#68 in HMTX Industries LLC v. United States (Fed. Cir., 23-1891)

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[1021565] [23-1891] [Pratik Shah] [Entered: 07/30/2024 04:08 PM] "/> <link rel="search" type="application/opensearchdescription+xml" title="CourtListener" href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/static/xml/opensearch.72b938ad7809.xml" /> <meta name="application-name" content="CourtListener"/> <meta name="msapplication-tooltip" content="Create alerts, search for and browse the latest case law."/> <meta name="msapplication-starturl" content="https://www.courtlistener.com"/> <meta name="msapplication-navbutton-color" content="#6683B7"/> <meta name="twitter:card" content="summary_large_image"> <meta name="twitter:creator" content="@freelawproject"> <meta name="twitter:site" content="@courtlistener"> <meta property="og:type" content="website"/> <meta property="og:title" content="#68 in HMTX Industries LLC v. United States (Fed. Cir., 23-1891) – CourtListener.com"/> <meta property="og:description" content="Citation of Supplemental Authority pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) for Appellants HMTX Industries LLC, Halstead New England Corp., Metroflor Corp. and Jasco Products Company LLC. Service: 07/30/2024 by email. 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United States, 23-1891, (Fed. Cir. Jul 30, 2024) ECF No. 68</span> </p> <p class="bottom"> <span class="meta-data-header">Date Filed:</span> <span class="meta-data-value"> July 30th, 2024 </span> </p> <p class="bottom"> <span class="meta-data-header">Uploaded:</span> <span class="meta-data-value"> July 31st, 2024 </span> </p> <div class="v-offset-below-3 v-offset-above-1"> <div class="btn-group"> <button id="add-note-button" class="btn btn-success pointer hidden-print" data-toggle="modal" data-target="#modal-save-note, #modal-logged-out" title="Save this record as a note in your profile"> <i class="fa fa-bookmark "></i> <span>Add Note</span></button> </div> <div class="btn-group"> <a href="/?type=r&q=id%3A407206038" rel="nofollow" role="button" class="btn btn-success" ><i class="fa fa-search"></i> Search this PDF </a> <button type="button" class="btn btn-success dropdown-toggle" data-toggle="dropdown" aria-haspopup="true" aria-expanded="false"> <span class="caret"></span> <span class="sr-only">Toggle Dropdown</span> </button> <ul class="dropdown-menu"> <li> <a href="/?type=r&q=docket_id%3A67394063" rel="nofollow" >Search full Docket</a> </li> </ul> </div> <div class="btn-group"> <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217.68.0.pdf" role="button" class="btn btn-primary">Download PDF <i class="fa fa-file-pdf-o"></i> </a> <button type="button" class="btn btn-primary dropdown-toggle" data-toggle="dropdown" aria-haspopup="true" aria-expanded="false"> <span class="caret"></span> <span class="sr-only">Toggle Dropdown</span> </button> <ul class="dropdown-menu"> <li> <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217.68.0.pdf">From CourtListener</a> </li> <li> <a href="https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217.68.0.pdf">From Internet Archive</a> </li> <li role="separator" class="divider"></li> <li> <a href="https://ecf.cafc.uscourts.gov/docs1/01302359166?caseId=20217" data-toggle="modal" data-target="#modal-buy-pacer" class="open_buy_pacer_modal" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Buy on PACER</a> </li> </ul> </div> </div> <br> <div> <div class="well well-sm"> <h4>Description</h4> <p>Citation of Supplemental Authority pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) for Appellants HMTX Industries LLC, Halstead New England Corp., Metroflor Corp. and Jasco Products Company LLC. Service: 07/30/2024 by email. [1021565] [23-1891] [Pratik Shah] [Entered: 07/30/2024 04:08 PM]</p> </div> <ul class="nav nav-tabs v-offset-below-1" role="tablist"> <li role="presentation" class="active"> <a href="#pdf" aria-controls="home" role="tab" data-toggle="tab">PDF</a> </li> <li role="presentation"> <a href="#text" aria-controls="profile" role="tab" data-toggle="tab">Text</a></li> <li class="inactive" role="presentation"> <a href="/docket/67394063/68/hmtx-industries-llc-v-united-states/authorities/"> Authorities </a> </li> </ul> <div class="tab-content"> <div role="tabpanel" class="tab-pane active" id="pdf"> <div class="embed-responsive embed-responsive-8by11"> <object data="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217.68.0.pdf?no-og=true" type="application/pdf" width="100%" height="100%"> <div class="row"> <div class="col-sm-1 col-md-2 col-lg-3"></div> <div class="col-xs-12 col-sm-10 col-md-8 col-lg-6 text-center"> <p>Oops! Your browser does not support embedded PDF viewing. </p> <p> <div class="v-offset-below-1 v-offset-above-1"> <div class="btn-group"> <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217.68.0.pdf" role="button" class="btn btn-primary">Download PDF <i class="fa fa-file-pdf-o"></i> </a> <button type="button" class="btn btn-primary dropdown-toggle" data-toggle="dropdown" aria-haspopup="true" aria-expanded="false"> <span class="caret"></span> <span class="sr-only">Toggle Dropdown</span> </button> <ul class="dropdown-menu"> <li> <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217.68.0.pdf">From CourtListener</a> </li> <li> <a href="https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217/gov.uscourts.cafc.20217.68.0.pdf">From Internet Archive</a> </li> <li role="separator" class="divider"></li> <li> <a href="https://ecf.cafc.uscourts.gov/docs1/01302359166?caseId=20217" data-toggle="modal" data-target="#modal-buy-pacer" class="open_buy_pacer_modal" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Buy on PACER</a> </li> </ul> </div> </div> </p> </div> </div> </object> </div> </div> <div role="tabpanel" class="tab-pane" id="text"> <div id='default-text'> <div id="opinion-content"> <pre>Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP T +1 202.887.4000 Robert S. Strauss Tower F +1 202.887.4288 2001 K Street, N.W. akingump.com Washington, DC 20006 Pratik A. Shah +1 202.887.4210/fax: +1 202.887.4288 pshah@akingump.com July 30, 2024 VIA ELECTRONIC FILING Jarrett B. Perlow, Clerk of the Court U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 717 Madison Place, NW Washington, DC 20439 Re: HMTX Industries LLC v. United States, No. 23-1891: Plaintiffs- Appellants’ F.R.A.P. 28(j) Notice of Supplemental Authority Dear Mr. Perlow: On June 28, the Supreme Court decided Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) (Attachment). Loper Bright overruled Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which had directed courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes in APA cases. Loper Bright is pertinent to this case for three reasons. First, Loper Bright confirms that “USTR’s Statutory Constructions Are Not Entitled To Deference.” Reply 9-11. Nothing in the APA permits the deferential “clear misconstruction” standard Defendants seek; on the contrary, deferring to USTR’s interpretation of Section 307 would “violate the APA by yielding to an agency the express responsibility, vested in ‘the reviewing court,’ to ‘decide all relevant questions of law’ and ‘interpret *** statutory provisions.’” Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2270 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706). That is especially so because this dispute is “about the scope of [USTR’s] own power—perhaps the occasion on which abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate.” Id. at 2266. Second, Loper Bright confirms that deferring to USTR would also run afoul of the “major questions” doctrine. That doctrine requires Congress, in delegating authority to agencies to act on questions of “deep economic and political July 30, 2024 Page 2 significance,” to do so “expressly if at all.” Id. at 2269 (cleaned up). Absent “express” authority to act, Defendants are really seeking “Chevron-like deference that has no place in the ‘major questions’ framework.” Reply 11. Third, although Loper Bright applies explicitly to agency decisions (like under Section 307), its reasoning is not so limited. Instead, the Judiciary’s obligation to find the “best” reading of the statute applies “[i]n an agency case as in any other.” 144 S. Ct. at 2266 (emphasis added). Thus, in all cases, it “makes no sense to speak of a ‘permissible’ interpretation that is not the one the court, after applying all relevant interpretive tools, concludes is best. In the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible.” Id. (emphasis added). Because Plaintiffs’ reading is the best, the Court should reverse the CIT’s judgment. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Pratik A. Shah Pratik A. Shah Matthew R. Nicely James E. Tysse Daniel M. Witkowski Devin S. Sikes AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP Counsel to Plaintiffs-Appellants HMTX Industries, LLC, Halstead New England Corp., Metroflor Corporation, and Jasco Products Company LLC Dated: July 30, 2024 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE The undersigned counsel at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP hereby certify that Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority, dated July 30, 2024, complies with the word-count limitation set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j). The notice contains 346 words according to the word-count function of the word-processing software used to prepare the memorandum. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Pratik A. Shah Pratik A. Shah Matthew R. Nicely James E. Tysse Daniel M. Witkowski Devin S. Sikes AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP Counsel to Plaintiffs-Appellants HMTX Industries, LLC, Halstead New England Corp., Metroflor Corporation, and Jasco Products Company LLC Dated: July 30, 2024 ATTACHMENT Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) 144 S.Ct. 2244 Vacated and remanded. Supreme Court of the United States. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, et al., Petitioners joined. v. Gina RAIMONDO, Secretary of Commerce, et al. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Relentless, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Department of Commerce, et al. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice No. 22-451, No. 22-1219 Sotomayor joined and Justice Jackson joined as applied to | second case. Argued January 17, 2024 | Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision Decided June 28, 2024 of the first case. Synopsis Procedural Posture(s): Petition for Writ of Certiorari; On Background: In first case, herring fishing companies Appeal; Motion for Summary Judgment. operating in the Atlantic herring fishery brought action against Secretary of Commerce and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), alleging that Magnuson-Stevens *2247 Syllabus * Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) did not authorize Service, in implementing statutory amendment The Court granted certiorari in these cases limited to the establishing industry-funded monitoring programs for fishery question whether Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources management, to promulgate final rule requiring Atlantic Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 herring fishery to fund costs for on-board observers required L.Ed.2d 694, should be overruled or clarified. Under the by fishery management plan. The United States District Chevron doctrine, courts have sometimes been required to Court for the District of Columbia, Emmet G. Sullivan, J., defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of the statutes 544 F.Supp.3d 82, granted summary judgment to Secretary those agencies administer—even when a reviewing court and Service. Companies appealed. The United States Court reads the statute differently. Id., at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Rogers, In each case below, the reviewing courts applied Chevron’s Circuit Judge, 45 F.4th 359, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. framework to resolve in favor of the Government challenges In second case, owners of fishing vessels operating in the by petitioners to a rule promulgated by the National Marine Atlantic herring fishery brought action asserting similar Fisheries Service pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 claims. The United States District Court for the District of U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., which incorporates the Administrative Rhode Island, William E. Smith, J., 561 F.Supp.3d 226, Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. entered summary judgment in government's favor. Owners appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to Circuit, Kayatta, Circuit Judge, 62 F.4th 621, affirmed. exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an Certiorari was granted in part. agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled. Pp. 2257 – 2273. The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts, held that courts need not, and under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (a) Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal may not, defer to an agency's interpretation of the law simply Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases” because a statute is ambiguous; overruling Chevron, U.S.A., and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, for the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors disputes would not always be clear, but envisioned that the which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” final “interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 peculiar province of the courts.” The Federalist No. 78, p. L.Ed. 124. 525 (A. Hamilton). As Chief Justice Marshall declared in the foundational decision of Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is Occasionally during this period, the Court applied deferential emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department review after concluding that a particular statute empowered to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60. an agency to decide how a broad statutory term applied In the decades following Marbury, when the meaning of a to specific facts found by the agency. See Gray v. Powell, statute was at issue, the judicial role was to “interpret the act 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301; NLRB v. of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.” Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515, 10 L.Ed. 559. 88 L.Ed. 1170. But such deferential review, which the Court was far from consistent in applying, was cabined to The Court recognized from the outset, though, that exercising factbound determinations. And the Court did not purport to independent judgment often included according due respect refashion the longstanding judicial approach to questions of to Executive Branch interpretations of federal statutes. Such law. It instead proclaimed that “[u]ndoubtedly questions of respect was thought especially warranted when an Executive statutory interpretation ... are for the courts to resolve, giving Branch interpretation was issued roughly contemporaneously appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special with enactment of the statute and remained consistent over duty is to administer the questioned statute.” Id., at 130–131, time. The Court also gave “the most respectful consideration” 64 S.Ct. 851. Nothing in the New Deal era or before it thus to Executive Branch interpretations simply because “[t]he resembled the deference rule the Court would begin applying officers concerned [were] usually able men, and masters of decades later to all varieties of agency interpretations of the subject,” who may well have drafted the laws at issue. statutes under Chevron. Pp. 2257 – 2261. United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763, 24 L.Ed. 588. “Respect,” though, was just that. The views of the Executive (b) Congress in 1946 enacted the APA “as a check upon Branch could inform the judgment of the Judiciary, but did administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried not supersede it. “[I]n cases where [a court's] own judgment ... them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating differ[ed] from that of other high functionaries,” the court was their offices.” Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 644, 70 S.Ct. “not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” United States v. 357. The APA prescribes procedures for agency action and Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 16, 10 L.Ed. 689. delineates the basic contours of judicial review of such action. And it codifies for agency cases the unremarkable, During the “rapid expansion of the administrative process” yet elemental proposition reflected by judicial practice dating that took place during the New Deal era, United States back to Marbury: that courts decide legal questions by v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 applying their own judgment. As relevant here, the APA L.Ed. 401, the Court often treated agency determinations specifies that courts, not agencies, will decide “all relevant of fact as binding on the courts, provided that there was questions of law” arising on review of agency action, “evidence to support the findings,” St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (emphasis added)—even those involving v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51, 56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033. ambiguous laws. It prescribes no deferential standard for But the Court did not extend similar deference to agency courts to employ in answering those legal questions, resolutions of questions of law. “The interpretation of the despite mandating deferential judicial review of agency meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies,” policymaking and factfinding. See §§ 706(2)(A), (E). And remained “exclusively a judicial function.” United States v. by directing courts to “interpret constitutional and statutory American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 544, 60 S.Ct. provisions” without differentiating between the two, § 706, 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345. The Court also continued to note that it makes clear that agency interpretations of statutes—like the informed judgment of the Executive Branch could be agency interpretations of the Constitution—are not entitled entitled to “great weight.” Id., at 549, 60 S.Ct. 1059. “The to deference. The APA's history and the contemporaneous weight of such a judgment in a particular case,” the Court views of various respected commentators underscore the observed, would “depend upon the thoroughness evident in plain meaning of its text. its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) Courts exercising independent judgment in determining this new test, the Court concluded that Congress had not the meaning of statutory provisions, consistent with the addressed the question at issue with the necessary “level of APA, may—as they have from the start—seek aid from specificity” and that EPA's interpretation was “entitled to the interpretations of those responsible for implementing deference.” Id., at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778. particular statutes. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. And when the best reading of a statute is that it Although the Court did not at first treat Chevron as the delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role watershed decision it was fated to become, the Court and of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to the courts of appeals were soon routinely invoking its independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of framework as the governing standard in cases involving Congress subject to constitutional limits. The court fulfills statutory questions of agency authority. The Court eventually that role by recognizing constitutional delegations, fixing decided that Chevron rested on “a presumption that Congress, the boundaries of the delegated authority, and ensuring the when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation agency has engaged in “ ‘reasoned decisionmaking’ ” within by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be those boundaries. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750, 135 resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the S.Ct. 2699, 192 L.Ed.2d 674 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374, 118 S.Ct. 818, discretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley v. Citibank (South 139 L.Ed.2d 797). By doing so, a court upholds the traditional Dakota), N. A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–741, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 135 conception of the judicial function that the APA adopts. Pp. L.Ed.2d 25. Pp. 2264 – 2265. 2261 – 2264. (2) Neither Chevron nor any subsequent decision of the (c) The deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing Court attempted to reconcile its framework with the APA. agency action cannot be squared with the APA. Pp. 2264 – Chevron defies the command of the APA that “the reviewing 2270. court”—not the agency whose action it reviews—is to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret ... (1) Chevron, decided in 1984 by a bare quorum of six statutory provisions.” § 706 (emphasis added). It requires Justices, triggered a marked departure from the traditional a court to ignore, not follow, “the reading the court would judicial approach of independently examining each statute to have reached” had it exercised its independent judgment determine its meaning. The question in the case was whether as required by the APA. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n. 11, an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation was 104 S.Ct. 2778. Chevron insists on more than the “respect” consistent with the term “stationary source” as used in the historically given to Executive Branch interpretations; it Clean Air Act. 467 U.S. at 840, 104 S.Ct. 2778. To answer that demands that courts mechanically afford binding deference question, the Court articulated and employed a now familiar to agency interpretations, including those that have been two-step approach broadly applicable to review of agency inconsistent over time, see id., at 863, 104 S.Ct. 2778, and action. The first step was to discern “whether Congress ha[d] even when a pre-existing judicial precedent holds that an directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id., at 842, ambiguous statute means something else, National Cable 104 S.Ct. 2778. The Court explained that “[i]f the intent of & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter,” ibid., and 545 U.S. 967, 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820. That courts were therefore to “reject administrative constructions regime is the antithesis of the time honored approach the APA which are contrary to clear congressional intent,” id., at 843, prescribes. n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. But in a case in which “the statute [was] silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” Chevron cannot be reconciled with the APA by presuming at hand, a reviewing court could not “simply impose its own that statutory ambiguities are implicit delegations to agencies. construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the That presumption does not approximate reality. A statutory absence of an administrative interpretation.” Id., at 843, 104 ambiguity does not necessarily reflect a congressional S.Ct. 2778 (footnote omitted). Instead, at Chevron’s second intent that an agency, as opposed to a court, resolve step, a court had to defer to the agency if it had offered “a the resulting interpretive question. Many or perhaps most permissible construction of the statute,” ibid., even if not “the statutory ambiguities may be unintentional. And when courts reading the court would have reached if the question initially confront statutory ambiguities in cases that do not involve had arisen in a judicial proceeding,” ibid., n. 11. Employing agency interpretations or delegations of authority, they are © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) not somehow relieved of their obligation to independently in agency cases before Chevron. After all, in an agency case interpret the statutes. Instead of declaring a particular party's in particular, the reviewing court will go about its task with reading “permissible” in such a case, courts use every tool at the agency's “body of experience and informed judgment,” their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and among other information, at its disposal. Skidmore, 323 U.S. resolve the ambiguity. But in an agency case as in any other, at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. An agency's interpretation of a statute there is a best reading all the same—“the reading the court “cannot bind a court,” but may be especially informative “to would have reached” if no agency were involved. Chevron, the extent it rests on factual premises within [the agency's] 467 U.S. at 843, n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778. It therefore makes expertise.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. no sense to speak of a “permissible” interpretation that is not FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 98, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 439, 78 L.Ed.2d the one the court, after applying all relevant interpretive tools, 195. Delegating ultimate interpretive authority to agencies is concludes is best. simply not necessary to ensure that the resolution of statutory ambiguities is well informed by subject matter expertise. Perhaps most fundamentally, Chevron’s presumption is misguided because agencies have no special competence Nor does a desire for the uniform construction of federal in resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do. The Framers law justify Chevron. It is unclear how much the Chevron anticipated that courts would often confront statutory doctrine as a whole actually promotes such uniformity, and ambiguities and expected that courts would resolve them in any event, we see no reason to presume that Congress by exercising independent legal judgment. Chevron gravely prefers uniformity for uniformity's sake over the correct erred in concluding that the inquiry is fundamentally different interpretation of the laws it enacts. just because an administrative interpretation is in play. The very point of the traditional tools of statutory construction Finally, the view that interpretation of ambiguous statutory is to resolve statutory ambiguities. That is no less true when provisions amounts to policymaking suited for political actors the ambiguity is about the scope of an agency's own power rather than courts is especially mistaken because it rests on —perhaps the occasion on which abdication in favor of the a profound misconception of the judicial role. Resolution of agency is least appropriate. Pp. 2265 – 2266. statutory ambiguities involves legal interpretation, and that task does not suddenly become policymaking just because (3) The Government responds that Congress must generally a court has an “agency to fall back on.” Kisor, 588 U.S. intend for agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities because at 575, 139 S.Ct. 2400. Courts interpret statutes, no matter agencies have subject matter expertise regarding the the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory statutes they administer; because deferring to agencies construction, not individual policy preferences. To stay out purportedly promotes the uniform construction of federal of discretionary policymaking left to the political branches, law; and because resolving statutory ambiguities can involve judges need only fulfill their obligations under the APA policymaking best left to political actors, rather than courts. to independently identify and respect such delegations of See Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 16–19. But authority, police the outer statutory boundaries of those none of these considerations justifies Chevron’s sweeping delegations, and ensure that agencies exercise their discretion presumption of congressional intent. consistent with the APA. By forcing courts to instead pretend that ambiguities are necessarily delegations, Chevron As the Court recently noted, interpretive issues arising in prevents judges from judging. Pp. 2266 – 2268. connection with a regulatory scheme “may fall more naturally into a judge's bailiwick” than an agency's. Kisor v. Wilkie, (4) Because Chevron’s justifying presumption is, as Members 588 U.S. 558, 578, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 204 L.Ed.2d 841. Under of the Court have often recognized, a fiction, the Court has Chevron’s broad rule of deference, though, ambiguities of spent the better part of four decades imposing one limitation all stripes trigger deference, even in cases having little to on Chevron after another. Confronted with the byzantine do with an agency's technical subject matter expertise. And set of preconditions and exceptions that has resulted, some even when an ambiguity happens to implicate a technical courts have simply bypassed Chevron or failed to heed its matter, it does not follow that Congress has taken the power various steps and nuances. The Court, for its part, has not to authoritatively interpret the statute from the courts and deferred to an agency interpretation under Chevron since given it to the agency. Congress expects courts to handle 2016. But because Chevron remains on the books, litigants technical statutory questions, and courts did so without issue must continue to wrestle with it, and lower courts—bound © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) by even the Court's crumbling precedents—understandably continue to apply it. At best, Chevron has been a distraction The only way to “ensure that the law will not merely change from the question that matters: Does the statute authorize erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible the challenged agency action? And at worst, it has required fashion,” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265, 106 S.Ct. 617, courts to violate the APA by yielding to an agency the express 88 L.Ed.2d 598, is for the Court to leave Chevron behind. responsibility, vested in “the reviewing court,” to “decide By overruling Chevron, though, the Court does not call into all relevant questions of law” and “interpret ... statutory question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework. provisions.” § 706 (emphasis added). Pp. 2268 – 2270. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself (d) Stare decisis, the doctrine governing judicial adherence to —are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite the Court's precedent, does not require the Court to persist in the Chevron change in interpretive methodology. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. project. The stare decisis considerations most relevant here Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 170 L.Ed.2d —“the quality of [the precedent's] reasoning, the workability 864. Mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a “ ‘special of the rule it established, ... and reliance on the decision,” justification’ ” for overruling such a holding. Halliburton Co. Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 203, 139 S.Ct. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266, 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2162, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (quoting Janus v. State, County, and 189 L.Ed.2d 339 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 Municipal Employees, 585 U.S. 878, 917, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405). Pp. 2270 L.Ed.2d 924)—all weigh in favor of letting Chevron go. – 2273. Chevron has proved to be fundamentally misguided. It No. 22–451, 45 F. 4th 359 & No. 22–1219, 62 F. 4th 621, reshaped judicial review of agency action without grappling vacated and remanded. with the APA, the statute that lays out how such review works. And its flaws were apparent from the start, prompting ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in the Court to revise its foundations and continually limit its which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and application. BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., and GORSUCH, J., filed concurring opinions. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting Experience has also shown that Chevron is unworkable. opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which The defining feature of its framework is the identification JACKSON, J., joined as it applies to No. 22–1219. of statutory ambiguity, but the concept of ambiguity has JACKSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision always evaded meaningful definition. Such an impressionistic of the case in No. 22–451. and malleable concept “cannot stand as an every-day test for allocating” interpretive authority between courts and agencies. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 125, 86 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 194. The Court has also been forced to COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF clarify the doctrine again and again, only adding to Chevron’s COLUMBIA CIRCUIT unworkability, and the doctrine continues to spawn difficult ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES threshold questions that promise to further complicate the COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT inquiry should Chevron be retained. And its continuing import is far from clear, as courts have often declined to Attorneys and Law Firms engage with the doctrine, saying it makes no difference. Roman Martinez, for Petitioners in No. 22–1219. Nor has Chevron fostered meaningful reliance. Given the Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, for the Respondents Court's constant tinkering with and eventual turn away from in No. 22–1219 and No. 22–451. Chevron, it is hard to see how anyone could reasonably expect a court to rely on Chevron in any particular case or Paul D. Clement for Petitioners in No. 22–451. expect it to produce readily foreseeable outcomes. And rather than safeguarding reliance interests, Chevron affirmatively Ryan P. Mulvey, Eric R. Bolinder, R. James Valvo, III, destroys them by allowing agencies to change course even Cause of Action Institute, Arlington, VA, Paul D. Clement, when Congress has given them no power to do so. Counsel of Record, Andrew C. Lawrence, Chadwick J. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) Harper, Clement & Murphy, PLLC, Alexandria, VA, for Petitioners in No. 22–451. A Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Before 1976, unregulated foreign vessels dominated fishing Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, in the international waters off the U. S. coast, which began Deputy Solicitor General, Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to just 12 nautical miles offshore. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94–459, the Solicitor General, Rachel Heron, Dina B. Mishra, Daniel pp. 2–3 (1975). Recognizing the resultant overfishing and the Halainen, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, need for sound management of fishery resources, Congress Respondents in No. 22–1219 and No. 22–451. enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and John J. Vecchione, Counsel of Record, Mark S. Chenoweth, Management Act (MSA). See 90 Stat. 331 (codified as Kara M. Rollins, Philip Hamburger, New Civil Liberties amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.). The MSA and Alliance, Washington, DC, Roman Martinez, Charles S. subsequent amendments extended the jurisdiction of the Dameron, Michael Clemente, William J. Seidleck, Alexander United States to 200 nautical miles beyond the U. S. territorial G. Siemers, Jacob P. Shapiro, Latham & Watkins LLP, sea and claimed “exclusive fishery management authority Washington, DC, for Petitioners in No. 22–1219. over all fish” within that area, known as the “exclusive economic zone.” § 1811(a); see Presidential Proclamation No. Opinion 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22 (1983 Comp.); §§ 101, 102, 90 Stat. 336. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) administers CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the the MSA under a delegation from the Secretary of Commerce. Court. The MSA established eight regional fishery management *2254 Since our decision in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural councils composed of representatives from the coastal States, Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. fishery stakeholders, and NMFS. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(a), 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), we have sometimes required (b). The councils develop fishery management plans, which courts to defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of the NMFS approves and promulgates as final regulations. See §§ statutes those agencies administer—even when a reviewing 1852(h), 1854(a). In *2255 service of the statute's fishery court reads the statute differently. In these cases we consider conservation and management goals, see § 1851(a), the whether that doctrine should be overruled. MSA requires that certain provisions—such as “a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits ... at a level such that overfishing does not occur,” § 1853(a)(15)—be included I in these plans, see § 1853(a). The plans may also include additional discretionary provisions. See § 1853(b). For Our Chevron doctrine requires courts to use a two-step example, plans may “prohibit, limit, condition, or require the framework to interpret statutes administered by federal use of specified types and quantities of fishing gear, fishing agencies. After determining that a case satisfies the various vessels, or equipment,” § 1853(b)(4); “reserve a portion of the preconditions we have set for Chevron to apply, a reviewing allowable biological catch of the fishery for use in scientific court must first assess “whether Congress has directly spoken research,” § 1853(b)(11); and “prescribe such other measures, to the precise question at issue.” Id., at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If, requirements, or conditions and restrictions as are determined and only if, congressional intent is “clear,” that is the end of to be necessary and appropriate for the conservation and the inquiry. Ibid. But if the court determines that “the statute is management of the fishery,” § 1853(b)(14). silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand, the court must, at Chevron’s second step, defer to the agency's Relevant here, a plan may also require that “one or more interpretation if it “is based on a permissible construction of observers be carried on board” domestic vessels “for the the statute.” Id., at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The reviewing courts purpose of collecting data necessary for the conservation and in each of the cases before us applied Chevron’s framework management of the fishery.” § 1853(b)(8). The MSA specifies to resolve in favor of the Government challenges to the same three groups that must cover costs associated with observers: agency rule. (1) foreign fishing vessels operating within the exclusive economic zone (which must carry observers), see §§ 1821(h) (1)(A), (h)(4), (h)(6); (2) vessels participating in certain © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) limited access privilege programs, which impose quotas et seq. In relevant part, they argued that the MSA does permitting fishermen to harvest only specific quantities of a not authorize NMFS to mandate that they pay for observers fishery's total allowable catch, see §§ 1802(26), 1853a(c)(1) required by a fishery management plan. The District Court (H), (e)(2), 1854(d)(2); and (3) vessels within the jurisdiction granted summary judgment to the Government. It concluded of the North Pacific Council, where many of the largest and that the MSA authorized the Rule, but noted that even if these most successful commercial fishing enterprises in the Nation petitioners’ “arguments were enough to raise an ambiguity operate, see § 1862(a). In the latter two cases, the MSA in the statutory text,” deference to the agency's interpretation expressly caps the relevant fees at two or three percent of the would be warranted under Chevron. 544 F.Supp.3d 82, 107 value of fish harvested on the vessels. See §§ 1854(d)(2)(B), (D.C.C 2021); see id., at 103–107. 1862(b)(2)(E). And in general, it authorizes the Secretary to impose “sanctions” when “any payment required for observer A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit affirmed. See 45 F.4th services provided to or contracted by an owner or operator ... 359 (2022). The majority addressed various provisions of the has not been paid.” § 1858(g)(1)(D). MSA and concluded that it was not “wholly unambiguous” whether NMFS may require Atlantic herring fishermen to The MSA does not contain similar terms addressing whether pay for observers. Id., at 366. Because there remained “some Atlantic herring fishermen may be required to bear costs question” as to Congress's intent, id., at 369, the court associated with any observers a plan may mandate. And at proceeded to Chevron’s second step and deferred to the one point, NMFS fully funded the observer coverage the agency's interpretation as a “reasonable” construction of the New England Fishery Management Council required in its MSA, 45 F.4th at 370. In dissent, Judge Walker concluded plan for the Atlantic herring fishery. See 79 Fed. Reg. 8792 that Congress's silence on industry funded observers for the (2014). In 2013, however, the council proposed amending its Atlantic herring fishery—coupled with the express provision fishery management plans to empower it to require fishermen for such observers in other fisheries and on foreign vessels— to pay for observers if federal funding became unavailable. unambiguously indicated that NMFS lacked the authority to Several years later, NMFS promulgated a rule approving the “require [Atlantic herring] fishermen to pay the wages of at- amendment. See 85 Fed. Reg. 7414 (2020). sea monitors.” Id., at 375. With respect to the Atlantic herring fishery, the Rule created an industry funded program that aims to ensure observer C coverage on 50 percent of trips undertaken by vessels with certain types of permits. Under that program, vessel Petitioners Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet representatives must “declare into” a fishery before beginning LLC own two vessels that operate in the Atlantic herring a trip by notifying NMFS of the trip and announcing the fishery: the F/V Relentless and the F/V Persistence. 1 These species the vessel intends to harvest. If NMFS determines that vessels use small-mesh bottom-trawl gear and can freeze fish an observer is required, but declines to assign a Government- at sea, so they can catch more species of fish and take longer paid one, the vessel must contract with and pay for a trips than other vessels (about 10 to 14 days, as opposed to Government-certified third-party observer. NMFS estimated the more typical 2 to 4). As a result, they generally declare that the cost of such an observer would be up to $710 per into multiple fisheries per trip so they can catch whatever the day, reducing annual returns to the vessel owner by up to 20 ocean offers up. If the vessels declare into the Atlantic herring percent. See id., at 7417–7418. fishery for a particular trip, they must carry an observer for that trip if NMFS selects the trip for coverage, even if they end up harvesting fewer herring than other vessels—or no herring B at all. Petitioners Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc., H&L Axelsson, This set of petitioners, like those in the D. C. Circuit case, Inc., Lund Marr Trawlers LLC, and Scombrus One LLC filed a suit challenging the Rule as unauthorized by the are family businesses that operate in the *2256 Atlantic MSA. The District Court, like the D. C. Circuit, deferred herring fishery. In February 2020, they challenged the Rule to NMFS's contrary interpretation under Chevron and thus under the MSA, 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f), which incorporates granted summary judgment to the Government. See 561 the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 F.Supp.3d 226, 234–238 (D.R.I. 2021). © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) branches, the courts would by design exercise “neither Force The First Circuit affirmed. See 62 F.4th 621 (2023). It nor Will, but merely judgment.” Id., at 523. To ensure the relied on a “default norm” that regulated entities must bear “steady, upright and impartial administration of the laws,” compliance costs, as well as the MSA's sanctions provision, the Framers structured the Constitution to allow judges to Section 1858(g)(1)(D). See id., at 629–631. And it rejected exercise that judgment independent of influence from the petitioners’ argument that the express statutory authorization political branches. Id., at 522; see id., at 522–524; Stern v. of three industry funding programs demonstrated that NMFS Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d lacked the broad implicit authority it asserted to impose 475 (2011). such a program for the Atlantic herring fishery. See id., at 631–633. The court ultimately concluded that the “[a]gency's This Court embraced the Framers’ understanding of the interpretation of its authority to require at-sea monitors who judicial function early on. In the foundational decision are paid for by owners of regulated vessels does not ‘exceed[ ] of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall famously the bounds of the permissible.’ ” Id., at 633–634 (quoting declared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218, 122 S.Ct. 1265, judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002); alteration in original). In reaching 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). And in the following decades, the Court that conclusion, the First Circuit stated *2257 that it was understood “interpret[ing] the laws, in the last resort,” to be a applying Chevron’s two-step framework. 62 F.4th at 628. But “solemn duty” of the Judiciary. United States v. Dickson, 15 it did not explain which aspects of its analysis were relevant to Pet. 141, 162, 10 L.Ed. 689 (1841) (Story, J., for the Court). which of Chevron’s two steps. Similarly, it declined to decide When the meaning of a statute was at issue, the judicial role whether the result was “a product of Chevron step one or step was to “interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the two.” Id., at 634. rights of the parties.” Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515, 10 L.Ed. 559 (1840). We granted certiorari in both cases, limited to the question whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified. See 601 U. The Court also recognized from the outset, though, that S. ––––, 144 S.Ct. 325, 217 L.Ed.2d 154 (2023); 598 U. S. exercising independent judgment often included according ––––, 144 S.Ct. 417, 217 L.Ed.2d 232 (2023). 2 due respect to Executive Branch interpretations of federal statutes. For example, in Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 6 L.Ed. 603 (1827), the Court explained that “[i]n the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the II contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions A into effect, is entitled to very great respect.” Id., at 210; see also United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch 368, 372, 3 L.Ed. 128 Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary (1809) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court). the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences for *2258 Such respect was thought especially warranted the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the laws when an Executive Branch interpretation was issued roughly judges would necessarily apply in resolving those disputes contemporaneously with enactment of the statute and would not always be clear. Cognizant of the limits of human remained consistent over time. See Dickson, 15 Pet. at 161; language and foresight, they anticipated that “[a]ll new laws, United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 142 U.S. though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on 615, 621, 12 S.Ct. 306, 35 L.Ed. 1134 (1892); National Lead the fullest and most mature deliberation,” would be “more or Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145–146, 40 S.Ct. 237, 64 less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning” was settled L.Ed. 496 (1920). That is because “the longstanding ‘practice “by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.” The of the government’ ”—like any other interpretive aid—“can Federalist No. 37, p. 236 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). inform [a court's] determination of ‘what the law is.’ ” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 189 The Framers also envisioned that the final “interpretation of L.Ed.2d 538 (2014) (first quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province of the Wheat. 316, 401, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819); then quoting Marbury, courts.” Id., No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton). Unlike the political 1 Cranch at 177). The Court also gave “the most respectful © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) consideration” to Executive Branch interpretations simply statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies,” was because “[t]he officers concerned [were] usually able men, “exclusively a judicial function.” United States v. American and masters of the subject,” who were “[n]ot unfrequently ... Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 544, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 the draftsmen of the laws they [were] afterwards called upon L.Ed. 1345 (1940); see also Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, to interpret.” United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763, 24 327 U.S. 358, 369, 66 S.Ct. 637, 90 L.Ed. 718 (1946); Medo L.Ed. 588 (1878); see also Jacobs v. Prichard, 223 U.S. 200, Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 681–682, n. 214, 32 S.Ct. 289, 56 L.Ed. 405 (1912). 1, 64 S.Ct. 830, 88 L.Ed. 1007 (1944). The Court *2259 understood, in the words of Justice Brandeis, that “[t]he “Respect,” though, was just that. The views of the Executive supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity Branch could inform the judgment of the Judiciary, but did to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law not supersede it. Whatever respect an Executive Branch was applied.” St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 84, 56 interpretation was due, a judge “certainly would not be bound S.Ct. 720 (concurring opinion). It also continued to note, to adopt the construction given by the head of a department.” as it long had, that the informed judgment of the Executive Decatur, 14 Pet. at 515; see also Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Branch—especially in the form of an interpretation issued Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16, 52 S.Ct. 275, 76 L.Ed. 587 (1932). contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute—could Otherwise, judicial judgment would not be independent at be entitled to “great weight.” American Trucking Assns., 310 all. As Justice Story put it, “in cases where [a court's] own U.S. at 549, 60 S.Ct. 1059. judgment ... differ[ed] from that of other high functionaries,” the court was “not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” Perhaps most notably along those lines, in Skidmore v. Swift Dickson, 15 Pet. at 162. & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), the Court explained that the “interpretations and opinions” of the relevant agency, “made in pursuance of official duty” and “based upon ... specialized experience,” “constitute[d] a body B of experience and informed judgment to which courts and The New Deal ushered in a “rapid expansion of the litigants [could] properly resort for guidance,” even on legal administrative process.” United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 questions. Id., at 139–140, 65 S.Ct. 161. “The weight of such U.S. 632, 644, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950). But as new a judgment in a particular case,” the Court observed, would agencies with new powers proliferated, the Court continued to “depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, adhere to the traditional understanding that questions of law the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and were for courts to decide, exercising independent judgment. later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id., at 140, During this period, the Court often treated agency 65 S.Ct. 161. determinations of fact as binding on the courts, provided that there was “evidence to support the findings.” St. Joseph On occasion, to be sure, the Court applied deferential review Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51, 56 S.Ct. upon concluding that a particular statute empowered an 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033 (1936). “When the legislature itself acts agency to decide how a broad statutory term applied to within the broad field of legislative discretion,” the Court specific facts found by the agency. For example, in Gray v. reasoned, “its determinations are conclusive.” Ibid. Congress Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941), could therefore “appoint[ ] an agent to act within that sphere the Court deferred to an administrative conclusion that a of legislative authority” and “endow the agent with power coal-burning railroad that had arrangements with several coal to make findings of fact which are conclusive, provided the mines was not a coal “producer” under the Bituminous Coal requirements of due process which are specially applicable Act of 1937. Congress had “specifically” granted the agency to such an agency are met, as in according a fair hearing the authority to make that determination. Id., at 411, 62 and acting upon evidence and not arbitrarily.” Ibid. (emphasis S.Ct. 326. The Court thus reasoned that “[w]here, as here, added). a determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion But the Court did not extend similar deference to agency left untouched” so long as the agency's decision constituted resolutions of questions of law. It instead made clear, “a sensible exercise of judgment.” Id., at 412–413, 62 S.Ct. repeatedly, that “[t]he interpretation of the meaning of 326. Similarly, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944), the Court deferred to those that triggered deference in Gray and Hearst, the Court to the determination of the National Labor Relations Board declined to “accept the Administrator's view in deference that newsboys were “employee[s]” within the meaning of the to administrative construction.” Davies Warehouse Co. v. National Labor Relations Act. The Act had, in the Court's Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 156, 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed. 635 (1944). judgment, “assigned primarily” to the Board the task of The Administrator's view, the Court explained, had “hardly marking a “definitive limitation around the term ‘employee.’ seasoned or broadened into a settled administrative practice,” ” Id., at 130, 64 S.Ct. 851. The Court accordingly viewed and thus did not “overweigh the considerations” the Court had its own role as “limited” to assessing whether the Board's “set forth as to the proper construction of the statute.” Ibid. determination had a “ ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.” Id., at 131, 64 S.Ct. 851. Nothing in the New Deal era or before it thus resembled the deference rule the Court would begin applying decades later Such deferential review, though, was cabined to factbound to all varieties of agency interpretations of statutes. Instead, determinations like those at issue in Gray and Hearst. Neither just five years after Gray and two after Hearst, Congress Gray nor Hearst purported to refashion the longstanding codified the opposite rule: the traditional understanding that judicial approach to questions of law. In Gray, after deferring courts must “decide all relevant questions of law.” 5 U.S.C. to the agency's determination that a particular entity was not § 706. 3 a “producer” of coal, the Court went on to discern, based on its own reading of the text, whether another statutory term—“other disposal” of coal—encompassed a transaction lacking a transfer of title. See 314 U.S. at 416–417, 62 S.Ct. *2261 C 326. The Court evidently perceived no basis for deference Congress in 1946 enacted the APA “as a check upon to the agency with respect to that pure legal question. administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them And in Hearst, the Court proclaimed that “[u]ndoubtedly to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their questions of statutory interpretation ... are for the courts to offices.” Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 644, 70 S.Ct. 357. It was resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment *2260 the culmination of a “comprehensive rethinking of the place of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned of administrative agencies in a regime of separate and divided statute.” 322 U.S. at 130–131, 64 S.Ct. 851. At least with powers.” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, respect to questions it regarded as involving “statutory 476 U.S. 667, 670–671, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 interpretation,” the Court thus did not disturb the traditional (1986). rule. It merely thought that a different approach should apply where application of a statutory term was sufficiently In addition to prescribing procedures for agency action, intertwined with the agency's factfinding. the APA delineates the basic contours of judicial review of such action. As relevant here, Section 706 directs that In any event, the Court was far from consistent in reviewing “[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, deferentially even such factbound statutory determinations. the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of Often the Court simply interpreted and applied the statute law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and before it. See K. Davis, Administrative Law § 248, p. 893 determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an (1951) (“The one statement that can be made with confidence agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. It further requires courts to about applicability of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell is that “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and sometimes the Supreme Court applies it and sometimes it conclusions found to be ... not in accordance with law.” § does not.”); B. Schwartz, Gray vs. Powell and the Scope 706(2)(A). of Review, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1955) (noting an “embarrassingly large number of Supreme Court decisions The APA thus codifies for agency cases the unremarkable, that do not adhere to the doctrine of Gray v. Powell”). In yet elemental proposition reflected by judicial practice dating one illustrative example, the Court rejected the U. S. Price back to Marbury: that courts decide legal questions by Administrator's determination that a particular warehouse applying their own judgment. It specifies that courts, not was a “public utility” entitled to an exemption from the agencies, will decide “all relevant questions of law” arising on Administrator's General Maximum Price Regulation. Despite review of agency action, § 706 (emphasis added)—even those the striking resemblance of that administrative determination involving ambiguous laws—and set aside any such action © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) inconsistent with the law as they interpret it. And it prescribes (same). That “present law,” as we have described, adhered to no deferential standard for courts to employ in answering the traditional conception of the judicial function. See supra, those legal questions. That omission is telling, because at 2258 – 2261. Section 706 does mandate that judicial review of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential. See § 706(2) Various respected commentators contemporaneously (A) (agency action to be set aside if “arbitrary, capricious, maintained that the APA required reviewing courts to [or] an abuse of discretion”); § 706(2)(E) (agency factfinding exercise independent judgment on questions of law. Professor in formal proceedings to be set aside if “unsupported by John Dickinson, for example, read the APA to “impose a substantial evidence”). clear mandate that all [questions of law] shall be decided by the reviewing Court itself, and in the exercise of its In a statute designed to “serve as the fundamental charter of own independent judgment.” Administrative Procedure Act: the administrative state,” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 580, Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A. B. 139 S.Ct. 2400, 204 L.Ed.2d 841 (2019) (plurality opinion) A. J. 434, 516 (1947). Professor Bernard Schwartz noted that (internal quotation marks omitted), Congress surely would § 706 “would seem ... to be merely a legislative restatement of have articulated a similarly deferential standard applicable the familiar review principle that questions of law are for the to questions of law had it intended to depart from the reviewing court, at the same time leaving to the courts the task settled pre-APA understanding that deciding such questions of determining in each case what are questions of law.” Mixed was “exclusively a judicial function,” American Trucking Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure Assns., 310 U.S. at 544, 60 S.Ct. 1059. But nothing in the Act, 19 Ford. L. Rev. 73, 84–85 (1950). And Professor Louis APA hints at such a dramatic departure. On the contrary, Jaffe, who had served in several agencies at the advent of the by directing courts to “interpret constitutional and statutory New Deal, thought that § 706 leaves it up to the reviewing provisions” without differentiating between the two, Section “court” to “decide as a ‘question of law’ whether there is 706 makes clear that agency interpretations of statutes—like ‘discretion’ in the premises”—that is, whether the statute at agency interpretations of the Constitution—are not entitled to issue delegates particular discretionary authority to an agency. deference. Under the APA, it thus “remains the responsibility Judicial Control of Administrative Action 570 (1965). of the court to decide whether the law means what the agency says.” Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U.S. The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional understanding 92, 109, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 191 L.Ed.2d 186 (2015) (Scalia, J., of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise concurring in judgment). 4 independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions. In exercising such judgment, though, *2262 The text of the APA means what it says. And a courts may—as they have from the start—seek aid from look at its history if anything only underscores that plain the interpretations of those responsible for implementing meaning. According to both the House and Senate Reports particular statutes. Such interpretations “constitute a body on the legislation, Section 706 “provide[d] that questions of experience and informed judgment to which courts and of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in litigants may properly resort for guidance” consistent with the last analysis.” H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d the APA. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. And Sess., 44 (1946) (emphasis added); accord, S. Rep. No. 752, interpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1945). Some of the legislation's issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may most prominent supporters articulated the same view. See be especially useful in determining the statute's meaning. See 92 Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter); P. ibid.; American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. at 549, 60 S.Ct. McCarran, Improving “Administrative Justice”: Hearings and 1059. Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A. B. A. J. 827, 831 (1946). Even the Department of Justice—an agency with *2263 In a case involving an agency, of course, the statute's every incentive to endorse a view of the APA favorable to the meaning may well be that the agency is authorized to exercise Executive Branch—opined after its enactment that Section a degree of discretion. Congress has often enacted such 706 merely “restate[d] the present law as to the scope of statutes. For example, some statutes “expressly delegate[ ]” judicial review.” Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Manual to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular on the Administrative Procedure Act 108 (1947); see also statutory term. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425, 97 Kisor, 588 U.S. at 582, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (plurality opinion) S.Ct. 2399, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977) (emphasis deleted). 5 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) Others empower an agency to prescribe rules to “fill up The question in the case was whether an EPA regulation the details” of a statutory scheme, Wayman v. Southard, 10 “allow[ing] States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices Wheat. 1, 43, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825), or to regulate subject to within the same industrial grouping as though they were the limits imposed by a term or phrase that “leaves agencies encased within a single ‘bubble’ ” was consistent with the with flexibility,” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752, 135 term “stationary source” as used in the Clean Air Act. 467 S.Ct. 2699, 192 L.Ed.2d 674 (2015), such as “appropriate” or U.S. at 840, 104 S.Ct. 2778. To answer that question of “reasonable.” 6 statutory interpretation, the Court articulated and employed a now familiar two-step approach broadly applicable to review When the best reading of a statute is that it delegates of agency action. discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to independently The first step was to discern “whether Congress ha[d] directly interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id., at 842, 104 S.Ct. subject to constitutional limits. The court fulfills that 2778. The Court explained that “[i]f the intent of Congress role by recognizing constitutional delegations, “fix[ing] the is clear, that is the end of the matter,” ibid., and courts boundaries of [the] delegated authority,” H. Monaghan, were therefore to “reject administrative constructions which Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, are contrary to clear congressional intent,” id., at 843, n. 27 (1983), and ensuring the agency has engaged in “ ‘reasoned 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. To discern such intent, the Court noted, decisionmaking’ ” within those boundaries, Michigan, 576 a reviewing court was to “employ[ ] traditional tools of U.S. at 750, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales statutory construction.” Ibid. & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374, 118 S.Ct. 818, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998)); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. Without mentioning the APA, or acknowledging any doctrinal of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., shift, the Court articulated a second step applicable when 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). By doing “Congress ha[d] not directly addressed the precise question so, a court upholds the traditional conception of the judicial at issue.” Id., at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In such a case function that the APA adopts. —that is, a case in which “the statute [was] silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand —a reviewing court could not “simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the III absence of an administrative interpretation.” Ibid. (footnote omitted). A court instead had to set aside the traditional The deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing interpretive tools and defer to the agency if it had offered agency action cannot be squared with the APA. “a permissible construction of the statute,” ibid., even if not “the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding,” ibid., n. 11. A That directive was justified, according to the Court, by the understanding that administering statutes “requires the In the decades between the enactment of the APA and this formulation of policy” to fill statutory “gap[s]”; by the Court's decision in Chevron, courts generally continued to long judicial tradition of according “considerable weight” review agency interpretations of the statutes they administer to Executive Branch interpretations; and by a host of other by independently examining each statute to determine its considerations, including the complexity of the regulatory meaning. Cf. T. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive scheme, EPA's “detailed and reasoned” consideration, the Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 972–975 (1992). As an early policy-laden nature of the judgment supposedly required, and proponent (and later critic) of Chevron recounted, courts the agency's indirect accountability to the people through the during this period thus identified delegations of discretionary President. Id., at 843, 844, and n. 14, 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778. authority to agencies on a “statute-by-statute basis.” A. Scalia, *2264 Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations Employing this new test, the Court concluded that Congress of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 516. had not addressed the question at issue with the necessary “level of specificity” and that EPA's interpretation was Chevron, decided in 1984 by a bare quorum of six Justices, “entitled to deference.” Id., at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778. It did not triggered a marked departure from the traditional approach. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) matter why Congress, as the Court saw it, had not squarely a court to ignore, not follow, “the reading the court would addressed the question, see ibid., or that “the agency ha[d] have reached” had it exercised its independent judgment as from time to time changed its interpretation,” id., at 863, 104 required by the APA. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The latest EPA interpretation was a permissible S.Ct. 2778. And although exercising independent judgment is reading of the Clean Air Act, so under the Court's new rule, consistent with the “respect” historically given to Executive that reading controlled. Branch interpretations, see, e.g., Edwards’ Lessee, 12 Wheat. at 210; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, Chevron Initially, Chevron “seemed destined to obscurity.” T. Merrill, insists on much more. It demands that courts mechanically The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental afford binding deference to agency interpretations, including Landmark, 66 Admin. L. Rev. 253, 276 (2014). The Court those that have been inconsistent over time. See 467 U.S. at did not at first treat it as the watershed decision it was fated 863, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Still worse, it forces courts to do so even to become; it was hardly cited in cases involving statutory when a pre-existing judicial precedent holds that the statute questions of agency authority. See ibid. But within a few means something else—unless the prior court happened to years, both this Court and the courts of appeals were routinely also say that the statute is “unambiguous.” Brand X, 545 invoking its two-step framework as the governing standard U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688. That regime is the antithesis of in such cases. See id., at 276–277. As the Court did so, the time honored approach the APA prescribes. In fretting it revisited the doctrine's justifications. *2265 Eventually, over the prospect of “allow[ing]” a judicial interpretation of the Court decided that Chevron rested on “a presumption a statute “to override an agency's” in a dispute before a court, that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for ibid., Chevron turns the statutory scheme for judicial review implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity of agency action upside down. would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever Chevron cannot be reconciled with the APA, as the degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley v. Citibank Government and the dissent contend, by presuming that (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–741, 116 S.Ct. statutory ambiguities are implicit delegations to agencies. 1730, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996); see also, e.g., Cuozzo Speed See Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 13, 37–38; Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 276–277, 136 S.Ct. post, at 2295 – 2302 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). Presumptions 2131, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016); Utility Air Regulatory Group have their place in statutory interpretation, but only to the v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 315, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 extent that they approximate reality. Chevron’s presumption (2014); National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand does not, because “[a]n ambiguity is simply not a delegation X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 of law-interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two.” C. L.Ed.2d 820 (2005). Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 445 (1989). As Chevron itself noted, ambiguities may result from an inability on the part of Congress to squarely answer the question at hand, or from B a failure to even “consider the question” with the requisite Neither Chevron nor any subsequent decision of this Court precision. 467 U.S. at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In neither case attempted to reconcile its framework with the APA. The “law does an ambiguity necessarily reflect a congressional intent of deference” that this Court has built on the foundation laid in that an agency, as opposed to a court, resolve the resulting Chevron has instead been “[h]eedless of the original design” interpretive question. And many or perhaps most statutory of the APA. Perez, 575 U.S. at 109, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (Scalia, ambiguities may be *2266 unintentional. As the Framers J., concurring in judgment). recognized, ambiguities will inevitably follow from “the complexity of objects, ... the imperfection of the human faculties,” and the simple fact that “no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea.” The 1 Federalist No. 37, at 236. Chevron defies the command of the APA that “the reviewing Courts, after all, routinely confront statutory ambiguities in court”—not the agency whose action it reviews—is to cases having nothing to do with Chevron—cases that do not “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret ... involve agency interpretations or delegations of authority. Of statutory provisions.” § 706 (emphasis added). It requires © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) course, when faced with a statutory ambiguity in such a case, the ambiguity is not a delegation to anybody, and a court is not 2 somehow relieved of its obligation to independently interpret the statute. Courts in that situation do not throw up their The Government responds that Congress must generally hands because “Congress's instructions have” supposedly intend for agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities because “run out,” leaving a statutory “gap.” Post, at 2294 (opinion of agencies have subject matter expertise regarding the KAGAN, J.). Courts instead understand that such statutes, no statutes they administer; because deferring to agencies matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—have a single, purportedly promotes the uniform construction of federal best meaning. That is the whole point of having written law; and because resolving statutory ambiguities can involve statutes; “every statute's meaning is fixed at the time of policymaking best left to political actors, rather than courts. enactment.” Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. See Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 16–19. The 274, 284, 138 S.Ct. 2067, 201 L.Ed.2d 490 (2018) (emphasis dissent offers more of the same. See post, at 2298 – 2301. deleted). So instead of declaring a particular party's reading But none of these considerations justifies Chevron’s *2267 “permissible” in such a case, courts use every tool at their sweeping presumption of congressional intent. disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity. Beginning with expertise, we recently noted that interpretive issues arising in connection with a regulatory scheme often In an agency case as in any other, though, even if some judges “may fall more naturally into a judge's bailiwick” than an might (or might not) consider the statute ambiguous, there agency's. Kisor, 588 U.S. at 578, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (opinion of is a best reading all the same—“the reading the court would the Court). We thus observed that “[w]hen the agency has have reached” if no agency were involved. Chevron, 467 U.S. no comparative expertise in resolving a regulatory ambiguity, at 843, n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778. It therefore makes no sense to Congress presumably would not grant it that authority.” Ibid. speak of a “permissible” interpretation that is not the one the Chevron’s broad rule of deference, though, demands that court, after applying all relevant interpretive tools, concludes courts presume just the opposite. Under that rule, ambiguities is best. In the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not of all stripes trigger deference. Indeed, the Government and, the best, it is not permissible. seemingly, the dissent continue to defend the proposition that Chevron applies even in cases having little to do with Perhaps most fundamentally, Chevron’s presumption is an agency's technical subject matter expertise. See Brief for misguided because agencies have no special competence in Respondents in No. 221219, p. 17; post, at 2298 – 2299. resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do. The Framers, as noted, anticipated that courts would often confront statutory But even when an ambiguity happens to implicate a technical ambiguities and expected that courts would resolve them by matter, it does not follow that Congress has taken the power exercising independent legal judgment. And even Chevron to authoritatively interpret the statute from the courts and itself reaffirmed that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on given it to the agency. Congress expects courts to handle issues of statutory construction” and recognized that “in the technical statutory questions. “[M]any statutory cases” call absence of an administrative interpretation,” it is “necessary” upon “courts [to] interpret the mass of technical detail that is for a court to “impose its own construction on the statute.” the ordinary diet of the law,” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. Id., at 843, and n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Chevron gravely 141, 161, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001) (Breyer, J., erred, though, in concluding that the inquiry is fundamentally dissenting), and courts did so without issue in agency cases different just because an administrative interpretation is in before Chevron, see post, at 2291 – 2292 (GORSUCH, J., play. The very point of the traditional tools of statutory concurring). Courts, after all, do not decide such questions construction—the tools courts use every day—is to resolve blindly. The parties and amici in such cases are steeped in the statutory ambiguities. That is no less true when the ambiguity subject matter, and reviewing courts have the benefit of their is about the scope of an agency's own power—perhaps the perspectives. In an agency case in particular, the court will occasion on which abdication in favor of the agency is least go about its task with the agency's “body of experience and appropriate. informed judgment,” among other information, at its disposal. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. And although an agency's interpretation of a statute “cannot bind a court,” it may be especially informative “to the extent it rests on factual © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) premises within [the agency's] expertise.” Bureau of Alcohol, not made it into the statute. 1 Works of James Wilson 363 (J. Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 98, n. 8, 104 Andrews ed. 1896). S.Ct. 439, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983). Such expertise has always been one of the factors which may give an Executive Branch That is not to say that Congress cannot or does not confer interpretation particular “power to persuade, if lacking power discretionary authority on agencies. Congress may do so, to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161; see, e.g., subject to constitutional limits, and it often has. But to County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 590 U.S. 165, 180, stay out of discretionary policymaking left to the political 140 S.Ct. 1462, 206 L.Ed.2d 640 (2020); Moore, 95 U.S. at branches, judges need only fulfill their obligations under the 763. APA to independently identify and respect such delegations of authority, police the outer statutory boundaries of those For those reasons, delegating ultimate interpretive authority delegations, and ensure that agencies exercise their discretion to agencies is simply not necessary to ensure that the consistent with the APA. By forcing courts to instead pretend resolution of statutory ambiguities is well informed by that ambiguities are necessarily delegations, Chevron does not subject matter expertise. The better presumption is therefore prevent judges from making policy. It prevents them from that Congress expects courts to do their ordinary job of judging. interpreting statutes, with due respect for the views of the Executive Branch. And to the extent that Congress and the Executive Branch may disagree with how the courts have 3 performed that job in a particular case, they are of course always free to act by revising the statute. In truth, Chevron’s justifying presumption is, as Members of this Court have often recognized, a fiction. See Buffington Nor does a desire for the uniform construction of federal law v. McDonough, 598 U. S. ––––, ––––, 143 S.Ct. 14, 19– justify Chevron. Given inconsistencies in how judges apply 20, 214 L.Ed.2d 206 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting from Chevron, see infra, at 2270 – 2272, it is unclear how much denial of certiorari); Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 286, 136 S.Ct. 2131 the doctrine as a whole (as opposed to its highly deferential (THOMAS, J., concurring); Scalia, 1989 Duke L. J., at 517; second step) actually promotes such uniformity. In any event, see also post, at 2301 – 2302 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). So there is little value in imposing a uniform interpretation of we have spent the better part of four decades imposing one a statute if that interpretation is wrong. We see no reason limitation on Chevron after another, pruning its presumption to presume that Congress prefers uniformity for uniformity's on the understanding that “where it is in doubt that Congress sake over the correct interpretation of the laws it enacts. actually intended to delegate particular interpretive authority to an agency, Chevron is ‘inapplicable.’ ” United States v. The view that interpretation of ambiguous statutory Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d provisions amounts to policymaking *2268 suited for 292 (2001) (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. political actors rather than courts is especially mistaken, for 576, 597, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (Breyer, it rests on a profound misconception of the judicial role. J., dissenting)); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. It is reasonable to assume that Congress intends to leave 638, 649, 110 S.Ct. 1384, 108 L.Ed.2d 585 (1990). policymaking to political actors. But resolution of statutory ambiguities involves legal interpretation. That task does not Consider the many refinements we have made in an effort suddenly become policymaking just because a court has an to match Chevron’s presumption to reality. We have said “agency to fall back on.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 575, 139 S.Ct. that Chevron applies only “when it appears that Congress 2400 (opinion of the Court). Courts interpret statutes, no delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation construction, not individual policy preferences. Indeed, the claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that Framers crafted the Constitution to ensure that federal judges authority.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–227, 121 S.Ct. 2164. could exercise judgment free from the influence of the In practice, that threshold requirement—sometimes called political branches. See The Federalist, No. 78, at 522–525. Chevron “step zero”—largely limits Chevron to “the fruits of They were to construe the law with “[c]lear heads ... and notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.” 533 honest hearts,” not with an eye to policy preferences that had U.S. at 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164. But even when those processes are used, deference is still not warranted “where the regulation © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) is ‘procedurally defective’—that is, where the agency errs 203, 238, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997)— by failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the understandably continue to apply it. regulation.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 220, 136 S.Ct. 2117, 195 L.Ed.2d 382 (2016) (quoting The experience of the last 40 years has thus done little to Mead, 533 U.S. at 227, 121 S.Ct. 2164). rehabilitate Chevron. It has only made clear that Chevron’s fictional presumption of congressional intent was always *2269 Even where those procedural hurdles are cleared, unmoored from the APA's demand that courts exercise substantive ones remain. Most notably, Chevron does not independent judgment in construing statutes administered by apply if the question at issue is one of “deep ‘economic agencies. At best, our intricate Chevron doctrine has been and political significance.’ ” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. nothing more than a distraction from the question that matters: 473, 486, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015). We Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action? And have instead expected Congress to delegate such authority at worst, it *2270 has required courts to violate the APA by “expressly” if at all, ibid., for “[e]xtraordinary grants of yielding to an agency the express responsibility, vested in “the regulatory authority are rarely accomplished through ‘modest reviewing court,” to “decide all relevant questions of law” and words,’ ‘vague terms,’ or ‘subtle device[s],’ ” West Virginia “interpret ... statutory provisions.” § 706 (emphasis added). v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723, 142 S.Ct. 2587, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2022) (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001); IV alteration in original). Nor have we applied Chevron to agency interpretations of judicial review provisions, see Adams Fruit The only question left is whether stare decisis, the doctrine Co., 494 U.S. at 649–650, 110 S.Ct. 1384, or to statutory governing judicial adherence to precedent, requires us to schemes not administered by the agency seeking deference, persist in the Chevron project. It does not. Stare decisis is see Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 519–520, not an “inexorable command,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 138 S.Ct. 1612, 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018). And we have sent 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), and the mixed signals on whether Chevron applies when a statute has stare decisis considerations most relevant here—“the quality criminal applications. Compare Abramski v. United States, of [the precedent's] reasoning, the workability of the rule 573 U.S. 169, 191, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014), it established, ... and reliance on the decision,” Knick v. with Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 203, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 204 Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 704, n. 18, 115 S.Ct. 2407, 132 L.Ed.2d L.Ed.2d 558 (2019) (quoting Janus v. State, County, and 597 (1995). Municipal Employees, 585 U.S. 878, 917, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018))—all weigh in favor of letting Chevron Confronted with this byzantine set of preconditions and go. exceptions, some courts have simply bypassed Chevron, saying it makes no difference for one reason or another. 7 And Chevron has proved to be fundamentally misguided. Despite even when they do invoke Chevron, courts do not always heed reshaping judicial review of agency action, neither it nor the various steps and nuances of that evolving doctrine. In any case of ours applying it grappled with the APA—the one of the cases before us today, for example, the First Circuit statute that lays out how such review works. Its flaws were both skipped “step zero,” see 62 F.4th at 628, and refused to nonetheless apparent from the start, prompting this Court to “classify [its] conclusion as a product of Chevron step one revise its foundations and continually limit its application. or step two”—though it ultimately appears to have deferred It has launched and sustained a cottage industry of scholars under step two, id., at 634. attempting to decipher its basis and meaning. And Members of this Court have long questioned its premises. See, e.g., This Court, for its part, has not deferred to an agency Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198, 219–221, 138 S.Ct. interpretation under Chevron since 2016. See Cuozzo, 579 2105, 201 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); U.S. at 280, 136 S.Ct. 2131 (most recent occasion). But Michigan, 576 U.S. at 760–764, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (THOMAS, Chevron remains on the books. So litigants must continue J., concurring); Buffington, 598 U. S. ––––, 143 S.Ct. 14, to wrestle with it, and lower courts—bound by even our 214 L.Ed.2d 206 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.); B. Kavanaugh, crumbling precedents, see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150–2154 (2016). Even Justice Scalia, an early champion © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 16 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) of Chevron, came to seriously doubt whether it could be meaning, necessarily discernible by a court deploying its reconciled with the APA. See Perez, 575 U.S. at 109–110, full interpretive toolkit. So for the dissent's test to have any 135 S.Ct. 1199 (opinion concurring in judgment). For its meaning, it must think that in an agency case (unlike in any entire existence, Chevron has been a “rule in search of a other), a court should give up on its “interpretive work” before justification,” Knick, 588 U.S. at 204, 139 S.Ct. 2162, if it was it has identified that best meaning. But how does a court know ever coherent enough to be called a rule at all. when to do so? On that point, the dissent leaves a gap of its own. It protests only that some other interpretive tools—all Experience has also shown that Chevron is unworkable. The with pedigrees more robust than Chevron’s, and all designed defining feature of its framework is the identification of to help courts identify the meaning of a text rather than allow statutory ambiguity, which requires deference at the doctrine's the Executive Branch to displace it—also apply to ambiguous second step. But the concept of ambiguity has always evaded texts. See post, at 2308 – 2309. That this is all the dissent meaningful definition. As Justice Scalia put the dilemma just can come up with, after four decades of judicial experience five years after Chevron was decided: “How clear is clear?” attempting to identify ambiguity under Chevron, reveals the 1989 Duke L. J., at 521. futility of the exercise. 8 We are no closer to an answer to that question than we Because Chevron in its original, two-step form was so were four decades ago. “ ‘[A]mbiguity’ is a term that may indeterminate and sweeping, we have instead been forced to have different meanings for different judges.” Exxon Mobil clarify the doctrine again and again. Our attempts to do so Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572, 125 have only added to Chevron’s unworkability, transforming S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). the original two-step into a dizzying breakdance. See Adams One judge might see ambiguity everywhere; another might Fruit Co., 494 U.S. at 649–650, 110 S.Ct. 1384; Mead, 533 never encounter it. Compare L. Silberman, Chevron—The U.S. at 226–227, 121 S.Ct. 2164; King, 576 U.S. at 486, 135 Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821, 822 S.Ct. 2480; Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 220, 136 S.Ct. (1990), with R. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: 2117; Epic Systems, 584 U.S. at 519–520, 138 S.Ct. 1612; Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 Vand. on and on. And the doctrine continues to spawn difficult L. Rev. En Banc 315, 323 (2017). A rule of law that is so threshold questions that promise to further complicate the wholly “in the eye of the beholder,” Exxon Mobil Corp., inquiry should Chevron be retained. See, e.g., Cargill v. 545 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 2611 (Stevens, J., dissenting), Garland, 57 F.4th 447, 465–468 (CA5 2023) (plurality invites different results in like cases and is therefore “arbitrary opinion) (May the Government waive reliance on Chevron? in practice,” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Does Chevron apply to agency interpretations of statutes Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 283, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d imposing criminal penalties? Does Chevron displace the rule 296 (1988). Such an impressionistic and malleable concept of lenity?), aff'd, 602 U. S. 406, 144 S.Ct. 1613, ––– L.Ed.2d *2271 “cannot stand as an every-day test for allocating” –––– (2024). interpretive authority between courts and agencies. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 125, 86 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d Four decades after its inception, Chevron has thus become 194 (1965). an impediment, rather than an aid, to accomplishing the basic judicial task of “say[ing] what the law is.” Marbury, The dissent proves the point. It tells us that a court should 1 Cranch at 177. And its continuing import is far from reach Chevron’s second step when it finds, “at the end of clear. Courts have often declined to engage with the doctrine, its interpretive work,” that “Congress has left an ambiguity saying it makes no difference. See n. 7, supra. And as noted, or gap.” Post, at 2294. (The Government offers a similar we have avoided deferring under Chevron since 2016. That test. See Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 7, 10, trend is nothing new; for decades, we have often declined 14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 113–114, 116.) That is no guide at all. to invoke Chevron even in those cases where it might Once more, the basic nature and meaning of a statute does appear to be applicable. See W. Eskridge & L. Baer, *2272 not change when an agency happens to be involved. Nor The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of does it change just because the agency has happened to offer Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, its interpretation through the sort of procedures necessary 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1125 (2008). At this point, all that remains to obtain deference, or because the other preconditions for of Chevron is a decaying husk with bold pretensions. Chevron happen to be satisfied. The statute still has a best © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 17 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) Nor has Chevron been the sort of “ ‘stable background’ rule” jettisoned many precedents that Congress likewise could have that fosters meaningful reliance. Post, at 2298, n. 1 (opinion legislatively overruled. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit of KAGAN, J.) (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Union, 485 U.S. 617, 618, 108 S.Ct. 1419, 99 L.Ed.2d 879 Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (1988) (per curiam) (collecting cases). And part of “judicial (2010)). Given our constant tinkering with and eventual turn humility,” post, at 2294 – 2295, 2307 (opinion of KAGAN, away from Chevron, and its inconsistent application by the J.,), is admitting and in certain cases correcting our own lower courts, it instead is hard to see how anyone—Congress mistakes, especially when those mistakes are serious, see included—could reasonably expect a court to rely on Chevron post, at 2279 – 2280 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). in any particular case. And even if it were possible to predict accurately when courts will apply Chevron, the doctrine This is one of those cases. Chevron was a judicial invention “does not provide ‘a clear or easily applicable standard, so that required judges to disregard their statutory duties. And arguments for reliance based on its clarity are misplaced.’ ” the only way to “ensure that the law will not merely change Janus, 585 U.S. at 927, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (quoting South Dakota erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162, 186, 138 S.Ct. 2080, 201 fashion,” *2273 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265, 106 L.Ed.2d 403 (2018)). To plan on Chevron yielding a particular S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), is for us to leave Chevron result is to gamble not only that the doctrine will be invoked, behind. but also that it will produce readily foreseeable outcomes and the stability that comes with them. History has proved neither By doing so, however, we do not call into question prior cases bet to be a winning proposition. that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Rather than safeguarding reliance interests, Chevron Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject affirmatively destroys them. Under Chevron, a statutory to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive ambiguity, no matter why it is there, becomes a license methodology. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 authorizing an agency to change positions as much as it likes, U.S. 442, 457, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 170 L.Ed.2d 864 (2008). with “[u]nexplained inconsistency” being “at most ... a reason Mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a “ ‘special for holding an interpretation to be ... arbitrary and capricious.” justification’ ” for overruling such a holding, because to say Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981, 125 S.Ct. 2688. But statutory a precedent relied on Chevron is, at best, “just an argument ambiguity, as we have explained, is not a reliable indicator that the precedent was wrongly decided.” Halliburton Co. v. of actual delegation of discretionary authority to agencies. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266, 134 S.Ct. 2398, Chevron thus allows agencies to change course even when 189 L.Ed.2d 339 (2014) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, Congress has given them no power to do so. By its sheer 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000)). breadth, Chevron fosters unwarranted instability in the law, That is not enough to justify overruling a statutory precedent. leaving those attempting to plan around agency action in an eternal fog of uncertainty. *** Chevron accordingly has undermined the very “rule of law” The dissent ends by quoting Chevron: “ ‘Judges are not values that stare decisis exists to secure. Michigan v. Bay experts in the field.’ ” Post, at 2310 (quoting 467 U.S. at 865, Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 798, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 104 S.Ct. 2778). That depends, of course, on what the “field” 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). And it cannot be constrained by is. If it is legal interpretation, that has been, “emphatically,” admonishing courts to be extra careful, or by tacking on a new “the province and duty of the judicial department” for at batch of conditions. We would need to once again “revis[e] its least 221 years. Marbury, 1 Cranch at 177. The rest of the theoretical basis ... in order to cure its practical deficiencies.” dissent's selected epigraph is that judges “ ‘are not part of Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792, 129 S.Ct. 2079, either political branch.’ ” Post, at 2310 (quoting Chevron, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009). Stare decisis does not require us 467 U.S. at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778). Indeed. Judges have always to do so, especially because any refinements we might make been expected to apply their “judgment” independent of the would only point courts back to their duties under the APA political branches when interpreting the laws those branches to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret ... enact. The Federalist No. 78, at 523. And one of those laws, statutory provisions.” § 706. Nor is there any reason to wait the APA, bars judges from disregarding that responsibility helplessly for Congress to correct our mistake. The Court has © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) just because an Executive Branch agency views a statute Chevron’s constitutional defects in overruling it. * Post, at differently. 2283 – 2286 (concurring opinion). To provide “practical and real protections for individual liberty,” the Framers Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent drafted a Constitution that divides the legislative, executive, judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its and judicial powers between three branches of Government. statutory authority, as the APA requires. Careful attention to Perez, 575 U.S. at 118, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (opinion of THOMAS, the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform that J.). Chevron deference compromises this separation of powers inquiry. And when a particular statute delegates authority to in two ways. It curbs the judicial power afforded to courts, and an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must simultaneously expands agencies’ executive power beyond respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts constitutional limits. within it. But courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a Chevron compels judges to abdicate their Article III “judicial statute is ambiguous. Power.” § 1. “[T]he judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in Because the D. C. and First Circuits relied on Chevron in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.” Perez, 575 U.S. deciding whether to uphold the Rule, their judgments are at 119, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); accord, vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings post, at 2284 – 2285 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). The Framers consistent with this opinion. understood that “legal texts ... often contain ambiguities,” and that the judicial power included “the power to resolve these It is so ordered. ambiguities over time.” Perez, 575 U.S. at 119, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); accord, ante, at 2257 – 2258. But, under Chevron, a judge must accept an agency's interpretation Justice THOMAS, concurring. of an ambiguous law, even if he thinks another interpretation I join the Court's opinion in full because it correctly concludes is correct. Ante, at 2264. Chevron deference thus prevents that Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense judges from exercising their independent judgment to resolve Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d ambiguities. Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ––––, 140 S.Ct. at 691– 694 (1984), must finally be overruled. Under Chevron, a 92 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Michigan, 576 U.S. judge was required to adopt an agency's interpretation of an at 761, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also ambiguous statute, so long as the agency had a “permissible Perez, 575 U.S. at 123, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (opinion of THOMAS, construction of the statute.” See id., at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. J.). By tying a judge's hands, Chevron prevents the Judiciary As the Court explains, that deference does not comport with from serving as a constitutional check on the Executive. It the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires judges allows “the Executive ... to dictate the outcome of cases to decide “all relevant questions of law” and “interpret through erroneous interpretations.” Baldwin, 589 U. S., at constitutional and statutory provisions” when reviewing an ––––, 140 S.Ct. at 692 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); Michigan, agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also ante, at 2263 – 2266; 576 U.S. at 763, n. 1, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (opinion of THOMAS, Baldwin v. United States, 589 U. S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 140 J.); see also Perez, 575 U.S. at 124, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (opinion S.Ct. 690, 692–93, 206 L.Ed.2d 231 (2020) (THOMAS, J., of THOMAS, J.). Because the judicial power requires judges dissenting from denial of certiorari). to exercise their independent judgment, the deference that Chevron requires contravenes Article III's mandate. *2274 I write separately to underscore a more fundamental problem: Chevron deference also violates our Constitution's Chevron deference also permits the Executive Branch to separation of powers, as I have previously explained at exercise powers not given to it. “When the Government length. See Baldwin, 589 U. S., at –––– – ––––, 140 is called upon to perform a function that requires an S.Ct. at 691–92 (dissenting opinion); Michigan v. EPA, exercise of legislative, executive, or judicial power, only the 576 U.S. 743, 761–763, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 192 L.Ed.2d 674 vested recipient of that power can perform it.” Department (2015) (concurring opinion); see also Perez v. Mortgage of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, Bankers Assn., 575 U.S. 92, 115–118, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 191 575 U.S. 43, 68, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 191 L.Ed.2d 153 L.Ed.2d 186 (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment). And, (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Because I agree with Justice GORSUCH that we should not overlook the Constitution gives the Executive Branch only “[t]he © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 19 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) executive Power,” executive agencies may constitutionally not be overlooked. Regardless of what a statute says, the type exercise only that power. Art. II, § 1, cl. 1. But, Chevron of deference required by Chevron violates the Constitution. gives agencies license to exercise judicial *2275 power. By allowing agencies to definitively interpret laws so long as they are ambiguous, Chevron “transfer[s]” the Judiciary's Justice GORSUCH, concurring. “interpretive judgment to the agency.” Perez, 575 U.S. at 124, In disputes between individuals and the government about 135 S.Ct. 1199 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Baldwin, the meaning of a federal law, federal courts have traditionally 589 U. S., at ––––, 140 S.Ct. at 692 (opinion of THOMAS, sought to offer independent judgments about “what the J.); Michigan, 576 U.S. at 761–762, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (opinion law is” without favor to either side. Marbury v. Madison, of THOMAS, J.); post, at 2284 – 2285 (GORSUCH, J., 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Beginning in the concurring). mid-1980s, however, this Court experimented with a radically different approach. Applying Chevron deference, judges Chevron deference “cannot be salvaged” by recasting it as began deferring to the views of executive agency officials deference to an agency's “formulation of policy.” Baldwin, about the meaning of federal statutes. See Chevron U. S. A. 589 U. S., at ––––, 140 S.Ct. at 691 (opinion of THOMAS, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). If that were true, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). With time, the error Chevron would mean that “agencies are unconstitutionally of this approach became widely appreciated. So much so that exercising ‘legislative Powers’ vested in Congress.” Baldwin, this Court has refused to apply Chevron deference since 2016. 589 U. S., at ––––, 140 S.Ct. at 691 (opinion of THOMAS, Today, the Court places a tombstone on Chevron no one can J.) (quoting Art. I, § 1). By “giv[ing] the force of law to miss. In doing so, the Court returns judges to interpretive rules agency pronouncements on matters of private conduct as to that have guided federal courts since the Nation's founding. which Congress did not actually have an intent,” Chevron I write separately to address why the proper application of “permit[s] a body other than Congress to perform a function *2276 the doctrine of stare decisis supports that course. that requires an exercise of legislative power.” Michigan, 576 U.S. at 762, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). No matter the gloss put I on it, Chevron expands agencies’ power beyond the bounds of Article II by permitting them to exercise powers reserved A to another branch of Government. Today, the phrase “common law judge” may call to mind a Chevron deference was “not a harmless transfer of power.” judicial titan of the past who brilliantly devised new legal Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ––––, 140 S.Ct. at 691 (opinion of rules on his own. The phrase “stare decisis” might conjure THOMAS, J.). “The Constitution carefully imposes structural up a sense that judges who come later in time are strictly constraints on all three branches, and the exercise of power bound to follow the work of their predecessors. But neither free of those accompanying restraints subverts the design of of those intuitions fairly describes the traditional common- the Constitution's ratifiers.” Ibid. In particular, the Founders law understanding of the judge's role or the doctrine of stare envisioned that “the courts [would] check the Executive decisis. by applying the correct interpretation of the law.” Id., at ––––, 140 S.Ct. at 692. Chevron was thus a fundamental At common law, a judge's charge to decide cases was not disruption of our separation of powers. It improperly strips usually understood as a license to make new law. For much courts of judicial power by simultaneously increasing the of England's early history, different rulers and different power of executive agencies. By overruling Chevron, we legal systems prevailed in different regions. As England restore this aspect of our separation of powers. To safeguard consolidated into a single kingdom governed by a single legal individual liberty, “[s]tructure is everything.” A. Scalia, system, the judge's task was to examine those pre-existing Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional legal traditions and apply in the disputes that came to him Interpretation, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (2008). those legal rules that were “common to the whole land and Although the Court finally ends our 40-year misadventure to all Englishmen.” F. Maitland, Equity, Also the Forms of with Chevron deference, its more profound problems should Action at Common Law 2 (1929). That was “common law” judging. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 20 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) 632, 98 Eng. Rep. 1277, 1279 (K. B. 1777). By discarding This view of the judge's role had consequences for the aberrational rulings and pursuing instead the mainstream of authority due judicial decisions. Because a judge's job was to past decisions, he observed, the common law tended over time find and apply the law, not make it, the “opinion of the judge” to “wor[k] itself pure.” Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 22, 33, 26 and “the law” were not considered “one and the same thing.” Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch. 1744) (emphasis deleted). Reflecting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 71 similar thinking, Edmund Burke offered five principles for (1765) (Blackstone) (emphasis deleted). A judge's decision the evaluation of past judicial decisions: “They ought to be might bind the parties to the case at hand. M. Hale, The shewn; first, to be numerous and not scattered here and there; History and Analysis of the Common Law of England 68 —secondly, concurrent and not contradictory and mutually (1713) (Hale). But none of that meant the judge had the power destructive;—thirdly, to be made in good and constitutional to “make a Law properly so called” for society at large, “for times;—fourthly, not to be made to serve an occasion;—and that only the King and Parliament can do.” Ibid. fifthly, to be agreeable to the general tenor of legal principles.” Speech of Dec. 23, 1790, in 3 The Speeches of the Right Other consequences followed for the role precedent played Honourable Edmund Burke 513 (1816). in future judicial proceedings. Because past decisions represented something “less than a Law,” they did not bind Not only did different decisions carry different weight, so did future judges. Ibid. At the same time, as Matthew Hale different language within a decision. An opinion's holding put it, a future judge could give a past decision “Weight” and the reasoning essential to it (the ratio decidendi) merited as “Evidence” of the law. Ibid. Expressing the same idea, careful attention. Dicta, stray remarks, and digressions William Blackstone conceived of judicial precedents as warranted less weight. See N. Duxbury, The Intricacies of “evidence” of “the common law.” 1 Blackstone 69, 71. And Dicta and Dissent 19–24 (2021) (Duxbury). These were no much like other forms of evidence, precedents at common more than “the vapours and fumes of law.” F. Bacon, The Lord law were thought to vary in the weight due them. Some Keeper's Speech in the Exchequer (1617), in 2 The Works of past decisions might supply future courts with considerable Francis Bacon 478 (B. Montagu ed. 1887) (Bacon). guidance. But others might be entitled to lesser weight, not least because judges are no less prone to error than That is not to say those “vapours” were worthless. Often anyone else and they may sometimes “mistake” what the dicta might provide the parties to a particular dispute a “fuller law demands. Id., at 71 (emphasis deleted). In cases like understanding of the court's decisional path or related areas that, both men thought, a future judge should not rotely of concern.” B. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent repeat a past mistake but instead “vindicate” the law “from 65 (2016) (Precedent). Dicta might also provide future courts misrepresentation.” Id., at 70. with a source of “thoughtful advice.” Ibid. But future courts had to be careful not to treat every “hasty expression ... as a When examining past decisions as evidence of the law, serious and deliberate opinion.” Steel v. Houghton, 1 Bl. H. common law judges did not, broadly speaking, afford 51, 53, 126 Eng. Rep. 32, 33 (C. P. 1788). To do so would overwhelming weight to any “single precedent.” J. Baker, work an “injustice to [the] memory” of their predecessors who An Introduction to English Legal History 209–210 (5th ed. could not expect judicial remarks issued in one context to 2019). Instead, a prior decision's persuasive force depended apply perfectly in others, perhaps especially ones they could in large measure on its “Consonancy and Congruity with not foresee. Ibid. Also, the limits of the adversarial process, Resolutions and Decisions of former Times.” Hale 68. An a distinctive feature of English law, had to be borne in mind. individual decision might reflect the views of one court at one When a single judge or a small panel reached a decision moment in time, but a consistent line of decisions representing in a case, they did so based on the factual record and legal the wisdom of many minds across many generations was arguments the parties at hand have chosen to develop. Attuned generally considered stronger evidence of the law's meaning. to those constraints, future judges had to proceed with an open Ibid. mind to the possibility that different facts and different legal arguments might dictate different outcomes in later disputes. With this conception of precedent in mind, Lord Mansfield See Duxbury 19–24. cautioned against elevating “particular cases” above the *2277 “general principles” that “run through the cases, and govern the decision of them.” Rust v. Cooper, 2 Cowp. 629, © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 21 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) The framers also recognized that the judicial power described in our Constitution implies, as the judicial power did in B England, a power (and duty) of discrimination when it comes Necessarily, this represents just a quick sketch of traditional to assessing the “evidence” embodied in past decisions. common-law understandings of the judge's role and the place So, for example, Madison observed that judicial rulings of precedent in it. It focuses, too, on the horizontal, not “repeatedly confirmed ” may supply better evidence of the vertical, force of judicial precedents. But there are good law's meaning than isolated or aberrant ones. Letter to C. reasons to think that the common law's understandings of Ingersoll (June 1831), in 4 Letters and Other Writings of judges and precedent outlined above crossed the Atlantic and James Madison 184 (1867) (emphasis added). Extending informed the nature of the “judicial Power” the Constitution the thought, Thomas Jefferson believed it would often take vests in federal courts. Art. III, § 1. “numerous decisions” for the meaning of new statutes to become truly “settled.” Letter to S. Jones (July 1809), in 12 Not only was the Constitution adopted against the backdrop The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 299 (A. Bergh ed. 1907). of these understandings and, in light of that alone, they may provide evidence of what the framers meant when they spoke From the start, too, American courts recognized that not of the “judicial Power.” Many other, more specific provisions everything found in a prior decision was entitled to equal in the Constitution reflect much the same distinction between weight. As Chief Justice Marshall warned, “It is a maxim not lawmaking and lawfinding functions the common law did. to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, The Constitution provides that its terms may be amended only are to be taken in connection with the case in which those through certain prescribed *2278 democratic processes. Art. expressions are used.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, V. It vests the power to enact federal legislation exclusively 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). To the extent a past court offered views in the people's elected representatives in Congress. Art. I, § 1. “beyond the case,” those expressions “may be respected” in Meanwhile, the Constitution describes the judicial power as a later case “but ought not to control the judgment.” Ibid. the power to resolve cases and controversies. Art. III, § 2, cl. One “obvious” reason for this, Marshall continued, had to do 1. As well, it delegates that authority to life-tenured judges, with the limits of the adversarial process we inherited from see § 1, an assignment that would have made little sense if England: Only “[t]he question actually before the Court is judges could usurp lawmaking powers vested in periodically investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other elected representatives. But one that makes perfect sense if principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in what is sought is a neutral party “to interpret and apply” the their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing law without fear or favor in a dispute between others. 2 The on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.” Id., at Works of James Wilson 161 (J. Andrews ed. 1896) (Wilson); 399–400. see Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 866, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824). Abraham Lincoln championed these traditional understandings in his debates with Stephen Douglas. Douglas The constrained view of the judicial power that runs through took the view that a single decision of this Court—no matter our Constitution carries with it familiar implications, ones the how flawed—could definitively resolve a contested issue for framers readily acknowledged. James Madison, for example, everyone and all time. Those who thought otherwise, he said, proclaimed that it would be a “fallacy” to suggest that judges “aim[ed] a deadly blow to our whole Republican system or their precedents could “repeal or alter” the Constitution or of government.” Speech at Springfield, Ill. (June 26, 1857), the laws of the United States. Letter to N. Trist (Dec. 1831), *2279 in 2 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 401 in 9 The Writings of James Madison 477 (G. Hunt ed. 1910). (R. Basler ed. 1953) (Lincoln Speech). But Lincoln knew A court's opinion, James Wilson added, may be thought of as better. While accepting that judicial decisions “absolutely “effective la[w]” “[a]s to the parties.” Wilson 160–161. But determine” the rights of the parties to a court's judgment, he as in England, Wilson said, a prior judicial decision could refused to accept that any single judicial decision could “fully serve in a future dispute only as “evidence” of the law's proper settl[e]” an issue, particularly when that decision departs from construction. Id., at 160; accord, 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on the Constitution. Id., at 400–401. In cases such as these, American Law 442–443 (1826). Lincoln explained, “it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat [the decision] as not having © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 22 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country.” Id., 203 L.Ed.2d 768 (2019). When it comes to fixing errors at 401. of statutory interpretation, the Court has proceeded perhaps more circumspectly. But in that field, too, it has overruled After the Civil War, the Court echoed some of these same even longstanding but “flawed” decisions. See, e.g., Leegin points. It stressed that every statement in a judicial opinion Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, “must be taken in connection with its immediate context,” 904, 907, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (2007). In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 488, 8 S.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216 (1887), and stray “remarks” must not be elevated above the Recent history illustrates all this. During the tenures of Chief written law, see The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 641, 19 L.Ed. 266 Justices Warren and Burger, it seems this Court overruled an (1869); see also, e.g., Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687, 692– average of around three cases per Term, including roughly 693, 20 L.Ed. 460 (1872); Mason v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231, 50 statutory precedents between the 1960s and 1980s alone. 236–238, 18 L.Ed. 783 (1868). During Chief Justice Chase's See W. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L. tenure, it seems a Justice writing the Court's majority opinion J. 1361, 1427–1434 (1988) (collecting cases). Many of these would generally work alone and present his work orally and in *2280 decisions came in settings no less consequential than summary form to his colleagues at conference, which meant today's. In recent years, we have not approached the pace set that other Justices often did not even review the opinion prior by our predecessors, overruling an average of just one or two to publication. 6 C. Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of prior decisions each Term. 1 But the point remains: Judicial the United States 69–70 (1971). The Court could proceed in decisions inconsistent with the written law do not inexorably this way because it understood that a single judicial opinion control. may resolve a “case or controversy,” and in so doing it may make “effective law” for the parties, but it does not legislate Second, another lesson tempers the first. While judicial for the whole of the country and is not to be confused with decisions may not supersede or revise the Constitution or laws that do. federal statutory law, they merit our “respect as embodying the considered views of those who have come before.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 105, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d C 583 (2020). As a matter of professional responsibility, a judge must not only avoid confusing his writings with the law. When From all this, I see at least three lessons about the doctrine a case comes before him, he must also weigh his view of of stare decisis relevant to the decision before us today. Each what the law demands against the thoughtful views of his concerns a form of judicial humility. predecessors. After all, “[p]recedent is a way of accumulating and passing down the learning of past generations, a font First, a past decision may bind the parties to a dispute, but it of established wisdom richer than what can be found in any provides this Court no authority in future cases to depart from single judge or panel of judges.” Precedent 9. what the Constitution or laws of the United States ordain. Instead, the Constitution promises, the American people Doubtless, past judicial decisions may, as they always are sovereign and they alone may, through democratically have, command “greater or less authority as precedents, responsive processes, amend our foundational charter or according to circumstances.” Lincoln Speech 401. But, like revise federal legislation. Unelected judges enjoy no such English judges before us, we have long turned to familiar power. Part I–B, supra. considerations to guide our assessment of the weight due a past decision. So, for example, as this Court has put Recognizing as much, this Court has often said that stare it, the weight due a precedent may depend on the quality decisis is not an “ ‘inexorable command.’ ” State Oil Co. of its reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, its v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 workability, and reliance interests that have formed around it. (1997). And from time to time it has found it necessary to See Ramos, 590 U.S. at 106, 140 S.Ct. 1390. The first factor correct its past mistakes. When it comes to correcting errors recognizes that the primary power of any precedent lies in its of constitutional interpretation, the Court has stressed the power to persuade—and poorly reasoned decisions may not importance of doing so, for they can be corrected otherwise provide reliable evidence of the law's meaning. The second only through the amendment process. See, e.g., Franchise factor reflects the fact that a precedent is more likely to be Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230, 248, 139 S.Ct. 1485, correct and worthy of respect when it reflects the time-tested © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 23 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) wisdom of generations than when it sits “unmoored” from statutes, and general expressions must be read in light of surrounding law. Ibid. The remaining factors, like workability the subject under consideration.” United States v. Skoien, and reliance, do not often supply reason enough on their own 614 F.3d 638, 640 (CA7 2010) (en banc); see also Reiter to abide a flawed decision, for almost any past decision is v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 likely to benefit some group eager to keep things as they are L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (stressing that an opinion is not “a and content with how things work. See, e.g., id., at 108, 140 statute,” and its language should not “be parsed” as if it S.Ct. 1390. But these factors can sometimes serve functions were); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 372, 121 S.Ct. 2304, similar to the others, by pointing to clues that may suggest a 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (same). If stare decisis counsels past decision is right in ways not immediately obvious to the respect for the thinking of those who have come before, it individual judge. also counsels against doing an “injustice to [their] memory” by overreliance on their every word. Steel, 1 Bl.H. at 53, When asking whether to follow or depart from a precedent, 126 Eng. Rep., at 33. As judges, “[w]e neither expect nor some judges deploy adverbs. They speak of whether or not hope that our successors will comb” through our opinions, a precedent qualifies as “demonstrably erroneous,” Gamble searching for delphic answers to matters we never fully v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 711, 139 S.Ct. 1960, explored. Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 141, 142 S.Ct. 204 L.Ed.2d 322 (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring), or 1510, 212 L.Ed.2d 463 (2022). To proceed otherwise risks “egregiously wrong,” Ramos, 590 U.S. at 121, 140 S.Ct. 1390 “turn[ing] stare decisis from a tool of judicial humility into (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part). But the emphasis the one of judicial hubris.” Ibid. adverb imparts is not meant for dramatic effect. It seeks to serve instead as a reminder of a more substantive lesson. The lesson that, in assessing the weight due a past decision, a II judge is not to be guided by his own impression alone, but must self-consciously test his views against those who have Turning now directly to the question what stare decisis effect come before, open to the possibility that a precedent might be Chevron deference warrants, each of these lessons seem to correct in ways not initially apparent to him. me to weigh firmly in favor of the course the Court charts today: Lesson 1, because Chevron deference contravenes the *2281 Third, it would be a mistake to read judicial opinions law Congress prescribed in the Administrative Procedure like statutes. Adopted through a robust and democratic Act. Lesson 2, because Chevron deference runs against process, statutes often apply in all their particulars to all mainstream currents in our law regarding the separation persons. By contrast, when judges reach a decision in our of powers, due process, and centuries-old interpretive rules adversarial system, they render a judgment based only on the that fortify those constitutional commitments. And Lesson factual record and legal arguments the parties at hand have 3, because to hold otherwise would effectively require us chosen to develop. A later court assessing a past decision to endow stray statements in Chevron with the authority must therefore appreciate the possibility that different facts of statutory language, all while ignoring more considered and different legal arguments may dictate a different outcome. language in that same decision and the teachings of They must appreciate, too, that, like anyone else, judges experience. are “innately digressive,” and their opinions may sometimes offer stray asides about a wider topic that may sound nearly like legislative commands. Duxbury 4. Often, enterprising counsel seek to exploit such statements to maximum effect. A See id., at 25. But while these digressions may sometimes Start with Lesson 1. The Administrative Procedure Act contain valuable counsel, they remain “vapours and fumes of 1946 (APA) directs a “reviewing court” to “decide of law,” Bacon 478, and cannot “control the judgment in a all relevant questions of law” and “interpret” relevant subsequent suit,” Cohens, 6 Wheat. at 399. “constitutional and statutory provisions.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. When applying Chevron deference, reviewing courts do not These principles, too, have long guided this Court and others. interpret all relevant statutory provisions and decide all As Judge Easterbrook has put it, an “opinion is not a relevant questions of law. Instead, judges abdicate a large comprehensive code; it is just an explanation for the Court's measure of that responsibility in favor of agency officials. disposition. Judicial opinions must not be confused with Their interpretations of “ambiguous” laws control even when © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 24 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) those interpretations *2282 are at odds with the fairest Lesson 2 cannot rescue Chevron deference. If stare decisis reading of the law an independent “reviewing court” can calls for judicial humility in the face of the written law, it also muster. Agency officials, too, may change their minds about *2283 cautions us to test our present conclusions carefully the law's meaning at any time, even when Congress has against the work of our predecessors. At the same time and not amended the relevant statutory language in any way. as we have seen, this second form of humility counsels us National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X to remember that precedents that have won the endorsement Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982–983, 125 S.Ct. 2688, of judges across many generations, demonstrated coherence 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005). And those officials may even with our broader law, and weathered the tests of time and disagree with and effectively overrule not only their own past experience are entitled to greater consideration than those that interpretations of a law but a court's past interpretation as well. have not. See Part I, supra. Viewed by each of these lights, Ibid. None of that is consistent with the APA's clear mandate. the case for Chevron deference only grows weaker still. The hard fact is Chevron “did not even bother to cite” the APA, let alone seek to apply its terms. United States v. Mead 1 Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead, as even its most Start with a look to how our predecessors traditionally ardent defenders have conceded, Chevron deference rests understood the judicial role in disputes over a law's upon a “fictionalized statement of legislative desire,” namely, meaning. From the Nation's founding, they considered “[t]he a judicial supposition that Congress implicitly wishes judges interpretation of the laws” in cases and controversies “the to defer to executive agencies’ interpretations of the law even proper and peculiar province of the courts.” The Federalist when it has said nothing of the kind. D. Barron & E. Kagan, No. 78, p. 467 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Perhaps Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 S. Ct. Rev. 201, 212 the Court's most famous early decision reflected exactly that (Kagan) (emphasis added). As proponents see it, that fiction view. There, Chief Justice Marshall declared it “emphatically represents a “policy judgmen[t] about what ... make[s] for the province and duty of the judicial department to say good government.” Ibid. 2 But in our democracy unelected what the law is.” Marbury, 1 Cranch at 177. For judges judges possess no authority to elevate their own fictions “have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment”— over the laws adopted by the Nation's elected representatives. and an obligation to exercise that judgment independently. Some might think the legal directive Congress provided in The Federalist No. 78, at 465. No matter how “disagreeable the APA unwise; some might think a different arrangement that duty may be,” this Court has said, a judge “is not preferable. See, e.g., post, at 2298 - 2299 (KAGAN, J., at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” United States v. dissenting). But it is Congress's view of “good government,” Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 162, 10 L.Ed. 689 (1841) (Story, J.). not ours, that controls. This duty of independent judgment is perhaps “the defining characteristi[c] of Article III judges.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 Much more could be said about Chevron’s inconsistency with U.S. 462, 483, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011). the APA. But I have said it in the past. See Buffington v. McDonough, 598 U. S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 143 S.Ct. 14, To be sure, this Court has also long extended “great respect” 16–17, 214 L.Ed.2d 206 (2022) (opinion dissenting from to the “contemporaneous” and consistent views of the denial of certiorari); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d coordinate branches about the meaning of a statute's terms. 1142, 1151–1153 (CA10 2016) (concurring opinion). And the Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210, 6 L.Ed. 603 Court makes many of the same points at length today. See (1827); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401, ante, at 2263 - 2266. For present purposes, the short of it is 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819); Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309, 2 that continuing to abide Chevron deference would require us L.Ed. 115 (1803). 4 But traditionally, that did not mean a to transgress the first lesson of stare decisis—the humility court had to “defer” to any “reasonable” construction of an required of judges to recognize that our decisions must yield “ambiguous” law that an executive agency might offer. It did to the laws adopted by the people's elected representatives. 3 not mean that the government could propound a “reasonable” view of the law's meaning one day, a different one the next, and bind the judiciary always to its latest word. Nor did it mean the executive could displace a pre-existing judicial B construction of a statute's terms, replace it with its own, and © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 25 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) effectively overrule a judicial precedent in the process. Put say so.” Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 156, simply, this Court was “not bound” by any and all reasonable 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed. 635 (1944). “administrative construction[s]” of ambiguous statutes when resolving cases and controversies. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait To the extent proper respect for precedent demands, as it Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16, 52 S.Ct. 275, 76 L.Ed. 587 (1932). always has, special respect for longstanding and mainstream While the executive's consistent and contemporaneous views decisions, Chevron scores badly. It represented not a warranted respect, they “by no means control[led] the action continuation of a long line of decisions but a break from them. or the opinion of this court in expounding the law with Worse, it did not merely depart from our precedents. More reference to the rights of parties litigant before them.” Irvine nearly, Chevron defied them. v. Marshall, 20 How. 558, 567, 15 L.Ed. 994 (1858); see also A. Bamzai, *2284 The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L. J. 908, 987 (2017). 2 Sensing how jarringly inconsistent Chevron is with this Consider next how uneasily Chevron deference sits alongside Court's many longstanding precedents discussing the nature so many other settled aspects of our law. Having witnessed of the judicial role in disputes over the law's meaning, the first-hand King George's efforts to gain influence and control government and dissent struggle for a response. The best they over colonial judges, see Declaration of Independence ¶ 11, can muster is a handful of cases from the early 1940s in the framers made a considered judgment to build judicial which, they say, this Court first “put [deference] principles independence into the Constitution's design. They vested the into action.” Post, at 2305 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). And, judicial power in decisionmakers with life tenure. Art. III, § 1. admittedly, for a period this Court toyed with a form of They placed the judicial salary beyond political control during deference akin to Chevron, at least for so-called mixed a judge's tenure. Ibid. And they rejected any proposal that questions of law and fact. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. would subject judicial decisions to review by political actors. 402, 411–412, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941); NLRB v. The Federalist No. 81, at 482; United States v. Hansen, 599 Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131, 64 S.Ct. 851, U.S. 762, 786–791, 143 S.Ct. 1932, 216 L.Ed.2d 692 (2023) 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944). But, as the Court details, even that (THOMAS, J., concurring). All of this served to ensure the limited experiment did not last. See ante, at 2258 - 2260. same thing: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal.” In re Murchison, Justice Roberts, in his Gray dissent, decried these decisions 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). One in for “abdicat[ing our] function as a court of review” and which impartial judges, not those currently wielding power in “complete[ly] revers[ing] ... the normal and usual method of the political branches, would “say what the law is” in *2285 construing a statute.” 314 U.S. at 420–421, 62 S.Ct. 326. And cases coming to court. Marbury, 1 Cranch at 177. just a few years later, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), the Court returned to Chevron deference undermines all that. It precludes courts its time-worn path. from exercising the judicial power vested in them by Article III to say what the law is. It forces judges to abandon the Echoing themes that had run throughout our law from its start, best reading of the law in favor of views of those presently Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote for the Court in Skidmore. holding the reins of the Executive Branch. It requires judges There, he said, courts may extend respectful consideration to change, and change again, their interpretations of the law to another branch's interpretation of the law, but the weight as and when the government demands. And that transfer of due those interpretations must always “depend upon the[ir] power has exactly the sort of consequences one might expect. thoroughness ..., the validity of [their] reasoning, [their] Rather than insulate adjudication from power and politics consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all to ensure a fair hearing “without respect to persons” as the those factors which give [them] power to persuade.” Id., at federal judicial oath demands, 28 U.S.C. § 453, Chevron 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. In another case the same year, and again deference requires courts to “place a finger on the scales of writing for the Court, Justice Jackson expressly rejected a call justice in favor of the most powerful of litigants, the federal for a judge-made doctrine of deference much like Chevron, government.” Buffington, 598 U. S., at ––––, 143 S.Ct. at offering that, “[i]f Congress had deemed it necessary or 17. Along the way, Chevron deference guarantees “systematic even appropriate” for courts to “defe[r] to administrative bias” in favor of whichever political party currently holds the construction[,] ... it would not have been at a loss for words to © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 26 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) levers of executive power. P. Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176, 73 S.Ct. 189, 97 L.Ed. Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1212 (2016). 200 (1952). Chevron deference undermines other aspects of our settled The ancient rule of lenity is still another of Chevron’s law, too. In this country, we often boast that the Constitution's victims. Since the founding, American courts have construed promise of due process of law, see Amdts. 5, 14, means that ambiguities in penal laws against the government and with “ ‘no man can be a judge in his own case.’ ” Williams v. lenity toward affected persons. Wooden v. United States, 595 Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8–9, 136 S.Ct. 1899, 195 L.Ed.2d U.S. 360, 388–390, 142 S.Ct. 1063, 212 L.Ed.2d 187 (2022) 132 (2016); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388, 1 L.Ed. 648 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). That principle (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). That principle, of course, has upholds due process by safeguarding individual liberty in the even deeper roots, tracing far back into the common law face of ambiguous laws. Ibid. And it fortifies the separation of where it was known by the Latin maxim nemo iudex in causa powers by keeping the power of punishment firmly “ ‘in the sua. See 1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England § 212, legislative, not in the judicial department.’ ” Id., at 391, 142 *141a. Yet, under the Chevron regime, all that means little, for S.Ct. 1063 (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, executive agencies may effectively judge the scope of their 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820)). But power begets power. And pressing own lawful powers. See, e.g., Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, Chevron deference as far as it can go, the government has 296–297, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 (2013). sometimes managed to leverage “ambiguities” in the written law to penalize conduct Congress never clearly proscribed. Traditionally, as well, courts have sought to construe statutes Compare Guedes v. ATF, 920 F.3d 1, 27–28, 31 (CADC as a reasonable reader would “when the law was made.” 2019), with Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 604, 144 S.Ct. 1613, Blackstone 59; see United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2024). 386, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1805). Today, some call this “textualism.” But really it's a very old idea, one that constrains judges to In all these ways, Chevron’s fiction has led us to a strange a lawfinding rather than lawmaking role by focusing their place. One where authorities long thought reserved for Article work on the statutory text, its linguistic context, and various III are transferred to Article II, where the scales of justice canons of construction. In that way, textualism serves as an are tilted systematically in favor of the most powerful, where essential guardian of the due process promise of fair notice. If legal demands can change with every election even though a judge could discard an old meaning and assign a new one to the laws do not, and where the people are left to guess a law's terms, all without any legislative revision, how could about their legal rights and responsibilities. So much tension people ever be sure of the rules that bind them? New Prime with so many foundational features of our legal order is Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113, 139 S.Ct. 532, 202 L.Ed.2d surely one more sign that we have “taken a wrong turn along 536 (2019). Were the rules otherwise, Blackstone warned, the way.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 607, 139 S.Ct. the people would be rendered “slaves to their magistrates.” 4 2400, 204 L.Ed.2d 841 (2019) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in Blackstone 371. judgment). 5 Yet, replace “magistrates” with “bureaucrats,” and Blackstone's fear becomes reality when courts employ Chevron deference. Whenever we confront an ambiguity 3 in the law, judges do not seek to resolve it impartially Finally, consider workability and reliance. If, as I have according to the best evidence of the law's original meaning. sought to suggest, these factors may sometimes serve as Instead, we resort to a far cruder heuristic: “The reasonable useful proxies for the question whether a precedent comports bureaucrat always wins.” And because the reasonable with the historic tide of judicial practice or represents an bureaucrat may change his mind year-to-year and election-to- aberrational mistake, see Part I–C, supra, they certainly do election, the people can never know with certainty what new here. “interpretations” might be used against them. This “fluid” approach to statutory interpretation is “as much a trap for the Take Chevron’s “workability.” Throughout its short life, this innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula,” which were posted Court has been forced to supplement and revise Chevron so high up on the walls and in print so small that ordinary *2287 so many times that no one can agree on how many people could never be sure what they required. *2286 United “steps” it requires, nor even what each of those “steps” © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 27 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) entails. Some suggest that the analysis begins with “step many interpretive options on the Chevron menu. On the one zero” (perhaps itself a tell), an innovation that traces to hand, we have the D. C. Circuit majority, which deemed the United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164, Magnuson-Stevens Act “ambiguous” and upheld the agency's 150 L.Ed.2d 292. Mead held that, before even considering regulation as “ ‘permissible.’ ” 45 F.4th 359, 365 (2022). On whether Chevron applies, a court must determine whether the other hand, we have the D. C. Circuit dissent, which argues Congress meant to delegate to the agency authority to the statute is “unambiguou[s]” and that it plainly forecloses interpret the law in a given field. 533 U.S. at 226–227, 121 the agency's new rule. Id., at 372 (opinion of Walker, J.). And S.Ct. 2164. But that exercise faces an immediate challenge: on yet a third hand, we have the First Circuit, which claimed Because Chevron depends on a judicially implied, rather than to have identified “clear textual support” for the regulation, a legislatively expressed, delegation of interpretive authority yet refused to say whether it would “classify [its] conclusion to an executive agency, Part II–A, supra, when should the as a product of Chevron step one or step two.” 62 F.4th 621, fiction apply and when not? Mead fashioned a multifactor 631, 634 (2023). As these cases illustrate, Chevron has turned test for judges to use. 533 U.S. at 229–231, 121 S.Ct. 2164. statutory interpretation into a game of bingo under blindfold, But that test has proved as indeterminate in application as it with parties guessing at how many boxes there are and which was contrived in origin. Perhaps for these reasons, perhaps one their case might ultimately fall in. for others, this Court has sometimes applied Mead and often ignored it. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1014, n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 2688 Turn now from workability to reliance. Far from engendering (Scalia, J., dissenting). reliance interests, *2288 the whole point of Chevron deference is to upset them. Under Chevron, executive officials Things do not improve as we move up the Chevron ladder. can replace one “reasonable” interpretation with another at At “step one,” a judge must defer to an executive official's any time, all without any change in the law itself. The result: interpretation when the statute at hand is “ambiguous.” But Affected individuals “can never be sure of their legal rights even today, Chevron’s principal beneficiary—the federal and duties.” Buffington, 598 U. S., at ––––, 143 S.Ct. at 20. government—still cannot say when a statute is sufficiently ambiguous to trigger deference. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. How bad is the problem? Take just one example. Brand in American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra, O. T. 2021, No. 20– X concerned a law regulating broadband internet services. 1114, pp. 71–72. Perhaps thanks to this particular confusion, There, the Court upheld an agency rule adopted by the the search for ambiguity has devolved into a sort of Snark administration of President George W. Bush because it was hunt: Some judges claim to spot it almost everywhere, while premised on a “reasonable” interpretation of the statute. Later, other equally fine judges claim never to have seen it. Compare President Barack Obama's administration rescinded the rule L. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, and replaced it with another. Later still, during President 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821, 826 (1990), with R. Kethledge, Donald J. Trump's administration, officials replaced that rule Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) with a different one, all before President Joseph R. Biden, Ten Years on the Bench, 70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 315, 323 Jr.’s administration declared its intention to reverse course (2017). for yet a fourth time. See Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet, 88 Fed. Reg. 76048 (2023); Brand X, 545 Nor do courts agree when it comes to “step two.” U.S. at 981–982, 125 S.Ct. 2688. Each time, the government There, a judge must assess whether an executive agency's claimed its new rule was just as “reasonable” as the last. interpretation of an ambiguous statute is “reasonable.” But Rather than promoting reliance by fixing the meaning of what does that inquiry demand? Some courts engage in a the law, Chevron deference engenders constant uncertainty comparatively searching review; others almost reflexively and convulsive change even when the statute at issue itself defer to an agency's views. Here again, courts have pursued remains unchanged. “wildly different” approaches and reached wildly different conclusions in similar cases. See B. Kavanaugh, Fixing Nor are these antireliance harms distributed equally. Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2152 (2016) Sophisticated entities and their lawyers may be able to (Kavanaugh). keep pace with rule changes affecting their rights and responsibilities. They may be able to lobby for new “ Today's cases exemplify some of these problems. We have ‘reasonable’ ” agency interpretations and even capture the before us two circuit decisions, three opinions, and at least as agencies that issue them. Buffington, 598 U. S., at ––––, ––––, © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 28 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) 143 S.Ct. 14, 18, 20–21. But ordinary people can do none of Our court ruled that this retrospective application of the BIA's those things. They are the ones who suffer the worst kind of new interpretation of the law violated Mr. De Niz Robles's regulatory whiplash Chevron invites. due process rights. Id., at 1172. But as a lower court, we could treat only the symptom, not the disease. So Chevron permitted Consider a couple of examples. Thomas Buffington, a veteran the agency going forward to overrule a judicial decision about of the U. S. Air Force, was injured in the line of duty. For a the best reading of the law with its own different “reasonable” time after he left the Air Force, the Department of Veterans one and in that way deny relief to countless future immigrants. Affairs (VA) paid disability benefits due him by law. But later the government called on Mr. Buffington to reenter Those are just two stories among so many that federal judges active service. During that period, everyone agreed, the VA could tell (and have told) about what Chevron deference could (as it did) suspend his disability payments. After he has meant for ordinary people interacting with the federal left active service for a second time, however, the VA turned government. See, e.g., Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, his patriotism against him. By law, Congress permitted the 1268–1276 (CA9 2020); Valent v. Commissioner of Social VA to suspend disability pay only “for any period for which Security, 918 F.3d 516, 525–527 (CA6 2019) (Kethledge, J., [a servicemember] receives active service pay.” 38 U.S.C. § dissenting); Gonzalez v. United States Atty. Gen., 820 F.3d 5304(c). But the VA had adopted a self-serving regulation 399, 402–405 (CA11 2016) (per curiam). requiring veterans to file a form asking for the resumption of their disability pay after a second (or subsequent) stint in What does the federal government have to say about this? active service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.654(b)(2) (2021). Unaware of It acknowledges that Chevron sits as a heavy weight on the the regulation, Mr. Buffington failed to reapply immediately. scale in favor of the government, “oppositional” to many When he finally figured out what had happened and reapplied, “categories of individuals.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22–1219, the VA agreed to resume payments going forward but refused p. 133 (Relentless Tr.). But, according to the government, to give Mr. Buffington all of the past disability payments it Chevron deference is too important an innovation to undo. had withheld. Buffington, 598 U. S., at –––– – ––––, 143 S.Ct. In its brief reign, the government says, it has become a at 15–16. “fundamenta[l] ... ground rul[e] for how all three branches of the government are operating together.” Relentless Tr. 102. Mr. Buffington challenged the agency's action as inconsistent But, in truth, the Constitution, the APA, and our longstanding with Congress's direction that the VA may suspend disability precedents set those ground rules some time ago. And under payments only for those periods when a veteran returns to them, agencies cannot invoke a judge-made fiction to unsettle active service. But armed with Chevron, the agency defeated our Nation's promise to individuals that they are entitled to Mr. Buffington's claim. Maybe the self-serving regulation the make their arguments about the law's demands on them in a VA cited as justification for its action was not premised on fair hearing, one in which they stand on equal footing with the the best reading of the law, courts said, but it represented a government before an independent judge. “ ‘permissible’ ” one. 598 U. S., at ––––, 143 S.Ct. at 17. In that way, the Executive Branch was able to evade Congress's promises to someone who took the field repeatedly in the C Nation's defense. How could a Court, guided for 200 years by Chief Justice *2289 In another case, one which I heard as a court of Marshall's example, come to embrace a counter-Marbury appeals judge, De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (CA10 revolution, one at war with the APA, time honored precedents, 2015), the Board of Immigration Appeals invoked Chevron to and so much surrounding law? To answer these questions, overrule a judicial precedent on which many immigrants had turn to Lesson 3 and witness the temptation to endow a stray relied, see In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 370 (BIA 2007) passage in a judicial decision with extraordinary authority. (purporting to overrule Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 Call it “power quoting.” F.3d 1294 (CA10 2005)). The agency then sought to apply its new interpretation retroactively to punish those immigrants Chevron was an unlikely place for a revolution to begin. —including Alfonzo De Niz Robles, who had relied on that The case concerned the Clean Air Act's requirement that judicial precedent as authority to remain in this country with States regulate “stationary sources” of air pollution in their his U. S. wife and four children. See 803 F.3d at 1168–1169. borders. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. At the time, it was © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 29 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) an open question whether entire industrial plants or their they acknowledge, “was not high,” C. Sunstein, Chevron as constituent polluting parts counted as “stationary sources.” Law, 107 Geo. L. J. 1613, 1669 (2019). The Environmental Protection Agency had defined entire plants as sources, an approach that allowed companies to If Chevron meant to usher in a revolution in how judges replace individual plant parts without automatically triggering interpret laws, no one appears to have realized it at the time. the permitting requirements that apply to new sources. Chevron’s author, Justice Stevens, characterized the decision Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840, 104 S.Ct. 2778. as a “simpl[e] ... restatement of existing law, nothing more or less.” Merrill 255, 275. In the “19 argued cases” in the This Court upheld the EPA's definition as consistent with following Term “that presented some kind of question about the governing statute. *2290 Id., at 866, 104 S.Ct. 2778. whether the Court should defer to an agency interpretation The decision, issued by a bare quorum of the Court, without of statutory law,” this Court cited Chevron just once. Merrill concurrence or dissent, purported to apply “well-settled 276. By some accounts, the decision seemed “destined to principles.” Id., at 845, 104 S.Ct. 2778. “If a court, employing obscurity.” Ibid. traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,” It was only three years later when Justice Scalia wrote a Chevron provided, then “that intention is the law and must concurrence that a revolution began to take shape. Buffington, be given effect.” Id., at 843, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Many 598 U. S., at ––––, 143 S.Ct. at 18. There, he argued for of the cases Chevron cited to support its judgment stood a new rule requiring courts to defer to executive agency for the traditional proposition that courts afford respectful interpretations of the law whenever a “ ‘statute is silent consideration, not deference, to executive interpretations of or ambiguous.’ ” NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, the law. See, e.g., Burnet, 285 U.S. at 16, 52 S.Ct. 275; United 484 U.S. 112, 133–134, 108 S.Ct. 413, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763, 24 L.Ed. 588 (1878). And (1987) (opinion of Scalia, J.). Eventually, a majority of the the decision's sole citation to legal scholarship was to Roscoe Court followed his lead. Buffington, 598 U. S., at ––––, Pound, who long championed de novo judicial review. 467 143 S.Ct. at 18. But from the start, Justice Scalia made U.S. at 843, n. 10, 104 S.Ct. 2778; see R. Pound, The Place no secret about the scope of his ambitions. See Judicial of the Judiciary in a Democratic Polity, 27 A. B. A. J. 133, Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 136–137 (1941). Duke L. J. 511, 521 (1989) (Scalia). The rule he advocated for represented such a sharp break from prior practice, he At the same time, of course, the opinion contained bits and explained, that many judges of his day didn't yet “understand” pieces that spoke differently. The decision also said that, “if the “old criteria” were “no longer relevant.” Ibid. Still, he said, [a] statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific overthrowing *2291 the past was worth it because a new issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer deferential rule would be “easier to follow.” Ibid. is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. But it seems the government Events proved otherwise. As the years wore on and the didn't advance this formulation in its brief, so there was Court's new and aggressive reading of Chevron gradually no adversarial engagement on it. T. Merrill, The Story of exposed itself as unworkable, unfair, and at odds with our Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, 66 Admin. separation of powers, Justice Scalia could have doubled down L. Rev. 253, 268 (2014) (Merrill). As we have seen, too, the on the project. But he didn't. He appreciated that stare decisis Court did not pause to consider (or even mention) the APA. is not a rule of “if I thought it yesterday, I must think it See Part II–A, supra. It did not discuss contrary precedents tomorrow.” And rather than cling to the pride of personal issued by the Court since the founding, let alone purport precedent, the Justice began to express doubts over the very to overrule any of them. See Part II–B–1, supra. Nor did project that he had worked to build. See Perez v. Mortgage the Court seek to address how its novel rule of deference Bankers Assn., 575 U.S. 92, 109–110, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 191 might be squared with so much surrounding law. See Part L.Ed.2d 186 (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment); cf. II–B–2, supra. As even its defenders have acknowledged, Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 568 “Chevron barely bothered to justify its rule of deference, and U.S. 597, 617–618, 621, 133 S.Ct. 1326, 185 L.Ed.2d 447 the few brief passages on this matter pointed in disparate (2013) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). If directions.” Kagan 212–213. “[T]he quality of the reasoning,” Chevron’s ascent is a testament to the Justice's ingenuity, its demise is an even greater tribute to his humility. 6 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 30 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) Court has exhibited before overruling Chevron may illustrate Justice Scalia was not alone in his reconsideration. After one of the reasons why the current Court has been slower to years spent laboring under Chevron, trying to make sense overrule precedents than some of its predecessors, see Part I– of it and make it work, Member after Member of this C, supra. Court came to question the project. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198, 219–221, 138 S.Ct. 2105, 201 None of this, of course, discharges any Member of this Court L.Ed.2d 433 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Michigan v. from the task of deciding for himself or herself today whether EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760–764, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 192 L.Ed.2d Chevron deference itself warrants deference. But when so 674 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring); Kisor, 588 U.S. many past and current judicial colleagues in this Court and at 591, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in across the country tell us our doctrine is misguided, and when part); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153; Buffington, 598 we ourselves managed without Chevron for centuries and U. S., at –––– – ––––, 143 S.Ct. at 21–22; Kavanaugh manage to do so today, the humility at the core of stare decisis 2150–2154. Ultimately, the Court gave up. Despite repeated compels us to pause and reflect carefully on the wisdom invitations, it has not applied Chevron deference since 2016. embodied in that experience. And, in the end, to my mind Relentless Tr. 81; App. to Brief for Respondents in No. the lessons of experience counsel wisely against continued 22–1219, p. 68a. So an experiment that began only in the reliance on Chevron’s stray and unconsidered digression. mid-1980s effectively ended eight years ago. Along the way, This Court's opinions fill over 500 volumes, and perhaps an unusually large number of federal appellate judges voiced “some printed judicial word may be found to support almost their own thoughtful and extensive criticisms of Chevron. any plausible proposition.” R. Jackson, Decisional Law and Buffington, 598 U. S., at –––– – ––––, 143 S.Ct. at 21– Stare Decisis, 30 A. B. A. J. 334 (1944). It is not for us 22 (collecting examples). A number of state courts did, to pick and choose passages we happen to like and demand too, refusing to import Chevron deference into their own total obedience to them in perpetuity. That would turn stare administrative law jurisprudence. See 598 U. S., at ––––, 143 decisis from a doctrine of humility into a tool for judicial S.Ct. at 22. opportunism. Brown, 596 U.S. at 141, 142 S.Ct. 1510. Even if all that and everything else laid out above is true, the government suggests we should retain Chevron deference III because judges simply cannot live without it; some statutes are just too “technical” for courts to interpret “intelligently.” Proper respect for precedent helps “keep the scale of justice Post, at 2298, 2311 (dissenting opinion). But that objection even and steady,” by reinforcing decisional rules consistent is no answer to Chevron’s inconsistency with Congress's with the law upon which all can rely. 1 Blackstone 69. But directions in the APA, so much surrounding law, or the that respect does not require, nor does it readily tolerate, a challenges its multistep regime have posed in practice. Nor steadfast refusal to correct mistakes. As early as 1810, this does history counsel such defeatism. Surely, it would be Court had already overruled one of its cases. See Hudson v. a mistake to suggest our predecessors before Chevron’s Guestier, 6 Cranch 281, 284, 3 L.Ed. 224 (overruling Rose v. rise in the mid-1980s were unable to make their way Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 2 L.Ed. 608 (1808)). In recent years, intelligently through technical statutory disputes. Following the Court may have overruled precedents less frequently than their lead, over the past eight years this Court has managed to it did during the Warren and Burger Courts. See Part I–C, resolve even highly complex *2292 cases without Chevron supra. But the job of reconsidering past decisions remains one deference, and done so even when the government sought every Member of this Court faces from time to time. 8 deference. Nor, as far as I am aware, did any Member of the Court suggest Chevron deference was necessary to an *2293 Justice William O. Douglas served longer on this intelligent resolution of any of those matters. 7 If anything, Court than any other person in the Nation's history. During his by affording Chevron deference a period of repose before tenure, he observed how a new colleague might be inclined addressing whether it should be retained, the Court has initially to “revere” every word written in an opinion issued enabled its Members to test the propriety of that precedent before he arrived. W. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. and reflect more deeply on how well it fits into the broader L. Rev. 735, 736 (1949). But, over time, Justice Douglas architecture of our law. Others may see things differently, see reflected, his new colleague would “remembe[r] ... that it is post, at 2307 - 2309 (dissenting opinion), but the caution the the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 31 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) gloss which his predecessors may have put on it.” Ibid. And Americans. And from the start, the whole project has relied “[s]o he [would] com[e] to formulate his own views, rejecting on the overaggressive use of snippets and stray remarks from some earlier ones as false and embracing others.” Ibid. This an opinion that carried mixed messages. Stare decisis’s true process of reexamination, Justice Douglas explained, is a lesson today is not that we *2294 are bound to respect “necessary consequence of our system” in which each judge Chevron’s “startling development,” but bound to inter it. takes an oath—both “personal” and binding—to discern the law's meaning for himself and apply it faithfully in the cases that come before him. Id., at 736–737. Justice KAGAN, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR and Justice Douglas saw, too, how appeals to precedent could Justice JACKSON join, * dissenting. be overstated and sometimes even overwrought. Judges, he For 40 years, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources reflected, would sometimes first issue “new and startling Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, decision[s],” and then later spin around and “acquire an acute 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), has served as a cornerstone of conservatism” in their aggressive defense of “their new status administrative law, allocating responsibility for statutory quo.” Id., at 737. In that way, even the most novel and unlikely construction between courts and agencies. Under Chevron, decisions became “coveted anchorage[s],” defended heatedly, a court uses all its normal interpretive tools to determine if ironically, under the banner of “stare decisis.” Ibid.; see also whether Congress has spoken to an issue. If the court finds Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 294, n. 7, 141 S.Ct. 1547, Congress has done so, that is the end of the matter; the 209 L.Ed.2d 651 (2021) (GORSUCH, J., concurring). agency's views make no difference. But if the court finds, at the end of its interpretive work, that Congress has left an That is Chevron’s story: A revolution masquerading as ambiguity or gap, then a choice must be made. Who should the status quo. And the defense of it follows the same give content to a statute when Congress's instructions have course Justice Douglas described. Though our dissenting run out? Should it be a court? Or should it be the agency colleagues have not hesitated to question other precedents in Congress has charged with administering the statute? The the past, they today manifest what Justice Douglas called an answer Chevron gives is that it should usually be the agency, “acute conservatism” for Chevron’s “startling” development, within the bounds of reasonableness. That rule has formed the insisting that if this “coveted anchorage” is abandoned the backdrop against which Congress, courts, and agencies—as heavens will fall. But the Nation managed to live with busy well as regulated parties and the public—all have operated executive agencies of all sorts long before the Chevron for decades. It has been applied in thousands of judicial revolution began to take shape in the mid-1980s. And all decisions. It has become part of the warp and woof of modern today's decision means is that, going forward, federal courts government, supporting regulatory efforts of all kinds—to will do exactly as this Court has since 2016, exactly as it name a few, keeping air and water clean, food and drugs safe, did before the mid-1980s, and exactly as it had done since and financial markets honest. the founding: resolve cases and controversies without any systemic bias in the government's favor. And the rule is right. This Court has long understood Chevron deference to reflect what Congress would want, and so to Proper respect for precedent does not begin to suggest be rooted in a presumption of legislative intent. Congress otherwise. Instead, it counsels respect for the written law, knows that it does not—in fact cannot—write perfectly adherence to consistent teachings over aberrations, and complete regulatory statutes. It knows that those statutes resistance to the temptation of treating our own stray remarks will inevitably contain ambiguities that some other actor as if they were statutes. And each of those lessons points will have to resolve, and gaps that some other actor will toward the same conclusion today: Chevron deference is have to fill. And it would usually prefer that actor to be inconsistent with the directions Congress gave us in the APA. the responsible agency, not a court. Some interpretive issues It represents a grave anomaly when viewed against the sweep arising in the regulatory context involve scientific or technical of historic judicial practice. The decision undermines core subject matter. Agencies have expertise in those areas; rule-of-law values ranging from the promise of fair notice courts do not. Some demand a detailed understanding of to the promise of a fair hearing. Even on its own terms, it complex and interdependent regulatory programs. Agencies has proved unworkable and operated to undermine rather than know those programs inside-out; again, courts do not. And advance reliance interests, often to the detriment of ordinary some present policy choices, including trade-offs between competing goods. Agencies report to a President, who in turn © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 32 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) answers to the public for his policy calls; courts have no such 388, 142 S.Ct. 2228, 213 L.Ed.2d 545 (2022) (joint opinion accountability and no proper basis for making policy. And of of Breyer, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting) course Congress has conferred on that expert, experienced, (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of and politically accountable agency the authority to administer England 69 (7th ed. 1775)). Chevron is entrenched precedent, —to make rules about and otherwise implement—the statute entitled to the protection of stare decisis, as even the majority giving rise to the ambiguity or gap. Put all that together and acknowledges. In fact, Chevron is entitled to the supercharged deference to the agency is the almost obvious choice, based on version of that doctrine because Congress could always an implicit congressional delegation of interpretive authority. overrule the decision, and because so many governmental and We defer, the Court has explained, “because of a presumption private actors have relied on it for so long. Because that is that Congress” would have “desired the agency (rather than so, the majority needs a “particularly special justification” the courts)” to exercise “whatever degree of discretion” the for its action. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 588, 139 statute allows. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 S.Ct. 2400, 204 L.Ed.2d 841 (2019) (opinion of the Court). U.S. 735, 740–741, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996). But the majority has nothing that would qualify. It barely tries to advance the usual factors this Court invokes for Today, the Court flips the script: It is now “the courts (rather overruling precedent. Its justification comes down, in the end, than the agency)” that will wield power when Congress to this: Courts must have more say over regulation—over the has left an area of interpretive discretion. A rule of judicial provision of health care, the protection of the environment, humility gives way to a rule of judicial hubris. In recent the safety of consumer products, the efficacy of transportation years, this Court has too often taken for itself decision- systems, and so on. A longstanding precedent at the crux of making authority Congress assigned *2295 to agencies. administrative governance thus falls victim to a bald assertion The Court has substituted its own judgment on workplace of judicial authority. The majority disdains restraint, and health for that of the Occupational Safety and Health grasps for power. Administration; its own judgment on climate change for that of the Environmental Protection Agency; and its own judgment on student loans for that of the Department of I Education. See, e.g., National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, 142 S.Ct. 661, 211 L.Ed.2d Begin with the problem that gave rise to Chevron (and also 448 (2022); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 142 S.Ct. to its older precursors): The regulatory statutes Congress 2587, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2022); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 passes often contain ambiguities and gaps. Sometimes they U. S. 477, 143 S.Ct. 2355, 216 L.Ed.2d 1063 (2023). But are intentional. Perhaps Congress “consciously desired” the evidently that was, for this Court, all too piecemeal. In one administering agency to fill in aspects of the legislative fell swoop, the majority today gives itself exclusive power scheme, believing that regulatory experts would be “in a over every open issue—no matter how expertise-driven or better position” than legislators to do so. Chevron, 467 U.S. policy-laden—involving the meaning of regulatory law. As at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Or “perhaps Congress was unable if it did not have enough on its plate, the majority turns to forge a coalition on either side” of a question, and the itself into the country's administrative czar. It defends that contending parties “decided to take their chances with” the move as one (suddenly) required by the (nearly 80-year-old) agency's resolution. Ibid. Sometimes, though, the gaps or Administrative Procedure Act. But the Act makes no such ambiguities are what might be thought of as predictable demand. Today's decision is not one Congress directed. It is accidents. They may be the result of sloppy drafting, a not entirely the majority's choice. infrequent legislative occurrence. Or they may arise *2296 from the well-known limits of language or foresight. Accord, And the majority cannot destroy one doctrine of judicial ante, at 2257, 2265 - 2266. “The subject matter” of a statutory humility without making a laughing-stock of a second. (If provision may be too “specialized and varying” to “capture opinions had titles, a good candidate for today's would be in its every detail.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 566, 139 S.Ct. 2400 Hubris Squared.) Stare decisis is, among other things, a way (plurality opinion). Or the provision may give rise, years or to remind judges that wisdom often lies in what prior judges decades down the road, to an issue the enacting Congress have done. It is a brake on the urge to convert “every new could not have anticipated. Whichever the case—whatever judge's opinion” into a new legal rule or regime. Dobbs the reason—the result is to create uncertainty about some v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, aspect of a provision's meaning. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 33 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 466–467, 474– Consider a few examples from the caselaw. They will help 475 (CADC 1998). show what a typical Chevron question looks like—or really, what a typical Chevron question is. Because when choosing • Or take Chevron itself. In amendments to the Clean whether to send some class of questions mainly to a court, Air Act, Congress told States to require permits for or mainly to an agency, abstract analysis can only go so far; modifying or constructing “stationary sources” of air indeed, it may obscure what matters most. So I begin with the pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5). Does the term concrete: “stationary source[ ]” refer to each pollution-emitting piece of equipment within a plant? Or does it refer to • Under the Public Health Service Act, the Food and Drug the entire plant, and thus allow escape *2297 from the Administration (FDA) regulates “biological product[s],” permitting requirement when increased emissions from including “protein[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1). When does one piece of equipment are offset by reductions from an alpha amino acid polymer qualify as such a “protein”? another? See 467 U.S. at 857, 859, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Must it have a specific, defined sequence of amino acids? See Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. FDA, 514 In each case, a statutory phrase has more than one reasonable F.Supp.3d 66, 79–80, 93–106 (D.C.C. 2020). reading. And Congress has not chosen among them: It has not, in any real-world sense, “fixed” the “single, best meaning” at • Under the Endangered Species Act, the Fish and “the time of enactment” (to use the majority's phrase). Ante, Wildlife Service must designate endangered “vertebrate at 2266. A question thus arises: Who decides which of the fish or wildlife” species, including “distinct population possible readings should govern? segment[s]” of those species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16); see § 1533. What makes one population segment This Court has long thought that the choice should usually fall “distinct” from another? Must the Service treat the to agencies, with courts broadly deferring to their judgments. Washington State population of western gray squirrels For the last 40 years, that doctrine has gone by the name of as “distinct” because it is geographically separated from Chevron deference, after the 1984 decision that formalized other western gray squirrels? Or can the Service take and canonized it. In Chevron, the Court set out a simple into account that the genetic makeup of the Washington two-part framework for reviewing an agency's interpretation population does not differ markedly from the rest? See of a statute that it administers. First, the reviewing court Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish and must determine whether Congress has “directly spoken to Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140–1145, 1149 (CA9 the precise question at issue.” 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2007). 2778. That inquiry is rigorous: A court must exhaust all the “traditional tools of statutory construction” to divine • Under the Medicare program, reimbursements to statutory meaning. Id., at 843, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. And hospitals are adjusted to reflect “differences in hospital when it can find that meaning—a “single right answer”— wage levels” across “geographic area[s].” 42 U.S.C. that is “the end of the matter”: The court cannot defer § 1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i). How should the Department of because it “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed Health and Human Services measure a “geographic intent of Congress.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 575, 139 S.Ct. 2400 area”? By city? By county? By metropolitan area? See (opinion of the Court); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–843, 104 Bellevue Hospital Center v. Leavitt, 443 F.3d 163, 174– S.Ct. 2778. But if the court, after using its whole legal 176 (CA2 2006). toolkit, concludes that “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” in dispute—for any of the not- • Congress directed the Department of the Interior and uncommon reasons discussed above—then the court must the Federal Aviation Administration to reduce noise cede the primary interpretive role. Ibid.; see supra, at 2295 from aircraft flying over Grand Canyon National Park - 2296. At that second step, the court asks only whether —specifically, to “provide for substantial restoration of the agency construction is within the sphere of “reasonable” the natural quiet.” § 3(b)(1), 101 Stat. 676; see § 3(b) readings. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If it (2). How much noise is consistent with “the natural is, the agency's interpretation of the statute that it every day quiet”? And how much of the park, for how many implements will control. hours a day, must be that quiet for the “substantial restoration” requirement to be met? See Grand Canyon © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 34 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) That rule, the Court has long explained, rests on a could, if forced to, muddle through that issue and announce presumption about legislative intent—about what Congress a result. But wouldn't the Fish and Wildlife Service, with wants when a statute it has charged an agency with all its specialized expertise, do a better job of the task— implementing contains an ambiguity or a gap. See id., at 843– of saying what, in the context of species protection, the 845, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740–741, 116 S.Ct. open-ended term “distinct” means? One idea behind the 1730. An enacting Congress, as noted above, knows those Chevron presumption is that Congress—the same Congress uncertainties will arise, even if it does not know what they will that charged the Service with implementing the Act—would turn out to be. See supra, at 2295 - 2296. And every once in answer that question with a resounding “yes.” a while, Congress provides an explicit instruction for dealing with that contingency—assigning primary responsibility to A second idea is that Congress would value the agency's the courts, or else to an agency. But much more often, experience with how a complex regulatory regime functions, Congress does not say. Thus arises the need for a presumption and with what is needed to make it effective. Let's stick with —really, a default rule—for what should happen in that event. squirrels for a moment, except broaden the lens. In construing Does a statutory silence or ambiguity then go to a court for a term like “distinct” in a case about squirrels, the Service resolution? Or to an agency? This Court has long thought likely would benefit from its “historical familiarity” with how Congress would choose an agency, with courts serving only as the term has covered the population segments of other species. a backstop to make sure the agency makes a reasonable choice Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, among the possible readings. Or said otherwise, Congress 499 U.S. 144, 153, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991); would select the agency it has put in control of a regulatory see, e.g., *2299 Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, scheme to exercise the “degree of discretion” that the statute's 900 F.3d 1053, 1060–1062 (CA9 2018) (arctic grayling); lack of clarity or completeness allows. Smiley, 517 U.S. at Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 868 F.3d 1054, 741, 116 S.Ct. 1730. Of course, Congress can always refute 1056 (CA9 2017) (desert eagle). Just as a common-law court that presumptive choice—can say that, really, it would prefer makes better decisions as it sees multiple variations on a courts to wield that discretionary power. But until then, the theme, an agency's construction of a statutory term benefits presumption cuts in the agency's favor. 1 The next question from its unique exposure to all the related ways the term is why. comes into play. Or consider, for another way regulatory familiarity matters, the example about adjusting Medicare *2298 For one, because agencies often know things about reimbursement for geographic wage differences. See supra, a statute's subject matter that courts could not hope to. The at 2296. According to a dictionary, the term “geographic area” point is especially stark when the statute is of a “scientific could be as large as a multi-state region or as small as a census or technical nature.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 571, 139 S.Ct. 2400 tract. How to choose? It would make sense to gather hard (plurality opinion). Agencies are staffed with “experts in the information about what reimbursement levels each approach field” who can bring their training and knowledge to bear will produce, to explore the ease of administering each on a on open statutory questions. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865, 104 nationwide basis, to survey how regulators have dealt with S.Ct. 2778. Consider, for example, the first bulleted case similar questions in the past, and to confer with the hospitals above. When does an alpha amino acid polymer qualify themselves about what makes sense. See Kisor, 588 U.S. at as a “protein”? See supra, at 2296. I don't know many 571, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (plurality opinion) (noting that agencies judges who would feel confident resolving that issue. (First are able to “conduct factual investigations” and “consult with question: What even is an alpha amino acid polymer?) But affected parties”). Congress knows the Department of Health the FDA likely has scores of scientists on staff who can and Human Services can do all those things—and that courts think intelligently about it, maybe collaborate with each cannot. other on its finer points, and arrive at a sensible answer. Or take the perhaps more accessible-sounding second case, Still more, Chevron’s presumption reflects that resolving involving the Endangered Species Act. See supra, at 2295 statutory ambiguities, as Congress well knows, is “often more - 2297. Deciding when one squirrel population is “distinct” a question of policy than of law.” Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, from another (and thus warrants protection) requires knowing Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 about species more than it does consulting a dictionary. (1991). The task is less one of construing a text than of How much variation of what kind—geographic, genetic, balancing competing goals and values. Consider the statutory morphological, or behavioral—should be required? A court directive to achieve “substantial restoration of the [Grand © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 35 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) Canyon's] natural quiet.” See supra, at 2296. Someone is which the Court has declined to defer. King v. Burwell, 576 going to have to decide exactly what that statute means for air U.S. 473, 485–486, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015). traffic over the canyon. How many flights, in what places and The theory is that Congress would not have left matters of at what times, are consistent with restoring enough natural such import to an agency, but would instead have insisted quiet on the ground? That is a policy trade-off of a kind on maintaining control. So the Chevron refinements proceed familiar to agencies—but peculiarly unsuited to judges. Or from the same place as the original doctrine. Taken together, consider Chevron itself. As the Court there understood, the they give interpretive primacy to the agency when—but only choice between defining a “stationary source” as a whole when—it is acting, as Congress specified, in the heartland of plant or as a pollution-emitting device is a choice about how its delegated authority. to “reconcile” two “manifestly competing interests.” 467 U.S. at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The plantwide definition relaxes That carefully calibrated framework “reflects a sensitivity the permitting requirement in the interest of promoting to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches.” economic growth; the device-specific definition strengthens Pauley, 501 U.S. at 696, 111 S.Ct. 2524. Where Congress that requirement to better reduce air pollution. See id., at has spoken, Congress has spoken; only its judgments matter. 851, 863, 866, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Again, that is a choice a And courts alone determine when that has happened: Using judge should not be making, but one an agency properly can. all their normal interpretive tools, they decide whether Agencies are “subject to the supervision of the President, Congress has addressed a given issue. But when courts have who in turn answers to the public.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at decided that Congress has not done so, a choice arises. 571–572, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (plurality opinion). So when faced Absent a legislative directive, either the administering agency with a statutory ambiguity, “an agency to which Congress or a court must take the lead. And the matter is more has delegated policymaking responsibilities” may rely on fit for the agency. The decision is likely to involve the an accountable actor's “views of wise policy to inform its agency's subject-matter expertise; to fall within its sphere judgments.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778. of regulatory experience; and to involve policy choices, including cost-benefit assessments and trade-offs between None of this is to say that deference to agencies is always conflicting values. So a court without relevant expertise appropriate. The Court over time has fine-tuned the Chevron or experience, and without warrant to make policy calls, regime to deny deference in classes of cases in which appropriately steps back. The court still has a role to play: It Congress has no reason to prefer an agency to a court. The polices the agency to ensure that it acts within the zone of majority treats those “refinements” as a flaw in the scheme, reasonable options. But the court does not insert itself into an ante, at 2268, but they are anything but. Consider the rule agency's expertise-driven, policy-laden functions. That is the that an agency gets no deference when construing a statute arrangement best suited to keep every actor in its proper lane. it is not responsible for administering. See Epic Systems And it is the one best suited to ensure that Congress's statutes Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 519–520, 138 S.Ct. 1612, work in the way Congress intended. 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018). Well, of course not—if Congress has not put an agency in charge of implementing a statute, The majority makes two points in reply, neither convincing. Congress would not have given the agency a special role First, it insists that “agencies have no special competence” in its construction. Or take the rule that an *2300 agency in filling gaps or resolving ambiguities in regulatory statutes; will not receive deference if it has reached its decision rather, “[c]ourts do.” Ante, at 2266. Score one for self- without using—or without using properly—its rulemaking confidence; maybe not so high for self-reflection or - or adjudicatory authority. See United States v. Mead Corp., knowledge. Of course courts often construe legal texts, 533 U.S. 218, 226–227, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 hopefully well. And Chevron’s first step takes full advantage (2001); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, of that talent: There, a court tries to divine what Congress 220, 136 S.Ct. 2117, 195 L.Ed.2d 382 (2016). Again, that meant, even in the most complicated or abstruse statutory should not be surprising: Congress expects that authoritative schemes. The deference comes in only if the court cannot pronouncements on a law's meaning will come from the do so—if the court must admit that standard legal tools procedures it has enacted to foster “fairness and deliberation” will not avail to fill a statutory silence or give content to in agency decision-making. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230, 121 S.Ct. an ambiguous term. That is when the issues look like the 2164. Or finally, think of the “extraordinary cases” involving ones I started off with: When does an alpha amino acid questions of vast “economic and political significance” in polymer qualify as a “protein”? How distinct is “distinct” © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 36 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) for squirrel populations? What size “geographic area” will Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An ensure appropriate hospital reimbursement? As between two Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and equally feasible understandings of “stationary source,” should the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 928 (fig. 2), one choose the one more protective of the environment 994 (2013). So if they had wanted a different assignment or the one more favorable to economic growth? The idea of interpretive responsibility, they would have inserted a that courts have “special competence” in deciding such provision to that effect. With just a pair of exceptions I know questions whereas *2301 agencies have “no[ne]” is, if I of, they did not. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (exception may say, malarkey. Answering those questions right does not #1); 15 U.S.C. § 8302(c)(3)(A) (exception #2). Similarly, mainly demand the interpretive skills courts possess. Instead, Congress has declined to enact proposed legislation that it demands one or more of: subject-matter expertise, long would abolish Chevron across the board. See S. 909, 116th engagement with a regulatory scheme, and policy choice. It is Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (2019) (still a bill, not a law); H. R. courts (not agencies) that “have no special competence”—or 5, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., § 202 (2017) (same). So to the even legitimacy—when those are the things a decision calls extent the majority is worried that the Chevron presumption for. is “fiction[al],” ante, at 2268—as all legal presumptions in some sense are—it has gotten less and less so every day for 40 Second, the majority complains that an ambiguity or gap does years. The congressional reaction shows as well as anything not “necessarily reflect a congressional intent that an agency” could that the Chevron Court read Congress right. should have primary interpretive authority. Ante, at 2265. On that score, I'll agree with the premise: It doesn't “necessarily” do so. Chevron is built on a presumption. The decision does II not maintain that Congress in every case wants the agency, rather than a court, to fill in gaps. The decision maintains The majority's principal arguments are in a different vein. that when Congress does not expressly pick one or the other, Around 80 years after the APA was enacted and 40 years we need a default rule; and the best default rule—agency after Chevron, the majority has decided that the former or court?—is the one we think Congress would generally precludes the latter. The APA's Section 706, the majority says, want. As to why Congress would generally want the agency: “makes clear” that agency interpretations of statutes “are not The answer lies in everything said above about Congress's entitled to deference.” Ante, at 2261 (emphasis in original). delegation of regulatory power to the agency and the agency's And that provision, the majority continues, codified *2302 special competencies. See supra, at 2298 - 2299. The majority the contemporaneous law, which likewise did not allow for appears to think it is a showstopping rejoinder to note that deference. See ante, at 2258 - 2261, 2261 - 2262. But neither many statutory gaps and ambiguities are “unintentional.” the APA nor the pre-APA state of the law does the work Ante, at 2266. But to begin, many are not; the ratio between that the majority claims. Both are perfectly compatible with the two is uncertain. See supra, at 2295 - 2296. And to end, Chevron deference. why should that matter in any event? Congress may not have deliberately introduced a gap or ambiguity into the statute; but Section 706, enacted with the rest of the APA in 1946, it knows that pretty much everything it drafts will someday provides for judicial review of agency action. It states: be found to contain such a “flaw.” Given that knowledge, “To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, Chevron asks, what would Congress want? The presumed the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of answer is again the same (for the same reasons): The agency. law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and And as with any default rule, if Congress decides otherwise, determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an all it need do is say. agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. In that respect, the proof really is in the pudding: Congress That text, contra the majority, “does not resolve the Chevron basically never says otherwise, suggesting that Chevron question.” C. Sunstein, Chevron As Law, 107 Geo. L. J. chose the presumption aligning with legislative intent (or, 1613, 1642 (2019) (Sunstein). Or said a bit differently, in the majority's words, “approximat[ing] reality,” ante, at Section 706 is “generally indeterminate” on the matter 2265). Over the last four decades, Congress has authorized of deference. A. Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty or reauthorized hundreds of statutes. The drafters of those 207 (2006) (Vermeule). The majority highlights the phrase statutes knew all about Chevron. See A. Gluck & L. “decide all relevant questions of law” (italicizing the “all”), © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 37 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) and notes that the provision “prescribes no deferential Control of Administrative Action 570 (1965). That is akin standard” for answering those questions. Ante, at 2261. But to step 1: Did Congress speak to the issue, or did it leave just as the provision does not prescribe a deferential standard openness? And if the latter, Jaffe continued, the agency's of review, so too it does not prescribe a de novo standard of view “if ‘reasonable’ is free of control.” Ibid. That of course review (in which the court starts from scratch, without giving looks like step 2: defer if reasonable. And just in case deference). In point of fact, Section 706 does not specify any that description was too complicated, Jaffe conveyed his standard of review for construing statutes. See Kisor, 588 main point this way: The argument that courts “must decide U.S. at 581, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (plurality opinion). And when a all questions of law”—as if there were no agency in the court uses a deferential standard—here, by deciding whether picture—“is, in my opinion, unsound.” Id., at 569. Similarly, an agency reading is reasonable—it just as much “decide[s]” Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, author of the then-preeminent a “relevant question[ ] of law” as when it uses a de novo treatise on administrative law, noted with approval that standard. § 706. The deferring court then conforms to Section “reasonableness” review of agency interpretations—in which 706 “by determining whether the agency has stayed within the courts “refused to substitute judgment”—had “survived the bounds of its assigned discretion—that is, whether the agency APA.” Administrative Law 880, 883, 885 (1951) (Davis). has construed [the statute it administers] reasonably.” J. Other contemporaneous scholars and experts agreed. See R. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 Harv. Levin, The APA and the Assault on Deference, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 457, 459 (2014); see Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, L. Rev. 125, 181–183 (2021) (Levin) (listing many of them). 317, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 (2013) (ROBERTS, C. They did not see in their own time what the majority finds J., dissenting) (“We do not ignore [Section 706’s] command there today. 4 when we afford an agency's statutory interpretation Chevron deference; we respect it”). 2 Nor, evidently, did the Supreme Court. In the years after the APA was enacted, the Court “never indicated that section Section 706’s references to standards of review in other 706 rejected the idea that courts might defer to agency contexts only further undercut the majority's argument. The interpretations of law.” Sunstein 1654. Indeed, not a single majority notes that Section 706 requires deferential review for Justice so much as floated that view of the APA. To the agency fact-finding and policy-making (under, respectively, a contrary, the Court issued a number of decisions in those substantial-evidence standard and an arbitrary-and-capricious years deferring to an *2304 agency's statutory interpretation. standard). See ante, at 2261. Congress, the majority claims, See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Alaska v. “surely would have articulated a similarly deferential standard Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153–154, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 applicable to questions of law had it intended to depart” (1946); NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403, 67 *2303 from de novo review. Ibid. Surely? In another part of S.Ct. 1265, 91 L.Ed. 1563 (1947); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Section 706, Congress explicitly referred to de novo review. § Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 478–479, 67 S.Ct. 801, 91 L.Ed. 706(2)(F). With all those references to standards of review— 1028 (1947). And that continued right up until Chevron. See, both deferential and not—running around Section 706, what e.g., Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473, 480, 76 S.Ct. 527, 100 is “telling” (ante, at 2261) is the absence of any standard for L.Ed. 565 (1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 reviewing an agency's statutory constructions. That silence U.S. 443, 450, 98 S.Ct. 2441, 57 L.Ed.2d 337 (1978). To left the matter, as noted above, “generally indeterminate”: be clear: Deference in those years was not always given Section 706 neither mandates nor forbids Chevron-style to interpretations that would receive it under Chevron. The deference. Vermeule 207. 3 practice then was more inconsistent and less fully elaborated than it later became. The point here is only that the Court came And contra the majority, most “respected commentators” nowhere close to accepting the majority's view of the APA. understood Section 706 in that way—as allowing, even if not Take the language from Section 706 that the majority most requiring, deference. Ante, at 2262. The finest administrative relies on: “decide all relevant questions of law.” See ante, at law scholars of the time (call them that generation's Manning, 2261. In the decade after the APA's enactment, those words Sunstein, and Vermeule) certainly did. Professor Louis Jaffe were used only four times in Supreme Court opinions (all in described something very like the Chevron two-step as the footnotes)—and never to suggest that courts could not defer preferred method of reviewing agency interpretations under to agency interpretations. See Sunstein 1656. the APA. A court, he said, first “must decide as a ‘question of law’ whether there is ‘discretion’ in the premises.” Judicial © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 38 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) The majority's view of Section 706 likewise gets no acknowledged “leading case.” Davis 882; see id., at 884. The support from how judicial review operated in the years Court again deferred, this time to an agency's construction leading up to the APA. That prior history matters: As the of the term “employee” in the National Labor Relations Act. majority recognizes, Section 706 was generally understood The scope of that term, the Court explained, “belong[ed] to” to “restate[ ] the present law as to the scope of judicial the agency to answer based on its “[e]veryday experience in review.” Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the the administration of the statute.” Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130, Administrative Procedure Act 108 (1947); ante, at 2261 - 64 S.Ct. 851. The Court therefore “limited” its review to 2262. The problem for the majority is that in the years whether the agency's reading had “warrant in the record and preceding the APA, courts became ever more deferential to a reasonable basis in law.” Id., at 131, 64 S.Ct. 851. 6 Recall agencies. New Deal administrative programs had by that here that even the majority accepts that Section 706 was meant point come into their own. And this Court and others, in a to “restate[ ] the present law” as to judicial review. See ante, fairly short time, had abandoned their initial resistance and at 2262; supra, at 2303 - 2304. Well then? It sure would seem gotten on board. Justice Breyer, wearing his administrative- that the provision allows a deference regime. law-scholar hat, characterized the pre-APA period this way: “[J]udicial review of administrative action was curtailed, The majority has no way around those two noteworthy and particular agency decisions were frequently sustained decisions. It first appears to distinguish between “pure legal with judicial obeisance to the mysteries of administrative question[s]” and the so-called mixed questions in Gray and expertise.” S. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Hearst, involving the application of a legal standard to a set of Regulatory Policy 21 (7th ed. 2011). And that description facts. Ante, at 2260. If in drawing that distinction, the majority extends to review of an agency's statutory constructions. An intends to confine its *2306 holding to the pure type of influential study of administrative practice, published five legal issue—thus enabling courts to defer when law and facts years before the APA's enactment, described the state of are entwined—I'd be glad. But I suspect the majority has no play: Judicial “review may, in some instances at least, be such intent, because that approach would preserve Chevron limited to the inquiry whether the administrative construction in a substantial part of its current domain. Cf. Wilkinson v. is a permissible one.” Final Report of Attorney General's Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 230, 144 S.Ct. 780, 218 L.Ed.2d 140 Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941), reprinted in (2024) (ALITO, J., dissenting) (noting, in the immigration Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. context, that the universe of mixed questions swamps that of No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 78 (1941). Or again: “[W]here pure legal ones). It is frequently in the consideration of mixed the statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one questions that the scope of statutory terms is established interpretation, the court may accept that of the administrative and their meaning defined. See H. Monaghan, Marbury body.” Id., at 90–91. 5 and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1983) (“Administrative application of law is administrative *2305 Two prominent Supreme Court decisions of the formulation of law whenever it involves elaboration of the 1940s put those principles into action. Gray v. Powell, statutory norm”). How does a statutory interpreter decide, as 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941), was in Hearst, what an “employee” is? In large part through cases then widely understood as “the leading case” on review asking whether the term covers people performing specific of agency interpretations. Davis 882; see ibid. (noting jobs, like (in that case) “newsboys.” 322 U.S. at 120, 64 S.Ct. that it “establish[ed] what is known as ‘the doctrine of 851. Or consider one of the examples I offered above. How Gray v. Powell’ ”). There, the Court deferred to an does an interpreter decide when one population segment of a agency construction of the term “producer” as used in a species is “distinct” from another? Often by considering that statutory exemption from price controls. Congress, the Court requirement with respect to particular species, like western explained, had committed the scope of the exemption to the gray squirrels. So the distinction the majority offers makes agency because its “experience in [the] field gave promise of a no real-world (or even theoretical) sense. If the Hearst Court better informed, more equitable, adjustment of the conflicting was deferring to an agency on whether the term “employee” interests.” Gray, 314 U.S. at 412, 62 S.Ct. 326. Accordingly, covered newsboys, it was deferring to the agency on the scope the Court concluded that it was “not the province of a court” and meaning of the term “employee.” to “substitute its judgment” for the agency's. Ibid. Three years later, the Court decided NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., The majority's next rejoinder—that “the Court was far from 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944), another consistent” in deferring—falls equally flat. Ante, at 2260. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 39 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) I am perfectly ready to acknowledge that in the pre-APA Adherence to precedent is “a foundation stone of the rule period, a deference regime had not yet taken complete hold. of law.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. I'll go even further: Let's assume that deference was then 782, 798, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). Stare an on-again, off-again function (as the majority seems to decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent suggest, see ante, at 2259 - 2260, and 2260, n. 3). Even on development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, that assumption, the majority's main argument—that Section 111 S.Ct. 2597. It enables people to order their lives in 706 prohibited deferential review—collapses. Once again, the reliance on judicial decisions. And it “contributes to the majority agrees that Section 706 was not meant to change actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,” by the then-prevailing law. See ante, at 2261 - 2262. And even ensuring that those decisions are founded in the law, and not if inconsistent, that law cannot possibly be thought to have in the “personal preferences” of judges. Id., at 828, 111 S.Ct. prohibited deference. Or otherwise said: “If Section 706 did 2597; Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 388, 142 S.Ct. 2228 (dissenting not change the law of judicial review (as we have long opinion). Perhaps above all else, stare decisis is a “doctrine of recognized), then it did not proscribe a deferential standard judicial modesty.” Id., at 363, 142 S.Ct. 2228. In that, it shares then known and in use.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 583, 139 S.Ct. something important with Chevron. Both tell judges that they 2400 (plurality opinion). do not know everything, and would do well to attend to the views of others. So today, the majority rejects what judicial The majority's whole argument for overturning Chevron relies humility counsels not just once but twice over. on Section 706. But the text of Section 706 does not support that result. And neither does the contemporaneous practice, And Chevron is entitled to a particularly strong form of which that text was supposed to reflect. So today's decision stare decisis, for two separate reasons. First, it matters has no basis in the only law the majority deems relevant. It that “Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” is grounded on air. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989); see Kisor, 588 U.S. at 587, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (opinion of the Court) (making the same point for Auer deference). In a constitutional case, the III Court alone can correct an error. But that is not so here. And still there is worse, because abandoning Chevron “Our deference decisions are balls tossed into Congress's subverts every known principle of stare decisis. Of course, court, for acceptance or not as that branch elects.” 588 respecting precedent is not an “inexorable command.” Payne U.S. at 587–588, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (opinion of the Court). v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d And for generations now, Congress has chosen acceptance. 720 (1991). But overthrowing it requires far more than the Throughout those years, Congress could have abolished majority has offered up here. Chevron is entitled to stare Chevron across the board, most easily by amending the APA. decisis’s strongest form of protection. The majority thus needs Or it could have eliminated deferential review in discrete an exceptionally strong reason to overturn the decision, above areas, by amending old laws or drafting new laws to include and beyond thinking it wrong. And it has nothing approaching an anti-Chevron provision. Instead, Congress has “spurned such a justification, proposing only a bewildering theory multiple opportunities” to do a comprehensive rejection of about Chevron’s “unworkability.” Ante, at 2271. Just five Chevron, and has hardly ever done a targeted one. Kimble years ago, this Court in Kisor rejected a plea to overrule Auer v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456, 135 S.Ct. v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 2401, 192 L.Ed.2d 463 (2015); see supra, at 2301 - 2302. (1997), which requires judicial deference to agencies’ *2307 Or to put the point more affirmatively, Congress has kept interpretations of their own regulations. See 588 U.S. at 586– Chevron as is for 40 years. It maintained that position even as 589, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (opinion of the Court). The case against Members of this Court began to call Chevron into question. overruling Chevron is at least as strong. In particular, the See ante, at 2270. From all it appears, Congress has not agreed majority's decision today will cause a massive shock to the with the view of some Justices that they and other judges legal system, “cast[ing] doubt on many settled constructions” should have more power. of statutes and threatening the interests of many parties who have relied on them for years. 588 U.S. at 587, 139 S.Ct. 2400 Second, Chevron is by now much more than a single decision. (opinion of the Court). This Court alone, acting as Chevron allows, has upheld an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute at least 70 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 40 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) times. See Brief for United States in No. 221219, p. 27; App. to id., at 68a–72a (collecting cases). Lower courts have The majority does no better in its main justification for applied the Chevron framework on thousands upon thousands overruling Chevron—that the decision is “unworkable.” Ante, of occasions. See K. Barnett & C. Walker, Chevron and Stare at 2270. The majority's first theory on that score is that there Decisis, 31 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 475, 477, and n. 11 (2024) is no single “answer” about what “ambiguity” means: Some (noting that at last count, Chevron was cited in more than judges turn out to see more of it than others do, leading to 18,000 federal-court decisions). The Kisor Court observed, “different results.” Ante, at 2270. But even if so, the legal when upholding Auer, that “[d]eference to reasonable agency system has for many years, in many contexts, dealt perfectly interpretations of ambiguous rules pervades the whole corpus well with that variation. Take contract law. It is hornbook of administrative *2308 law.” 588 U.S. at 587, 139 S.Ct. stuff that when (but only when) a contract is ambiguous, a 2400 (opinion of the Court). So too does deference to court interpreting it can consult extrinsic evidence. See CNH reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes— Industrial N.V. v. Reese, 583 U.S. 133, 139, 138 S.Ct. 761, except more so. Chevron is as embedded as embedded gets 200 L.Ed.2d 1 (2018) (per curiam). And when all interpretive in the law. tools still leave ambiguity, the contract is construed against the drafter. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 186– The majority says differently, because this Court has ignored 187, 139 S.Ct. 1407, 203 L.Ed.2d 636 (2019). So I guess Chevron lately; all that is left of the decision is a “decaying the contract rules of the 50 States are unworkable now. Or husk with bold pretensions.” Ante, at 2272. Tell that to the look closer to home, to doctrines this Court regularly applies. D. C. Circuit, the court that reviews a large share of agency In deciding whether a government has waived sovereign interpretations, where Chevron remains alive and well. See, immunity, we construe “[a]ny ambiguities in the statutory e.g., Lissack v. Commissioner, 68 F.4th 1312, 1321–1322 language” in “favor of immunity.” FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. (2023); Solar Energy Industries Assn. v. FERC, 59 F.4th 1287, 284, 290, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012). Similarly, 1291–1294 (2023). But more to the point: The majority's the rule of lenity tells us to construe ambiguous statutes in argument is a bootstrap. This Court has “avoided deferring favor of criminal defendants. See United States v. Castleman, under Chevron since 2016” (ante, at 2271) because it has 572 U.S. 157, 172–173, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 been preparing to overrule Chevron since around that time. (2014). And the canon of constitutional avoidance instructs us That kind of self-help on the way to reversing precedent to construe ambiguous laws to avoid difficult constitutional has become almost routine at this Court. Stop applying a questions. See *2309 United States v. Oakland Cannabis decision where one should; “throw some gratuitous criticisms Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 494, 121 S.Ct. 1711, into a couple of opinions”; issue a few separate writings 149 L.Ed.2d 722 (2001). I could go on, but the point is “question[ing the decision's] premises” (ante, at 2270); give made. There are ambiguity triggers all over the law. Somehow the whole process a few years ... and voila!—you have everyone seems to get by. a justification for overruling the decision. Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U.S. 878, 950, And Chevron is an especially puzzling decision to criticize 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) (KAGAN, J., on the ground of generating too much judicial divergence. dissenting) (discussing the overruling of Abood v. Detroit There's good empirical—meaning, non-impressionistic— Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 evidence on exactly that subject. And it shows that, as (1977)); see also, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., compared with de novo review, use of the Chevron two- 597 U.S. 507, 571–572, 142 S.Ct. 2407, 213 L.Ed.2d 755 step framework fosters agreement among judges. See K. (2022) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (similar for Lemon Barnett, C. Boyd, & C. Walker, Administrative Law's Political v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d Dynamics, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 1463, 1502 (2018) (Barnett). 745 (1971)); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 587– More particularly, Chevron has a “powerful constraining 588, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013) (Ginsburg, effect on partisanship in judicial decisionmaking.” Barnett J., dissenting) (similar for South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 1463 (italics deleted); see Sunstein 1672 (“[A] predictable 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966)). I effect of overruling Chevron would be to ensure a far greater once remarked that this overruling-through-enfeeblement role for judicial policy preferences in statutory interpretation technique “mock[ed] stare decisis.” Janus, 585 U.S. at 950, and far more common splits along ideological lines”). So if 138 S.Ct. 2448 (dissenting opinion). I have seen no reason to consistency among judges is the majority's lodestar, then the change my mind. Court should not overrule Chevron, but return to using it. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 41 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) or “delimit[ ]” statutory terms or concepts, or to “fill up The majority's second theory on workability is likewise a the details” of a statutory scheme. Ante, at 2263, and n. 5. makeweight. Chevron, the majority complains, has some Or Congress may use, in describing an agency's regulatory exceptions, which (so the majority says) are “difficult” and authority, inherently “flexib[le]” language like “appropriate” “complicate[d]” to apply. Ante, at 2271. Recall that courts or “reasonable.” Ante, at 2263, and n. 6. Attending to every are not supposed to defer when the agency construing a such delegation, as the majority says, is necessary in a world statute (1) has not been charged with administering that law; without Chevron. But that task involves complexities of its (2) has not used deliberative procedures—i.e., notice-and- own. Indeed, one reason Justice Scalia supported Chevron comment rulemaking or adjudication; or (3) is intervening was that it replaced such a “statute-by-statute evaluation in a “major question,” of great economic and political (which was assuredly a font of uncertainty and litigation) significance. See supra, at 2299 - 2300; ante, at 2268 - 2269. with an across-the-board presumption.” A. Scalia, Judicial As I've explained, those exceptions—the majority also aptly Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 calls them “refinements”—fit with Chevron’s rationale: They Duke L. J. 511, 516. As a lover of the predictability that define circumstances in which Congress is unlikely to have rules create, Justice Scalia thought the latter “unquestionably wanted agency views to govern. Ante, at 2268 - 2269; see better.” Id., at 517. supra, at 2299 - 2300. And on the difficulty scale, they are nothing much. Has Congress put the agency in charge On the other side of the balance, the most important stare of administering the statute? In 99 of 100 cases, everyone decisis factor—call it the “jolt to the legal system” issue will agree on the answer with scarcely a moment's thought. —weighs heavily against overruling Chevron. Dobbs, 597 Did the agency use notice-and-comment or an adjudication U.S. at 357, 142 S.Ct. 2228 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring before rendering an interpretation? Once again, I could stretch in judgment). Congress and agencies alike have relied on my mind and think up a few edge cases, but for the most Chevron—have assumed its existence—in much of their part, the answer is an easy yes or no. The major questions work for the last 40 years. Statutes passed during that exception is, I acknowledge, different: There, many judges time reflect the expectation that Chevron would allocate have indeed disputed its nature and scope. Compare, e.g., West interpretive authority between agencies and courts. Rules Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721–724, 142 S.Ct. 2587, with id., at issued during the period likewise presuppose that statutory 764–770, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). But that ambiguities were the agencies’ to (reasonably) resolve. Those disagreement concerns, on everyone's view, a tiny subset of agency interpretations may have benefited regulated entities; all agency interpretations. For the most part, the exceptions or they may have protected members of the broader public. that so upset the majority require merely a rote, check-the- Either way, private parties have ordered their affairs—their box inquiry. If that is the majority's idea of a “dizzying business and financial decisions, their health-care decisions, breakdance,” ante, at 2271, the majority needs to get out their educational decisions—around agency actions that are more. suddenly now subject to challenge. In Kisor, this Court refused to overrule Auer because doing so would “cast doubt And anyway, difficult as compared to what? The majority's on” many longstanding constructions of rules, and thereby prescribed way of proceeding is no walk in the park. First, upset settled expectations. 588 U.S. at 587, 139 S.Ct. 2400 the majority makes clear that what is usually called Skidmore (opinion of the Court). Overruling Chevron, and thus raising deference continues to apply. See ante, at 2262 - 2263. Under new doubts about agency constructions of statutes, will be far that decision, agency interpretations “constitute a body of more disruptive. experience and informed judgment” that may be “entitled to respect.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. The majority tries to alleviate concerns about a piece of that 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). If the majority thinks that the same problem: It states that judicial decisions that have upheld judges who argue today about where “ambiguity” resides (see agency action as reasonable under Chevron should not be ante, at 2262 - 2264) are not going to argue tomorrow about overruled on that account alone. See ante, at 2272 - 2273. what “respect” requires, I fear it will be gravely disappointed. That is all to the good: There are thousands of such decisions, Second, the majority directs courts to comply with the varied many settled for decades. See supra, at 2307 - 2308. But first, ways in which Congress in fact “delegates discretionary reasonable reliance need not be predicated on a prior judicial authority” to agencies. *2310 Ante, at 2262 - 2264. For decision. Some agency interpretations never challenged under example, Congress may authorize an agency to “define[ ]” Chevron now will be; expectations formed around those © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 42 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) statutes, and often of great import. What actions can be taken constructions thus could be upset, in a way the majority's to address climate change or other environmental challenges? assurance does not touch. And anyway, how good is that What will the Nation's health-care system look like in the assurance, really? The majority says that a decision's “[m]ere coming decades? Or the financial or transportation systems? reliance on Chevron” is not enough to counter the force of What rules are going to constrain the development of A.I.? stare decisis; a challenger will need an additional “special In every sphere of current or future federal regulation, expect justification.” Ante, at 2273. The majority is sanguine; I am courts from now on to play a commanding role. It is not a role not so much. Courts motivated to overrule an old Chevron- Congress has given to them, in the APA or any other statute. based decision can always come up with something to label It is a role this Court has now claimed for itself, as well as a “special justification.” Maybe a court will say “the quality for other judges. of [the precedent's] reasoning” was poor. Ante, at 2270. Or maybe the court will discover something “unworkable” in the And that claim requires disrespecting, too, this Court's decision—like some exception that has to be applied. Ante, precedent. There are no special reasons, of the kind usually at 2270. All a court need do is look to today's opinion to see invoked for overturning precedent, to eliminate Chevron how it is done. deference. And given Chevron’s pervasiveness, the decision to do so is likely to produce large-scale disruption. All that backs today's decision is the majority's belief that Chevron IV was wrong—that it gave agencies too much power and courts not enough. But shifting views about the worth of regulatory Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either actors and their work do not justify overhauling a cornerstone political branch of the Government. of administrative law. In that sense too, today's majority has *2311 lost sight of its proper role. — Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 And it is impossible to pretend that today's decision is a one- L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) off, in either its treatment of agencies or its treatment of Those were the days, when we knew what we are not. When precedent. As to the first, this very Term presents yet another we knew that as between courts and agencies, Congress example of the Court's resolve to roll back agency authority, would usually think agencies the better choice to resolve the despite congressional direction to the contrary. See SEC v. ambiguities and fill the gaps in regulatory statutes. Because Jarkesy, 603 U. S. ––––, 144 S.Ct. 2117, ––– L.Ed.2d ––– agencies are “experts in the field.” And because they are (2024); see also supra, at 2294 - 2295. As to the second, part of a political branch, with a claim to making interstitial just my own defenses of stare decisis—my own dissents to policy. And because Congress has charged them, not us, this Court's reversals of settled law—by now fill a small with administering the statutes containing the open questions. volume. See Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 363–364, 142 S.Ct. 2228 At its core, Chevron is about respecting that allocation (joint opinion of Breyer, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.); of responsibility—the conferral of primary authority over Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 296–297, 141 S.Ct. 1547, regulatory matters to agencies, not courts. 209 L.Ed.2d 651 (2021); Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 207–208, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019); Today, the majority does not respect that judgment. It gives Janus, 585 U.S. at 931–932, 138 S.Ct. 2448. Once again, with courts the power to make all manner of scientific and technical respect, I dissent. judgments. It gives courts the power to make all manner of policy calls, including about how to weigh competing goods All Citations and values. (See Chevron itself.) It puts courts at the apex of the administrative process as to every conceivable subject— 144 S.Ct. 2244 because there are always gaps and ambiguities in regulatory Footnotes © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 43 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) * The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. 1 For any landlubbers, “F/V” is simply the designation for a fishing vessel. 2 Both petitions also presented questions regarding the consistency of the Rule with the MSA. See Pet. for Cert. in No. 22–451, p. i; Pet. for Cert. in No. 22–1219, p. ii. We did not grant certiorari with respect to those questions and thus do not reach them. 3 The dissent plucks out Gray, Hearst, and—to “gild the lily,” in its telling—three more 1940s decisions, claiming they reflect the relevant historical tradition of judicial review. Post, at 2305 – 2306, and n. 6 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). But it has no substantial response to the fact that Gray and Hearst themselves endorsed, implicitly in one case and explicitly in the next, the traditional rule that “questions of statutory interpretation ... are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight”—not outright deference—“to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute.” Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130–131, 64 S.Ct. 851. And it fails to recognize the deep roots that this rule has in our Nation's judicial tradition, to the limited extent it engages with that tradition at all. See post, at 2304 – 2305, n. 5. Instead, like the Government, it strains to equate the “respect” or “weight” traditionally afforded to Executive Branch interpretations with binding deference. See ibid.; Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 21–24. That supposed equivalence is a fiction. The dissent's cases establish that a “contemporaneous construction” shared by “not only ... the courts” but also “the departments” could be “controlling,” Schell's Executors v. Fauché, 138 U.S. 562, 572, 11 S.Ct. 376, 34 L.Ed. 1040 (1891) (emphasis added), and that courts might “lean in favor” of a “contemporaneous” and “continued” construction of the Executive Branch as strong evidence of a statute's meaning, United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 142 U.S. 615, 621, 12 S.Ct. 306, 35 L.Ed. 1134 (1892). They do not establish that Executive Branch interpretations of ambiguous statutes—no matter how inconsistent, late breaking, or flawed—always bound the courts. In reality, a judge was never “bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a department.” Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515, 10 L.Ed. 559 (1840). 4 The dissent observes that Section 706 does not say expressly that courts are to decide legal questions using “a de novo standard of review.” Post, at 2302. That much is true. But statutes can be sensibly understood only “by reviewing text in context.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 133, 144 S.Ct. 718, 218 L.Ed.2d 77 (2024). Since the start of our Republic, courts have “decide[d] ... questions of law” and “interpret[ed] constitutional and statutory provisions” by applying their own legal judgment. § 706. Setting aside its misplaced reliance on Gray and Hearst, the dissent does not and could not deny that tradition. But it nonetheless insists that to codify that tradition, Congress needed to expressly reject a sort of deference the courts had never before applied—and would not apply for several decades to come. It did not. “The notion that some things ‘go without saying’ applies to legislation just as it does to everyday life.” Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014). 5 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (exempting from provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act “any employee employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary)” (emphasis added)); 42 U.S.C. § 5846(a)(2) (requiring notification to Nuclear Regulatory Commission when a facility or activity licensed or regulated pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act “contains a defect which could create a substantial safety hazard, as defined by regulations which the Commission shall promulgate” (emphasis added)). 6 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (requiring establishment of effluent limitations “[w]henever, in the judgment of the [Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)] Administrator ..., discharges of pollutants from a point source or group of point sources ... would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of that water quality ... which © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 44 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) shall assure” various outcomes, such as the “protection of public health” and “public water supplies”); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (directing EPA to regulate power plants “if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary”). 7 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 45 F.4th 306, 313–314 (CADC 2022), abrogated by Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 406, 144 S.Ct. 1613, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2024); County of Amador v. United States Dept. of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012, 1021–1022 (CA9 2017); Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 397, 403–404 (CA8 2016); Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 220 (CA2 2014); Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co., 747 F.3d 673, 685, n. 52 (CA9 2014); Jurado- Delgado v. Attorney Gen. of U. S., 498 Fed.Appx. 107, 117 (CA3 2009); see also D. Brookins, Confusion in the Circuit Courts: How the Circuit Courts Are Solving the Mead-Puzzle by Avoiding It Altogether, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1484, 1496–1499 (2017) (documenting Chevron avoidance by the lower courts); A. Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095, 1127–1129 (2009) (same); L. Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1464–1466 (2005) (same). 8 Citing an empirical study, the dissent adds that Chevron “fosters agreement among judges.” Post, at 2309. It is hardly surprising that a study might find as much; Chevron’s second step is supposed to be hospitable to agency interpretations. So when judges get there, they tend to agree that the agency wins. That proves nothing about the supposed ease or predictability of identifying ambiguity in the first place. * There is much to be commended in Justice GORSUCH's careful consideration from first principles of the weight we should afford to our precedent. I agree with the lion's share of his concurrence. See generally Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 710, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 204 L.Ed.2d 322 (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring). 1 For relevant databases of decisions, see Congressional Research Service, Table of Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decisions, Constitution Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/ resources/ecisions-overruled/; see also H. Spaeth et al., 2023 Supreme Court Database, http:// supremecourtdatabase.org. 2 See also A. Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 516– 517 (1989) (describing Chevron’s theory that Congress “delegat[ed]” interpretive authority to agencies as “fictional”); S. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986) (describing the notion that there exists a “ ‘legislative intent to delegate the law-interpreting function’ as a kind of legal fiction”). 3 The dissent suggests that we need not take the APA's directions quite so seriously because the “finest administrative law scholars” from Harvard claim to see in them some wiggle room. Post, at 2303 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). But nothing in the APA commands deference to the views of professors any more than it does the government. Nor is the dissent's list of Harvard's finest administrative law scholars entirely complete. See S. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 288 (7th ed. 2011) (acknowledging that Chevron deference “seems in conflict with ... the apparently contrary language of 706”); Kagan 212 (likewise acknowledging Chevron deference rests upon a “fictionalized statement of legislative desire”). 4 Accord, National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145–146, 40 S.Ct. 237, 64 L.Ed. 496 (1920) (affording “great weight” to a “contemporaneous construction” by the executive that had “been long continued”); Jacobs v. Prichard, 223 U.S. 200, 214, 32 S.Ct. 289, 56 L.Ed. 405 (1912) (“find[ing] no ambiguity in the act” but also finding “strength” for the Court's interpretation in the executive's “immediate and continued construction of the act”); Schell's Executors v. Fauché, 138 U.S. 562, 572, 11 S.Ct. 376, 34 L.Ed. 1040 (1891) © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 45 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) (treating as “controlling” a “contemporaneous construction” of a law endorsed “not only [by] the courts but [also by] the departments”). 5 The dissent suggests that Chevron deference bears at least something in common with surrounding law because it resembles a presumption or traditional canon of construction, and both “are common.” Post, at 2297 - 2298, n. 1, 2309 - 2310 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). But even that thin reed wavers at a glance. Many of the presumptions and interpretive canons the dissent cites—including lenity, contra proferentem, and others besides—“ ‘embod[y] ... legal doctrine[s] centuries older than our Republic.’ ” Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418, 425, 140 S.Ct. 1601, 206 L.Ed.2d 904 (2020). Chevron deference can make no such boast. Many of the presumptions and canons the dissent cites also serve the Constitution, protecting the lines of authority it draws. Take just two examples: The federalism canon tells courts to presume federal statutes do not preempt state laws because of the sovereignty States enjoy under the Constitution. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014). The presumption against retroactivity serves as guardian of the Constitution's promise of due process and its ban on ex post facto laws, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). Once more, however, Chevron deference can make no similar claim. Rather than serve the Constitution's usual rule that litigants are entitled to have an independent judge interpret disputed legal terms, Chevron deference works to undermine that promise. As explored above, too, Chevron deference sits in tension with many traditional legal presumptions and interpretive principles, representing nearly the inverse of the rules of lenity, nemo iudex, and contra proferentem. 6 It should be recalled that, when Justice Scalia launched the Chevron revolution, there were many judges who “abhor[red] ... ‘plain meaning’ ” and preferred instead to elevate “legislative history” and their own curated accounts of a law's “purpose[s]” over enacted statutory text. Scalia 515, 521. Chevron, he predicted, would provide a new guardrail against that practice. Scalia 515, 521. As the Justice's later writings show, he had the right diagnosis, just the wrong cure. The answer for judges eliding statutory terms is not deference to agencies that may seek to do the same, but a demand that all return to a more faithful adherence to the written law. That was, of course, another project Justice Scalia championed. And as we like to say, “we're all textualists now.” 7 See, e.g., Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center, 597 U.S. 424, 434, 142 S.Ct. 2354, 213 L.Ed.2d 685 (2022) (resolving intricate Medicare dispute by reference solely to “text,” “context,” and “structure”); see also Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651, 143 S.Ct. 1322, 215 L.Ed.2d 579 (2023) (same in a complex Clean Water Act dispute); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 141 S.Ct. 2271, 210 L.Ed.2d 656 (2021) (same in technical immigration case). 8 Today's dissenters are no exceptions. They have voted to overrule precedents that they consider “wrong,” Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 101, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) (opinion for the Court by SOTOMAYOR, J., joined by, inter alios, KAGAN, J.); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665, 675, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (opinion for the Court, joined by, inter alios, SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.); that conflict with the Constitution's “original meaning,” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 118, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (SOTOMAYOR, J., joined by, inter alias, KAGAN, J., concurring); and that have proved “unworkable,” Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 605, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (opinion for the Court, joined by, inter alios, SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.); see also Erlinger v. United States, 602 U. S. –––––, 144 S.Ct. 1840, 1873, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2024) (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1) (arguing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and the many cases applying it were all “wrongly decided”). * Justice JACKSON did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22–451 and joins this opinion only as it applies to the case in No. 22–1219. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 46 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) 1 Note that presumptions of this kind are common in the law. In other contexts, too, the Court responds to a congressional lack of direction by adopting a presumption about what Congress wants, rather than trying to figure that out in every case. And then Congress can legislate, with “predictable effects,” against that “stable background” rule. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010). Take the presumption against extraterritoriality: The Court assumes Congress means for its statutes to apply only within the United States, absent a “clear indication” to the contrary. Id., at 255, 130 S.Ct. 2869. Or the presumption against retroactivity: The Court assumes Congress wants its laws to apply only prospectively, unless it “unambiguously instruct[s]” something different. Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 266, 132 S.Ct. 1479, 182 L.Ed.2d 473 (2012). Or the presumption against repeal of statutes by implication: The Court assumes Congress does not intend a later statute to displace an earlier one unless it makes that intention “clear and manifest.” Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 510, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018). Or the (so far unnamed) presumption against treating a procedural requirement as “jurisdictional” unless “Congress clearly states that it is.” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199, 203, 142 S.Ct. 1493, 212 L.Ed.2d 524 (2022). I could continue, except that this footnote is long enough. The Chevron deference rule is to the same effect: The Court generally assumes that Congress intends to confer discretion on agencies to handle statutory ambiguities or gaps, absent a direction to the contrary. The majority calls that presumption a “fiction,” ante, at 2268, but it is no more so than any of the presumptions listed above. They all are best guesses—and usually quite good guesses—by courts about congressional intent. 2 The majority tries to buttress its argument with a stray sentence or two from the APA's legislative history, but the same response holds. As the majority notes, see ante, at 2262, the House and Senate Reports each stated that Section 706 “provid[ed] that questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis.” H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 44 (1946); S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1945). But that statement also does not address the standard of review that courts should then use. When a court defers under Chevron, it reviews the agency's construction for reasonableness “in the last analysis.” The views of Representative Walter, which the majority also cites, further demonstrate my point. He stated that the APA would require courts to “determine independently all relevant questions of law,” but he also stated that courts would be required to “exercise ... independent judgment” in applying the substantial- evidence standard (a deferential standard if ever there were one). 92 Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946). He therefore did not equate “independent” review with de novo review; he thought that a court could conduct independent review of agency action using a deferential standard. 3 In a footnote responding to the last two paragraphs, the majority raises the white flag on Section 706’s text. See ante, at 2261 - 2262, n. 4. Yes, it finally concedes, Section 706 does not say that de novo review is required for an agency's statutory construction. Rather, the majority says, “some things go without saying,” and de novo review is such a thing. See ibid. But why? What extra-textual considerations force us to read Section 706 the majority's way? In its footnote, the majority repairs only to history. But as I will explain below, the majority also gets wrong the most relevant history, pertaining to how judicial review of agency interpretations operated in the years before the APA was enacted. See infra, at 2303 - 2306. 4 I concede one exception (whose view was “almost completely isolated,” Levin 181), but his comments on Section 706 refute a different aspect of the majority's argument. Professor John Dickinson, as the majority notes, thought that Section 706 precluded courts from deferring to agency interpretations. See Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A. B. A. J. 434, 516 (1947) (Dickinson); ante, at 2262. But unlike the majority, he viewed that bar as “a change” to, not a restatement of, pre-APA law. Compare Dickinson 516 with ante, at 2261 - 2262. So if the majority really wants to rely on Professor Dickinson, it will have to give up the claim, which I address below, that the law before the APA forbade deference. See infra, at 2303 - 2306. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 47 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) 5 Because the APA was meant to “restate[ ] the present law,” the judicial review practices of the 1940s are more important to understanding the statute than is any earlier tradition (such as the majority dwells on). But before I expand on those APA-contemporaneous practices, I pause to note that they were “not built on sand.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 568–569, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 204 L.Ed.2d 841 (2019) (plurality opinion). Since the early days of the Republic, this Court has given significant weight to official interpretations of “ambiguous law[s].” Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210, 6 L.Ed. 603 (1827). With the passage of time—and the growth of the administrative sphere—those “judicial expressions of deference increased.” H. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1983). By the early 20th century, the Court stated that it would afford “great weight” to an agency construction in the face of statutory “uncertainty or ambiguity.” National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145, 40 S.Ct. 237, 64 L.Ed. 496 (1920); see Schell's Executors v. Fauché, 138 U.S. 562, 572, 11 S.Ct. 376, 34 L.Ed. 1040 (1891) (“controlling” weight in “all cases of ambiguity”); United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 142 U.S. 615, 621, 12 S.Ct. 306, 35 L.Ed. 1134 (1892) (“decisive” weight “in case of ambiguity”); Jacobs v. Prichard, 223 U.S. 200, 214, 32 S.Ct. 289, 56 L.Ed. 405 (1912) (referring to the “rule which gives strength” to official interpretations if “ambiguity exist[s]”). So even before the New Deal, a strand of this Court's cases exemplified deference to executive constructions of ambiguous statutes. And then, as I show in the text, the New Deal arrived and deference surged—creating the “present law” that the APA “restated.” 6 The majority says that I have “pluck[ed] out” Gray and Hearst, impliedly from a vast number of not-so-helpful cases. Ante, at 2260, n. 3. It would make as much sense to say that a judge “plucked out” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), to discuss substantial-evidence review or “plucked out” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983), to discuss arbitrary-and-capricious review. Gray and Hearst, as noted above, were the leading cases about agency interpretations in the years before the APA's enactment. But just to gild the lily, here are a number of other Supreme Court decisions from the five years prior to the APA's enactment that were of a piece: United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 536, 66 S.Ct. 687, 90 L.Ed. 821 (1946); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65, 65 S.Ct. 1490, 89 L.Ed. 2051 (1945); Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 227–228, 63 S.Ct. 589, 87 L.Ed. 724 (1943). The real “pluck[ing]” offense is the majority's—for taking a stray sentence from Hearst (ante, at 2260, n. 3) to suggest that both Hearst and Gray stand for the opposite of what they actually do. End of Document © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. © 2024 Thomson Reuters. 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