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type="text/javascript"> $j(document).ready(ppTypeahead.initialize(".topSearch")); </script> <div id="contentContainer" class=" container panel panel-body panel-default"> <div id="content"> <div class="cattop"> <div style="float:right;width:250px;" class="hidden-xs"> <a class="addthis_button" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=250&username=dbourget"><img src="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352im_/https://s7.addthis.com/static/btn/v2/lg-share-en.gif" width="125" height="16" alt="Bookmark and Share" style="border:0"/></a><script type="text/javascript" src="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352js_/https://s7.addthis.com/js/250/addthis_widget.js#username=dbourget"></script> </div> <div class="ch" style="margin-left:0;font-size:11px;margin-bottom:10px"><a rel="section" class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics/">Normative Ethics</a> <span style="font-size:9px">></span> <a rel="section" class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ethical-theories-miscellaneous/">Ethical Theories, Miscellaneous</a> <span style="font-size:9px">></span> <a rel="section" class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics/">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a></div> <h1 class="gh"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a> </h1> <div style="font-size:12px;color:#333;font-weight:bold;margin-bottom:10px;"> Edited by <a class="person" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpeople.org/profiles/douglas-w-portmore">Douglas W. Portmore</a> <span class="affils">(<span class="affil">Arizona State University</span>)</span> </div> </div> <div class="miniheader" style="font-weight:bold;border-top:1px solid #aaa">About this topic </div> <div class="summaries"> <table class="responsive nospace" style="margin-bottom:10px;width:80%"> <tr> <td style="font-size:12px;width:90px" valign="top"><em>Summary</em></td> <td style="padding-bottom:10px">The actualism-possibilism debate concerns cases that have the following three features: (F1) Each of the following is something that the given subject, S, could possibly do: (a) φ, (b) φ well, (c) φ poorly, and (d) refrain from φ-ing—where, for all x, x-ing at tʹ is, as of t, something that S could possibly perform if and only if there exists an available schedule of intentions from t on wards such that if, S’s intentions were to follow this schedule, S would x at tʹ (tʹ being later than t). (F2) Her φ-ing well is the best thing that she could possibly do, her refraining from φ-ing is second best, and her φ-ing poorly is the worst thing that she could possibly do. And, (F3) as a matter of fact, she would actually φ poorly if she were to φ. Actualists and possibilists disagree about whether the subject ought to φ in such cases. Actualists say 'no', and possibilists say 'yes'. To illustrate, consider the case that I call <em>Cookies</em>: If Gifre were to eat some cookies, he would continue eating one after another until he finishes the whole bag and is sick to his stomach. But if, after eating just one cookie, he were to decide to stop and put the bag away, he would then stop after having eaten just one cookie, which is what would be best. Second best would be his refraining from eating some cookies. And worst of all would be his eating all the cookies. The problem is that although he would stop eating after having eaten just one cookie if he were to decide then (that is, after having eaten the first cookie) to stop and put the bag away, he is in fact going to decide, after tasting how delicious they are, to continue eating them. And this unfortunate decision will lead to his eating all of them and becoming sick to his stomach. Moreover, there’s nothing that Gifre can do now to change the fact that he would continue eating the whole bag if he were eat some cookies. Thus, even if he were, say, to resolve now to put the bag of cookies away after eating just one, he would change his mind after eating the one and continue eating the whole bag. Now, whereas actualists hold that Gifre ought to refrain from eating some cookies given that he would actually eat all the cookies if he were to eat some cookies, possibilists hold that, because he could possibly eat just one cookie if, and only if, he were to eat some cookies, he ought to eat some cookies. More generally, actualists hold that, for any subject S and any act φ that she could possibly perform, the normative status of S’s φ-ing depends only on what would actually happen if she were to φ and how that compares to what would actually happen if she were to perform various alternatives to φ. And, by contrast, possibilists hold that, for any subject S and any act φ that she could possibly perform, the normative status of S’s φ-ing depends only on what could possibly happen if she were to φ and how that compares to what could possibly happen if she were to perform various alternatives to φ.</td> </tr> </table> <table class="responsive nospace" style="margin-bottom:10px;width:80%"> <tr> <td style="font-size:12px;width:90px" valign="top"><em>Key works</em></td> <td>Some of the classic works defending actualism are <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLDRA">Goldman 1976</a>, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/SOBUAP">Sobel 1976</a>, and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/JACOOA">Jackson & Pargetter 1986</a>. And some of the classic works defending possibilism are <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GREOAD">Greenspan 1978</a>, Feldman 1986, and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTCO-2">Zimmerman 1996</a>. Other works try to take some sort of intermediary position between the two: see, for instance, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLDTB">Goldman 1978</a>, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORCCW">Portmore 2011</a>, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/ROSAPA">Ross 2012</a>, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOWWW">Woodard 2009</a>, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMMOA">Timmerman & Cohen 2016</a>, and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT">Portmore 2019</a>.</td> </tr> </table> <table class="responsive nospace" style="margin-bottom:0px;width:80%"> <tr> <td style="font-size:12px;width:90px" valign="top"><em>Introductions</em></td> <td>For an introduction to the actualism and possibilism debate, I would recommend <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMAAP-3">Timmerman & Cohen 2019</a>.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="padding-bottom:10px"> </tr> </table> <div id="reflink" class="ll" onclick="simpleReq('/utils/intro_text_refs.html',{cId:11486,field:'introductions',noheader:1},function(r) {;$('xp_refs2').update(r);$('xp_refs2').show();;$('reflink').hide();return false})">Show all references</div> <div id="xp_refs2" style="display:none;"></div></td> </div> <a name="content"></a> <div class="miniheader" style="font-weight:bold;border-top:1px solid #aaa">Related categories</div> <div class="clearfix"> <div class="col-xs-12 col-sm-6 col-md-8"> Siblings:<ul class="toc normal" style="padding-bottom:8px"><li><a rel="section" class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/anti-theory">Anti-Theory</a><span class="hint"> (<b class="hint">122</b>)</span></li><li><a rel="section" class="catName" 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Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper concerns Warren Quinn’s famous “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.” I argue that even if we accept his assumption that practical rationality is purely instrumental such that what he ought to do is simply a function of how the relevant options compare to each other in terms of satisfying his actual preferences that doesn’t mean that every explanation as to why he shouldn’t advance to the next level must appeal to the idea that so advancing would be suboptimal in<span id="PORWAR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORWAR-abstract2").show();$("PORWAR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORWAR-abstract2" style="display:none"> terms of the satisfaction of his actual preferences. Rather, we can admit that his advancing would always be optimal, but argue that advancing isn’t always what he ought to do given that advancing sometimes fails to meet some necessary condition for being what he ought to do. For instance, something can be what he ought to do only if it’s an option for him. What’s more, something can be what he ought to do only if it’s something that he can do without responding inappropriately to his reasons—or, so, I argue. Thus, the solution to the puzzle is, I argue, to realize that, in certain circumstances, advancing is not what the self-torturer ought to do given that he can do so only by responding inappropriately to his reasons. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORWAR-abstract2").hide();$("PORWAR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORWAR"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/decision" rel="section">Decision</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-rationality" rel="section">Moral Rationality</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/rational-choice-theory" rel="section">Rational Choice Theory</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-social-science" rel="section">Philosophy of Social Science</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/reasons-and-rationality" rel="section">Reasons and Rationality</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORWAR')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORWAR&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORWAR.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-PORWAR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORWAR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORWAR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORWAR','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/PORWAR"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORWAR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORMAR-2" onclick="ee('click','PORMAR-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORMAR-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORMAR-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORMAR-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Maximalism and Rational Control.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Maximalism is the view that if an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking), this is in virtue of the fact that she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking a pie), where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Now, the point of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when<span id="PORMAR-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMAR-2-abstract2").show();$("PORMAR-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORMAR-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> combined with maximalism results in a theory that both avoids the sorts of objections that have typically been levelled against maximalism and accommodates the plausible idea that a moral theory must be collectively successful in the sense that everyone’s satisfying the theory guarantees that our theory-given aims will be best achieved. I argue that, for something to count as an option for an agent, it must, in the relevant sense, be under her control. And I argue that the relevant sort of control is the sort that we exercise over our reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions) by being both receptive and reactive to reasons. I call this sort of control rational control, and I call the view that φ-ing is an option for an agent if and only if she has rational control over whether she φs rationalism. When we combine this view with maximalism, we get rationalist maximalism, which I argue is a promising moral theory. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMAR-2-abstract2").hide();$("PORMAR-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORMAR-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ethical-theories-misc" rel="section">Ethical Theories, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORMAR-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORMAR-2&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORMAR-2.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-PORMAR-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORMAR-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORMAR-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORMAR-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/PORMAR-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 2 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORMAR-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORAAA-5" onclick="ee('click','PORAAA-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORAAA-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORAAA-5')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORAAA-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Control.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">I argue that when determining whether an agent ought to perform an act, we should not hold fixed the fact that she’s going to form certain attitudes (and, here, I’m concerned with only reasons-responsive attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and intentions). For, as I argue, agents have, in the relevant sense, just as much control over which attitudes they form as which acts they perform. This is important because what effect an act will have on the world depends not only<span id="PORAAA-5-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORAAA-5-abstract2").show();$("PORAAA-5-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORAAA-5-abstract2" style="display:none"> on which acts the agent will simultaneously and subsequently perform, but also on which attitudes she will simultaneously and subsequently form. And this all leads me to adopt a new type of practical theory, which I call rational possibilism. On this theory, we first evaluate the entire set of things over which the agent exerts control, where this includes the formation of certain attitudes as well as the performance of certain acts. And, then, we evaluate individual acts as being permissible if and only if, and because, there is such a set that is itself permissible and that includes that act as a proper part. Importantly, this theory has two unusual features. First, it is not exclusively act-orientated, for it requires more from us than just the performance of certain voluntary acts. It requires, in addition, that we involuntarily form certain attitudes. Second, it is attitude-dependent in that it holds that which acts we’re required to perform depends on which attitudes we’re required to form. I then show how these two features can help us both to address certain puzzling cases of rational choice and to understand why most typical practical theories (utilitarianism, virtue ethics, rational egoism, Rossian deontology, etc.) are problematic. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORAAA-5-abstract2").hide();$("PORAAA-5-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORAAA-5"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/obligation" rel="section">Obligation</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ought-implies-can" rel="section">Ought Implies Can</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORAAA-5')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORAAA-5&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORAAA-5.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-PORAAA-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORAAA-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORAAA-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORAAA-5','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/PORAAA-5"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 2 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORAAA-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORMRA-2" onclick="ee('click','PORMRA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORMRA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORMRA-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORMRA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Morality, Rationality, and Performance Entailment.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, baking an apple pie entails baking a pie. Now, suppose that both of these options—baking a pie and baking an apple pie—are permissible. This raises the issue of which, if either, is more fundamental than the other. Is baking a pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake an apple pie? Or is baking an apple pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake a pie? Or are they equally<span id="PORMRA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMRA-2-abstract2").show();$("PORMRA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORMRA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> fundamental, as they would be if they were both permissible because, say, they both accord with Kant’s categorical imperative? I defend the view that the permissibility of an option that entails another is more fundamental than the permissibility of the option that it entails. That is, I defend maximalism: the view that if an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking a pie), this is in virtue of the fact that she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking an apple pie), where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. If maximalism is correct, then, as I show, most theories of morality and rationality must be revised. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMRA-2-abstract2").hide();$("PORMRA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORMRA-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ethical-theories-misc" rel="section">Ethical Theories, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORMRA-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORMRA-2&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORMRA-2.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-PORMRA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORMRA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORMRA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORMRA-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/PORMRA-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 2 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORMRA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORCAC" onclick="ee('click','PORCAC')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORCAC')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORCAC')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORCAC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Consequentialism and Coordination Problems.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Imagine both that (1) S1 is deliberating at t about whether or not to x at t' and that (2) although S1’s x-ing at t' would not itself have good consequences, good consequences would ensue if both S1 x's at t' and S2 y's at t", where S1 may or may not be identical to S2 and where t < t' ≤ t". In this paper, I consider how consequentialists should treat S2 and the possibility that S2 will y at<span id="PORCAC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORCAC-abstract2").show();$("PORCAC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORCAC-abstract2" style="display:none"> t". At one end of the spectrum, consequentialists would hold that, in deciding whether or not to x at t', S1 should always treat S2 as a force of nature over which she has no control and, thus, treat the possibility that S2 will y at t" as she would the possibility that a hurricane will take a certain path. On this view, S1 is to predict whether or not S2 will y and act accordingly. At the other end of the spectrum, consequentialists would hold that S1 should always treat S2 as someone available for mutual cooperation and, thus, treat the possibility that S2 will y at t" as something to be relied upon. On this view, S1 is to rely on S2’s cooperation and so play her part in the best cooperative scheme involving the two of them. A third and intermediate position would be to hold that whether S1 should treat S2 as a force of nature or as someone available for mutual cooperation depends on whether S1 can see to it that S2 will y at t" by, say, having the right set attitudes. I’ll argue for this third position. As we’ll see, an important implication of this view is that consequentialists should be concerned not just with an agent’s voluntary actions but also with their involuntary acquisitions of various mental attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Indeed, I will argue that consequentialists should hold both that (1) an agent’s most fundamental duty is to have all those attitudes that she has decisive reason to have and only those attitudes that she has sufficient reason to have and that (2) she has a derivative duty to perform an act x if and only if her fulfilling this fundamental duty ensures that she x’s. Thus, I argue (as Donald Regan did before me) that consequentialism should not be exclusively act-orientated – that it should require agents not only to perform certain voluntary actions but also to have certain attitudes. In the process, I develop a new version of consequentialism, which I call attitude-consequentialism. (The latest version of this paper can always be found at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/14740340/Consequentialism%20and%20Coordination%20Problems.pdf) -/- . (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORCAC-abstract2").hide();$("PORCAC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORCAC"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/objections-to-consequentialism-misc" rel="section">Objections to Consequentialism, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/varieties-of-consequentialism-misc" rel="section">Varieties of Consequentialism, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORCAC')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORCAC&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORCAC.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-PORCAC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORCAC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORCAC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORCAC','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORCAC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORMVO" onclick="ee('click','PORMVO')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORMVO')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORMVO')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORMVO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Maximalism Vs. Omnism About Reasons.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, I have the option of baking a pumpkin pie as well as the option of baking a pie, and the former entails the latter. Now, suppose that I have both reason to bake a pie and reason to bake a pumpkin pie. This raises the question: Which, if either, is more fundamental than the other? Do I have reason to bake a pie because I have reason to<span id="PORMVO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMVO-abstract2").show();$("PORMVO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORMVO-abstract2" style="display:none"> perform some instance of pie-baking—perhaps, pumpkin-pie baking? Or do I have reason to bake a pumpkin pie because I have reason to bake a pie? Or are they equally fundamental, as they would be if, say, I had reason to do each because each would have optimal consequences? The aim of this paper is to compare two possible answers to this question—omnism and maximalism—and to argue that the latter is preferable. Roughly speaking, maximalism is the view that only those options that are not entailed by any other option are to be assessed in terms of whether they have some feature (such as that of having optimal consequences), whereas omnism is the view that all options are to be assessed in terms of whether they have this feature. I argue that there are at least two reasons to prefer maximalism, for it is able to overcome two critical problems with omnism. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMVO-abstract2").hide();$("PORMVO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORMVO"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/pratical-reason-misc" rel="section">Pratical Reason, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/reasons-and-oughts" rel="section">Reasons and Oughts</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORMVO')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORMVO&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORMVO.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-PORMVO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORMVO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORMVO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORMVO','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/PORMVO"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORMVO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORMVO-2" onclick="ee('click','PORMVO-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORMVO-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORMVO-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORMVO-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Maximalism Vs. Omnism About Permissibility.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, I have the option of baking a pumpkin pie as well as the option of baking a pie, and the former entails the latter. Now, suppose that both of these options are permissible. This raises the issue of which, if either, is more fundamental than the other. Is baking a pie permissible because it’s permissible to perform some instance of pie-baking, such as pumpkin-pie baking? Or is baking<span id="PORMVO-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMVO-2-abstract2").show();$("PORMVO-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORMVO-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> a pumpkin pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake a pie? Or are they equally fundamental, as they would be if they were both permissible because, say, they both have optimal consequences? The aim of this paper is to compare two alternative responses to this issue—omnism and maximalism—and to argue that the latter is preferable. Roughly speaking, maximalism is the view that only those options that are not entailed by any other option are to be assessed in terms of whether they have some right-making feature F (such as that of having optimal consequences), whereas omnism is the view that all options are to be assessed in terms of whether they are F. I argue that maximalism is preferable to omnism because it provides a more plausible solution to the problem of act versions and is not subject to any problems of its own. And if I’m right about maximalism’s being preferable to omnism, then most moral theories, which are all versions of omnism, need significant revision. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMVO-2-abstract2").hide();$("PORMVO-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORMVO-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/objections-to-consequentialism-misc" rel="section">Objections to Consequentialism, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORMVO-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORMVO-2&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORMVO-2.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-PORMVO-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORMVO-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORMVO-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORMVO-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORMVO-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORWAO" onclick="ee('click','PORWAO')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORWAO')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORWAO')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORWAO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">What Are Our Options?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">We ought to perform our best option—that is, the option that we have most reason, all things considered, to perform. This is perhaps the most fundamental and least controversial of all normative principles concerning action. Yet, it is not, I believe, well understood. For even setting aside questions about what our reasons are and about how best to formulate the principle, there is a question about how we should construe our options. This question is of the upmost importance, for which<span id="PORWAO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORWAO-abstract2").show();$("PORWAO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORWAO-abstract2" style="display:none"> option will count as being best depends on how broadly or narrowly we are to construe our options. In this paper, I argue that we ought to construe an agent’s options at a time, t, as being those actions (or sets of actions) that are scrupulously securable by her at t. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORWAO-abstract2").hide();$("PORWAO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORWAO"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/reasons-and-oughts" rel="section">Reasons and Oughts</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/reasons-and-rationality" rel="section">Reasons and Rationality</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORWAO')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <div id="la-PORWAO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORWAO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORWAO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORWAO','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/PORWAO"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORWAO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORAAA-4" onclick="ee('click','PORAAA-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORAAA-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORAAA-4')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORAAA-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this paper, I argue that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but also to have certain attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions), and this despite the fact that we rarely, if ever, have direct voluntary control over our attitudes. Moreover, I argue that whatever obligations we have with respect to actions derive from our obligations with respect to attitudes. More specifically, I argue that an agent is obligated to perform an action if and only if<span id="PORAAA-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORAAA-4-abstract2").show();$("PORAAA-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORAAA-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> it’s the action that she would perform if she were to have the attitudes that she ought to have. This view, which I call attitudism, has three important implications. First, it implies that an adequate practical theory must not be exclusively act-orientated. That is, it must require more of us than just the performance of certain voluntary acts. Second, it implies that an adequate practical theory must be attitude-dependent. That is, it must hold that what we ought to do depends on what attitudes we ought to have. Third, it implies that no adequate practical theory can require us to perform acts that we would not perform even if we were to have the attitudes that we ought to have. I then show how these implications can help us both to address certain puzzling cases of rational choice and to understand why most typical practical theories (utilitarianism, rational egoism, virtue ethics, Rossian deontology, etc.) are mistaken. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORAAA-4-abstract2").hide();$("PORAAA-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORAAA-4"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ethical-theories-misc" rel="section">Ethical Theories, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/pratical-reason-misc" rel="section">Pratical Reason, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORAAA-4')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORAAA-4&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORAAA-4.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-PORAAA-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORAAA-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORAAA-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORAAA-4','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/PORAAA-4"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORAAA-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eNAITFO-5" onclick="ee('click','NAITFO-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','NAITFO-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','NAITFO-5')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/NAITFO-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Three Forms of Actualist Direct Consequentialism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Shyam Nair" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Shyam%20Nair"><span class="name">Shyam Nair</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Utilitas</em>:1-24.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">One family of maximizing act consequentialist theories are actualist direct theories. Indeed, historically there are at least three different forms of actualist direct consequentialism (due to Bentham, Moore, and contemporary consequentialists). This paper is about the logical differences between these three actualist direct theories and the differences between actualist direct theories and their competitors. Three main points emerge. First, the sharpest separation between actualist direct theories and their competitors concerns the so-called inheritance principle. Second, there are a myriad of other<span id="NAITFO-5-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("NAITFO-5-abstract2").show();$("NAITFO-5-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="NAITFO-5-abstract2" style="display:none"> logical differences among actualist direct theories. Third, one theory (Moore's theory) stands out among actualist direct theories because it entails a variety of logical principles. This fact may count in favor of that theory. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("NAITFO-5-abstract2").hide();$("NAITFO-5-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-NAITFO-5"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/deontic-logic" rel="section">Deontic Logic</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/logic-and-philosophy-of-logic" rel="section">Logic and Philosophy of Logic</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/varieties-of-consequentialism" rel="section">Varieties of Consequentialism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','NAITFO-5')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=NAITFO-5&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FNAITFO-5.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/NAITFO-5">(3 more)</a>   <div id="la-NAITFO-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('NAITFO-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-NAITFO-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('NAITFO-5','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-NAITFO-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSPETPA-10" onclick="ee('click','SPETPA-10')" onmouseover="ee('over','SPETPA-10')" onmouseout="ee('out','SPETPA-10')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/SPETPA-10"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jack Spencer" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Jack%20Spencer"><span class="name">Jack Spencer</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Studies</em> 178 (11):3819-3842.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper develops a form of moral actualism that can explain the procreative asymmetry. Along the way, it defends and explains the attractive asymmetry: the claim that although an impermissible option can be self-conditionally permissible, a permissible option cannot be self-conditionally impermissible. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-SPETPA-10"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics-general-works" rel="section">Meta-Ethics, General Works</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/morality-of-procreation" rel="section">Morality of Procreation</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/applied-ethics" rel="section">Applied Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','SPETPA-10')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=SPETPA-10&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FSPETPA-10.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/SPETPA-10">(3 more)</a>   <div id="la-SPETPA-10" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SPETPA-10')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SPETPA-10" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SPETPA-10','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/SPETPA-10"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SPETPA-10"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTIMSAF" onclick="ee('click','TIMSAF')" onmouseover="ee('over','TIMSAF')" onmouseout="ee('out','TIMSAF')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMSAF"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Sweatshops and Free Action: The Stakes of the Actualism/Possibilism Debate for Business Ethics.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Travis Timmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Travis%20Timmerman"><span class="name">Travis Timmerman</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Abe Zakhem" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Abe%20Zakhem"><span class="name">Abe Zakhem</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Business Ethics</em> 171 (4):683-694.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Whether an action is morally right depends upon the alternative acts available to the agent. Actualists hold that what an agent would actually do determines her moral obligations. Possibilists hold that what an agent could possibly do determines her moral obligations. Both views face compelling criticisms. Despite the fact that actualist and possibilist assumptions are at the heart of seminal arguments in business ethics, there has been no explicit discussion of actualism and possibilism in the business ethics literature. This paper<span id="TIMSAF-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMSAF-abstract2").show();$("TIMSAF-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TIMSAF-abstract2" style="display:none"> has two primary goals. First, it aims to rectify this omission by bringing to light the importance of the actualism/possibilism debate for business ethics through questions about the ethics of sweatshops. Second, it aims to make some progress in the sweatshop debate by examining and defending an alternative view, hybridism, and describing the moral and practical implications of hybridism for the sweatshop debate. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMSAF-abstract2").hide();$("TIMSAF-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-TIMSAF"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ethical-theories-misc" rel="section">Ethical Theories, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-theory-and-business-ethics" rel="section">Moral Theory and Business Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/applied-ethics" rel="section">Applied Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','TIMSAF')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=TIMSAF&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FTIMSAF.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMSAF">(3 more)</a>   <div id="la-TIMSAF" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TIMSAF')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TIMSAF" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TIMSAF','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TIMSAF"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGRAAH-2" onclick="ee('click','GRAAH-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','GRAAH-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','GRAAH-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GRAAH-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Avoidable Harm.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Peter A. Graham" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Peter A.%20Graham"><span class="name">Peter A. Graham</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em> 101 (1):175-199.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-GRAAH-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','GRAAH-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=GRAAH-2&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%2Fphpr.12586"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-GRAAH-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GRAAH-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GRAAH-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GRAAH-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/GRAAH-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 3 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GRAAH-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eIMMHSW" onclick="ee('click','IMMHSW')" onmouseover="ee('over','IMMHSW')" onmouseout="ee('out','IMMHSW')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/IMMHSW"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">How should we accommodate our future misbehavior? The answer turns on how bad it will be.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Daniel Immerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Daniel%20Immerman"><span class="name">Daniel Immerman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Studies</em> 177 (12):3903-3922.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Professor Procrastinate receives an invitation to review a book. Best would be to accept it and then write the review. But if he accepts it, he will never get around to writing. And this would be worse than declining. Should he accept? Possibilists say yes, Actualists say no, and I say we need more information. In particular, we lack some information about the level of goodness of the various options. For example, we lack information regarding how much better it would<span id="IMMHSW-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("IMMHSW-abstract2").show();$("IMMHSW-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="IMMHSW-abstract2" style="display:none"> be to accept and write than it would be to decline. In the course of defending my view, I discuss its implications for ethical theory and our everyday actions. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("IMMHSW-abstract2").hide();$("IMMHSW-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-IMMHSW"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','IMMHSW')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=IMMHSW&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11098-020-01414-1"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/IMMHSW">(2 more)</a>   <div id="la-IMMHSW" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('IMMHSW')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-IMMHSW" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('IMMHSW','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-IMMHSW"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eFOEMO" onclick="ee('click','FOEMO')" onmouseover="ee('over','FOEMO')" onmouseout="ee('out','FOEMO')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/FOEMO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Moral Offsetting.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Thomas Foerster" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Thomas%20Foerster"><span class="name">Thomas Foerster</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Quarterly</em> 69 (276):617-635.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper explores the idea of moral offsetting: the idea that good actions can offset bad actions in a way roughly analogous to carbon offsetting. For example, a meat eater might try to offset their consumption of meat by donating to an animal welfare charity. In this paper, I clarify the idea of moral offsetting, consider whether the leading moral theories and theories of moral worth are consistent with the possibility of moral offsetting, and consider potential benefits of moral offsetting.<span id="FOEMO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FOEMO-abstract2").show();$("FOEMO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="FOEMO-abstract2" style="display:none"> I also compare moral offsetting to a related practice that I call ‘moral triaging’. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FOEMO-abstract2").hide();$("FOEMO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-FOEMO"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/contrasting-ethical-theories-misc" rel="section">Contrasting Ethical Theories, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-worth" rel="section">Moral Worth</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/varieties-of-consequentialism" rel="section">Varieties of Consequentialism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/vegetarianism" rel="section">Vegetarianism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/applied-ethics" rel="section">Applied Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','FOEMO')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=FOEMO&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FFOEMO.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/FOEMO">(5 more)</a>   <div id="la-FOEMO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FOEMO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FOEMO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FOEMO','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/FOEMO"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 2 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FOEMO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eFORADH" onclick="ee('click','FORADH')" onmouseover="ee('over','FORADH')" onmouseout="ee('out','FORADH')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/FORADH"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Actualism Doesn’T Have Control Issues: A Reply to Cohen and Timmerman.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andrew T. Forcehimes" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Andrew T.%20Forcehimes"><span class="name">Andrew T. Forcehimes</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Luke Semrau" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Luke%20Semrau"><span class="name">Luke Semrau</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophia</em> 47 (1):271-277.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Recently, Cohen and Timmerman, 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-FORADH"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/consequentialism" rel="section">Consequentialism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','FORADH')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=FORADH&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11406-018-9957-x"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/FORADH">(2 more)</a>   <div id="la-FORADH" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FORADH')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FORADH" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FORADH','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FORADH"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGRAAAF-5" onclick="ee('click','GRAAAF-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','GRAAAF-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','GRAAAF-5')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GRAAAF-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">An Argument for Objective Possibilism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Peter A. Graham" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Peter A.%20Graham"><span class="name">Peter A. Graham</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy</em> 6.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-GRAAAF-5"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','GRAAAF-5')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=GRAAAF-5&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.3998%2Fergo.12405314.0006.008"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GRAAAF-5">(2 more)</a>   <div id="la-GRAAAF-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GRAAAF-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GRAAAF-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GRAAAF-5','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GRAAAF-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMASWTB" onclick="ee('click','MASWTB')" onmouseover="ee('over','MASWTB')" onmouseout="ee('out','MASWTB')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/MASWTB"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Elinor Mason" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Elinor%20Mason"><span class="name">Elinor Mason</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Elinor Mason draws on ethics and responsibility theory to present a pluralistic view of both wrongness and blameworthiness. Mason argues that our moral concepts, rightness and wrongness, must be connected to our responsibility concepts. But the connection is not simple. She identifies three different ways to be blameworthy, corresponding to different ways of acting wrongly. The paradigmatic way to be blameworthy is to act subjectively wrongly. Mason argues for an account of subjective obligation that is connected to the notion of<span id="MASWTB-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MASWTB-abstract2").show();$("MASWTB-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MASWTB-abstract2" style="display:none"> trying - to act rightly is try to do well by morality, to act wrongly (and to be blameworthy) is to fail to try hard enough. Trying involves understanding morality, those who do not grasp morality are in a different category. So agents might also be blameworthy for being oriented away from what really matters. In that case, agents are blameworthy in a different sense, the detached sense. Finally, we can become blameworthy by taking responsibility in cases where our agency is ambiguous. In the final section, Mason gives us an account of taking responsibility and agues that that is an important art of our responsibility practices. 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title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The book concerns what I take to be the least controversial normative principle concerning action: you ought to perform your best option—best, that is, in terms of whatever ultimately matters. The book sets aside the question of what ultimately matters so as to focus on more basic issues, such as: What are our options? Do I have the option of typing out the cure for cancer if that’s what I would in fact do if I had the right intentions at<span id="POROFT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("POROFT-abstract2").show();$("POROFT-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="POROFT-abstract2" style="display:none"> the right times (e.g., the intention to type the letter T at t1, the intention to type the letter H at t2, the intention to type the letter E at t3, etc.)? If I can’t form intentions voluntarily, does that mean that I don’t have the option of forming the intention that I ought to form? Which options do we assess directly in terms of their own goodness and which do we assess in terms of their relations to the goodness of other options? What do we hold fixed when assessing how good an option is? Do we, for instance, hold fixed the agent’s future beliefs, desires, and intentions? And do we hold fixed the agent’s predictable future misbehavior? Lastly, how do the things that ultimately matter determine the goodness of an option? If one of the things that ultimately matters in determining the goodness of an option is that the option doesn’t involve violating anyone’s rights, do we evaluate the option itself in terms of whether it involves violating anyone’s rights or do we evaluate the option’s prospect in terms of this and then the option in terms of its prospect? And what if there is indeterminacy or uncertainty with regards to whether an option would involve violating someone’s rights? (<span class="ll" onclick="$("POROFT-abstract2").hide();$("POROFT-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-POROFT"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/consequentialism-misc" rel="section">Consequentialism, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/control-and-responsibility" rel="section">Control and Responsibility</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/deontological-moral-theories-misc" rel="section">Deontological Moral Theories, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ought-implies-can" rel="section">Ought Implies Can</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class="affiliateLinks"><span class="price_used bargain"><a class="price_used bargain" target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0190945354?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1">$57.50 used</a></span>   <span class="price_new bargain"><a class="price_new bargain" target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0190945354?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1">$59.72 new</a></span>   <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0190945354?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1"> View on Amazon.com</a></div><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','POROFT')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=POROFT&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fsites.google.com%2Fsite%2Fdwportmore%2Fopting-for-the-best"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT">(3 more)</a>   <div id="la-POROFT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('POROFT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-POROFT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('POROFT','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/POROFT"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 26 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-POROFT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTIMEAU" onclick="ee('click','TIMEAU')" onmouseover="ee('over','TIMEAU')" onmouseout="ee('out','TIMEAU')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMEAU"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Effective Altruism’s Underspecification Problem.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Travis Timmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Travis%20Timmerman"><span class="name">Travis Timmerman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Hilary Greaves & Theron Pummer (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GREEAP-5">Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues</a></em>. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 166-183.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Effective altruists either believe they ought to be, or strive to be, doing the most good they can. Since they’re human, however, effective altruists are invariably fallible. In numerous situations, even the most committed EAs would fail to live up to the ideal they set for themselves. This fact raises a central question about how to understand effective altruism. How should one’s future prospective failures at doing the most good possible affect the current choices one makes as an effective altruist?<span id="TIMEAU-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMEAU-abstract2").show();$("TIMEAU-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TIMEAU-abstract2" style="display:none"> This question is important to answer not only because every effective altruist will face this question due to typical human akrasia, but also because how the question is answered will determine just how demanding effective altruism can be. I argue that no matter how effective altruists answer this question, they will have to take on some commitments seemingly antithetical to their movement. More precisely, I argue that effective altruism is subject to a dilemma. Effective altruists’, at times, implicit actualist assumptions (i) commit them to conclusions seemingly antithetical to what typical effective altruists actually believe, as well as the spirit of the movement and (ii) undermine effective altruists’ arguments against moral offsetting and giving to charities close to the heart. Yet, effective altruists’, at times, implicit possibilist assumptions (iii) also commit them to conclusions seemingly antithetical to what typical effective altruists actually believe, as well as the spirit of the movement and (iv) undermine typical responses to demandingness worries for the normative conception of effective altruism. I argue that the best way out of the dilemma is to accept hybridism, though even hybridism won’t preserve every commitment of effective altruism. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMEAU-abstract2").hide();$("TIMEAU-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-TIMEAU"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/applied-ethics-and-normative-ethics" rel="section">Applied Ethics and Normative Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/applied-ethics" rel="section">Applied Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/consequentialism-in-applied-ethics" rel="section">Consequentialism in Applied Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/effective-altruism" rel="section">Effective Altruism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/applied-ethics" rel="section">Applied Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/utilitarianism-misc" rel="section">Utilitarianism, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class="affiliateLinks"><span class="price_new"><a class="price_new" target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0198841361?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1">$69.30 new</a></span>   <span class="price_used"><a class="price_used" target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0198841361?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1">$85.00 used</a></span>   (collection)   <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0198841361?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1"> View on Amazon.com</a></div><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','TIMEAU')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=TIMEAU&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FTIMEAU.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-TIMEAU" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TIMEAU')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TIMEAU" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TIMEAU','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/TIMEAU"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TIMEAU"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTIMAAP-3" onclick="ee('click','TIMAAP-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','TIMAAP-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','TIMAAP-3')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMAAP-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Travis Timmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Travis%20Timmerman"><span class="name">Travis Timmerman</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Yishai Cohen" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Yishai%20Cohen"><span class="name">Yishai Cohen</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-TIMAAP-3"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ethical-theories-misc" rel="section">Ethical Theories, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/topics-in-consequentialism-misc" rel="section">Topics in Consequentialism, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','TIMAAP-3')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=TIMAAP-3&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Factualism-possibilism-ethics%2F"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-TIMAAP-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TIMAAP-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TIMAAP-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TIMAAP-3','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/TIMAAP-3"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 5 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TIMAAP-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTIMHTB" onclick="ee('click','TIMHTB')" onmouseover="ee('over','TIMHTB')" onmouseout="ee('out','TIMHTB')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMHTB"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">How to Be an Actualist and Blame People.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Travis Timmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Travis%20Timmerman"><span class="name">Travis Timmerman</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Philip Swenson" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Philip%20Swenson"><span class="name">Philip Swenson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility</em> 6.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics concerns the relationship between an agent’s free actions and her moral obligations. The actualist affirms, while the possibilist denies, that facts about what agents would freely do in certain circumstances partly determines that agent’s moral obligations. This paper assesses the plausibility of actualism and possibilism in light of desiderata about accounts of blameworthiness. This paper first argues that actualism cannot straightforwardly accommodate certain very plausible desiderata before offering a few independent solutions on behalf of the<span id="TIMHTB-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMHTB-abstract2").show();$("TIMHTB-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TIMHTB-abstract2" style="display:none"> actualist. This paper then argues that, contrary to initial appearances, possibilism is subject to its own comparably troubling blameworthiness problem. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMHTB-abstract2").hide();$("TIMHTB-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-TIMHTB"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/consequentialism-misc" rel="section">Consequentialism, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/control-and-responsibility" rel="section">Control and Responsibility</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','TIMHTB')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=TIMHTB&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FTIMHTB.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-TIMHTB" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TIMHTB')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TIMHTB" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TIMHTB','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/TIMHTB"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 3 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TIMHTB"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eIMMDOI" onclick="ee('click','IMMDOI')" onmouseover="ee('over','IMMDOI')" onmouseout="ee('out','IMMDOI')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/IMMDOI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Does Ought Imply Ought Ought?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Daniel Immerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Daniel%20Immerman"><span class="name">Daniel Immerman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Quarterly</em> 68 (273):702-716.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Knows-knows principles in epistemology say that if you know some proposition, then you are in a position to know that you know it. This paper examines the viability of analogous principles in ethics, which I call ought-ought principles. Several epistemologists have recently offered new defences of KK principles and of other related principles, and there has recently been an increased interest in examining analogies between ethics and epistemology, and so it seems natural to examine whether defences of KK and related<span id="IMMDOI-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("IMMDOI-abstract2").show();$("IMMDOI-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="IMMDOI-abstract2" style="display:none"> principles carry over to OO principles. In this paper, I introduce two OO principles, and I show how some arguments in favour of KK carry over to them. Then I show how these OO principles can be used to shed light on a much-discussed case in ethics, that of Professor Procrastinate. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("IMMDOI-abstract2").hide();$("IMMDOI-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-IMMDOI"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/obligation" rel="section">Obligation</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/the-kk-principle" rel="section">The KK Principle</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/epistemology" rel="section">Epistemology</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','IMMDOI')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=IMMDOI&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FIMMDOI.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/IMMDOI">(3 more)</a>   <div id="la-IMMDOI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('IMMDOI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-IMMDOI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('IMMDOI','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/IMMDOI"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-IMMDOI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePORMAM-11" onclick="ee('click','PORMAM-11')" onmouseover="ee('over','PORMAM-11')" onmouseout="ee('out','PORMAM-11')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORMAM-11"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Maximalism and Moral Harmony.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em> (2):318-341.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type, where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in a theory that accommodates the idea<span id="PORMAM-11-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMAM-11-abstract2").show();$("PORMAM-11-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PORMAM-11-abstract2" style="display:none"> that a moral theory ought to be morally harmonious—that is, ought to be such that the agents who satisfy the theory, whoever and however numerous they may be, are guaranteed to produce the morally best world that they have the option of producing. I argue that, for something to count as an option for an agent, it must, in the relevant sense, be under her control. And I argue that the relevant sort of control is the sort that we exercise over our reasons-responsive attitudes by being both receptive and reactive to reasons. I call this sort of control rational control, and I call the view that φ-ing is an option for a subject if and only if she has rational control over whether she φs rationalism. When we combine this view with maximalism, we get rationalist maximalism, which I argue is a promising moral theory. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PORMAM-11-abstract2").hide();$("PORMAM-11-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-PORMAM-11"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/collective-action" rel="section">Collective Action</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/control-and-responsibility" rel="section">Control and Responsibility</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','PORMAM-11')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=PORMAM-11&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPORMAM-11.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/PORMAM-11">(2 more)</a>   <div id="la-PORMAM-11" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PORMAM-11')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PORMAM-11" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PORMAM-11','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/PORMAM-11"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 13 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PORMAM-11"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMASDTR" onclick="ee('click','MASDTR')" onmouseover="ee('over','MASDTR')" onmouseout="ee('out','MASDTR')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/MASDTR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Do the Right Thing.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Elinor Mason" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Elinor%20Mason"><span class="name">Elinor Mason</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2017</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/MASOSI">Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7</a></em>. pp. 117-135.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Subjective rightness (or ‘ought’ or obligation) seems to be the sense of rightness that should be action guiding where more objective senses fail. However, there is an ambiguity between strong and weak senses of action guidance. No general account of subjective rightness can succeed in being action guiding in a strong sense by providing an immediately helpful instruction, because helpfulness always depends on the context. Subjective rightness is action guiding in a weaker sense, in that it is always accessible and<span id="MASDTR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MASDTR-abstract2").show();$("MASDTR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MASDTR-abstract2" style="display:none"> comprehensible to the agent. Hence traditional belief formulations say roughly, “do what you believe is best.” This is not yet a satisfactory formulation, because it cannot make sense of our ongoing subjective duty to improve our beliefs. The notion of ‘trying’ does capture the dynamic and diachronic nature of our subjective obligation. Thus, we should formulate subjective obligation in terms of trying: “try to do well by morality.”. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MASDTR-abstract2").hide();$("MASDTR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-MASDTR"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/control-and-responsibility" rel="section">Control and Responsibility</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/free-will-and-responsibility" rel="section">Free Will and Responsibility</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-concepts" rel="section">Moral Concepts</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-judgment-misc" rel="section">Moral Judgment, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-responsibility-misc" rel="section">Moral Responsibility, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','MASDTR')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=MASDTR&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FMASDTR.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-MASDTR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MASDTR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MASDTR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MASDTR','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/MASDTR"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MASDTR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCARCAC-19" onclick="ee('click','CARCAC-19')" onmouseover="ee('over','CARCAC-19')" onmouseout="ee('out','CARCAC-19')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/CARCAC-19"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Consequence and Contrast in Deontic Semantics.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Fabrizio Cariani" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Fabrizio%20Cariani"><span class="name">Fabrizio Cariani</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2016</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Philosophy</em> 113 (8):396-416.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Contrastivists view ought-sentences as expressing comparisons among alternatives. Deontic actualists believe that the value of each alternative in such a comparison is determined by what would actually happen if that alternative were to be the case. One of the arguments that motivates actualism is a challenge to the principle of agglomeration over conjunction—the principle according to which if you ought to run and you ought to jump, then you ought to run and jump. I argue that there is no way<span id="CARCAC-19-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CARCAC-19-abstract2").show();$("CARCAC-19-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CARCAC-19-abstract2" style="display:none"> of developing the actualist insight into a logic that invalidates the agglomeration principle without also invalidating other desirable patterns of inference. After doing this, I extend the analysis to other contrastive views that challenge agglomeration in the way that the actualist does. This motivates skepticism about the actualist’s way of challenging agglomeration. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CARCAC-19-abstract2").hide();$("CARCAC-19-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-CARCAC-19"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/deontic-logic" rel="section">Deontic Logic</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/logic-and-philosophy-of-logic" rel="section">Logic and Philosophy of Logic</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/deontic-modals" rel="section">Deontic Modals</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-language" rel="section">Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','CARCAC-19')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=CARCAC-19&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FCARCAC-19.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/CARCAC-19">(3 more)</a>   <div id="la-CARCAC-19" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CARCAC-19')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CARCAC-19" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CARCAC-19','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/CARCAC-19"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 14 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CARCAC-19"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCOHAHC" onclick="ee('click','COHAHC')" onmouseover="ee('over','COHAHC')" onmouseout="ee('out','COHAHC')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/COHAHC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Actualism Has Control Issues.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Yishai Cohen" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Yishai%20Cohen"><span class="name">Yishai Cohen</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Travis Timmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Travis%20Timmerman"><span class="name">Travis Timmerman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2016</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</em> 10 (3):1-18.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">According to actualism, an agent ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We argue that actualism makes a morally irrelevant distinction between certain counterfactuals, given that an agent sometimes has the same kind of control over their truth-value. We then offer a substantive revision to actualism that avoids this morally irrelevant distinction by focusing on a certain kind of control that is available<span id="COHAHC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("COHAHC-abstract2").show();$("COHAHC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="COHAHC-abstract2" style="display:none"> to an agent. Finally, we show how this revised view has two additional advantages over actualism. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("COHAHC-abstract2").hide();$("COHAHC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-COHAHC"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','COHAHC')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=COHAHC&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fjesp.org%2FPDF%2FActualism%2520Has%2520Control%2520Issues_final.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/COHAHC">(8 more)</a>   <div id="la-COHAHC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('COHAHC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-COHAHC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('COHAHC','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/COHAHC"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 8 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-COHAHC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTIMMOA" onclick="ee('click','TIMMOA')" onmouseover="ee('over','TIMMOA')" onmouseout="ee('out','TIMMOA')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMMOA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Travis Timmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Travis%20Timmerman"><span class="name">Travis Timmerman</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Yishai Cohen" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Yishai%20Cohen"><span class="name">Yishai Cohen</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2016</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Australasian Journal of Philosophy</em> 94 (4):672-686.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Do facts about what an agent would freely do in certain circumstances at least partly determine any of her moral obligations? Actualists answer ‘yes’, while possibilists answer ‘no’. We defend two novel hybrid accounts that are alternatives to actualism and possibilism: Dual Obligations Hybridism and Single Obligation Hybridism. By positing two moral ‘oughts’, each account retains the benefits of actualism and possibilism, yet is immune from the prima facie problems that face actualism and possibilism. We conclude by highlighting one substantive<span id="TIMMOA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMMOA-abstract2").show();$("TIMMOA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TIMMOA-abstract2" style="display:none"> difference between our two hybrid accounts. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMMOA-abstract2").hide();$("TIMMOA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-TIMMOA"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-general-works" rel="section">Normative Ethics, General Works</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','TIMMOA')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=TIMMOA&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FTIMMOA.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMMOA">(7 more)</a>   <div id="la-TIMMOA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TIMMOA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TIMMOA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TIMMOA','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/TIMMOA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 11 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TIMMOA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVESAST" onclick="ee('click','VESAST')" onmouseover="ee('over','VESAST')" onmouseout="ee('out','VESAST')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/VESAST"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Against Securitism, the New Breed of Actualism in Consequentialist Thought.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jean-Paul Vessel" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Jean-Paul%20Vessel"><span class="name">Jean-Paul Vessel</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2016</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Utilitas</em> 28 (2):164-178.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, Douglas Portmore introduces a novel position regarding the actualist securitism – a position he argues is theoretically superior to the standard views in both the actualist and possibilist camps. After distinguishing the two camps through an examination of the original Procrastinate case, I present Portmore's securitism and its implications regarding his modified Procrastinate case. I level two serious objections against securitism: that it implausibly implies that morality is radically more demanding for the virtuous<span id="VESAST-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VESAST-abstract2").show();$("VESAST-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VESAST-abstract2" style="display:none"> than it is for the vicious and that it fails to recognize moral vice in a wide range of cases. I close by arguing that a possibilist variant of Portmore's securitist view is impervious to such objections and thus appears theoretically superior to the actualist version Portmore promotes. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VESAST-abstract2").hide();$("VESAST-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-VESAST"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/agent-neutral-and-agent-relative-consequentialism" rel="section">Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','VESAST')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=VESAST&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1017%2Fs095382081500028x"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/VESAST">(4 more)</a>   <div id="la-VESAST" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VESAST')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VESAST" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VESAST','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/VESAST"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 4 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VESAST"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTIMDSS-3" onclick="ee('click','TIMDSS-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','TIMDSS-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','TIMDSS-3')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMDSS-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Does Scrupulous Securitism Stand-Up to Scrutiny? Two Problems for Moral Securitism and How We Might Fix Them.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Travis Timmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Travis%20Timmerman"><span class="name">Travis Timmerman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2015</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Studies</em> 172 (6):1509-1528.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A relatively new debate in ethics concerns the relationship between one's present obligations and how one would act in the future. One popular view is actualism, which holds that what an agent would do in the future affects her present obligations. Agent's future behavior is held fixed and the agent's present obligations are determined by what would be best to do now in light of how the agent would act in the future. Doug Portmore defends a new view he calls<span id="TIMDSS-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMDSS-3-abstract2").show();$("TIMDSS-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TIMDSS-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> moral securitism, which is supposed to avoid the problems associated with actualism. On this account, what an agent would do in the future is treated as fixed iff that agent's future actions are not currently under the agent's present deliberative control. φ-ing is under an agent's present deliberative control iff whether the agent φ's depends upon the immediate outcome of the agent's present deliberations. I argue that moral securitism falls prey to two of the same serious problems that actualism does: it lets agents avoid incurring moral obligations because they have rotten moral dispositions and entails that agents ought to perform truly terribly acts. After providing a few standard counter-examples to actualism to show how it is plagued with these two problems, I offer my own example which demonstrates that moral securitism is subject to a version of these same two problems. I then review Portmore's response to my objection, arguing that it fails. I end the paper by offering a tentative revision of moral securitism that would allow it to avoid the aforementioned problems. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TIMDSS-3-abstract2").hide();$("TIMDSS-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-TIMDSS-3"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics-misc" rel="section">Normative Ethics, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','TIMDSS-3')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=TIMDSS-3&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11098-014-0362-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMDSS-3">(2 more)</a>   <div id="la-TIMDSS-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TIMDSS-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TIMDSS-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TIMDSS-3','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/TIMDSS-3"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 13 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TIMDSS-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGUSCCA" onclick="ee('click','GUSCCA')" onmouseover="ee('over','GUSCCA')" onmouseout="ee('out','GUSCCA')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GUSCCA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Combinative Consequentialism and the Problem of Act Versions.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Johan E. Gustafsson" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Johan E.%20Gustafsson"><span class="name">Johan E. Gustafsson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2014</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Studies</em> 167 (3):585-596.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In the 1960’s, Lars Bergström and Hector-Neri Castañeda noticed a problem with alternative acts and consequentialism. The source of the problem is that some performable acts are versions of other performable acts and the versions need not have the same consequences as the originals. Therefore, if all performable acts are among the agent’s alternatives, act consequentialism yields deontic paradoxes. A standard response is to restrict the application of act consequentialism to certain relevant alternative sets. Many proposals are based on some<span id="GUSCCA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GUSCCA-abstract2").show();$("GUSCCA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GUSCCA-abstract2" style="display:none"> variation of maximalism, that is, the view that act consequentialism should only be applied to maximally specific acts. In this paper, I argue that maximalism cannot yield the right prescriptions in some cases where one can either (i) form at once the intention to do an immediate act and form at a later time the intention to do a succeeding act or (ii) form at once the intention to do both acts and where the consequences of (i) and (ii) differ in value. Maximalism also violates normative invariance, that is, the condition that if an act is performable in a situation, then the normative status of the act does not depend on what acts are performed in the situation. Instead of maximalism, I propose that the relevant alternatives should be the exhaustive combinations of acts the agent can jointly perform without performing any other act in the situation. In this way, one avoids the problem of act versions without violating normative invariance. Another advantage is that one can adequately differentiate between possibilities like (i) and (ii). (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GUSCCA-abstract2").hide();$("GUSCCA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-GUSCCA"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/varieties-of-consequentialism-misc" rel="section">Varieties of Consequentialism, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','GUSCCA')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=GUSCCA&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fjohanegustafsson.net%2Fpapers%2Fcombinative-consequentialism-and-the-problem-of-act-versions.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/GUSCCA">(4 more)</a>   <div id="la-GUSCCA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GUSCCA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GUSCCA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GUSCCA','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/GUSCCA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 20 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GUSCCA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eJACPR-2" onclick="ee('click','JACPR-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','JACPR-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','JACPR-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/JACPR-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Procrastinate Revisited.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Frank Jackson" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Frank%20Jackson"><span class="name">Frank Jackson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2014</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</em> 95 (4):634-647.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">How is what an agent ought to do at time t related to what they ought to do over a period of time that includes t? I revisit an example that sheds light on this question, taking account of issues to do with the agent's intentions and the distinction between subjective and objective obligation. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-JACPR-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/ethics" rel="section">Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/value-theory-miscellaneous" rel="section">Value Theory, Miscellaneous</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','JACPR-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=JACPR-2&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%2Fpapq.12051"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-JACPR-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('JACPR-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-JACPR-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('JACPR-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/JACPR-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 31 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-JACPR-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eFIOCAT" onclick="ee('click','FIOCAT')" onmouseover="ee('over','FIOCAT')" onmouseout="ee('out','FIOCAT')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/FIOCAT"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Consequentialism and the World in Time.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by M. Oreste Fiocco" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/M. Oreste%20Fiocco"><span class="name">M. Oreste Fiocco</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2013</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Ratio</em> 26 (2):212-224.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Consequentialism is a general approach to understanding the nature of morality that seems to entail a certain view of the world in time. This entailment raises specific problems for the approach. The first seems to lead to the conclusion that every actual act is right – an unacceptable result for any moral theory. The second calls into question the idea that consequentialism is an approach to morality, for it leads to the conclusion that this approach produces a theory whose truth<span id="FIOCAT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FIOCAT-abstract2").show();$("FIOCAT-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="FIOCAT-abstract2" style="display:none"> does not depend in any way on the nature of rational beings or value. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FIOCAT-abstract2").hide();$("FIOCAT-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-FIOCAT"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/objections-to-consequentialism" rel="section">Objections to Consequentialism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','FIOCAT')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=FIOCAT&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%2Frati.12002"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-FIOCAT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FIOCAT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FIOCAT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FIOCAT','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/FIOCAT"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 3 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FIOCAT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVANOCA-2" onclick="ee('click','VANOCA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','VANOCA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','VANOCA-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/VANOCA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Rob van Someren Greve" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Rob%20van Someren Greve"><span class="name">Rob van Someren Greve</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2013</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Ethical Theory and Moral Practice</em> 16 (3):481-492.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">There are two distinct views on how to formulate an objective consequentialist account of the deontic status of actions, actualism and possibilism. On an actualist account, what matters to the deontic status of actions is only the value of the outcome an action would have, if performed. By contrast, a possibilist account also takes into account the value of the outcomes that an action could have. These two views come apart in their deontic verdicts when an agent is imperfect in<span id="VANOCA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VANOCA-2-abstract2").show();$("VANOCA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VANOCA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> an avoidable way, viz., when agent brings about less good than she could. In this paper, I offer an argument against actualism that draws on the connection between moral obligation and practical reasons. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VANOCA-2-abstract2").hide();$("VANOCA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-VANOCA-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/objective-and-subjective-consequentialism" rel="section">Objective and Subjective Consequentialism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','VANOCA-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=VANOCA-2&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FVANOCA-2.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/VANOCA-2">(7 more)</a>   <div id="la-VANOCA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VANOCA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VANOCA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VANOCA-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/VANOCA-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 2 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VANOCA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBAKKYG" onclick="ee('click','BAKKYG')" onmouseover="ee('over','BAKKYG')" onmouseout="ee('out','BAKKYG')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/BAKKYG"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Knowing Yourself—And Giving Up On Your Own Agency In The Process.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Derek Clayton Baker" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Derek Clayton%20Baker"><span class="name">Derek Clayton Baker</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2012</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Australasian Journal of Philosophy</em> 90 (4):641 - 656.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Are there cases in which agents ought to give up on satisfying an obligation, so that they can avoid a temptation which will lead them to freely commit an even more significant wrong? Actualists say yes. Possibilists say no. Both positions have absurd consequences. This paper argues that common-sense morality is committed to an inconsistent triad of principles. This inconsistency becomes acute when we consider the cases that motivate the possibilism?actualism debate. Thus, the absurd consequences of both solutions are unsurprising:<span id="BAKKYG-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BAKKYG-abstract2").show();$("BAKKYG-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BAKKYG-abstract2" style="display:none"> any proposed solution will have consequences incompatible with common moral practice. Arguments for denying one of the principles are considered and rejected. The paper then suggests that the inconsistent moral commitments originate in an inconsistent picture of human agency. Revisionary pictures of human agency are considered. It is argued that a quasi-Platonic picture of agency, similar to that advocated by Gary Watson 1977, is the most promising. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BAKKYG-abstract2").hide();$("BAKKYG-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-BAKKYG"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','BAKKYG')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=BAKKYG&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FBAKKYG.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/BAKKYG">(6 more)</a>   <div id="la-BAKKYG" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BAKKYG')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BAKKYG" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BAKKYG','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/BAKKYG"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 10 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BAKKYG"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROSAPA" onclick="ee('click','ROSAPA')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROSAPA')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROSAPA')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/ROSAPA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jacob Ross" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Jacob%20Ross"><span class="name">Jacob Ross</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2012</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">How is what an agent ought to do related to what an agent ought to prefer that she does? More precisely, suppose we know what an agent’s preference ordering ought to be over the prospects of performing the various courses of action open to her. Can we infer from this information how she ought to act, and if so, how can we infer it? One view (which, for convenience, I will call ‘actualism’) is that an agent ought to  just<span id="ROSAPA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROSAPA-abstract2").show();$("ROSAPA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ROSAPA-abstract2" style="display:none"> in case she ought to prefer the prospect of her -ing to the prospect of her not -ing. Another view (which, for convenience, I will call ‘possibilism’) is that an agent ought to  just in case she ought to prefer the prospect of some maximally specific option that involves her -ing to the prospect of any maximally specific option that does not involve her -ing (with the quantifiers appropriately restricted). After making some preliminary clarifications in part 1, I will discuss actualism and possibilism in parts 2 and 3, respectively. I will argue, in part 2, that actualism is very far from the truth. And I will argue, in part 3, that while the standard version of possibilism faces significant problems, there are much better versions of possibilism that avoid the objections to the standard view. Ultimately, however, I will argue that even the best forms of possibilism are not acceptable. Then, in part 4, I will propose what I take to be the best view, one that is neither strictly possibilist nor actualist, and that avoids the shortcomings of both these views. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROSAPA-abstract2").hide();$("ROSAPA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-ROSAPA"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','ROSAPA')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=ROSAPA&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww-bcf.usc.edu%2F~jacobmro%2Fppr%2FActualism_Possibilism_and_Beyond.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-ROSAPA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROSAPA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROSAPA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROSAPA','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/ROSAPA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 26 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROSAPA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWPOCCW-2" onclick="ee('click','WPOCCW-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WPOCCW-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WPOCCW-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/WPOCCW-2"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Douglas W. Portmore" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Douglas W.%20Portmore"><span class="name">Douglas W. Portmore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2011</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should be<span id="WPOCCW-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WPOCCW-2-abstract2").show();$("WPOCCW-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WPOCCW-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can. What's more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain.Although the primary aim of the book is to defend a particular moral theory, Portmore defends this theory as part of a coherent whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not only to those working on consequentialism and other areas of normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics. Beyond offering an account of morality, Portmore offers accounts of practical reasons, practical rationality, and the objective/subjective obligation distinction. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WPOCCW-2-abstract2").hide();$("WPOCCW-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WPOCCW-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/agent-neutral-and-agent-relative-consequentialism" rel="section">Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/arguments-for-consequentialism" rel="section">Arguments for Consequentialism</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-rationality" rel="section">Moral Rationality</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class="affiliateLinks"><span class="price_new"><a class="price_new" target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0199396450?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1">$44.72 new</a></span>   <span class="price_used"><a class="price_used" target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0199396450?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1">$78.05 used</a></span>   <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0199396450?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1"> View on Amazon.com</a></div><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','WPOCCW-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WPOCCW-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fsites.google.com%2Fsite%2Fcommonsenseconsequentialism%2F"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/WPOCCW-2">(4 more)</a>   <div id="la-WPOCCW-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WPOCCW-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WPOCCW-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WPOCCW-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/WPOCCW-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 124 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WPOCCW-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDRITAI" onclick="ee('click','DRITAI')" onmouseover="ee('over','DRITAI')" onmouseout="ee('out','DRITAI')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/DRITAI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The 'Actual' in Actualism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Julia Driver" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Julia%20Driver"><span class="name">Julia Driver</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2009</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/RAVMEA-2">Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson</a></em>. Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-DRITAI"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','DRITAI')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <div id="la-DRITAI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DRITAI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DRITAI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DRITAI','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/DRITAI"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DRITAI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLITCNO" onclick="ee('click','LITCNO')" onmouseover="ee('over','LITCNO')" onmouseout="ee('out','LITCNO')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCNO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Critical Notice of Michael Zimmerman's, Living with Uncertainty. <span class="hint">[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Clayton Littlejohn" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Clayton%20Littlejohn"><span class="name">Clayton Littlejohn</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2009</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Books</em> 50 (4):235–247.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-LITCNO"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-norms" rel="section">Moral Norms</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-responsibility-misc" rel="section">Moral Responsibility, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','LITCNO')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=LITCNO&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FLITCNO.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCNO">(3 more)</a>   <div id="la-LITCNO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LITCNO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LITCNO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LITCNO','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/LITCNO"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LITCNO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLOUIWD" onclick="ee('click','LOUIWD')" onmouseover="ee('over','LOUIWD')" onmouseout="ee('out','LOUIWD')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/LOUIWD"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">I Won’T Do It! Self-Prediction, Moral Obligation and Moral Deliberation.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jennie Louise" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Jennie%20Louise"><span class="name">Jennie Louise</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2009</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Studies</em> 146 (3):327 - 348.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e., claims that an agent won’t Φ), the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to<span id="LOUIWD-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LOUIWD-abstract2").show();$("LOUIWD-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LOUIWD-abstract2" style="display:none"> be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LOUIWD-abstract2").hide();$("LOUIWD-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-LOUIWD"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/deliberation" rel="section">Deliberation</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-action" rel="section">Philosophy of Action</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-deliberation" rel="section">Moral Deliberation</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','LOUIWD')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=LOUIWD&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11098-008-9258-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/LOUIWD">(5 more)</a>   <div id="la-LOUIWD" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LOUIWD')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LOUIWD" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LOUIWD','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/LOUIWD"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 8 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LOUIWD"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLOUIWD-2" onclick="ee('click','LOUIWD-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','LOUIWD-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','LOUIWD-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/LOUIWD-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">I Won’T Do It! Self-Prediction, Moral Obligation and Moral Deliberation.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jennie Louise" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Jennie%20Louise"><span class="name">Jennie Louise</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2009</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Studies</em> 146 (3):327-348.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of 'won't' claims, the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates<span id="LOUIWD-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LOUIWD-2-abstract2").show();$("LOUIWD-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LOUIWD-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LOUIWD-2-abstract2").hide();$("LOUIWD-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-LOUIWD-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-reasoning-and-motivation-misc" rel="section">Moral Reasoning and Motivation, Misc</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','LOUIWD-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=LOUIWD-2&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11098-008-9258-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/LOUIWD-2">(3 more)</a>   <div id="la-LOUIWD-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LOUIWD-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LOUIWD-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LOUIWD-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/LOUIWD-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 6 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LOUIWD-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVESDAP" onclick="ee('click','VESDAP')" onmouseover="ee('over','VESDAP')" onmouseout="ee('out','VESDAP')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/VESDAP"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Defending a Possibilist Insight in Consequentialist Thought.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jean-Paul Vessel" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Jean-Paul%20Vessel"><span class="name">Jean-Paul Vessel</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2009</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Studies</em> 142 (2):183 - 195.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following deontic principle. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-VESDAP"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','VESDAP')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=VESDAP&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11098-007-9182-0"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/VESDAP">(4 more)</a>   <div id="la-VESDAP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VESDAP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VESDAP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VESDAP','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/VESDAP"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 9 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VESDAP"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWOOWWW-4" onclick="ee('click','WOOWWW-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','WOOWWW-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','WOOWWW-4')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOWWW-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">What's Wrong with Possibilism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by C. Woodard" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/C.%20Woodard"><span class="name">C. Woodard</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2009</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Analysis</em> 69 (2):219-226.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Argues (1) that the debate between actualists and possibilists in deontic logic distorts what is really at issue, and (2) that reframing the debate as being about reasons strongly suggests that those with possibilist sympathies should adopt more moderate claims (which may nevertheless be distinct from actualism). </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WOOWWW-4"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','WOOWWW-4')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WOOWWW-4&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fpattern.reasons.googlepages.com%2FWhatswrongwithpossibilism.pdf"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOWWW-4">(8 more)</a>   <div id="la-WOOWWW-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WOOWWW-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WOOWWW-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WOOWWW-4','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/WOOWWW-4"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 14 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WOOWWW-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eZIMLWU-2" onclick="ee('click','ZIMLWU-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','ZIMLWU-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','ZIMLWU-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMLWU-2"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael J. Zimmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Michael J.%20Zimmerman"><span class="name">Michael J. Zimmerman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2008</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Cambridge University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Every choice we make is set against a background of massive ignorance about our past, our future, our circumstances, and ourselves. Philosophers are divided on the moral significance of such ignorance. Some say that it has a direct impact on how we ought to behave - the question of what our moral obligations are; others deny this, claiming that it only affects how we ought to be judged in light of the behaviour in which we choose to engage - the<span id="ZIMLWU-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ZIMLWU-2-abstract2").show();$("ZIMLWU-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ZIMLWU-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> question of what responsibility we bear for our choices. Michael Zimmerman claims that our ignorance has an important bearing on both questions, and offers an account of moral obligation and moral responsibility that is sharply at odds with the prevailing wisdom. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in ethics. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ZIMLWU-2-abstract2").hide();$("ZIMLWU-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-ZIMLWU-2"><div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/actualism-and-possibilism-in-ethics" rel="section">Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/normative-ethics" rel="section">Normative Ethics</a></div> <div><a class="catName" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-uncertainty" rel="section">Moral Uncertainty</a><span class="catIn"> in </span><a class="catArea" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/browse/meta-ethics" rel="section">Meta-Ethics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class="affiliateLinks"><span class="price_used bargain"><a class="price_used bargain" target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0521171717?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1">$26.31 used</a></span>   <span class="price_new bargain"><a class="price_new bargain" target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0521171717?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1">$27.40 new</a></span>   <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://www.amazon.com/dp/0521171717?tag=philp02-20&linkCode=osi&th=1&psc=1"> View on Amazon.com</a></div><span title="Remove from this list" class="ll" onclick="removeFromList('11486','ZIMLWU-2')"><i class="fa fa-times"></i> Remove from this list</span>   <a rel="nofollow" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=ZIMLWU-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fanalysis.oxfordjournals.org%2Fcgi%2Fdoi%2F10.1093%2Fanalys%2Fanp111"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-ZIMLWU-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ZIMLWU-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ZIMLWU-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ZIMLWU-2','11486')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20221104035352im_/https://philpapers.org/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/citations/ZIMLWU-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 106 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ZIMLWU-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eZIMTRO-2" onclick="ee('click','ZIMTRO-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','ZIMTRO-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','ZIMTRO-2')" class="entry"><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTRO-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Relevance of Risk to Wrongdoing.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael J. Zimmerman" href="/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/s/Michael J.%20Zimmerman"><span class="name">Michael J. Zimmerman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2005</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, Richard Feldman & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221104035352/https://philpapers.org/rec/MCDTGT">The Good, the Right, Life And Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman</a></em>. 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I conclude that only agents who are cognitively and conatively ``ideal'' are in general able to use a moral theory as a guide to action. In Sections 2 and 3, I discuss whether moral ``actualism'' implies that morality cannot be action-guiding even for ideal agents. If actualism is true, an ideal<span id="ERIDFA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ERIDFA-abstract2").show();$("ERIDFA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ERIDFA-abstract2" style="display:none"> agent will know about her own future actions. Since such foreknowledge is often thought to be incompatible with deliberation, and since action-guidance presupposes the possibility of deliberation, there is an apparent difficulty in combining actualism with the requirement of action-guidance. In opposition to an argument by Jan Österberg, I try to show that actualism and action-guidance are in fact compatible. 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