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<!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <title>CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Blessed John Duns Scotus</title><script src="https://dtyry4ejybx0.cloudfront.net/js/cmp/cleanmediacmp.js?ver=0104" async="true"></script><script defer data-domain="newadvent.org" src="https://plausible.io/js/script.js"></script><link rel="canonical" href="https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05194a.htm"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <meta name="description" content="Called 'Doctor Subtilis,' Franciscan, philosopher, d. 1308"> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"><link rel="alternate" type="application/rss+xml" title="RSS" href="http://feeds.newadvent.org/bestoftheweb?format=xml"><link rel="icon" href="../images/icon1.ico" type="image/x-icon"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../images/icon1.ico" type="image/x-icon"><meta name="robots" content="noodp"><link type="text/css" rel="stylesheet" href="../utility/screen6.css" media="screen"></head> <body class="cathen" id="05194a.htm">  <br/> <div id="capitalcity"><table summary="Logo" cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%"><tr valign="bottom"><td align="left"><a href="../"><img height=36 width=153 border="0" alt="New Advent" src="../images/logo.gif"></a></td><td align="right"> <form id="searchbox_000299817191393086628:ifmbhlr-8x0" action="../utility/search.htm">  <input type="hidden" name="safe" value="active"> <input type="hidden" name="cx" value="000299817191393086628:ifmbhlr-8x0"/> <input type="hidden" name="cof" value="FORID:9"/>  <label for="searchQuery" id="searchQueryLabel">Search:</label> <input id="searchQuery" name="q" type="text" size="25" aria-labelledby="searchQueryLabel"/>  <label for="submitButton" id="submitButtonLabel" class="visually-hidden">Submit Search</label> <input id="submitButton" type="submit" name="sa" value="Search" aria-labelledby="submitButtonLabel"/> </form> <table summary="Spacer" cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0><tr><td height="2"></td></tr></table> <table summary="Tabs" cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0><tr> <td bgcolor="#ffffff"></td> <td class="tab"><a class="tab_color_on_beige" href="../"> Home </a></td> <td class="tab"><a class="tab_white_on_color" href="../cathen/index.html"> Encyclopedia </a></td> <td class="tab"><a class="tab_color_on_beige" href="../summa/index.html"> Summa </a></td> <td class="tab"><a class="tab_color_on_beige" href="../fathers/index.html"> Fathers </a></td> <td class="tab"><a class="tab_color_on_beige" href="../bible/gen001.htm"> Bible </a></td> <td class="tab"><a class="tab_color_on_beige" href="../library/index.html"> Library </a></td> </tr></table> </td> </tr></table><table summary="Alphabetical index" width="100%" cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0><tr><td class="bar_white_on_color"> <a href="../cathen/a.htm"> A </a><a href="../cathen/b.htm"> B </a><a href="../cathen/c.htm"> C </a><a href="../cathen/d.htm"> D </a><a href="../cathen/e.htm"> E </a><a href="../cathen/f.htm"> F </a><a href="../cathen/g.htm"> G </a><a href="../cathen/h.htm"> H </a><a href="../cathen/i.htm"> I </a><a href="../cathen/j.htm"> J </a><a href="../cathen/k.htm"> K </a><a href="../cathen/l.htm"> L </a><a href="../cathen/m.htm"> M </a><a href="../cathen/n.htm"> N </a><a href="../cathen/o.htm"> O </a><a href="../cathen/p.htm"> P </a><a href="../cathen/q.htm"> Q </a><a href="../cathen/r.htm"> R </a><a href="../cathen/s.htm"> S </a><a href="../cathen/t.htm"> T </a><a href="../cathen/u.htm"> U </a><a href="../cathen/v.htm"> V </a><a href="../cathen/w.htm"> W </a><a href="../cathen/x.htm"> X </a><a href="../cathen/y.htm"> Y </a><a href="../cathen/z.htm"> Z </a> </td></tr></table></div> <div id="mobilecity" style="text-align: center; "><a href="../"><img height=24 width=102 border="0" alt="New Advent" src="../images/logo.gif"></a></div>  <div id="mi5"><span class="breadcrumbs"><a href="../">Home</a> > <a href="../cathen">Catholic Encyclopedia</a> > <a href="../cathen/d.htm">D</a> > Bl. John Duns Scotus</span></div> <div id="springfield2"> <div class='catholicadnet-728x90' id='cathen-728x90-top' style='display: flex; height: 100px; align-items: center; justify-content: center; '></div> <h1>Bl. John Duns Scotus</h1> <p><em><a href="https://gumroad.com/l/na2"><strong>Please help support the mission of New Advent</strong> and get the full contents of this website as an instant download. Includes the Catholic Encyclopedia, Church Fathers, Summa, Bible and more  all for only $19.99...</a></em></p> <p>Surnamed DOCTOR SUBTILIS, died 8 November, 1308; he was the founder and leader of the famous <a href="../cathen/13610b.htm">Scotist School</a>, which had its chief representatives among the <a href="../cathen/06217a.htm">Franciscans</a>. Of his antecedents and life very little is definitely known, as the contemporary sources are silent about him. It is <a href="../cathen/03539b.htm">certain</a> that he died rather young, according to earlier traditions at the age of thirty-four years (cf. <a href="../cathen/15521d.htm">Wadding</a>, Vita Scoti, in vol. I of his works); but it would seem that he was somewhat older than this and that he was born in 1270. The birthplace of Scotus has been the subject of much discussion and so far no conclusive argument in favour of any locality has been advanced. The surname Scotus by no means decides the question, for it was given to Scotchmen, <a href="../cathen/08098b.htm">Irishmen</a>, and even to natives of northern <a href="../cathen/05445a.htm">England</a>. The other name, Duns, to which the <a href="../cathen/08098b.htm">Irish</a> attach so much importance, settles nothing; there was a Duns also in <a href="../cathen/13613a.htm">Scotland</a> (Berwick). Moreover, it is impossible to determine whether Duns was a family name or the name of a place. Appeal to supposedly ancient local traditions in behalf of <a href="../cathen/08098b.htm">Ireland's</a> claim is of no avail, since we cannot ascertain just how old they are; and their age is the pivotal point.</p> <div class="CMtag_300x250" style="display: flex; height: 300px; align-items: center; justify-content: center; "></div> <p>This discussion has been strongly tinged with national sentiment, especially since the beginning of the sixteenth century after prominent <a href="../cathen/08098b.htm">Irish</a> <a href="../cathen/06217a.htm">Franciscans</a> like Mauritius de Portu (O'Fihely), Hugh MacCaghwell, and <a href="../cathen/15521d.htm">Luke Wadding</a> rendered great service by editing Scotus's works. On the other hand, the English have some right to claim Scotus; as a professor for several years at <a href="../cathen/11365b.htm">Oxford</a>, he belonged at any rate to the English province; and neither during his lifetime nor for some time after his death was any other view as to his nationality proposed. It should not, however, be forgotten that in those days the <a href="../cathen/06217a.htm">Franciscan</a> <a href="../cathen/04060a.htm">cloisters</a> in <a href="../cathen/13613a.htm">Scotland</a> were affiliated to the English province, i.e. to the <em>custodia</em> of Newcastle. It would not therefore be amiss to regard Scotus as a native of <a href="../cathen/13613a.htm">Scotland</a> or as a member of a Scottish <a href="../cathen/04060a.htm">cloister</a>. In any case it is high time to eliminate from this discussion the famous entry in the Merton College <a href="../cathen/09614b.htm">manuscript</a> (no. 39) which would make it appear that Scotus was a member of that college and therefore a native of Northern <a href="../cathen/05445a.htm">England</a>. The <a href="../cathen/09053a.htm">statutes</a> of the college excluded <a href="../cathen/10487b.htm">monks</a>; and as Scotus became a <a href="../cathen/06217a.htm">Franciscan</a> when he was quite younger he could not have belonged to the college previous to joining the order. Besides, the entry in the college register is under the <a href="../cathen/04636c.htm">date</a> of 1455, and consequently too late to serve as an argument.</p> <p>The case is somewhat better with the entry in the catalogue of the <a href="../cathen/09227b.htm">library</a> of St. Francis at <a href="../cathen/01801a.htm">Assisi</a>, under <a href="../cathen/04636c.htm">date</a> of 1381, which designates Duns Scotus's commentary on the "Sentences" of <a href="../cathen/11768d.htm">Peter Lombard</a> as "magistri fratris Johannis Scoti de Ordine Minorum, qui et Doctor Subtilis nuncupatur, de provincia Hiberniæ" (the work of master John Scotus of the <a href="../cathen/06217a.htm">Franciscan Order</a> known as the subtle doctor, from the province of <a href="../cathen/08098b.htm">Ireland</a>). This, though it furnishes the strongest evidence in <a href="../cathen/08098b.htm">Ireland's</a> favour, cannot be regarded as decisive. Since Scotus laboured during several years in <a href="../cathen/05445a.htm">England</a>, he cannot, simply on the strength of this evidence, be assigned to the <a href="../cathen/08098b.htm">Irish</a> province. The <a href="../cathen/09227b.htm">library</a> entry, moreover, cannot possibly be accepted as contemporary with Scotus. Add to this the geographical distance and it becomes plain that the discussion cannot be settled by an entry made in far-off <a href="../cathen/08208a.htm">Italy</a> seventy-three years after Scotus's death, at a time too when geographical <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a> was by no means perfect. Finally, no decisive evidence is offered by the epitaphs of Scotus; they are too late and too poetical. The question, then, of Scotus's native land must still be considered an open one. When he took the habit of St. Francis is unknown; probably about 1290. It is a fact that he lived and taught at <a href="../cathen/11365b.htm">Oxford</a>; for on 26 July, 1300, the <a href="../cathen/12514b.htm">provincial</a> of the English province of <a href="../cathen/06217a.htm">Franciscans</a> asked the <a href="../cathen/02581b.htm">Bishop</a> of Lincoln to confer upon twenty-two of his subjects <a href="../cathen/08567a.htm">jurisdiction</a> to hear <a href="../cathen/11618c.htm">confessions</a>. The <a href="../cathen/02581b.htm">bishop</a> gave the permission only to eight; among those who were refused was "Ioannes Douns". It is quite certain, too, that he went to <a href="../cathen/11480c.htm">Paris</a> about 1304 and that there he was at first merely a Bachelor of Arts, for the general of the <a href="../cathen/06217a.htm">Franciscans</a>, Gonsalvus de Vallebona, wrote (18 November, 1304) to the guardian of the <a href="../cathen/04107b.htm">college</a> of the <a href="../cathen/06217a.htm">Franciscans</a> at <a href="../cathen/11480c.htm">Paris</a> to present John Scotus at the <a href="../cathen/15188a.htm">university</a> for the doctor's degree. The general's letter mentions that John Scotus had distinguished himself for some time past by his learning <em>ingenioque subtilissimo.</em> He did not teach very long in <a href="../cathen/11480c.htm">Paris</a>; in 1307 or 1308 he was sent to <a href="../cathen/04116a.htm">Cologne</a>, probably as a professor at the <a href="../cathen/15188a.htm">university</a>. There he died, and was buried in the <a href="../cathen/04340c.htm">monastery</a> of the Minorities. At the present time (1908) the process of his <a href="../cathen/02364b.htm">beatification</a> is being agitated in <a href="../cathen/13164a.htm">Rome</a> on the ground of a <em>cultus immemorabilis.</em></p> <p>Duns Scotus's writings are very numerous and they have often been printed; some, in fact, at a very early <a href="../cathen/04636c.htm">date</a>. But a complete edition, in 12 folio volumes, was published only in 1639 by <a href="../cathen/15521d.htm">Wadding</a> at <a href="../cathen/09472a.htm">Lyons</a>; this, however, included the commentaries of the <a href="../cathen/13610b.htm">Scotists</a>, Lychetus, Poncius, Cavellus, and Hiquæus. A reprint of <a href="../cathen/15521d.htm">Wadding's</a> edition, with the treatise "De perfectione statuum" added to it, appeared 1891-95 at <a href="../cathen/11480c.htm">Paris</a> (Vives) in 26 vols. 4to. Whether all the writings contained in these editions are by Duns Scotus himself is <a href="../cathen/05141a.htm">doubtful</a>; it is <a href="../cathen/03539b.htm">certain</a>, however, that many changes and additions were made by later <a href="../cathen/13610b.htm">Scotists</a>. A critical edition is still wanting. Besides these printed works, some others are attributed to Scotus, especially commentaries on several books of Scripture. The printed writings deal with grammatical and scientific, but chiefly with <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophical</a> and <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theological</a> subjects. Of a purely <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophical</a> nature are his commentaries and <em>quæstiones</em> on various works of <a href="../cathen/01713a.htm">Aristotle</a>. These, with some other treatises, are contained in the first seven volumes of the <a href="../cathen/11480c.htm">Paris</a> edition. The principal work of Scotus, however, is the so-called "Opus Oxoniense", i.e. the great commentary on the "Sentences" of <a href="../cathen/11768d.htm">Peter Lombard</a>, written in Oxford (vols. VIII-XXI). It is primarily a <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theological</a> work, but it contains many treatises, or at least digressions, on <a href="../cathen/09324a.htm">logical</a>, metaphysical, grammatical, and scientific topics, so that nearly his whole system of <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophy</a> can be derived from this work. Volumes XXII-XXIV contain the "Reportata Parisiensia", i.e., a smaller commentary, for the most part <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theological</a>; on the "Sentences". The "Quæstiones Quodlibetales", chiefly on <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theological</a> subjects, one of his most important works, and the above-mentioned essay, "De perfectione statuum", fill the last two volumes. As to the time when these works were composed, we <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">know</a> nothing for certain. The commentaries on <a href="../cathen/01713a.htm">Aristotle</a> were probably his first work, then followed the."Opus Oxoniense" and some minor essays, last the "Quæstiones Quodlibetales", his dissertation for the doctor's degree. The "Reportata" may be notes written out after his lectures, but this is merely a surmise.</p> <div class="CMtag_300x250" style="display: flex; height: 300px; align-items: center; justify-content: center; "></div> <p>Scotus seems to have changed his <a href="../cathen/05075b.htm">doctrine</a> in the course of <a href="../cathen/14726a.htm">time</a>, or at least not to have been uniformly precise in expressing his thought; now he follows rather the <em>sententia communis</em> as in the "Quæstiones Quodlibetales"; then again he goes his own way. Many of his essays are unfinished. He did not write a <em>summa philosophica</em> or <em>theologica</em>, as did <a href="../cathen/01298a.htm">Alexander of Hales</a> and <a href="../cathen/14663b.htm">St. Thomas Aquinas</a>, or even a compendium of his <a href="../cathen/05075b.htm">doctrine</a>. He wrote only commentaries or treatises on disputed questions; but even these commentaries are not continuous explanations of <a href="../cathen/01713a.htm">Aristotle</a> or <a href="../cathen/11768d.htm">Peter Lombard</a>. Usually he cites first the text or presupposes it as already known, then he takes up various points which in that day were live issues and discusses them from all sides, at the same time presenting the opinions of others. He is sharp in his criticism, and with relentless <a href="../cathen/09324a.htm">logic</a> he refutes; the opinions, or at least the argument, of his opponents. In his fervour he sometimes forgets to set down his own view, or he simply states the reasons for various tenable opinions, and puts them forward as more or less probable; this he does especially in the "Collationes". Hence it is said that he is no systematizer, that he is better at tearing down than at building up. It is <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> that none of his writings plainly reveals a system; while several of them, owing no <a href="../cathen/05141a.htm">doubt</a> to his early death, betray lack of finish. His real teaching is not always fully stated where one would naturally look for it; often enough one finds instead the discussion of some special point, or a long excursus in which the author follows his critical bent. His own opinion is to be sought elsewhere, in various incidental remarks, or in the presuppositions which serve as a basis for his treatment of other problems; and it can be discovered only after a lengthy search. Besides, in the heat of controversy he often uses expressions which seem to go to extremes and even to contain <a href="../cathen/07256b.htm">heresy</a>. His language is frequently obscure; a maze of terms, definitions, distinctions, and objections through which it is by no means easy to thread one's way. For these reasons the study of Scotus's works was difficult; when undertaken at all, it was not carried on with the requisite thoroughness. It was hard to find a unified system in them. Not a few unsatisfactory one-sided or even wrong opinions about him were circulated and passed on unchallenged from mouth to mouth and from book to book, growing more <a href="../cathen/05525a.htm">erroneous</a> as they went. Nevertheless, there is in Scotus's teaching a rounded-out system, to be found especially in his principal work, a system worked out in minutest details. For the present purpose, only his leading <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">ideas</a> and his departures from <a href="../cathen/14663b.htm">St. Thomas</a> and the <em>sententia communis</em> need be indicated.</p> <h2>System of philosophy</h2> <p>The fundamental principles of his <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophical</a> and <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theological</a> teaching are his <em>distinctio formalis</em> and his <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">idea</a> of being. The <em>distinctio formalis</em> is intermediate between the <em>distinctio rationis tantum</em>, or the distinction made by the <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellect</a> alone, and the <em>distinctio realis</em> or that which exists in reality. The former occurs, e.g., between the definition and the thing defined, the latter, within the realm of created reality, between things that can exist separately or at least can be made to exist separately by Divine <a href="../cathen/11251c.htm">omnipotence</a>, as, e.g., between the different parts of a body or between <a href="../cathen/14322c.htm">substance</a> and <a href="../cathen/01096c.htm">accident</a>. A thing is "formally distinct" when it is such in essence and in concept that it can be thought of by itself, when it is not another thing, though with that other it may be so closely united that not even <a href="../cathen/11251c.htm">omnipotence</a> can separate it, e.g. <a href="../cathen/05749a.htm">the soul and its faculties</a> and these faculties among themselves. The <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a> forms with its faculties only one thing <em>(res)</em>, but conceptually it is not identical with <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">the intellect</a> or the will, nor are <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellect</a> and will the same. Thus we have various realities, entities, or formalities of one and the same thing. So far as the thing itself exists, these entities have their own being; for each entity has its own being or its own existence. But existence is not identical with subsistence. The accident e.g., has its own being, its own existence, which is different from the existence of the substance in which it inheres, just because the accident is not identical with the substance. But it has no subsistence of its own, since it is not a thing existing by itself, but inheres in the substance as its subject and support; it is not an independent being. Moreover, only actually existing; things have real being: in other words, being is identical with existence. In the state of mere ideality or possibility, before their realization, things have an essence, an ideal conceivable being, but not an actual one; else they could not be created or annihilated, since they would have had an existence before their creation. And since being is <em>eo ipso</em> also <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> and good, only those things are really good and <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> which actually exist. If <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, therefore, by an act of His <a href="../cathen/06259a.htm">free will</a> gives existence to the essences, He makes them by this very act also <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> and good. In this sense, it is quite correct to say that according to Scotus things are <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> and good because <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> so wills. By this assertion, however, he does not deny that things are good and <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> in themselves. They have an objective being, and thence also objective <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truth</a> and <a href="../cathen/06636b.htm">goodness</a>, because they are in the likeness of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, Whose being, Goodness, and <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truth</a> they imitate. At the same time, in their ideal being they are <a href="../cathen/10733a.htm">necessary</a>; the <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">ideas</a> of them are not produced by the Divine <a href="../cathen/06259a.htm">free will</a>, but by the Divine <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellect</a>, which, without the co-operation of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God's</a> will, recognizes His own <a href="../cathen/08004a.htm">infinite</a> essence as imitable by finite things and thus of necessity conceives the <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">ideas</a>. In this ideal state <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> necessarily wills the things, since they cannot but be pleasing to Him as images of His own essence. But from this it does not follow that He must will them with an effective will, i.e. that He must realize them. <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> is entirely free in determining what things shall come into existence.</p> <p><a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> alone is absolutely immaterial, since He alone is absolute and perfect actuality, without any potentiality for becoming other than what He is. All creatures, <a href="../cathen/01476d.htm">angels</a> and human <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">souls</a> included, are material, because they are changeable and may become the subject of accidents. But from this it does not follow that <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">souls</a> and <a href="../cathen/01476d.htm">angels</a> are corporeal; on the contrary they are spiritual, physically simple, though material in the sense just explained. Since all created things, corporeal and spiritual, are composed of potentiality and actuality, the same <em>materia prima</em> is the foundation of all, and therefore all things have a common substratum, a common material basis. This <em>materia</em>, in itself quite indeterminate, may be determined to any sort of thing by a form--a spiritual form determines it to a spirit, a corporeal form to a material body. Scotus, however, does not teach an extreme Realism; he does not attribute to the <a href="../cathen/15182a.htm">universals</a> or abstract essences, e.g. genus and species an existence of their own, independent of the individual beings in which they are realized. It is <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a>, he holds that <em>materia prima</em>, as the indeterminate principle, can be separated from the <em>forma</em>, or the determining principle, at least by Divine <a href="../cathen/11251c.htm">omnipotence</a>, and that it can then exist by itself. Conceptually, the <em>materia</em> is altogether different from the <em>forma</em>; moreover, the same <em>materia</em> a can be determined by entirely different forms and the same form can be united with different <em>materiæ</em>, as is evident from the processes of generation and corruption. For this reason <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> at least can separate the one from the other, just as in the <a href="../cathen/05572c.htm">Holy Eucharist</a> He keeps the accidents of <a href="../cathen/01349d.htm">bread</a> and <a href="../cathen/01358a.htm">wine</a> in existence, without a substance in which they inhere. It is no less certain that Scotus teaches a plurality of forms in the same thing. The human body, e.g., taken by itself, without the <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a>, has its own form; the <em>forma corporeitatis</em>. It is transmitted to the child by its <a href="../cathen/11478c.htm">parents</a> and is different from the rational <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a>, which is infused by <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> himself. The <em>forma corporeitatis</em> gives the body a sort of human form, though quite imperfect, and remains after the rational <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a> has departed from the body in death until decomposition takes place. Nevertheless, it is the rational <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a> which is the essential form of the body or of man; this constitutes with the body one being, one substance, one <a href="../cathen/11726a.htm">person</a>, one man. With all its faculties, vegetative sensitive and <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellectual</a>, it is the immediate work of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, Who infuses it into the child. There is only one <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a> in man, but we can distinguish in it several forms; for conceptually the <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellectual</a> is not the same as the sensitive, nor is this identical with the vegetative, nor the vegetative with that which gives the body, as such, its form; yet all these belong formally, by their concept and essence, to the one indivisible <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a>. Scotus also maintains a formal distinction between the universal nature of each thing and its individuality, e.g. in <a href="../cathen/12159a.htm">Plato</a> between his <a href="../cathen/09580c.htm">human</a> <a href="../cathen/10715a.htm">nature</a> and that which makes him just <a href="../cathen/12159a.htm">Plato</a>--his Platoneity. For the one is not the other; the individuality is added to the <a href="../cathen/09580c.htm">human</a> <a href="../cathen/10715a.htm">nature</a> and with it constitutes the human individual. In this sense the <a href="../cathen/12462a.htm">property</a> or difference, or the <em>hæccitas</em>, is the <em>principium individuationis.</em> Hence it is clear that there are many points of resemblance between <a href="../cathen/10053b.htm">matter</a> and form on the one hand and universal natures and their individualization on the other. But Scotus is far from teaching extreme Realism. According to his view, matter can exist without form, but not the universal essence without individuation; nor can the different forms of the same thing exist by themselves. He does not maintain that the uniform matter underlying all created things is the absolute being which exists by itself, independent of the <a href="../cathen/07762a.htm">individuals</a>, and is then determined by added forms, first to genera, then to species, and lastly to <a href="../cathen/07762a.htm">individuals</a>. On the contrary, <em>materia prima</em>, which according to him can exist without a form, is already something individual and numerically determined. In reality there is no <em>materia</em> without form, and vice versa. The <em>materia</em> which <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> created had already a certain form, the imperfect form of chaos. <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> could create matter by itself and form by itself, but both would then be something individual, numerically, though not specifically, different from other matter and other forms of the same kind. This matter, numerically different from other matter, could then be united with a form, also numerically different from other forms of the same kind; and the result would be a compound individual, numerically different from other <a href="../cathen/07762a.htm">individuals</a> of the same kind. From such individualized matter, form, and compound we get by abstraction the <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">idea</a> of a universal matter, a universal form, a universal compound, e.g. of a universal man. But by themselves universal matter and universal form cannot exist. The <a href="../cathen/15182a.htm">universal</a> as such is a mere conception of the mind; it cannot exist by itself, it receives its existence in and with the individual; in and with the individual it is multiplied, in and with the individual it loses again its existence. Even <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> cannot separate in man the universal nature from the individuality, or in the human <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a> the <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellectual</a> from the sensitive part, without destroying the whole. In reality there are only <a href="../cathen/07762a.htm">individuals</a>, in which, however, we can by abstraction formally separate both the abstract <a href="../cathen/09580c.htm">human</a> <a href="../cathen/10715a.htm">nature</a> from the individuality and the several faculties from one another. But the separation and distinction and formation of genera and species are mere processes of thought, the work of the contemplating mind.</p> <div class="CMtag_300x250" style="display: flex; height: 300px; align-items: center; justify-content: center; "></div> <p>The <a href="../cathen/12545b.htm">psychology</a> of Scotus is in its essentials the same as that of <a href="../cathen/14663b.htm">St. Thomas.</a> The starting-point of all <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a> is the sensory or outer experience, to which must be added the inner experience, which he designates as the ultimate criterion of certitude. He lays stress on induction as the basis of all natural <a href="../cathen/13598b.htm">sciences</a>. He denies that sense perception, and a fortiori <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellectual</a> <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a>, is merely a passive process; moreover, he asserts that not only the universal but also the individual is perceived directly. The adequate object of <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellectual</a> <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a> is not the spiritual in the material, but being in its universality. In the whole realm of the <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a> the will has the primacy since it can determine itself, while it controls more or less completely the other faculties. The freedom of the will, taken as freedom of choice, is emphasized and vigorously defended. In presence of any good, even in the contemplation of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, the will is not necessitated, but determines itself freely. This <a href="../cathen/05075b.htm">doctrine</a> does not imply that the will can decide what is <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> and what is <a href="../cathen/05781a.htm">false</a>, what is right and what is wrong, nor that its choice is blind and arbitrary. Objects, motives, habits, passions, etc. exert a great influence upon the will, and incline it to choose one thing rather than another. Yet the final decision remains with the will, and in so far the will is the one complete cause of its act, else it would not be free. With regard to memory, sensation, and association we find in Scotus many modern views.</p> <h2>System of theology</h2> <p>It has been asserted that according to Scotus the essence of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> consists in His will; but the assertion is unfounded. <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, he holds, is the <em>ens infinitum.</em> It is <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> that according to him <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God's</a> <a href="../cathen/09397a.htm">love</a> for Himself and the spiration of the Holy Ghost by Father and Son are not based upon a natural <a href="../cathen/08050b.htm">instinct</a>, so to say, but upon <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God's</a> own free choice. Every will is free, and therefore <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God's</a> will also. But His will is so perfect and His essence so <a href="../cathen/08004a.htm">infinitely</a> good, that His <a href="../cathen/06259a.htm">free will</a> cannot but <a href="../cathen/09397a.htm">love</a> it. This <a href="../cathen/09397a.htm">love</a>, therefore, is at once free and <a href="../cathen/10733a.htm">necessary</a>. Also with regard to created things Scotus emphasizes the freedom of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, without, however, falling into the <a href="../cathen/05525a.htm">error</a> of merely arbitrary, unmotived indeterminism. It has been asserted, too, that according to Scotus, being can be attributed univocally to <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> and creatures; but this again is <a href="../cathen/05781a.htm">false</a>. Scotus maintains that <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> is the <em>ens per essentiam</em>, creatures are <em>entia per participationem</em>--they have being only in an analogical sense. But from the being of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> and the being of creatures, a universal <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">idea</a> of being can be abstracted and predicated univocally of both the finite and the <a href="../cathen/08004a.htm">infinite</a>; otherwise we could not infer from the existence of finite things the <a href="../cathen/06608b.htm">existence of God</a>, we should have no <a href="../cathen/12454c.htm">proof</a> of <a href="../cathen/06608b.htm">God's existence</a>, as every syllogism would contain a <em>quaternio terminorum.</em> Between <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God's</a> essence and His <a href="../cathen/06612a.htm">attributes</a>, between the <a href="../cathen/06612a.htm">attributes</a> themselves, and then between <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God's</a> essence and the Divine Persons, there is a formal distinction along with real identity. For conceptually Divinity is not the same as wisdom, <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellect</a> not the same as will; Divinity is not identical with paternity, since Divinity neither begets, as does the Father, nor is begotten, as is the Son. But all these realities are formally in <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> and their distinction is not annulled by His <a href="../cathen/08004a.htm">infinity</a>; on the other hand it remains <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> that <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> is only one <em>res.</em> The process constituting the <a href="../cathen/15047a.htm">Blessed Trinity</a> takes Place without regard to the external world. Only after its completion the three Divine Persons, as one principle, produce by their act of cognition the <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">ideas</a> of things. But quite apart from this process, <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> is independent of the world in His <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a> and volition, for the obvious reason that dependence of any sort would imply imperfection.</p> <p>The cognition, volition, and activity of the <a href="../cathen/01476d.htm">angels</a> is more akin to ours. The <a href="../cathen/01476d.htm">angels</a> can of themselves <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">know</a> things; they do not need an infused species though in fact they receive such from <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>. The <a href="../cathen/04764a.htm">devil</a> is not necessarily compelled, as a result of his <a href="../cathen/14004b.htm">sin</a> always to will what is <a href="../cathen/05649a.htm">evil</a>; with his splendid natural endowments he can do what in itself is good; he can even <a href="../cathen/09397a.htm">love</a> <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> above all things, though in fact he does not do so. Sin is only in so far an <a href="../cathen/08004a.htm">infinite</a> offense of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> as it leads away from Him; in itself its malice is no greater than is the <a href="../cathen/06636b.htm">goodness</a> of the opposite <a href="../cathen/15472a.htm">virtue</a>.</p> <p>In his <a href="../cathen/14597a.htm">Christology</a>, Scotus insists strongly on the reality of <a href="../cathen/08374c.htm">Christ's</a> Humanity. Though it has no <a href="../cathen/11727b.htm">personality</a> and no subsistence of its own, it has its own existence. The <a href="../cathen/07610b.htm"><em>unio hypostatica</em></a> and the <a href="../cathen/04169a.htm"><em>communicatio idiomatum</em></a> are explained in accordance with the <a href="../cathen/05075b.htm">doctrine</a> of the <a href="../cathen/03744a.htm">Church</a>, with no leaning to either <a href="../cathen/10755a.htm">Nestorianism</a> or <a href="../cathen/01150a.htm">Adoptionism</a>. It is <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> that Scotus explains the influence of the <a href="../cathen/07610b.htm">hypostatic union</a> upon the <a href="../cathen/09580c.htm">human</a> <a href="../cathen/10715a.htm">nature</a> of Christ and upon His work differently from <a href="../cathen/14663b.htm">St. Thomas</a>. Since this union in no way changes the <a href="../cathen/09580c.htm">human</a> <a href="../cathen/10715a.htm">nature</a> of <a href="../cathen/08374c.htm">Christ</a>, it does not of itself impart to the Humanity the <a href="../cathen/02364a.htm">beatific vision</a> or impeccability. These prerogatives were given to Christ with the fullness of grace which He received in consequence of that union. <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> would have become man even if Adam had not <a href="../cathen/14004b.htm">sinned</a>, since He willed that in Christ humanity and the world should be united with Himself by the closest possible bond. Scotus also defends energetically the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. All objections founded on <a href="../cathen/11312a.htm">original sin</a> and the universal need of <a href="../cathen/12677d.htm">redemption</a> are solved. The merits of Christ are <a href="../cathen/08004a.htm">infinite</a> only in a broader sense, but of themselves they are entirely sufficient to give adequate satisfaction to the Divine <a href="../cathen/08571c.htm">justice</a>; there is no deficiency to be supplied by <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God's</a> mercy. But there is needed a merciful acceptation of the work of <a href="../cathen/08374c.htm">Christ</a>, since in the sight of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> there is no real merit in the strictest sense of the word.</p> <p><a href="../cathen/06710a.htm">Grace</a> is something entirely <a href="../cathen/14336b.htm">supernatural</a> and can be given only by <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, and, what is more, only by a creative act; hence the <a href="../cathen/13295a.htm">sacraments</a> are not, properly speaking, the physical or instrumental cause of grace, because <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> alone can create. <a href="../cathen/06701a.htm">Sanctifying grace</a> is identical with the infused virtue of charity, and has its seat in the will; it is therefore conceived rather from the <a href="../cathen/05556a.htm">ethical</a> standpoint. The <a href="../cathen/13295a.htm">sacraments</a> give grace of themselves, or <em>ex opere operato</em>, if man places no obstacle in the way. The real essence of the <a href="../cathen/11618c.htm">Sacrament of Penance</a> consists in the <a href="../cathen/01061a.htm">absolution</a>; but this is of no avail unless the sinner repent with a sorrow that springs from <a href="../cathen/09397a.htm">love</a> of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>; his <a href="../cathen/05075b.htm">doctrine</a> of attrition is by no means lax. As to his <a href="../cathen/05528b.htm">eschatology</a> it must suffice to state that he makes the essence of beatitude consist in activity, i.e. in the <a href="../cathen/09397a.htm">love</a> of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, not in the <a href="../cathen/02364a.htm">Beatific Vision;</a> this latter is only the <a href="../cathen/10733a.htm">necessary</a> condition.</p> <p>In ethics Scotus declares emphatically that the morality of an act requires an object which is good in its nature, its end, and its circumstances, and according to the dictate of right <a href="../cathen/12673b.htm">reason</a>. It is not <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> that he makes <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God's</a> <a href="../cathen/06259a.htm">free will</a> decide arbitrarily what is good and what is bad; he only asserts that the Commandments. Of the second table of the <a href="../cathen/04664a.htm">Decalogue</a> are not in such strict sense <a href="../cathen/09053a.htm">laws</a> of nature as are those of the first table; because <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> cannot grant a <a href="../cathen/05041a.htm">dispensation</a> from the <a href="../cathen/09053a.htm">laws</a> of the first, whereas He can dispense from those of the second; as in fact He did when He commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son. But the <a href="../cathen/12372b.htm">precepts</a> of the second table also are far more binding than the other positive <a href="../cathen/09053a.htm">laws</a> of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>. In the present order of things <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> cannot permit manslaughter universally, taking the <a href="../cathen/12462a.htm">property</a> of others, and the like. There are also indifferent actions <em>in individuo.</em> Absolutely speaking, man should direct all his actions towards <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>; but <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> does not require this, because He does not wish to burden man with so heavy a yoke. He obliges man only to observe the <a href="../cathen/04664a.htm">Decalogue</a>; the rest is free. Social and legal questions are not treated by Scotus <em>ex professo;</em> his works, however, contain sound observations on these subjects.</p> <h2>Relation between philosophy and theology</h2> <p>Scotus does not, as is often asserted, maintain that <a href="../cathen/13598b.htm">science</a> and <a href="../cathen/05752c.htm">faith</a> can contradict each other, or that a proposition may be <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">true</a> in <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophy</a> and <a href="../cathen/05781a.htm">false</a> in <a href="../cathen/14580a.htm">theology</a> and vice versa. Incorrect, also, is the statement that he attaches little importance to showing the harmony between scientific <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a> and <a href="../cathen/05752c.htm">faith</a> and that he has no regard for speculative <a href="../cathen/14580a.htm">theology</a>. Quite the contrary, he proves the <a href="../cathen/05089a.htm">dogmas</a> of <a href="../cathen/05752c.htm">faith</a> not only from authority but, as far as possible, from reason also. Theology presupposes philosophy as its basis. Facts which have <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> for their author and yet can be known by our natural powers especially <a href="../cathen/10338a.htm">miracles</a> and prophecies, are criteria of the <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truth</a> of Revelation, religion, and the <a href="../cathen/03744a.htm">Church</a>. Scotus strives to gain as thorough an insight as possible into the <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truths</a> of <a href="../cathen/05752c.htm">faith</a>, to disclose them to the <a href="../cathen/09580c.htm">human</a> <a href="../cathen/10321a.htm">mind</a>, to establish <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truth</a> upon <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truth</a>, and from <a href="../cathen/05089a.htm">dogma</a> to prove or to reject many a <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophical</a> proposition. There is just as little warrant for the statement that his chief concern is <a href="../cathen/07543b.htm">humble</a> subjection to the authority of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a> and of the <a href="../cathen/03744a.htm">Church</a>, or that his tendency a priori is to depreciate scientific <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a> and to resolve speculative <a href="../cathen/14580a.htm">theology</a> into <a href="../cathen/05141a.htm">doubts</a>. Scotus simply believes that many <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophical</a> and <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theological</a> <a href="../cathen/12454c.htm">proofs</a> of other scholars are not conclusive; in their stead he adduces other arguments. He also thinks that many <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophical</a> and <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theological</a> propositions can be <a href="../cathen/12454c.htm">proved</a> which other <a href="../cathen/13548a.htm">Scholastics</a> consider incapable of demonstration. He indeed lays great stress on the authority of Scripture, the Fathers, and the <a href="../cathen/03744a.htm">Church</a> but he also attaches much importance to natural <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a> and the <a href="../cathen/08066a.htm">intellectual</a> capacity of the mind of <a href="../cathen/01476d.htm">angels</a> and of men, both in this world and in the other. He is inclined to widen rather than narrow the range of attainable <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a>. He sets great value upon mathematics and the natural <a href="../cathen/13598b.htm">sciences</a> and especially upon <a href="../cathen/10226a.htm">metaphysics</a>. He rejects every unnecessary recourse to Divine or <a href="../cathen/01476d.htm">angelic</a> intervention or to <a href="../cathen/10338a.htm">miracles</a>, and demands that the <a href="../cathen/14336b.htm">supernatural</a> and <a href="../cathen/10338a.htm">miraculous</a> be limited as far as possible even in matters of <a href="../cathen/05752c.htm">faith</a>. Dogmas he holds are to be explained in a somewhat softened and more easily intelligible sense, so far as this may be done without diminution of their substantial meaning, dignity, and depth. In Scripture the literal sense is to be taken, and freedom of opinion is to be granted so far as it is not opposed to <a href="../cathen/03712a.htm">Christian Faith</a> or the authority of the <a href="../cathen/03744a.htm">Church</a>. Scotus was much given to the study of mathematics, and for this reason he insists on demonstrative <a href="../cathen/12454c.htm">proofs</a> in <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophy</a> and <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theology</a>; but he is no real sceptic. He grants that our senses, our internal and external experience, and authority together with reason, can furnish us with absolute <a href="../cathen/03539b.htm">certainty</a> and evidence. The difficulty which many <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truths</a> present lies not so much in ourselves as in the objects. In itself everything knowable is the object of our <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">knowledge</a>. Reason can of its own powers recognize the <a href="../cathen/06608b.htm">existence of God</a> and many of His attributes, the creation of the world out of nothing, the conservation of the world by <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>, the spirituality, individuality, substantiality, and unity of the <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a>, as well as its <a href="../cathen/06259a.htm">free will</a>. In many of his writings he asserts that mere reason can come to <a href="../cathen/08673a.htm">know</a> the <a href="../cathen/07687a.htm">immortality</a> and the creation of the <a href="../cathen/14153a.htm">soul</a>; in others he asserts the direct opposite; but he never denies the so-called moral evidence for these <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truths</a>.</p> <p>Theology with him is not a scientific study in the strictest sense of the word, as are mathematics and <a href="../cathen/10226a.htm">metaphysics</a>, because it is not based upon the evidence of its objects, but upon revelation and authority. It is a practical <a href="../cathen/13598b.htm">science</a> because it pursues a practical end: the possession of <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>. But it gives the mind perfect <a href="../cathen/03539b.htm">certainty</a> and unchangeable <a href="../cathen/15073a.htm">truths</a>; it does not consist in mere practical, moral, and religious activity Thus Scotus is removed from <a href="../cathen/08603a.htm">Kant</a> and the modern <em>Gefühlstheologen</em>, not by a single line of thought but by the whole range of his <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophical</a> speculation. Scotus is no precursor of <a href="../cathen/09438b.htm">Luther</a>; he emphasizes <a href="../cathen/15006b.htm">ecclesiastical tradition</a> and authority, <a href="../cathen/06259a.htm">the freedom of the will</a>, the power of our reason, and the co-operation with grace. Nor is he a precursor of <a href="../cathen/08603a.htm">Kant</a>. The <a href="../cathen/05075b.htm">doctrine</a> regarding primacy of the will and the practical character of <a href="../cathen/14580x.htm">theology</a> has quite a different meaning in his mind from what it has in <a href="../cathen/08603a.htm">Kant's</a>. He values <a href="../cathen/10226a.htm">metaphysics</a> highly and calls it the queen of <a href="../cathen/13598b.htm">sciences</a>. Only as a very subtle critic may he be called the <a href="../cathen/08603a.htm">Kant</a> of the thirteenth century. Nor is he a precursor of the <a href="../cathen/10415a.htm">Modernists</a>. His writings indeed contain many entirely modern <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">ideas</a>, e.g. the stress he lays on freedom in scientific and also in religious matters, upon the separateness of the objective world and of thought, the self-activity of the thinking subject, the dignity and value of <a href="../cathen/11727b.htm">personality</a>; yet in all this he remains within proper limits, and in opposition to the <a href="../cathen/10415a.htm">Modernists</a> he asserts very forcibly the necessity of an absolute authority in the <a href="../cathen/03744a.htm">Church</a>, the necessity of <a href="../cathen/05752c.htm">faith</a>, the freedom of the will; and he rejects absolutely any and every <a href="../cathen/10483a.htm">monistic</a> identification of the world and <a href="../cathen/06608a.htm">God</a>. That he has so often been misunderstood is due simply to the fact that his teaching has been viewed from the standpoint of modern thought.</p> <p>Scotus is a genuine <a href="../cathen/13548a.htm">Scholastic</a> <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosopher</a> who works out <a href="../cathen/07630a.htm">ideas</a> taken from <a href="../cathen/01713a.htm">Aristotle</a>, <a href="../cathen/02084a.htm">St. Augustine</a>, and the preceding <a href="../cathen/13548a.htm">Scholastics</a>. He is universally recognized as a deep thinker, an original mind, and a sharp critic; a thoroughly scientific man, who without personal bias proceeds objectively, stating his own doctrines with modesty and with a certain reserve. It has been asserted that he did more harm than good to the <a href="../cathen/03744a.htm">Church</a>, and that by his destructive criticism, his subtleties, and his barbarous terminology he prepared the ruin of <a href="../cathen/13548a.htm">Scholasticism</a>, indeed that its downfall begins with him. These accusations originated to a great extent in the insufficient understanding or the <a href="../cathen/05781a.htm">false</a> interpretation of his doctrines. No <a href="../cathen/05141a.htm">doubt</a> his diction lacks elegance; it is often obscure and unintelligible; but the same must be said of many earlier <a href="../cathen/13548a.htm">Scholastics</a>. Then too, subtle discussions and distinctions which to this age are meaningless, abound in his works; yet his researches were occasioned for the most part, by the remarks of other <a href="../cathen/13548a.htm">Scholastic</a> <a href="../cathen/12025c.htm">philosophers</a>, especially by <a href="../cathen/07235b.htm">Henry of Ghent</a>, whom he attacks perhaps even more than he does <a href="../cathen/14663b.htm">St. Thomas</a>. But the real spirit of scholasticism is perhaps in no other <a href="../cathen/13548a.htm">Scholastic</a> so pronounced as in Scotus. In depth of thoughts which after all is the important thing, Scotus is not surpassed by any of his contemporaries. He was a child of his time; a thorough <a href="../cathen/01713a.htm">Aristotelean</a>, even more so than St. Thomas; but he criticizes sharply even the <a href="../cathen/01713a.htm">Stagirite</a> and his commentators. He tries always to explain them favourably, but does not hesitate to differ from them. <a href="../cathen/05194a.htm">Duns Scotus's</a> teaching is <a href="../cathen/11330a.htm">orthodox</a>. <a href="../cathen/03449a.htm">Catholics</a> and <a href="../cathen/12495a.htm">Protestants</a> have charged him with sundry <a href="../cathen/05525a.htm">errors</a> and <a href="../cathen/07256b.htm">heresies</a>, but the <a href="../cathen/03744a.htm">Church</a> has not condemned a single proposition of his; on the contrary, the <a href="../cathen/05075b.htm">doctrine</a> of the <a href="../cathen/07674d.htm">Immaculate Conception</a> which he so strongly advocated, has been declared a <a href="../cathen/05089a.htm">dogma</a>.</p> <div class='catholicadnet-728x90' id='cathen-728x90-bottom' style='display: flex; height: 100px; align-items: center; justify-content: center; '></div> <div class="pub"><h2>About this page</h2><p id="apa"><strong>APA citation.</strong> <span id="apaauthor">Minges, P.</span> <span id="apayear">(1909).</span> <span id="apaarticle">Bl. John Duns Scotus.</span> In <span id="apawork">The Catholic Encyclopedia.</span> <span id="apapublisher">New York: Robert Appleton Company.</span> <span id="apaurl">http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05194a.htm</span></p><p id="mla"><strong>MLA citation.</strong> <span id="mlaauthor">Minges, Parthenius.</span> <span id="mlaarticle">"Bl. John Duns Scotus."</span> <span id="mlawork">The Catholic Encyclopedia.</span> <span id="mlavolume">Vol. 5.</span> <span id="mlapublisher">New York: Robert Appleton Company,</span> <span id="mlayear">1909.</span> <span id="mlaurl"><http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05194a.htm>.</span></p><p id="transcription"><strong>Transcription.</strong> <span id="transcriber">This article was transcribed for New Advent by Rick McCarty.</span> <span id="dedication"></span></p><p id="approbation"><strong>Ecclesiastical approbation.</strong> <span id="nihil"><em>Nihil Obstat.</em> May 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, Censor.</span> <span id="imprimatur"><em>Imprimatur.</em> +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York.</span></p><p id="contactus"><strong>Contact information.</strong> The editor of New Advent is Kevin Knight. My email address is webmaster <em>at</em> newadvent.org. Regrettably, I can't reply to every letter, but I greatly appreciate your feedback — especially notifications about typographical errors and inappropriate ads.</p></div> </div> <div id="ogdenville"><table summary="Bottom bar" width="100%" cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0><tr><td class="bar_white_on_color"><center><strong>Copyright © 2023 by <a href="../utility/contactus.htm">New Advent LLC</a>. 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