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fake-truncate js-profile-about" style="margin: 0px;">I am Silver Professor of Philosophy at NYU and Director of the New York Institute of Philosophy.  http://nyip.as.nyu.edu/page/home <br /> <br />My main interests are in the philosophy of mind, epistemology and the philosophy of language, although I also have strong interests in aesthetics, especially in the philosophy of music.<br /><div class="js-profile-less-about u-linkUnstyled u-tcGrayDarker u-textDecorationUnderline u-displayNone">less</div></div></div><div class="suggested-academics-container"><div class="suggested-academics--header"><p class="ds2-5-body-md-bold">Related Authors</p></div><ul class="suggested-user-card-list" data-nosnippet="true"><div class="suggested-user-card"><div class="suggested-user-card__avatar social-profile-avatar-container"><a href="https://neu.academia.edu/BrandenFitelson"><img class="profile-avatar u-positionAbsolute" alt="Branden Fitelson" border="0" onerror="if (this.src != 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$a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="profile--tab_heading_container js-section-heading" data-section="Papers" id="Papers"><h3 class="profile--tab_heading_container">Papers by Paul Boghossian</h3></div><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900094"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900094/Analyticity_Reconsidered1"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Analyticity Reconsidered1" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Analyticity Reconsidered1</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900094"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900094"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900094; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900094]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900094]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900094; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900094']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900094]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900094,"title":"Analyticity Reconsidered1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.","publisher":"Oxford University Press","publication_date":{"day":15,"month":10,"year":2020,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Oxford University Press eBooks"},"translated_abstract":"This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. 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It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":804,"name":"Metaphysics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphysics"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":82123,"name":"Virtue","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Virtue"},{"id":170957,"name":"Quine","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Quine"},{"id":961850,"name":"Sentence","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Sentence"}],"urls":[{"id":40101979,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0001"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900093"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900093/Inferential_role_semantics_and_the_analytic_synthetic_distinction"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Inferential role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Inferential role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Studies</span><span>, Mar 1, 1994</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Page 1. PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN INFERENTIAL ROLE SEMANTICS AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION (Rec...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Page 1. PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN INFERENTIAL ROLE SEMANTICS AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION (Received 15 September 1993) 1. INTRODUCTION Towards the end of their provocative discussion of conceptual ...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900093"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900093"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900093; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900093]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900093]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900093; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900093']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900093]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900093,"title":"Inferential role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Page 1. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900091"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900091/Debating_the_A_Priori"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Debating the A Priori" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Debating the A Priori</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate e...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than fifteen years. 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The argument involves revisiting Williamson’s famous expert-based recipe for generating counterexamples to any constitutive understanding–assent link. Notwithstanding, it is further argued that the theory of the a priori cannot avoid appeal to a notion of intuition or rational insight primarily because there are propositions, such as normative principles, that are synthetic a priori. It answers Williamson’s stated skepticism about the existence of intuitions and makes a start at explaining how intuitions might be able to contribute to a priori justification.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900090"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900090"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900090; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900090]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900090]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900090; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900090']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900090]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900090,"title":"Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay distinguishes between Constitutive and Basis versions of understanding-based accounts of a priori justification and argues, contra Williamson, that the phenomenon of expert competent dissent doesn’t undermine either one. 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It answers Williamson’s stated skepticism about the existence of intuitions and makes a start at explaining how intuitions might be able to contribute to a priori justification.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":7673,"name":"Intuition","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Intuition"},{"id":29711,"name":"Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Skepticism"},{"id":138943,"name":"Normative","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Normative"},{"id":561321,"name":"Appeal","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Appeal"},{"id":1806081,"name":"Counterexample","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Counterexample"},{"id":3325992,"name":"a priori and a posteriori","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/a_priori_and_a_posteriori"}],"urls":[{"id":40101975,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0013"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900089"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900089/Williamson_on_the_Distinction_between_the_A_Priori_and_the_A_Posteriori_Once_Again1"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again1" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again1</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down c...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down characterization of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, arguing that Williamson fails to show that sense experience plays an irreducibly epistemic role in his new Mathematician example. Williamson’s example turns on the problematic claim that there is something intermediate between reading a proof lazily, deferring to the authority of its author, and reading it while checking its soundness for oneself. Furthermore, it is argued that Williamson’s defense of his Central argument is vitiated by a serious misreading of Boghossian’s initial criticism: that criticism was not meant to supply an alternative account of the way in which certain a priori propositions are known.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900089"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900089"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900089; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900089]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900089]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900089; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900089']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900089]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900089,"title":"Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down characterization of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, arguing that Williamson fails to show that sense experience plays an irreducibly epistemic role in his new Mathematician example. 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Furthermore, it is argued that Williamson’s defense of his Central argument is vitiated by a serious misreading of Boghossian’s initial criticism: that criticism was not meant to supply an alternative account of the way in which certain a priori propositions are known.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":300,"name":"Mathematics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Mathematics"},{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":56663,"name":"Criticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Criticism"},{"id":1354400,"name":"Reading Process","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Reading_Process"},{"id":1865378,"name":"SOUNDNESS","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/SOUNDNESS"},{"id":3325992,"name":"a priori and a posteriori","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/a_priori_and_a_posteriori"}],"urls":[{"id":40101974,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0011"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900088"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900088/Reply_to_Williamson_on_Intuition_Understanding_and_the_A_Priori1"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. The paper gives grounds for rejecting Williamson’s argument that intuitions, supposing them to exist, cannot be the source of distinctively a priori justification. Finally, it is argued that Williamson’s argument against the existence of intuitions (understood as sui generis states of intellectual seeming) flounders because it rests on a misguided and naïve dichotomy between ‘introspectable’ and ‘postulated’ mental states.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900088"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900088"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900088; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900088]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900088]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900088; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900088']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900088]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900088,"title":"Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. The paper gives grounds for rejecting Williamson’s argument that intuitions, supposing them to exist, cannot be the source of distinctively a priori justification. Finally, it is argued that Williamson’s argument against the existence of intuitions (understood as sui generis states of intellectual seeming) flounders because it rests on a misguided and naïve dichotomy between ‘introspectable’ and ‘postulated’ mental states.","publisher":"Oxford University Press","publication_date":{"day":15,"month":10,"year":2020,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Oxford University Press eBooks"},"translated_abstract":"This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. 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There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900087"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900087"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900087; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900087]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900087]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900087; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900087']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900087]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900087,"title":"Closing Reflections1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of other domains have always been salient to him. 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There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":10984,"name":"Formal Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Formal_Epistemology"},{"id":20545,"name":"Evolutionary Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Evolutionary_Epistemology"},{"id":49350,"name":"Externalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Externalism"},{"id":900033,"name":"Internalism and Externalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Internalism_and_Externalism"},{"id":1003013,"name":"Meta epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Meta_epistemology"}],"urls":[{"id":40101972,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0017"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900086"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900086/Do_We_Have_Reason_to_Doubt_the_Importance_of_the_Distinction_between_A_Priori_and_A_Posteriori_Knowledge"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed b...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. Against the argument that no top-down characterization of the distinction can line up with the intuitive paradigm examples, it contends that the argument’s reliance on the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience renders it ineffective. An alternative way of running the argument is shown to lead to a different conclusion, one about the nature of justifiers. Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900086"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900086"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900086; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900086]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900086]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900086; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900086']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900086]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900086,"title":"Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. 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Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.","publisher":"Oxford University Press","publication_date":{"day":15,"month":10,"year":2020,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Oxford University Press eBooks"},"translated_abstract":"This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. Against the argument that no top-down characterization of the distinction can line up with the intuitive paradigm examples, it contends that the argument’s reliance on the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience renders it ineffective. An alternative way of running the argument is shown to lead to a different conclusion, one about the nature of justifiers. Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/115900086/Do_We_Have_Reason_to_Doubt_the_Importance_of_the_Distinction_between_A_Priori_and_A_Posteriori_Knowledge","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-03-06T22:23:51.467-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Do_We_Have_Reason_to_Doubt_the_Importance_of_the_Distinction_between_A_Priori_and_A_Posteriori_Knowledge","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. Against the argument that no top-down characterization of the distinction can line up with the intuitive paradigm examples, it contends that the argument’s reliance on the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience renders it ineffective. An alternative way of running the argument is shown to lead to a different conclusion, one about the nature of justifiers. Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":29711,"name":"Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Skepticism"},{"id":3325992,"name":"a priori and a posteriori","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/a_priori_and_a_posteriori"}],"urls":[{"id":40101971,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0009"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900085"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900085/Virtuous_intuitions_comments_on_Lecture_3_of_Ernest_Sosa_s_A_Virtue_Epistemology"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Virtuous intuitions: comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/112179040/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900085/Virtuous_intuitions_comments_on_Lecture_3_of_Ernest_Sosa_s_A_Virtue_Epistemology">Virtuous intuitions: comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Studies</span><span>, Apr 1, 2009</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposi...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. However, I don't think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities. I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation. Keywords Intuitions Á Foundational justification Á Perception Á Virtue epistemology Á Meaning I want to look at what Ernest Sosa has to say about the nature and status of intuitions, as they figure in a priori knowledge. This is an important topic in its own right and a good test of the virtue approach to epistemology that Sosa favors and has done so much to place at the center of philosophical discussions of knowledge. My own view has tended to be that we should eschew talk of intuitions in the theory of a priori knowledge, especially as it concerns the epistemology of logical inference. 1 In this comment, though, I want to take a different tack: I want to use</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="e011298eca6875f53f781d48d5b72918" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":112179040,"asset_id":115900085,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/112179040/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900085"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900085"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900085; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900085]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900085]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900085; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900085']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "e011298eca6875f53f781d48d5b72918" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900085]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900085,"title":"Virtuous intuitions: comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Springer Science+Business Media","grobid_abstract":"I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. 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As Consequências Perniciosas e as Contradições Internas do Relativismo «Pós-Moderno»</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Disputatio</span><span>, 1997</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="65756d26dc66454955e62291190e7f09" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":112178920,"asset_id":115900083,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/112178920/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900083"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900083"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900083; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900083]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900083]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900083; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900083']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "65756d26dc66454955e62291190e7f09" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900083]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900083,"title":"O Que o Embuste de Sokal Nos Deve Ensinar. 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(p. 247) Unfortunately, his claims are based upon a serious misunderstanding of the argument of my paper. His most serious confusion can be succinctly stated: He thinks that content irrealism, as I defined it, is a thesis that is distinct from, and an optional elaboration upon, an antecedently articulated thesis o f content eliminativism, rather than an expression o f it. This causes havoc throughout his paper. Indeed, with a single exception to be discussed later, all his principal criticisms are based, and depend, upon this one simple mistake.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="06ff89fcff54b5ff51913353642fa3b1" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":112178958,"asset_id":115900078,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/112178958/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900078"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900078"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900078; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900078]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900078]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900078; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900078']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "06ff89fcff54b5ff51913353642fa3b1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900078]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900078,"title":"The Status of Content Revisited","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Wiley","grobid_abstract":"I aim to show that all arguments to this effect are bad by laying bare the question-begging strategy that is common to them. 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Williamson’s argument turns on several large claims. The first is that experience often plays a role intermediate between evidential and merely enabling, and that this poses a difficulty for giving a theoretically satisfying account of the distinction. The second is that there are no constitutive understanding–assent links. Both of these claims are subjected to detailed scrutiny. In particular, it is argued that Williamson’s case of the deviant logician, Simon, fails to constitute an intelligible counterexample to the status of conjunction elimination as an understanding–assent link for ‘and’.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115899525"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115899525"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115899525; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115899525]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115899525]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115899525; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115899525']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115899525]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115899525,"title":"Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay criticizes Williamson’s attempt, in his book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, to undermine the interest of the a priori–a posteriori distinction. 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The first is that experience often plays a role intermediate between evidential and merely enabling, and that this poses a difficulty for giving a theoretically satisfying account of the distinction. The second is that there are no constitutive understanding–assent links. Both of these claims are subjected to detailed scrutiny. In particular, it is argued that Williamson’s case of the deviant logician, Simon, fails to constitute an intelligible counterexample to the status of conjunction elimination as an understanding–assent link for ‘and’.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/115899525/Williamson_on_the_A_Priori_and_the_Analytic","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-03-06T22:10:48.903-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Williamson_on_the_A_Priori_and_the_Analytic","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"This essay criticizes Williamson’s attempt, in his book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, to undermine the interest of the a priori–a posteriori distinction. Williamson’s argument turns on several large claims. The first is that experience often plays a role intermediate between evidential and merely enabling, and that this poses a difficulty for giving a theoretically satisfying account of the distinction. The second is that there are no constitutive understanding–assent links. Both of these claims are subjected to detailed scrutiny. In particular, it is argued that Williamson’s case of the deviant logician, Simon, fails to constitute an intelligible counterexample to the status of conjunction elimination as an understanding–assent link for ‘and’.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":806,"name":"Philosophy of Mind","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy_of_Mind"},{"id":807,"name":"Philosophy Of Language","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy_Of_Language"},{"id":809,"name":"Analytic Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Analytic_Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":891,"name":"Metaphilosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphilosophy"},{"id":206649,"name":"Scrutiny","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Scrutiny"},{"id":1806081,"name":"Counterexample","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Counterexample"},{"id":3325992,"name":"a priori and a posteriori","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/a_priori_and_a_posteriori"}],"urls":[{"id":40101616,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0004"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="96742678"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/96742678/Relativismo_sobre_moralidad"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Relativismo sobre moralidad" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Relativismo sobre moralidad</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. Por lo tanto, es mas dificil evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas de lo que los relativistas suelen suponer.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="96742678"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="96742678"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742678; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742678]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742678]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742678; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='96742678']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=96742678]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":96742678,"title":"Relativismo sobre moralidad","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. Por lo tanto, es mas dificil evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas de lo que los relativistas suelen suponer.","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2020,"errors":{}}},"translated_abstract":"El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. Por lo tanto, es mas dificil evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas de lo que los relativistas suelen suponer.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/96742678/Relativismo_sobre_moralidad","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-02-11T21:24:57.501-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Relativismo_sobre_moralidad","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. Por lo tanto, es mas dificil evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas de lo que los relativistas suelen suponer.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":951,"name":"Humanities","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Humanities"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="96742677"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/96742677/What_the_Sokal_Hoax_Outght_to_Teach_Us"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of What the Sokal Hoax Outght to Teach Us" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">What the Sokal Hoax Outght to Teach Us</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Arguing About Knowledge</span><span>, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="96742677"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="96742677"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742677; 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="96742673"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/96742673/Epistemic_Relativism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Epistemic Relativism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Epistemic Relativism</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>The Routledge Companion to Epistemology</span><span>, 2011</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="96742673"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="96742673"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742673; 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> </div><div class="profile--tab_content_container js-tab-pane tab-pane" data-section-id="19757" id="papers"><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900094"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900094/Analyticity_Reconsidered1"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Analyticity Reconsidered1" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Analyticity Reconsidered1</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900094"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900094"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900094; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900094]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900094]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900094; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900094']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900094]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900094,"title":"Analyticity Reconsidered1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. 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It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":804,"name":"Metaphysics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphysics"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":82123,"name":"Virtue","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Virtue"},{"id":170957,"name":"Quine","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Quine"},{"id":961850,"name":"Sentence","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Sentence"}],"urls":[{"id":40101979,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0001"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900093"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900093/Inferential_role_semantics_and_the_analytic_synthetic_distinction"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Inferential role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Inferential role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Studies</span><span>, Mar 1, 1994</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Page 1. PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN INFERENTIAL ROLE SEMANTICS AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION (Rec...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Page 1. PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN INFERENTIAL ROLE SEMANTICS AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION (Received 15 September 1993) 1. INTRODUCTION Towards the end of their provocative discussion of conceptual ...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900093"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900093"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900093; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900093]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900093]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900093; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900093']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900093]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900093,"title":"Inferential role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Page 1. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900091"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900091/Debating_the_A_Priori"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Debating the A Priori" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Debating the A Priori</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate e...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than fifteen years. 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The argument involves revisiting Williamson’s famous expert-based recipe for generating counterexamples to any constitutive understanding–assent link. Notwithstanding, it is further argued that the theory of the a priori cannot avoid appeal to a notion of intuition or rational insight primarily because there are propositions, such as normative principles, that are synthetic a priori. It answers Williamson’s stated skepticism about the existence of intuitions and makes a start at explaining how intuitions might be able to contribute to a priori justification.","publisher":"Oxford University Press","publication_date":{"day":15,"month":10,"year":2020,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Oxford University Press eBooks"},"translated_abstract":"This essay distinguishes between Constitutive and Basis versions of understanding-based accounts of a priori justification and argues, contra Williamson, that the phenomenon of expert competent dissent doesn’t undermine either one. 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It answers Williamson’s stated skepticism about the existence of intuitions and makes a start at explaining how intuitions might be able to contribute to a priori justification.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/115900090/Intuition_Understanding_and_the_A_Priori1","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-03-06T22:23:52.484-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Intuition_Understanding_and_the_A_Priori1","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"This essay distinguishes between Constitutive and Basis versions of understanding-based accounts of a priori justification and argues, contra Williamson, that the phenomenon of expert competent dissent doesn’t undermine either one. The argument involves revisiting Williamson’s famous expert-based recipe for generating counterexamples to any constitutive understanding–assent link. Notwithstanding, it is further argued that the theory of the a priori cannot avoid appeal to a notion of intuition or rational insight primarily because there are propositions, such as normative principles, that are synthetic a priori. It answers Williamson’s stated skepticism about the existence of intuitions and makes a start at explaining how intuitions might be able to contribute to a priori justification.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":7673,"name":"Intuition","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Intuition"},{"id":29711,"name":"Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Skepticism"},{"id":138943,"name":"Normative","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Normative"},{"id":561321,"name":"Appeal","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Appeal"},{"id":1806081,"name":"Counterexample","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Counterexample"},{"id":3325992,"name":"a priori and a posteriori","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/a_priori_and_a_posteriori"}],"urls":[{"id":40101975,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0013"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900089"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900089/Williamson_on_the_Distinction_between_the_A_Priori_and_the_A_Posteriori_Once_Again1"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again1" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again1</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down c...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down characterization of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, arguing that Williamson fails to show that sense experience plays an irreducibly epistemic role in his new Mathematician example. Williamson’s example turns on the problematic claim that there is something intermediate between reading a proof lazily, deferring to the authority of its author, and reading it while checking its soundness for oneself. Furthermore, it is argued that Williamson’s defense of his Central argument is vitiated by a serious misreading of Boghossian’s initial criticism: that criticism was not meant to supply an alternative account of the way in which certain a priori propositions are known.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900089"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900089"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900089; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900089]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900089]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900089; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900089']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900089]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900089,"title":"Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down characterization of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, arguing that Williamson fails to show that sense experience plays an irreducibly epistemic role in his new Mathematician example. Williamson’s example turns on the problematic claim that there is something intermediate between reading a proof lazily, deferring to the authority of its author, and reading it while checking its soundness for oneself. Furthermore, it is argued that Williamson’s defense of his Central argument is vitiated by a serious misreading of Boghossian’s initial criticism: that criticism was not meant to supply an alternative account of the way in which certain a priori propositions are known.","publisher":"Oxford University Press","publication_date":{"day":15,"month":10,"year":2020,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Oxford University Press eBooks"},"translated_abstract":"This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down characterization of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, arguing that Williamson fails to show that sense experience plays an irreducibly epistemic role in his new Mathematician example. 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Furthermore, it is argued that Williamson’s defense of his Central argument is vitiated by a serious misreading of Boghossian’s initial criticism: that criticism was not meant to supply an alternative account of the way in which certain a priori propositions are known.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":300,"name":"Mathematics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Mathematics"},{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":56663,"name":"Criticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Criticism"},{"id":1354400,"name":"Reading Process","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Reading_Process"},{"id":1865378,"name":"SOUNDNESS","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/SOUNDNESS"},{"id":3325992,"name":"a priori and a posteriori","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/a_priori_and_a_posteriori"}],"urls":[{"id":40101974,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0011"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900088"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900088/Reply_to_Williamson_on_Intuition_Understanding_and_the_A_Priori1"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. The paper gives grounds for rejecting Williamson’s argument that intuitions, supposing them to exist, cannot be the source of distinctively a priori justification. Finally, it is argued that Williamson’s argument against the existence of intuitions (understood as sui generis states of intellectual seeming) flounders because it rests on a misguided and naïve dichotomy between ‘introspectable’ and ‘postulated’ mental states.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900088"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900088"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900088; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900088]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900088]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900088; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900088']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900088]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900088,"title":"Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. The paper gives grounds for rejecting Williamson’s argument that intuitions, supposing them to exist, cannot be the source of distinctively a priori justification. Finally, it is argued that Williamson’s argument against the existence of intuitions (understood as sui generis states of intellectual seeming) flounders because it rests on a misguided and naïve dichotomy between ‘introspectable’ and ‘postulated’ mental states.","publisher":"Oxford University Press","publication_date":{"day":15,"month":10,"year":2020,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Oxford University Press eBooks"},"translated_abstract":"This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. 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There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900087"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900087"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900087; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900087]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900087]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900087; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900087']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900087]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900087,"title":"Closing Reflections1","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of other domains have always been salient to him. 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Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/115900087/Closing_Reflections1","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-03-06T22:23:51.769-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Closing_Reflections1","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of other domains have always been salient to him. There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":10984,"name":"Formal Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Formal_Epistemology"},{"id":20545,"name":"Evolutionary Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Evolutionary_Epistemology"},{"id":49350,"name":"Externalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Externalism"},{"id":900033,"name":"Internalism and Externalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Internalism_and_Externalism"},{"id":1003013,"name":"Meta epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Meta_epistemology"}],"urls":[{"id":40101972,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0017"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900086"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900086/Do_We_Have_Reason_to_Doubt_the_Importance_of_the_Distinction_between_A_Priori_and_A_Posteriori_Knowledge"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford University Press eBooks</span><span>, Oct 15, 2020</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed b...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. Against the argument that no top-down characterization of the distinction can line up with the intuitive paradigm examples, it contends that the argument’s reliance on the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience renders it ineffective. An alternative way of running the argument is shown to lead to a different conclusion, one about the nature of justifiers. Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900086"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900086"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900086; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900086]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900086]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900086; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900086']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900086]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900086,"title":"Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. Against the argument that no top-down characterization of the distinction can line up with the intuitive paradigm examples, it contends that the argument’s reliance on the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience renders it ineffective. An alternative way of running the argument is shown to lead to a different conclusion, one about the nature of justifiers. Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.","publisher":"Oxford University Press","publication_date":{"day":15,"month":10,"year":2020,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Oxford University Press eBooks"},"translated_abstract":"This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. Against the argument that no top-down characterization of the distinction can line up with the intuitive paradigm examples, it contends that the argument’s reliance on the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience renders it ineffective. An alternative way of running the argument is shown to lead to a different conclusion, one about the nature of justifiers. Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/115900086/Do_We_Have_Reason_to_Doubt_the_Importance_of_the_Distinction_between_A_Priori_and_A_Posteriori_Knowledge","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-03-06T22:23:51.467-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Do_We_Have_Reason_to_Doubt_the_Importance_of_the_Distinction_between_A_Priori_and_A_Posteriori_Knowledge","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. Against the argument that no top-down characterization of the distinction can line up with the intuitive paradigm examples, it contends that the argument’s reliance on the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience renders it ineffective. An alternative way of running the argument is shown to lead to a different conclusion, one about the nature of justifiers. Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":29711,"name":"Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Skepticism"},{"id":3325992,"name":"a priori and a posteriori","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/a_priori_and_a_posteriori"}],"urls":[{"id":40101971,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0009"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="115900085"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900085/Virtuous_intuitions_comments_on_Lecture_3_of_Ernest_Sosa_s_A_Virtue_Epistemology"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Virtuous intuitions: comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/112179040/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/115900085/Virtuous_intuitions_comments_on_Lecture_3_of_Ernest_Sosa_s_A_Virtue_Epistemology">Virtuous intuitions: comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Studies</span><span>, Apr 1, 2009</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposi...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. However, I don't think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities. I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation. Keywords Intuitions Á Foundational justification Á Perception Á Virtue epistemology Á Meaning I want to look at what Ernest Sosa has to say about the nature and status of intuitions, as they figure in a priori knowledge. This is an important topic in its own right and a good test of the virtue approach to epistemology that Sosa favors and has done so much to place at the center of philosophical discussions of knowledge. My own view has tended to be that we should eschew talk of intuitions in the theory of a priori knowledge, especially as it concerns the epistemology of logical inference. 1 In this comment, though, I want to take a different tack: I want to use</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="e011298eca6875f53f781d48d5b72918" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":112179040,"asset_id":115900085,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/112179040/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900085"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900085"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900085; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900085]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900085]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900085; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900085']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "e011298eca6875f53f781d48d5b72918" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900085]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900085,"title":"Virtuous intuitions: comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Springer Science+Business Media","grobid_abstract":"I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. 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As Consequências Perniciosas e as Contradições Internas do Relativismo «Pós-Moderno»</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Disputatio</span><span>, 1997</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="65756d26dc66454955e62291190e7f09" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":112178920,"asset_id":115900083,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/112178920/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900083"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900083"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900083; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900083]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900083]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900083; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900083']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "65756d26dc66454955e62291190e7f09" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900083]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900083,"title":"O Que o Embuste de Sokal Nos Deve Ensinar. 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(p. 247) Unfortunately, his claims are based upon a serious misunderstanding of the argument of my paper. His most serious confusion can be succinctly stated: He thinks that content irrealism, as I defined it, is a thesis that is distinct from, and an optional elaboration upon, an antecedently articulated thesis o f content eliminativism, rather than an expression o f it. This causes havoc throughout his paper. Indeed, with a single exception to be discussed later, all his principal criticisms are based, and depend, upon this one simple mistake.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="06ff89fcff54b5ff51913353642fa3b1" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":112178958,"asset_id":115900078,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/112178958/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115900078"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115900078"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900078; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900078]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115900078]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115900078; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115900078']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "06ff89fcff54b5ff51913353642fa3b1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115900078]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115900078,"title":"The Status of Content Revisited","translated_title":"","metadata":{"publisher":"Wiley","grobid_abstract":"I aim to show that all arguments to this effect are bad by laying bare the question-begging strategy that is common to them. 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Williamson’s argument turns on several large claims. The first is that experience often plays a role intermediate between evidential and merely enabling, and that this poses a difficulty for giving a theoretically satisfying account of the distinction. The second is that there are no constitutive understanding–assent links. Both of these claims are subjected to detailed scrutiny. In particular, it is argued that Williamson’s case of the deviant logician, Simon, fails to constitute an intelligible counterexample to the status of conjunction elimination as an understanding–assent link for ‘and’.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="115899525"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="115899525"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115899525; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115899525]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=115899525]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 115899525; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='115899525']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=115899525]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":115899525,"title":"Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"This essay criticizes Williamson’s attempt, in his book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, to undermine the interest of the a priori–a posteriori distinction. 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The first is that experience often plays a role intermediate between evidential and merely enabling, and that this poses a difficulty for giving a theoretically satisfying account of the distinction. The second is that there are no constitutive understanding–assent links. Both of these claims are subjected to detailed scrutiny. In particular, it is argued that Williamson’s case of the deviant logician, Simon, fails to constitute an intelligible counterexample to the status of conjunction elimination as an understanding–assent link for ‘and’.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/115899525/Williamson_on_the_A_Priori_and_the_Analytic","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2024-03-06T22:10:48.903-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Williamson_on_the_A_Priori_and_the_Analytic","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"This essay criticizes Williamson’s attempt, in his book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, to undermine the interest of the a priori–a posteriori distinction. Williamson’s argument turns on several large claims. The first is that experience often plays a role intermediate between evidential and merely enabling, and that this poses a difficulty for giving a theoretically satisfying account of the distinction. The second is that there are no constitutive understanding–assent links. Both of these claims are subjected to detailed scrutiny. In particular, it is argued that Williamson’s case of the deviant logician, Simon, fails to constitute an intelligible counterexample to the status of conjunction elimination as an understanding–assent link for ‘and’.","owner":{"id":108575,"first_name":"Paul","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Boghossian","page_name":"PaulBoghossian","domain_name":"nyu","created_at":"2010-01-03T04:14:33.787-08:00","display_name":"Paul Boghossian","url":"https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian"},"attachments":[],"research_interests":[{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":806,"name":"Philosophy of Mind","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy_of_Mind"},{"id":807,"name":"Philosophy Of Language","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy_Of_Language"},{"id":809,"name":"Analytic Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Analytic_Philosophy"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":891,"name":"Metaphilosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphilosophy"},{"id":206649,"name":"Scrutiny","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Scrutiny"},{"id":1806081,"name":"Counterexample","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Counterexample"},{"id":3325992,"name":"a priori and a posteriori","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/a_priori_and_a_posteriori"}],"urls":[{"id":40101616,"url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0004"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="96742678"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/96742678/Relativismo_sobre_moralidad"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Relativismo sobre moralidad" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Relativismo sobre moralidad</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. Por lo tanto, es mas dificil evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas de lo que los relativistas suelen suponer.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="96742678"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="96742678"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742678; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742678]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742678]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742678; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='96742678']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=96742678]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":96742678,"title":"Relativismo sobre moralidad","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. Por lo tanto, es mas dificil evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas de lo que los relativistas suelen suponer.","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2020,"errors":{}}},"translated_abstract":"El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. Por lo tanto, es mas dificil evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas de lo que los relativistas suelen suponer.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/96742678/Relativismo_sobre_moralidad","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-02-11T21:24:57.501-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Relativismo_sobre_moralidad","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. 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window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742677]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742677]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742677; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='96742677']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="96742673"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/96742673/Epistemic_Relativism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Epistemic Relativism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Epistemic Relativism</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>The Routledge Companion to Epistemology</span><span>, 2011</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="96742673"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="96742673"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742673; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742673]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742673]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742673; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='96742673']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="96742639"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" rel="nofollow" href="https://www.academia.edu/96742639/Does_Philosophy_Matter_It_Would_Appear_So_A_Reply_to_Fish"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Does Philosophy Matter?—It Would Appear So. A Reply to Fish" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title">Does Philosophy Matter?—It Would Appear So. A Reply to Fish</div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In a piece provocatively entitled “Does Philosophy Matter?” Stanley Fish sets out to respond to m...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In a piece provocatively entitled “Does Philosophy Matter?” Stanley Fish sets out to respond to my July 24, 2011 Stone column on moral relativism in the New York Times. His argument proceeds as follows. First, Fish changes the topic: instead of talking about the thesis I was discussing, he defines another thesis that, he claims, implausibly, also deserves to be called “moral relativism.” This thesis, he implies, is both more interesting and more defensible than the one I was criticizing. Second, he argues that neither his thesis nor mine could make any difference to “real life,” because philosophical conclusions don’t travel outside the seminar room. His argument limps at both stages. Fish’s ‘relativism’ is neither relativism, nor interesting in its own right. And his claim that no philosophical or meta-ethical thesis can matter in real life is clearly false</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="96742639"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="96742639"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742639; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742639]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=96742639]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 96742639; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='96742639']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=96742639]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":96742639,"title":"Does Philosophy Matter?—It Would Appear So. A Reply to Fish","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In a piece provocatively entitled “Does Philosophy Matter?” Stanley Fish sets out to respond to my July 24, 2011 Stone column on moral relativism in the New York Times. His argument proceeds as follows. First, Fish changes the topic: instead of talking about the thesis I was discussing, he defines another thesis that, he claims, implausibly, also deserves to be called “moral relativism.” This thesis, he implies, is both more interesting and more defensible than the one I was criticizing. Second, he argues that neither his thesis nor mine could make any difference to “real life,” because philosophical conclusions don’t travel outside the seminar room. His argument limps at both stages. Fish’s ‘relativism’ is neither relativism, nor interesting in its own right. And his claim that no philosophical or meta-ethical thesis can matter in real life is clearly false"},"translated_abstract":"In a piece provocatively entitled “Does Philosophy Matter?” Stanley Fish sets out to respond to my July 24, 2011 Stone column on moral relativism in the New York Times. His argument proceeds as follows. First, Fish changes the topic: instead of talking about the thesis I was discussing, he defines another thesis that, he claims, implausibly, also deserves to be called “moral relativism.” This thesis, he implies, is both more interesting and more defensible than the one I was criticizing. Second, he argues that neither his thesis nor mine could make any difference to “real life,” because philosophical conclusions don’t travel outside the seminar room. His argument limps at both stages. Fish’s ‘relativism’ is neither relativism, nor interesting in its own right. And his claim that no philosophical or meta-ethical thesis can matter in real life is clearly false","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/96742639/Does_Philosophy_Matter_It_Would_Appear_So_A_Reply_to_Fish","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2023-02-11T21:23:44.430-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":108575,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[],"slug":"Does_Philosophy_Matter_It_Would_Appear_So_A_Reply_to_Fish","translated_slug":"","page_count":null,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","summary":"In a piece provocatively entitled “Does Philosophy Matter?” Stanley Fish sets out to respond to my July 24, 2011 Stone column on moral relativism in the New York Times. His argument proceeds as follows. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> </div><div class="profile--tab_content_container js-tab-pane tab-pane" data-section-id="17169149" id="editedbooks"><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="37598137"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/37598137/Choses_en_soi_M%C3%A9taphysique_du_r%C3%A9alisme"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Choses en soi. Métaphysique du réalisme" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/57608862/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/37598137/Choses_en_soi_M%C3%A9taphysique_du_r%C3%A9alisme">Choses en soi. Métaphysique du réalisme</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--coauthors"><span>by </span><span><a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://unifr.academia.edu/EmmanuelAlloa">Emmanuel Alloa</a>, <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" rel="nofollow" href="https://u-paris10.academia.edu/During">Elie During</a>, <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://univ-lorraine.academia.edu/PaulClavier">Paul Clavier</a>, <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://cnrs.academia.edu/DavidRabouin">David Rabouin</a>, <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://univ-paris-diderot.academia.edu/GabrielCatren">Gabriel Catren</a>, <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://ufrj.academia.edu/EVdeCastro">Eduardo Viveiros de Castro</a>, <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://ulb.academia.edu/CamilleChamois">Camille Chamois</a>, <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://ulb.academia.edu/DidierDebaise">Didier Debaise</a>, <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://sciences-po.academia.edu/BaptisteGille">Baptiste Gille</a>, and <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://nyu.academia.edu/PaulBoghossian">Paul Boghossian</a></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Paris, PUF, coll. "MétaphysiqueS"</span><span>, 2018</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">La scène philosophique connaît depuis quelques années une ruée vers le réel, dont témoigne un ret...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">La scène philosophique connaît depuis quelques années une ruée vers le réel, dont témoigne un retour massif à certaines positions de type réaliste. Les formes de ce réalisme sont diverses : épistémologique, moral, spéculatif… Mais qui sont les vrais réalistes ? De quelle idée du réel se réclament-ils ? Et que reste-t-il de l'idéalisme sous la profusion des vocables (constructivisme, perspectivisme, relativisme…) ? Une quarantaine de philosophes livrent ici leur diagnostic, sous la forme d'un vaste état des lieux de la métaphysique contemporaine. La discussion tourne pour partie autour d'une notion maudite, associée à Kant : la « chose en soi », dont le spectre continue de hanter la philosophie. Comment parler des choses elles-mêmes, indépendamment de ce qu'elles sont pour nous ? Comment aborder la réalité dans ce qu'elle a d'irréductible, sinon d'absolu ? Tout existe-t-il au même titre, comme le proclament les nouvelles ontologies « plates » ? Outre quelques drôles de pensées, on croisera au fil de ces questions une multitude d'objets, grands ou petits : la Vérité, le Monde et Dieu, mais aussi la Terre, le jaguar, et même la « table en soi ».</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="2ab7fd3915804c95eece8e8a3eaa776a" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":57608862,"asset_id":37598137,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/57608862/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="37598137"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="37598137"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 37598137; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=37598137]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=37598137]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 37598137; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='37598137']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "2ab7fd3915804c95eece8e8a3eaa776a" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=37598137]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":37598137,"title":"Choses en soi. 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Métaphysique du réalisme"}],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":57608862,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/57608862/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Choses_en_soi_COUV_TDM.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/57608862/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Choses_en_soi_Metaphysique_du_realisme.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/57608862/Choses_en_soi_COUV_TDM-libre.pdf?1540191144=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DChoses_en_soi_Metaphysique_du_realisme.pdf\u0026Expires=1742571739\u0026Signature=Z8lvDKm4ax01GI6bT3IPh6Qnni~7jGlcFQcLPiW9zv9ZXpI~OoSbLtEotTFjtL4qFQ6ECav09jIH4BMWJu9OPxkBbcaQ5IIA6la64P5MSJJ4z1fmcQz1kABUTEnx29IKRN04lbBBrQnekoGC2LFLWMqIGmbXxL-Q7Z~cLv4m2vr1iWuEXp8h6r6vwTATHxK3NqbJOHLnwDmLU6CNmNjg6Sw0NPfzVaiCvZw8iYqeHeEJj5tH8m4eSkYWMQelwvDUoNbWAhns9YsNAlbF9HBHXLhKr7lWfXaYHGAgEYVobC8MXCHwQkywQdjgo2~xePpKOMifVOY~ndx6mRV3RhzQvw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Choses_en_soi_Métaphysique_du_réalisme","translated_slug":"","page_count":7,"language":"fr","content_type":"Work","summary":"La scène philosophique connaît depuis quelques années une ruée vers le réel, dont témoigne un retour massif à certaines positions de type réaliste. Les formes de ce réalisme sont diverses : épistémologique, moral, spéculatif… Mais qui sont les vrais réalistes ? De quelle idée du réel se réclament-ils ? Et que reste-t-il de l'idéalisme sous la profusion des vocables (constructivisme, perspectivisme, relativisme…) ? Une quarantaine de philosophes livrent ici leur diagnostic, sous la forme d'un vaste état des lieux de la métaphysique contemporaine. La discussion tourne pour partie autour d'une notion maudite, associée à Kant : la « chose en soi », dont le spectre continue de hanter la philosophie. Comment parler des choses elles-mêmes, indépendamment de ce qu'elles sont pour nous ? Comment aborder la réalité dans ce qu'elle a d'irréductible, sinon d'absolu ? Tout existe-t-il au même titre, comme le proclament les nouvelles ontologies « plates » ? Outre quelques drôles de pensées, on croisera au fil de ces questions une multitude d'objets, grands ou petits : la Vérité, le Monde et Dieu, mais aussi la Terre, le jaguar, et même la « table en soi ».","owner":{"id":3866038,"first_name":"Emmanuel","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Alloa","page_name":"EmmanuelAlloa","domain_name":"unifr","created_at":"2013-04-19T20:03:35.233-07:00","display_name":"Emmanuel Alloa","url":"https://unifr.academia.edu/EmmanuelAlloa"},"attachments":[{"id":57608862,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/57608862/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Choses_en_soi_COUV_TDM.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/57608862/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Choses_en_soi_Metaphysique_du_realisme.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/57608862/Choses_en_soi_COUV_TDM-libre.pdf?1540191144=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DChoses_en_soi_Metaphysique_du_realisme.pdf\u0026Expires=1742571739\u0026Signature=Z8lvDKm4ax01GI6bT3IPh6Qnni~7jGlcFQcLPiW9zv9ZXpI~OoSbLtEotTFjtL4qFQ6ECav09jIH4BMWJu9OPxkBbcaQ5IIA6la64P5MSJJ4z1fmcQz1kABUTEnx29IKRN04lbBBrQnekoGC2LFLWMqIGmbXxL-Q7Z~cLv4m2vr1iWuEXp8h6r6vwTATHxK3NqbJOHLnwDmLU6CNmNjg6Sw0NPfzVaiCvZw8iYqeHeEJj5tH8m4eSkYWMQelwvDUoNbWAhns9YsNAlbF9HBHXLhKr7lWfXaYHGAgEYVobC8MXCHwQkywQdjgo2~xePpKOMifVOY~ndx6mRV3RhzQvw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":8,"name":"Critical Theory","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Critical_Theory"},{"id":803,"name":"Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"},{"id":804,"name":"Metaphysics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphysics"},{"id":805,"name":"Ontology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Ontology"},{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":1629,"name":"French Studies","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/French_Studies"},{"id":5960,"name":"Continental Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Continental_Philosophy"},{"id":6072,"name":"Realism (Philosophy)","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Realism_Philosophy_"},{"id":6784,"name":"Contemporary French Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Contemporary_French_Philosophy"},{"id":13341,"name":"Relativism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Relativism"},{"id":13792,"name":"Speculative Realism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Speculative_Realism"},{"id":16031,"name":"Immanuel Kant","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Immanuel_Kant"},{"id":26622,"name":"Metaphysical Realism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphysical_Realism"},{"id":29236,"name":"Continental (vs.) Analytical Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Continental_vs._Analytical_Philosophy"},{"id":30862,"name":"Quentin Meillassoux","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Quentin_Meillassoux"},{"id":38870,"name":"Contemporary Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Contemporary_Philosophy"},{"id":64833,"name":"Realism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Realism"},{"id":81504,"name":"Correlation","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Correlation"}],"urls":[{"id":8610501,"url":"https://www.puf.com/content/Choses_en_soi_M%C3%A9taphysique_du_r%C3%A9alisme"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); 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