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board of directors</title> <meta name="description" content="Search results for: size of the board of directors"> <meta name="keywords" content="size of the board of directors"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, minimum-scale=1, maximum-scale=1, user-scalable=no"> <meta charset="utf-8"> <link href="https://cdn.waset.org/favicon.ico" type="image/x-icon" rel="shortcut icon"> <link href="https://cdn.waset.org/static/plugins/bootstrap-4.2.1/css/bootstrap.min.css" rel="stylesheet"> <link href="https://cdn.waset.org/static/plugins/fontawesome/css/all.min.css" rel="stylesheet"> <link href="https://cdn.waset.org/static/css/site.css?v=150220211555" rel="stylesheet"> </head> <body> <header> <div class="container"> <nav class="navbar navbar-expand-lg navbar-light"> <a class="navbar-brand" href="https://waset.org"> <img src="https://cdn.waset.org/static/images/wasetc.png" alt="Open Science Research Excellence" title="Open Science Research Excellence" /> </a> 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action="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search"> <div id="custom-search-input"> <div class="input-group"> <i class="fas fa-search"></i> <input type="text" class="search-query" name="q" placeholder="Author, Title, Abstract, Keywords" value="size of the board of directors"> <input type="submit" class="btn_search" value="Search"> </div> </div> </form> </div> </div> <div class="row mt-3"> <div class="col-sm-3"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"><strong>Commenced</strong> in January 2007</div> </div> </div> <div class="col-sm-3"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"><strong>Frequency:</strong> Monthly</div> </div> </div> <div class="col-sm-3"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"><strong>Edition:</strong> International</div> </div> </div> <div class="col-sm-3"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"><strong>Paper Count:</strong> 6518</div> </div> </div> </div> <h1 class="mt-3 mb-3 text-center" style="font-size:1.6rem;">Search results for: size of the board of directors</h1> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6518</span> Supervisory Board in the Governance of Cooperatives: Disclosing Power Elements in the Selection of Directors</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Kari%20Huhtala">Kari Huhtala</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Iiro%20Jussila"> Iiro Jussila</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The supervisory board is assumed to use power in the governance of a firm, but the actual use of power has been scantly investigated. The research question of the paper is “How does the supervisory board use power in the selection of the board of directors”. The data stem from 11 large Finnish agricultural cooperatives. The research approach was qualitative including semi-structured interviews of the board of directors and supervisory board chairpersons. The results were analyzed and interpreted against theories of social power. As a result, the use of power is approached from two perspectives: (1) formal position-based authority and (2) informal power. Central elements of power were the mandate of the supervisory board, the role of the supervisory board, the supervisory board chair, the nomination committee, collaboration between the supervisory board and the board of directors, the role of regions and the role of the board of directors. The study contributes to the academic discussion on corporate governance in cooperatives and on the supervisory board in the context of the two-tier model. Additional research of the model in other countries and of other types of cooperatives would further academic understanding of supervisory boards. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board" title="board">board</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=co-operative" title=" co-operative"> co-operative</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=supervisory%20board" title=" supervisory board"> supervisory board</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=selection" title=" selection"> selection</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=director" title=" director"> director</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/102206/supervisory-board-in-the-governance-of-cooperatives-disclosing-power-elements-in-the-selection-of-directors" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/102206.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">174</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6517</span> Board of Directors Gender Diversity, Board Committees and Financial Performance: Evidence from Nigeria</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Aliyu%20Aminu%20Baba">Aliyu Aminu Baba</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Yahaya%20Danjuma"> Yahaya Danjuma</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Ahmad%20Sule%20Liman-Katagum"> Ahmad Sule Liman-Katagum</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This paper examines the effects of the board of directors’ diversity on firm performance. We investigate the relationship between the number of women directors on the board and important board committees and financial performance measured as return on assets. Our statistical analysis supports the theoretical position of the effect diversity on financial performance. These studies enhanced the previous studies on the board of director’s gender diversity, board committees, and its impacts on firm financial performance. The study uses data from eighteen (18) Nigerian commercial banks. The study finds that banks with a higher number of females directors on board and board committees have higher Earning per share(EPS)) and Return on Assets (ROA). It also finds that some banks did not even have a single female on its corporate board. Evidence imply that decisions concerning the appointment of women to corporate boards should be on criteria and financial performance. It is recommended that banks can enhance their financial performance by having more female directors on their corporate board. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title="board of directors">board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=gender%20diversity" title=" gender diversity"> gender diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20committees" title=" board committees"> board committees</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=financial%20performance" title=" financial performance"> financial performance</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/47226/board-of-directors-gender-diversity-board-committees-and-financial-performance-evidence-from-nigeria" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/47226.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">324</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6516</span> Board of Directors of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises to Go Public: Characteristics and Moderating Factors</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Mar%C3%ADa-Jos%C3%A9%20Palacin-Sanchez">María-José Palacin-Sanchez</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Filippo%20Di%20Pietro"> Filippo Di Pietro</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Reyes%20Samaniego-Medina"> Reyes Samaniego-Medina</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This article examines, in an institutional context such as Spanish one, the corporate board structure characteristics and determinants in entrepreneurial firms to go public. Specifically, it explores these issues through all the initial public offerings in the Spanish Alternative Equity Market (MAB), which is a market segment for smaller growing companies. The results show that: a) firm size, age of the company, and the reputation of the auditor and the nominated advisor and Corporate Governance Code favour a larger and more independent board structure that enhances its monitoring functions; and b) leverage, opportunities of growth, sector risk and ownership by executive directors all lead towards a smaller broad of directors where the role of entrepreneurship provided by executive directors remains crucial. This reflects the delicate balance of power between small-business entrepreneurs and financial equity market forces, which demand more transparency and monitoring in the companies. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20composition" title="board composition">board composition</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20size" title=" board size"> board size</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=IPO" title=" IPO"> IPO</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=SMEs" title=" SMEs"> SMEs</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/65556/board-of-directors-of-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-to-go-public-characteristics-and-moderating-factors" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/65556.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">400</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6515</span> Board of Directors Characteristics and Credit Union Financial Performance</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Luisa%20Unda">Luisa Unda</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Kamran%20Ahmed"> Kamran Ahmed</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Paul%20Mather"> Paul Mather</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> We examine the effect of board characteristics on the performance and asset quality of credit unions in Australia, using a large sample covering the period 2004-2012. Credit unions are unique in that they are customer-owned financial institutions and directors are democratically elected by members, which is distinctly different from other financial institutions, such as commercial banks. We find that board remuneration, board expertise, and attendance at board meetings have significantly positive impacts on credit union performance and asset quality, while board members who hold multiple directorships (busy directors), have a significant negative impact on credit union performance. Financial performance also improves with larger boards and long-tenured directors in credit unions. All of these relations hold after we control for alternative measures of performance, credit union characteristics and endogeneity problem. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=credit%20unions" title="credit unions">credit unions</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=financial%20performance" title=" financial performance"> financial performance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Australia" title=" Australia"> Australia</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=asset%20quality" title=" asset quality"> asset quality</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/26547/board-of-directors-characteristics-and-credit-union-financial-performance" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/26547.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">518</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6514</span> Exploring Corporate Governance Structure in Gulf Cooperation Council Countries</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Zahra%20A.%20Al%20Nasser">Zahra A. Al Nasser</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Domenico%20Campa"> Domenico Campa</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This paper investigates board of directors and firms’ ownership structure on non-financial companies listed in Gulf Cooperation council (GCC) countries using data from 2009 to 2013. The overall result of the study is that board size and board meeting have increased over years. Additionally, all combined committee variables have improved as well as audit committee size, audit committee meeting and audit committee experience have improved over the years. Furthermore, Oman is the only country that has not shown any statistically significant change in value of its associated variables. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title="corporate governance">corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=GCC%20countries" title=" GCC countries"> GCC countries</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=ownership%20structure" title=" ownership structure "> ownership structure </a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/20883/exploring-corporate-governance-structure-in-gulf-cooperation-council-countries" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/20883.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">571</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6513</span> Directors’ Compensation: Analyzing the Multilevel Factors That Exert the Greatest Influence</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Isabel%20Acero">Isabel Acero</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Nuria%20Alcalde"> Nuria Alcalde</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The economic crisis and notorious corporate scandals have caused social indignation and sparked the debate concerning the underlying rationality of the compensation that directors receive. In this context, this study examines the determinants of the remuneration of directors in listed Spanish companies using individualized data. A multilevel methodology appropriate for this type of data has been used that allows us to differentiate between inter-company variations and intra-company variations. The results show that company size is the variable (at the company level) that exerts the greatest influence on the level of director´s compensation. One surprising finding is that the presence of independent directors on the board has a positive influence on remuneration. At the individual level, tenure and experience have a significant influence on the level of compensation, while the director´s level of education does not appear to have an effect on it. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title="board of directors">board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=compensation" title=" compensation"> compensation</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=experience" title=" experience"> experience</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=multilevel" title=" multilevel"> multilevel</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=tenure" title=" tenure"> tenure</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/87177/directors-compensation-analyzing-the-multilevel-factors-that-exert-the-greatest-influence" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/87177.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">339</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6512</span> The Link between Corporate Governance and EU Competition Law Enforcement: A Conditional Logistic Regression Analysis of the Role of Diversity, Independence and Corporate Social Responsibility</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Jeroen%20De%20Ceuster">Jeroen De Ceuster</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This study is the first empirical analysis of the link between corporate governance and European Union competition law. Although competition law enforcement is often studied through the lens of competition law, we offer an alternative perspective by looking at a number of corporate governance factor at the level of the board of directors. We find that undertakings where the Chief Executive Officer is also chairman of the board are twice as likely to violate European Union competition law. No significant relationship was found between European Union competition law infringements and gender diversity of the board, the size of the board, the percentage of directors appointed after the Chief Executive Officer, the percentage of independent directors, or the presence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee. This contribution is based on a 1-1 matched peer study. Our sample includes all ultimate parent companies with a board that have been sanctioned by the European Commission for either anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominance for the period from 2004 to 2018. These companies were matched to a company with headquarters in the same country, belongs to the same industry group, is active in the European Economic Area, and is the nearest neighbor to the infringing company in terms of revenue. Our final sample includes 121 pairs. As is common with matched peer studies, we use CLR to analyze the differences within these pairs. The only statistically significant independent variable after controlling for size and performance is CEO/Chair duality. The results indicate that companies whose Chief Executive Officer also functions as chairman of the board are twice as likely to infringe European Union competition law. This is in line with the monitoring theory of the board of directors, which states that its primary function is to monitor top management. Since competition law infringements are mostly organized by management and hidden from board directors, the results suggest that a Chief Executive Officer who is also chairman is more likely to be either complicit in the infringement or less critical towards his day-to-day colleagues and thus impedes proper detection by the board of competition law infringements. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title="corporate governance">corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=competition%20law" title=" competition law"> competition law</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20independence" title=" board independence"> board independence</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=ender%20diversity" title=" ender diversity"> ender diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20social%20responisbility" title=" corporate social responisbility"> corporate social responisbility</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/152363/the-link-between-corporate-governance-and-eu-competition-law-enforcement-a-conditional-logistic-regression-analysis-of-the-role-of-diversity-independence-and-corporate-social-responsibility" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/152363.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">139</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6511</span> The Impact of Board of Directors on CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Saleh%20Alagla">Saleh Alagla</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Murya%20Habbash"> Murya Habbash</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The paper investigates whether the board of directors plays a monitoring role or not in CEO compensation for the UK firms during the eve of the recent financial crisis, 2004-2008. The use of heteroscedastic and autocorrelated error consistent estimation of the panel data shows, surprisingly, that four board characteristics variables are found to play a significant role in increasing the level of CEO compensation. This insightful result would suggest evidence of the managerial power theory in general and the cronyism hypothesis in particular. Moreover, the interesting evidence supporting managerial power perspective is that CEO-Chair duality reduces long-term compensation while increasing short-term compensation, thus suggesting that CEOs are risk averse who prefer short-term compensation to long-term compensation. Finally, consistent with the agency perspective board size is found to increase all compensation variables as expected. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title="corporate governance">corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=CEO%20compensation" title=" CEO compensation"> CEO compensation</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=internal%20governance%20mechanisms" title=" internal governance mechanisms"> internal governance mechanisms</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=agency%20theory" title=" agency theory"> agency theory</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=managerial%20power%20theory" title=" managerial power theory"> managerial power theory</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=cronyism%20hypothesis" title=" cronyism hypothesis "> cronyism hypothesis </a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/80249/the-impact-of-board-of-directors-on-ceo-compensation-evidence-from-the-uk" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/80249.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">804</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6510</span> The Impact of the Board of Directors’ Characteristics on Tax Aggressiveness in USA Companies</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=jihen%20ayadi%20sellami">jihen ayadi sellami</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The rapid evolution of the global financial landscape has led to increased attention to corporate tax policies and the need to understand the factors that influence their tax behavior. In order to mitigate any residual loss for shareholders resulting from tax aggressiveness and resolve the agency problem, appropriate systems that separate the function of management from that of controlling are needed. In this context of growing concerns to limit aggressive corporate taxation practices through governance, this study discusses. Its aims is to examine the influence of six key characteristics of the board of directors (board size, diligence, CEO duality, presence of audit committees, gender diversity and independence of directors), given a governance mechanism, on the tax decisions of non-financial corporations in the United State. In fact, using a sample of 90 non-financial US firms from S&P 500 over a period of 4 years going from 2014 to 2017, the results based on a multivariate linear regression highlight significant associations between these characteristics and corporate tax policy. Notably, larger board, gender diversity, diligence and increased director independence appear to play an important role in reducing aggressive taxation. While duality has a positive and significant correlation with tax aggressiveness, that can be explained by the fact that the manager did properly exploit his specific position within the company. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how board characteristics can influence corporate tax management, providing avenues for more effective corporate governance and more responsible tax decision-making <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=tax%20aggressiveness" title="tax aggressiveness">tax aggressiveness</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20size" title=" board size"> board size</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=CEO%20duality" title=" CEO duality"> CEO duality</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=audit%20committees" title=" audit committees"> audit committees</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=gender%20diversity" title=" gender diversity"> gender diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=director%20independence" title=" director independence"> director independence</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=diligence" title=" diligence"> diligence</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=united%20states" title=" united states"> united states</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/173999/the-impact-of-the-board-of-directors-characteristics-on-tax-aggressiveness-in-usa-companies" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/173999.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">61</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6509</span> Sustainable Development Goals: The Effect of a Board Structure on the Sustainability Performance </h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=V.%20Naciti">V. Naciti</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=L.%20Pulejo"> L. Pulejo</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=F.%20Cesaroni"> F. Cesaroni</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This study empirically analyzes whether the composition of the board of directors (BoD) enhances sustainability performance, in order to understand how the BoD contribute to the integration of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in their businesses. Hypotheses are developed based on the agency theory and stakeholder theory. Using a system generalized method of the moment (SGMM) two-step estimator, with data from Sustainalytics and Compustat databases for 362 firms in six regions, we find that firms with more diversity on the board and a separation of chair and CEO roles have higher sustainability performance. Moreover, our findings provide that a higher number of independent directors is negatively associated with sustainability performance. This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and the firm’s performance by demonstrating that the composition of the board of directors contributes to a better sustainability performance: by the implementation of a particular corporate governance mechanism, it is possible to integrate SDGs in the corporate strategy. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=sustainable%20development%20goals" title="sustainable development goals">sustainable development goals</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=sustainability%20performance" title=" sustainability performance"> sustainability performance</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/103910/sustainable-development-goals-the-effect-of-a-board-structure-on-the-sustainability-performance" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/103910.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">180</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6508</span> The Impact of Political Connections on the Funtion of Independent Directors</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Chih-Lin%20Chang">Chih-Lin Chang</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Tzu-Ching%20Weng"> Tzu-Ching Weng</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between corporate political ties and independent directors' functions. With reference to the literature variables such as the characteristics of the relevant board of directors in the past, a single comprehensive function indicator is established as a substitute variable for the function of independent directors, and the impact of political connection on the independent board of directors is further discussed. This research takes Taiwan listed enterprises from 2014 to 2020 as the main research object and conducts empirical research through descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analysis. The empirical results show that companies with political connections will have a positive impact on the number of independent directors; political connections also have a significant positive relationship with the functional part of independent directors, which means that because companies have political connections, they have a positive impact on the seats or functions of independent directors. will pay more attention and increase their oversight functions. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=political" title="political">political</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=connection" title=" connection"> connection</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=independent" title=" independent"> independent</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=director" title=" director"> director</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=function" title=" function"> function</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/156664/the-impact-of-political-connections-on-the-funtion-of-independent-directors" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/156664.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">97</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6507</span> Toward an Appropriate Index for Corporate Governance</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Bita%20Mashayekhi">Bita Mashayekhi</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Farzaneh%20Jalali"> Farzaneh Jalali</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Alemeh%20Yazdanian"> Alemeh Yazdanian</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This study contributes to identifying the corporate governance indices in previous researches by using content analysis on relevant papers published in 20 top accounting journals according to Google Scholar ranking, dated from 1990 to 2016. For this purpose, 65 papers are scrutinized deeply, and the concepts of corporate governance are coded and categorized. Then extracted indices are clustered into 10 and 51 categories and subcategories, respectively; and their frequencies are determined. Results show that the board of directors’ characteristics is employed more frequently in reviewed papers, and the board of directors’ independency is the most frequent index within the 97 percent of our sample. Duality, board size, and ownership structure have more frequencies in comparison with other extracted corporate governance indices. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title="corporate governance">corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=content%20analysis" title=" content analysis"> content analysis</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance%20index" title=" corporate governance index"> corporate governance index</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=top%20accounting%20journals" title=" top accounting journals"> top accounting journals</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/60498/toward-an-appropriate-index-for-corporate-governance" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/60498.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">354</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6506</span> The Impact of Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, and Cash Holdings on Firm Value with Profitability as Intervening Variable</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Lucy%20Novianti">Lucy Novianti</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of corporate governance, ownership structure, and cash holdings on firm value, either direct or indirect through profitability as an intervening variable for non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2006 to 2014. Samples of 176 firms are chosen based on purposive sampling method. The results of this study conclude that profitability, the size of Audit Committee, audit quality, and cash flow have positive effects on firm value. This study also shows that the meeting frequency of the Board of Directors and free cash flow have negative effects on firm value. In addition, this study finds that the size of the Board of Directors, Independent Commissioner, and ownership structure do not have significant effects on firm value. In this study, the function of profitability as an intervening variable can only be done on the impact of the meeting frequency of the Board of Directors and cash flow on firm value. This study provides a reference for management in decision making concerning the application of corporate governance, cash holdings, and financial performance. Moreover, it can be used as additional information for investors in assessing the feasibility of an investment. Finally, it provides a suggestion for the government regarding the regulation of corporate governance. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=cash%20holdings" title="cash holdings">cash holdings</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=firm%20value" title=" firm value"> firm value</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=ownership%20structure" title=" ownership structure"> ownership structure</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=profitability" title=" profitability"> profitability</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/56601/the-impact-of-corporate-governance-ownership-structure-and-cash-holdings-on-firm-value-with-profitability-as-intervening-variable" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/56601.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">262</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6505</span> The Effect of the 2015 Revision to the Corporate Governance Code on Japanese Listed Firms</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Tomotaka%20Yanagida">Tomotaka Yanagida</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The Corporate Governance Code, revised in 2015, requires firms listed within the first and second sections of Japan’s Tokyo stock exchange to select two or more independent outside directors (the Corporate Governance Code4-8). Therefore, Japanese listed firms must do this or explain the reason why they are not able to do so. This study investigates how the Corporate Governance Code affects Japanese listed firms. We find that the Corporate Governance Code increases the ratio of outside directors by nearly 8.8% for a sample of Japanese firms comprising nearly 4,200 firm-year observations from 2014 to 2015 using a difference-in-differences approach. This implies that they felt it would have been difficult to explain why it was not appropriate to have an outside director at the annual shareholders' meeting. Moreover, this suggests that they appoint outside directors as defined by the Corporate Governance Code, but maintain board size. This situation shows that compliance in Japan may simply be 'window dressing,' that is, more form than substance. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20structure" title="board structure">board structure</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=comply%20or%20explain" title=" comply or explain"> comply or explain</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance%20code" title=" corporate governance code"> corporate governance code</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=soft%20law" title=" soft law"> soft law</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/131186/the-effect-of-the-2015-revision-to-the-corporate-governance-code-on-japanese-listed-firms" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/131186.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">173</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6504</span> Board of Directors' Structure and Corporate Restructuring: A Preliminary Evidences</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Norazlan%20Alias">Norazlan Alias</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Mohd.%20Hasimi%20Yaacob"> Mohd. Hasimi Yaacob</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This study examines the impact of governance structure via corporate restructuring decision on selected firm characteristics and performance. Results of selected ratios that represent corporate decision, governance structure and performance in pre and post restructuring are analyzed for some conclusions. This study uses annual data of companies that are consistently listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia and announced completed corporate restructuring. The results show that only debt ratio is significantly different before and after asset restructuring. This study concludes that firms do not view corporate restructuring namely asset restructuring as an opportunity to simultaneous enhance governance structure that could also contribute enhance firm performance and board of directors’ structure subsequent to asset restructuring only has significantly influence on changing capital structure but not on firm performance. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title="board of directors">board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=capital%20structure" title=" capital structure"> capital structure</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20restructuring" title=" corporate restructuring"> corporate restructuring</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=performance" title=" performance"> performance</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/41291/board-of-directors-structure-and-corporate-restructuring-a-preliminary-evidences" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/41291.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">403</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6503</span> Endogeneity between Shari'ah Governance and Board Governance and Its Impact on Financial Stability</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Sabur%20Mollah">Sabur Mollah</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Asma%20Mobarek"> Asma Mobarek</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This study aims to explore the endogenous relationship between Shari’ah governance and board governance for Islamic banks to identify complementary or substituting relationship between these governance parameters. By using a sample of 161 Islamic Banks from 24 countries for the period of 2005-2013, we show an endogenous relationship between Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) and Board of Directors (BoD). In this relationship, SSB and BoD complement each other. We also show that this complementary relationship between SSB and BoD helps enhance both management and asset quality, but mitigates capital adequacy, earnings, and liquidity in Islamic banks. The study has important implications for financial stability in the Islamic banking system. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Shari%E2%80%99ah%20Supervisory%20Board" title="Shari’ah Supervisory Board">Shari’ah Supervisory Board</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Boards%20of%20Directors" title=" Boards of Directors"> Boards of Directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Islamic%20banking" title=" Islamic banking"> Islamic banking</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=financial%20stability" title=" financial stability"> financial stability</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/108886/endogeneity-between-shariah-governance-and-board-governance-and-its-impact-on-financial-stability" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/108886.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">188</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6502</span> Independent Directors and Board Decisions</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Shital%20Jhunjhunwala">Shital Jhunjhunwala</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Shweta%20Saraf"> Shweta Saraf</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> Research Question: The study, based on a survey, empirically tests the impact of the board’s engagement in the decision-making process on firm outcomes. It also examines the moderating effect of board leadership and board independence on the relationship. Research Findings: Boards’ engagement in the decision-making process is found to be vital for firm performance, wherein effective monitoring by the board outperforms their strategic guidance role in achieving desired outcomes. The separation of CEO and Chairman positively moderates the board’s engagement in protecting stakeholders’ interests, but lack of independence and passive behaviour of independent directors raises concern on the efficacy of independent directors. Theoretical Implications: The study provides the framework for process-oriented corporate governance research, where investigation of boards’ behaviour inside the boardroom develops a deeper understanding of board processes. Practitioner Implications: The study highlights the necessity of developing boards’ focus in a company on monitoring managerial actions. It suggests the need to separate the position of CEO and Chairman for addressing the interest of all stakeholders. It recommends policymakers review the existing mandate on board independence and create alternate monitoring mechanisms for addressing agency conflict. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board" title="board">board</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=decision-making%20process" title=" decision-making process"> decision-making process</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=engagement" title=" engagement"> engagement</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=independence" title=" independence"> independence</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=leadership" title=" leadership"> leadership</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=innovation" title=" innovation"> innovation</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=stakeholders" title=" stakeholders"> stakeholders</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=firm%20performance" title=" firm performance"> firm performance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=qualitative" title=" qualitative"> qualitative</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=India" title=" India"> India</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/148508/independent-directors-and-board-decisions" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/148508.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">109</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6501</span> Analyzing the Impact of Board Diversity on Firm Performance: Case Study of the Nigerian Banking Sector</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Data%20Collete%20Bob-Manuel">Data Collete Bob-Manuel</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> In light of global financial crisis in 2007-2008 various factors including board diversity, succession planning and board evaluation have been identified as essential ingredients in ensuring board effectiveness. The composition and structure of the board is of outmost importance in assessing a board’s ability and success in achieving its objectives. Following the corporate frauds and accounting scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, Oceanic Bank Nigeria and AfriBank Nigeria, there has been a notable amount of research about the effectiveness of the board of directors in the corporate governance of firms. The need to have an effective board cannot be over emphasized as it results in a more stable and thriving company. There has been an overarching need in the business world for a more diverse workforce and board of directors. Big corporations like Texaco, Ford Motors and DuPont have stated how diversity at every level of the workforce including the board of directors has been cited as a vital element for a company to succeed. Developed countries are also seeking for companies to have a more diverse board. For instance Norway has implemented a 60:40 board ratio to all companies. In West Africa, particularly Nigeria, the topic of diversity has received little attention as most studies conducted have focused on the gender aspect of diversity, which results found to have a negative impact on firm performance. This paper seeks to examine four variables of diversity; age, ethnicity, gender and skills to weigh the positive or negative impact the variables have on firm performance, based on evidence from the Nigerian Financial sector. Information used for this study will be gathered from financial statements and annual reports so as to enable the researcher to reflect on past years to know what is being done differently today. The findings of this study will help the researcher to develop a working definition for ethnicity with regards to the West African context where the issue of “tribe” is a sensitive topic. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Board%20of%20Directors" title="Board of Directors">Board of Directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Board%20Diversity" title=" Board Diversity"> Board Diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Firm%20Performance" title=" Firm Performance"> Firm Performance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Nigeria" title=" Nigeria"> Nigeria</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/66797/analyzing-the-impact-of-board-diversity-on-firm-performance-case-study-of-the-nigerian-banking-sector" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/66797.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">396</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6500</span> Board Gender Diversity and Firm Sustainable Investment: An Empirical Evidence </h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Muhammad%20Atif">Muhammad Atif</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=M.%20Samsul%20Alam"> M. Samsul Alam</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of board room gender diversity on firm sustainable investment. We test the extent to which sustainable investment is affected by the presence of female directors on U.S. corporate boards. Using data of S&P 1500 indexed firms collected from Bloomberg covering the period 2004-2016, we estimate the baseline model to investigate the effects of board room gender diversity on firm sustainable investment. We find a positive relationship between board gender diversity and sustainable investment. We also find that boards with two or more women have a pronounced impact on sustainable investment, consistent with the critical mass theory. Female independent directors have a stronger impact on sustainable investment than female executive directors. Our findings are robust to different identification and estimation techniques. The study offers another perspective of the ongoing debate in the social responsibility literature about the accountability relationships between business and society. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=sustainable%20investment" title="sustainable investment">sustainable investment</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=gender%20diversity" title=" gender diversity"> gender diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=environmental%20proctection" title=" environmental proctection"> environmental proctection</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=social%20responsibility" title=" social responsibility"> social responsibility</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/117360/board-gender-diversity-and-firm-sustainable-investment-an-empirical-evidence" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/117360.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">162</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6499</span> Corporate Governance and Audit Report Lag: The Case of Tunisian Listed Companies</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Lajmi%20Azhaar">Lajmi Azhaar</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Yab%20Mdallelah"> Yab Mdallelah</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This study examines the Tunisian market in which recent events, notably financial scandals, provide an appropriate framework for studying the impact of corporate governance on the audit report lag. Moreover, very little research has been done to examine this relationship in this context. The objective of this work is, therefore, to understand the factors influencing audit report lag, drawing primarily on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which shows that the characteristics of the board of directors have an impact on the report lag (independence, diligence, and size). In addition, the characteristics of the committee also have an impact on the audit report lag (size, independence, diligence, and expertise). Therefore, our research provides empirical evidence on the impact of governance mechanisms attributes on audit report lag. Using a sample of forty-seven (47) Tunisian companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange (BVMT) during the period from 2014 to 2019, and basing on the GMM method of the dynamic panel, multivariate analysis shows that most corporate governance attributes have a significant effect on audit report lag. Specifically, the audit committee diligence and the audit committee expertise have a significant and positive effect on audit report lag. But the diligence of the board has a significant and negative effect on audit report lag. However, this study finds no evidence that the audit committee independence, the size, independence, and diligence of the director’s board are associated with the audit report lag. In addition, the results of this study also show that there is a significant effect of some control variables. Finally, we are contributing to this study by using the GMM method of the dynamic panel. We are also using an emerging context that is very poorly developed and exploited by previous studies. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=governance%20mechanisms" title="governance mechanisms">governance mechanisms</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=audit%20committee" title=" audit committee"> audit committee</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=audit%20report%20lag" title=" audit report lag"> audit report lag</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/134412/corporate-governance-and-audit-report-lag-the-case-of-tunisian-listed-companies" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/134412.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">174</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6498</span> The Impact of Board Characteristics on Firm Performance: Evidence from Banking Industry in India</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Manmeet%20Kaur">Manmeet Kaur</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Madhu%20Vij"> Madhu Vij</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The Board of Directors in a firm performs the primary role of an internal control mechanism. This Study seeks to understand the relationship between internal governance and performance of banks in India. The research paper investigates the effect of board structure (proportion of nonexecutive directors, gender diversity, board size and meetings per year) on the firm performance. This paper evaluates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on bank’s financial performance using panel data for 28 listed banks in National Stock Exchange of India for the period of 2008-2014. Returns on Asset, Return on Equity, Tobin’s Q and Net Interest Margin were used as the financial performance indicators. To estimate the relationship among governance and bank performance initially the Study uses Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Estimation and Generalized Least Square (GLS) Estimation. Then a well-developed panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimator is developed to investigate the dynamic nature of performance and governance relationship. The Study empirically confirms that two-step system GMM approach controls the problem of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity as compared to the OLS and GLS approach. The result suggests that banks with small board, boards with female members, and boards that meet more frequently tend to be more efficient and subsequently have a positive impact on performance of banks. The study offers insights to policy makers interested in enhancing the quality of governance of banks in India. Also, the findings suggest that board structure plays a vital role in the improvement of corporate governance mechanism for financial institutions. There is a need to have efficient boards in banks to improve the overall health of the financial institutions and the economic development of the country. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title="board of directors">board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=GMM%20estimation" title=" GMM estimation"> GMM estimation</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Indian%20banking" title=" Indian banking"> Indian banking</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/50349/the-impact-of-board-characteristics-on-firm-performance-evidence-from-banking-industry-in-india" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/50349.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">260</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6497</span> The Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Extent and Quality: The Case of Jordan</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Hani%20Alkayed">Hani Alkayed</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Belal%20Omar"> Belal Omar</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Eileen%20Roddy"> Eileen Roddy</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This study focuses on investigating the determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) extent and quality in Jordan. The study examines factors that influence CSR disclosure extent and quality, such as corporate characteristics (size, gearing, firm’s age, and industry type), corporate governance (board size, number of meetings, non-executive directors, female directors in the board, family directors in the board, foreign members, audit committee, type of external auditors, and CEO duality) and ownership structure (government ownership, institutional ownership, and ownership concentration). Legitimacy theory is utilised as the main theory for our theoretical framework. A quantitative approach is adopted for this research and content analysis technique is used to gather CSR disclosure extent and quality from the annual reports. The sample is withdrawn from the annual reports of 118 Jordanian companies over the period of 2010-2015. A CSRD index is constructed, and includes the disclosures of the following categories; environmental, human resources, product and consumers, and community involvement. A 7 point-scale measurement was developed to examine the quality of disclosure, were 0= No Disclosures, 1= General disclosures, (Non-monetary), 2= General disclosures, (Non-monetary) with pictures, charts, and graphs 3= Descriptive/ qualitative disclosures, specific details (Non-monetary), 4= Descriptive/ qualitative disclosures, specific details with pictures, charts, and graphs, 5= Numeric disclosures, full descriptions with supporting numbers, 6= Numeric disclosures, full descriptions with supporting numbers, pictures, and Charts. This study fills the gap in the literature regarding CSRD in Jordan, and the fact that all the previous studies have ignored a clear categorisation as a measurement of quality. The result shows that the extent of CSRD is higher than the quality in Jordan. Regarding the determinants of CSR disclosures, the followings were found to have a significant relationship with both extent and quality of CSRD except non-executives, were the significant relationship was found just with the extent of CSRD: board size, non-executive directors, firm’s age, foreign members on the board, number of boards meetings, the presence of audit committees, big 4, government ownership, firm’s size, industry type. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=content%20analysis" title="content analysis">content analysis</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20social%20responsibility%20disclosure" title=" corporate social responsibility disclosure"> corporate social responsibility disclosure</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Jordan" title=" Jordan"> Jordan</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=quality%20of%20disclosure" title=" quality of disclosure"> quality of disclosure</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/85826/the-determinants-of-corporate-social-responsibility-disclosure-extent-and-quality-the-case-of-jordan" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/85826.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">230</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6496</span> The Effect of Corporate Governance to Islamic Banking Performance Using Maqasid Index Approach in Indonesia</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Audia%20Syafa%27atur%20Rahman">Audia Syafa'atur Rahman</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Rozali%20Haron"> Rozali Haron</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The practices of Islamic banking are more attuned to the goals of profit maximization rather than obtaining ethical profit. Ethical profit is obtained from interest-free earnings and to give an impact which benefits to the growth of society and economy. Good corporate governance practices are needed to assure the sustainability of Islamic banks in order to achieve Maqasid Shariah with the main purpose of boosting the well-being of people. The Maqasid Shariah performance measurement is used to measure the duties and responsibilities expected to be performed by Islamic banks. It covers not only unification dimension like financial measurement, but also many dimensions covered to reflect the main purpose of Islamic banks. The implementation of good corporate governance is essential because it covers the interests of the stakeholders and facilitates effective monitoring to encourage Islamic banks to utilize resources more efficiently in order to achieve the Maqasid Shariah. This study aims to provide the empirical evidence on the Maqasid performance of Islamic banks in relation to the Maqasid performance evaluation model, to examine the influence of SSB characteristics and board structures to Islamic Banks performance as measured by Maqasid performance evaluation model. By employing the simple additive weighting method, Maqasid index for all the Islamic Banks in Indonesia within 2012 to 2016 ranged from above 11% to 28%. The Maqasid Syariah performance index where results reached above 20% are obtained by Islamic Banks such as Bank Muamalat Indonesia, Bank Panin Syariah, and Bank BRI Syariah. The consistent achievement above 23% is achieved by BMI. Other Islamic Banks such as Bank Victoria Syariah, Bank Jabar Banten Syariah, Bank BNI Syariah, Bank Mega Syariah, BCA Syariah, and Maybank Syariah Indonesia shows a fluctuating value of the Maqasid performance index every year. The impact of SSB characteristics and board structures are tested using random-effects generalized least square. The findings indicate that SSB characteristics (Shariah Supervisory Board size, Shariah Supervisory Board cross membership, Shariah Supervisory Board Education, and Shariah Supervisory Board reputation) and board structures (Board size and Board independence) have an essential role in improving the performance of Islamic Banks. The findings denote Shariah Supervisory Board with smaller size, higher portion of Shariah Supervisory Board cross membership; lesser Shariah Supervisory Board holds doctorate degree, lesser reputable scholar, more members on board of directors, and less independence non-executive directors will enhance the performance of Islamic Banks. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Maqasid%20Shariah" title="Maqasid Shariah">Maqasid Shariah</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Islamic%20banks" title=" Islamic banks"> Islamic banks</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Shariah%20supervisory%20board" title=" Shariah supervisory board"> Shariah supervisory board</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/89994/the-effect-of-corporate-governance-to-islamic-banking-performance-using-maqasid-index-approach-in-indonesia" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/89994.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">240</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6495</span> On the Limits of Board Diversity: Impact of Network Effect on Director Appointments</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Vijay%20Marisetty">Vijay Marisetty</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Poonam%20Singh"> Poonam Singh</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> Research on the effect of director's network connections on investor welfare is inconclusive. Some studies suggest that directors' connections are beneficial, in terms of, improving earnings information, firms valuation for new investors. On the other hand, adverse effects of directorial networks are also reported, in terms of higher earnings management, options back dating fraud, reduction in firm performance, lower board monitoring. From regulatory perspective, the role of directorial networks on corporate welfare is crucial. Cognizant of the possible ill effects associated with directorial networks, large investors, for better representation on the boards, are building their own database of prospective directors who are highly qualified, however, sourced from outside the highly connected directorial labor market. For instance, following Dodd-Frank Reform Act, California Public Employees' Retirement Systems (CalPERs) has initiated a database for registering aspiring and highly qualified directors to nominate them for board seats (proxy access). Our paper stems from this background and tries to explore the chances of outside directors getting directorships who lack established network connections. The paper is able to identify such aspiring directors' information by accessing a unique Indian data sourced from an online portal that aims to match the supply of registered aspirants with the growing demand for outside directors in India. The online portal's tie-up with stock exchanges ensures firms to access the new pool of directors. Such direct access to the background details of aspiring directors over a period of 10 years, allows us to examine the chances of aspiring directors without corporate network, to enter directorial network. Using this resume data of 16105 aspiring corporate directors in India, who have no prior board experience in the directorial labor market, the paper analyses the entry dynamics in corporate directors' labor market. The database also allows us to investigate the value of corporate network by comparing non-network new entrants with incumbent networked directors. The study develops measures of network centrality and network degree based on merit, i.e. network of individuals belonging to elite educational institutions, like Indian Institute of Management (IIM) or Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) and based on job or company, i.e. network of individuals serving in the same company. The paper then measures the impact of these networks on the appointment of first time directors and subsequent appointment of directors. The paper reports the following main results: 1. The likelihood of becoming a corporate director, without corporate network strength, is only 1 out 100 aspirants. This is inspite of comparable educational background and similar duration of corporate experience; 2. Aspiring non-network directors' elite educational ties help them to secure directorships. However, for post-board appointments, their newly acquired corporate network strength overtakes as their main determinant for subsequent board appointments and compensation. The results thus highlight the limitations in increasing board diversity. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=aspiring%20corporate%20directors" title="aspiring corporate directors">aspiring corporate directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20diversity" title=" board diversity"> board diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=director%20labor%20market" title=" director labor market"> director labor market</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=director%20networks" title=" director networks"> director networks</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/67725/on-the-limits-of-board-diversity-impact-of-network-effect-on-director-appointments" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/67725.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">312</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6494</span> The Impact of Board Director Characteristics on the Quality of Information Disclosure</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Guo%20Jinhong">Guo Jinhong</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The purpose of this study is to explore the association between board member functions and information disclosure levels. Based on the literature variables, such as the characteristics of the board of directors in the past, a single comprehensive indicator is established as a substitute variable for board functions, and the information disclosure evaluation results published by the Securities and Foundation are used to measure the information disclosure level of the company. This study focuses on companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2010 and uses descriptive statistical analysis, univariate analysis, correlation analysis and ordered normal probability (Ordered Probit) regression for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the function of board members and the level of information disclosure. This study also conducts a sensitivity test and draws similar conclusions, showing that boards with better board member functions have higher levels of information disclosure. In addition, this study also found that higher board independence, lower director shareholding pledge ratio, higher director shareholding ratio, and directors with rich professional knowledge and practical experience can help improve the level of information disclosure. The empirical results of this study provide strong support for the "relative regulations to improve the level of information disclosure" formulated by the competent authorities in recent years. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=function%20of%20board%20members" title="function of board members">function of board members</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=information%20disclosure" title=" information disclosure"> information disclosure</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=securities" title=" securities"> securities</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=foundation" title=" foundation"> foundation</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/156932/the-impact-of-board-director-characteristics-on-the-quality-of-information-disclosure" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/156932.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">97</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6493</span> The Characteristics of the Chairman of Board of Directors That Are Associated with Better Levels of Performance</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Abilio%20Pires%20Zacarias">Abilio Pires Zacarias</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> Analyzing company boards of directors is a relevant and timely topic. As the representative of shareholders, the board is the most senior management body of this type of company. Therefore, ascertaining the best kind of candidates to nominate, namely the most appropriate characteristics for leading the board to achieve better levels of performance, is certainly of great interest. The companies selected for this study were the 1,000 largest non-financial companies and the 100 largest financial companies in Portugal according to the Instituto Nacional de Estatística for 2010. The information stemmed from a questionnaire addressed to the person in charge of daily company management and then processed through STATA 17 with the multivariate analysis of variables - MANOVA. The study may correspondingly report that the vast majority of boards in the sample operate a dual leadership structure. By in terms of its prevalence, unitary leadership represents only a minority. Agency theory and stewardship theory postulate different characteristics for the ideal chairman but neither receive confirmation from our results. On the other hand, our findings do validate the behavioral theory of firms (BToF), concluding that experience is associated with organizational performance. This study is also relevant due to its analysis of companies not listed on the financial markets not only because of their weighting in the economy but also because they remain only very poorly studied in this field and thus also correspondingly contributing to deepening the literature. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=agency%20theory" title="agency theory">agency theory</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=behavioral%20theory%20of%20the%20firm" title=" behavioral theory of the firm"> behavioral theory of the firm</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=stewardship%20theory" title=" stewardship theory"> stewardship theory</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/143339/the-characteristics-of-the-chairman-of-board-of-directors-that-are-associated-with-better-levels-of-performance" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/143339.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">181</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6492</span> What Determine Corporate Board Diligence: Evidence from Sultanate of Oman</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Badar%20Khalid%20Hakim%20Alshabibi">Badar Khalid Hakim Alshabibi</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This study aims to examine the determinants of corporate board diligence in the listed firm in Sultanate of Oman, using four corporate board characteristics, the board size, board independence, board gender diversity, and nationality diversity. Design/methodology/approach: Using a sample comprised of all companies listed in the Muscat Securities Exchange over a ten-year period (2009–2019), the study applies Pooled OLS regression to examine the determinants of corporate board diligence. Findings: Drawing from the agency theory and institutional theory, the results reveal that the number of independent board members had statistical significance, suggesting that board independence can improve corporate board diligence, though board size and nationality diversity were found to have a negative association with corporate board diligence. There is no evidence, however, that board gender diversity improves corporate board diligence. Practical implications: The study provides insights for both the investors and regulatory authorities in developing economies. For the investors to be aware about the corporate board characteristics which enhance board monitoring, and for the regulatory authorities to consider revising the corporate governance codes which enhance the quality of governance practices. Originality/value: The study provides new evidence documenting the determinants of corporate board diligence in a developing country such as the Sultanate of Oman, which has a high potential for growth and attracting foreign investment, as stated in Oman vision 2040. In addition, this paper is the first to examine the association between corporate board diligence and corporate board diversity aspects. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20diligence" title="board diligence">board diligence</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20monitoring" title="board monitoring">board monitoring</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20composition" title="board composition">board composition</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20diversity" title="board diversity">board diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=oman" title="oman">oman</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/140877/what-determine-corporate-board-diligence-evidence-from-sultanate-of-oman" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/140877.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">218</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6491</span> Gender Quotas in Italy: Effects on Corporate Performance</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=G.%20Bruno">G. Bruno</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=A.%20Ciavarella"> A. Ciavarella</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=N.%20Linciano"> N. Linciano</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> The proportion of women in boardroom has traditionally been low around the world. Over the last decades, several jurisdictions opted for active intervention, which triggered a tangible progress in female representation. In Europe, many countries have implemented boardroom diversity policies in the form of legal quotas (Norway, Italy, France, Germany) or governance code amendments (United Kingdom, Finland). Policy actions rest, among other things, on the assumption that gender balanced boards result in improved corporate governance and performance. The investigation of the relationship between female boardroom representation and firm value is therefore key on policy grounds. The evidence gathered so far, however, has not produced conclusive results also because empirical studies on the impact of voluntary female board representation had to tackle with endogeneity, due to either differences in unobservable characteristics across firms that may affect their gender policies and governance choices, or potential reverse causality. In this paper, we study the relationship between the presence of female directors and corporate performance in Italy, where the Law 120/2011 envisaging mandatory quotas has introduced an exogenous shock in board composition which may enable to overcome reverse causality. Our sample comprises Italian firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange and the members of their board of directors over the period 2008-2016. The study relies on two different databases, both drawn from CONSOB, referring respectively to directors and companies’ characteristics. On methodological grounds, information on directors is treated at the individual level, by matching each company with its directors every year. This allows identifying all time-invariant, possibly correlated, elements of latent heterogeneity that vary across firms and board members, such as the firm immaterial assets and the directors’ skills and commitment. Moreover, we estimate dynamic panel data specifications, so accommodating non-instantaneous adjustments of firm performance and gender diversity to institutional and economic changes. In all cases, robust inference is carried out taking into account the bidimensional clustering of observations over companies and over directors. The study shows the existence of a U-shaped impact of the percentage of women in the boardroom on profitability, as measured by Return On Equity (ROE) and Return On Assets. Female representation yields a positive impact when it exceeds a certain threshold, ranging between about 18% and 21% of the board members, depending on the specification. Given the average board size, i.e., around ten members over the time period considered, this would imply that a significant effect of gender diversity on corporate performance starts to emerge when at least two women hold a seat. This evidence supports the idea underpinning the critical mass theory, i.e., the hypothesis that women may influence. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=gender%20diversity" title="gender diversity">gender diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=quotas" title=" quotas"> quotas</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=firms%20performance" title=" firms performance"> firms performance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title=" corporate governance"> corporate governance</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/89676/gender-quotas-in-italy-effects-on-corporate-performance" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/89676.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">170</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6490</span> Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence in the French Context</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Elhem%20Zaatir">Elhem Zaatir</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Taher%20Hamza"> Taher Hamza</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> Several governments seek to implement gender parity on boards, but the results of doing so are not clear and could harm corporations and economies. The present paper aims to investigate the relationship between women’s presence on boards and firms’ performance in the context of the French listed firms during the quota period. A dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation is applied to control the endogenous effect of board structure and reverse the causality impact of the financial performance. Our results show that the impact of gender diversity manifests in conflicting directions, positively affecting accounting performance and negatively influencing market performance. These results suggest that female directors create economic value, but the market discounts their impact. Apparently, they are subject to a biased evaluation by the market, which undervalues their presence on boards. Added to that, our results confirm a twofold nature of female representation in the French market. The effect of female directorship on firm performance varies with the affiliation of the directors. In other words, the positive impact of gender diversity on return on assets primarily originates from the positive effect of non-family-affiliated women directors on market performance rather than on the effect of family-affiliated women directors on ROA. Finally, according to our results, women’s demographic attributes namely the level of education and multiple directorships strongly and positively impact firm performance as measured by return on assets (ROA). Obviously, women directors seem to be appointed to the business case rather than as token directors. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=corporate%20governance" title="corporate governance">corporate governance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20of%20directors" title=" board of directors"> board of directors</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=women" title=" women"> women</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=gender%20diversity" title=" gender diversity"> gender diversity</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=demographic%20attributes" title=" demographic attributes"> demographic attributes</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=firm%20performance" title=" firm performance"> firm performance</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/97605/demographic-diversity-in-the-boardroom-and-firm-performance-empirical-evidence-in-the-french-context" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/97605.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">126</span> </span> </div> </div> <div class="card paper-listing mb-3 mt-3"> <h5 class="card-header" style="font-size:.9rem"><span class="badge badge-info">6489</span> The Effects of Corporate Governance on Firm’s Financial Performance: A Study of Family and Non-family Owned Firms in Pakistan</h5> <div class="card-body"> <p class="card-text"><strong>Authors:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Saad%20Bin%20Nasir">Saad Bin Nasir</a> </p> <p class="card-text"><strong>Abstract:</strong></p> This research will examine the impact of corporate governance on firm performance in family and non-family owned firms in Pakistan. For the purpose of this research, corporate governance mechanisms which included are board size, board composition, leadership structure, board meetings are taken as independent variable and firm performance taken as dependent variable and it will be measured with return on asset and return on equity. Firm size and firm’s age will be taken as control variables. Secondary data will collect from audited annul reports of companies and panel data regression model will applied, to check the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. <p class="card-text"><strong>Keywords:</strong> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20size" title="board size">board size</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20composition" title=" board composition"> board composition</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=Leadership%20Structure" title=" Leadership Structure"> Leadership Structure</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=board%20meetings" title=" board meetings"> board meetings</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=firm%20performance" title=" firm performance"> firm performance</a>, <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=family%20and%20non-family%20owned%20firms" title=" family and non-family owned firms"> family and non-family owned firms</a> </p> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/41248/the-effects-of-corporate-governance-on-firms-financial-performance-a-study-of-family-and-non-family-owned-firms-in-pakistan" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">Procedia</a> <a href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/41248.pdf" target="_blank" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm">PDF</a> <span class="bg-info text-light px-1 py-1 float-right rounded"> Downloads <span class="badge badge-light">373</span> </span> </div> </div> <ul class="pagination"> <li class="page-item disabled"><span class="page-link">&lsaquo;</span></li> <li class="page-item active"><span class="page-link">1</span></li> <li class="page-item"><a class="page-link" href="https://publications.waset.org/abstracts/search?q=size%20of%20the%20board%20of%20directors&page=2">2</a></li> <li class="page-item"><a class="page-link" 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