Techniques - ICS | MITRE ATT&CK®

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Check out the <a href='https://medium.com/mitre-attack/attack-v16-561c76af94cf'>blog post</a> for more information. </div> </div> </div> <div class="row flex-grow-1 flex-shrink-0">   <div class="sidebar nav sticky-top flex-column pr-0 pt-4 pb-3 pl-3" id="v-tab" role="tablist" aria-orientation="vertical"> <div class="resizer" id="resizer"></div>  <div id="sidebars"></div>  </div> <div class="tab-content col-xl-9 pt-4" id="v-tabContent"> <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="v-attckmatrix" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="v-attckmatrix-tab"> <ol class="breadcrumb"> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/">Home</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/techniques/ics/">Techniques</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item">ICS</li> </ol> <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="v-" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="v--tab"></div> <div class="row"> <div class="col-xl-12"> <div class="jumbotron jumbotron-fluid"> <div class="container-fluid"> <div class="overflow-x-auto"> <div class="row"> <div class="col-md-10"> <h1> ICS Techniques </h1> <p> Techniques represent 'how' an adversary achieves a tactical goal by performing an action. For example, an adversary may dump credentials to achieve credential access. </p> </div> <div class="col-md-2 div-count"> <div class="row table-object-count pr-3"> <h6>Techniques: 83</h6> </div> <div class="row table-object-count pr-3"> <h6>Sub-techniques: 0</h6> </div> </div> </div> <table class="table-techniques"> <thead> <tr> <td colspan="2">ID</td> <td>Name</td> <td>Description</td> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0800"> T0800 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0800"> Activate Firmware Update Mode </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process monitoring and related functions to allow new firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an inactive holding state if no firmware is provided to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may deny its usual functionalities. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0830"> T0830 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0830"> Adversary-in-the-Middle </a> </td> <td> Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks. This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a AiTM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0878"> T0878 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0878"> Alarm Suppression </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0802"> T0802 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0802"> Automated Collection </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0895"> T0895 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0895"> Autorun Image </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may leverage AutoRun functionality or scripts to execute malicious code. Devices configured to enable AutoRun functionality or legacy operating systems may be susceptible to abuse of these features to run malicious code stored on various forms of removeable media (i.e., USB, Disk Images [.ISO]). Commonly, AutoRun or AutoPlay are disabled in many operating systems configurations to mitigate against this technique. If a device is configured to enable AutoRun or AutoPlay, adversaries may execute code on the device by mounting the removable media to the device, either through physical or virtual means. This may be especially relevant for virtual machine environments where disk images may be dynamically mapped to a guest system on a hypervisor. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0803"> T0803 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0803"> Block Command Message </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0804"> T0804 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0804"> Block Reporting Message </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0805"> T0805 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0805"> Block Serial COM </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0806"> T0806 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0806"> Brute Force I/O </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary's goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0892"> T0892 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0892"> Change Credential </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may modify software and device credentials to prevent operator and responder access. Depending on the device, the modification or addition of this password could prevent any device configuration actions from being accomplished and may require a factory reset or replacement of hardware. These credentials are often built-in features provided by the device vendors as a means to restrict access to management interfaces. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0858"> T0858 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0858"> Change Operating Mode </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0807"> T0807 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0807"> Command-Line Interface </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0885"> T0885 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0885"> Commonly Used Port </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0884"> T0884 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0884"> Connection Proxy </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0879"> T0879 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0879"> Damage to Property </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in <a href="/techniques/T0880">Loss of Safety</a>. Operations that result in <a href="/techniques/T0827">Loss of Control</a> may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of <a href="/techniques/T0828">Loss of Productivity and Revenue</a>. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0809"> T0809 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0809"> Data Destruction </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0811"> T0811 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0811"> Data from Information Repositories </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases in the process environment, as well as databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0893"> T0893 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0893"> Data from Local System </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may target and collect data from local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, or local databases. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0812"> T0812 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0812"> Default Credentials </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0813"> T0813 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0813"> Denial of Control </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0814"> T0814 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0814"> Denial of Service </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0815"> T0815 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0815"> Denial of View </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0868"> T0868 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0868"> Detect Operating Mode </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0816"> T0816 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0816"> Device Restart/Shutdown </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0817"> T0817 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0817"> Drive-by Compromise </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0871"> T0871 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0871"> Execution through API </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0819"> T0819 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0819"> Exploit Public-Facing Application </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0820"> T0820 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0820"> Exploitation for Evasion </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0890"> T0890 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0890"> Exploitation for Privilege Escalation </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0866"> T0866 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0866"> Exploitation of Remote Services </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for initial access into and lateral movement throughout the ICS environment to enable access to targeted systems. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0822"> T0822 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0822"> External Remote Services </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0823"> T0823 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0823"> Graphical User Interface </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0891"> T0891 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0891"> Hardcoded Credentials </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may leverage credentials that are hardcoded in software or firmware to gain an unauthorized interactive user session to an asset. Examples credentials that may be hardcoded in an asset include: </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0874"> T0874 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0874"> Hooking </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for execution and privilege escalation means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0877"> T0877 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0877"> I/O Image </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0872"> T0872 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0872"> Indicator Removal on Host </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to remove indicators of their presence on a system in an effort to cover their tracks. In cases where an adversary may feel detection is imminent, they may try to overwrite, delete, or cover up changes they have made to the device. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0883"> T0883 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0883"> Internet Accessible Device </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through <a href="/techniques/T0822">External Remote Services</a>. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the <a href="/techniques/T0819">Exploit Public-Facing Application</a> technique. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0867"> T0867 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0867"> Lateral Tool Transfer </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0826"> T0826 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0826"> Loss of Availability </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0827"> T0827 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0827"> Loss of Control </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0828"> T0828 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0828"> Loss of Productivity and Revenue </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0837"> T0837 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0837"> Loss of Protection </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0880"> T0880 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0880"> Loss of Safety </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0829"> T0829 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0829"> Loss of View </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0835"> T0835 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0835"> Manipulate I/O Image </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0831"> T0831 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0831"> Manipulation of Control </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0832"> T0832 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0832"> Manipulation of View </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0849"> T0849 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0849"> Masquerading </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0838"> T0838 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0838"> Modify Alarm Settings </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0821"> T0821 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0821"> Modify Controller Tasking </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0836"> T0836 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0836"> Modify Parameter </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0889"> T0889 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0889"> Modify Program </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0839"> T0839 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0839"> Module Firmware </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0801"> T0801 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0801"> Monitor Process State </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0834"> T0834 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0834"> Native API </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0840"> T0840 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0840"> Network Connection Enumeration </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as Netstat, in conjunction with <a href="/techniques/T0857">System Firmware</a>, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network . The adversary can also use <a href="/techniques/T0842">Network Sniffing</a> to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0842"> T0842 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0842"> Network Sniffing </a> </td> <td> Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0861"> T0861 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0861"> Point & Tag Identification </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0843"> T0843 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0843"> Program Download </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0845"> T0845 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0845"> Program Upload </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0873"> T0873 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0873"> Project File Infection </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0104">Execution</a> and <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0110">Persistence</a> techniques. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0886"> T0886 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0886"> Remote Services </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0846"> T0846 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0846"> Remote System Discovery </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0888"> T0888 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0888"> Remote System Information Discovery </a> </td> <td> An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system's operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary's operational objectives. In addition, the system's configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0847"> T0847 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0847"> Replication Through Removable Media </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0848"> T0848 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0848"> Rogue Master </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0851"> T0851 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0851"> Rootkit </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0852"> T0852 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0852"> Screen Capture </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0853"> T0853 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0853"> Scripting </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0881"> T0881 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0881"> Service Stop </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0865"> T0865 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0865"> Spearphishing Attachment </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon <a href="/techniques/T0863">User Execution</a> to gain execution and access. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0856"> T0856 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0856"> Spoof Reporting Message </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0869"> T0869 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0869"> Standard Application Layer Protocol </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0862"> T0862 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0862"> Supply Chain Compromise </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0894"> T0894 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0894"> System Binary Proxy Execution </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands. Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as split to proxy execution of malicious commands. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0857"> T0857 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0857"> System Firmware </a> </td> <td> System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0882"> T0882 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0882"> Theft of Operational Information </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0864"> T0864 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0864"> Transient Cyber Asset </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0855"> T0855 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0855"> Unauthorized Command Message </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0105">Impact</a>. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0863"> T0863 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0863"> User Execution </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0859"> T0859 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0859"> Valid Accounts </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0860"> T0860 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0860"> Wireless Compromise </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/techniques/T0887"> T0887 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T0887"> Wireless Sniffing </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div>   <div class="overlay search" id="search-overlay" style="display: none;"> <div class="overlay-inner">  <div class="search-header"> <div class="search-input"> <input type="text" id="search-input" placeholder="search"> </div> <div class="search-icons"> <div class="search-parsing-icon spinner-border" style="display: none" id="search-parsing-icon"></div> <div class="close-search-icon" id="close-search-icon">×</div> </div> </div>  <div id="search-body" class="search-body"> <div class="results" id="search-results">  </div> <div id="load-more-results" class="load-more-results"> <button class="btn btn-default" id="load-more-results-button">load more results</button> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="row flex-grow-0 flex-shrink-1">  <footer class="col footer"> <div class="container-fluid"> <div class="row row-footer"> <div class="col-2 col-sm-2 col-md-2"> <div class="footer-center-responsive my-auto"> <a href="https://www.mitre.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="MITRE"> <img src="/theme/images/mitrelogowhiteontrans.gif" class="mitre-logo-wtrans"> </a> </div> </div> <div class="col-2 col-sm-2 footer-responsive-break"></div> <div class="footer-link-group"> <div class="row row-footer"> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/engage-with-attack/contact" class="footer-link">Contact Us</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/legal-and-branding/terms-of-use" class="footer-link">Terms of Use</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/legal-and-branding/privacy" class="footer-link">Privacy Policy</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/changelog.html" class="footer-link" data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="top" data-html="true" title="ATT&CK content v16.1Website v4.2.1">Website Changelog</a></u> </div> </div> <div class="row"> <small class="px-3"> © 2015 - 2024, The MITRE Corporation. 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