{"title":"CEO Duality and Firm Performance: An Integration of Institutional Perceptive with Agency Theory","authors":"A. Ujunwa, P. O. Salami, A. H. Umar","volume":73,"journal":"International Journal of Economics and Management Engineering","pagesStart":180,"pagesEnd":187,"ISSN":"1307-6892","URL":"https:\/\/publications.waset.org\/pdf\/12557","abstract":"The recommendation of the committee on corporate\ngovernance for public companies in Nigeria, that the position of the\nCEO be separated from board chair has generated serious debate\namong scholars and practitioners. They have questioned the\nappropriateness of implementing corporate governance model that is\nbased on Anglo-Saxon agency problem characterized by dispersed\nownership structure; where markets for corporate control, legal\nregulation, and contractual incentives are the key governance\nmechanisms. This paper strives to resolve the argument by adopting\nan institutional perspective in testing the agency theory on board\nduality. The study developed a theoretical and empirical model to\nbetter understand how ownership structure influences agency conflict\nand how such affects firm performance. Hence, the study examines\nthe relationship between CEO duality and firm performance using\ntwo institutional ownership structures \u2013 dispersed ownership and\nconcentrated ownership structures. The empirical results show that\nCEO duality is negatively correlated with firm performance in\nNigeria irrespective of the firm-s ownership structure. The findings\ngive credence to the recommendation of the Peterside Commission\non the need to separate the position of CEO from board chair.","references":"[1] Canadian Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Corporate\nGovernance Principles for Financial Institutions, Canada: COSF\nPublications, 2008.\n[2] A. 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