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Judicial Branch</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2">Section II</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-1">Clause I</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-1/constitutional-avoidance-doctrine"> Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item breadcrumb-last"> The Judicial Branch in the Constitutional Framework</li> </ol> </nav> </div> </div> </div> <main id="main" class="container-fluid"> <div id="content" class="col-sm-8"> <div class="pagewrapper"> <div class="container-fluid"> <div class="row"> <div title="Definitions Frame"></div> <div id="prevnext"> <a href="/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-1/overview-of-constitutional-avoidance-doctrine" title="">prev</a> | <a href="/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-1/the-counter-majoritarian-difficulty" title="">next</a> </div> <div class="chunkcontent" divtype="anncon3"> <div class="topic_block" level="4"> <div class="header">ArtIII.S2.C1.10.2 Judiciary in the Constitutional Framework</div> <p class="const-intro">Article III, Section 2, Clause 1:</p> <p class="const-context">The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.</p> <p class="indent-paragraph">The Supreme Court developed the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine to minimize concerns about unelected federal judges setting aside Congress’s laws on constitutional grounds. Underlying the Constitution is the principle that government legitimacy depends on the consent of the people. Noting that “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,” the Declaration of Independence justified the colonies’ separation from the British Crown, because it had, through “repeated injuries and usurpations,” deprived the colonists of government that represented and protected their interests.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn1art3" id="fn1" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019794" /> <span class="cite cite-type-constitution"><span>The Declaration of Independence</span> (1776)</span>. '>1</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019794"></span><span class="cite cite-type-constitution"><span class="title">The Declaration of Independence</span> (1776)</span>.</span></p> <p class="indent-paragraph">Contemplating that popular sovereignty would guard against tyranny, the Framers provided for the people to elect the House of Representatives directly and the Senate and the Executive indirectly. Popular sovereignty, which the Framers viewed as necessary for a free and republican government, meant government by the majority.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn2art3" id="fn2" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019795" /> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>John Locke</span>, <span>Second Treatise</span> § 97 (1689)</span> ( “And thus every Man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the <em>majority</em>, and to be concluded by it; or else this <em>original Compact,</em> whereby he with others incorporates into <em>one Society</em>, would signifie nothing and be no Compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties, than he was in before in the state of Nature.” ). '>2</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019795"></span><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="author">John Locke</span>, <span class="title">Second Treatise</span> § 97 (1689)</span> ( “And thus every Man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the <em>majority</em>, and to be concluded by it; or else this <em>original Compact,</em> whereby he with others incorporates into <em>one Society</em>, would signifie nothing and be no Compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties, than he was in before in the state of Nature.” ).</span> The Framers, however, feared that conflicting opinions and rivalries among factions of citizens might cause political instability or, if a faction gained a political majority, harm “the public good and the rights of other citizens.” <a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn3art3" id="fn3" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019796" /> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493273" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 10</span> (James Madison)</span></a>. <em>See also</em> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-51-60#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493427" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 51</span> (James Madison)</span></a> ( “It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard one part of the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” ). '>3</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019796"></span><a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493273"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 10</span> (James Madison)</span></a>. <em>See also</em> <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-51-60#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493427"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 51</span> (James Madison)</span></a> ( “It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard one part of the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” ).</span> To avoid this, the Framers crafted a Constitution that disbursed the limited powers of the new American government across three departments: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary, each with a unique role in securing for the Republic “a steady, upright, and impartial administration of laws.” <a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn4art3" id="fn4" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019797" /> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493417" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em> <span>No. 50</span> (James Madison)</span></a>. '>4</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019797"></span><a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493417"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em> <span class="title">No. 50</span> (James Madison)</span></a>.</span></p> <p class="indent-paragraph">The Framers were also concerned that different branches might attempt to expand their powers beyond those granted by the Constitution and upset the balance the Framers designed to “secure the blessings of liberty.” <a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn5art3" id="fn5" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019798" /> <span>U.S. Const. pmbl.</span> '>5</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019798"></span><span class="cite cite-type-constitution"><a href="/constitution/preamble/"><span class="title">U.S. Const.</span> pmbl.</a></span></span> Consequently, the Framers provided each branch some ability to offset the power of the other two.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn6art3" id="fn6" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019799" /> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>. '>6</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019799"></span><a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>.</span> Describing the division of federal power among the three branches in the <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Federalist No. 78</em></span>, Alexander Hamilton identified the Judicial Branch as posing the least danger to the constitutional framework. He stated:</p> <div class="blockquote"> <p>Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The Judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn7art3" id="fn7" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019800" /> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> '>7</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019800"></span><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span></span></p> </div> <p class="indent-paragraph">Although Hamilton viewed the Judicial Branch as the weakest of the branches, the Framers saw it as critical to preserving the rights of individuals and ensuring that the Legislative and Executive Branches did not exceed their constitutionally-granted powers.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn8art3" id="fn8" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019801" /> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> ( “The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specific exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way then through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” ). '>8</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019801"></span><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> ( “The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specific exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way then through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” ).</span> Hamilton recognized the Constitution as superior to acts passed by Congress because the Constitution, by virtue of its ratification process,<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn9art3" id="fn9" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019802" /> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-31-40#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493396" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em> <span>No. 40</span> (James Madison)</span></a> (describing the Constitution as being submitted to “the people themselves” for ratification). Delegates to state ratifying conventions were selected by popular vote. <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>John Hart Ely</span>, <span>Democracy and Distrust, A Theory of Judicial Review</span> 5 (1980)</span>. '>9</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019802"></span><a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-31-40#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493396"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em> <span class="title">No. 40</span> (James Madison)</span></a> (describing the Constitution as being submitted to “the people themselves” for ratification). Delegates to state ratifying conventions were selected by popular vote. <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="author">John Hart Ely</span>, <span class="title">Democracy and Distrust, A Theory of Judicial Review</span> 5 (1980)</span>.</span> manifests the intentions of the people, whereas acts of Congress merely manifest the intention of the people’s agents.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn10art3" id="fn10" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019803" /> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “If there should be an irreconcilable variance between the [Constitution and a statute], that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” ). <em>See</em> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 49</span> (James Madison)</span> ( “As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power is derived.” ); <em>see also</em> <span>M’Culloch v. Maryland, <a href="/supremecourt/text/17/316">17 U.S. 316</a>, 404–05 (1819)</span> (Marshall, C.J.) ( “The government of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be directly exercised on them, and for their benefit.” ). '>10</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019803"></span><a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “If there should be an irreconcilable variance between the [Constitution and a statute], that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” ). <em>See</em> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 49</span> (James Madison)</span> ( “As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power is derived.” ); <em>see also</em> <span class="cite cite-type-case">M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404–05 (1819)</span> (Marshall, C.J.) ( “The government of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be directly exercised on them, and for their benefit.” ).</span> He wrote: “[W]henever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.” <a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn11art3" id="fn11" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019804" /> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “If there should be an irreconcilable variance between the [Constitution and a statute], that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” ). '>11</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019804"></span><a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “If there should be an irreconcilable variance between the [Constitution and a statute], that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” ).</span></p> <p class="indent-paragraph">Hamilton further described the Judiciary as the “bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments,” stating: “[E]very act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.” <a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn12art3" id="fn12" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019805" /> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> '>12</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019805"></span><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span></span> Hamilton also viewed the Judiciary as protecting minority interests from potential oppression by the majority, stating:</p> <div class="blockquote"> <p>This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn13art3" id="fn13" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019806" /> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> '>13</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019806"></span><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span></span></p> </div> <p class="indent-paragraph">Whether the Framers intended to authorize the Judiciary to set aside laws passed by the elected legislature, as Hamilton envisioned, has been the subject of debate from the Nation’s earliest days. The Constitution does not expressly provide for judicial review. And while it is clear from the <em>Federalist Papers</em> that many Framers contemplated judicial review as including the power to invalidate acts that violated the Constitution, it is less clear whether delegates to the state ratification conventions agreed as to what judicial review might entail.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn14art3" id="fn14" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019807" /> There was not always consensus that the federal courts had the power to strike down laws as unconstitutional. President Andrew Jackson once opined: “[T]he opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.” <span>Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp</span>. After identifying the twenty-five delegates with the greatest impact on the Constitutional Convention, historian Charles Beard identified those who either directly or indirectly supported “judicial control” —John Blair of Virginia, John Dickinson of Delaware, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Alexander Hamilton of New York, William Johnson of Connecticut, Rufus King of Massachusetts, James Madison of Virginia, Luther Martin of Maryland, George Mason of Virginia, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, William Paterson of New Jersey, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, George Washington of Virginia, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania—either directly or indirectly supported “judicial control.” <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>Charles Beard</span>, <span>The Supreme Court and the Constitution</span> 47 (Dover ed. 2006)</span>. '>14</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019807"></span>There was not always consensus that the federal courts had the power to strike down laws as unconstitutional. President Andrew Jackson once opined: “[T]he opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.” <span class="cite cite-type-other">Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832),<a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href=" http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp" target="_blank"> http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp</a></span>. After identifying the twenty-five delegates with the greatest impact on the Constitutional Convention, historian Charles Beard identified those who either directly or indirectly supported “judicial control” —John Blair of Virginia, John Dickinson of Delaware, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Alexander Hamilton of New York, William Johnson of Connecticut, Rufus King of Massachusetts, James Madison of Virginia, Luther Martin of Maryland, George Mason of Virginia, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, William Paterson of New Jersey, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, George Washington of Virginia, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania—either directly or indirectly supported “judicial control.” <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="author">Charles Beard</span>, <span class="title">The Supreme Court and the Constitution</span> 47 (Dover ed. 2006)</span>.</span></p> <p class="indent-paragraph">Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in his seminal 1803 decision, <span class="cite cite-type-case format-in-text"><span class="title">Marbury v. Madison</span></span> firmly entrenched judicial review as a tenet of the new Republic.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn15art3" id="fn15" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019808" /> <span>Marbury v. Madison, <a href="/supremecourt/text/5/137" aria-label="5 U.S. 137">5 U.S. 137 (1803)</a></span>. For an earlier case recognizing judicial review, see <span>Hylton v. United States, <a href="/supremecourt/text/3/171" aria-label="3 U.S. 171">3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796)</a></span>. <em>See also</em> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>Herbert Wechsler</span>, <span>Principles, Politics & Fundamental Law</span> (1961)</span> ( “The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before them to review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions, even though the action involves value choices . . . .” ); <span class="cite cite-type-periodical"><span>William Michael Treanor</span>, <span>Judicial Review Before Marbury</span>, <span>58 Stan. L. Rev. 455</span> (2005)</span>; <span class="cite cite-type-periodical"><span>Robert P. Frankel, Jr.</span>, <span><em>Before Marbury: Hylton v. United States and the Origins of Judicial Review</em></span>, <span>28 J. Sup. Ct Hist. 1</span> (2003)</span>. '>15</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019808"></span><span class="cite cite-type-case">Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)</span>. For an earlier case recognizing judicial review, see <span class="cite cite-type-case">Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796)</span>. <em>See also</em> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="author">Herbert Wechsler</span>, <span class="title">Principles, Politics & Fundamental Law</span> (1961)</span> ( “The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before them to review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions, even though the action involves value choices . . . .” ); <span class="cite cite-type-periodical"><span class="author">William Michael Treanor</span>, <span class="title title-type-article">Judicial Review Before Marbury</span>, <span class="title title-type-journal">58 Stan. L. Rev. 455</span> (2005)</span>; <span class="cite cite-type-periodical"><span class="author">Robert P. Frankel, Jr.</span>, <span class="title"><em>Before Marbury: Hylton v. United States and the Origins of Judicial Review</em></span>, <span class="title title-type-journal">28 J. Sup. Ct Hist. 1</span> (2003)</span>.</span> Chief Justice Marshall saw judicial review as implicit in the Constitution because, among other reasons, written constitutions are the paramount law; legislative acts contrary to the Constitution are thereby void; and the Constitution provides for the judicial department to interpret the law. In <span class="cite cite-type-case format-in-text"><span class="title">Marbury</span></span>, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:</p> <div class="blockquote"> <p>That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected. . . . This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their respective powers. . . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution is void. . . . It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . . [I]n declaring what shall be the <em>supreme</em> law of the land, the <em>constitution</em> itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in <em>pursuance</em> of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle . . . that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that <em>courts</em>, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn16art3" id="fn16" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019809" /> <span class="cite cite-type-case format-short" full="Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)"><span>Marbury</span>, <span> <a href="/supremecourt/text/5/137">5 U.S. 137</a> at 176–80</span></span> (emphasis retained). <em>See also</em> <span>Trop v. Dulles, <a href="/supremecourt/text/356/86">356 U.S. 86</a>, 103 (1958)</span> ( “The Judiciary has the duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights.” ). '>16</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019809"></span><span class="cite cite-type-case format-short" full="Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)"><span class="title">Marbury</span>, <span class="vrpd"> <a aria-label="5 U.S. 137" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/5/137">5 U.S. 137</a> at 176–80</span></span> (emphasis retained). <em>See also</em> <span class="cite cite-type-case">Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958)</span> ( “The Judiciary has the duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights.” ).</span></p> </div> <p class="indent-paragraph">Lending support to the notion that the Constitution contemplates judicial review, the Framers distinguished the Judicial Branch from the Legislative and Executive Branches by freeing it from most forms of political accountability.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn17art3" id="fn17" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019810" /> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493416" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 49</span> (James Madison)</span></a> ( “The [Judiciary], by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions.” ). <em>See also</em> <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>id.</em> <span>No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specific exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way then through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” ). '>17</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019810"></span><a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493416"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 49</span> (James Madison)</span></a> ( “The [Judiciary], by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions.” ). <em>See also</em> <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>id.</em> <span class="title">No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specific exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way then through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” ).</span> Unlike the Legislative and Executive Branches, the Federal Judiciary is not subject to elections or term limits. Instead, the President nominates and the Senate approves Justices to the Supreme Court.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn18art3" id="fn18" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019811" /> <span> <a href="/constitution/articleii" aria-label="US Constitution Article ii">U.S. Const. art. II</a>, § 2, cl. 2</span> ( “[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court . . . .” ). '>18</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019811"></span><span class="cite cite-type-constitution"><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii"><span class="title">U.S. Const.</span> art. II, § 2, cl. 2</a></span> ( “[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court . . . .” ).</span> The Constitution further secures the Judiciary’s independence from public pressure and Legislative and Executive Branch influence by providing Justices life tenure during Good Behavior<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn19art3" id="fn19" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019812" /> The Good Behavior Clause created a “permanent tenure of judicial offices” to ensure an “independent spirit in judges.” <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>. <em>See</em> ArtIII.S1.10.2.3 Good Behavior Clause Doctrine. '>19</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019812"></span>The Good Behavior Clause created a “permanent tenure of judicial offices” to ensure an “independent spirit in judges.” <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>. <em>See</em> ArtIII.S1.10.2.3 Good Behavior Clause Doctrine.</span> and preventing Congress from reducing the Justices’ compensation.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn20art3" id="fn20" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019813" /> The Compensation Clause created a “fixed provision for [the judiciary’s] support” to prevent the political branches from having power over a Justice’s pecuniary remuneration and, with that, “power over his will.” <a class="external" aria-describedby="new-window-0" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493471" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 79</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>. <em>See</em> ArtIII.S1.10.3.1 Historical Background on Compensation Clause. '>20</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019813"></span>The Compensation Clause created a “fixed provision for [the judiciary’s] support” to prevent the political branches from having power over a Justice’s pecuniary remuneration and, with that, “power over his will.” <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493471"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="title">The Federalist No. 79</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>. <em>See</em> ArtIII.S1.10.3.1 Historical Background on Compensation Clause.</span></p> <p class="indent-paragraph">Congress, however, has some checks on the Judiciary. Justices can be impeached,<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn21art3" id="fn21" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019814" /> <span><span>Jared P. Cole & Todd Garvey, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span>R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution</span> (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46013</span>. '>21</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019814"></span><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="author">Jared P. Cole & Todd Garvey, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span class="title">R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution</span> (2019),<a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href=" https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46013" target="_blank"> https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46013</a></span>.</span> and the Exceptions Clause in Article III grants Congress the power to make “exceptions” and “regulations” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn22art3" id="fn22" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019815" /> <em>See</em> <span><span>Kevin Lewis, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span>R44967, Congress’s Power over Courts: Jurisdiction Stripping and the Rule of Klein</span> (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44967</span>. '>22</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019815"></span><em>See</em> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="author">Kevin Lewis, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span class="title">R44967, Congress’s Power over Courts: Jurisdiction Stripping and the Rule of Klein</span> (2018),<a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href=" https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44967" target="_blank"> https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44967</a></span>.</span> In addition, Congress can dilute the influence of individual Justices by increasing the number of Justices on the Court.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn23art3" id="fn23" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019816" /> <span><span>Joanna Lampe, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span>LSB10562, “Court Packing” : Legislative Control Over the Size of the Supreme Court</span> (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10562</span>. '>23</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019816"></span><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span class="author">Joanna Lampe, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span class="title">LSB10562, “Court Packing” : Legislative Control Over the Size of the Supreme Court</span> (2020),<a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href=" https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10562" target="_blank"> https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10562</a></span>.</span> Finally, the Judiciary’s reliance on the other branches to give effect to its rulings provides a further check: If the Judicial Branch’s rulings are not enforced, the Judiciary becomes, in practical effect, a nullity, incapable of meaningfully performing its duty of preserving the Constitution.<a class="footnote" data-toggle="tooltip" href="#fn24art3" id="fn24" title='<span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019817" /> Chief Justice John Marshall recognized this problem in <span>Marbury v. Madison</span>, ruling that while Marbury was entitled to his commission, the Court could not effectuate its delivery because the Judiciary Act of 1793’s writs of mandamus provision was unconstitutional. <span> <a href="/supremecourt/text/5/137">5 U.S. 137</a>, 176 (1803)</span> ( “The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.” ). '>24</a> <span aria-hidden="true" class="essay-tooltip-text footnotes aside" hidden=""><span class="text-accent h4">Footnote<br/></span><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_00019817"></span>Chief Justice John Marshall recognized this problem in <span class="cite cite-type-case">Marbury v. Madison</span>, ruling that while Marbury was entitled to his commission, the Court could not effectuate its delivery because the Judiciary Act of 1793’s writs of mandamus provision was unconstitutional. <span class="cite cite-type-case">5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803)</span> ( “The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.” ).</span> Consequently, while the Judicial Branch is largely insulated from political pressure, it is not completely insulated.</p> <dl class="footnotes"> Footnotes <dt id="fn1art3">1 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000197940be8c1a8-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span class="cite cite-type-constitution"><span>The Declaration of Independence</span> (1776)</span>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 1" href="#fn1"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn2art3">2 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000197950be8c1a9-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>John Locke</span>, <span>Second Treatise</span> § 97 (1689)</span> ( “And thus every Man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the <em>majority</em>, and to be concluded by it; or else this <em>original Compact,</em> whereby he with others incorporates into <em>one Society</em>, would signifie nothing and be no Compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties, than he was in before in the state of Nature.” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 2" href="#fn2"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn3art3">3 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000197960be8c1aa-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493273" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 10</span> (James Madison)</span></a>. <em>See also</em> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-51-60#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493427" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 51</span> (James Madison)</span></a> ( “It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard one part of the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 3" href="#fn3"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn4art3">4 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000197970be8c1ab-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493417" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em> <span>No. 50</span> (James Madison)</span></a>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 4" href="#fn4"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn5art3">5 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000197980be8c1ac-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span>U.S. Const. pmbl.</span> <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 5" href="#fn5"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn6art3">6 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000197990be8c1ad-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 6" href="#fn6"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn7art3">7 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198000be8c1ae-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 7" href="#fn7"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn8art3">8 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198010be8c1af-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> ( “The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specific exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way then through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 8" href="#fn8"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn9art3">9 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198020be8c1b0-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-31-40#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493396" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em> <span>No. 40</span> (James Madison)</span></a> (describing the Constitution as being submitted to “the people themselves” for ratification). Delegates to state ratifying conventions were selected by popular vote. <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>John Hart Ely</span>, <span>Democracy and Distrust, A Theory of Judicial Review</span> 5 (1980)</span>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 9" href="#fn9"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn10art3">10 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198030be8c1b1-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “If there should be an irreconcilable variance between the [Constitution and a statute], that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” ). <em>See</em> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 49</span> (James Madison)</span> ( “As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power is derived.” ); <em>see also</em> <span>M’Culloch v. Maryland, <a aria-label="17 U.S. 316" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/17/316">17 U.S. 316</a>, 404–05 (1819)</span> (Marshall, C.J.) ( “The government of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be directly exercised on them, and for their benefit.” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 10" href="#fn10"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn11art3">11 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198040be8c1b2-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “If there should be an irreconcilable variance between the [Constitution and a statute], that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 11" href="#fn11"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn12art3">12 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198050be8c1b3-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 12" href="#fn12"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn13art3">13 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198060be8c1b4-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>Id.</em></span> <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 13" href="#fn13"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn14art3">14 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198070be8c1b5-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> There was not always consensus that the federal courts had the power to strike down laws as unconstitutional. President Andrew Jackson once opined: “[T]he opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.” <span>Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp</span>. After identifying the twenty-five delegates with the greatest impact on the Constitutional Convention, historian Charles Beard identified those who either directly or indirectly supported “judicial control” —John Blair of Virginia, John Dickinson of Delaware, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Alexander Hamilton of New York, William Johnson of Connecticut, Rufus King of Massachusetts, James Madison of Virginia, Luther Martin of Maryland, George Mason of Virginia, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, William Paterson of New Jersey, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, George Washington of Virginia, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania—either directly or indirectly supported “judicial control.” <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>Charles Beard</span>, <span>The Supreme Court and the Constitution</span> 47 (Dover ed. 2006)</span>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 14" href="#fn14"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn15art3">15 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198080be8c1b6-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span>Marbury v. Madison, <a aria-label="5 U.S. 137" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/5/137">5 U.S. 137 (1803)</a></span>. For an earlier case recognizing judicial review, see <span>Hylton v. United States, <a aria-label="3 U.S. 171" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/3/171">3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796)</a></span>. <em>See also</em> <span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>Herbert Wechsler</span>, <span>Principles, Politics & Fundamental Law</span> (1961)</span> ( “The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before them to review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions, even though the action involves value choices . . . .” ); <span class="cite cite-type-periodical"><span>William Michael Treanor</span>, <span>Judicial Review Before Marbury</span>, <span>58 Stan. L. Rev. 455</span> (2005)</span>; <span class="cite cite-type-periodical"><span>Robert P. Frankel, Jr.</span>, <span><em>Before Marbury: Hylton v. United States and the Origins of Judicial Review</em></span>, <span>28 J. Sup. Ct Hist. 1</span> (2003)</span>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 15" href="#fn15"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn16art3">16 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198090be8c1b7-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span class="cite cite-type-case format-short" full="Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)"><span>Marbury</span>, <span> <a aria-label="5 U.S. 137" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/5/137">5 U.S. 137</a> at 176–80</span></span> (emphasis retained). <em>See also</em> <span>Trop v. Dulles, <a aria-label="356 U.S. 86" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/356/86">356 U.S. 86</a>, 103 (1958)</span> ( “The Judiciary has the duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights.” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 16" href="#fn16"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn17art3">17 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198100be8c1b8-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493416" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 49</span> (James Madison)</span></a> ( “The [Judiciary], by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions.” ). <em>See also</em> <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><em>id.</em> <span>No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a> ( “The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specific exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way then through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 17" href="#fn17"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn18art3">18 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198110be8c1b9-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span> <a aria-label="US Constitution Article ii" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii">U.S. Const. art. II</a>, § 2, cl. 2</span> ( “[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court . . . .” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 18" href="#fn18"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn19art3">19 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198120be8c1ba-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> The Good Behavior Clause created a “permanent tenure of judicial offices” to ensure an “independent spirit in judges.” <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 78</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>. <em>See</em> ArtIII.S1.10.2.3 Good Behavior Clause Doctrine. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 19" href="#fn19"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn20art3">20 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198130be8c1bb-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> The Compensation Clause created a “fixed provision for [the judiciary’s] support” to prevent the political branches from having power over a Justice’s pecuniary remuneration and, with that, “power over his will.” <a aria-describedby="new-window-0" class="external" href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493471" target="_blank"><span class="cite cite-type-book"><span>The Federalist No. 79</span> (Alexander Hamilton)</span></a>. <em>See</em> ArtIII.S1.10.3.1 Historical Background on Compensation Clause. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 20" href="#fn20"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn21art3">21 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198140be8c1bc-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span><span>Jared P. Cole & Todd Garvey, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span>R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution</span> (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46013</span>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 21" href="#fn21"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn22art3">22 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198150be8c1bd-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <em>See</em> <span><span>Kevin Lewis, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span>R44967, Congress’s Power over Courts: Jurisdiction Stripping and the Rule of Klein</span> (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44967</span>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 22" href="#fn22"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn23art3">23 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198160be8c1be-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> <span><span>Joanna Lampe, Cong. Rsch. Serv.</span>, <span>LSB10562, “Court Packing” : Legislative Control Over the Size of the Supreme Court</span> (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10562</span>. <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 23" href="#fn23"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> <dt id="fn24art3">24 </dt> <dd><span class="fn_ref" id="_ALDF_000198170be8c1bf-484a-11ef-b8c7-e9213680cfdc"></span> Chief Justice John Marshall recognized this problem in <span>Marbury v. Madison</span>, ruling that while Marbury was entitled to his commission, the Court could not effectuate its delivery because the Judiciary Act of 1793’s writs of mandamus provision was unconstitutional. <span> <a aria-label="5 U.S. 137" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/5/137">5 U.S. 137</a>, 176 (1803)</span> ( “The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.” ). <a aria-label="Back to text at footnote reference 24" href="#fn24"><img alt="back" class="back-to-text" src="/images/back_to_text.png"/></a></dd> </dl> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div id="page-bottom" aria-hidden="true"> <div class="region region-bottom"> <div id="block-liidfp-2" class="block block-liidfp first last odd"> <div class="gfs"> <div id="div-gpt-ad-bottom" data-google-query-id="CNH77Z7C7d8CFURLAQodp9oMpg"> <script type="text/javascript"> googletag.cmd.push(function () { googletag.display('div-gpt-ad-bottom'); }); </script> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <aside id="supersizeme" class="col-sm-4" aria-label="Sponsor Listings and Toolbox panel"> <div class="block" id="toolbox"> <h2 class="title toolbox"><span class="glyphicon glyphicon-briefcase"></span> U.S. Constitution Annotated Toolbox </h2> <ul> <li> <a href="/anncon/">Explanation of the Constitution</a> - from the Congressional Research Service </li> </ul> <div class="socSep"> <hr /> </div> <div class="addthis_sharing_toolbox"></div> <div class="socSep"> <hr /> </div> <script type="text/javascript"> var addthis_config = { data_track_addressbar: false, data_track_clickback: true, publid: 'liiadverts', ui_tabindex: 0, ui_508_compliant: true }; var addthis_share = { url_transforms: { shorten: { twitter: 'bitly' } }, shorteners: { bitly: { login: 'liicornell', apiKey: 'R_75b99d95e1c3033c4dbea23ce04bf5d3' } }, passthrough: { twitter: { via: 'LIICornell' } } }; </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="https://s7.addthis.com/js/300/addthis_widget.js#pubid=liiadverts" async="async"></script> </div> <div class="block" aria-hidden="true"> <div class="gfs"> <div id='div-gpt-ad-top'> <script type='text/javascript'> googletag.cmd.push(function () { googletag.display('div-gpt-ad-top'); }); </script> </div> </div> </div> <div class="block" aria-hidden="true"> <div class="gfs"> <div id='div-gpt-ad-middle'> <script type='text/javascript'> googletag.cmd.push(function () { googletag.display('div-gpt-ad-middle'); }); </script> </div> </div> </div> <div id="block-lii-justia-find-lawyers-sidebar" class="block block-lii last even"> <div id="block-lii-justia-lawyers" class="block block-lii last even"> <div class="sidebar"> <div class="results-sponsored"> <div data-directive="j-find-a-lawyer" data-crosslink="seemorelawyers" data-domain="lawyers.law.cornell.edu"> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </aside> </main> <footer id="liifooter" class="container-fluid"> <ul id="liifooternav" class="nav navbar-nav"> <li class="first"> <a href="/lii/about/accessibility" class="nav">Accessibility</a> </li> <li class="first"> <a href="/lii/about/about_lii" class="nav">About LII</a> </li> <li> <a href="/lii/about/contact_us" class="nav">Contact us</a> </li> <li> <a href="/lii/help_out/sponsor">Advertise here</a> </li> <li> <a href="/lii/help" class="nav">Help</a> </li> <li> <a href="/lii/terms/documentation" class="nav">Terms of use</a> </li> <li class="last"> <a href="/lii/terms/privacy_policy" class="nav">Privacy</a> </li> </ul> <ul class="nav navbar-nav navbar-right"> <li> <a href="/" title="LII home page"> <img width="62" height="43" src="https://www.law.cornell.edu/sites/all/themes/liizenboot/images/LII_logo_footer.gif" alt="LII logo"> </a> </li> </ul> </footer> <script> jQuery(document).ready(function () { jQuery("#liisearchlink").click(function () { jQuery("#liisearch").toggle('slide'); jQuery("#liinavbarstuff").toggleClass('searchboxslid'); }); }); jQuery(document).ready(function () { jQuery('[data-toggle="tooltip"]').each(function () { var $elem = jQuery(this); $elem.tooltip({ html: true, container: $elem, delay: { hide: 400 } }); }); }); </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="/staticsite_scripts/htmldiff.js"> </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="/staticsite_scripts/lii_scriptinator.min.js"> </script> <script> window.addEventListener("load", function () { window.cookieconsent.initialise( { "palette": { "popup": { "background": "#000" }, "button": { "background": "#f1d600" } } }) }); </script> </body>