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name="order"><option selected value="-announced_date_first">Announcement date (newest first)</option><option value="announced_date_first">Announcement date (oldest first)</option><option value="-submitted_date">Submission date (newest first)</option><option value="submitted_date">Submission date (oldest first)</option><option value="">Relevance</option></select> </span> </div> <div class="control"> <button class="button is-small is-link">Go</button> </div> </div> </form> </div> </div> <ol class="breathe-horizontal" start="1"> <li class="arxiv-result"> <div class="is-marginless"> <p class="list-title is-inline-block"><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.09233">arXiv:2406.09233</a> <span>&nbsp;[<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.09233">pdf</a>, <a href="https://arxiv.org/format/2406.09233">other</a>]&nbsp;</span> </p> <div class="tags is-inline-block"> <span class="tag is-small is-link tooltip is-tooltip-top" data-tooltip="Hardware Architecture">cs.AR</span> </div> </div> <p class="title is-5 mathjax"> C2HLSC: Can LLMs Bridge the Software-to-Hardware Design Gap? </p> <p class="authors"> <span class="search-hit">Authors:</span> <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Collini%2C+L">Luca Collini</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Garg%2C+S">Siddharth Garg</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Karri%2C+R">Ramesh Karri</a> </p> <p class="abstract mathjax"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Abstract</span>: <span class="abstract-short has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2406.09233v1-abstract-short" style="display: inline;"> High Level Synthesis (HLS) tools offer rapid hardware design from C code, but their compatibility is limited by code constructs. This paper investigates Large Language Models (LLMs) for refactoring C code into HLS-compatible formats. We present several case studies by using an LLM to rewrite C code for NIST 800-22 randomness tests, a QuickSort algorithm and AES-128 into HLS-synthesizable c. The LL&hellip; <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2406.09233v1-abstract-full').style.display = 'inline'; document.getElementById('2406.09233v1-abstract-short').style.display = 'none';">&#9661; More</a> </span> <span class="abstract-full has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2406.09233v1-abstract-full" style="display: none;"> High Level Synthesis (HLS) tools offer rapid hardware design from C code, but their compatibility is limited by code constructs. This paper investigates Large Language Models (LLMs) for refactoring C code into HLS-compatible formats. We present several case studies by using an LLM to rewrite C code for NIST 800-22 randomness tests, a QuickSort algorithm and AES-128 into HLS-synthesizable c. The LLM iteratively transforms the C code guided by user prompts, implementing functions like streaming data and hardware-specific signals. This evaluation demonstrates the LLM&#39;s potential to assist hardware design refactoring regular C code into HLS synthesizable C code. <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2406.09233v1-abstract-full').style.display = 'none'; document.getElementById('2406.09233v1-abstract-short').style.display = 'inline';">&#9651; Less</a> </span> </p> <p class="is-size-7"><span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Submitted</span> 13 June, 2024; <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">originally announced</span> June 2024. </p> <p class="comments is-size-7"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Comments:</span> <span class="has-text-grey-dark mathjax">Accepted at The First IEEE International Workshop on LLM-Aided Design</span> </p> </li> <li class="arxiv-result"> <div class="is-marginless"> <p class="list-title is-inline-block"><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.03372">arXiv:2303.03372</a> <span>&nbsp;[<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.03372">pdf</a>, <a href="https://arxiv.org/format/2303.03372">other</a>]&nbsp;</span> </p> <div class="tags is-inline-block"> <span class="tag is-small is-link tooltip is-tooltip-top" data-tooltip="Cryptography and Security">cs.CR</span> <span class="tag is-small is-grey tooltip is-tooltip-top" data-tooltip="Machine Learning">cs.LG</span> </div> </div> <p class="title is-5 mathjax"> ALMOST: Adversarial Learning to Mitigate Oracle-less ML Attacks via Synthesis Tuning </p> <p class="authors"> <span class="search-hit">Authors:</span> <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Chowdhury%2C+A+B">Animesh Basak Chowdhury</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Alrahis%2C+L">Lilas Alrahis</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Collini%2C+L">Luca Collini</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Knechtel%2C+J">Johann Knechtel</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Karri%2C+R">Ramesh Karri</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Garg%2C+S">Siddharth Garg</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Sinanoglu%2C+O">Ozgur Sinanoglu</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Tan%2C+B">Benjamin Tan</a> </p> <p class="abstract mathjax"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Abstract</span>: <span class="abstract-short has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2303.03372v1-abstract-short" style="display: inline;"> Oracle-less machine learning (ML) attacks have broken various logic locking schemes. Regular synthesis, which is tailored for area-power-delay optimization, yields netlists where key-gate localities are vulnerable to learning. Thus, we call for security-aware logic synthesis. We propose ALMOST, a framework for adversarial learning to mitigate oracle-less ML attacks via synthesis tuning. ALMOST use&hellip; <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2303.03372v1-abstract-full').style.display = 'inline'; document.getElementById('2303.03372v1-abstract-short').style.display = 'none';">&#9661; More</a> </span> <span class="abstract-full has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2303.03372v1-abstract-full" style="display: none;"> Oracle-less machine learning (ML) attacks have broken various logic locking schemes. Regular synthesis, which is tailored for area-power-delay optimization, yields netlists where key-gate localities are vulnerable to learning. Thus, we call for security-aware logic synthesis. We propose ALMOST, a framework for adversarial learning to mitigate oracle-less ML attacks via synthesis tuning. ALMOST uses a simulated-annealing-based synthesis recipe generator, employing adversarially trained models that can predict state-of-the-art attacks&#39; accuracies over wide ranges of recipes and key-gate localities. Experiments on ISCAS benchmarks confirm the attacks&#39; accuracies drops to around 50\% for ALMOST-synthesized circuits, all while not undermining design optimization. <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2303.03372v1-abstract-full').style.display = 'none'; document.getElementById('2303.03372v1-abstract-short').style.display = 'inline';">&#9651; Less</a> </span> </p> <p class="is-size-7"><span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Submitted</span> 6 March, 2023; <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">originally announced</span> March 2023. </p> <p class="comments is-size-7"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Comments:</span> <span class="has-text-grey-dark mathjax">Accepted at Design Automation Conference (DAC 2023)</span> </p> </li> <li class="arxiv-result"> <div class="is-marginless"> <p class="list-title is-inline-block"><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.01291">arXiv:2209.01291</a> <span>&nbsp;[<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2209.01291">pdf</a>, <a href="https://arxiv.org/format/2209.01291">other</a>]&nbsp;</span> </p> <div class="tags is-inline-block"> <span class="tag is-small is-link tooltip is-tooltip-top" data-tooltip="Cryptography and Security">cs.CR</span> </div> <div class="is-inline-block" style="margin-left: 0.5rem"> <div class="tags has-addons"> <span class="tag is-dark is-size-7">doi</span> <span class="tag is-light is-size-7"><a class="" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3508352.3549369">10.1145/3508352.3549369 <i class="fa fa-external-link" aria-hidden="true"></i></a></span> </div> </div> </div> <p class="title is-5 mathjax"> Don&#39;t CWEAT It: Toward CWE Analysis Techniques in Early Stages of Hardware Design </p> <p class="authors"> <span class="search-hit">Authors:</span> <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Ahmad%2C+B">Baleegh Ahmad</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Liu%2C+W">Wei-Kai Liu</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Collini%2C+L">Luca Collini</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Pearce%2C+H">Hammond Pearce</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Fung%2C+J+M">Jason M. Fung</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Valamehr%2C+J">Jonathan Valamehr</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Bidmeshki%2C+M">Mohammad Bidmeshki</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Sapiecha%2C+P">Piotr Sapiecha</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Brown%2C+S">Steve Brown</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Chakrabarty%2C+K">Krishnendu Chakrabarty</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Karri%2C+R">Ramesh Karri</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Tan%2C+B">Benjamin Tan</a> </p> <p class="abstract mathjax"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Abstract</span>: <span class="abstract-short has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2209.01291v1-abstract-short" style="display: inline;"> To help prevent hardware security vulnerabilities from propagating to later design stages where fixes are costly, it is crucial to identify security concerns as early as possible, such as in RTL designs. In this work, we investigate the practical implications and feasibility of producing a set of security-specific scanners that operate on Verilog source files. The scanners indicate parts of code t&hellip; <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2209.01291v1-abstract-full').style.display = 'inline'; document.getElementById('2209.01291v1-abstract-short').style.display = 'none';">&#9661; More</a> </span> <span class="abstract-full has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2209.01291v1-abstract-full" style="display: none;"> To help prevent hardware security vulnerabilities from propagating to later design stages where fixes are costly, it is crucial to identify security concerns as early as possible, such as in RTL designs. In this work, we investigate the practical implications and feasibility of producing a set of security-specific scanners that operate on Verilog source files. The scanners indicate parts of code that might contain one of a set of MITRE&#39;s common weakness enumerations (CWEs). We explore the CWE database to characterize the scope and attributes of the CWEs and identify those that are amenable to static analysis. We prototype scanners and evaluate them on 11 open source designs - 4 system-on-chips (SoC) and 7 processor cores - and explore the nature of identified weaknesses. Our analysis reported 53 potential weaknesses in the OpenPiton SoC used in Hack@DAC-21, 11 of which we confirmed as security concerns. <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2209.01291v1-abstract-full').style.display = 'none'; document.getElementById('2209.01291v1-abstract-short').style.display = 'inline';">&#9651; Less</a> </span> </p> <p class="is-size-7"><span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Submitted</span> 2 September, 2022; <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">originally announced</span> September 2022. </p> </li> <li class="arxiv-result"> <div class="is-marginless"> <p class="list-title is-inline-block"><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.07425">arXiv:2205.07425</a> <span>&nbsp;[<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.07425">pdf</a>, <a href="https://arxiv.org/format/2205.07425">other</a>]&nbsp;</span> </p> <div class="tags is-inline-block"> <span class="tag is-small is-link tooltip is-tooltip-top" data-tooltip="Hardware Architecture">cs.AR</span> </div> <div class="is-inline-block" style="margin-left: 0.5rem"> <div class="tags has-addons"> <span class="tag is-dark is-size-7">doi</span> <span class="tag is-light is-size-7"><a class="" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3489517.3530543">10.1145/3489517.3530543 <i class="fa fa-external-link" aria-hidden="true"></i></a></span> </div> </div> </div> <p class="title is-5 mathjax"> ALICE: An Automatic Design Flow for eFPGA Redaction </p> <p class="authors"> <span class="search-hit">Authors:</span> <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Tomajoli%2C+C+M">Chiara Muscari Tomajoli</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Collini%2C+L">Luca Collini</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Bhandari%2C+J">Jitendra Bhandari</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Moosa%2C+A+K+T">Abdul Khader Thalakkattu Moosa</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Tan%2C+B">Benjamin Tan</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Tang%2C+X">Xifan Tang</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Gaillardon%2C+P">Pierre-Emmanuel Gaillardon</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Karri%2C+R">Ramesh Karri</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Pilato%2C+C">Christian Pilato</a> </p> <p class="abstract mathjax"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Abstract</span>: <span class="abstract-short has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2205.07425v1-abstract-short" style="display: inline;"> Fabricating an integrated circuit is becoming unaffordable for many semiconductor design houses. Outsourcing the fabrication to a third-party foundry requires methods to protect the intellectual property of the hardware designs. Designers can rely on embedded reconfigurable devices to completely hide the real functionality of selected design portions unless the configuration string (bitstream) is&hellip; <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2205.07425v1-abstract-full').style.display = 'inline'; document.getElementById('2205.07425v1-abstract-short').style.display = 'none';">&#9661; More</a> </span> <span class="abstract-full has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2205.07425v1-abstract-full" style="display: none;"> Fabricating an integrated circuit is becoming unaffordable for many semiconductor design houses. Outsourcing the fabrication to a third-party foundry requires methods to protect the intellectual property of the hardware designs. Designers can rely on embedded reconfigurable devices to completely hide the real functionality of selected design portions unless the configuration string (bitstream) is provided. However, selecting such portions and creating the corresponding reconfigurable fabrics are still open problems. We propose ALICE, a design flow that addresses the EDA challenges of this problem. ALICE partitions the RTL modules between one or more reconfigurable fabrics and the rest of the circuit, automating the generation of the corresponding redacted design. <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2205.07425v1-abstract-full').style.display = 'none'; document.getElementById('2205.07425v1-abstract-short').style.display = 'inline';">&#9651; Less</a> </span> </p> <p class="is-size-7"><span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Submitted</span> 15 May, 2022; <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">originally announced</span> May 2022. </p> <p class="comments is-size-7"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Comments:</span> <span class="has-text-grey-dark mathjax">Paper accepted for presentation at the IEEE/ACM Design Automation Conference (DAC 2022)</span> </p> </li> <li class="arxiv-result"> <div class="is-marginless"> <p class="list-title is-inline-block"><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.05399">arXiv:2203.05399</a> <span>&nbsp;[<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.05399">pdf</a>, <a href="https://arxiv.org/format/2203.05399">other</a>]&nbsp;</span> </p> <div class="tags is-inline-block"> <span class="tag is-small is-link tooltip is-tooltip-top" data-tooltip="Cryptography and Security">cs.CR</span> </div> </div> <p class="title is-5 mathjax"> Designing ML-Resilient Locking at Register-Transfer Level </p> <p class="authors"> <span class="search-hit">Authors:</span> <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Sisejkovic%2C+D">Dominik Sisejkovic</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Collini%2C+L">Luca Collini</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Tan%2C+B">Benjamin Tan</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Pilato%2C+C">Christian Pilato</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Karri%2C+R">Ramesh Karri</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Leupers%2C+R">Rainer Leupers</a> </p> <p class="abstract mathjax"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Abstract</span>: <span class="abstract-short has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2203.05399v2-abstract-short" style="display: inline;"> Various logic-locking schemes have been proposed to protect hardware from intellectual property piracy and malicious design modifications. Since traditional locking techniques are applied on the gate-level netlist after logic synthesis, they have no semantic knowledge of the design function. Data-driven, machine-learning (ML) attacks can uncover the design flaws within gate-level locking. Recent p&hellip; <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2203.05399v2-abstract-full').style.display = 'inline'; document.getElementById('2203.05399v2-abstract-short').style.display = 'none';">&#9661; More</a> </span> <span class="abstract-full has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2203.05399v2-abstract-full" style="display: none;"> Various logic-locking schemes have been proposed to protect hardware from intellectual property piracy and malicious design modifications. Since traditional locking techniques are applied on the gate-level netlist after logic synthesis, they have no semantic knowledge of the design function. Data-driven, machine-learning (ML) attacks can uncover the design flaws within gate-level locking. Recent proposals on register-transfer level (RTL) locking have access to semantic hardware information. We investigate the resilience of ASSURE, a state-of-the-art RTL locking method, against ML attacks. We used the lessons learned to derive two ML-resilient RTL locking schemes built to reinforce ASSURE locking. We developed ML-driven security metrics to evaluate the schemes against an RTL adaptation of the state-of-the-art, ML-based SnapShot attack. <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2203.05399v2-abstract-full').style.display = 'none'; document.getElementById('2203.05399v2-abstract-short').style.display = 'inline';">&#9651; Less</a> </span> </p> <p class="is-size-7"><span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Submitted</span> 6 April, 2022; <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">v1</span> submitted 10 March, 2022; <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">originally announced</span> March 2022. </p> <p class="comments is-size-7"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Comments:</span> <span class="has-text-grey-dark mathjax">Proceedings of the 59th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC &#39;22)</span> </p> </li> <li class="arxiv-result"> <div class="is-marginless"> <p class="list-title is-inline-block"><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.09666">arXiv:2105.09666</a> <span>&nbsp;[<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.09666">pdf</a>, <a href="https://arxiv.org/format/2105.09666">other</a>]&nbsp;</span> </p> <div class="tags is-inline-block"> <span class="tag is-small is-link tooltip is-tooltip-top" data-tooltip="Hardware Architecture">cs.AR</span> <span class="tag is-small is-grey tooltip is-tooltip-top" data-tooltip="Cryptography and Security">cs.CR</span> </div> <div class="is-inline-block" style="margin-left: 0.5rem"> <div class="tags has-addons"> <span class="tag is-dark is-size-7">doi</span> <span class="tag is-light is-size-7"><a class="" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TCAD.2022.3179651">10.1109/TCAD.2022.3179651 <i class="fa fa-external-link" aria-hidden="true"></i></a></span> </div> </div> </div> <p class="title is-5 mathjax"> Optimizing the Use of Behavioral Locking for High-Level Synthesis </p> <p class="authors"> <span class="search-hit">Authors:</span> <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Pilato%2C+C">Christian Pilato</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Collini%2C+L">Luca Collini</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Cassano%2C+L">Luca Cassano</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Sciuto%2C+D">Donatella Sciuto</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Garg%2C+S">Siddharth Garg</a>, <a href="/search/cs?searchtype=author&amp;query=Karri%2C+R">Ramesh Karri</a> </p> <p class="abstract mathjax"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Abstract</span>: <span class="abstract-short has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2105.09666v3-abstract-short" style="display: inline;"> The globalization of the electronics supply chain requires effective methods to thwart reverse engineering and IP theft. Logic locking is a promising solution, but there are many open concerns. First, even when applied at a higher level of abstraction, locking may result in significant overhead without improving the security metric. Second, optimizing a security metric is application-dependent and&hellip; <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2105.09666v3-abstract-full').style.display = 'inline'; document.getElementById('2105.09666v3-abstract-short').style.display = 'none';">&#9661; More</a> </span> <span class="abstract-full has-text-grey-dark mathjax" id="2105.09666v3-abstract-full" style="display: none;"> The globalization of the electronics supply chain requires effective methods to thwart reverse engineering and IP theft. Logic locking is a promising solution, but there are many open concerns. First, even when applied at a higher level of abstraction, locking may result in significant overhead without improving the security metric. Second, optimizing a security metric is application-dependent and designers must evaluate and compare alternative solutions. We propose a meta-framework to optimize the use of behavioral locking during the high-level synthesis (HLS) of IP cores. Our method operates on chip&#39;s specification (before HLS) and it is compatible with all HLS tools, complementing industrial EDA flows. Our meta-framework supports different strategies to explore the design space and to select points to be locked automatically. We evaluated our method on the optimization of differential entropy, achieving better results than random or topological locking: 1) we always identify a valid solution that optimizes the security metric, while topological and random locking can generate unfeasible solutions; 2) we minimize the number of bits used for locking up to more than 90% (requiring smaller tamper-proof memories); 3) we make better use of hardware resources since we obtain similar overheads but with higher security metric. <a class="is-size-7" style="white-space: nowrap;" onclick="document.getElementById('2105.09666v3-abstract-full').style.display = 'none'; document.getElementById('2105.09666v3-abstract-short').style.display = 'inline';">&#9651; Less</a> </span> </p> <p class="is-size-7"><span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Submitted</span> 7 June, 2022; <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">v1</span> submitted 20 May, 2021; <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">originally announced</span> May 2021. </p> <p class="comments is-size-7"> <span class="has-text-black-bis has-text-weight-semibold">Comments:</span> <span class="has-text-grey-dark mathjax">Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems</span> </p> </li> </ol> <div class="is-hidden-tablet"> <!-- feedback for mobile only --> <span class="help" style="display: inline-block;"><a href="https://github.com/arXiv/arxiv-search/releases">Search v0.5.6 released 2020-02-24</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;</span> </div> </div> </main> <footer> <div class="columns is-desktop" role="navigation" aria-label="Secondary"> <!-- MetaColumn 1 --> <div class="column"> <div class="columns"> <div class="column"> <ul class="nav-spaced"> <li><a href="https://info.arxiv.org/about">About</a></li> <li><a href="https://info.arxiv.org/help">Help</a></li> </ul> </div> <div class="column"> <ul class="nav-spaced"> <li> <svg 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