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Mishnato","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":1979,"errors":{}}},"translated_abstract":null,"internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/126583508/Barukh_Shpinozah_Kovets_Ma_Amarim_Al_Mishnato","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-12-26T06:33:28.541-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Barukh_Shpinozah_Kovets_Ma_Amarim_Al_Mishnato","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"id","content_type":"Work","summary":null,"impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"}],"urls":[{"id":46223409,"url":"https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIBSK"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-126583508-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="123624202"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/123624202/G%C3%B6del_on_Truth_and_Proof"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Gödel on Truth and Proof" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/118012459/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/123624202/G%C3%B6del_on_Truth_and_Proof">Gödel on Truth and Proof</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. A calculus cannot give us information about the f...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. A calculus cannot give us information about the foundations of mathematics. (Wittgenstein, 1933-34: 296) 1. Introduction: Pragmaticist Epistemological Proof of Gödel's Insight of the Realistic Nature of Mathematical Theories and the Impossibility of Proving Their Incompleteness Formally In this article, I attempt a pragmaticist epistemological proof of Gödel's conception of the realistic nature of mathematical theories representing facts of their external reality. Gödel generated a realistic revolution in the foundations of mathematics by attempting to prove formally the distinction between complete formal systems and incomplete mathematical theories. According to Gödel's Platonism, mathematical reality consists of eternal true ideal facts that we can grasp with our mathematical intuition, an analogue of our sensual perception of physical facts. Moreover, mathematical facts force us to accept intuitively mathematical true axioms, which are analogues of physical laws of nature, and through such intuition we evaluate the inferred theorems upon newly grasped mathematical facts. However, grasping ideal abstractions by means of such mysterious pure intuitions is beyond human cognitive capacity. Employing pragmaticist epistemology, I will show that formal systems are only radical abstractions of human cognitive operations and therefore cannot explain how we represent external reality. Moreover, in formal systems we cannot prove the truth of their axioms but only assume it dogmatically, and their inferred theorems are logically isolated from external reality. Therefore, if Gödel's incompleteness of mathematical theories holds, then we cannot know the truth of the basic mathematical facts of reality by means of any formal proofs. Hence Gödel's formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematics cannot hold since the truth of basic facts of mathematical reality cannot be proved formally and thus his unprovable theorem cannot be true. However, Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts from mathematical proof by assuming that mathematical facts are eternally true and thus, the unprovable theorem seems to be true. Pragmatistically, realistic theories represent external reality, not by formal logic and not the abstract reality, but by the epistemic logic of the complete proof of our perceptual propositions of facts and realistic theories. Accordingly, it can be explained how all our knowledge starts from our perceptual confrontation with reality without assuming any a priori or "given" knowledge. Hence, mathematics is also an empirical science; however, its represented reality is neither that of ideal objects nor that of physical objects but our operations of counting and measuring physical objects which we perceptually quasi-prove true as mathematical basic facts (Nesher, 2002: V, X).</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><div class="carousel-container carousel-container--sm" id="profile-work-123624202-figures"><div class="prev-slide-container js-prev-button-container"><button aria-label="Previous" class="carousel-navigation-button js-profile-work-123624202-figures-prev"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 24px" translate="no">arrow_back_ios</span></button></div><div class="slides-container js-slides-container"><figure class="figure-slide-container"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/figures/31457469/figure-1-proofs-and-the-subjective-conception-of-pure"><img alt="proofs and the subjective conception of pure intuition owing to his Platonist realism that motivated this " class="figure-slide-image" src="https://figures.academia-assets.com/118012459/figure_001.jpg" width="114" height="68" /></a></figure><figure class="figure-slide-container"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/figures/31457478/figure-2-pragmaticist-epistemological-presentation-of"><img alt="[7] Pragmaticist Epistemological Presentation of Mathematical Empirical Theory: The following is a pragmaticist epistemological explanation of the general structure and operation of th " class="figure-slide-image" src="https://figures.academia-assets.com/118012459/figure_002.jpg" width="114" height="68" /></a></figure></div><div class="next-slide-container js-next-button-container"><button aria-label="Next" class="carousel-navigation-button js-profile-work-123624202-figures-next"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 24px" translate="no">arrow_forward_ios</span></button></div></div></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="06e68799cef025ed5347d32061e45a26" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":118012459,"asset_id":123624202,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/118012459/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="123624202"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="123624202"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 123624202; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=123624202]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=123624202]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 123624202; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='123624202']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "06e68799cef025ed5347d32061e45a26" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=123624202]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":123624202,"title":"Gödel on Truth and Proof","translated_title":"","metadata":{"grobid_abstract":"No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. A calculus cannot give us information about the foundations of mathematics. (Wittgenstein, 1933-34: 296) 1. Introduction: Pragmaticist Epistemological Proof of Gödel's Insight of the Realistic Nature of Mathematical Theories and the Impossibility of Proving Their Incompleteness Formally In this article, I attempt a pragmaticist epistemological proof of Gödel's conception of the realistic nature of mathematical theories representing facts of their external reality. Gödel generated a realistic revolution in the foundations of mathematics by attempting to prove formally the distinction between complete formal systems and incomplete mathematical theories. According to Gödel's Platonism, mathematical reality consists of eternal true ideal facts that we can grasp with our mathematical intuition, an analogue of our sensual perception of physical facts. Moreover, mathematical facts force us to accept intuitively mathematical true axioms, which are analogues of physical laws of nature, and through such intuition we evaluate the inferred theorems upon newly grasped mathematical facts. However, grasping ideal abstractions by means of such mysterious pure intuitions is beyond human cognitive capacity. Employing pragmaticist epistemology, I will show that formal systems are only radical abstractions of human cognitive operations and therefore cannot explain how we represent external reality. Moreover, in formal systems we cannot prove the truth of their axioms but only assume it dogmatically, and their inferred theorems are logically isolated from external reality. Therefore, if Gödel's incompleteness of mathematical theories holds, then we cannot know the truth of the basic mathematical facts of reality by means of any formal proofs. Hence Gödel's formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematics cannot hold since the truth of basic facts of mathematical reality cannot be proved formally and thus his unprovable theorem cannot be true. However, Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts from mathematical proof by assuming that mathematical facts are eternally true and thus, the unprovable theorem seems to be true. Pragmatistically, realistic theories represent external reality, not by formal logic and not the abstract reality, but by the epistemic logic of the complete proof of our perceptual propositions of facts and realistic theories. Accordingly, it can be explained how all our knowledge starts from our perceptual confrontation with reality without assuming any a priori or \"given\" knowledge. Hence, mathematics is also an empirical science; however, its represented reality is neither that of ideal objects nor that of physical objects but our operations of counting and measuring physical objects which we perceptually quasi-prove true as mathematical basic facts (Nesher, 2002: V, X).","publication_date":{"day":10,"month":6,"year":2012,"errors":{}},"grobid_abstract_attachment_id":118012459},"translated_abstract":null,"internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/123624202/G%C3%B6del_on_Truth_and_Proof","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-09-06T12:56:26.209-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":118012459,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/118012459/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"11923246.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/118012459/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Godel_on_Truth_and_Proof.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/118012459/11923246-libre.pdf?1725654698=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DGodel_on_Truth_and_Proof.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=glWJrMFsOIp3J6hf78yvcSNyiVYjhxdGsUO2yQ3FatYWjwkqjyjlXbIMySz-TnRt2UyL-CwoDC8JZvd~JXh5C50ouVVqnb4CvIEQljDuQSVUhzYasNUzNt1IIkkpuKn9Nhp7U3BNLmdmbTClgFOq6WrLIFsi~vP9eG6T-u0IRDdMBIgC72sP~lS8HtdvFZyPPMglbOA1-jdHVP4cqC2qw7LwxtCLh5I1y059FWf2EEslfddeYhQ35W6wXNQExVzJ8HcPKgzpvz52nv67jhgMGlV3Hml6gdXmSidH~yPBQs7c7h4Bnl0wmGYIa~SW6GUyAceESUBfkKQSimaJkaywQw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Gödel_on_Truth_and_Proof","translated_slug":"","page_count":24,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. A calculus cannot give us information about the foundations of mathematics. (Wittgenstein, 1933-34: 296) 1. Introduction: Pragmaticist Epistemological Proof of Gödel's Insight of the Realistic Nature of Mathematical Theories and the Impossibility of Proving Their Incompleteness Formally In this article, I attempt a pragmaticist epistemological proof of Gödel's conception of the realistic nature of mathematical theories representing facts of their external reality. Gödel generated a realistic revolution in the foundations of mathematics by attempting to prove formally the distinction between complete formal systems and incomplete mathematical theories. According to Gödel's Platonism, mathematical reality consists of eternal true ideal facts that we can grasp with our mathematical intuition, an analogue of our sensual perception of physical facts. Moreover, mathematical facts force us to accept intuitively mathematical true axioms, which are analogues of physical laws of nature, and through such intuition we evaluate the inferred theorems upon newly grasped mathematical facts. However, grasping ideal abstractions by means of such mysterious pure intuitions is beyond human cognitive capacity. Employing pragmaticist epistemology, I will show that formal systems are only radical abstractions of human cognitive operations and therefore cannot explain how we represent external reality. Moreover, in formal systems we cannot prove the truth of their axioms but only assume it dogmatically, and their inferred theorems are logically isolated from external reality. Therefore, if Gödel's incompleteness of mathematical theories holds, then we cannot know the truth of the basic mathematical facts of reality by means of any formal proofs. Hence Gödel's formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematics cannot hold since the truth of basic facts of mathematical reality cannot be proved formally and thus his unprovable theorem cannot be true. However, Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts from mathematical proof by assuming that mathematical facts are eternally true and thus, the unprovable theorem seems to be true. Pragmatistically, realistic theories represent external reality, not by formal logic and not the abstract reality, but by the epistemic logic of the complete proof of our perceptual propositions of facts and realistic theories. Accordingly, it can be explained how all our knowledge starts from our perceptual confrontation with reality without assuming any a priori or \"given\" knowledge. Hence, mathematics is also an empirical science; however, its represented reality is neither that of ideal objects nor that of physical objects but our operations of counting and measuring physical objects which we perceptually quasi-prove true as mathematical basic facts (Nesher, 2002: V, X).","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[{"id":118012459,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/118012459/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"11923246.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/118012459/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Godel_on_Truth_and_Proof.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/118012459/11923246-libre.pdf?1725654698=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DGodel_on_Truth_and_Proof.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=glWJrMFsOIp3J6hf78yvcSNyiVYjhxdGsUO2yQ3FatYWjwkqjyjlXbIMySz-TnRt2UyL-CwoDC8JZvd~JXh5C50ouVVqnb4CvIEQljDuQSVUhzYasNUzNt1IIkkpuKn9Nhp7U3BNLmdmbTClgFOq6WrLIFsi~vP9eG6T-u0IRDdMBIgC72sP~lS8HtdvFZyPPMglbOA1-jdHVP4cqC2qw7LwxtCLh5I1y059FWf2EEslfddeYhQ35W6wXNQExVzJ8HcPKgzpvz52nv67jhgMGlV3Hml6gdXmSidH~yPBQs7c7h4Bnl0wmGYIa~SW6GUyAceESUBfkKQSimaJkaywQw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":402413,"name":"Gödel","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/G%C3%B6del"}],"urls":[{"id":44508317,"url":"http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9154/"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (true) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-123624202-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="121767972"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/121767972/Epistemic_logic_All_knowledge_is_based_on_our_experience_and_epistemic_logic_is_the_cognitive_representation_of_our_experiential_confrontation_in_reality"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span><span>, Dec 7, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in real...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. However, epistemic logic is our basic science which enable us to prove the truth of our cognitions, including the epistemic logic itself.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="121767972"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="121767972"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 121767972; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=121767972]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=121767972]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 121767972; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='121767972']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=121767972]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":121767972,"title":"Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. 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Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. However, epistemic logic is our basic science which enable us to prove the truth of our cognitions, including the epistemic logic itself.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/121767972/Epistemic_logic_All_knowledge_is_based_on_our_experience_and_epistemic_logic_is_the_cognitive_representation_of_our_experiential_confrontation_in_reality","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-07-04T02:28:33.662-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Epistemic_logic_All_knowledge_is_based_on_our_experience_and_epistemic_logic_is_the_cognitive_representation_of_our_experiential_confrontation_in_reality","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-121767972-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115787111"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115787111/Wittgenstein_on_Language_Meaning_and_Use"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Wittgenstein on Language, Meaning, and Use" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Wittgenstein on Language, Meaning, and Use</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>International Philosophical Quarterly</span><span>, 1992</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115787111"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115787111"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115787111; 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-115787111-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115787051"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115787051/In_Spite_of_Davidson_s_Arguments_for_The_Folly_of_Trying_to_Define_Truth_Truth_Can_Be_Defined"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of In Spite of Davidson’s Arguments for “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Truth Can Be Defined" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">In Spite of Davidson’s Arguments for “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Truth Can Be Defined</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. Howe...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that &amp;quot;there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . . s . . . L’.&amp;quot; I am challenging Davidson by introducing into his above scheme my own definition of truth — &amp;quot;For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if we prove s in L&amp;quot; — and then showing how to prove this definition philosophically.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115787051"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115787051"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115787051; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115787051]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115787051]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115787051; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115787051']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115787051]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115787051,"title":"In Spite of Davidson’s Arguments for “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Truth Can Be Defined","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that \u0026amp;quot;there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . . s . . . L’.\u0026amp;quot; I am challenging Davidson by introducing into his above scheme my own definition of truth — \u0026amp;quot;For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if we prove s in L\u0026amp;quot; — and then showing how to prove this definition philosophically.","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":1998,"errors":{}}},"translated_abstract":"Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that \u0026amp;quot;there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . . s . . . L’.\u0026amp;quot; I am challenging Davidson by introducing into his above scheme my own definition of truth — \u0026amp;quot;For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if we prove s in L\u0026amp;quot; — and then showing how to prove this definition philosophically.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/115787051/In_Spite_of_Davidson_s_Arguments_for_The_Folly_of_Trying_to_Define_Truth_Truth_Can_Be_Defined","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-03-04T11:51:21.142-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"In_Spite_of_Davidson_s_Arguments_for_The_Folly_of_Trying_to_Define_Truth_Truth_Can_Be_Defined","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that \u0026amp;quot;there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . . s . . . L’.\u0026amp;quot; I am challenging Davidson by introducing into his above scheme my own definition of truth — \u0026amp;quot;For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if we prove s in L\u0026amp;quot; — and then showing how to prove this definition philosophically.","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"}],"urls":[{"id":40032704,"url":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wcp20-paideia199845884"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-115787051-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="111073505"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/111073505/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692330/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/111073505/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation">Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span><span>, 1983</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of phi...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side Claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that the disputants must be of cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or eise one side of the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. (5.6, 1905(7); cf. 5.33) This program in regard to the specific meaning of a specific kind of sign is to some extent similar to Kant's program in CPR (1787) with regard to truth, and to Wittgenstein's program in the Tractatus in regard to the meaning of linguistic expressions: to demarcate the explainable from the unexplainable and to give it a philosophical account. There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="f560cf954cb86ef6ce8bae4c2390cc77" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":108692330,"asset_id":111073505,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692330/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="111073505"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="111073505"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 111073505; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=111073505]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=111073505]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 111073505; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='111073505']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "f560cf954cb86ef6ce8bae4c2390cc77" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=111073505]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":111073505,"title":"Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"De Gruyter","ai_title_tag":"Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim and Meaning Analysis","grobid_abstract":"But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side Claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that the disputants must be of cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or eise one side of the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. (5.6, 1905(7); cf. 5.33) This program in regard to the specific meaning of a specific kind of sign is to some extent similar to Kant's program in CPR (1787) with regard to truth, and to Wittgenstein's program in the Tractatus in regard to the meaning of linguistic expressions: to demarcate the explainable from the unexplainable and to give it a philosophical account. There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":1983,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Semiotica","grobid_abstract_attachment_id":108692330},"translated_abstract":null,"internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/111073505/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-12-10T12:36:51.676-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":108692330,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692330/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"semi.1983.44.3-4.20320231210-1-f016wv.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692330/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Pe.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/108692330/semi.1983.44.3-4.20320231210-1-f016wv-libre.pdf?1702242098=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Pe.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=F1YgG5guSxJKwC3CxfpK~ROOVlgvL5s0vyp731L7lmgOLvLAShhWnZsu7FBpNlNlsZkNi-rPU05zPJJrHF8mQVgTYIWlfGvE90wYfguDs0OpSgX0ThfOS2RHBPH9iBTv-G94fRoD0RfqFKDlLrEo1MyLHasjOUcGgmT8oSecYqmeEbPjDr3tsTDxm-nO-dHAJbMV0EbbLN-z15VLrSES6ajVJK426crZ3gmbrkJKk7JCZhGixqZr5LnWCtFBOvai~FZ2edeQfkuBO6L2eebtNm1uqu-8JmEuE9vRr1-mymeFlS9X7h2Zq91MzvDIF5dqrFlTQIhcqCmPS0KRdhS4-A__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation","translated_slug":"","page_count":56,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"But first, what is its purpose? 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There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[{"id":108692330,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692330/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"semi.1983.44.3-4.20320231210-1-f016wv.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692330/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Pe.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/108692330/semi.1983.44.3-4.20320231210-1-f016wv-libre.pdf?1702242098=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Pe.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=F1YgG5guSxJKwC3CxfpK~ROOVlgvL5s0vyp731L7lmgOLvLAShhWnZsu7FBpNlNlsZkNi-rPU05zPJJrHF8mQVgTYIWlfGvE90wYfguDs0OpSgX0ThfOS2RHBPH9iBTv-G94fRoD0RfqFKDlLrEo1MyLHasjOUcGgmT8oSecYqmeEbPjDr3tsTDxm-nO-dHAJbMV0EbbLN-z15VLrSES6ajVJK426crZ3gmbrkJKk7JCZhGixqZr5LnWCtFBOvai~FZ2edeQfkuBO6L2eebtNm1uqu-8JmEuE9vRr1-mymeFlS9X7h2Zq91MzvDIF5dqrFlTQIhcqCmPS0KRdhS4-A__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":98,"name":"Semiotics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Semiotics"},{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":15674,"name":"Linguistics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Linguistics"},{"id":137020,"name":"Semiotica","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Semiotica"},{"id":661935,"name":"Maxim","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Maxim"}],"urls":[{"id":36827281,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.1983.44.3-4.203"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-111073505-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="111073425"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/111073425/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692267/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/111073425/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative">On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span><span>, Mar 29, 2023</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In my work on Kant's Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that n...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In my work on Kant's Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce developed his epistemological realism in response to the difficulties of Kant's transcendental epistemology, especially that of his three Critiques. It seems that in his late research Kant tries to follow Spinoza in the distinction between the causality in nature and the human inner causality as one's Moral freedom and yet for Kant they operate in different domains to keep human freedom absolute, while the Spinozist conception of human freedom is in Nature and relative to human knowledge of reality and one's relative power in Nature. Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is a continuation of his Transcendental critical philosophy, but also his intended empirical epistemology by which to develop a practical deviation from his Copernican Revolution in the direction of the Peircean contra-revolution in Pragmaticist epistemology.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><div class="carousel-container carousel-container--sm" id="profile-work-111073425-figures"><div class="prev-slide-container js-prev-button-container"><button aria-label="Previous" class="carousel-navigation-button js-profile-work-111073425-figures-prev"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 24px" translate="no">arrow_back_ios</span></button></div><div class="slides-container js-slides-container"><figure class="figure-slide-container"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/figures/45962462/figure-8-peircean-semiotic-conception-of-platonist-and"><img alt="Peircean Semiotic Conception of Platonist and Nominalist Aspects of Mathematical Signs-Numbers Mathematical Reality Upon Which the Pragmaticist Structure of Cognitive Symbolic-Signs Operates Figure 8: The structure of a cognitive symbolic-type sign is a hierarchy of its components: The " class="figure-slide-image" src="https://figures.academia-assets.com/108692267/table_001.jpg" width="114" height="68" /></a></figure></div><div class="next-slide-container js-next-button-container"><button aria-label="Next" class="carousel-navigation-button js-profile-work-111073425-figures-next"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 24px" translate="no">arrow_forward_ios</span></button></div></div></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="9d2fc7e73508aa7c9bf19d3c63ce2cfd" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":108692267,"asset_id":111073425,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692267/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="111073425"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="111073425"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 111073425; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=111073425]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=111073425]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 111073425; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='111073425']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "9d2fc7e73508aa7c9bf19d3c63ce2cfd" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=111073425]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":111073425,"title":"On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"De Gruyter","ai_title_tag":"Kant vs. Peirce: Epistemology Reevaluated","grobid_abstract":"In my work on Kant's Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce developed his epistemological realism in response to the difficulties of Kant's transcendental epistemology, especially that of his three Critiques. It seems that in his late research Kant tries to follow Spinoza in the distinction between the causality in nature and the human inner causality as one's Moral freedom and yet for Kant they operate in different domains to keep human freedom absolute, while the Spinozist conception of human freedom is in Nature and relative to human knowledge of reality and one's relative power in Nature. Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is a continuation of his Transcendental critical philosophy, but also his intended empirical epistemology by which to develop a practical deviation from his Copernican Revolution in the direction of the Peircean contra-revolution in Pragmaticist epistemology.","publication_date":{"day":29,"month":3,"year":2023,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Semiotica","grobid_abstract_attachment_id":108692267},"translated_abstract":null,"internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/111073425/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-12-10T12:35:31.816-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":108692267,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692267/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692267/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/108692267/pdf-libre.pdf?1702242069=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=FYgMpuJZSUFLlz4VLv6zjr6H5UtnV~WLpZHCFHLNIMzRNAkFxyZag0G97DMWSh9EnCsAYQv6GSl02ityTtBU0f5mhKXWneol0tfUuL2rO3AtduTM3Kcxl7ypoWVJtk~D6lcGS4IVgxy-pKV13U-FQbBtloZyIs4rZC6O4y6ZMohiriIZKiKVddNuiAhuNFdAL3bEsNv1Pdg81cFMLiHUqs3BxlgqdUx8LUCpI~B~f9t3OOFrOi6ZpPKCoAlDI22TjxePxdN4EFpp~nfuSnPrDBYnKq1GhgGhFiQfzmIw9T3VLL6DWqO5Ehd3RL4HEx9Kd5nzuDlLz0RhVS7mCHR1ug__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative","translated_slug":"","page_count":38,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"In my work on Kant's Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce developed his epistemological realism in response to the difficulties of Kant's transcendental epistemology, especially that of his three Critiques. It seems that in his late research Kant tries to follow Spinoza in the distinction between the causality in nature and the human inner causality as one's Moral freedom and yet for Kant they operate in different domains to keep human freedom absolute, while the Spinozist conception of human freedom is in Nature and relative to human knowledge of reality and one's relative power in Nature. Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is a continuation of his Transcendental critical philosophy, but also his intended empirical epistemology by which to develop a practical deviation from his Copernican Revolution in the direction of the Peircean contra-revolution in Pragmaticist epistemology.","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[{"id":108692267,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692267/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692267/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/108692267/pdf-libre.pdf?1702242069=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=FYgMpuJZSUFLlz4VLv6zjr6H5UtnV~WLpZHCFHLNIMzRNAkFxyZag0G97DMWSh9EnCsAYQv6GSl02ityTtBU0f5mhKXWneol0tfUuL2rO3AtduTM3Kcxl7ypoWVJtk~D6lcGS4IVgxy-pKV13U-FQbBtloZyIs4rZC6O4y6ZMohiriIZKiKVddNuiAhuNFdAL3bEsNv1Pdg81cFMLiHUqs3BxlgqdUx8LUCpI~B~f9t3OOFrOi6ZpPKCoAlDI22TjxePxdN4EFpp~nfuSnPrDBYnKq1GhgGhFiQfzmIw9T3VLL6DWqO5Ehd3RL4HEx9Kd5nzuDlLz0RhVS7mCHR1ug__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":804,"name":"Metaphysics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphysics"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":13031,"name":"Transcendental Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Transcendental_Philosophy"},{"id":15674,"name":"Linguistics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Linguistics"},{"id":137020,"name":"Semiotica","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Semiotica"}],"urls":[{"id":36827226,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2022-0022"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (true) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-111073425-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="100703540"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/100703540/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/101450963/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/100703540/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative">On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that n...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce ...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="f5c6734eb35b800042a04cf7c8f16506" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":101450963,"asset_id":100703540,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/101450963/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="100703540"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="100703540"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 100703540; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=100703540]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=100703540]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 100703540; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='100703540']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "f5c6734eb35b800042a04cf7c8f16506" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=100703540]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":100703540,"title":"On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce ...","publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","ai_title_tag":"Kant's Epistemology vs. Peircean Pragmatism","publication_name":"Semiotica"},"translated_abstract":"In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce ...","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/100703540/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-04-24T12:20:59.499-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":101450963,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/101450963/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/101450963/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/101450963/pdf-libre.pdf?1682367405=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=J1B-GAfx1L2x0eZBcoOmzg7Sh0pbZ2kod6bF-pR4VhAe-tWdyha85DZ2gtMQnfqXGAClNSp9ED0xeC-Kez0CnH6SB0gN~txmak2Ay6nDQlsmeBzwPUgR4YVkBs0LRjfK6~S4cZwngjQup0XXiaPyYtKttXnJmdPbGG~fnp7CH9iRYbGlViXJiLASmFAdsrl8pJcsizgGIsgbZmm8t4GVjwu7XjW65hiCWT3nqqfN8kbQ6WjXb5UVp3kpLoTxV~rWOEEGSinSzD1ysBsMc2ZvGJYcB27kQIIXCYirGZ2IH~o2A6wRllJiO-lX4d1svBXNHje6ZZuBz7EobVHCdOj8pg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative","translated_slug":"","page_count":38,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce ...","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[{"id":101450963,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/101450963/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/101450963/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/101450963/pdf-libre.pdf?1682367405=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=J1B-GAfx1L2x0eZBcoOmzg7Sh0pbZ2kod6bF-pR4VhAe-tWdyha85DZ2gtMQnfqXGAClNSp9ED0xeC-Kez0CnH6SB0gN~txmak2Ay6nDQlsmeBzwPUgR4YVkBs0LRjfK6~S4cZwngjQup0XXiaPyYtKttXnJmdPbGG~fnp7CH9iRYbGlViXJiLASmFAdsrl8pJcsizgGIsgbZmm8t4GVjwu7XjW65hiCWT3nqqfN8kbQ6WjXb5UVp3kpLoTxV~rWOEEGSinSzD1ysBsMc2ZvGJYcB27kQIIXCYirGZ2IH~o2A6wRllJiO-lX4d1svBXNHje6ZZuBz7EobVHCdOj8pg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"},{"id":101450962,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/101450962/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/101450962/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/101450962/pdf-libre.pdf?1682367401=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=TIrKn2RPiuT8Hi8-HrVg1QSUqEKXw8PZtLA7ejrpazbftgOV1DdHl7tXFm5YYPW82qngwG30c9FdumPJfHvwznEaaAAZ~4824VGBlszMH2qOfy1asrm8t-wv3y~P7jh5jCpg~79mXPRa7qTh5~cRBf1Ix3CQ-ELqjlSP61EIHzPtWDjbTrFCiOcU9gxnBzAHHPEcEC6JJIONYH5MKwvwkeCzXIJ1YqaGDTD24qBC0nX3-XEBiR5ONvZJYJfnIaHfG7juCtF8REqvkX7wjQVev-ReZn8M3VKi-ztpscmCn2DQm1fT0MneXdMwn5eYsJMyq7dQ3ZMgQh6uagH01DABZA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":15674,"name":"Linguistics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Linguistics"},{"id":137020,"name":"Semiotica","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Semiotica"}],"urls":[{"id":30889292,"url":"https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/sem-2022-0022/pdf"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-100703540-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="100702715"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/100702715/Essays_in_Honor_of_Richard_S_Robin_Peirces_Essential_Discovery_Our_Senses_as_Reasoning_Machines_Can_Quasi_Prove_Our_Perceptual_Judgments"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Essays in Honor of Richard S. Robin || Peirce's Essential Discovery: \Our Senses as Reasoning Machines\ Can Quasi-Prove Our Perceptual Judgments" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Essays in Honor of Richard S. 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Peirce Society","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2002,"errors":{}}},"translated_abstract":null,"internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/100702715/Essays_in_Honor_of_Richard_S_Robin_Peirces_Essential_Discovery_Our_Senses_as_Reasoning_Machines_Can_Quasi_Prove_Our_Perceptual_Judgments","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-04-24T12:03:35.887-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Essays_in_Honor_of_Richard_S_Robin_Peirces_Essential_Discovery_Our_Senses_as_Reasoning_Machines_Can_Quasi_Prove_Our_Perceptual_Judgments","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":null,"impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-100702715-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="96728915"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/96728915/Peircean_Realism_Truth_as_the_Meaning_of_Cognitive_Signs_Representing_External_Reality"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Peircean Realism: Truth as the Meaning of Cognitive Signs Representing External Reality" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Peircean Realism: Truth as the Meaning of Cognitive Signs Representing External Reality</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Etude de la phenomenologie de Peirce definie comme phaneroscopie et de sa theorie des signes comm...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Etude de la phenomenologie de Peirce definie comme phaneroscopie et de sa theorie des signes comme cognition. Soulevant le probleme de la representation et de la reference dans le cadre du debat opposant phenomenalisme et pragmatisme, l&#39;A. met en evidence le fondement experimental de notre instinct naturel pour la verite, et analyse l&#39;explication peirceenne de notre connaissance objective du monde exterieur</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="96728915"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="96728915"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96728915; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96728915]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96728915]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96728915; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='96728915']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=96728915]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":96728915,"title":"Peircean Realism: Truth as the Meaning of Cognitive Signs Representing External Reality","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Etude de la phenomenologie de Peirce definie comme phaneroscopie et de sa theorie des signes comme cognition. 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Soulevant le probleme de la representation et de la reference dans le cadre du debat opposant phenomenalisme et pragmatisme, l\u0026#39;A. met en evidence le fondement experimental de notre instinct naturel pour la verite, et analyse l\u0026#39;explication peirceenne de notre connaissance objective du monde exterieur","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/96728915/Peircean_Realism_Truth_as_the_Meaning_of_Cognitive_Signs_Representing_External_Reality","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-02-11T12:20:11.205-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Peircean_Realism_Truth_as_the_Meaning_of_Cognitive_Signs_Representing_External_Reality","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"fr","content_type":"Work","summary":"Etude de la phenomenologie de Peirce definie comme phaneroscopie et de sa theorie des signes comme cognition. Soulevant le probleme de la representation et de la reference dans le cadre du debat opposant phenomenalisme et pragmatisme, l\u0026#39;A. met en evidence le fondement experimental de notre instinct naturel pour la verite, et analyse l\u0026#39;explication peirceenne de notre connaissance objective du monde exterieur","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":951,"name":"Humanities","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Humanities"},{"id":729720,"name":"Explication","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Explication"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-96728915-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="91005399"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/91005399/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/94413284/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/91005399/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation">Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span><span>, 1983</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of phi...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side Claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that the disputants must be of cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or eise one side of the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. (5.6, 1905(7); cf. 5.33) This program in regard to the specific meaning of a specific kind of sign is to some extent similar to Kant's program in CPR (1787) with regard to truth, and to Wittgenstein's program in the Tractatus in regard to the meaning of linguistic expressions: to demarcate the explainable from the unexplainable and to give it a philosophical account. There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="b900a352f3f1e4e68d9fd6ebfe5c79e6" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":94413284,"asset_id":91005399,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/94413284/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="91005399"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="91005399"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 91005399; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=91005399]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=91005399]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 91005399; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='91005399']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "b900a352f3f1e4e68d9fd6ebfe5c79e6" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=91005399]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":91005399,"title":"Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","grobid_abstract":"But first, what is its purpose? 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There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. 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Thus the nature of Sign and its function in the structure of the Semiotic process is the hero of this story. In the framework of this paper I will discuss semiotics in its widest sense: namely, not only as a theory of signs and philosophy of language, but also as a philosophy of cognition and mind. This extension of the conception of Semiosis comes, upon my interpretation, as a natural conclusion of the reconstruction of Peirce's pragmaticist philosophy. There is a strong inclination among some semioticians, philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and others (including physicists) to understand every natural phenomenon, either physical or psychical, as a Sign process, and therefore as a Semiosis. In doing so they seem to be identifying the structures of the physical processes they study with the structure of their own cognition, in which they interpret in Signs those former processes. Such enterprises follow the path of cybernetics, information theory, and computer science in understanding physical processes in terms of 'sign',</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="5058c84838b1de308b98376d65204eb1" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":89965649,"asset_id":85190472,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/89965649/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="85190472"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="85190472"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 85190472; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=85190472]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=85190472]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 85190472; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='85190472']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "5058c84838b1de308b98376d65204eb1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=85190472]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":85190472,"title":"Understanding sign semiosis as cognition and as self-conscious process: A reconstruction of some basic conceptions in Peirce’s semiotics","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","ai_title_tag":"Sign Semiosis: Cognition and Peirce's Perspective","grobid_abstract":"In this paper I will deal with some basic conceptions of semioticsmainly with the nature, the structure, and the evolution of Semiosis. 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Thus the nature of Sign and its function in the structure of the Semiotic process is the hero of this story. In the framework of this paper I will discuss semiotics in its widest sense: namely, not only as a theory of signs and philosophy of language, but also as a philosophy of cognition and mind. This extension of the conception of Semiosis comes, upon my interpretation, as a natural conclusion of the reconstruction of Peirce's pragmaticist philosophy. There is a strong inclination among some semioticians, philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and others (including physicists) to understand every natural phenomenon, either physical or psychical, as a Sign process, and therefore as a Semiosis. In doing so they seem to be identifying the structures of the physical processes they study with the structure of their own cognition, in which they interpret in Signs those former processes. 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From this perspective, Putnam&#x27;s causal theory of meaning is only a relic of his previous...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">... From this perspective, Putnam&#x27;s causal theory of meaning is only a relic of his previousmetaphysical realism in which the causal connections be tween physical objects and their representing signs hold independently from human cognition (Putnam 1975, chaps. ...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="74408037"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="74408037"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 74408037; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=74408037]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=74408037]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 74408037; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='74408037']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=74408037]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":74408037,"title":"Pragmaticist Realism: The Third Philosophical Perspective as the Intermediate Point Between Metaphysical Realism and Internal Realism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"... 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between &quot;Metaphysical Realism&quot; and &quot;Internal Realism&quot; Chapter 6 &quot;Which Side Spinoza Would Have Taken [between Einstein and Bohr] if He had Lived to See the [Scientific] Development of Our Days&quot; (Bohr, 1949:237): An Analysis of Human Representation of Physical Reality Chapter 7 The Pragmatist Conception of Truth with a &quot;Bold&quot; Solution to the Liar Paradox Chapter 8 In Spite of Davidson&#39;s Arguments for &quot;The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,&quot; Truth Can be Defined Chapter 9 We Know What Our Propositions Represent When We Prove Their Truth: Response to Gettier Chapter 10 Putnam on Truth: Can We Know Reality with a Big &quot;R&quot; with Proved Truths with a Smal...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="69740061"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="69740061"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 69740061; 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-126583508-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="123624202"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/123624202/G%C3%B6del_on_Truth_and_Proof"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Gödel on Truth and Proof" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/118012459/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/123624202/G%C3%B6del_on_Truth_and_Proof">Gödel on Truth and Proof</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. A calculus cannot give us information about the f...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. A calculus cannot give us information about the foundations of mathematics. (Wittgenstein, 1933-34: 296) 1. Introduction: Pragmaticist Epistemological Proof of Gödel's Insight of the Realistic Nature of Mathematical Theories and the Impossibility of Proving Their Incompleteness Formally In this article, I attempt a pragmaticist epistemological proof of Gödel's conception of the realistic nature of mathematical theories representing facts of their external reality. Gödel generated a realistic revolution in the foundations of mathematics by attempting to prove formally the distinction between complete formal systems and incomplete mathematical theories. According to Gödel's Platonism, mathematical reality consists of eternal true ideal facts that we can grasp with our mathematical intuition, an analogue of our sensual perception of physical facts. Moreover, mathematical facts force us to accept intuitively mathematical true axioms, which are analogues of physical laws of nature, and through such intuition we evaluate the inferred theorems upon newly grasped mathematical facts. However, grasping ideal abstractions by means of such mysterious pure intuitions is beyond human cognitive capacity. Employing pragmaticist epistemology, I will show that formal systems are only radical abstractions of human cognitive operations and therefore cannot explain how we represent external reality. Moreover, in formal systems we cannot prove the truth of their axioms but only assume it dogmatically, and their inferred theorems are logically isolated from external reality. Therefore, if Gödel's incompleteness of mathematical theories holds, then we cannot know the truth of the basic mathematical facts of reality by means of any formal proofs. Hence Gödel's formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematics cannot hold since the truth of basic facts of mathematical reality cannot be proved formally and thus his unprovable theorem cannot be true. However, Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts from mathematical proof by assuming that mathematical facts are eternally true and thus, the unprovable theorem seems to be true. Pragmatistically, realistic theories represent external reality, not by formal logic and not the abstract reality, but by the epistemic logic of the complete proof of our perceptual propositions of facts and realistic theories. Accordingly, it can be explained how all our knowledge starts from our perceptual confrontation with reality without assuming any a priori or "given" knowledge. Hence, mathematics is also an empirical science; however, its represented reality is neither that of ideal objects nor that of physical objects but our operations of counting and measuring physical objects which we perceptually quasi-prove true as mathematical basic facts (Nesher, 2002: V, X).</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><div class="carousel-container carousel-container--sm" id="profile-work-123624202-figures"><div class="prev-slide-container js-prev-button-container"><button aria-label="Previous" class="carousel-navigation-button js-profile-work-123624202-figures-prev"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 24px" translate="no">arrow_back_ios</span></button></div><div class="slides-container js-slides-container"><figure class="figure-slide-container"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/figures/31457469/figure-1-proofs-and-the-subjective-conception-of-pure"><img alt="proofs and the subjective conception of pure intuition owing to his Platonist realism that motivated this " class="figure-slide-image" src="https://figures.academia-assets.com/118012459/figure_001.jpg" width="114" height="68" /></a></figure><figure class="figure-slide-container"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/figures/31457478/figure-2-pragmaticist-epistemological-presentation-of"><img alt="[7] Pragmaticist Epistemological Presentation of Mathematical Empirical Theory: The following is a pragmaticist epistemological explanation of the general structure and operation of th " class="figure-slide-image" src="https://figures.academia-assets.com/118012459/figure_002.jpg" width="114" height="68" /></a></figure></div><div class="next-slide-container js-next-button-container"><button aria-label="Next" class="carousel-navigation-button js-profile-work-123624202-figures-next"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 24px" translate="no">arrow_forward_ios</span></button></div></div></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="06e68799cef025ed5347d32061e45a26" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":118012459,"asset_id":123624202,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/118012459/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="123624202"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="123624202"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 123624202; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=123624202]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=123624202]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 123624202; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='123624202']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "06e68799cef025ed5347d32061e45a26" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=123624202]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":123624202,"title":"Gödel on Truth and Proof","translated_title":"","metadata":{"grobid_abstract":"No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. 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Moreover, mathematical facts force us to accept intuitively mathematical true axioms, which are analogues of physical laws of nature, and through such intuition we evaluate the inferred theorems upon newly grasped mathematical facts. However, grasping ideal abstractions by means of such mysterious pure intuitions is beyond human cognitive capacity. Employing pragmaticist epistemology, I will show that formal systems are only radical abstractions of human cognitive operations and therefore cannot explain how we represent external reality. Moreover, in formal systems we cannot prove the truth of their axioms but only assume it dogmatically, and their inferred theorems are logically isolated from external reality. Therefore, if Gödel's incompleteness of mathematical theories holds, then we cannot know the truth of the basic mathematical facts of reality by means of any formal proofs. Hence Gödel's formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematics cannot hold since the truth of basic facts of mathematical reality cannot be proved formally and thus his unprovable theorem cannot be true. However, Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts from mathematical proof by assuming that mathematical facts are eternally true and thus, the unprovable theorem seems to be true. Pragmatistically, realistic theories represent external reality, not by formal logic and not the abstract reality, but by the epistemic logic of the complete proof of our perceptual propositions of facts and realistic theories. Accordingly, it can be explained how all our knowledge starts from our perceptual confrontation with reality without assuming any a priori or \"given\" knowledge. Hence, mathematics is also an empirical science; however, its represented reality is neither that of ideal objects nor that of physical objects but our operations of counting and measuring physical objects which we perceptually quasi-prove true as mathematical basic facts (Nesher, 2002: V, X).","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[{"id":118012459,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/118012459/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"11923246.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/118012459/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Godel_on_Truth_and_Proof.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/118012459/11923246-libre.pdf?1725654698=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DGodel_on_Truth_and_Proof.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=glWJrMFsOIp3J6hf78yvcSNyiVYjhxdGsUO2yQ3FatYWjwkqjyjlXbIMySz-TnRt2UyL-CwoDC8JZvd~JXh5C50ouVVqnb4CvIEQljDuQSVUhzYasNUzNt1IIkkpuKn9Nhp7U3BNLmdmbTClgFOq6WrLIFsi~vP9eG6T-u0IRDdMBIgC72sP~lS8HtdvFZyPPMglbOA1-jdHVP4cqC2qw7LwxtCLh5I1y059FWf2EEslfddeYhQ35W6wXNQExVzJ8HcPKgzpvz52nv67jhgMGlV3Hml6gdXmSidH~yPBQs7c7h4Bnl0wmGYIa~SW6GUyAceESUBfkKQSimaJkaywQw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":402413,"name":"Gödel","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/G%C3%B6del"}],"urls":[{"id":44508317,"url":"http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9154/"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (true) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-123624202-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="121767972"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/121767972/Epistemic_logic_All_knowledge_is_based_on_our_experience_and_epistemic_logic_is_the_cognitive_representation_of_our_experiential_confrontation_in_reality"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span><span>, Dec 7, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in real...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. However, epistemic logic is our basic science which enable us to prove the truth of our cognitions, including the epistemic logic itself.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="121767972"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="121767972"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 121767972; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=121767972]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=121767972]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 121767972; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='121767972']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=121767972]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":121767972,"title":"Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. 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Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. However, epistemic logic is our basic science which enable us to prove the truth of our cognitions, including the epistemic logic itself.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/121767972/Epistemic_logic_All_knowledge_is_based_on_our_experience_and_epistemic_logic_is_the_cognitive_representation_of_our_experiential_confrontation_in_reality","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-07-04T02:28:33.662-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Epistemic_logic_All_knowledge_is_based_on_our_experience_and_epistemic_logic_is_the_cognitive_representation_of_our_experiential_confrontation_in_reality","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-121767972-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115787111"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115787111/Wittgenstein_on_Language_Meaning_and_Use"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Wittgenstein on Language, Meaning, and Use" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Wittgenstein on Language, Meaning, and Use</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>International Philosophical Quarterly</span><span>, 1992</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115787111"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115787111"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115787111; 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-115787111-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115787051"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115787051/In_Spite_of_Davidson_s_Arguments_for_The_Folly_of_Trying_to_Define_Truth_Truth_Can_Be_Defined"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of In Spite of Davidson’s Arguments for “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Truth Can Be Defined" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">In Spite of Davidson’s Arguments for “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Truth Can Be Defined</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. Howe...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that &amp;quot;there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . . s . . . L’.&amp;quot; I am challenging Davidson by introducing into his above scheme my own definition of truth — &amp;quot;For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if we prove s in L&amp;quot; — and then showing how to prove this definition philosophically.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115787051"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115787051"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115787051; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115787051]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115787051]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115787051; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115787051']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115787051]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115787051,"title":"In Spite of Davidson’s Arguments for “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Truth Can Be Defined","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that \u0026amp;quot;there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . . s . . . L’.\u0026amp;quot; I am challenging Davidson by introducing into his above scheme my own definition of truth — \u0026amp;quot;For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if we prove s in L\u0026amp;quot; — and then showing how to prove this definition philosophically.","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":1998,"errors":{}}},"translated_abstract":"Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that \u0026amp;quot;there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . . s . . . L’.\u0026amp;quot; I am challenging Davidson by introducing into his above scheme my own definition of truth — \u0026amp;quot;For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if we prove s in L\u0026amp;quot; — and then showing how to prove this definition philosophically.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/115787051/In_Spite_of_Davidson_s_Arguments_for_The_Folly_of_Trying_to_Define_Truth_Truth_Can_Be_Defined","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-03-04T11:51:21.142-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"In_Spite_of_Davidson_s_Arguments_for_The_Folly_of_Trying_to_Define_Truth_Truth_Can_Be_Defined","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that \u0026amp;quot;there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . . s . . . L’.\u0026amp;quot; I am challenging Davidson by introducing into his above scheme my own definition of truth — \u0026amp;quot;For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if we prove s in L\u0026amp;quot; — and then showing how to prove this definition philosophically.","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"}],"urls":[{"id":40032704,"url":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wcp20-paideia199845884"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-115787051-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="111073505"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/111073505/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692330/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/111073505/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation">Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span><span>, 1983</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of phi...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side Claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that the disputants must be of cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or eise one side of the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. (5.6, 1905(7); cf. 5.33) This program in regard to the specific meaning of a specific kind of sign is to some extent similar to Kant's program in CPR (1787) with regard to truth, and to Wittgenstein's program in the Tractatus in regard to the meaning of linguistic expressions: to demarcate the explainable from the unexplainable and to give it a philosophical account. There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="f560cf954cb86ef6ce8bae4c2390cc77" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":108692330,"asset_id":111073505,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692330/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="111073505"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="111073505"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 111073505; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=111073505]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=111073505]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 111073505; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='111073505']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "f560cf954cb86ef6ce8bae4c2390cc77" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=111073505]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":111073505,"title":"Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"De Gruyter","ai_title_tag":"Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim and Meaning Analysis","grobid_abstract":"But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side Claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that the disputants must be of cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or eise one side of the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. (5.6, 1905(7); cf. 5.33) This program in regard to the specific meaning of a specific kind of sign is to some extent similar to Kant's program in CPR (1787) with regard to truth, and to Wittgenstein's program in the Tractatus in regard to the meaning of linguistic expressions: to demarcate the explainable from the unexplainable and to give it a philosophical account. There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":1983,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Semiotica","grobid_abstract_attachment_id":108692330},"translated_abstract":null,"internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/111073505/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-12-10T12:36:51.676-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":108692330,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692330/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"semi.1983.44.3-4.20320231210-1-f016wv.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692330/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Pe.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/108692330/semi.1983.44.3-4.20320231210-1-f016wv-libre.pdf?1702242098=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Pe.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=F1YgG5guSxJKwC3CxfpK~ROOVlgvL5s0vyp731L7lmgOLvLAShhWnZsu7FBpNlNlsZkNi-rPU05zPJJrHF8mQVgTYIWlfGvE90wYfguDs0OpSgX0ThfOS2RHBPH9iBTv-G94fRoD0RfqFKDlLrEo1MyLHasjOUcGgmT8oSecYqmeEbPjDr3tsTDxm-nO-dHAJbMV0EbbLN-z15VLrSES6ajVJK426crZ3gmbrkJKk7JCZhGixqZr5LnWCtFBOvai~FZ2edeQfkuBO6L2eebtNm1uqu-8JmEuE9vRr1-mymeFlS9X7h2Zq91MzvDIF5dqrFlTQIhcqCmPS0KRdhS4-A__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation","translated_slug":"","page_count":56,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side Claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that the disputants must be of cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or eise one side of the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. (5.6, 1905(7); cf. 5.33) This program in regard to the specific meaning of a specific kind of sign is to some extent similar to Kant's program in CPR (1787) with regard to truth, and to Wittgenstein's program in the Tractatus in regard to the meaning of linguistic expressions: to demarcate the explainable from the unexplainable and to give it a philosophical account. There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[{"id":108692330,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692330/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"semi.1983.44.3-4.20320231210-1-f016wv.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692330/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Pe.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/108692330/semi.1983.44.3-4.20320231210-1-f016wv-libre.pdf?1702242098=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Pe.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=F1YgG5guSxJKwC3CxfpK~ROOVlgvL5s0vyp731L7lmgOLvLAShhWnZsu7FBpNlNlsZkNi-rPU05zPJJrHF8mQVgTYIWlfGvE90wYfguDs0OpSgX0ThfOS2RHBPH9iBTv-G94fRoD0RfqFKDlLrEo1MyLHasjOUcGgmT8oSecYqmeEbPjDr3tsTDxm-nO-dHAJbMV0EbbLN-z15VLrSES6ajVJK426crZ3gmbrkJKk7JCZhGixqZr5LnWCtFBOvai~FZ2edeQfkuBO6L2eebtNm1uqu-8JmEuE9vRr1-mymeFlS9X7h2Zq91MzvDIF5dqrFlTQIhcqCmPS0KRdhS4-A__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":98,"name":"Semiotics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Semiotics"},{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":15674,"name":"Linguistics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Linguistics"},{"id":137020,"name":"Semiotica","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Semiotica"},{"id":661935,"name":"Maxim","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Maxim"}],"urls":[{"id":36827281,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.1983.44.3-4.203"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-111073505-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="111073425"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/111073425/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692267/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/111073425/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative">On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span><span>, Mar 29, 2023</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In my work on Kant's Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that n...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In my work on Kant's Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce developed his epistemological realism in response to the difficulties of Kant's transcendental epistemology, especially that of his three Critiques. It seems that in his late research Kant tries to follow Spinoza in the distinction between the causality in nature and the human inner causality as one's Moral freedom and yet for Kant they operate in different domains to keep human freedom absolute, while the Spinozist conception of human freedom is in Nature and relative to human knowledge of reality and one's relative power in Nature. Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is a continuation of his Transcendental critical philosophy, but also his intended empirical epistemology by which to develop a practical deviation from his Copernican Revolution in the direction of the Peircean contra-revolution in Pragmaticist epistemology.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><div class="carousel-container carousel-container--sm" id="profile-work-111073425-figures"><div class="prev-slide-container js-prev-button-container"><button aria-label="Previous" class="carousel-navigation-button js-profile-work-111073425-figures-prev"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 24px" translate="no">arrow_back_ios</span></button></div><div class="slides-container js-slides-container"><figure class="figure-slide-container"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/figures/45962462/figure-8-peircean-semiotic-conception-of-platonist-and"><img alt="Peircean Semiotic Conception of Platonist and Nominalist Aspects of Mathematical Signs-Numbers Mathematical Reality Upon Which the Pragmaticist Structure of Cognitive Symbolic-Signs Operates Figure 8: The structure of a cognitive symbolic-type sign is a hierarchy of its components: The " class="figure-slide-image" src="https://figures.academia-assets.com/108692267/table_001.jpg" width="114" height="68" /></a></figure></div><div class="next-slide-container js-next-button-container"><button aria-label="Next" class="carousel-navigation-button js-profile-work-111073425-figures-next"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 24px" translate="no">arrow_forward_ios</span></button></div></div></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="9d2fc7e73508aa7c9bf19d3c63ce2cfd" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":108692267,"asset_id":111073425,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692267/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="111073425"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="111073425"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 111073425; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=111073425]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=111073425]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 111073425; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='111073425']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "9d2fc7e73508aa7c9bf19d3c63ce2cfd" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=111073425]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":111073425,"title":"On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"De Gruyter","ai_title_tag":"Kant vs. Peirce: Epistemology Reevaluated","grobid_abstract":"In my work on Kant's Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce developed his epistemological realism in response to the difficulties of Kant's transcendental epistemology, especially that of his three Critiques. It seems that in his late research Kant tries to follow Spinoza in the distinction between the causality in nature and the human inner causality as one's Moral freedom and yet for Kant they operate in different domains to keep human freedom absolute, while the Spinozist conception of human freedom is in Nature and relative to human knowledge of reality and one's relative power in Nature. 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In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce developed his epistemological realism in response to the difficulties of Kant's transcendental epistemology, especially that of his three Critiques. It seems that in his late research Kant tries to follow Spinoza in the distinction between the causality in nature and the human inner causality as one's Moral freedom and yet for Kant they operate in different domains to keep human freedom absolute, while the Spinozist conception of human freedom is in Nature and relative to human knowledge of reality and one's relative power in Nature. Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is a continuation of his Transcendental critical philosophy, but also his intended empirical epistemology by which to develop a practical deviation from his Copernican Revolution in the direction of the Peircean contra-revolution in Pragmaticist epistemology.","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[{"id":108692267,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/108692267/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/108692267/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/108692267/pdf-libre.pdf?1702242069=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=FYgMpuJZSUFLlz4VLv6zjr6H5UtnV~WLpZHCFHLNIMzRNAkFxyZag0G97DMWSh9EnCsAYQv6GSl02ityTtBU0f5mhKXWneol0tfUuL2rO3AtduTM3Kcxl7ypoWVJtk~D6lcGS4IVgxy-pKV13U-FQbBtloZyIs4rZC6O4y6ZMohiriIZKiKVddNuiAhuNFdAL3bEsNv1Pdg81cFMLiHUqs3BxlgqdUx8LUCpI~B~f9t3OOFrOi6ZpPKCoAlDI22TjxePxdN4EFpp~nfuSnPrDBYnKq1GhgGhFiQfzmIw9T3VLL6DWqO5Ehd3RL4HEx9Kd5nzuDlLz0RhVS7mCHR1ug__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":804,"name":"Metaphysics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphysics"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":13031,"name":"Transcendental Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Transcendental_Philosophy"},{"id":15674,"name":"Linguistics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Linguistics"},{"id":137020,"name":"Semiotica","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Semiotica"}],"urls":[{"id":36827226,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2022-0022"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (true) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-111073425-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="100703540"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/100703540/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/101450963/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/100703540/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative">On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that n...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce ...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="f5c6734eb35b800042a04cf7c8f16506" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":101450963,"asset_id":100703540,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/101450963/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="100703540"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="100703540"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 100703540; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=100703540]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=100703540]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 100703540; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='100703540']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "f5c6734eb35b800042a04cf7c8f16506" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=100703540]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":100703540,"title":"On Kant doing philosophy and the Peircean alternative","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce ...","publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","ai_title_tag":"Kant's Epistemology vs. Peircean Pragmatism","publication_name":"Semiotica"},"translated_abstract":"In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce ...","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/100703540/On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-04-24T12:20:59.499-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":101450963,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/101450963/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/101450963/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/101450963/pdf-libre.pdf?1682367405=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=J1B-GAfx1L2x0eZBcoOmzg7Sh0pbZ2kod6bF-pR4VhAe-tWdyha85DZ2gtMQnfqXGAClNSp9ED0xeC-Kez0CnH6SB0gN~txmak2Ay6nDQlsmeBzwPUgR4YVkBs0LRjfK6~S4cZwngjQup0XXiaPyYtKttXnJmdPbGG~fnp7CH9iRYbGlViXJiLASmFAdsrl8pJcsizgGIsgbZmm8t4GVjwu7XjW65hiCWT3nqqfN8kbQ6WjXb5UVp3kpLoTxV~rWOEEGSinSzD1ysBsMc2ZvGJYcB27kQIIXCYirGZ2IH~o2A6wRllJiO-lX4d1svBXNHje6ZZuBz7EobVHCdOj8pg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircean_alternative","translated_slug":"","page_count":38,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"In my work on Kant’s Transcendental epistemology, I criticize his three Critiques and show that none of them can solve the problems that Kant endeavored to solve and he even, in a way, admitted it. In the first Critique, Kant attempts to solve the difficulties of the Cartesian Idealism and Humean Empirism, in combining them mechanically in his own Transcendental formalism and Sensual matter without being able to bridge the gap between them. In the second Critique, Kant endeavored to make his Practical Reason of the a priori pure fact of formal morality into free moral conduct to materialize his ideal commonwealth of ends, but he could not bridge this gap. In his third Critique, Kant attempted to make the aesthetic reflective judgment of beauty objective, including of artworks, but failed to do so. The Peircean pragmaticist method can save the theory of knowledge both from the dogmatism of the metaphysical realists and from the inconsistency of the phenomenalists and holists. Peirce ...","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[{"id":101450963,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/101450963/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/101450963/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/101450963/pdf-libre.pdf?1682367405=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=J1B-GAfx1L2x0eZBcoOmzg7Sh0pbZ2kod6bF-pR4VhAe-tWdyha85DZ2gtMQnfqXGAClNSp9ED0xeC-Kez0CnH6SB0gN~txmak2Ay6nDQlsmeBzwPUgR4YVkBs0LRjfK6~S4cZwngjQup0XXiaPyYtKttXnJmdPbGG~fnp7CH9iRYbGlViXJiLASmFAdsrl8pJcsizgGIsgbZmm8t4GVjwu7XjW65hiCWT3nqqfN8kbQ6WjXb5UVp3kpLoTxV~rWOEEGSinSzD1ysBsMc2ZvGJYcB27kQIIXCYirGZ2IH~o2A6wRllJiO-lX4d1svBXNHje6ZZuBz7EobVHCdOj8pg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"},{"id":101450962,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/101450962/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"pdf.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/101450962/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"On_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/101450962/pdf-libre.pdf?1682367401=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DOn_Kant_doing_philosophy_and_the_Peircea.pdf\u0026Expires=1744413138\u0026Signature=TIrKn2RPiuT8Hi8-HrVg1QSUqEKXw8PZtLA7ejrpazbftgOV1DdHl7tXFm5YYPW82qngwG30c9FdumPJfHvwznEaaAAZ~4824VGBlszMH2qOfy1asrm8t-wv3y~P7jh5jCpg~79mXPRa7qTh5~cRBf1Ix3CQ-ELqjlSP61EIHzPtWDjbTrFCiOcU9gxnBzAHHPEcEC6JJIONYH5MKwvwkeCzXIJ1YqaGDTD24qBC0nX3-XEBiR5ONvZJYJfnIaHfG7juCtF8REqvkX7wjQVev-ReZn8M3VKi-ztpscmCn2DQm1fT0MneXdMwn5eYsJMyq7dQ3ZMgQh6uagH01DABZA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":15674,"name":"Linguistics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Linguistics"},{"id":137020,"name":"Semiotica","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Semiotica"}],"urls":[{"id":30889292,"url":"https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/sem-2022-0022/pdf"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-100703540-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="100702715"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/100702715/Essays_in_Honor_of_Richard_S_Robin_Peirces_Essential_Discovery_Our_Senses_as_Reasoning_Machines_Can_Quasi_Prove_Our_Perceptual_Judgments"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Essays in Honor of Richard S. Robin || Peirce's Essential Discovery: \Our Senses as Reasoning Machines\ Can Quasi-Prove Our Perceptual Judgments" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Essays in Honor of Richard S. Robin || Peirce's Essential Discovery: \Our Senses as Reasoning Machines\ Can Quasi-Prove Our Perceptual Judgments</div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="100702715"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="100702715"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 100702715; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=100702715]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=100702715]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 100702715; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='100702715']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=100702715]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":100702715,"title":"Essays in Honor of Richard S. Robin || Peirce's Essential Discovery: \\Our Senses as Reasoning Machines\\ Can Quasi-Prove Our Perceptual Judgments","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2002,"errors":{}}},"translated_abstract":null,"internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/100702715/Essays_in_Honor_of_Richard_S_Robin_Peirces_Essential_Discovery_Our_Senses_as_Reasoning_Machines_Can_Quasi_Prove_Our_Perceptual_Judgments","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-04-24T12:03:35.887-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Essays_in_Honor_of_Richard_S_Robin_Peirces_Essential_Discovery_Our_Senses_as_Reasoning_Machines_Can_Quasi_Prove_Our_Perceptual_Judgments","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":null,"impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-100702715-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="96728915"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/96728915/Peircean_Realism_Truth_as_the_Meaning_of_Cognitive_Signs_Representing_External_Reality"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Peircean Realism: Truth as the Meaning of Cognitive Signs Representing External Reality" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Peircean Realism: Truth as the Meaning of Cognitive Signs Representing External Reality</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Etude de la phenomenologie de Peirce definie comme phaneroscopie et de sa theorie des signes comm...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Etude de la phenomenologie de Peirce definie comme phaneroscopie et de sa theorie des signes comme cognition. Soulevant le probleme de la representation et de la reference dans le cadre du debat opposant phenomenalisme et pragmatisme, l&#39;A. met en evidence le fondement experimental de notre instinct naturel pour la verite, et analyse l&#39;explication peirceenne de notre connaissance objective du monde exterieur</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="96728915"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="96728915"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96728915; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96728915]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96728915]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96728915; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='96728915']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=96728915]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":96728915,"title":"Peircean Realism: Truth as the Meaning of Cognitive Signs Representing External Reality","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Etude de la phenomenologie de Peirce definie comme phaneroscopie et de sa theorie des signes comme cognition. 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Soulevant le probleme de la representation et de la reference dans le cadre du debat opposant phenomenalisme et pragmatisme, l\u0026#39;A. met en evidence le fondement experimental de notre instinct naturel pour la verite, et analyse l\u0026#39;explication peirceenne de notre connaissance objective du monde exterieur","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/96728915/Peircean_Realism_Truth_as_the_Meaning_of_Cognitive_Signs_Representing_External_Reality","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-02-11T12:20:11.205-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":9995570,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Peircean_Realism_Truth_as_the_Meaning_of_Cognitive_Signs_Representing_External_Reality","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"fr","content_type":"Work","summary":"Etude de la phenomenologie de Peirce definie comme phaneroscopie et de sa theorie des signes comme cognition. Soulevant le probleme de la representation et de la reference dans le cadre du debat opposant phenomenalisme et pragmatisme, l\u0026#39;A. met en evidence le fondement experimental de notre instinct naturel pour la verite, et analyse l\u0026#39;explication peirceenne de notre connaissance objective du monde exterieur","impression_tracking_id":null,"owner":{"id":9995570,"first_name":"Dan","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Nesher","page_name":"DanNesher","domain_name":"haifa","created_at":"2014-03-11T20:17:23.507-07:00","display_name":"Dan Nesher","url":"https://haifa.academia.edu/DanNesher"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":951,"name":"Humanities","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Humanities"},{"id":729720,"name":"Explication","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Explication"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-96728915-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="91005399"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/91005399/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/94413284/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/91005399/Pragmatic_theory_of_meaning_A_note_on_Peirces_last_formulation_of_the_pragmatic_maxim_and_its_Interpretation">Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Semiotica</span><span>, 1983</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of phi...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side Claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that the disputants must be of cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or eise one side of the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. (5.6, 1905(7); cf. 5.33) This program in regard to the specific meaning of a specific kind of sign is to some extent similar to Kant's program in CPR (1787) with regard to truth, and to Wittgenstein's program in the Tractatus in regard to the meaning of linguistic expressions: to demarcate the explainable from the unexplainable and to give it a philosophical account. There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="b900a352f3f1e4e68d9fd6ebfe5c79e6" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":94413284,"asset_id":91005399,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/94413284/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="91005399"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="91005399"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 91005399; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=91005399]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=91005399]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 91005399; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='91005399']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "b900a352f3f1e4e68d9fd6ebfe5c79e6" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=91005399]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":91005399,"title":"Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce's 'last' formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its Interpretation","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","grobid_abstract":"But first, what is its purpose? 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There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. 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Thus the nature of Sign and its function in the structure of the Semiotic process is the hero of this story. In the framework of this paper I will discuss semiotics in its widest sense: namely, not only as a theory of signs and philosophy of language, but also as a philosophy of cognition and mind. This extension of the conception of Semiosis comes, upon my interpretation, as a natural conclusion of the reconstruction of Peirce's pragmaticist philosophy. There is a strong inclination among some semioticians, philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and others (including physicists) to understand every natural phenomenon, either physical or psychical, as a Sign process, and therefore as a Semiosis. In doing so they seem to be identifying the structures of the physical processes they study with the structure of their own cognition, in which they interpret in Signs those former processes. Such enterprises follow the path of cybernetics, information theory, and computer science in understanding physical processes in terms of 'sign',</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="5058c84838b1de308b98376d65204eb1" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":89965649,"asset_id":85190472,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/89965649/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="85190472"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="85190472"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 85190472; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=85190472]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=85190472]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 85190472; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='85190472']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "5058c84838b1de308b98376d65204eb1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=85190472]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":85190472,"title":"Understanding sign semiosis as cognition and as self-conscious process: A reconstruction of some basic conceptions in Peirce’s semiotics","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","ai_title_tag":"Sign Semiosis: Cognition and Peirce's Perspective","grobid_abstract":"In this paper I will deal with some basic conceptions of semioticsmainly with the nature, the structure, and the evolution of Semiosis. 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Thus the nature of Sign and its function in the structure of the Semiotic process is the hero of this story. In the framework of this paper I will discuss semiotics in its widest sense: namely, not only as a theory of signs and philosophy of language, but also as a philosophy of cognition and mind. This extension of the conception of Semiosis comes, upon my interpretation, as a natural conclusion of the reconstruction of Peirce's pragmaticist philosophy. There is a strong inclination among some semioticians, philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and others (including physicists) to understand every natural phenomenon, either physical or psychical, as a Sign process, and therefore as a Semiosis. In doing so they seem to be identifying the structures of the physical processes they study with the structure of their own cognition, in which they interpret in Signs those former processes. 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From this perspective, Putnam&#x27;s causal theory of meaning is only a relic of his previous...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">... From this perspective, Putnam&#x27;s causal theory of meaning is only a relic of his previousmetaphysical realism in which the causal connections be tween physical objects and their representing signs hold independently from human cognition (Putnam 1975, chaps. ...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="74408037"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="74408037"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 74408037; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=74408037]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=74408037]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 74408037; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='74408037']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=74408037]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":74408037,"title":"Pragmaticist Realism: The Third Philosophical Perspective as the Intermediate Point Between Metaphysical Realism and Internal Realism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"... 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between &quot;Metaphysical Realism&quot; and &quot;Internal Realism&quot; Chapter 6 &quot;Which Side Spinoza Would Have Taken [between Einstein and Bohr] if He had Lived to See the [Scientific] Development of Our Days&quot; (Bohr, 1949:237): An Analysis of Human Representation of Physical Reality Chapter 7 The Pragmatist Conception of Truth with a &quot;Bold&quot; Solution to the Liar Paradox Chapter 8 In Spite of Davidson&#39;s Arguments for &quot;The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,&quot; Truth Can be Defined Chapter 9 We Know What Our Propositions Represent When We Prove Their Truth: Response to Gettier Chapter 10 Putnam on Truth: Can We Know Reality with a Big &quot;R&quot; with Proved Truths with a Smal...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="69740061"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="69740061"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 69740061; 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