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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:admin="http://webns.net/mvcb/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:syn="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/" > <channel rdf:about="https://philpapers.org"> <title>PhilPapers: Selected recent additions to PhilArchive</title> <link>https://philpapers.org</link> <description></description> <syn:updateBase>2008-07-01T00:00+00:00</syn:updateBase> <syn:updateFrequency>1</syn:updateFrequency> <syn:updatePeriod>daily</syn:updatePeriod> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> <rdf:li resource="http://www.dmoz.org/Reference/Bibliography/" /> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> <items> <rdf:Seq> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/CAWEAT-4" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/THALTT-3" /> <rdf:li 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rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/SIFARN" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHWDC-2" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/THOTAT-17" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/WUIMR" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/CRABAQ" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/MORPCA-7" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/STROAC-2" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/LINADO-7" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/CARAST-4" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/FEROOV" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/SIMMOW-2" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/FRUSW" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/RANKPA-2" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/ARBSVS" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/PALTPP-3" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/LEFART" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/KERTRC" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/MALEAR-4" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/RIEFAT-3" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/LICDA-4" /> <rdf:li rdf:resource="https://philarchive.org/rec/LICMA-2" /> </rdf:Seq> </items> </channel> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/CAWEAT-4"> <title> Caws, Peter : Evidence and Testimony: Philip Henry Gosse and the _Omphalos_ Theory</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/CAWEAT-4</link> <description> In Harold Orel & George J. Worth (eds.), _Six Studies in Nineteenth-Century English Literature and Thought_. University of Kansas Publications. pp. 69-90. 1962 </description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/THALTT-3"> <title> Thatcher, Sanford G. & Christensen, David : Letter to the Editor</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/THALTT-3</link> <description> _Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association_ 68 (5):107-122. 1995 A letter protesting the publication of a homophobic rant in the Proceedings of the APA.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/CHRTMA"> <title> Christensen, David & Kornblith, Hilary : Testimony, memory and the limits of the a priori</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/CHRTMA</link> <description> _Philosophical Studies_ 86 (1):1-20. 1997 A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle that we are justified in believing what our senses tell us.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=CHRTMA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1023%2FA%3A1004268430546">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/RAYNGF"> <title> Raymond, Leigh ; Kelly, Daniel & Hennes, Erin : Norm-based Governance for a New Era: Collective Action in the Face of Hyper-Politicization</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/RAYNGF</link> <description> _Perspectives on Politics_. forthcoming The world has surpassed three million deaths from COVID-19, and faces potentially catastrophic tipping points in the global climate system. Despite the urgency, governments have struggled to address either problem. In this paper, we argue that COVID-19 and anthropogenic climate change (ACC) are critical examples of an emerging type of governance challenge: severe collective action problems that require significant individual behavior change under conditions of hyper- partisanship and scientific misinformation. Building on foundational political science work demonstrating the potential for norms (or informal rules of behavior) to solve collective action problems, we analyze more recent work on norms from neighboring disciplines to offer novel recommendations for more difficult challenges like COVID-19 and ACC. Key insights include more attention to (1) norm-based messaging strategies that appeal to individuals across the ideological spectrum or that reframe collective action as consistent with resistant subgroups’ pre-existing values, (2) messages that emphasize both the prevalence and the social desirability of individual behaviors required to address these challenges, (3) careful use of public policies and incentives that make individual behavior change easier without threatening norm internalization, and (4) greater attention to epistemic norms governing trust in different information sources. We conclude by pointing out that COVID-19 and climate change are likely harbingers of other polarized collective action problems that governments will face in the future. By connecting work on norms and political governance with a broader, interdisciplinary literature on norm psychology, motivation, and behavior change, we aim to improve the ability of political scientists and policy makers to respond to these and future collective action challenges.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/FLOLAT"> <title> Floridi, Luciano & Sanders, J. W. : Levellism and the method of abstraction</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/FLOLAT</link> <description> _IEG Research Report_. 2004 The use of "levels of abstraction" in philosophical analysis (levellism) has recently come under attack. In this paper, we argue that a refined version of epistemological levellism should be retained as a fundamental method, which we call the method of abstraction. After a brief introduction, in section two we make clear the nature and applicability of the (epistemological) method of levels of abstraction. In section three, we show the fruitfulness of the new method by applying it to five case studies: the concept of agenthood, the Turing test, the definition of emergence, quantum observation and decidable observation. In section four, we further characterise and support the method by distinguishing it from three other forms of "levellism": (i) levels of organisation; (ii) levels of explanation and (iii) conceptual schemes. In this context, we also briefly address the problems of relativism and antirealism. In the conclusion, we indicate some of the work that lies ahead, two potential limitations of the method and some results that have already been obtained by applying the method to some long-standing philosophical problems.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/BREEI"> <title> Brey, Philip ; Floridi, Luciano & Grodzinsky, Frances : Editorial introduction – ethics of new information technology</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/BREEI</link> <description> _Ethics and Information Technology_ 7 (3):109–109. 2005 This special issue of Ethics and Information Technology focuses on the ethics of new and emerging information technology (IT). The papers have been selected from submissions to the sixth international conference on Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE2005), which took place at the University of Twente, the Netherlands, July 17–19, 2005. <div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=BREEI&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%2Fs10676-006-0009-z">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/STOCF"> <title> Stockdale, Katie : Collective Forgiveness</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/STOCF</link> <description> In Robert Enright & Glen Pettigrove (eds.), _Routledge Handbook of Forgiveness_. Routledge. forthcoming This chapter considers the possibility and ethics of collective forgiveness. I begin by distinguishing between different forms of forgiveness to illustrate what it might look like for a collective to forgive that is distinct from the individual and group-based forgiveness of its members. I then consider how emotional models of forgiveness might capture the phenomenon of collective forgiveness. I argue that shortcomings with emotional models suggest that performative and social practice models of forgiveness more plausibly extend to collective forgiveness. I close by exploring a range of moral questions and objections to practices of collective forgiveness.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/ROSWAW-3"> <title> Rossi, Benjamin Cohen : Way and Whiting on Elusive Reasons</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/ROSWAW-3</link> <description> _Analytic Philosophy_. forthcoming Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=ROSWAW-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fdoi%2F10.1111%2Fphib.12223%2Fabstract">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/LANTEO-39"> <title> Lange, Benjamin : The Ethics of Partiality</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/LANTEO-39</link> <description>Partiality refers to the special concern that we display to ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into the good life and the role of our personal commitments, the demands of impartial morality, equality and other moral ideals, or common-sense ideas about supererogation. This paper provides an overview of the debate on the ethics of partiality through the lens of focusing on the domain of permissible and required partiality. After outlining the conceptual space, I first discuss agent-centred moral options which concern permissions not to do what would be impartially optimal. I sketch the options that are commonly defended in the literature and discuss the objections that have been raised against them. I then focus on required partiality, which concerns associative duties that go beyond your general duties to others, and which require us to give special priority to people who are close to us. I discuss some notable features of associative duties and the two main objections that have been raised against them: the Voluntarist and the Distributive Objection. I then turn to the justification of permissible and required partiality, focusing on underivative approaches and reasons-based frameworks. I discuss the reductionism and nonreductionism debate: the question whether partiality is derivative or fundamental. I survey arguments for ‘the big three’ according to which partiality is justified either by appeal to the special value of projects, valuable personal relationships, or the special value of individuals. I conclude by discussing a new emerging area in the debate, namely negative partiality which concerns what we owe our moral adversaries as opposed to intimates.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/BACHRA"> <title> Backman, Jussi M. : Heidegger's Revolutionary (Anti-/Counter-/Post-)Modernism</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/BACHRA</link> <description> _Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual_ 11:93-101. 2021 A rejoinder to Harri Mäcklin, "A Heideggerian Critique of Immersive Art"<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=BACHRA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fheidegger-circle.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2021%2F07%2F5b-Backman.pdf">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/LANPCC"> <title> Landy, Joshua : Passion, counter-passion, catharsis : Beckett and Flaubert on feeling nothing</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/LANPCC</link> <description> In Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), _A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature_. Wiley-Blackwell. 2010 This chapter presents Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy as modern fictions with ancient-skeptical ambitions. Whether in the affective domain (Flaubert) or in the cognitive (Beckett), the aim is to help the reader achieve a position of studied neutrality—ataraxia, époché—thanks not to an a priori decision but to the mutual cancellation of opposing tendencies. Understanding Flaubert and Beckett in this way allows us, first, to enrich our sense of what “catharsis” may involve; second, to see why the apparently odious Charles, in Madame Bovary, suddenly becomes a deeply touching figure; and third, to recognize the severe limitations of empathy-based moralist theories of fiction.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=LANPCC&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1002%2F9781444315592.ch12">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/UMBWDT"> <title> Umbrello, Steven : What do Trollies Teach Us About Responsible Innovation?</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/UMBWDT</link> <description> In _Death And Anti-Death, Volume 19: One Year After Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020)_. Ria University Press. forthcoming Since its inception, the trolley problem has sparked a rich debate both within and beyond moral philosophy. Often used as a primer for students to begin thinking about moral intuitions as well as how to distinguish between different forms of moral reasoning, the trolley problem is not without its uses in very practical, applied field like engineering. Often thought of as unrealistic by technically-oriented engineers, trolley cases in fact, help us to think about moral responsibility in a high tech world. This chapter explores the usefulness of trolley-like thinking within the realm of responsible innovation and discusses how despite the inherent issues with trolley scenarios, they remain nonetheless an indispensable tool for helping us to explore ways to maximize our moral responsibility in innovation.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/FERTAO-21"> <title> Fernández, José Luis : The Analogical 'Ought' of Taste</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/FERTAO-21</link> <description> In Margit Ruffing Violetta L. Waibel (ed.), _Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses_. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 2997-3004. 2018 In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Immanuel Kant argues that when we form a judgment of taste, the representation goes together with a demand that we require others to share. Some commentators note that the aesthetic feeling in a judgment of taste and its expectant universality seems to display a normative necessity in the explicit judgment itself, and that the expression of this normative component is sometimes stated as a claim to which everyone ought to conform. In this paper, I argue that the normative component of taste and its concomitant demand should not be interpreted too strongly as an actual expectation, but rather as only a conceivable possibility. Toward this end, I examine several passages for the declaration of taste to call into view certain caveats which suggest that Kant’s description of an intersubjective demand arising concomitantly with a judgment of taste functions only as an “analogical ought,” i. e., that the demand of taste is expressed as if the satisfaction I feel in a judgment of taste can possibly demand universal assent.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FERTAO-21&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.degruyter.com%2Fview%2Fbooks%2F9783110467888%2F9783110467888-302%2F9783110467888-302.xml">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/STUTDF-2"> <title> Studtmann, Paul : The Divine Fractal: 1st Order Extensional Theology</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/STUTDF-2</link> <description> _Philosophia_ 54:1-21. 2021 In this paper, I present what I call the symmetry conception of God within 1st order, extensional, non-well-founded set theory. The symmetry conception comes in two versions. According to the first, God is that unique being that is universally symmetrical with respect to set membership. According to the second, God is the universally symmetrical set of all sets that are universally symmetrical with respect to set membership. I present a number of theorems, most importantly that any universally symmetrical set is identical to its essence, that show that the two symmetry conceptions intersect with some dominant theological conceptions of God. The theorems also show that both of the symmetry conceptions of God entail that God has a fractal like structure.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=STUTDF-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11406-021-00384-w">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/NORNTA-4"> <title> Norlock, Kathryn J. : Non-ideal Theory and Gender Voluntarism in Against Purity</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/NORNTA-4</link> <description> _Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy_ 18 (1):1-5. 2018 In Against Purity, Alexis Shotwell takes up a multiplicity of tasks with respect to what I think of as non-ideal ethical theory. In what follows, I trace the relationship of her work to that of non-ideal theorists whose work influences mine. Then, more critically, I probe her analysis of gender voluntarism in Chapter 5, “Practicing Freedom: Disability and Gender Transformation,” partly to better understand what she takes it to be, and partly to advance a cautious defense of some of the moral functions of individualistic performances of gender voluntarism that non-ideal theory leads me to value. I conclude that my interest in retaining a positive account of individualistic gender voluntarism as a form of resistance to a hostile world is due to my tendency to take non-ideal theory as a recommendation for some pessimism, whereas Shotwell’s similar commitments turn out to inform her more optimistic philosophy.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=NORNTA-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.apaonline.org%2Fpage%2Ffeminism_newsletter">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/SANUFN-2"> <title> Sander, Thorsten : Understanding Frege’s notion of presupposition</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/SANUFN-2</link> <description> _Synthese_:1-22. forthcoming Why did Frege offer only proper names as examples of presupposition triggers? Some scholars claim that Frege simply did not care about the full range of presuppositional phenomena. This paper argues, in contrast, that he had good reasons for employing an extremely narrow notion of 'Voraussetzung'. On Frege's view, many devices that are now construed as presupposition triggers either express several thoughts at once or merely 'illuminate' a thought in a particular way. Fregean presuppositions, in contrast, are essentially tied to names.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SANUFN-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11229-021-03346-7">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/PERAFD-4"> <title> Persson, Erik ; Eriksson, Kerstin & Knaggård, Åsa : A Fair Distribution of Responsibility for Climate Adaptation -Translating Principles of Distribution from an International to a Local Context</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/PERAFD-4</link> <description> _Philosophies_ 6 (3). 2021 Distribution of responsibility is one of the main focus areas in discussions about climate change ethics. Most of these discussions deal with the distribution of responsibility for climate change mitigation at the international level. The aim of this paper is to investigate if and how these principles can be used to inform the search for a fair distribution of responsibility for climate change adaptation on the local level. We found that the most influential distribution principles on the international level were in turn built on one or more of seven basic principles: (P1) equal shares, (P2) desert, (P3) beneficiary pays, (P4) ability, (P5) self-help, (P6) limited responsibility for the worst off, and (P7) status quo preservation. It was found that all the basic principles, but P1, P3, and P7, are to some extent translatable to local climate adaptation. Two major problems hamper their usefulness on the local level: (1) several categories of agents need to take on responsibility; and (2) emissions do not work as a base for all principles. P4, P5, and P6 are applicable to local adaptation without changes. P4 is of particular importance as it seems to solve the first problem. P2 is applicable only if the second problem is solved, which can be achieved by using risk of harm instead of emissions as the basis for desert.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=PERAFD-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mdpi.com%2F2409-9287%2F6%2F3%2F68">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/LEBWAE-2"> <title> LeBrun, Alex : What are Empirical Consequences? On Dispensability and Composite Objects</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/LEBWAE-2</link> <description> _Synthese_. forthcoming Philosophers sometimes give arguments that presuppose the following principle: two theories can fail to be empirically equivalent on the sole basis that they present different "thick? metaphysical pictures of the world. Recently, a version of this principle has been invoked to respond to the argument that composite objects are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This response claims that our scientific evidence distinguishes between ordinary and composite-free theories, and it empirically favors the ordinary ones (Hofweber, 2016, 2018). In this paper, I ask whether this response to the dispensability argument is tenable. I claim that it is not. This is because it presupposes an indefensible thesis about when two empirical consequences are distinct or the same. My argument provides some insight into what our empirical consequences are, and I conclude that scientific evidence is radically metaphysically neutral. This gives us some insight into the significant content of our scientific theories---the content that a scientific realist is committed to---and I show how this insight relates to questions about theoretical equivalence more broadly.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=LEBWAE-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.alexlebrun.net%2Fresearch">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/IAISOA"> <title> Campbell, Iain : Sonic obstacles and conceptual nostalgia: preliminary considerations on musical conceptualism and contemporary art</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/IAISOA</link> <description> _Philosophical Inquiries_ 9 (2):111-132. 2021 This paper is concerned with the aesthetic and discursive gap between music and contemporary art, and the recent attempts to remedy this in the field of New Music through a notion of “New Conceptualism.” It examines why, despite musical sources being central to the emergence of conceptual artistic strategies in the 1950s and ’60s, the worlds of an increasingly transmedial “generic art” and music have remained largely distinct. While it takes New Music’s New Conceptualism as its focus, it argues that the perspective on New Music it takes has wider implications in music and art. It begins by defining what exactly “New Music” refers to, and outlines some of the conditions for the recent rise of conceptualism in New Music. It then takes the work of the composer Johannes Kreidler as a key example of some artistic tendencies and theoretical presuppositions in New Conceptualism. Following this it draws on work in the field of sound studies in order to critically examine the theoretical attempt to connect New Music with contemporary art that is found in the notion of “Music in the Expanded Field.” To conclude it offers some reflections on how a more robust conversation between contemporary art and New Music can begin to be conceived.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/BALHR"> <title> Ballantyne, Nathan & Ditto, Peter H. : Hanlon’s Razor</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/BALHR</link> <description> _Midwest Studies in Philosophy_. forthcoming “Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity” – so says Hanlon’s Razor. This principle is designed to curb the human tendency toward explaining other people’s behavior by moralizing it. In this article, we ask whether Hanlon’s Razor is good or bad advice. After offering a nuanced interpretation of the principle, we critically evaluate two strategies purporting to show it is good advice. Our discussion highlights important, unsettled questions about an idea that has the potential to infuse greater humility and civility into discourse and debate.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/NERTDO-3"> <title> Nerczuk, Zbigniew : The discussion of human nature in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE in the so-called sophistic movement</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/NERTDO-3</link> <description> _Schole_ 2 (15):511-520. 2021 The paper discusses the debate on the human nature in the sophistic thought. Focusing on the "nature-culture" controversy it presents the evolution of the views of the sophists: from Protagoras' optimistic contention of the progress of mankind and his appraisal of culture to its criticism and the radical turn to nature in Antiphon, Hippias, Trasymachos, and Callicles. The paper aims at presenting the analysis of the ongoing discussion, with the stress laid on reconstruction of the arguments and concepts as well as the attitudes that are associated with various positions of this debate. </description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/HILHLP"> <title> Hill, Christopher S. & Schechter, Joshua : Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/HILHLP</link> <description> _Philosophical Issues_ 17 (1):120-122. 2007 In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that practical reasoning has more to do with rational degrees of belief than with states of knowledge.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HILHLP&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brown.edu%2Facademics%2Fphilosophy%2Fsites%2Fbrown.edu.academics.philosophy%2Ffiles%2Fuploads%2FHawthornesLotteryPuzzleAndTheNatureOfBelief.pdf">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/HAALCN"> <title> Haar, Michel : La critique nietzscheenne de la subjectivite</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/HAALCN</link> <description> _Nietzsche-Studien_ 12 (1):80. 1983 <div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HAALCN&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.degruyter.com%2Fview%2Fj%2Fniet.1983.12.issue-1%2F9783110244311.80%2F9783110244311.80.xml">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/GUTEIP"> <title> Gutland, Christopher ; Cai, Wenjing & Fernandez, Anthony Vincent : Editorial: Integrating Philosophical and Scientific Approaches in Consciousness Research</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/GUTEIP</link> <description> _Frontiers in Psychology_ 12. 2021 <div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=GUTEIP&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.frontiersin.org%2Farticles%2F10.3389%2Ffpsyg.2021.683860%2Ffull">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/FERFPP-2"> <title> Fernandez, Anthony Vincent : From Phenomenological Psychopathology to Neurodiversity and Mad Pride: Reflections on Prejudice</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/FERFPP-2</link> <description> _Puncta_ 3 (2):19-22. 2020 Musing for Puncta special issue "Critically Sick: New Phenomenologies Of Illness, Madness, And Disability."<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FERFPP-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fjournals.oregondigital.org%2Findex.php%2Fpjcp%2Farticle%2Fview%2F4751">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/GUICCA-4"> <title> Guillermo, Del Pinal & Shannon, Spaulding : Conceptual Centrality and Implicit Bias</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/GUICCA-4</link> <description> _Mind and Language_ 33 (1):95-111. 2018 How are biases encoded in our representations of social categories? Philosophical and empirical discussions of implicit bias overwhelmingly focus on salient or statistical associations between target features and representations of social categories. These are the sorts of associations probed by the Implicit Association Test and various priming tasks. In this paper, we argue that these discussions systematically overlook an alternative way in which biases are encoded, that is, in the dependency networks that are part of our representations of social categories. Dependency networks encode information about how features in a conceptual representation depend on each other. This information determines the degree of centrality of a feature for a conceptual representation. Importantly, centrally encoded biases systematically disassociate from those encoded in salient-statistical associations. Furthermore, the degree of centrality of a feature determines its cross-contextual stability: in general, the more central a feature is for a concept, the more likely it is to survive into a wide array of cognitive tasks involving that concept. Accordingly, implicit biases that are encoded in the central features of concepts are predicted to be more resilient across different tasks and contexts. As a result, the distinction between centrally encoded and salient-statistical biases has important theoretical and practical implications.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/ENOHAB"> <title> Enoch, David & Schechter, Joshua : How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/ENOHAB</link> <description> _Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_ 76 (3):547–579. 2008 In this paper, we develop an account of the justification thinkers have for employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing any belief-forming method such that "if it doesn't work, nothing will" for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological issues and debates.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=ENOHAB&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.interscience.wiley.com%2Fjournal%2F119395222%2Fabstract">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/ZHAMIA-4"> <title> Zhang, Xiao : Motivational Internalism and The Second-Order Desire Explanation</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/ZHAMIA-4</link> <description> _European Journal of Analytic Philosophy_ 17 (1). 2021 Both motivational internalism and externalism need to explain why sometimes moral judgments tend to motivate us. In this paper, I argue that Dreier’ second-order desire model cannot be a plausible externalist alternative to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation. I explain that the relevant second-order desire is merely a constitutive requirement of rationality because that desire makes a set of desires more unified and coherent. As a rational agent with the relevant second-order desire is disposed towards coherence, she will have some motivation to act in accordance with her moral judgments. Dreier’s second-order desire model thus collapses into a form of internalism and cannot be a plausible externalist option to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=ZHAMIA-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoaj.org%2Farticle%2Fe6410cb6056a4a9cb0fd2eb0ffba7876">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/SHEHOC"> <title> Shea, Brendan : House of Cards as Philosophy: Democracy on Trial</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/SHEHOC</link> <description> In _Palgrave Handbook of Popular Culture as Philosophy_. Springer. 2021 Over the course of its six seasons, the Netflix show the House of Cards (HOC) details the rise to power of Claire and Frank Underwood in a fictional United States. They achieve power not by winning free and fair elections, but by exploiting various weaknesses of the U.S. political system. Could such a thing happen to our own democracies? This chapter argues that it is a threat that should be taken seriously, as the structure of HOC’s democratic institutions closely mirrors our own, and the flaws that the Underwoods exploit are precisely those that have allowed autocrats to capture democracies “from the inside.” Of even greater concern, these flaws may flow from the nature of democracy itself. This possibility is explored by considering the events of the HOC in the light of the anti-democratic arguments of Plato and Hobbes. The chapter concludes by briefly considering responses to these arguments.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/RICFIA"> <title> Richardson, Alan : Freedom in a Scientific Society: Reading the Context of Reichenbach's Contexts</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/RICFIA</link> <description> In Jutta Schickore & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), _Revisiting Discovery and Justification_. Springer. pp. 41--54. 2006 The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification, this distinction dear to the projects of logical empiricism, was, as is well known, introduced in precisely those terms by Hans Reichenbach in his Experience and Prediction (Reichenbach 1938). Thus, while the idea behind the distinction has a long history before Reichenbach, this text from 1938 plays a salient role in how the distinction became canonical in the work of philosophers of science in the mid twentieth century. The new contextualist history of philosophy that has arisen in recent years invites us into an investigation of the nuances of philosophical distinctions and their roles in shaping the development of disciplines. Logical empiricism played a key role in the historical development of philosophy of science and this contextualist history has revealed a much richer set of projects in logical empiricism than the potted histories had allowed. Many stories have been told about the contexts of justification and discovery; few of those stories have paid more than passing attention to the larger projects in epistemology and meta-epistemology that Reichenbach was pursuing when he drew the distinction. This brief essay will seek partially to rectify that lack in, I hope, a somewhat surprising way. I shall stress the connection between this canonical distinction and some other epistemological and social terms that loom large in Reichenbach’s text, arguing that the social relevance of scientific philosophy for Reichenbach cannot be set aside in understanding his use of the DJ distinction. My point is, therefore, historical and reflexive. If we attend to the larger significance of the project in scientific philosophy that Reichenbach was advancing, we can see more clearly why the DJ distinction was introduced and rethink the significance of questioning the distinction.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=RICFIA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Fchapter%2F10.1007%2F1-4020-4251-5_4">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/STE_HI-15"> <title> Stetter, Jack : _Un homme ivre d'immanence_: Deleuze's Spinoza and Immanence</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/STE_HI-15</link> <description> _Crisis and Critique_ 8 (1). 2021 Although Deleuze’s work on Spinoza is widely known, it remains poorly understood. In particular, Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s immanentism has not been treated sufficient care; that is, with an eye to the context of its elaboration and the way in which it gradually takes on different characteristics. With this paper, I offer a synoptic analysis of Deleuze’s views on immanence in Spinoza and examine how these change over the course of Deleuze’s career. There are three ascending stages here: a first one, where Deleuze’s attention is drawn to more recognizable issues in understanding Spinoza’s views on the deep metaphysical structure of reality; a second, more experimental one, where Deleuze questions what it means to be a reader of Spinoza in light of Spinoza’s theory of the body and affects; and a third, particularly iconoclastic stage, where Deleuze develops the theory of “the plane of immanence” as a way of articulating a meta-philosophical story about the place of non-philosophy at the heart of all philosophy. I trace each of these accounts, tie them together to tell a coherent and comprehensive narrative, and show what may be learned from this Spinoza that Deleuze portrays as drunk on immanence.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=STE_HI-15&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.crisiscritique.org%2F">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/VAZFHT"> <title> Vazard, Juliette : From Habits to Compulsions: Losing Control?</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/VAZFHT</link> <description> _Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology_ 28 (2):163-171. 2021 In recent years, there has been a trend in psychiatry to try and explain disorders of action in terms of an over-reliance on the habitual mode of action. In particular, it has been hypothesized that compulsions in obsessive-compulsive disorder are driven by maladaptive habits. In this paper, I argue that this view of obsessive-compulsive disorder does not fit the phenomenology of the disorder in many patients and that a more refined conceptualization of habit is likely to be helpful in clarifying the distinctions between disorders of action. There are thus two aims to this paper. The first is to highlight the issues pertaining to the view that compulsions are the result of an over-reliance on the habitual mode of action, leading to a loss of agentive control. The second aim is to examine the view of agentive control implicit in those accounts and see how other conceptions of agentive control might do a better job at accounting for the distinct ways in which persons suffering from pathologies of action may be said to lack control.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=VAZFHT&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fmuse.jhu.edu%2Farticle%2F794994%2Fpdf%3Fcasa_token%3D3UVspnNvCswAAAAA%3AqcH-FWEK_2QepR7MwaeCxyY0yFQepsOuRVGrRBC7KH_-ofdEzLST-oDNXGWEcAV_jh-SH8yLUyg">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/LYONAO"> <title> Lyons, Michael & Harrison, Lionel G. : Non-linear Analysis of Models for Biological Pattern Formation: Application to Ocular Dominance Stripes</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/LYONAO</link> <description> In Frank H. Eeckman (ed.), _Neural Systems: Analysis and Modeling_. New York, USA: Springer. pp. 39-46. 1993 We present a technique for the analysis of pattern formation by a class of models for the formation of ocular dominance stripes in the striate cortex of some mammals. The method, which employs the adiabatic approximation to derive a set of ordinary differential equations for patterning modes, has been successfully applied to reaction-diffusion models for striped patterns [1]. Models of ocular dominance stripes have been studied [2,3] by computation, or by linearization of the model equations. These techniques do not provide a rationale for the origin of the stripes. We show here that stripe formation is a non-linear property of the models. Our analysis indicates that stripe selection is closely linked to a property in the dynamics of the models which arises from a symmetry between ipsilateral and contralateral synapses to the visual cortex of a given hemisphere. <div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=LYONAO&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2F978-1-4615-3560-7_3">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/MELSAS-4"> <title> Melamed, Yitzhak : Spinoza and Some of His Medieval Predecessors on the Summum Bonum</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/MELSAS-4</link> <description> In Yehuda Halper (ed.), _The Pursuit of Happiness in Medieval Jewish and Islamic Thought_. pp. 377-392. 2021 In the current paper I rely on two outstanding studies. The one, by Warren Zev Harvey, draws a portrait of Spinoza as Maimonidean, stressing the continuity between Maimonides and Spinoza on the issue of morality and the highest good. The other is the magisterial study by Steven Shmuel Harvey of the reception of the Nicomachean Ethics in medieval Jewish philosophy, from its being subject to almost complete indifference in the period before Maimonides until it became “the best known and most cited work of Aristotle” in sixteenth-century Jewish philosophy. In the first part of this paper I will discuss some main junctions in the medieval Jewish reception of the notion of the highest good. This discussion will be cursory and will mostly focus on matters that will help us approach Spinoza’s views on the issue, views which will be examined closely in the second part of the paper.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/WESPA-4"> <title> Westfall, Mason : Perceiving Agency</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/WESPA-4</link> <description> _Mind and Language_. forthcoming When we look around the world, some things are inert and others are ‘alive’. What is it to ‘look alive’? An account of animacy perception is crucial, both for a proper understanding of visual experience, and for downstream questions about the epistemology of social cognition. I argue that empirical work on animacy supports the view that animacy is genuinely perceptual. We should construe perception of animacy as perception of agents and perception of behavior. My proposal explains how static and dynamic animacy cues relate, and offers a plausible account of how animacy perception relates to social cognition more broadly. Animacy perception draws perceptual attention to objects that are apt to be well-understood folk psychologically, and in doing so enables us to marshal our folk psychological resources efficiently.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/SILAFA-4"> <title> Silvestre, Ricardo : A Formal-Logical Approach to the Concept of God</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/SILAFA-4</link> <description>In this paper I try to answer four basic questions: (1) How the concept of God is to be represented? (2) Are there any logical principles governing it? (3) If so, what kind of logic lies behind them? (4) Can there be a logic of the concept of God? I address them by presenting a formal-logical account to the concept of God. I take it as a methodological desideratum that this should be done within the simplest existing logical formalism. I start with first-order logic (FOL) with identity, and then show that its simplest modal extension (SQML, or the simplest quantified modal logic) is enough for us to formalize a minimally satisfactory theory of the concept of God. I focus exclusively on the monotheistic concept of God.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/JENATA-3"> <title> Jennings, Carolyn Dicey & Tabatabaeian, Shadab : Attention, Technology, and Creativity</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/JENATA-3</link> <description>An important topic in the ethics of technology is the extent to which recent digital technologies undermine user autonomy. Supporting evidence includes the fact that recent digital technologies are known to have an impact on attention, which balances "bottom-up" and "top-down" influences on cognition. As described in numerous papers, these technologies manipulate bottom-up influences through cognitive fluency, intermittent variable rewards, and other techniques, making them more attractive to the user. We further reason that recent digital technologies reduce the user’s ability to exert top-down attention due to the scale of the content—they provide far more content at a much faster pace than other technologies, which over time reweights the balance of attention in favor of bottom-up influences. After reviewing evidence for these effects, including their temporal duration, we consider their downstream effects on both autonomy and creativity. We find that while the impact of recent digital technologies on top-down attention may allow for more idea generation, that creativity also depends on control, which is undermined by these technologies. We are more circumspect with autonomy, reasoning that in certain cases it might not make sense to see user autonomy as harmed through these effects. We conclude with other ways that recent digital technologies may improve creativity, which may act as an offset to the detrimental impacts of these technologies. (Part of the essay collection from the 2021 HOS Workshop in the History of Science at Princeton on the theme of Attention, to be published in 2022)</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/PITWAT-2"> <title> Pittard, John : Worship and the Problem of Divine Achievement</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/PITWAT-2</link> <description> _Faith and Philosophy_ 38 (1):65-90. 2021 Gwen Bradford has plausibly argued that one attains achievement only if one does something one finds difficult. It is also plausible that one must attain achievement to be worthy of “agential” praise, praise that is appropriately directed to someone on the basis of things that redound to their credit. These claims pose a challenge to classical theists who direct agential praise to God, since classical theism arguably entails that none of God’s actions are difficult for God. I consider responses to this challenge and commend a view accord- ing to which God’s loving character is not necessitated by God’s nature but is a contingent and difficult achievement. I argue that this view can still satisfy the explanatory ambitions of natural theology.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=PITWAT-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fplace.asburyseminary.edu%2Ffaithandphilosophy%2Fvol38%2Fiss1%2F5%2F">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/JOSWIO-2"> <title> Joshi, Hrishikesh : Why It's OK to Speak Your Mind</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/JOSWIO-2</link> <description><div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=JOSWIO-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.routledge.com%2FWhy-Its-OK-to-Speak-Your-Mind%2FJoshi%2Fp%2Fbook%2F9780367141721">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/TILDDM"> <title> Tillmanns, Maria daVenza : Does Developing Moral Thinking Skills lead to Moral Action? Developing Moral Proprioception</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/TILDDM</link> <description> _International Journal of Philosophical Practice_. 2021 This paper explores the relationship between thinking and acting morally. Can we transfer critical thinking skills to real life situations? Philosophical practice with clients as well as with school children creates a context for not only being a critical and reflective thinker but also a self -critical thinker and self -reflective thinker. In his book On Dialogue, David Bohm explores the notion of proprioception of thinking; focusing on thinking as a movement. The tacit, concrete process of thinking informs our actions in a way that rational thinking by itself cannot. We can try to impose rational thinking on our tacit, concrete process of thinking but knowing how to be just abstractly, for example, does not necessarily make us act justly in the moment. Philosophical practice puts us in touch with our own tacit, concrete process of thinking. Through dialogue (Bohm, Buber) we become more than skilled rational thinkers ; we become skilled thinking beings.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/GALCD_-5"> <title> Gallow, J. Dmitri : Chance Deference _De Se_</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/GALCD_-5</link> <description>Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you've lost track of the time. I provide a generalisation of these principles which handles these problem cases. The generalisation has surprising consequences for Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty puzzle.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/FEREAA-11"> <title> Fernandez, Jose Luis : Evil as a Modal Mismatch: On Hegel’s Distinction Between What Is and What Ought to Be</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/FEREAA-11</link> <description> _Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy_ 17 (1):599-616. 2021 G.W.F. Hegel argues that a philosophy of history should engender comprehension of evil in the world. And yet some commentators have charged his philosophy with transcending mere explication by justifying the existence of these evils. In defense of his words, Hegel famously characterizes evil as a modal mismatch; namely, as the incompatibility between what is given and what ought to be the case. Unfortunately, some readers of Hegel’s grand narrative either continue to struggle with or overlook this fine distinction. Against such readings, I organize my paper into three sections that speak directly to these concerns. In §1, against the concern that Hegel’s view of the “actual world” justifies suffering, it is shown that his philosophy does not endorse the merely extant world, which is a whole world apart from the actual world. In §2, I articulate the premises of Hegel’s Doppelsatz to argue that the famous slogan is not, as some commentators take it, an endorsement of “things as they are.” And in §3, I expose a category error that mistakes an epistemological claim made by Hegel about contingency as a metaphysical assertion in support of evil. Ultimately, I argue that Hegel views evil as neither actual nor necessary nor justified.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FEREAA-11&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cosmosandhistory.org%2Findex.php%2Fjournal%2Farticle%2Fview%2F900%2F1579">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/NGUPVL"> <title> Nguyen, Hong Kong To ; Ho, Manh-Tung & Vuong, Quan-Hoang : Probing Vietnam’s Legal Prospects in the South China Sea Dispute</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/NGUPVL</link> <description> _Asia Policy_ 16 (3):105-132. 2021 Although most Asian states are signatories to UNCLOS, which offers options for dispute resolution by either voluntary or compulsory processes, in reality fewer than a dozen Asian states have taken advantage of such an approach. The decision to adopt third-party mechanisms comes under great scrutiny and deliberation, not least because of the entailing legal procedures and the politically sensitive nature of disputes. Vietnam claims the second-largest maritime area in the South China Sea dispute after China. A comparison of two recent cases—the arbitration between the Philippines and China and the conciliation between Timor-Leste and Australia—highlights the importance of selecting between binding and nonbinding decisions and framing a complaint. In particular, any legal action under UNCLOS should specify China’s claims and actions in areas that encroach on Vietnam’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and violate international law.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/BIRATP"> <title> Birch, Jonathan : Applying the Precautionary Principle to Pandemics</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/BIRATP</link> <description>When faced with an urgent and credible threat of grave harm, we should take proportionate precautions. This maxim captures the core commitments of the “precautionary principle”. But what is it for a precaution to be “proportionate”? I construct an account of proportionality (the “ARCANE” account) that consists of five fundamental conditions (absolute rights compatibility, reasonable compensation, consistency, adequacy and non- excessiveness) and a tie-breaker (efficiency). I apply this account to two examples from the COVID-19 pandemic (border closures and school closures), arguing that my account captures the key questions on which it is both feasible and important to integrate expert input with democratic input. I close by considering how we might try to manage the risk of future pandemics in a proportionate way.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/ROBMAA-7"> <title> Roberts, Tom & Krueger, Joel : Musical agency and collaboration in the digital age</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/ROBMAA-7</link> <description> In Kath Bicknell & John Sutton (eds.), _Collaborative Embodied Performance: Ecologies of Skill_. forthcoming </description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/REGMBD"> <title> Reglitz, Merten : Medical Brain Drain: Free-Riding, Exploitation, and Global Justice</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/REGMBD</link> <description> _Moral Philosophy and Politics_ 3 (1): 67-81. 2016 In her debate with Michael Blake, Gillian Brock sets out to justify emigration restrictions on medical workers from poor states on the basis of their free-riding on the public investment that their states have made in them in form of a publicly funded education. For this purpose, Brock aims to isolate the question of emigration restrictions from the larger question of responsibilities for remedying global inequalities. I argue that this approach is misguided because it is blind to decisive factors at play in the problem of medical brain drain and consequently distorts the different responsibilities this problem generates. Brock’s strategy, if successful, would effectively lead to punishing emigrating workers from poor states for the free-riding and exploitation that is committed by affluent states – which is a counter-intuitive result.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/ADATNA-3"> <title> Adams, George P. : The Nature and Validity of the Causal Principle</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/ADATNA-3</link> <description> _University of California Publications in Philosophy_ 15:207-31. 1932 </description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/BROAEC-2"> <title> Brown, Joshua Matthan : An epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/BROAEC-2</link> <description> _International Journal for Philosophy of Religion_:1-19. forthcoming It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literature. In this article, I grant for the sake of argument that every version of PSR is false. Thus, I concede with the critics of PSR, that it is possible that there is, at least, one fact that is ontologically brute. I then proffer an epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Specifically, I argue that whenever a knowledge seeker, S, perceives some unexplained fact, F, it is never reasonable for S to believe F is ontologically brute. I conclude that, even if PSR is false, it is more reasonable to believe that the key premise in the first stage of classical arguments for theism is true.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=BROAEC-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11153-021-09805-y">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/SMIPAE-4"> <title> Smith, Barry : Preface: Austrian economics from Menger to Hayek</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/SMIPAE-4</link> <description> In Wolfgang Grassl & Barry Smith (eds.), _Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background_. Croom Helm, Reprinted: Routledge Revivals 2010. 1986 </description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/KHADOP-2"> <title> Khani, Ali Hossein : Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/KHADOP-2</link> <description> _Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review_. forthcoming I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=KHADOP-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1017%2FS0012217321000214">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/SIFARN"> <title> Sifferd, Katrina L. & Fagan, Tyler K. : Author’s Reply: Negligence and Normative Import</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/SIFARN</link> <description> _Criminal Law and Philosophy_ 22 (August):1-19. 2022 In this paper we attempt to reply to the thoughtful comments made on our book, Responsible Brains, by a stellar group of scholars. Our reply focuses on two topics discussed in the commenting papers: frst, the issue of responsibility for negligent behavior; and second, the broad claim that facts about brain function are normatively inert. In response to worries that our theory lacks normative implications, we will concentrate on an area where our theory has clear relevance to law and legal policy: juvenile responsibility.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SIFARN&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%252Fs11572-021-09602-8">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHWDC-2"> <title> Schwan, Ben : Why Decision-making Capacity Matters</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHWDC-2</link> <description> _Journal of Moral Philosophy_. forthcoming Decision-making Capacity (DMC) matters to whether a patient’s decision should determine her treatment. But why it matters in this way isn’t clear. The standard story is that DMC matters because autonomy matters. And this is thought to justify DMC as a gatekeeper for autonomy—whereby autonomy concerns arise if but only if a patient has DMC. But appeals to autonomy invoke two distinct concerns: concern for authenticity—concern that a choice is consistent with an individual’s commitments; and concern for sovereignty—concern that an individual exercises control over that which is hers to control. Here, I argue, neither concern can alone explain why DMC matters. Instead, DMC matters because it indicates a harmony between the two concerns—the demands of each concern are more likely to agree if a patient has DMC. This vindicates the standard story, but also makes clear that DMC is an inappropriate gatekeeper for autonomy.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SCHWDC-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1163%2F17455243-20213610">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/THOTAT-17"> <title> Thorstad, David : The accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/THOTAT-17</link> <description> _British Journal for Philosophy of Science_. forthcoming I argue that bounded agents face a systematic accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition. Agents must choose whether to structure their cognition in ways likely to promote coherence or accuracy. I illustrate the accuracy-coherence tradeoff by showing how it arises out of at least two component tradeoffs: a coherence-complexity tradeoff between coherence and cognitive complexity, and a coherence-variety tradeoff between coherence and strategic variety. These tradeoffs give rise to an accuracy-coherence tradeoff because privileging coherence over complexity or strategic variety often leads to a corresponding reduction in accuracy. I conclude with a discussion of two normative consequences for the study of bounded rationality: the importance of procedural rationality and the role of coherence in theories of bounded rationality.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=THOTAT-17&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.journals.uchicago.edu%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1086%2F716518">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/WUIMR"> <title> Wu, Yun & Afrouzi, Amin Ebrahimi : Is Mohism really li-promotionalism?</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/WUIMR</link> <description> _Asian Philosophy_:1-11. forthcoming A longstanding orthodoxy holds that the Mohists regard the promotion of li (benefit, 利) as their ultimate normative criterion, meaning that they measure what is yi (just, 義) or buyi (unjust, 不義) depending on whether it maximizes li or not. This orthodoxy dates back at least to Joseph Edkins (1859), who saw Mozi as a utilitarian and an ally of Bentham. In this paper, we will argue that this orthodoxy should be reconsidered because it does not square with several passages from the Mozi. That the Mohists place a strong weight on the promotion of ‘li for the whole world (tianxia zhi li, 天下之利)’ is uncontroversial. We argue, however, that in certain cases the Mohist moral calculus diverges in its rationale or outcome from li-promotionalism. This position rejects the orthodoxy by showing that Mohism and li-promotionalism are not entirely coterminous.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=WUIMR&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Ffull%2F10.1080%2F09552367.2021.1960677%3Fai%3D26j%26mi%3D5vokgg%26af%3DR">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/CRABAQ"> <title> Crawford, Sean : Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/CRABAQ</link> <description> _Journal of Transcendental Philosophy_. forthcoming In Making it Explicit Robert Brandom claims that perspectivally hybrid de re attitude ascriptions explain what an agent actually did, from the point of view of the ascriber, whether or not that was what the agent intended to do. There is a well-known problem, however, first brought to attention by Quine, but curiously ignored by Brandom, that threatens to undermine the role of de re ascriptions in the explanation of action, a problem that stems directly from the fact that, unlike de dicto ascriptions, they permit the attribution of inconsistent attitudes to agents. I propose a solution to the problem which I believe is consistent with Brandom’s approach to the nature of intentionality and the explanation of action.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=CRABAQ&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.degruyter.com%2Fdocument%2Fdoi%2F10.1515%2Fjtph-2020-0004%2Fhtml">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/MORPCA-7"> <title> Morioka, Masahiro : Painless Civilization 1</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/MORPCA-7</link> <description>This is the English translation of Chapter One of Mutsu Bunmei Ron, which was published in Japanese in 2003. Since this book’s publication I have received many requests for an English translation from people around the world. I decided to begin by publishing this first chapter under the title Painless Civilization 1 and make it available to readers who have a keen interest in this topic. * The original text of this chapter was written in 1998, more than twenty years ago, but I believe what I argued there is becoming increasingly important today. Painless civilization is a pathology of contemporary society. We will be pulled much deeper into a painless stream in the future. What is needed is the wisdom to see through the fundamental structure of our painless civilization and its relationship with the meaning of life. ** Modern society seems on the verge of being swallowed up by the pathology of “painless civilization.” I have written this book for people who, in the midst of anxiety studded with pleasure, joyless repetition, and a maze from which they cannot escape no matter how far they walk, nevertheless retain in some corner of their hearts a desire to live life fully and without regrets. * When we feel a vague anxiety, like being bound in gossamer cords, in the midst of modern society, we are perhaps intuitively sensing the existence of “painless civilization.” This book is an attempt to give words to this feeling that the reader has, I am sure, already experienced at least once in their life.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=MORPCA-7&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lifestudies.org%2Fpainless00.html">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/STROAC-2"> <title> Strohmaier, David : Organisations as Computing Systems</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/STROAC-2</link> <description> _Journal of Social Ontology_ 6 (2):211-236. 2021 Organisations are computing systems. The university’s sports centre is a computing system for managing sports teams and facilities. The tenure committee is a computing system for assigning tenure status. Despite an increasing number of publications in group ontology, the computational nature of organisations has not been recognised. The present paper is the first in this debate to propose a theory of organisations as groups structured for computing. I begin by describing the current situation in group ontology and by spelling out the thesis in more detail. I then present the example of a sports centre to illustrate why one might intuitively think of organisations as computing systems. To substantiate the thesis, I introduce Piccinini’s restrictive analysis of physical computation. As I show, organisations meet all criteria for being computing systems. Organisations are structured groups with the function of manipulating medium-independent vehicles according to rules. Furthermore, I argue for the modal claim that this is a necessary feature of organisations. Having sketched the computational account of organisations, I compare it to other proposals in the literature.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=STROAC-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoaj.org%2Farticle%2Fd876ea4c6b5c4d99b26c793d6c638fd5">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/LINADO-7"> <title> Lin, Kent : A Discourse on the Problem of Consciousness from the Viewpoint of Oriental Philosophy</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/LINADO-7</link> <description> _Asian Philosophy_ 21. 2011 This paper discusses the possible inspirations that might be derived from the viewpoints of Eastern Philosophy in contemporary studies of consciousness. First of all, two notions of consciousness are introduced, one of which can be explained by science. The other however cannot, and as such is also called the ‘Hard Problem’. Secondly, the special features shared by morality and the ‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’ are discussed. Thirdly, I discuss the conventional routes Oriental philosophy takes toward an exploration of the human mind, and consequently point out that Oriental philosophy views consciousness as the fundamental feature of moral beings. One of the reasons that human beings can pursue meaningful life is because of the necessary existence of conscious experience. It is our conscious experience that makes a life of value possible. Therefore, in Oriental philosophy matters of consciousness revolve around aspects of morality and spirituality, and the training of the abilities of consciousness is emphasized over knowledge. Finally, this paper concludes with a comparison of the different approaches Oriental philosophy and current Western academics take in their study of consciousness. Hopefully, one day consciousness can be fully explored from more diverse viewpoints to gain a more comprehensive understanding and so further the happiness of humanity.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=LINADO-7&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1080%2F09552367.2011.597928">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/CARAST-4"> <title> Carter, Sam : A Suppositional Theory of Conditionals</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/CARAST-4</link> <description> _Mind_:fzaa071. forthcoming Suppositional theories of conditionals take apparent similarities between supposition and conditionals as a starting point, appealing to features of the former to provide an account of the latter. This paper develops a novel form of suppositional theory, one which characterizes the relationship at the level of semantics rather than at the level of speech acts. In the course of doing so, it considers a range of novel data which shed additional light on how conditionals and supposition interact.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=CARAST-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fmind%2Fadvance-article%2Fdoi%2F10.1093%2Fmind%2Ffzaa071%2F6322927%3Frss%3D1">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/FEROOV"> <title> Ferro, Floriana : Object-Oriented Ontology’s View of Relations: a Phenomenological Critique</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/FEROOV</link> <description> _Open Philosophy_ 2 (1):566-581. 2019 This paper is focused on the possibility of a dialogue between Object-Oriented Ontology and phenomenology, a dialogue concerning the problem of objects and relations. In the first part, the author shows what is interesting in OOO from a phenomenological perspective and why it should be considered as a challenge for contemporary philosophy. The second part develops the phenomenological perspective of the author, a perspective based on Merleau-Ponty’s “carnal” phenomenology, as well as some suggestions coming from the Italian school of Gaetano Kanizsa. The third part is dedicated to the objections of the author to the OOO view regarding the separation between objects and relations: a separation which leads to Harman’s quadruple object. In the concluding portion, the author shows that, despite evident differences between phenomenological and OOO’s views of relations, OOO offers new starting points for phenomenological reflections, thanks to its specific focus on objects and its pluralistic view of reality.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FEROOV&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.degruyter.com%2Fview%2Fj%2Fopphil.2019.2.issue-1%2Fopphil-2019-0040%2Fopphil-2019-0040.xml">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/SIMMOW-2"> <title> Sims, Matthew : Modelling ourselves: what the debate on the Free Energy Principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/SIMMOW-2</link> <description> _Synthese_ 1 (1):30. 2021 Predictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a nor- mative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., repre- sentational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpre- tations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to dis- tinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, struc- tural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that tradition- ally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demon- strates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what represen- tations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SIMMOW-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11229-021-03140-5">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/FRUSW"> <title> Frugé, Christopher : Structuring Wellbeing</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/FRUSW</link> <description> _Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_. forthcoming Many questions about wellbeing involve metaphysical dependence. Does wellbeing depend on minds? Is wellbeing determined by distinct sorts of things? Is it determined differently for different subjects? However, we should distinguish two axes of dependence. First, there are the grounds that generate value. Second, there are the connections between the grounds and value which make it so that those grounds generate that value. Given these distinct axes of dependence, there are distinct dimensions to questions about the dependence of wellbeing. In this paper, I offer a view of wellbeing that gives different answers with respect to these different dimensions. The view is subjectivist about connections but objectivist about grounds. Pluralist about grounds but monist about connections. Invariabilist about connections but variabilist about grounds. Thus, the view offers a simple account that captures the complexity of wellbeing.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FRUSW&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fdoi%2F10.1111%2Fphpr.12830%2Fabstract">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/RANKPA-2"> <title> Rankin, Kenneth : Karl Pfeifer, Actions and Other Events: The Unifier-Multiplier Controversy Reviewed by</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/RANKPA-2</link> <description> _Philosophy in Review_ 12 (2):133-135. 1992 </description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/ARBSVS"> <title> Arbib, Michael A. : Schemas versus symbols: A vision from the 90s</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/ARBSVS</link> <description> _Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems_ 2 (1):68-74. 2021 Thirty years ago, I elaborated on a position that could be seen as a compromise between an "extreme," symbol-based AI, and a "neurochemical reductionism" in AI. The present article recalls aspects of the espoused framework of schema theory that, it suggested, could provide a better bridge from human psychology to brain theory than that offered by the symbol systems of A. Newell and H. A. Simon.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/PALTPP-3"> <title> Pallies, Daniel : The Pleasure Problem and the Spriggean Solution</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/PALTPP-3</link> <description> _Journal of the American Philosophical Association_. forthcoming Some experiences—like the experience of drinking a cool sip of water on a hot day—are good experiences to have. But when we try to explain why they are good, we encounter a clash of intuitions. First, we have an objectivist intuition: plausibly, the experience is non-derivatively good for me just because it feels the way that it does. It ‘feels good’. Thus, any experience of the same kind would be good for the person who has it. That experience would also ‘feel good’. Second, we have a subjectivist intuition: if a person were indifferent to that kind of experience, then it might fail to be good for that person. Third, we have a possibility intuition: for any kind of experience, possibly there is a subject who is indifferent to that kind of experience. The Pleasure Problem is the problem we face in reconciling these three claims. I explain the problem and I argue for a solution. I argue that we ought to reject the most common solutions: rejecting the objectivist or subjectivist intuitions. Instead we ought to follow Timothy Sprigge in rejecting the possibility claim. We should embrace the view that experiences bear necessary connections to our attitudes.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/LEFART"> <title> Leffler, Olof : A Reason to Know</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/LEFART</link> <description> _Journal of Value Inquiry_:1-19. 2021 It is often thought that desire-based versions of reasons internalism, according to which our practical reasons depend on what we desire, are committed to denying that we have any categorical reasons. I shall argue, however, that such theories are committed to a universal desire which gives rise to an unexpected categorical reason – a reason to know our surroundings. I will arrive at this conclusion by using Fichte’s argument for thinking that security from unpredictable and powerful forces of nature is constitutive of agency. Fichte thinks this is the case because we ought to aim at knowledge of our surroundings, and such environments uniquely facilitate it. I show that his argument fails, but the point that we ought to aim at – or desire – such knowledge is fundamentally sound. This aim can then be leveraged to generate a categorical reason when embedded in an account of agency typically embraced by internalists.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=LEFART&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%2Fs10790-021-09843-9%3Fwt_mc%3DInternal.Event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst%26utm_source%3DArticleAuthorOnlineFirst%26utm_medium%3Demail%26utm_content%3DAA_en_06082018%26ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst_20210807">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/KERTRC"> <title> Kershnar, Stephen & Kelly, Robert : The Right-Based Criticism of the Doctrine of Double Effect</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/KERTRC</link> <description> _International Journal of Applied Philosophy_ 34 (2):215-233. 2020 If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent or a promotion of the common good). The weak version asserts that, other things being equal, it is deontically worse to intentionally infringe a norm than to foreseeably do so. A person’s intention or mere foresight might still be relevant to his or her blameworthiness or virtue, but this is a separate issue.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=KERTRC&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pdcnet.org%2Fijap%2Fcontent%2Fijap_2021_0999_3_31_150">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/MALEAR-4"> <title> Malmqvist, Erik & Szigeti, András : Exploitation and Remedial Duties</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/MALEAR-4</link> <description> _Journal of Applied Philosophy_ 38 (1):55-72. 2021 The concept of exploitation and potentially exploitative real-world practices are the subject of increasing philosophical attention. However, while philosophers have extensively debated what exploitation is and what makes it wrong, they have said surprisingly little about what might be required to remediate it. By asking how the consequences of exploitation should be addressed, this article seeks to contribute to filling this gap. We raise two questions. First, what are the victims of exploitation owed by way of remediation? Second, who ought to remediate? Our answers to these questions are connected by the idea that exploitation cannot be fully remediated by redistributing the exploiter's gain in order to repair or compensate the victim's loss. This is because exploitation causes not only distributive but also relational harm. Therefore, redistributive measures are necessary but not sufficient for adequate remediation. Moreover, this relational focus highlights the fact that exploitative real-world practices commonly involve agents other than the exploiter who stand to benefit from the exploitation. Insofar as these third parties are implicated in the distributive and relational harms caused by exploitation, there is, we argue, good reason to assign part of the burden of remediation to them.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=MALEAR-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fjapp.12407%3Faf%3DR">direct link</a>)</div></description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/RIEFAT-3"> <title> Riedener, Stefan : Forgiveness and the Significance of Wrongs</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/RIEFAT-3</link> <description> _Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy_. forthcoming According to the standard account of forgiveness, you forgive your wrongdoer by overcoming your resentment towards them. But how exactly must you overcome your resentment, and when is it fitting to do so? I introduce a novel version of the standard account to answer these questions. The negative reactive attitudes are a fitting response not just to someone’s blameworthiness, but to their blameworthiness being significant for you, or worthy of your caring. Someone’s blameworthiness is significant for you to the extent you’re bound up with what grounds it—e.g. with the wrongdoer’s being a participant in human relationships, or the victim’s being a source of demands. So you may fittingly not care about someone’s blameworthiness if it’s sufficiently insignificant for you—e.g. if they lived in a distant time and place. And forgiveness revolves around this. You (fittingly) forgive your wrongdoer if and only if, partly out of goodwill towards them, you (fittingly) don’t care about their blameworthiness anymore—a bit as if their fault had happened far off. This account resolves the apparent ‘paradoxy of forgiveness’ (Kolnai 1973), and satisfies a number of desiderata.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/LICDA-4"> <title> Li, Chenyang & Xiao, Hong : Chinese Diaspora as People of Their Own Countries and Chinese Philosophy as World Philosophy</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/LICDA-4</link> <description> _Chinese Studies 漢学研究_ 2:63-84. 2013 In this essay, we will follow Tang Junyi’s lead in exploring issues related to Chinese diaspora and Chinese philosophy. While we largely endorse Tang’s call for overseas Chinese to establish themselves in their adopted lands, we will argue for a more nuanced view on the identity of Chinese people outside China: they are not marginalized individuals scattered out of “homeland” China, rather they are people legitimately established in their own respective countries. In this connection, we will also advance a view of future Chinese philosophy as a world philosophy that takes roots in China as well as in the world at large. In our view, although Chinese immigrant thinkers in the past century have played a major role in promoting Chinese philosophy outside China, the importance of such a role is likely to decline along with the success of Chinese philosophy becoming a world philosophy. </description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> <item rdf:about="https://philarchive.org/rec/LICMA-2"> <title> Li, Chenyang & Perkins, Franklin : Chinese Metaphysics as a Fruitful Subject of Study</title> <link>https://philarchive.org/rec/LICMA-2</link> <description> _Journal of East-West Thought_ 4 (4):71-86. 2014 The study of Chinese philosophy in the English-speaking world has largely focused on ethical and political theories. In comparison, Chinese metaphysics—here understood primarily as theories regarding the nature, components, and operating principles of reality—has been far less researched and recognized. In this essay, we examine various meanings of “metaphysics” as it has been used in denoting a branch of philosophy and make the case that metaphysics is an important part of Chinese philosophy. We argue for the need to study Chinese metaphysics as a serious field of scholarship. We also present some most recent studies of Chinese metaphysics by leading scholars of Chinese philosophy who publish in the English-speaking world. This essay aims to show that not only that Chinese metaphysics is an appropriate and legitimate subject of scholarly research but it can also be a fruitful subfield of in the study in Chinese philosophy.</description> <taxo:topics> <rdf:Bag> </rdf:Bag> </taxo:topics> </item> </rdf:RDF>