Mach">Ernst Mach</a> and <a href="/wiki/William_James" title="William James">William James</a> argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter, and dual-aspect monists such as <a href="/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Spinoza</a> adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of physicalism; these positions include <a href="/wiki/Behaviorism" title="Behaviorism">behaviorism</a>, the <a href="/wiki/Type_physicalism" title="Type physicalism">type identity theory</a>, <a href="/wiki/Anomalous_monism" title="Anomalous monism">anomalous monism</a> and <a href="/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">functionalism</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Kim-15">[15]</a></li></ul> Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a <a href="/wiki/Physicalism#Reductionism" title="Physicalism">reductive physicalist</a> or <a href="/wiki/Physicalism#Reductionism" title="Physicalism">non-reductive physicalist</a> position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body.<a href="#cite_note-Kim-15">[15]</a> These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of <a href="/wiki/Sociobiology" title="Sociobiology">sociobiology</a>, <a href="/wiki/Computer_science" title="Computer science">computer science</a> (specifically, <a href="/wiki/Artificial_intelligence" title="Artificial intelligence">artificial intelligence</a>), <a href="/wiki/Evolutionary_psychology" title="Evolutionary psychology">evolutionary psychology</a> and the various <a href="/wiki/Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">neurosciences</a>.<a href="#cite_note-PsyBio-16">[16]</a><a href="#cite_note-LeDoux-17">[17]</a><a href="#cite_note-RussNor-18">[18]</a><a href="#cite_note-DawkRich-19">[19]</a> Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states.<a href="#cite_note-Pat-20">[20]</a><a href="#cite_note-Paul-21">[21]</a><a href="#cite_note-Smart-22">[22]</a> Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties <a href="/wiki/Supervenience" title="Supervenience">supervene</a> on physical properties, or that the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.<a href="#cite_note-Davidson-23">[23]</a><a href="#cite_note-Pu-24">[24]</a> Continued <a href="/wiki/Neuroscientific" class="mw-redirect" title="Neuroscientific">neuroscientific</a> progress has helped to clarify some of these issues; however, they are far from being resolved. Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the <a href="/wiki/Intentionality" title="Intentionality">intentionality</a> of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms.<a href="#cite_note-Int-25">[25]</a><a href="#cite_note-Searleint-26">[26]</a> The problems of physicalist theories of the mind have led some contemporary philosophers to assert that the traditional view of substance dualism should be defended. From this perspective, this theory is coherent, and problems such as "the interaction of mind and body" can be rationally resolved.<a href="#cite_note-27">[27]</a> <div id="toc" class="toc" role="navigation" aria-labelledby="mw-toc-heading"><input type="checkbox" role="button" id="toctogglecheckbox" class="toctogglecheckbox" style="display:none"><div class="toctitle" lang="en" dir="ltr"><h2 id="mw-toc-heading">Contents</h2><label class="toctogglelabel" for="toctogglecheckbox"></label></div> <ul> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-1"><a href="#Mind%E2%80%93body_problem">1 Mind–body problem</a> <ul> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-2"><a href="#Dualist_solutions_to_the_mind%E2%80%93body_problem">1.1 Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem</a> <ul> <li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-3"><a href="#Arguments_for_dualism">1.1.1 Arguments for dualism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-4"><a href="#Interactionist_dualism">1.1.2 Interactionist dualism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-5"><a href="#Other_forms_of_dualism">1.1.3 Other forms of dualism</a> <ul> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-6"><a href="#Psychophysical_parallelism">1.1.3.1 Psychophysical parallelism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-7"><a href="#Occasionalism">1.1.3.2 Occasionalism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-8"><a href="#Property_dualism">1.1.3.3 Property dualism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-9"><a href="#Dual_aspect_theory">1.1.3.4 Dual aspect theory</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-10"><a href="#Experiential_dualism">1.1.3.5 Experiential dualism</a></li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-11"><a href="#Monist_solutions_to_the_mind%E2%80%93body_problem">1.2 Monist solutions to the mind–body problem</a> <ul> <li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-12"><a href="#Physicalistic_monisms">1.2.1 Physicalistic monisms</a> <ul> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-13"><a href="#Behaviorism">1.2.1.1 Behaviorism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-14"><a href="#Identity_theory">1.2.1.2 Identity theory</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-15"><a href="#Functionalism">1.2.1.3 Functionalism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-16"><a href="#Non-reductive_physicalism">1.2.1.4 Non-reductive physicalism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-17"><a href="#Weak_emergentism">1.2.1.5 Weak emergentism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-4 tocsection-18"><a href="#Eliminative_materialism">1.2.1.6 Eliminative materialism</a></li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-19"><a href="#Mysterianism">1.3 Mysterianism</a></li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-20"><a href="#Linguistic_criticism_of_the_mind%E2%80%93body_problem">1.4 Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem</a></li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-21"><a href="#Naturalism_and_its_problems">1.5 Naturalism and its problems</a> <ul> <li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-22"><a href="#Qualia">1.5.1 Qualia</a></li> <li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-23"><a href="#Intentionality">1.5.2 Intentionality</a></li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-24"><a href="#Philosophy_of_perception">2 Philosophy of perception</a></li> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-25"><a href="#Philosophy_of_mind_and_science">3 Philosophy of mind and science</a> <ul> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-26"><a href="#Neurobiology">3.1 Neurobiology</a></li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-27"><a href="#Computer_science">3.2 Computer science</a></li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-28"><a href="#Psychology">3.3 Psychology</a></li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-29"><a href="#Cognitive_science">3.4 Cognitive science</a></li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-30"><a href="#Near-death_research">3.5 Near-death research</a></li> </ul> </li> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-31"><a href="#Philosophy_of_mind_in_the_continental_tradition">4 Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition</a></li> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-32"><a href="#Topics_related_to_the_philosophy_of_mind">5 Topics related to the philosophy of mind</a> <ul> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-33"><a href="#Free_will">5.1 Free will</a></li> <li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-34"><a href="#Self">5.2 Self</a></li> </ul> </li> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-35"><a href="#See_also">6 See also</a></li> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-36"><a href="#References">7 References</a></li> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-37"><a href="#Further_reading">8 Further reading</a></li> <li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-38"><a href="#External_links">9 External links</a></li> </ul> </div> </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(1)"><h2 id="Mind–body_problem">Mind–body problem</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=1" title="Edit section: Mind–body problem" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-1 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-1"> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem" title="Mind–body problem">Mind–body problem</a></div> <figure class="mw-halign-right" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Descartes_mind_and_body.gif" class="mw-file-description"><noscript><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Descartes_mind_and_body.gif/200px-Descartes_mind_and_body.gif" decoding="async" width="200" height="247" class="mw-file-element" data-file-width="493" data-file-height="609"></noscript><span class="lazy-image-placeholder" style="width: 200px;height: 247px;" data-src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Descartes_mind_and_body.gif/200px-Descartes_mind_and_body.gif" data-width="200" data-height="247" data-srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Descartes_mind_and_body.gif/300px-Descartes_mind_and_body.gif 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Descartes_mind_and_body.gif/400px-Descartes_mind_and_body.gif 2x" data-class="mw-file-element"> </a><figcaption>Illustration of mind–body dualism by <a href="/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a>. Inputs are passed by the sensory organs to the <a href="/wiki/Pineal_gland" title="Pineal gland">pineal gland</a>, and from there to the immaterial <a href="/wiki/Soul" title="Soul">spirit</a>.</figcaption></figure> The mind–body problem concerns the explanation of the relationship that exists between <a href="/wiki/Mind" title="Mind">minds</a>, or <a href="/wiki/Mental_processes" class="mw-redirect" title="Mental processes">mental processes</a>, and bodily states or processes.<a href="#cite_note-Kim1-1">[1]</a> The main aim of philosophers working in this area is to determine the nature of the mind and mental states/processes, and how—or even if—minds are affected by and can affect the body. <a href="/wiki/Perceptual" class="mw-redirect" title="Perceptual">Perceptual</a> experiences depend on <a href="/wiki/Stimulation" title="Stimulation">stimuli</a> that arrive at our various <a href="/wiki/Sensory_system" class="mw-redirect" title="Sensory system">sensory organs</a> from the external world, and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. For example, someone's desire for a slice of pizza will tend to cause that person to move his or her body in a specific manner and direction to obtain what he or she wants. The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of gray matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties.<a href="#cite_note-Kim-15">[15]</a> A related problem is how someone's <a href="/wiki/Propositional_attitude" title="Propositional attitude">propositional attitudes</a> (e.g. beliefs and desires) cause that individual's <a href="/wiki/Neuron" title="Neuron">neurons</a> to fire and muscles to contract. These comprise some of the puzzles that have confronted <a href="/wiki/Epistemology" title="Epistemology">epistemologists</a> and philosophers of mind from the time of <a href="/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a>.<a href="#cite_note-De-4">[4]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Dualist_solutions_to_the_mind–body_problem">Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=2" title="Edit section: Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">See also: <a href="/wiki/Mind_in_eastern_philosophy" title="Mind in eastern philosophy">Mind in eastern philosophy</a></div> <a href="/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)" class="mw-redirect" title="Dualism (philosophy of mind)">Dualism</a> is a set of views about the relationship between <a href="/wiki/Mind" title="Mind">mind</a> and <a href="/wiki/Matter" title="Matter">matter</a> (or <a href="/wiki/Human_body" title="Human body">body</a>). It begins with the claim that mental <a href="/wiki/Phenomenon" title="Phenomenon">phenomena</a> are, in some respects, non-<a href="/wiki/Nature" title="Nature">physical</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Du-5">[5]</a> One of the earliest known formulations of mind–body dualism was expressed in the eastern <a href="/wiki/Samkhya" title="Samkhya">Samkhya</a> and <a href="/wiki/Yoga" title="Yoga">Yoga</a> schools of <a href="/wiki/Hindu_philosophy" title="Hindu philosophy">Hindu philosophy</a> (<abbr title="circa">c.</abbr> 650 BCE), which divided the world into <a href="/wiki/Purusha" title="Purusha">purusha</a> (mind/spirit) and <a href="/wiki/Prakriti" class="mw-redirect" title="Prakriti">prakriti</a> (material substance).<a href="#cite_note-Sa-28">[28]</a> Specifically, the <a href="/wiki/Yoga_Sutra" class="mw-redirect" title="Yoga Sutra">Yoga Sutra</a> of <a href="/wiki/Patanjali" title="Patanjali">Patanjali</a> presents an analytical approach to the nature of the mind. In Western philosophy, the earliest discussions of dualist ideas are in the writings of <a href="/wiki/Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a> who suggested that humans' intelligence (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, their physical body.<a href="#cite_note-Plato-29">[29]</a><a href="#cite_note-Rob-30">[30]</a> However, the best-known version of dualism is due to <a href="/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a> (1641), and holds that the mind is a non-extended, non-physical substance, a "<a href="/wiki/Mental_substance" title="Mental substance">res cogitans</a>".<a href="#cite_note-De-4">[4]</a> Descartes was the first to clearly identify the mind with <a href="/wiki/Consciousness" title="Consciousness">consciousness</a> and <a href="/wiki/Self-awareness" title="Self-awareness">self-awareness</a>, and to distinguish this from the brain, which was the seat of intelligence. He was therefore the first to formulate the mind–body problem in the form in which it still exists today.<a href="#cite_note-De-4">[4]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Arguments_for_dualism">Arguments for dualism</h4> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=3" title="Edit section: Arguments for dualism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> The most frequently used argument in favor of dualism appeals to the common-sense intuition that conscious experience is distinct from inanimate matter. If asked what the mind is, the average person would usually respond by identifying it with their <a href="/wiki/Self_(psychology)" class="mw-redirect" title="Self (psychology)">self</a>, their personality, their <a href="/wiki/Soul" title="Soul">soul</a>, or another related entity. They would almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain, or vice versa, finding the idea that there is just one <a href="/wiki/Ontology" title="Ontology">ontological</a> entity at play to be too mechanistic or unintelligible.<a href="#cite_note-Du-5">[5]</a> Modern philosophers of mind think that these intuitions are misleading, and that critical faculties, along with <a href="/wiki/Empirical_evidence" title="Empirical evidence">empirical evidence</a> from the sciences, should be used to examine these assumptions and determine whether there is any real basis to them.<a href="#cite_note-Du-5">[5]</a> According to some,[<a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Words_to_watch#Unsupported_attributions" title="Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Words to watch">who?</a>] the mental and the physical seem to have quite different, and perhaps irreconcilable, properties.<a href="#cite_note-Ja-31">[31]</a> Mental events have a subjective quality, whereas physical events do not. So, for example, one can reasonably ask what a burnt finger feels like, or what a blue sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like to a person. But it is meaningless, or at least odd, to ask what a surge in the uptake of <a href="/wiki/Glutamate" class="mw-redirect" title="Glutamate">glutamate</a> in the dorsolateral portion of the <a href="/wiki/Prefrontal_cortex" title="Prefrontal cortex">prefrontal cortex</a> feels like. Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events "<a href="/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia">qualia</a>" or "raw feels".<a href="#cite_note-Ja-31">[31]</a> There are qualia involved in these mental events that seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical. David Chalmers explains this argument by stating that we could conceivably know all the objective information about something, such as the brain states and wavelengths of light involved with seeing the color red, but still not know something fundamental about the situation – what it is like to see the color red.<a href="#cite_note-Nagel-32">[32]</a> If consciousness (the mind) can exist independently of physical reality (the brain), one must explain how physical memories are created concerning consciousness. Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One possible explanation is that of a miracle, proposed by <a href="/wiki/Arnold_Geulincx" title="Arnold Geulincx">Arnold Geulincx</a> and <a href="/wiki/Nicolas_Malebranche" title="Nicolas Malebranche">Nicolas Malebranche</a>, where all mind–body interactions require the direct intervention of God. Another argument that has been proposed by <a href="/wiki/C._S._Lewis" title="C. S. Lewis">C. S. Lewis</a><a href="#cite_note-33">[33]</a> is the <a href="/wiki/Argument_from_Reason" class="mw-redirect" title="Argument from Reason">Argument from Reason</a>: if, as monism implies, all of our thoughts are the effects of physical causes, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the <a href="/wiki/Consequent" title="Consequent">consequent</a> of a reasonable ground. Knowledge, however, is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if monism is correct, there would be no way of knowing this—or anything else—we could not even suppose it, except by a fluke. The <a href="/wiki/P-zombie" class="mw-redirect" title="P-zombie">zombie argument</a> is based on a <a href="/wiki/Thought_experiment" title="Thought experiment">thought experiment</a> proposed by Todd Moody, and developed by <a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a> in his book <a href="/wiki/The_Conscious_Mind" title="The Conscious Mind">The Conscious Mind</a>. The basic idea is that one can imagine one's body, and therefore conceive the existence of one's body, without any conscious states being associated with this body. Chalmers' argument is that it seems possible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe about a zombie must be true of it. Since none of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be by definition described scientifically via <a href="/wiki/Physics" title="Physics">physics</a>, the move from conceivability to possibility is not such a large one.<a href="#cite_note-34">[34]</a> Others such as Dennett have <a href="/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#Criticism" title="Philosophical zombie">argued</a> that the notion of a philosophical zombie is an incoherent,<a href="#cite_note-Dennett,_Daniel_1995_322%E2%80%936-35">[35]</a> or unlikely,<a href="#cite_note-36">[36]</a> concept. It has been argued under physicalism that one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie—following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's. This argument has been expressed by Dennett who argues that "Zombies think they are conscious, think they have qualia, think they suffer pains—they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition) in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!"<a href="#cite_note-Dennett,_Daniel_1995_322%E2%80%936-35">[35]</a> See also the <a href="/wiki/Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">problem of other minds</a>. <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Interactionist_dualism">Interactionist dualism</h4> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=4" title="Edit section: Interactionist dualism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg" class="mw-file-description"><noscript><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg/220px-Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg" decoding="async" width="220" height="269" class="mw-file-element" data-file-width="817" data-file-height="1000"></noscript><span class="lazy-image-placeholder" style="width: 220px;height: 269px;" data-src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg/220px-Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg" data-width="220" data-height="269" data-srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg/330px-Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg/440px-Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg 2x" data-class="mw-file-element"> </a><figcaption>Portrait of <a href="/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a> by <a href="/wiki/Frans_Hals" title="Frans Hals">Frans Hals</a> (1648)</figcaption></figure> Interactionist dualism, or simply interactionism, is the particular form of dualism first espoused by Descartes in the Meditations.<a href="#cite_note-De-4">[4]</a> In the 20th century, its major defenders have been <a href="/wiki/Karl_Popper" title="Karl Popper">Karl Popper</a> and <a href="/wiki/John_Carew_Eccles" class="mw-redirect" title="John Carew Eccles">John Carew Eccles</a>.<a href="#cite_note-PopE-37">[37]</a> It is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states.<a href="#cite_note-Du-5">[5]</a> Descartes's argument for this position can be summarized as follows: Seth has a clear and distinct idea of his mind as a thinking thing that has no spatial extension (i.e., it cannot be measured in terms of length, weight, height, and so on). He also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think. It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties.<a href="#cite_note-De-4">[4]</a> Seth's mental states (desires, beliefs, etc.) have <a href="/wiki/Causality" title="Causality">causal</a> effects on his body and vice versa: A child touches a hot stove (physical event) which causes pain (mental event) and makes her yell (physical event), this in turn provokes a sense of fear and protectiveness in the caregiver (mental event), and so on. Descartes' argument depends on the premise that what Seth believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are <a href="/wiki/Logical_truth" title="Logical truth">necessarily true</a>. Many contemporary philosophers doubt this.<a href="#cite_note-CE-38">[38]</a><a href="#cite_note-SS-39">[39]</a><a href="#cite_note-40">[40]</a> For example, <a href="/wiki/Joseph_Agassi" title="Joseph Agassi">Joseph Agassi</a> suggests that several scientific discoveries made since the early 20th century have undermined the idea of privileged access to one's own ideas. <a href="/wiki/Sigmund_Freud" title="Sigmund Freud">Freud</a> claimed that a psychologically-trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than the person himself does. <a href="/wiki/Pierre_Duhem" title="Pierre Duhem">Duhem</a> has shown that a philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than that person herself does, while <a href="/wiki/Bronis%C5%82aw_Malinowski" title="Bronisław Malinowski">Malinowski</a> has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than the person whose customs and habits they are. He also asserts that modern psychological experiments that cause people to see things that are not there provide grounds for rejecting Descartes' argument, because scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than the person themself can.<a href="#cite_note-41">[41]</a><a href="#cite_note-42">[42]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Other_forms_of_dualism">Other forms of dualism</h4> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=5" title="Edit section: Other forms of dualism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <figure typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:DualismCausationViews3.svg" class="mw-file-description"><noscript><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/DualismCausationViews3.svg/400px-DualismCausationViews3.svg.png" decoding="async" width="400" height="88" class="mw-file-element" data-file-width="512" data-file-height="112"></noscript><span class="lazy-image-placeholder" style="width: 400px;height: 88px;" data-src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/DualismCausationViews3.svg/400px-DualismCausationViews3.svg.png" data-width="400" data-height="88" data-srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/DualismCausationViews3.svg/600px-DualismCausationViews3.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/DualismCausationViews3.svg/800px-DualismCausationViews3.svg.png 2x" data-class="mw-file-element"> </a><figcaption>Four varieties of dualism. The arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions. Occasionalism is not shown.</figcaption></figure> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Psychophysical_parallelism">Psychophysical parallelism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=6" title="Edit section: Psychophysical parallelism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <a href="/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism" title="Psychophysical parallelism">Psychophysical parallelism</a>, or simply parallelism, is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another. Instead, they run along parallel paths (mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events) and only seem to influence each other.<a href="#cite_note-DuSEP-43">[43]</a> This view was most prominently defended by <a href="/wiki/Gottfried_Leibniz" class="mw-redirect" title="Gottfried Leibniz">Gottfried Leibniz</a>. Although Leibniz was an ontological monist who believed that only one type of substance, the <a href="/wiki/Monad_(Greek_philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Monad (Greek philosophy)">monad</a>, exists in the universe, and that everything is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of <a href="/wiki/Pre-established_harmony" class="mw-redirect" title="Pre-established harmony">pre-established harmony</a>.<a href="#cite_note-44">[44]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Occasionalism">Occasionalism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=7" title="Edit section: Occasionalism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <a href="/wiki/Occasionalism" title="Occasionalism">Occasionalism</a> is the view espoused by <a href="/wiki/Nicholas_Malebranche" class="mw-redirect" title="Nicholas Malebranche">Nicholas Malebranche</a> as well as Islamic philosophers such as <a href="/wiki/Al-Ghazali" title="Al-Ghazali">Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali</a> that asserts all supposedly causal relations between physical events, or between physical and mental events, are not really causal at all. While body and mind are different substances, causes (whether mental or physical) are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion.<a href="#cite_note-45">[45]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Property_dualism">Property dualism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=8" title="Edit section: Property dualism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <a href="/wiki/Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">Property dualism</a> is the view that the world is constituted of one kind of <a href="/wiki/Substance_theory" title="Substance theory">substance</a> – the physical kind – and there exist two distinct kinds of properties: <a href="/wiki/Physical_properties" class="mw-redirect" title="Physical properties">physical properties</a> and <a href="/wiki/Mental_properties" class="mw-redirect" title="Mental properties">mental properties</a>. It is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical bodies (at least, brains). Sub-varieties of property dualism include: <ol><li><a href="/wiki/Emergent_materialism" title="Emergent materialism">Emergent materialism</a> asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge in a way not fully accountable for by physical laws.<a href="#cite_note-Du-5">[5]</a> These emergent properties have an independent ontological status and cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical substrate from which they emerge. They are dependent on the physical properties from which they emerge, but opinions vary as to the coherence of <a href="/w/index.php?title=Top%E2%80%93down_causation&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Top–down causation (page does not exist)">top–down causation</a>, that is, the causal effectiveness of such properties. A form of emergent materialism has been espoused by <a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a> and the concept has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years,<a href="#cite_note-Chalmers-46">[46]</a> but it was already suggested in the 19th century by <a href="/wiki/William_James" title="William James">William James</a>.</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</a> is a doctrine first formulated by <a href="/wiki/Thomas_Henry_Huxley" title="Thomas Henry Huxley">Thomas Henry Huxley</a>.<a href="#cite_note-47">[47]</a> It consists of the view that mental phenomena are causally ineffectual, where one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states or mental phenomena are the effects, but not the causes, of physical phenomena. Physical events can cause other physical and mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything since they are just causally inert by-products (i.e., epiphenomena) of the physical world.<a href="#cite_note-DuSEP-43">[43]</a> This view has been defended by <a href="/wiki/Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">Frank Jackson</a>.<a href="#cite_note-48">[48]</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Property_dualism#Non-reductive_Physicalism" title="Property dualism">Non-reductive physicalism</a> is the view that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: mental states (such as qualia) are not reducible to physical states. The ontological stance towards qualia in the case of non-reductive physicalism does not imply that qualia are causally inert; this is what distinguishes it from epiphenomenalism.</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Panpsychism" title="Panpsychism">Panpsychism</a> is the view that all matter has a mental aspect, or, alternatively, all objects have a unified center of experience or point of view. Superficially, it seems to be a form of property dualism, since it regards everything as having both mental and physical properties. However, some panpsychists say that mechanical behaviour is derived from the primitive mentality of atoms and molecules—as are sophisticated mentality and organic behaviour, the difference being attributed to the presence or absence of <a href="/wiki/Complexity" title="Complexity">complex</a> structure in a compound object. So long as the reduction of non-mental properties to mental ones is in place, panpsychism is not a (strong) form of property dualism; otherwise it is.</li></ol> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Dual_aspect_theory">Dual aspect theory</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=9" title="Edit section: Dual aspect theory" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <a href="/wiki/Dual_aspect_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="Dual aspect theory">Dual aspect theory</a> or dual-aspect monism is the view that the <a href="/wiki/Mind" title="Mind">mental</a> and the <a href="/wiki/Nature" title="Nature">physical</a> are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance. (Thus it is a mixed position, which is monistic in some respects). In modern philosophical writings, the theory's relationship to <a href="/wiki/Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">neutral monism</a> has become somewhat ill-defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements and the relationships into which they enter to determine whether the group can be thought of as mental, physical, both, or neither, dual-aspect theory suggests that the mental and the physical are manifestations (or aspects) of some underlying substance, entity or process that is itself neither mental nor physical as normally understood. Various formulations of dual-aspect monism also require the mental and the physical to be complementary, mutually irreducible and perhaps inseparable (though distinct).<a href="#cite_note-49">[49]</a><a href="#cite_note-50">[50]</a><a href="#cite_note-51">[51]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Experiential_dualism">Experiential dualism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=10" title="Edit section: Experiential dualism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> This is a philosophy of mind that regards the degrees of freedom between mental and physical well-being as not synonymous thus implying an experiential dualism between body and mind. An example of these disparate degrees of freedom is given by <a href="/wiki/B._Alan_Wallace" title="B. Alan Wallace">Allan Wallace</a> who notes that it is "experientially apparent that one may be physically uncomfortable—for instance, while engaging in a strenuous physical workout—while mentally cheerful; conversely, one may be mentally distraught while experiencing physical comfort".<a href="#cite_note-:0-52">[52]</a> Experiential dualism notes that our subjective experience of merely seeing something in the physical world seems qualitatively different from mental processes like grief that comes from losing a loved one. This philosophy is a proponent of causal dualism, which is defined as the dual ability for mental states and physical states to affect one another. Mental states can cause changes in physical states and vice versa. However, unlike cartesian dualism or some other systems, experiential dualism does not posit two fundamental substances in reality: mind and matter. Rather, experiential dualism is to be understood as a conceptual framework that gives credence to the qualitative difference between the experience of mental and physical states. Experiential dualism is accepted as the conceptual framework of <a href="/wiki/Madhyamaka" title="Madhyamaka">Madhyamaka Buddhism</a>. Madhayamaka Buddhism goes further, finding fault with the monist view of physicalist philosophies of mind as well in that these generally posit matter and energy as the fundamental substance of reality. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the cartesian dualist view is correct, rather Madhyamaka regards as error any affirming view of a fundamental substance to reality.<blockquote>In denying the independent self-existence of all the phenomena that make up the world of our experience, the Madhyamaka view departs from both the substance dualism of Descartes and the substance monism—namely, physicalism—that is characteristic of modern science. The physicalism propounded by many contemporary scientists seems to assert that the real world is composed of physical things-in-themselves, while all mental phenomena are regarded as mere appearances, devoid of any reality in and of themselves. Much is made of this difference between appearances and reality.<a href="#cite_note-:0-52">[52]</a></blockquote> Indeed, physicalism, or the idea that matter is the only fundamental substance of reality, is explicitly rejected by Buddhism.<blockquote>In the Madhyamaka view, mental events are no more or less real than physical events. In terms of our common-sense experience, differences of kind do exist between physical and mental phenomena. While the former commonly have mass, location, velocity, shape, size, and numerous other physical attributes, these are not generally characteristic of mental phenomena. For example, we do not commonly conceive of the feeling of affection for another person as having mass or location. These physical attributes are no more appropriate to other mental events such as sadness, a recalled image from one's childhood, the visual perception of a rose, or consciousness of any sort. Mental phenomena are, therefore, not regarded as being physical, for the simple reason that they lack many of the attributes that are uniquely characteristic of physical phenomena. Thus, Buddhism has never adopted the physicalist principle that regards only physical things as real.<a href="#cite_note-:0-52">[52]</a></blockquote> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Monist_solutions_to_the_mind–body_problem">Monist solutions to the mind–body problem</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=11" title="Edit section: Monist solutions to the mind–body problem" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> In contrast to <a href="/wiki/Mind-body_dualism" class="mw-redirect" title="Mind-body dualism">dualism</a>, <a href="/wiki/Monism" title="Monism">monism</a> does not accept any fundamental divisions. The fundamentally disparate nature of reality has been central to forms of eastern philosophies for over two millennia. In <a href="/wiki/Indian_philosophy" title="Indian philosophy">Indian</a> and <a href="/wiki/Chinese_philosophy" title="Chinese philosophy">Chinese philosophy</a>, monism is integral to how experience is understood. Today, the most common forms of monism in Western philosophy are <a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalist</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Kim-15">[15]</a> Physicalistic monism asserts that the only existing substance is physical, in some sense of that term to be clarified by our best science.<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> However, a variety of formulations (see below) are possible. Another form of monism, <a href="/wiki/Idealism" title="Idealism">idealism</a>, states that the only existing substance is mental. Although pure idealism, such as that of <a href="/wiki/George_Berkeley" title="George Berkeley">George Berkeley</a>, is uncommon in contemporary Western philosophy, a more sophisticated variant called <a href="/wiki/Panpsychism" title="Panpsychism">panpsychism</a>, according to which mental experience and properties may be at the foundation of physical experience and properties, has been espoused by some philosophers such as <a href="/wiki/Alfred_North_Whitehead" title="Alfred North Whitehead">Alfred North Whitehead</a><a href="#cite_note-54">[54]</a> and <a href="/wiki/David_Ray_Griffin" title="David Ray Griffin">David Ray Griffin</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Chalmers-46">[46]</a> <a href="/wiki/Phenomenalism" title="Phenomenalism">Phenomenalism</a> is the theory that representations (or <a href="/wiki/Sense_data" title="Sense data">sense data</a>) of external objects are all that exist. Such a view was briefly adopted by <a href="/wiki/Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a> and many of the <a href="/wiki/Logical_positivists" class="mw-redirect" title="Logical positivists">logical positivists</a> during the early 20th century.<a href="#cite_note-55">[55]</a> A third possibility is to accept the existence of a basic substance that is neither physical nor mental. The mental and physical would then both be properties of this neutral substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch Spinoza<a href="#cite_note-Spin-6">[6]</a> and was popularized by <a href="/wiki/Ernst_Mach" title="Ernst Mach">Ernst Mach</a><a href="#cite_note-56">[56]</a> in the 19th century. This <a href="/wiki/Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">neutral monism</a>, as it is called, resembles property dualism. <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Physicalistic_monisms">Physicalistic monisms</h4> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=12" title="Edit section: Physicalistic monisms" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Behaviorism">Behaviorism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=13" title="Edit section: Behaviorism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Behaviorism" title="Behaviorism">Behaviorism</a></div> Behaviorism dominated philosophy of mind for much of the 20th century, especially the first half.<a href="#cite_note-Kim-15">[15]</a> In psychology, behaviorism developed as a reaction to the inadequacies of <a href="/wiki/Introspection" title="Introspection">introspectionism</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> Introspective reports on one's own interior mental life are not subject to careful examination for accuracy and cannot be used to form predictive generalizations. Without generalizability and the possibility of third-person examination, the behaviorists argued, psychology cannot be scientific.<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> The way out, therefore, was to eliminate the idea of an interior mental life (and hence an ontologically independent mind) altogether and focus instead on the description of observable behavior.<a href="#cite_note-57">[57]</a> Parallel to these developments in psychology, a philosophical behaviorism (sometimes called logical behaviorism) was developed.<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> This is characterized by a strong <a href="/wiki/Verificationism" title="Verificationism">verificationism</a>, which generally considers unverifiable statements about interior mental life pointless. For the behaviorist, mental states are not interior states on which one can make introspective reports. They are just descriptions of behavior or <a href="/wiki/Disposition" title="Disposition">dispositions</a> to behave in certain ways, made by third parties to explain and predict another's behavior.<a href="#cite_note-58">[58]</a> Philosophical behaviorism has fallen out of favor since the latter half of the 20th century, coinciding with the rise of <a href="/wiki/Cognitivism_(psychology)" title="Cognitivism (psychology)">cognitivism</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Kim1-1">[1]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Identity_theory">Identity theory</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=14" title="Edit section: Identity theory" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Type_physicalism" title="Type physicalism">Type physicalism</a></div> Type physicalism (or type-identity theory) was developed by <a href="/wiki/J._J._C._Smart" title="J. J. C. Smart">Jack Smart</a><a href="#cite_note-Smart-22">[22]</a> and <a href="/wiki/Ullin_Place" title="Ullin Place">Ullin Place</a><a href="#cite_note-59">[59]</a> as a direct reaction to the failure of behaviorism. These philosophers reasoned that, if mental states are something material, but not behavioral, then mental states are probably identical to internal states of the brain. In very simplified terms: a mental state M is nothing other than brain state B. The mental state "desire for a cup of coffee" would thus be nothing more than the "firing of certain neurons in certain brain regions".<a href="#cite_note-Smart-22">[22]</a> <figure class="mw-halign-right" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Anomalous_Monism.png" class="mw-file-description"><noscript><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Anomalous_Monism.png/250px-Anomalous_Monism.png" decoding="async" width="250" height="250" class="mw-file-element" data-file-width="600" data-file-height="600"></noscript><span class="lazy-image-placeholder" style="width: 250px;height: 250px;" data-src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Anomalous_Monism.png/250px-Anomalous_Monism.png" data-width="250" data-height="250" data-srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Anomalous_Monism.png/375px-Anomalous_Monism.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Anomalous_Monism.png/500px-Anomalous_Monism.png 2x" data-class="mw-file-element"> </a><figcaption>The classic Identity theory and Anomalous Monism in contrast. For the Identity theory, every token instantiation of a single mental type corresponds (as indicated by the arrows) to a physical token of a single physical type. For anomalous monism, the token–token correspondences can fall outside of the type–type correspondences. The result is token identity.</figcaption></figure> On the other hand, even granted the above, it does not follow that identity theories of all types must be abandoned. According to token identity theories, the fact that a certain brain state is connected with only one mental state of a person does not have to mean that there is an absolute correlation between types of mental state and types of brain state. The type–token distinction can be illustrated by a simple example: the word "green" contains four types of letters (g, r, e, n) with two tokens (occurrences) of the letter e along with one each of the others. The idea of token identity is that only particular occurrences of mental events are identical with particular occurrences or tokenings of physical events.<a href="#cite_note-60">[60]</a> Anomalous monism (see below) and most other non-reductive physicalisms are token-identity theories.<a href="#cite_note-61">[61]</a> Despite these problems, there is a renewed interest in the type identity theory today, primarily due to the influence of <a href="/wiki/Jaegwon_Kim" title="Jaegwon Kim">Jaegwon Kim</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Smart-22">[22]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Functionalism">Functionalism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=15" title="Edit section: Functionalism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">Functionalism (philosophy of mind)</a></div> Functionalism was formulated by <a href="/wiki/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a> and <a href="/wiki/Jerry_Fodor" title="Jerry Fodor">Jerry Fodor</a> as a reaction to the inadequacies of the identity theory.<a href="#cite_note-Pu-24">[24]</a> Putnam and Fodor saw mental states in terms of an empirical <a href="/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind" title="Computational theory of mind">computational theory of the mind</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Block-62">[62]</a> At about the same time or slightly after, <a href="/wiki/D.M._Armstrong" class="mw-redirect" title="D.M. Armstrong">D.M. Armstrong</a> and <a href="/wiki/David_Kellogg_Lewis" class="mw-redirect" title="David Kellogg Lewis">David Kellogg Lewis</a> formulated a version of functionalism that analyzed the mental concepts of folk psychology in terms of functional roles.<a href="#cite_note-63">[63]</a> Finally, <a href="/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein" title="Ludwig Wittgenstein">Wittgenstein</a>'s idea of meaning as use led to a version of functionalism as a theory of meaning, further developed by <a href="/wiki/Wilfrid_Sellars" title="Wilfrid Sellars">Wilfrid Sellars</a> and <a href="/wiki/Gilbert_Harman" title="Gilbert Harman">Gilbert Harman</a>. Another one, <a href="/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Psychofunctionalism" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">psychofunctionalism</a>, is an approach adopted by the <a href="/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy)#Metaphysical_naturalism" title="Naturalism (philosophy)">naturalistic philosophy of mind</a> associated with Jerry Fodor and <a href="/wiki/Zenon_Pylyshyn" title="Zenon Pylyshyn">Zenon Pylyshyn</a>. Mental states are characterized by their causal relations with other mental states and with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. Functionalism abstracts away from the details of the physical implementation of a mental state by characterizing it in terms of non-mental functional properties. For example, a kidney is characterized scientifically by its functional role in filtering blood and maintaining certain chemical balances.<a href="#cite_note-Block-62">[62]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Non-reductive_physicalism">Non-reductive physicalism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=16" title="Edit section: Non-reductive physicalism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">Physicalism</a></div> Non-reductionist philosophers hold firmly to two essential convictions with regard to mind–body relations: 1) Physicalism is true and mental states must be physical states, but 2) All reductionist proposals are unsatisfactory: mental states cannot be reduced to behavior, brain states or functional states.<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> Hence, the question arises whether there can still be a non-reductive physicalism. <a href="/wiki/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)" title="Donald Davidson (philosopher)">Donald Davidson</a>'s <a href="/wiki/Anomalous_monism" title="Anomalous monism">anomalous monism</a><a href="#cite_note-Davidson-23">[23]</a> is an attempt to formulate such a physicalism. He "thinks that when one runs across what are traditionally seen as absurdities of Reason, such as <a href="/wiki/Akrasia" title="Akrasia">akrasia</a> or self-deception, the personal psychology framework is not to be given up in favor of the subpersonal one, but rather must be enlarged or extended so that the rationality set out by the principle of charity can be found elsewhere."<a href="#cite_note-64">[64]</a> Davidson uses the thesis of <a href="/wiki/Supervenience" title="Supervenience">supervenience</a>: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to them. "Supervenience" therefore describes a functional dependence: there can be no change in the mental without some change in the physical–causal reducibility between the mental and physical without ontological reducibility.<a href="#cite_note-65">[65]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Weak_emergentism">Weak emergentism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=17" title="Edit section: Weak emergentism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Emergentism" title="Emergentism">Emergentism</a></div> Weak emergentism is a form of "non-reductive physicalism" that involves a layered view of nature, with the layers arranged in terms of increasing complexity and each corresponding to its own special science. Some philosophers[<a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Words_to_watch#Unsupported_attributions" title="Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Words to watch">who?</a>] hold that emergent properties causally interact with more fundamental levels, while others maintain that higher-order properties simply supervene over lower levels without direct causal interaction. The latter group therefore holds a less strict, or "weaker", definition of emergentism, which can be rigorously stated as follows: a property P of composite object O is emergent if it is metaphysically impossible for another object to lack property P if that object is composed of parts with intrinsic properties identical to those in O and has those parts in an identical configuration.[<a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed" title="Wikipedia:Citation needed">citation needed</a>] Sometimes emergentists use the example of water having a new property when Hydrogen H and Oxygen O combine to form H2O (water). In this example there "emerges" a new property of a transparent liquid that would not have been predicted by understanding hydrogen and oxygen as gases. This is analogous to physical properties of the brain giving rise to a mental state. Emergentists try to solve the notorious mind–body gap this way. One problem for emergentism is the idea of <a href="/wiki/Causal_closure" title="Causal closure">causal closure</a> in the world that does not allow for a mind-to-body causation.<a href="#cite_note-66">[66]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading5"><h5 id="Eliminative_materialism">Eliminative materialism</h5> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=18" title="Edit section: Eliminative materialism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Eliminative_materialism" title="Eliminative materialism">Eliminative materialism</a></div> If one is a materialist and believes that all aspects of our common-sense psychology will find reduction to a mature <a href="/wiki/Cognitive_neuroscience" title="Cognitive neuroscience">cognitive neuroscience</a>, and that non-reductive materialism is mistaken, then one can adopt a final, more radical position: eliminative materialism. There are several varieties of eliminative materialism, but all maintain that our common-sense "<a href="/wiki/Folk_psychology" title="Folk psychology">folk psychology</a>" badly misrepresents the nature of some aspect of cognition. Eliminativists such as <a href="/wiki/Patricia_Churchland" title="Patricia Churchland">Patricia</a> and <a href="/wiki/Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland">Paul Churchland</a> argue that while folk psychology treats cognition as fundamentally sentence-like, the non-linguistic vector/matrix model of neural network theory or <a href="/wiki/Connectionism" title="Connectionism">connectionism</a> will prove to be a much more accurate account of how the brain works.<a href="#cite_note-Pat-20">[20]</a> The Churchlands often invoke the fate of other, erroneous popular theories and <a href="/wiki/Ontology" title="Ontology">ontologies</a> that have arisen in the course of history.<a href="#cite_note-Pat-20">[20]</a><a href="#cite_note-Paul-21">[21]</a> For example, Ptolemaic astronomy served to explain and roughly predict the motions of the planets for centuries, but eventually this model of the solar system was eliminated in favor of the Copernican model. The Churchlands believe the same eliminative fate awaits the "sentence-cruncher" model of the mind in which thought and behavior are the result of manipulating sentence-like states called "<a href="/wiki/Propositional_attitude" title="Propositional attitude">propositional attitudes</a>". Sociologist <a href="/wiki/Jacy_Reese_Anthis" title="Jacy Reese Anthis">Jacy Reese Anthis</a> argues for eliminative materialism on all faculties of mind, including consciousness, stating, "The deepest mysteries of the mind are within our reach."<a href="#cite_note-anthis-67">[67]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Mysterianism">Mysterianism</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=19" title="Edit section: Mysterianism" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/New_mysterianism" title="New mysterianism">New mysterianism</a></div> Some philosophers take an epistemic approach and argue that the mind–body problem is currently unsolvable, and perhaps will always remain unsolvable to human beings. This is usually termed <a href="/wiki/New_mysterianism" title="New mysterianism">New mysterianism</a>. <a href="/wiki/Colin_McGinn" title="Colin McGinn">Colin McGinn</a> holds that human beings are <a href="/wiki/Cognitive_closure_(philosophy)" title="Cognitive closure (philosophy)">cognitively closed</a> in regards to their own minds. According to McGinn human minds lack the concept-forming procedures to fully grasp how mental properties such as <a href="/wiki/Consciousness" title="Consciousness">consciousness</a> arise from their causal basis.<a href="#cite_note-68">[68]</a> An example would be how an elephant is cognitively closed in regards to particle physics. A more moderate conception has been expounded by <a href="/wiki/Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Thomas Nagel</a>, which holds that the mind–body problem is currently unsolvable at the present stage of scientific development and that it might take a future scientific <a href="/wiki/Paradigm_shift" title="Paradigm shift">paradigm shift</a> or revolution to bridge the <a href="/wiki/Explanatory_gap" title="Explanatory gap">explanatory gap</a>. Nagel posits that in the future a sort of "objective <a href="/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy)" title="Phenomenology (philosophy)">phenomenology</a>" might be able to bridge the gap between subjective conscious experience and its physical basis.<a href="#cite_note-69">[69]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Linguistic_criticism_of_the_mind–body_problem">Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=20" title="Edit section: Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> Each attempt to answer the mind–body problem encounters substantial problems. Some philosophers argue that this is because there is an underlying conceptual confusion.<a href="#cite_note-Hacker-70">[70]</a> These philosophers, such as <a href="/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein" title="Ludwig Wittgenstein">Ludwig Wittgenstein</a> and his followers in the tradition of linguistic criticism, therefore reject the problem as illusory.<a href="#cite_note-Witt-71">[71]</a> They argue that it is an error to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather it should simply be accepted that human experience can be described in different ways—for instance, in a mental and in a biological vocabulary. Illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts.<a href="#cite_note-Witt-71">[71]</a> This is the case, for instance, if one searches for mental states of the brain. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary—the search for mental states of the brain is therefore a <a href="/wiki/Category_error" class="mw-redirect" title="Category error">category error</a> or a sort of fallacy of reasoning.<a href="#cite_note-Witt-71">[71]</a> Today, such a position is often adopted by interpreters of Wittgenstein such as <a href="/wiki/Peter_Hacker" title="Peter Hacker">Peter Hacker</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Hacker-70">[70]</a> However, <a href="/wiki/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a>, the originator of functionalism, has also adopted the position that the mind–body problem is an illusory problem which should be dissolved according to the manner of Wittgenstein.<a href="#cite_note-72">[72]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Naturalism_and_its_problems">Naturalism and its problems</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=21" title="Edit section: Naturalism and its problems" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> The thesis of physicalism is that the mind is part of the material (or physical) world. Such a position faces the problem that the mind has certain properties that no other material thing seems to possess. Physicalism must therefore explain how it is possible that these properties can nonetheless emerge from a material thing. The project of providing such an explanation is often referred to as the "<a href="/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy)" title="Naturalism (philosophy)">naturalization</a> of the mental".<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> Some of the crucial problems that this project attempts to resolve include the existence of qualia and the nature of intentionality.<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Qualia">Qualia</h4> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=22" title="Edit section: Qualia" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia">Qualia</a></div> Many mental states seem to be experienced subjectively in different ways by different individuals.<a href="#cite_note-Nagel-32">[32]</a> And it is characteristic of a mental state that it has some experiential quality, e.g. of pain, that it hurts. However, the sensation of pain between two individuals may not be identical, since no one has a perfect way to measure how much something hurts or of describing exactly how it feels to hurt. Philosophers and scientists therefore ask where these experiences come from. The existence of cerebral events, in and of themselves, cannot explain why they are accompanied by these corresponding qualitative experiences. The puzzle of why many cerebral processes occur with an accompanying experiential aspect in consciousness seems impossible to explain.<a href="#cite_note-Ja-31">[31]</a> Yet it also seems to many that science will eventually have to explain such experiences.<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> This <a href="/wiki/Logical_consequence" title="Logical consequence">follows from</a> an assumption about the possibility of <a href="/wiki/Reductionism" title="Reductionism">reductive explanations</a>. According to this view, if an attempt can be successfully made to explain a phenomenon reductively (e.g., water), then it can be explained why the phenomenon has all of its properties (e.g., fluidity, transparency).<a href="#cite_note-Stol-53">[53]</a> In the case of mental states, this means that there needs to be an explanation of why they have the property of being experienced in a certain way. The 20th-century German philosopher <a href="/wiki/Martin_Heidegger" title="Martin Heidegger">Martin Heidegger</a> criticized the <a href="/wiki/Ontology" title="Ontology">ontological</a> assumptions underpinning such a reductive model, and claimed that it was impossible to make sense of experience in these terms. This is because, according to Heidegger, the nature of our subjective experience and its qualities is impossible to understand in terms of <a href="/wiki/Descartes" class="mw-redirect" title="Descartes">Cartesian</a> "substances" that bear "properties". Another way to put this is that the very concept of qualitative experience is incoherent in terms of—or is semantically <a href="/wiki/Commensurability_(philosophy_of_science)" title="Commensurability (philosophy of science)">incommensurable</a> with the concept of—substances that bear properties.<a href="#cite_note-73">[73]</a> This problem of explaining introspective first-person aspects of mental states and consciousness in general in terms of third-person quantitative neuroscience is called the <a href="/wiki/Explanatory_gap" title="Explanatory gap">explanatory gap</a>.<a href="#cite_note-74">[74]</a> There are several different views of the nature of this gap among contemporary philosophers of mind. <a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a> and the early <a href="/wiki/Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">Frank Jackson</a> interpret the gap as <a href="/wiki/Ontology" title="Ontology">ontological</a> in nature; that is, they maintain that qualia can never be explained by science because <a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalism</a> is false. There are two separate categories involved and one cannot be reduced to the other.<a href="#cite_note-75">[75]</a> An alternative view is taken by philosophers such as <a href="/wiki/Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Thomas Nagel</a> and <a href="/wiki/Colin_McGinn" title="Colin McGinn">Colin McGinn</a>. According to them, the gap is <a href="/wiki/Epistemology" title="Epistemology">epistemological</a> in nature. For Nagel, science is not yet able to explain subjective experience because it has not yet arrived at the level or kind of knowledge that is required. We are not even able to formulate the problem coherently.<a href="#cite_note-Nagel-32">[32]</a> For McGinn, on other hand, the problem is one of permanent and inherent biological limitations. We are not able to resolve the explanatory gap because the realm of subjective experiences is cognitively closed to us in the same manner that quantum physics is cognitively closed to elephants.<a href="#cite_note-76">[76]</a> Other philosophers liquidate the gap as purely a semantic problem. This semantic problem, of course, led to the famous "Qualia Question", which is: Does Red cause Redness? <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Intentionality">Intentionality</h4> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=23" title="Edit section: Intentionality" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Intentionality" title="Intentionality">Intentionality</a></div> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:John_Searle_2002.jpg" class="mw-file-description"><noscript><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1d/John_Searle_2002.jpg/220px-John_Searle_2002.jpg" decoding="async" width="220" height="255" class="mw-file-element" data-file-width="302" data-file-height="350"></noscript><span class="lazy-image-placeholder" style="width: 220px;height: 255px;" data-src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1d/John_Searle_2002.jpg/220px-John_Searle_2002.jpg" data-width="220" data-height="255" data-srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1d/John_Searle_2002.jpg 1.5x" data-class="mw-file-element"> </a><figcaption><a href="/wiki/John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a>—one of the most influential philosophers of mind, proponent of <a href="/wiki/Biological_naturalism" title="Biological naturalism">biological naturalism</a> (Berkeley 2002)</figcaption></figure> <a href="/wiki/Intentionality" title="Intentionality">Intentionality</a> is the capacity of mental states to be directed towards (about) or be in relation with something in the external world.<a href="#cite_note-Searleint-26">[26]</a> This property of mental states entails that they have <a href="/wiki/Mental_content" class="mw-redirect" title="Mental content">contents</a> and <a href="/wiki/Semantics" title="Semantics">semantic referents</a> and can therefore be assigned <a href="/wiki/Truth_value" title="Truth value">truth values</a>. When one tries to reduce these states to natural processes there arises a problem: natural processes are not true or false, they simply happen.<a href="#cite_note-77">[77]</a> It would not make any sense to say that a natural process is true or false. But mental ideas or judgments are true or false, so how then can mental states (ideas or judgments) be natural processes? The possibility of assigning semantic value to ideas must mean that such ideas are about facts. Thus, for example, the idea that <a href="/wiki/Herodotus" title="Herodotus">Herodotus</a> was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was a historian. If the fact is true, then the idea is true; otherwise, it is false. But where does this relation come from? In the brain, there are only electrochemical processes and these seem not to have anything to do with Herodotus.<a href="#cite_note-Int-25">[25]</a> </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(2)"><h2 id="Philosophy_of_perception">Philosophy of perception</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=24" title="Edit section: Philosophy of perception" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-2 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-2"> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_perception" title="Philosophy of perception">Philosophy of perception</a></div> Philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of <a href="/wiki/Perception" title="Perception">perceptual experience</a> and the status of perceptual objects, in particular how perceptual experience relates to appearances and beliefs about the world. The main contemporary views within philosophy of perception include <a href="/wiki/Naive_realism" class="mw-redirect" title="Naive realism">naive realism</a>, <a href="/wiki/Enactivism" title="Enactivism">enactivism</a> and <a href="/wiki/Mental_representation" title="Mental representation">representational</a> views.<a href="#cite_note-ReferenceA-2">[2]</a><a href="#cite_note-Macpherson,_F._2008-3">[3]</a><a href="#cite_note-78">[78]</a> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Phrenology1.jpg" class="mw-file-description"><noscript><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Phrenology1.jpg/260px-Phrenology1.jpg" decoding="async" width="260" height="306" class="mw-file-element" data-file-width="450" data-file-height="529"></noscript><span class="lazy-image-placeholder" style="width: 260px;height: 306px;" data-src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Phrenology1.jpg/260px-Phrenology1.jpg" data-width="260" data-height="306" data-srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Phrenology1.jpg/390px-Phrenology1.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Phrenology1.jpg 2x" data-class="mw-file-element"> </a><figcaption>A phrenological <a href="/wiki/Brain_mapping" title="Brain mapping">mapping</a> of the <a href="/wiki/Brain" title="Brain">brain</a> – <a href="/wiki/Phrenology" title="Phrenology">phrenology</a> was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain although it is now widely discredited.</figcaption></figure> </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(3)"><h2 id="Philosophy_of_mind_and_science">Philosophy of mind and science</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=25" title="Edit section: Philosophy of mind and science" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-3 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-3"> Humans are corporeal beings and, as such, they are subject to examination and description by the natural sciences. Since mental processes are intimately related to bodily processes (e.g., <a href="/wiki/Embodied_cognition" title="Embodied cognition">embodied cognition</a> theory of mind), the descriptions that the natural sciences furnish of human beings play an important role in the philosophy of mind.<a href="#cite_note-Kim1-1">[1]</a> There are many scientific disciplines that study processes related to the mental. The list of such sciences includes: <a href="/wiki/Biology" title="Biology">biology</a>, <a href="/wiki/Computer_science" title="Computer science">computer science</a>, <a href="/wiki/Cognitive_science" title="Cognitive science">cognitive science</a>, <a href="/wiki/Cybernetics" title="Cybernetics">cybernetics</a>, <a href="/wiki/Linguistics" title="Linguistics">linguistics</a>, <a href="/wiki/Medicine" title="Medicine">medicine</a>, <a href="/wiki/Pharmacology" title="Pharmacology">pharmacology</a>, and <a href="/wiki/Psychology" title="Psychology">psychology</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Pinker-79">[79]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Neurobiology">Neurobiology</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=26" title="Edit section: Neurobiology" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">Neuroscience</a></div> The theoretical background of biology, as is the case with modern <a href="/wiki/Natural_science" title="Natural science">natural sciences</a> in general, is fundamentally materialistic. The objects of study are, in the first place, physical processes, which are considered to be the foundations of mental activity and behavior.<a href="#cite_note-Bear-80">[80]</a> The increasing success of biology in the explanation of mental phenomena can be seen by the absence of any empirical refutation of its fundamental presupposition: "there can be no change in the mental states of a person without a change in brain states."<a href="#cite_note-Pinker-79">[79]</a> Within the field of neurobiology, there are many subdisciplines that are concerned with the relations between mental and physical states and processes:<a href="#cite_note-Bear-80">[80]</a> <a href="/wiki/Neurophysiology" title="Neurophysiology">Sensory neurophysiology</a> investigates the relation between the processes of <a href="/wiki/Perception" title="Perception">perception</a> and <a href="/wiki/Stimulation" title="Stimulation">stimulation</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Pinel-81">[81]</a> <a href="/wiki/Cognitive_neuroscience" title="Cognitive neuroscience">Cognitive neuroscience</a> studies the correlations between mental processes and neural processes.<a href="#cite_note-Pinel-81">[81]</a> <a href="/wiki/Neuropsychology" title="Neuropsychology">Neuropsychology</a> describes the dependence of mental faculties on specific anatomical regions of the brain.<a href="#cite_note-Pinel-81">[81]</a> Lastly, <a href="/wiki/Evolutionary_biology" title="Evolutionary biology">evolutionary biology</a> studies the origins and development of the human nervous system and, in as much as this is the basis of the mind, also describes the <a href="/wiki/Ontogenesis" class="mw-redirect" title="Ontogenesis">ontogenetic</a> and <a href="/wiki/Phylogenesis" title="Phylogenesis">phylogenetic</a> development of mental phenomena beginning from their most primitive stages.<a href="#cite_note-Pinker-79">[79]</a> Evolutionary biology furthermore places tight constraints on any philosophical theory of the mind, as the <a href="/wiki/Gene" title="Gene">gene</a>-based mechanism of <a href="/wiki/Natural_selection" title="Natural selection">natural selection</a> does not allow any giant leaps in the development of neural complexity or neural software but only incremental steps over long time periods.<a href="#cite_note-82">[82]</a> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Functional_magnetic_resonance_imaging.jpg" class="mw-file-description"><noscript><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/87/Functional_magnetic_resonance_imaging.jpg/220px-Functional_magnetic_resonance_imaging.jpg" decoding="async" width="220" height="183" class="mw-file-element" data-file-width="250" data-file-height="208"></noscript><span class="lazy-image-placeholder" style="width: 220px;height: 183px;" data-src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/87/Functional_magnetic_resonance_imaging.jpg/220px-Functional_magnetic_resonance_imaging.jpg" data-width="220" data-height="183" data-srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/Functional_magnetic_resonance_imaging.jpg 1.5x" data-class="mw-file-element"> </a><figcaption>Since the 1980s, sophisticated <a href="/wiki/Neuroimaging" title="Neuroimaging">neuroimaging</a> procedures, such as <a href="/wiki/FMRI" class="mw-redirect" title="FMRI">fMRI</a> (above), have furnished increasing knowledge about the workings of the human brain, shedding light on ancient philosophical problems.</figcaption></figure> The <a href="/wiki/Methodology" title="Methodology">methodological</a> breakthroughs of the neurosciences, in particular the introduction of high-tech neuroimaging procedures, has propelled scientists toward the elaboration of increasingly ambitious research programs: one of the main goals is to describe and comprehend the neural processes which correspond to mental functions (see: <a href="/wiki/Neural_correlate" class="mw-redirect" title="Neural correlate">neural correlate</a>).<a href="#cite_note-Bear-80">[80]</a> Several groups are inspired by these advances. <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Computer_science">Computer science</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=27" title="Edit section: Computer science" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Computer_science" title="Computer science">Computer science</a></div> Computer science concerns itself with the automatic processing of <a href="/wiki/Information" title="Information">information</a> (or at least with physical systems of symbols to which information is assigned) by means of such things as <a href="/wiki/Computer" title="Computer">computers</a>.<a href="#cite_note-83">[83]</a> From the beginning, <a href="/wiki/Computer_programmer" class="mw-redirect" title="Computer programmer">computer programmers</a> have been able to develop programs that permit computers to carry out tasks for which organic beings need a mind. A simple example is multiplication. It is not clear whether computers could be said to have a mind. Could they, someday, come to have what we call a mind? This question has been propelled into the forefront of much philosophical debate because of investigations in the field of <a href="/wiki/Artificial_intelligence" title="Artificial intelligence">artificial intelligence</a> (AI). Within AI, it is common to distinguish between a modest research program and a more ambitious one: this distinction was coined by <a href="/wiki/John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a> in terms of a <a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_artificial_intelligence#Strong_AI_vs._weak_AI" title="Philosophy of artificial intelligence">weak AI and strong AI</a>. The exclusive objective of "weak AI", according to Searle, is the successful simulation of mental states, with no attempt to make computers become conscious or aware, etc. The objective of strong AI, on the contrary, is a computer with consciousness similar to that of human beings.<a href="#cite_note-Searle-84">[84]</a> The program of strong AI goes back to one of the pioneers of computation <a href="/wiki/Alan_Turing" title="Alan Turing">Alan Turing</a>. As an answer to the question "Can computers think?", he formulated the famous <a href="/wiki/Turing_test" title="Turing test">Turing test</a>.<a href="#cite_note-85">[85]</a> Turing believed that a computer could be said to "think" when, if placed in a room by itself next to another room that contained a human being and with the same questions being asked of both the computer and the human being by a third party human being, the computer's responses turned out to be indistinguishable from those of the human. Essentially, Turing's view of machine intelligence followed the behaviourist model of the mind—intelligence is as intelligence does. The Turing test has received many criticisms, among which the most famous is probably the <a href="/wiki/Chinese_room" title="Chinese room">Chinese room</a> <a href="/wiki/Thought_experiment" title="Thought experiment">thought experiment</a> formulated by Searle.<a href="#cite_note-Searle-84">[84]</a> The question about the possible sensitivity (<a href="/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia">qualia</a>) of computers or robots still remains open. Some computer scientists believe that the specialty of AI can still make new contributions to the resolution of the "mind–body problem". They suggest that based on the reciprocal influences between software and hardware that takes place in all computers, it is possible that someday theories can be discovered that help us to understand the reciprocal influences between the human mind and the brain (<a href="/wiki/Wetware_(brain)" title="Wetware (brain)">wetware</a>).<a href="#cite_note-86">[86]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Psychology">Psychology</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=28" title="Edit section: Psychology" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Psychology" title="Psychology">Psychology</a></div> Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly. It uses generally empirical methods to investigate concrete mental states like <a href="/wiki/Joy" title="Joy">joy</a>, <a href="/wiki/Fear" title="Fear">fear</a> or <a href="/wiki/Obsessive%E2%80%93compulsive_disorder" title="Obsessive–compulsive disorder">obsessions</a>. Psychology investigates the laws that bind these mental states to each other or with inputs and outputs to the human organism.<a href="#cite_note-87">[87]</a> An example of this is the <a href="/wiki/Perception" title="Perception">psychology of perception</a>. Scientists working in this field have discovered general principles of the <a href="/wiki/Form_perception" title="Form perception">perception of forms</a>. A law of the psychology of forms says that objects that move in the same direction are perceived as related to each other.<a href="#cite_note-Pinker-79">[79]</a> This law describes a relation between visual input and mental perceptual states. However, it does not suggest anything about the nature of perceptual states. The laws discovered by psychology are compatible with all the answers to the mind–body problem already described. <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Cognitive_science">Cognitive science</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=29" title="Edit section: Cognitive science" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <a href="/wiki/Cognitive_science" title="Cognitive science">Cognitive science</a> is the interdisciplinary scientific study of the mind and its processes. It examines what <a href="/wiki/Cognition" title="Cognition">cognition</a> is, what it does, and how it works. It includes research on intelligence and behavior, especially focusing on how information is represented, processed, and transformed (in faculties such as perception, language, memory, reasoning, and emotion) within nervous systems (human or other animals) and machines (e.g. computers). Cognitive science consists of multiple research disciplines, including <a href="/wiki/Psychology" title="Psychology">psychology</a>, <a href="/wiki/Artificial_intelligence" title="Artificial intelligence">artificial intelligence</a>, <a href="/wiki/Philosophy" title="Philosophy">philosophy</a>, <a href="/wiki/Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">neuroscience</a>, <a href="/wiki/Linguistics" title="Linguistics">linguistics</a>, <a href="/wiki/Anthropology" title="Anthropology">anthropology</a>, <a href="/wiki/Sociology" title="Sociology">sociology</a>, and <a href="/wiki/Education" title="Education">education</a>.<a href="#cite_note-88">[88]</a> It spans many levels of analysis, from low-level learning and decision mechanisms to high-level logic and planning; from neural circuitry to modular brain organization. Over the years, cognitive science has evolved from a representational and information processing approach to explaining the mind to embrace an <a href="/wiki/Embodied_cognition" title="Embodied cognition">embodied</a> perspective of it. Accordingly, bodily processes play a significant role in the acquisition, development, and shaping of cognitive capabilities.<a href="#cite_note-89">[89]</a> For instance, <a href="/wiki/Mark_Rowlands" title="Mark Rowlands">Rowlands</a> (2012) argues that cognition is enactive, <a href="/wiki/Embodied_cognition" title="Embodied cognition">embodied</a>, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. The position is taken that the "classical sandwich" of cognition sandwiched between perception and action is artificial; cognition has to be seen as a product of a strongly coupled interaction that cannot be divided this way.<a href="#cite_note-Rowlands-90">[90]</a><a href="#cite_note-Ward-91">[91]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Near-death_research">Near-death research</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=30" title="Edit section: Near-death research" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Near-death_studies" title="Near-death studies">Near-death studies</a></div> In the field of near-death research, the following phenomenon, among others, occurs: For example, during some brain operations the brain is artificially and measurably deactivated. Nevertheless, some patients report during this phase that they have perceived what is happening in their surroundings, that is, that they have had consciousness. Patients also report experiences during a cardiac arrest. There is the following problem: As soon as the brain is no longer supplied with blood and thus with oxygen after a cardiac arrest, the brain ceases its normal operation after about 15 seconds, that is, the brain falls into a state of unconsciousness.<a href="#cite_note-PMID24081351-92">[92]</a> </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(4)"><h2 id="Philosophy_of_mind_in_the_continental_tradition">Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=31" title="Edit section: Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-4 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-4"> Most of the discussion in this article has focused on one style or tradition of philosophy in modern <a href="/wiki/Western_culture" title="Western culture">Western culture</a>, usually called <a href="/wiki/Analytic_philosophy" title="Analytic philosophy">analytic philosophy</a> (sometimes described as Anglo-American philosophy).<a href="#cite_note-Dummett-93">[93]</a> Many other schools of thought exist, however, which are sometimes subsumed under the broad (and vague) label of <a href="/wiki/Continental_philosophy" title="Continental philosophy">continental philosophy</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Dummett-93">[93]</a> In any case, though topics and methods here are numerous, in relation to the philosophy of mind the various schools that fall under this label (<a href="/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy)" title="Phenomenology (philosophy)">phenomenology</a>, <a href="/wiki/Existentialism" title="Existentialism">existentialism</a>, etc.) can globally be seen to differ from the analytic school in that they focus less on language and logical analysis alone but also take in other forms of understanding human existence and experience. With reference specifically to the discussion of the mind, this tends to translate into attempts to grasp the concepts of <a href="/wiki/Thought" title="Thought">thought</a> and <a href="/wiki/Experience" title="Experience">perceptual experience</a> in some sense that does not merely involve the analysis of linguistic forms.<a href="#cite_note-Dummett-93">[93]</a> Immanuel Kant's <a href="/wiki/Critique_of_Pure_Reason" title="Critique of Pure Reason">Critique of Pure Reason</a>, first published in 1781 and presented again with major revisions in 1787, represents a significant intervention into what will later become known as the philosophy of mind. Kant's first <a href="/wiki/Critique" title="Critique">critique</a> is generally recognized as among the most significant works of <a href="/wiki/Modern_philosophy" title="Modern philosophy">modern philosophy</a> in the West. Kant is a figure whose influence is marked in both <a href="/wiki/Continental_philosophy" title="Continental philosophy">continental</a> and analytic/Anglo-American philosophy. Kant's work develops an in-depth study of <a href="/wiki/Transcendental_idealism" title="Transcendental idealism">transcendental</a> consciousness, or the life of the mind as conceived through the universal <a href="/wiki/Category_(Kant)" title="Category (Kant)">categories</a> of understanding. In <a href="/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel" title="Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel">Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel</a>'s Philosophy of Mind (frequently translated as Philosophy of Spirit or <a href="/wiki/Geist" title="Geist">Geist</a>),<a href="#cite_note-94">[94]</a> the third part of his <a href="/wiki/Encyclopedia_of_the_Philosophical_Sciences" title="Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences">Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences</a>, Hegel discusses three distinct types of mind: the "subjective mind/spirit", the mind of an individual; the "objective mind/spirit", the mind of society and of the State; and the "Absolute mind/spirit", the position of religion, art, and philosophy. See also Hegel's <a href="/wiki/The_Phenomenology_of_Spirit" title="The Phenomenology of Spirit">The Phenomenology of Spirit</a>. Nonetheless, Hegel's work differs radically from the style of <a href="/wiki/Anglosphere" title="Anglosphere">Anglo-American</a> philosophy of mind. In 1896, <a href="/wiki/Henri_Bergson" title="Henri Bergson">Henri Bergson</a> made in <a href="/wiki/Matter_and_Memory" title="Matter and Memory">Matter and Memory</a> "Essay on the relation of body and spirit" a forceful case for the ontological difference of body and mind by reducing the problem to the more definite one of memory, thus allowing for a solution built on the empirical test case of <a href="/wiki/Aphasia" title="Aphasia">aphasia</a>. In modern times, the two main schools that have developed in response or opposition to this Hegelian tradition are phenomenology and existentialism. Phenomenology, founded by <a href="/wiki/Edmund_Husserl" title="Edmund Husserl">Edmund Husserl</a>, focuses on the contents of the human mind (see <a href="/wiki/Noema" title="Noema">noema</a>) and how processes shape our experiences.<a href="#cite_note-95">[95]</a> Existentialism, a school of thought founded upon the work of <a href="/wiki/S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard" title="Søren Kierkegaard">Søren Kierkegaard</a>, focuses on Human predicament and how people deal with the situation of being alive. Existential-phenomenology represents a major branch of continental philosophy (they are not contradictory), rooted in the work of Husserl but expressed in its fullest forms in the work of <a href="/wiki/Martin_Heidegger" title="Martin Heidegger">Martin Heidegger</a>, <a href="/wiki/Jean-Paul_Sartre" title="Jean-Paul Sartre">Jean-Paul Sartre</a>, <a href="/wiki/Simone_de_Beauvoir" title="Simone de Beauvoir">Simone de Beauvoir</a> and <a href="/wiki/Maurice_Merleau-Ponty" title="Maurice Merleau-Ponty">Maurice Merleau-Ponty</a>. See Heidegger's <a href="/wiki/Being_and_Time" title="Being and Time">Being and Time</a>, Merleau-Ponty's <a href="/wiki/Phenomenology_of_Perception" title="Phenomenology of Perception">Phenomenology of Perception</a>, Sartre's <a href="/wiki/Being_and_Nothingness" title="Being and Nothingness">Being and Nothingness</a>, and Simone de Beauvoir's <a href="/wiki/The_Second_Sex" title="The Second Sex">The Second Sex</a>. </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(5)"><h2 id="Topics_related_to_the_philosophy_of_mind">Topics related to the philosophy of mind</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=32" title="Edit section: Topics related to the philosophy of mind" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-5 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-5"> There are countless subjects that are affected by the ideas developed in the philosophy of mind. Clear examples of this are the nature of <a href="/wiki/Death" title="Death">death</a> and its definitive character, the nature of <a href="/wiki/Emotion" title="Emotion">emotion</a>, of <a href="/wiki/Perception" title="Perception">perception</a> and of <a href="/wiki/Memory" title="Memory">memory</a>. Questions about what a <a href="/wiki/Person" title="Person">person</a> is and what his or her <a href="/wiki/Personal_identity" title="Personal identity">identity</a> have to do with the philosophy of mind. There are two subjects that, in connection with the philosophy of the mind, have aroused special attention: <a href="/wiki/Free_will" title="Free will">free will</a> and the <a href="/wiki/Self_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Self (philosophy)">self</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Kim1-1">[1]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Free_will">Free will</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=33" title="Edit section: Free will" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Free_will" title="Free will">Free will</a></div> In the context of philosophy of mind, the problem of free will takes on renewed intensity. This is the case for materialistic <a href="/wiki/Determinism" title="Determinism">determinists</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Kim1-1">[1]</a> According to this position, natural laws completely determine the course of the material world. Mental states, and therefore the will as well, would be material states, which means human behavior and decisions would be completely determined by natural laws. Some take this reasoning a step further: people cannot determine by themselves what they want and what they do. Consequently, they are not free.<a href="#cite_note-Hond-96">[96]</a> This argumentation is rejected, on the one hand, by the <a href="/wiki/Compatibilism" title="Compatibilism">compatibilists</a>. Those who adopt this position suggest that the question "Are we free?" can only be answered once we have determined what the term "free" means. The opposite of "free" is not "caused" but "compelled" or "coerced". It is not appropriate to identify freedom with indetermination. A free act is one where the agent could have done otherwise if it had chosen otherwise. In this sense a person can be free even though determinism is true.<a href="#cite_note-Hond-96">[96]</a> The most important compatibilist in the history of the philosophy was <a href="/wiki/David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a>.<a href="#cite_note-97">[97]</a> More recently,[<a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Dates_and_numbers#Chronological_items" title="Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Dates and numbers">when?</a>] this position was defended, for example, by <a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a>.<a href="#cite_note-98">[98]</a> On the other hand, there are also many <a href="/wiki/Incompatibilism" title="Incompatibilism">incompatibilists</a> who reject the argument because they believe that the will is free in a stronger sense called <a href="/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics)" title="Libertarianism (metaphysics)">libertarianism</a>.<a href="#cite_note-Hond-96">[96]</a> These philosophers affirm the course of the world is either a) not completely determined by natural law where natural law is intercepted by physically independent agency,<a href="#cite_note-99">[99]</a> b) determined by indeterministic natural law only, or c) determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the subjective effort of physically non-reducible agency.<a href="#cite_note-100">[100]</a> Under Libertarianism, the will does not have to be deterministic and, therefore, it is potentially free. Critics of the second proposition (b) accuse the incompatibilists of using an incoherent concept of freedom. They argue as follows: if our will is not determined by anything, then we desire what we desire by pure chance. And if what we desire is purely accidental, we are not free. So if our will is not determined by anything, we are not free.<a href="#cite_note-Hond-96">[96]</a> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Self">Self</h3> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=34" title="Edit section: Self" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951"><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_self" title="Philosophy of self">Philosophy of self</a></div> The philosophy of mind also has important consequences for the concept of "self". If by "self" or "I" one refers to an essential, immutable nucleus of the person, some modern philosophers of mind, such as <a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a> believe that no such thing exists. According to Dennett and other contemporaries, the self is considered an illusion.<a href="#cite_note-DHof-101">[101]</a> The idea of a self as an immutable essential nucleus derives from the idea of an <a href="/wiki/Soul" title="Soul">immaterial soul</a>. Such an idea is unacceptable to modern philosophers with physicalist orientations and their general skepticism of the concept of "self" as postulated by <a href="/wiki/David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a>, who could never catch himself not doing, thinking or feeling anything.<a href="#cite_note-102">[102]</a> However, in the light of empirical results from <a href="/wiki/Developmental_psychology" title="Developmental psychology">developmental psychology</a>, <a href="/wiki/Developmental_biology" title="Developmental biology">developmental biology</a> and <a href="/wiki/Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">neuroscience</a>, the idea of an essential inconstant, material nucleus—an integrated representational system distributed over changing patterns of synaptic connections—seems reasonable.<a href="#cite_note-103">[103]</a> </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(6)"><h2 id="See_also">See also</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=35" title="Edit section: See also" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-6 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-6"> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1239009302">.mw-parser-output .portalbox{padding:0;margin:0.5em 0;display:table;box-sizing:border-box;max-width:175px;list-style:none}.mw-parser-output .portalborder{border:1px solid var(--border-color-base,#a2a9b1);padding:0.1em;background:var(--background-color-neutral-subtle,#f8f9fa)}.mw-parser-output .portalbox-entry{display:table-row;font-size:85%;line-height:110%;height:1.9em;font-style:italic;font-weight:bold}.mw-parser-output .portalbox-image{display:table-cell;padding:0.2em;vertical-align:middle;text-align:center}.mw-parser-output .portalbox-link{display:table-cell;padding:0.2em 0.2em 0.2em 0.3em;vertical-align:middle}@media(min-width:720px){.mw-parser-output .portalleft{clear:left;float:left;margin:0.5em 1em 0.5em 0}.mw-parser-output .portalright{clear:right;float:right;margin:0.5em 0 0.5em 1em}}</style><ul role="navigation" aria-label="Portals" class="noprint portalbox portalborder portalright"> <li class="portalbox-entry"><noscript><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/Socrates.png/18px-Socrates.png" decoding="async" width="18" height="28" class="mw-file-element" data-file-width="326" data-file-height="500"></noscript><span class="lazy-image-placeholder" style="width: 18px;height: 28px;" data-src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/Socrates.png/18px-Socrates.png" data-alt="" data-width="18" data-height="28" data-srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/Socrates.png/27px-Socrates.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/Socrates.png/36px-Socrates.png 2x" data-class="mw-file-element"> <a href="/wiki/Portal:Philosophy" title="Portal:Philosophy">Philosophy portal</a></li></ul> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1184024115">.mw-parser-output .div-col{margin-top:0.3em;column-width:30em}.mw-parser-output .div-col-small{font-size:90%}.mw-parser-output .div-col-rules{column-rule:1px solid #aaa}.mw-parser-output .div-col dl,.mw-parser-output .div-col ol,.mw-parser-output .div-col ul{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .div-col li,.mw-parser-output .div-col dd{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}</style><div class="div-col"> <ul><li>Artificial philosophy</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Animal_consciousness" title="Animal consciousness">Animal consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Artificial_consciousness" title="Artificial consciousness">Artificial consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Chinese_Room" class="mw-redirect" title="Chinese Room">Chinese Room</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Collective_intentionality" title="Collective intentionality">Collective intentionality</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind" title="Computational theory of mind">Computational theory of mind</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Embodied_cognition" title="Embodied cognition">Embodied cognition</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Intension" title="Intension">Intension</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Intention" title="Intention">Intention</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Outline_of_human_intelligence" title="Outline of human intelligence">Outline of human intelligence</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Outline_of_thought" title="Outline of thought">Outline of thought</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_artificial_intelligence" title="Philosophy of artificial intelligence">Philosophy of artificial intelligence</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Theory_of_mind_in_animals" title="Theory of mind in animals">Theory of mind in animals</a></li></ul> </div> </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(7)"><h2 id="References">References</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=36" title="Edit section: References" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-7 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-7"> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1239543626">.mw-parser-output .reflist{margin-bottom:0.5em;list-style-type:decimal}@media screen{.mw-parser-output .reflist{font-size:90%}}.mw-parser-output .reflist .references{font-size:100%;margin-bottom:0;list-style-type:inherit}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns-2{column-width:30em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns-3{column-width:25em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns{margin-top:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns ol{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns li{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}.mw-parser-output .reflist-upper-alpha{list-style-type:upper-alpha}.mw-parser-output .reflist-upper-roman{list-style-type:upper-roman}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-alpha{list-style-type:lower-alpha}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-greek{list-style-type:lower-greek}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-roman{list-style-type:lower-roman}</style><div class="reflist"> <div class="mw-references-wrap mw-references-columns"><ol class="references"> <li id="cite_note-Kim1-1">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Kim1_1-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Kim1_1-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Kim1_1-2">c</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Kim1_1-3">d</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Kim1_1-4">e</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Kim1_1-5">f</a> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1238218222">.mw-parser-output cite.citation{font-style:inherit;word-wrap:break-word}.mw-parser-output .citation q{quotes:"\"""\"""'""'"}.mw-parser-output .citation:target{background-color:rgba(0,127,255,0.133)}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-free.id-lock-free a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Lock-green.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited.id-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration.id-lock-registration a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Lock-gray-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription.id-lock-subscription a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Lock-red-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg")right 0.1em center/12px no-repeat}body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-free a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon a{background-size:contain;padding:0 1em 0 0}.mw-parser-output .cs1-code{color:inherit;background:inherit;border:none;padding:inherit}.mw-parser-output .cs1-hidden-error{display:none;color:var(--color-error,#d33)}.mw-parser-output .cs1-visible-error{color:var(--color-error,#d33)}.mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{display:none;color:#085;margin-left:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-left{padding-left:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-right{padding-right:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .citation .mw-selflink{font-weight:inherit}@media screen{.mw-parser-output .cs1-format{font-size:95%}html.skin-theme-clientpref-night .mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{color:#18911f}}@media screen and (prefers-color-scheme:dark){html.skin-theme-clientpref-os .mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{color:#18911f}}</style><cite id="CITEREFKim1995" class="citation book cs1">Kim, Jaegwan (1995). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" 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Noûs. 47 (1): 135–153. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1468-0068.2011.00847.x">10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00847.x</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0029-4624">0029-4624</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=No%C3%BBs&rft.atitle=Non-Reductive+Physicalism+and+the+Mind+Problem1&rft.volume=47&rft.issue=1&rft.pages=135-153&rft.date=2013&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0068.2011.00847.x&rft.issn=0029-4624&rft.aulast=Schneider&rft.aufirst=Susan&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-DePaulBaltimore2013-8"><a href="#cite_ref-DePaulBaltimore2013_8-0">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDePaulBaltimore2013" class="citation journal cs1">DePaul, Michael; Baltimore, Joseph A. 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C. Gibb; E. J. Lowe; R. D. Ingthorsson (21 March 2013). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=-sBoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA58">Mental Causation and Ontology</a>. 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European Journal of Analytic Philosophy. 7 (1): 25–35.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=European+Journal+of+Analytic+Philosophy&rft.atitle=Supervenience+And+Reductive+Physicalism&rft.volume=7&rft.issue=1&rft.pages=25-35&rft.date=2011&rft.aulast=Demircioglu&rft.aufirst=Erhan&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-Francescotti-11">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Francescotti_11-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Francescotti_11-1">b</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFFrancescotti" class="citation web cs1">Francescotti, Robert. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/supermin/">"Supervenience and Mind"</a>. 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Retrieved 2014-08-10.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=The+Internet+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&rft.atitle=Supervenience+and+Mind&rft.issn=2161-0002&rft.aulast=Francescotti&rft.aufirst=Robert&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iep.utm.edu%2Fsupermin%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-Gibb2010-12"><a href="#cite_ref-Gibb2010_12-0">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFGibb2010" class="citation journal cs1">Gibb, Sophie (2010). "Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum". Dialectica. 64 (3): 363–384. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1746-8361.2010.01237.x">10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01237.x</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0012-2017">0012-2017</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:55120533">55120533</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Dialectica&rft.atitle=Closure+Principles+and+the+Laws+of+Conservation+of+Energy+and+Momentum&rft.volume=64&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=363-384&rft.date=2010&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A55120533%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.issn=0012-2017&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.1746-8361.2010.01237.x&rft.aulast=Gibb&rft.aufirst=Sophie&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> See also <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDempsey2012" class="citation journal cs1">Dempsey, L. P. (2012). "Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience". Dialogue. 51 (3): 373–395. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fs0012217312000662">10.1017/s0012217312000662</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:147060838">147060838</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Dialogue&rft.atitle=Consciousness%2C+Supervenience%2C+and+Identity%3A+Marras+and+Kim+on+the+Efficacy+of+Conscious+Experience&rft.volume=51&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=373-395&rft.date=2012&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1017%2Fs0012217312000662&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A147060838%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.aulast=Dempsey&rft.aufirst=L.+P.&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> See also <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFBaltimore2010" class="citation journal cs1">Baltimore, J. A. (2010). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philpapers.org/rec/BALDTP">"Defending the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober's empirical approach"</a>. Dialectica. 175 (2): 151–168. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11229-009-9467-2">10.1007/s11229-009-9467-2</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:13314992">13314992</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Dialectica&rft.atitle=Defending+the+piggyback+principle+against+Shapiro+and+Sober%27s+empirical+approach&rft.volume=175&rft.issue=2&rft.pages=151-168&rft.date=2010&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1007%2Fs11229-009-9467-2&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A13314992%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.aulast=Baltimore&rft.aufirst=J.+A.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Frec%2FBALDTP&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-McLaughlinAndBennett-13"><a href="#cite_ref-McLaughlinAndBennett_13-0">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFMcLaughlinBennett2014" class="citation journal cs1">McLaughlin, Brian; Bennett, Karen (2014). 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The Self and Its Brain. Springer Verlag. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-3-492-21096-6" title="Special:BookSources/978-3-492-21096-6"><bdi>978-3-492-21096-6</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=The+Self+and+Its+Brain&rft.pub=Springer+Verlag&rft.date=2002&rft.isbn=978-3-492-21096-6&rft.au=Popper%2C+Karl&rft.au=Eccles%2C+John&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-CE-38"><a href="#cite_ref-CE_38-0">^</a> Dennett D., (1991), Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown & Company </li> <li id="cite_note-SS-39"><a href="#cite_ref-SS_39-0">^</a> Stich, S., (1983), From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: <a href="/wiki/MIT_Press" title="MIT Press">MIT Press</a> (Bradford) </li> <li id="cite_note-40"><a href="#cite_ref-40">^</a> Ryle, G., 1949, The Concept of Mind, New York: Barnes and Noble </li> <li id="cite_note-41"><a href="#cite_ref-41">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFAgassi,_J.1975" class="citation book cs1">Agassi, J. (1975). Privileged Access; Science in Flux, Boston Stidues in the Philosophy of Science, 80. 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Rome: Armando.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=La+Scienza+in+Divenire&rft.place=Rome&rft.pub=Armando&rft.date=1997&rft.au=Agassi%2C+J.&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-DuSEP-43">^ <a href="#cite_ref-DuSEP_43-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-DuSEP_43-1">b</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFRobinson2003" class="citation web cs1">Robinson, Howard (2003-08-19). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/dualism/">"Dualism"</a>. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition). Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved 2006-09-25.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=The+Stanford+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy+%28Fall+2003+Edition%29&rft.atitle=Dualism&rft.date=2003-08-19&rft.aulast=Robinson&rft.aufirst=Howard&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Farchives%2Ffall2003%2Fentries%2Fdualism%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-44"><a href="#cite_ref-44">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFLeibniz1714" class="citation book cs1">Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1714). <a href="/wiki/Monadology" title="Monadology">Monadology</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-87548-030-5" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-87548-030-5"><bdi>978-0-87548-030-5</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Monadology&rft.date=1714&rft.isbn=978-0-87548-030-5&rft.aulast=Leibniz&rft.aufirst=Gottfried+Wilhelm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-45"><a href="#cite_ref-45">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFSchmaltz2002" class="citation web cs1">Schmaltz, Tad (2002). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/malebranche/">"Nicolas Malebranche"</a>. 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Appleton and Company, 1898). </li> <li id="cite_note-48"><a href="#cite_ref-48">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFJackson,_Frank1986" class="citation journal cs1">Jackson, Frank (1986). "What Mary didn't know". Journal of Philosophy. 83 (5): 291–295. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2026143">10.2307/2026143</a>. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026143">2026143</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:19000667">19000667</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Philosophy&rft.atitle=What+Mary+didn%27t+know&rft.volume=83&rft.issue=5&rft.pages=291-295&rft.date=1986&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A19000667%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F2026143%23id-name%3DJSTOR&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.2307%2F2026143&rft.au=Jackson%2C+Frank&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-49"><a href="#cite_ref-49">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFAtmanspacher2012" class="citation journal cs1">Atmanspacher, H (2012). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262956033">"Dual-aspect monism a la Pauli and Jung"</a>. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 19 (9–10): 96–120.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Consciousness+Studies&rft.atitle=Dual-aspect+monism+a+la+Pauli+and+Jung&rft.volume=19&rft.issue=9%E2%80%9310&rft.pages=96-120&rft.date=2012&rft.aulast=Atmanspacher&rft.aufirst=H&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fpublication%2F262956033&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-50"><a href="#cite_ref-50">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFVelmans2012" class="citation journal cs1">Velmans, M (2012). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.academia.edu/2053423">"Reflexive Monism: psychophysical relations among mind, matter and consciousness"</a>. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 19 (9–10): 143–165. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171111113509/http://www.academia.edu/2053423/Reflexive_Monism_Psychophysical_relations_among_mind_matter_and_consciousness">Archived</a> from the original on 2017-11-11.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Consciousness+Studies&rft.atitle=Reflexive+Monism%3A+psychophysical+relations+among+mind%2C+matter+and+consciousness&rft.volume=19&rft.issue=9%E2%80%9310&rft.pages=143-165&rft.date=2012&rft.aulast=Velmans&rft.aufirst=M&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F2053423&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-51"><a href="#cite_ref-51">^</a> Leopold Stubenberg. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/#9.4">"Neutral Monism and the Dual Aspect Theory"</a>. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. </li> <li id="cite_note-:0-52">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:0_52-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:0_52-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-:0_52-2">c</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFWallace1999" class="citation book cs1">Wallace, Allen (1999). Consciousness At The Crossroads: Conversations With The Dalai Lama On Brain Science And Buddhism. Snow Lion. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-545-22720-9" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-545-22720-9"><bdi>978-0-545-22720-9</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Consciousness+At+The+Crossroads%3A+Conversations+With+The+Dalai+Lama+On+Brain+Science+And+Buddhism&rft.pub=Snow+Lion&rft.date=1999&rft.isbn=978-0-545-22720-9&rft.aulast=Wallace&rft.aufirst=Allen&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-Stol-53">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-2">c</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-3">d</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-4">e</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-5">f</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-6">g</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-7">h</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Stol_53-8">i</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFStoljar2005" class="citation web cs1">Stoljar, Daniel (2005). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/physicalism/">"Physicalism"</a>. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition). Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved 2006-09-24.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=The+Stanford+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy+%28Winter+2005+Edition%29&rft.atitle=Physicalism&rft.date=2005&rft.aulast=Stoljar&rft.aufirst=Daniel&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Farchives%2Fwin2005%2Fentries%2Fphysicalism%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-54"><a href="#cite_ref-54">^</a> Cf. <a href="/wiki/Michel_Weber" title="Michel Weber">Michel Weber</a> and Anderson Weekes (eds.), <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.academia.edu/279961/Process_Approaches_to_Consciousness_in_Psychology_Neuroscience_and_Philosophy_of_Mind">Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind (Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies II)</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20150408022540/http://www.academia.edu/279961/Process_Approaches_to_Consciousness_in_Psychology_Neuroscience_and_Philosophy_of_Mind">Archived</a> 2015-04-08 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>, Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 2009. </li> <li id="cite_note-55"><a href="#cite_ref-55">^</a> Russell, Bertrand (1918) Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, London: Longmans, Green. </li> <li id="cite_note-56"><a href="#cite_ref-56">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFMach1959" class="citation book cs1">Mach, Ernst (1959) [1886]. Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen [The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of Physical to the Psychical] (Fifth ed.). New York: Dover.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Die+Analyse+der+Empfindungen+und+das+Verh%C3%A4ltnis+des+Physischen+zum+Psychischen&rft.place=New+York&rft.edition=Fifth&rft.pub=Dover&rft.date=1959&rft.aulast=Mach&rft.aufirst=Ernst&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-57"><a href="#cite_ref-57">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFSkinner,_B.F.1972" class="citation book cs1">Skinner, B.F. (1972). Beyond Freedom & Dignity. 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Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures 2021. Studies in Computational Intelligence. Vol. 1032. pp. 20–41. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-030-96993-6_3">10.1007/978-3-030-96993-6_3</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-3-030-96992-9" title="Special:BookSources/978-3-030-96992-9"><bdi>978-3-030-96992-9</bdi></a>. 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The Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 417–424. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0140525X00005756">10.1017/S0140525X00005756</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:55303721">55303721</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&rft.atitle=Minds%2C+Brains+and+Programs&rft.volume=3&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=417-424&rft.date=1980&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1017%2FS0140525X00005756&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A55303721%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.au=Searle%2C+John&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F7150%2F1%2F10.1.1.83.5248.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-85"><a href="#cite_ref-85">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFTuring1950" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="/wiki/Alan_Turing" title="Alan Turing">Turing, Alan</a> (October 1950). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/LIX/236/433/986238">"Computing Machinery and Intelligence"</a>. <a href="/wiki/Mind_(journal)" title="Mind (journal)">Mind</a>. 59 (236): 433–460. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fmind%2FLIX.236.433">10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1460-2113">1460-2113</a>. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251299">2251299</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:14636783">14636783</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Mind&rft.atitle=Computing+Machinery+and+Intelligence&rft.volume=59&rft.issue=236&rft.pages=433-460&rft.date=1950-10&rft.issn=1460-2113&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A14636783%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F2251299%23id-name%3DJSTOR&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1093%2Fmind%2FLIX.236.433&rft.aulast=Turing&rft.aufirst=Alan&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fmind%2Farticle%2FLIX%2F236%2F433%2F986238&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-86"><a href="#cite_ref-86">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFRussell,_S.Norvig,_R.1995" class="citation book cs1">Russell, S. & Norvig, R. (1995). Artificial Intelligence:A Modern Approach. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-13-103805-9" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-13-103805-9"><bdi>978-0-13-103805-9</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Artificial+Intelligence%3AA+Modern+Approach&rft.place=New+Jersey&rft.pub=Prentice+Hall%2C+Inc.&rft.date=1995&rft.isbn=978-0-13-103805-9&rft.au=Russell%2C+S.&rft.au=Norvig%2C+R.&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-87"><a href="#cite_ref-87">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.psychology.org">"Encyclopedia of Psychology"</a>. 2019-03-07. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080513103646/http://www.psychology.org/">Archived</a> from the original on 2008-05-13.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Encyclopedia+of+Psychology&rft.date=2019-03-07&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.psychology.org&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-88"><a href="#cite_ref-88">^</a> Thagard, Paul, <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/cognitive-science/">Cognitive Science</a>, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). </li> <li id="cite_note-89"><a href="#cite_ref-89">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFCalvoGomila2008" class="citation book cs1">Calvo, Paco; Gomila, Toni (2008). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jxnhqHuo3gQC">Handbook of Cognitive Science: An Embodied Approach</a>. Elsevier. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-08-091487-9" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-08-091487-9"><bdi>978-0-08-091487-9</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Handbook+of+Cognitive+Science%3A+An+Embodied+Approach&rft.pub=Elsevier&rft.date=2008&rft.isbn=978-0-08-091487-9&rft.aulast=Calvo&rft.aufirst=Paco&rft.au=Gomila%2C+Toni&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DjxnhqHuo3gQC&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-Rowlands-90"><a href="#cite_ref-Rowlands_90-0">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFMark_Rowlands2010" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Mark_Rowlands" title="Mark Rowlands">Mark Rowlands</a> (2010). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=AiwjpL-0hDgC&pg=PA51">"Chapter 3: The mind embedded"</a>. The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-01455-7" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-01455-7"><bdi>978-0-262-01455-7</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=Chapter+3%3A+The+mind+embedded&rft.btitle=The+new+science+of+the+mind%3A+From+extended+mind+to+embodied+phenomenology&rft.pages=51+%27%27ff%27%27&rft.pub=MIT+Press&rft.date=2010&rft.isbn=978-0-262-01455-7&rft.au=Mark+Rowlands&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DAiwjpL-0hDgC%26pg%3DPA51&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-Ward-91"><a href="#cite_ref-Ward_91-0">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDave_WardMog_Stapleton2012" class="citation book cs1">Dave Ward; Mog Stapleton (2012). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Y1E7FogqvJ0C&pg=PA89">"Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended"</a>. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-90-272-1352-5" title="Special:BookSources/978-90-272-1352-5"><bdi>978-90-272-1352-5</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=Es+are+good.+Cognition+as+enacted%2C+embodied%2C+embedded%2C+affective+and+extended&rft.btitle=Consciousness+in+Interaction%3A+The+role+of+the+natural+and+social+context+in+shaping+consciousness&rft.pages=89+%27%27ff%27%27&rft.pub=John+Benjamins+Publishing&rft.date=2012&rft.isbn=978-90-272-1352-5&rft.au=Dave+Ward&rft.au=Mog+Stapleton&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DY1E7FogqvJ0C%26pg%3DPA89&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://philpapers.org/archive/WAREAG.pdf">On-line version here</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140410040010/http://philpapers.org/archive/WAREAG.pdf">Archived</a> 2014-04-10 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>. </li> <li id="cite_note-PMID24081351-92"><a href="#cite_ref-PMID24081351_92-0">^</a> J. M. Luce: Chronic disorders of consciousness following coma: Part one: medical issues. In: Chest. Band 144, Nummer 4, Oktober 2013, S. 1381–1387, <a href="//doi.org/10.1378/chest.13-0395" class="extiw" title="doi:10.1378/chest.13-0395">doi:10.1378/chest.13-0395</a>, <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><a href="/wiki/PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24081351">24081351</a> (Review). </li> <li id="cite_note-Dummett-93">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Dummett_93-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dummett_93-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dummett_93-2">c</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDummett,_M.2001" class="citation book cs1">Dummett, M. (2001). Origini della Filosofia Analitica. Einaudi. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-88-06-15286-4" title="Special:BookSources/978-88-06-15286-4"><bdi>978-88-06-15286-4</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Origini+della+Filosofia+Analitica&rft.pub=Einaudi&rft.date=2001&rft.isbn=978-88-06-15286-4&rft.au=Dummett%2C+M.&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-94"><a href="#cite_ref-94">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFHegel,_G.W.F1983" class="citation book cs1">Hegel, G.W.F (1983). Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford University Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-503169-0" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-19-503169-0"><bdi>978-0-19-503169-0</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Phenomenology+of+Spirit&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press&rft.date=1983&rft.isbn=978-0-19-503169-0&rft.au=Hegel%2C+G.W.F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988">, translated by A.V. Miller with analysis of the text and foreword by J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-19-824597-1" title="Special:BookSources/0-19-824597-1">0-19-824597-1</a> . </li> <li id="cite_note-95"><a href="#cite_ref-95">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFHusserl,_Edmund2008" class="citation book cs1">Husserl, Edmund (2008). Logische Untersuchungen. Akademie Verlag Berlin. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-3-05-004391-3" title="Special:BookSources/978-3-05-004391-3"><bdi>978-3-05-004391-3</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Logische+Untersuchungen&rft.pub=Akademie+Verlag+Berlin&rft.date=2008&rft.isbn=978-3-05-004391-3&rft.au=Husserl%2C+Edmund&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> trans.: Giovanni Piana. Milan: EST. <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/88-428-0949-7" title="Special:BookSources/88-428-0949-7">88-428-0949-7</a> </li> <li id="cite_note-Hond-96">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Hond_96-0">a</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Hond_96-1">b</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Hond_96-2">c</a> <a href="#cite_ref-Hond_96-3">d</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm">"Philosopher Ted Honderich's Determinism web resource"</a>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080516062050/http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm">Archived</a> from the original on 2008-05-16.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Philosopher+Ted+Honderich%27s+Determinism+web+resource&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ucl.ac.uk%2F~uctytho%2FdfwIntroIndex.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-97"><a href="#cite_ref-97">^</a> Russell, Paul, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility Oxford University Press: New York & Oxford, 1995. </li> <li id="cite_note-98"><a href="#cite_ref-98">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDennett,_Daniel1984" class="citation book cs1">Dennett, Daniel (1984). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/elbowroom00dani">The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting</a>. Cambridge MA: Bradford Books–MIT Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-54042-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-54042-1"><bdi>978-0-262-54042-1</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=The+Varieties+of+Free+Will+Worth+Wanting&rft.place=Cambridge+MA&rft.pub=Bradford+Books%E2%80%93MIT+Press&rft.date=1984&rft.isbn=978-0-262-54042-1&rft.au=Dennett%2C+Daniel&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Farchive.org%2Fdetails%2Felbowroom00dani&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-99"><a href="#cite_ref-99">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDescartes1649" class="citation book cs1">Descartes, René (1649). Passions of the Soul. Hackett Publishing Company. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-87220-035-7" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-87220-035-7"><bdi>978-0-87220-035-7</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Passions+of+the+Soul&rft.pub=Hackett+Publishing+Company&rft.date=1649&rft.isbn=978-0-87220-035-7&rft.aulast=Descartes&rft.aufirst=Ren%C3%A9&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-100"><a href="#cite_ref-100">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFKane2009" class="citation journal cs1">Kane, Robert (2009). "Libertarianism". Philosophical Studies. 144 (1): 39. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11098-009-9365-y">10.1007/s11098-009-9365-y</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:262782420">262782420</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Philosophical+Studies&rft.atitle=Libertarianism&rft.volume=144&rft.issue=1&rft.pages=39&rft.date=2009&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1007%2Fs11098-009-9365-y&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A262782420%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.aulast=Kane&rft.aufirst=Robert&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-DHof-101"><a href="#cite_ref-DHof_101-0">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDennett,_C.Hofstadter,_D.R.1981" class="citation book cs1">Dennett, C. & Hofstadter, D.R. (1981). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/mindsi00doug">The Mind's I</a>. Bantam Books. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-553-01412-9" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-553-01412-9"><bdi>978-0-553-01412-9</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=The+Mind%27s+I&rft.pub=Bantam+Books&rft.date=1981&rft.isbn=978-0-553-01412-9&rft.au=Dennett%2C+C.&rft.au=Hofstadter%2C+D.R.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Farchive.org%2Fdetails%2Fmindsi00doug&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-102"><a href="#cite_ref-102">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFSearle,_John2004" class="citation book cs1">Searle, John (1 November 2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press Inc, USA. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-515733-8" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-19-515733-8"><bdi>978-0-19-515733-8</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Mind%3A+A+Brief+Introduction&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press+Inc%2C+USA&rft.date=2004-11-01&rft.isbn=978-0-19-515733-8&rft.au=Searle%2C+John&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> <li id="cite_note-103"><a href="#cite_ref-103">^</a> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFLeDoux,_Joseph2002" class="citation book cs1">LeDoux, Joseph (2002). The Synaptic Self. New York: Viking Penguin. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-88-7078-795-5" title="Special:BookSources/978-88-7078-795-5"><bdi>978-88-7078-795-5</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=The+Synaptic+Self&rft.place=New+York&rft.pub=Viking+Penguin&rft.date=2002&rft.isbn=978-88-7078-795-5&rft.au=LeDoux%2C+Joseph&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"> </li> </ol></div></div> </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(8)"><h2 id="Further_reading">Further reading</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=37" title="Edit section: Further reading" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-8 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-8"> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1184024115"><div class="div-col"> <ul><li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/">The London Philosophy Study Guide</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090923081848/http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/Language.htm">Archived</a> 2009-09-23 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a> offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/Mind.htm">Philosophy of Mind</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200615172950/http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/Mind.htm">Archived</a> 2020-06-15 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Richard_Rorty" title="Richard Rorty">Richard Rorty</a>, <a href="/wiki/Philosophy_and_the_Mirror_of_Nature" title="Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature">Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature</a> (Princeton, 1980), p. 120, 125.</li> <li>Pedro Jesús Teruel, Mente, cerebro y antropología en Kant (Madrid, 2008). <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-84-309-4688-4" title="Special:BookSources/978-84-309-4688-4">978-84-309-4688-4</a>.</li> <li>David J. Ungs, Better than one; how we each have two minds (London, 2004). <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-78220-173-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-1-78220-173-1">978-1-78220-173-1</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Alfred_North_Whitehead" title="Alfred North Whitehead">Alfred North Whitehead</a> Science and the Modern World (1925; reprinted London, 1985), pp. 68–70.</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Edwin_Burtt" class="mw-redirect" title="Edwin Burtt">Edwin Burtt</a> The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, 2nd ed. (London, 1932), pp. 318–19.</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Felix_Deutsch" class="mw-redirect" title="Felix Deutsch">Felix Deutsch</a> (ed.) On the Mysterious Leap from the Mind to the Body (New York, 1959).</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Herbert_Feigl" title="Herbert Feigl">Herbert Feigl</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://ditext.com/feigl/mp/mp.html">The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript (1967)</a>, in H. Feigl et al., (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis, 1958), Vol. 2, pp. 370–497, at p. 373.</li> <li>Nap Mabaquiao, Jr., <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170331021010/http://www.vibebookstore.com/mind-science-and-computation.html">Mind, Science and Computation</a> (with foreword by <a href="/wiki/Tim_Crane" title="Tim Crane">Tim Crane</a>). Manila: De La Salle University Publishing House, 2012.</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Celia_Green" title="Celia Green">Celia Green</a> The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind–Body Problem. (Oxford: Oxford Forum, 2003). Applies a sceptical view on <a href="/wiki/Causality" title="Causality">causality</a> to the problems of interactionism.</li> <li>Gyatso, <a href="/wiki/Geshe_Kelsang_Gyatso" class="mw-redirect" title="Geshe Kelsang Gyatso">Geshe Kelsang Gyatso</a>, Understanding the Mind: The Nature and Power of the Mind, <a href="/wiki/Tharpa_Publications" title="Tharpa Publications">Tharpa Publications</a> (2nd. ed., 1997) <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-948006-78-4" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-948006-78-4">978-0-948006-78-4</a></li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160304105534/https://www.uibk.ac.at/psychologie/humanethologie/einfuehrung-in-die-humanethologie/dateien/medicus_engl_cover.pdf">Gerhard Medicus. Being Human – Bridging the Gap between the Sciences of Body and Mind. Berlin (2015): VWB</a></li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.25651/1.2022.0005">Gerhard Medicus (2017). Being Human – Bridging the Gap between the Sciences of Body and Mind, Berlin VWB</a></li> <li>Scott Robert Sehon, <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20121011021421/http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=10693">Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency and Explanation</a>. Cambridge: MIT University Press, 2005.</li></ul> </div> </section><div class="mw-heading mw-heading2 section-heading" onclick="mfTempOpenSection(9)"><h2 id="External_links">External links</h2> <a role="button" href="/w/index.php?title=Philosophy_of_mind&action=edit&section=38" title="Edit section: External links" class="cdx-button cdx-button--size-large cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--icon-only cdx-button--weight-quiet "> edit </a> </div><section class="mf-section-9 collapsible-block" id="mf-section-9"> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1235681985">.mw-parser-output .side-box{margin:4px 0;box-sizing:border-box;border:1px solid #aaa;font-size:88%;line-height:1.25em;background-color:var(--background-color-interactive-subtle,#f8f9fa);display:flow-root}.mw-parser-output .side-box-abovebelow,.mw-parser-output .side-box-text{padding:0.25em 0.9em}.mw-parser-output .side-box-image{padding:2px 0 2px 0.9em;text-align:center}.mw-parser-output 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class="external text" href="https://ftl.toolforge.org/cgi-bin/ftl?st=wp&su=Philosophy+of+mind&library=0CHOOSE0">Resources in other libraries</a></li> </ul></div></div> </div> <ul><li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-mind">Philosophy of mind</a> at <a href="/wiki/PhilPapers" title="PhilPapers">PhilPapers</a></li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.inphoproject.org/taxonomy/2183">Philosophy of mind</a> at the <a href="/wiki/Indiana_Philosophy_Ontology_Project" class="mw-redirect" title="Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project">Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project</a></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite class="citation encyclopaedia cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/theomind/">"Theory of Mind"</a>. <a href="/wiki/Internet_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=Theory+of+Mind&rft.btitle=Internet+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iep.utm.edu%2Ftheomind%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3APhilosophy+of+mind" class="Z3988"></li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://consc.net/guide.html">Guide to Philosophy of Mind</a>, compiled by David Chalmers.</li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071027060927/http://consc.net/mindpapers/">MindPapers: A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Mind and the Science of Consciousness</a>, compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor).</li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130121124039/http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/">Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind</a>, edited by Chris Eliasmith.</li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090208071843/http://galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43792">An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind</a>, by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.</li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://consc.net/online.html">A list of online papers on consciousness and philosophy of mind</a>, compiled by David Chalmers</li></ul> <div class="navbox-styles"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1129693374"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1236075235">.mw-parser-output .navbox{box-sizing:border-box;border:1px solid #a2a9b1;width:100%;clear:both;font-size:88%;text-align:center;padding:1px;margin:1em auto 0}.mw-parser-output .navbox .navbox{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .navbox+.navbox,.mw-parser-output .navbox+.navbox-styles+.navbox{margin-top:-1px}.mw-parser-output .navbox-inner,.mw-parser-output .navbox-subgroup{width:100%}.mw-parser-output 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id='mw-data-after-content'> <div class="read-more-container"></div> </div> <div id="p-lang"> <h4>Languages</h4> <section> <ul id="p-variants" class="minerva-languages"></ul> <ul class="minerva-languages"><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ar badge-Q17437796 badge-featuredarticle mw-list-item" title="featured article badge"><a href="https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%84" title="فلسفة العقل – Arabic" lang="ar" hreflang="ar" data-title="فلسفة العقل" data-language-autonym="العربية" data-language-local-name="Arabic" class="interlanguage-link-target">العربية</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ast mw-list-item"><a href="https://ast.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filosof%C3%ADa_de_la_mente" title="Filosofía de la mente – Asturian" lang="ast" hreflang="ast" data-title="Filosofía de la mente" data-language-autonym="Asturianu" data-language-local-name="Asturian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Asturianu</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-az mw-list-item"><a href="https://az.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%B0drak_f%C9%99ls%C9%99f%C9%99si" title="İdrak fəlsəfəsi – Azerbaijani" lang="az" hreflang="az" data-title="İdrak fəlsəfəsi" data-language-autonym="Azərbaycanca" data-language-local-name="Azerbaijani" class="interlanguage-link-target">Azərbaycanca</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-bn mw-list-item"><a href="https://bn.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B0_%E0%A6%A6%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B6%E0%A6%A8" title="মনের দর্শন – Bangla" lang="bn" hreflang="bn" data-title="মনের দর্শন" data-language-autonym="বাংলা" data-language-local-name="Bangla" class="interlanguage-link-target">বাংলা</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ba mw-list-item"><a href="https://ba.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%90%D2%A3_%D1%84%D3%99%D0%BB%D1%81%D3%99%D1%84%D3%99%D2%BB%D0%B5" title="Аң фәлсәфәһе – Bashkir" lang="ba" hreflang="ba" data-title="Аң фәлсәфәһе" data-language-autonym="Башҡортса" data-language-local-name="Bashkir" class="interlanguage-link-target">Башҡортса</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-bg mw-list-item"><a href="https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D1%81%D1%8A%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BE" title="Философия на съзнанието – Bulgarian" lang="bg" hreflang="bg" data-title="Философия на съзнанието" data-language-autonym="Български" data-language-local-name="Bulgarian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Български</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ca mw-list-item"><a href="https://ca.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filosofia_de_la_ment" title="Filosofia de la ment – Catalan" lang="ca" hreflang="ca" data-title="Filosofia de la ment" data-language-autonym="Català" data-language-local-name="Catalan" class="interlanguage-link-target">Català</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-cs mw-list-item"><a href="https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filozofie_mysli" title="Filozofie mysli – Czech" lang="cs" hreflang="cs" data-title="Filozofie mysli" data-language-autonym="Čeština" data-language-local-name="Czech" class="interlanguage-link-target">Čeština</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-cy mw-list-item"><a href="https://cy.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athroniaeth_y_meddwl" title="Athroniaeth y meddwl – Welsh" lang="cy" hreflang="cy" data-title="Athroniaeth y meddwl" data-language-autonym="Cymraeg" data-language-local-name="Welsh" class="interlanguage-link-target">Cymraeg</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-da mw-list-item"><a href="https://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bevidsthedsfilosofi" title="Bevidsthedsfilosofi – Danish" lang="da" hreflang="da" data-title="Bevidsthedsfilosofi" data-language-autonym="Dansk" data-language-local-name="Danish" class="interlanguage-link-target">Dansk</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-de mw-list-item"><a href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophie_des_Geistes" title="Philosophie des Geistes – German" lang="de" hreflang="de" data-title="Philosophie des Geistes" data-language-autonym="Deutsch" data-language-local-name="German" class="interlanguage-link-target">Deutsch</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-et mw-list-item"><a href="https://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vaimufilosoofia" title="Vaimufilosoofia – Estonian" lang="et" hreflang="et" data-title="Vaimufilosoofia" data-language-autonym="Eesti" data-language-local-name="Estonian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Eesti</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-el mw-list-item"><a href="https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A6%CE%B9%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%83%CE%BF%CF%86%CE%AF%CE%B1_%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85_%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%85" title="Φιλοσοφία του νου – Greek" lang="el" hreflang="el" data-title="Φιλοσοφία του νου" data-language-autonym="Ελληνικά" data-language-local-name="Greek" class="interlanguage-link-target">Ελληνικά</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-es mw-list-item"><a href="https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filosof%C3%ADa_de_la_mente" title="Filosofía de la mente – Spanish" lang="es" hreflang="es" data-title="Filosofía de la mente" data-language-autonym="Español" data-language-local-name="Spanish" class="interlanguage-link-target">Español</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-eo mw-list-item"><a href="https://eo.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filozofio_de_menso" title="Filozofio de menso – Esperanto" lang="eo" hreflang="eo" data-title="Filozofio de menso" data-language-autonym="Esperanto" data-language-local-name="Esperanto" class="interlanguage-link-target">Esperanto</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-eu mw-list-item"><a href="https://eu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adimenaren_filosofia" title="Adimenaren filosofia – Basque" lang="eu" hreflang="eu" data-title="Adimenaren filosofia" data-language-autonym="Euskara" data-language-local-name="Basque" class="interlanguage-link-target">Euskara</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fa mw-list-item"><a href="https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%87_%D8%B0%D9%87%D9%86" title="فلسفه ذهن – Persian" lang="fa" hreflang="fa" data-title="فلسفه ذهن" data-language-autonym="فارسی" data-language-local-name="Persian" class="interlanguage-link-target">فارسی</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fr mw-list-item"><a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophie_de_l%27esprit" title="Philosophie de l'esprit – French" lang="fr" hreflang="fr" data-title="Philosophie de l'esprit" data-language-autonym="Français" data-language-local-name="French" class="interlanguage-link-target">Français</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ko mw-list-item"><a href="https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%8B%AC%EB%A6%AC%EC%B2%A0%ED%95%99" title="심리철학 – Korean" lang="ko" hreflang="ko" data-title="심리철학" data-language-autonym="한국어" data-language-local-name="Korean" class="interlanguage-link-target">한국어</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-hy mw-list-item"><a href="https://hy.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D4%B3%D5%AB%D5%BF%D5%A1%D5%AF%D6%81%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%A9%D5%B5%D5%A1%D5%B6_%D6%83%D5%AB%D5%AC%D5%AB%D5%BD%D5%B8%D6%83%D5%A1%D5%B5%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%A9%D5%B5%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%B6" title="Գիտակցության փիլիսոփայություն – Armenian" lang="hy" hreflang="hy" data-title="Գիտակցության փիլիսոփայություն" data-language-autonym="Հայերեն" data-language-local-name="Armenian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Հայերեն</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-hr badge-Q17437796 badge-featuredarticle mw-list-item" title="featured article badge"><a href="https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filozofija_uma" title="Filozofija uma – Croatian" lang="hr" hreflang="hr" data-title="Filozofija uma" data-language-autonym="Hrvatski" data-language-local-name="Croatian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Hrvatski</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-id mw-list-item"><a href="https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filsafat_budi" title="Filsafat budi – Indonesian" lang="id" hreflang="id" data-title="Filsafat budi" data-language-autonym="Bahasa Indonesia" data-language-local-name="Indonesian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Bahasa Indonesia</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-is mw-list-item"><a href="https://is.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugspeki" title="Hugspeki – Icelandic" lang="is" hreflang="is" data-title="Hugspeki" data-language-autonym="Íslenska" data-language-local-name="Icelandic" class="interlanguage-link-target">Íslenska</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-it mw-list-item"><a href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filosofia_della_mente" title="Filosofia della mente – Italian" lang="it" hreflang="it" data-title="Filosofia della mente" data-language-autonym="Italiano" data-language-local-name="Italian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Italiano</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-he mw-list-item"><a href="https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%94_%D7%A9%D7%9C_%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%A4%D7%A9" title="פילוסופיה של הנפש – Hebrew" lang="he" hreflang="he" data-title="פילוסופיה של הנפש" data-language-autonym="עברית" data-language-local-name="Hebrew" class="interlanguage-link-target">עברית</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-kk mw-list-item"><a href="https://kk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D1%84%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B8%D1%8F%D1%81%D1%8B" title="Сана философиясы – Kazakh" lang="kk" hreflang="kk" data-title="Сана философиясы" data-language-autonym="Қазақша" data-language-local-name="Kazakh" class="interlanguage-link-target">Қазақша</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-la mw-list-item"><a href="https://la.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophia_mentis" title="Philosophia mentis – Latin" lang="la" hreflang="la" data-title="Philosophia mentis" data-language-autonym="Latina" data-language-local-name="Latin" class="interlanguage-link-target">Latina</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-lv mw-list-item"><a href="https://lv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pr%C4%81ta_filozofija" title="Prāta filozofija – Latvian" lang="lv" hreflang="lv" data-title="Prāta filozofija" data-language-autonym="Latviešu" data-language-local-name="Latvian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Latviešu</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-lt mw-list-item"><a href="https://lt.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C4%85mon%C4%97s_filosofija" title="Sąmonės filosofija – Lithuanian" lang="lt" hreflang="lt" data-title="Sąmonės filosofija" data-language-autonym="Lietuvių" data-language-local-name="Lithuanian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Lietuvių</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-hu mw-list-item"><a href="https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elmefiloz%C3%B3fia" title="Elmefilozófia – Hungarian" lang="hu" hreflang="hu" data-title="Elmefilozófia" data-language-autonym="Magyar" data-language-local-name="Hungarian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Magyar</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-mk mw-list-item"><a href="https://mk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0_%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%82" title="Филозофија на умот – Macedonian" lang="mk" hreflang="mk" data-title="Филозофија на умот" data-language-autonym="Македонски" data-language-local-name="Macedonian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Македонски</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-mg mw-list-item"><a href="https://mg.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fil%C3%B4z%C3%B4fian%27_ny_saina" title="Filôzôfian' ny saina – Malagasy" lang="mg" hreflang="mg" data-title="Filôzôfian' ny saina" data-language-autonym="Malagasy" data-language-local-name="Malagasy" class="interlanguage-link-target">Malagasy</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-nl mw-list-item"><a href="https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filosofie_van_de_geest" title="Filosofie van de geest – Dutch" lang="nl" hreflang="nl" data-title="Filosofie van de geest" data-language-autonym="Nederlands" data-language-local-name="Dutch" class="interlanguage-link-target">Nederlands</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ja mw-list-item"><a href="https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%BF%83%E3%81%AE%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6" title="心の哲学 – Japanese" lang="ja" hreflang="ja" data-title="心の哲学" data-language-autonym="日本語" data-language-local-name="Japanese" class="interlanguage-link-target">日本語</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-no mw-list-item"><a href="https://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinnsfilosofi" title="Sinnsfilosofi – Norwegian Bokmål" lang="nb" hreflang="nb" data-title="Sinnsfilosofi" data-language-autonym="Norsk bokmål" data-language-local-name="Norwegian Bokmål" class="interlanguage-link-target">Norsk bokmål</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-uz mw-list-item"><a href="https://uz.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ong_falsafasi" title="Ong falsafasi – Uzbek" lang="uz" hreflang="uz" data-title="Ong falsafasi" data-language-autonym="Oʻzbekcha / ўзбекча" data-language-local-name="Uzbek" class="interlanguage-link-target">Oʻzbekcha / ўзбекча</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pa mw-list-item"><a href="https://pa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%A8%AE%E0%A8%A8_%E0%A8%A6%E0%A8%BE_%E0%A8%AB%E0%A8%BC%E0%A8%B2%E0%A8%B8%E0%A8%AB%E0%A8%BC%E0%A8%BE" title="ਮਨ ਦਾ ਫ਼ਲਸਫ਼ਾ – Punjabi" lang="pa" hreflang="pa" data-title="ਮਨ ਦਾ ਫ਼ਲਸਫ਼ਾ" data-language-autonym="ਪੰਜਾਬੀ" data-language-local-name="Punjabi" class="interlanguage-link-target">ਪੰਜਾਬੀ</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pnb mw-list-item"><a href="https://pnb.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%B0%DB%81%D9%86_%D8%AF%D8%A7_%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%DB%81" title="ذہن دا فلسفہ – Western Punjabi" lang="pnb" hreflang="pnb" data-title="ذہن دا فلسفہ" data-language-autonym="پنجابی" data-language-local-name="Western Punjabi" class="interlanguage-link-target">پنجابی</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ps mw-list-item"><a href="https://ps.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%AF_%D8%B0%D9%87%D9%86_%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%87" title="د ذهن فلسفه – Pashto" lang="ps" hreflang="ps" data-title="د ذهن فلسفه" data-language-autonym="پښتو" data-language-local-name="Pashto" class="interlanguage-link-target">پښتو</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pl mw-list-item"><a href="https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filozofia_umys%C5%82u" title="Filozofia umysłu – Polish" lang="pl" hreflang="pl" data-title="Filozofia umysłu" data-language-autonym="Polski" data-language-local-name="Polish" class="interlanguage-link-target">Polski</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pt mw-list-item"><a href="https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filosofia_da_mente" title="Filosofia da mente – Portuguese" lang="pt" hreflang="pt" data-title="Filosofia da mente" data-language-autonym="Português" data-language-local-name="Portuguese" class="interlanguage-link-target">Português</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ro mw-list-item"><a href="https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filozofia_min%C8%9Bii" title="Filozofia minții – Romanian" lang="ro" hreflang="ro" data-title="Filozofia minții" data-language-autonym="Română" data-language-local-name="Romanian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Română</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ru mw-list-item"><a href="https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F" title="Философия сознания – Russian" lang="ru" hreflang="ru" data-title="Философия сознания" data-language-autonym="Русский" data-language-local-name="Russian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Русский</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sq mw-list-item"><a href="https://sq.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filozofia_e_mendjes" title="Filozofia e mendjes – Albanian" lang="sq" hreflang="sq" data-title="Filozofia e mendjes" data-language-autonym="Shqip" data-language-local-name="Albanian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Shqip</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-simple mw-list-item"><a href="https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind – Simple English" lang="en-simple" hreflang="en-simple" data-title="Philosophy of mind" data-language-autonym="Simple English" data-language-local-name="Simple English" class="interlanguage-link-target">Simple English</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sk mw-list-item"><a href="https://sk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filozofia_mysle" title="Filozofia mysle – Slovak" lang="sk" hreflang="sk" data-title="Filozofia mysle" data-language-autonym="Slovenčina" data-language-local-name="Slovak" class="interlanguage-link-target">Slovenčina</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ckb mw-list-item"><a href="https://ckb.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%81%DB%95%D9%84%D8%B3%DB%95%D9%81%DB%95%DB%8C_%D8%B2%DB%95%DB%8C%D9%86" title="فەلسەفەی زەین – Central Kurdish" lang="ckb" hreflang="ckb" data-title="فەلسەفەی زەین" data-language-autonym="کوردی" data-language-local-name="Central Kurdish" class="interlanguage-link-target">کوردی</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sr mw-list-item"><a href="https://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0_%D0%B4%D1%83%D1%85%D0%B0" title="Филозофија духа – Serbian" lang="sr" hreflang="sr" data-title="Филозофија духа" data-language-autonym="Српски / srpski" data-language-local-name="Serbian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Српски / srpski</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sh mw-list-item"><a href="https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filozofija_uma" title="Filozofija uma – Serbo-Croatian" lang="sh" hreflang="sh" data-title="Filozofija uma" data-language-autonym="Srpskohrvatski / српскохрватски" data-language-local-name="Serbo-Croatian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Srpskohrvatski / српскохрватски</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fi mw-list-item"><a href="https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mielenfilosofia" title="Mielenfilosofia – Finnish" lang="fi" hreflang="fi" data-title="Mielenfilosofia" data-language-autonym="Suomi" data-language-local-name="Finnish" class="interlanguage-link-target">Suomi</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sv badge-Q17437796 badge-featuredarticle mw-list-item" title="featured article badge"><a href="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medvetandefilosofi" title="Medvetandefilosofi – Swedish" lang="sv" hreflang="sv" data-title="Medvetandefilosofi" data-language-autonym="Svenska" data-language-local-name="Swedish" class="interlanguage-link-target">Svenska</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-tl mw-list-item"><a href="https://tl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilosopiya_ng_isipan" title="Pilosopiya ng isipan – Tagalog" lang="tl" hreflang="tl" data-title="Pilosopiya ng isipan" data-language-autonym="Tagalog" data-language-local-name="Tagalog" class="interlanguage-link-target">Tagalog</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ta mw-list-item"><a href="https://ta.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%AE%AE%E0%AE%A9_%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%86%E0%AE%AF%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AF%E0%AE%BF%E0%AE%AF%E0%AE%B2%E0%AF%8D" title="மன மெய்யியல் – Tamil" lang="ta" hreflang="ta" data-title="மன மெய்யியல்" data-language-autonym="தமிழ்" data-language-local-name="Tamil" class="interlanguage-link-target">தமிழ்</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ti mw-list-item"><a href="https://ti.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E1%8A%A3%E1%8A%A5%E1%88%9D%E1%88%AE%E1%8A%A3%E1%8B%8A_%E1%8D%8D%E1%88%8D%E1%88%B5%E1%8D%8D%E1%8A%93" title="ኣእምሮኣዊ ፍልስፍና – Tigrinya" lang="ti" hreflang="ti" data-title="ኣእምሮኣዊ ፍልስፍና" data-language-autonym="ትግርኛ" data-language-local-name="Tigrinya" class="interlanguage-link-target">ትግርኛ</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-tr mw-list-item"><a href="https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zihin_felsefesi" title="Zihin felsefesi – Turkish" lang="tr" hreflang="tr" data-title="Zihin felsefesi" data-language-autonym="Türkçe" data-language-local-name="Turkish" class="interlanguage-link-target">Türkçe</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-uk mw-list-item"><a href="https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D1%96%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%84%D1%96%D1%8F_%D1%81%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%96" title="Філософія свідомості – Ukrainian" lang="uk" hreflang="uk" data-title="Філософія свідомості" data-language-autonym="Українська" data-language-local-name="Ukrainian" class="interlanguage-link-target">Українська</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-vi badge-Q17437796 badge-featuredarticle mw-list-item" title="featured article badge"><a href="https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tri%E1%BA%BFt_h%E1%BB%8Dc_tinh_th%E1%BA%A7n" title="Triết học tinh thần – Vietnamese" lang="vi" hreflang="vi" data-title="Triết học tinh thần" data-language-autonym="Tiếng Việt" data-language-local-name="Vietnamese" class="interlanguage-link-target">Tiếng Việt</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-war mw-list-item"><a href="https://war.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilosopiya_hin_hunahuna" title="Pilosopiya hin hunahuna – Waray" lang="war" hreflang="war" data-title="Pilosopiya hin hunahuna" data-language-autonym="Winaray" data-language-local-name="Waray" class="interlanguage-link-target">Winaray</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-zh-yue mw-list-item"><a href="https://zh-yue.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%BF%83%E9%9D%88%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%B8" title="心靈哲學 – Cantonese" lang="yue" hreflang="yue" data-title="心靈哲學" data-language-autonym="粵語" data-language-local-name="Cantonese" class="interlanguage-link-target">粵語</a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-zh mw-list-item"><a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%BF%83%E7%81%B5%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6" title="心灵哲学 – Chinese" lang="zh" hreflang="zh" data-title="心灵哲学" data-language-autonym="中文" data-language-local-name="Chinese" class="interlanguage-link-target">中文</a></li></ul> </section> </div> <div class="minerva-footer-logo"><img 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