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What are words? That these questions have not received much attention is rather surprising: after all, philosophers and linguists frequently appeal to considerations about word and sentence identity in connection with a variety of puzzles and problems that are foundational to the very subject matter of philosophy of language and linguistics.1 Kaplan’s attention to words is thus to be applauded. And there is no doubt that his discussion contains many<span id="HAWOW-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAWOW-abstract2").show();$("HAWOW-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HAWOW-abstract2" style="display:none"> useful insights. Nevertheless, we find his picture deeply flawed for a variety of crosscutting reasons. Our aim in this paper is to further advance an understanding of the nature of words, both by remedying the problems with Kaplan’s account, and also by achieving a suitable perspective on what the metaphysical investigation of word identity can hope to achieve. Our discussion divides into four parts. In Part One, we examine and critique Kaplan’s discussion of a contrast integral to his own account: that between the type-token and the stage-continuant conceptions of words. In Part Two, we present three constraints on any account of words and two further themes in Kaplan’s discussion central to his conception of words – the role of repetition and the constitutive authority of intentions. While these ideas have laudable motivations, we argue they are far from the best way of making good on the insights that drive them. The final two sections take a skeptical turn. In Part Three, we express doubt about Kaplan’s presumption of the importance of what he calls ‘common currency names’, thus raising a suspicion that he may be in pursuit of chimera. Finally, in Part Four, we express pessimism about whether interesting answers to question above will be forthcoming, and suggest that the legitimacy of our word ontology need not depend on the availability of such answers. Along the way, we tease apart a number of metaphysical questions in the vicinity of the topic of word individuation – questions that are often not disentangled – and consider how the discussion of the previous parts bears on them.. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAWOW-abstract2").hide();$("HAWOW-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/HAWOW"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HAWOW" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HAWOW')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HAWOW" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HAWOW','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/HAWOW"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 67 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HAWOW"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVAIPAR" onclick="ee('click','VAIPAR')" onmouseover="ee('over','VAIPAR')" onmouseout="ee('out','VAIPAR')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/VAIPAR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Perceiving and responding to embarrassing predicaments across languages: Cultural influences on the mental lexicon.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jyotsna Vaid" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Jyotsna%20Vaid"><span class="name">Jyotsna Vaid</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hyun Choi" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Hyun%20Choi"><span class="name">Hyun Choi</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hsin-Chin Chen" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Hsin-Chin%20Chen"><span class="name">Hsin-Chin Chen</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael Friedman" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael%20Friedman"><span class="name">Michael Friedman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2008</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Mental Lexicon</em> 3 (1):121-147.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The experience of embarrassment was explored in two experiments comparing monolingual and bilingual speakers from cultures varying in the degree of elabo- ration of the embarrassment lexicon. In Experiment 1, narratives in English or Korean depicting three types of embarrassing predicaments were to be rated on their embarrassability and humorousness by Korean-English bilinguals, Korean monolinguals, and Euro-American monolinguals. All groups judged certain predicaments (involving social gaffes) to be the most embarrassing. However, significant group and language differences occurred in judgments of<span id="VAIPAR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VAIPAR-abstract2").show();$("VAIPAR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VAIPAR-abstract2" style="display:none"> the inten- sity of embarrassment and amusement judgments evoked. Euro-Americans ex- hibited higher overall levels of amusement than the two Korean groups who, in turn, reported higher levels of embarrassment, particularly for certain predica- ment types and contexts (ingroup members present). Further, for the bilinguals, inept performance predicaments in English were judged more embarrassing than those in Korean, whereas all predicament types were judged more amusing when framed with English emotion labels. Bilinguals also appeared to show a heightened embarrassability relative to both monolingual groups. Experiment 2 found lexical selection differences in open-ended responses to embarrassing predicaments depicted in each language, with Euro-Americans preferring to give justifications or use humor to minimize the embarrassment and Korean-English bilinguals preferring to give apologies or say nothing. The findings are interpret- ed to reflect the influence of culturally-mediated schemas guiding the activation and processing of emotion vocabulary. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VAIPAR-abstract2").hide();$("VAIPAR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/VAIPAR"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VAIPAR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VAIPAR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VAIPAR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VAIPAR','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/VAIPAR"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VAIPAR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKUHOTV" onclick="ee('click','KUHOTV')" onmouseover="ee('over','KUHOTV')" onmouseout="ee('out','KUHOTV')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KUHOTV"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">On the Very Idea of a Minimal Proposition.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hsiu-Lin Ku" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Hsiu-Lin%20Ku"><span class="name">Hsiu-Lin Ku</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2017</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">NTU Philosophical Review</em> 53:35-74.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off,<span id="KUHOTV-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KUHOTV-abstract2").show();$("KUHOTV-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KUHOTV-abstract2" style="display:none"> invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KUHOTV-abstract2").hide();$("KUHOTV-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KUHOTV"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KUHOTV" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KUHOTV')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KUHOTV" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KUHOTV','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KUHOTV"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eRABSFT" onclick="ee('click','RABSFT')" onmouseover="ee('over','RABSFT')" onmouseout="ee('out','RABSFT')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/RABSFT"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Structural fixed-point theorems.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Brian Rabern" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Brian%20Rabern"><span class="name">Brian Rabern</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Landon Rabern" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Landon%20Rabern"><span class="name">Landon Rabern</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The semantic paradoxes are associated with self-reference or referential circularity. However, there are infinitary versions of the paradoxes, such as Yablo's paradox, that do not involve this form of circularity. It remains an open question what relations of reference between collections of sentences afford the structure necessary for paradoxicality -- these are the so-called "dangerous" directed graphs. Building on Rabern, et. al (2013) we reformulate this problem in terms of fixed points of certain functions, thereby boiling it down to get<span id="RABSFT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("RABSFT-abstract2").show();$("RABSFT-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="RABSFT-abstract2" style="display:none"> a purely mathematical problem. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("RABSFT-abstract2").hide();$("RABSFT-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/RABSFT"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-RABSFT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('RABSFT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-RABSFT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('RABSFT','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-RABSFT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBENPAT-21" onclick="ee('click','BENPAT-21')" onmouseover="ee('over','BENPAT-21')" onmouseout="ee('out','BENPAT-21')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BENPAT-21"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Samuel%20Bendeck Sotillos"><span class="name">Samuel Bendeck Sotillos</span></a> (ed.) - <span class="pubYear">2013</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, presents<span id="BENPAT-21-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BENPAT-21-abstract2").show();$("BENPAT-21-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BENPAT-21-abstract2" style="display:none"> the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BENPAT-21-abstract2").hide();$("BENPAT-21-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BENPAT-21"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BENPAT-21" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BENPAT-21')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BENPAT-21" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BENPAT-21','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BENPAT-21"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBRIQWI" onclick="ee('click','BRIQWI')" onmouseover="ee('over','BRIQWI')" onmouseout="ee('out','BRIQWI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-04</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BRIQWI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">All Worlds in One: Reassessing the Forest-Armstrong Argument.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Phillip Bricker" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Phillip%20Bricker"><span class="name">Phillip Bricker</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BRIMME">Modal Matters: Essays in Metaphysics</a></em>. Oxford: OUP. pp. 278-314.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The Forrest-Armstrong argument, as reconfigured by David Lewis, is a reductio against an unrestricted principle of recombination. There is a gap in the argument which Lewis thought could be bridged by an appeal to recombination. After presenting the argument, I show that no plausible principle of recombination can bridge the gap. But other plausible principles of plenitude can bridge the gap, both principles of plenitude for world contents and principles of plenitude for world structures. I conclude that the Forrest-Armstrong argument,<span id="BRIQWI-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BRIQWI-abstract2").show();$("BRIQWI-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BRIQWI-abstract2" style="display:none"> when fortified in one of these ways, demands that unrestricted recombination be rejected. The appropriate restriction comes from a consideration of what world structures are possible. I argue that, although there are too many worlds to form a set, for any world, the individuals at that world do form a set. To defend it I invoke a principle of Limitation of Size together with an iterative conception of structure. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BRIQWI-abstract2").hide();$("BRIQWI-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BRIQWI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BRIQWI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BRIQWI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BRIQWI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BRIQWI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/BRIQWI"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BRIQWI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eHAMOGS" onclick="ee('click','HAMOGS')" onmouseover="ee('over','HAMOGS')" onmouseout="ee('out','HAMOGS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-04</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/HAMOGS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">On Galen Strawson's central approach to the self.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Manhal Hamdo" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Manhal%20Hamdo"><span class="name">Manhal Hamdo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2023</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Theoria</em> 89 (1):42-56.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The crux of this paper is to provide a concentrated critical evaluation of Galen Strawson's innovative approach to the self. To that end, I will first attempt to concisely introduce his general thesis, which seems appropriate to be broken up into two major pieces: the phenomenology (experience) of the self, what the self would have to be; and the metaphysics of the self (i.e., a query refers to its metaphysics [its existence and nature]: whether there is any). Explaining and discussing<span id="HAMOGS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAMOGS-abstract2").show();$("HAMOGS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HAMOGS-abstract2" style="display:none"> Strawson's twofold account of the self is my first target in this paper. And it is with these two parts that I take issues. Accordingly, I shall determinedly try to develop a counterargument according to which Strawson's establishment of his entire enterprise of the self is based merely on unjustified intuitive generalisation. Next, I will put more effort into making some more argumentative points, mainly to show how his metaphysics does not give much thought to some vital matters of the self in comparison with the systems of metaphysics of his forebears of Western philosophers. What all this means is that Strawsonian metaphysical analysis of the self so conceived and so described appears philosophically to drive itself to justly be placed in an ahistorical context. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAMOGS-abstract2").hide();$("HAMOGS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/HAMOGS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HAMOGS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HAMOGS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HAMOGS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HAMOGS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HAMOGS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLEBCAS" onclick="ee('click','LEBCAS')" onmouseover="ee('over','LEBCAS')" onmouseout="ee('out','LEBCAS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-04</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/LEBCAS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Citizens and States in Spinoza’s Political Treatise.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael LeBuffe" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael%20LeBuffe"><span class="name">Michael LeBuffe</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Mind</em> 130 (519):809-832.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In his Political Treatise, Spinoza repeatedly compares states to human beings. In this interpretation of the comparisons, I present a progressively more restrictive account of Spinoza’s views about the nature of human beings in the Ethics and show at each step how those views inform the account of states in the Political Treatise. Because, like human beings, states are individuals, they strive to persevere in existence. Because, like human beings, states are composed of parts that are individuals, states' parts also<span id="LEBCAS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LEBCAS-abstract2").show();$("LEBCAS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LEBCAS-abstract2" style="display:none"> strive to persevere in being. Finally, because in states, as in human beings, a change to the power of striving of a part can be at the same time a change to the whole that differs in kind, strong states can be bad for their citizens and states that serve their citizens well may nevertheless be weak. Spinoza’s principal project in the Political Treatise is to design states that are stable and good for their citizens. This account of the comparisons shows why that project is so difficult: one cannot design a good state simply by designing a stable state. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LEBCAS-abstract2").hide();$("LEBCAS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/LEBCAS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LEBCAS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LEBCAS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LEBCAS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LEBCAS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LEBCAS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBOLAMP" onclick="ee('click','BOLAMP')" onmouseover="ee('over','BOLAMP')" onmouseout="ee('out','BOLAMP')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BOLAMP"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">A Monist Proposal: Against Integrative Pluralism About Protein Structure.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Agnes Bolinska" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Agnes%20Bolinska"><span class="name">Agnes Bolinska</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Erkenntnis</em>:1-23.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Mitchell & Gronenborn propose that we account for the presence of multiple models of protein structure, each produced in different contexts, through the framework of integrative pluralism. I argue that two interpretations of this framework are available, neither of which captures the relationship between a model and the protein structure it represents or between multiple models of protein structure. Further, it inclines us toward concluding prematurely that models of protein structure are right in their contexts and makes extrapolation of findings<span id="BOLAMP-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BOLAMP-abstract2").show();$("BOLAMP-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BOLAMP-abstract2" style="display:none"> from one context to another seem unwarranted. Instead, protein structure determination ought to be understood as modestly monistic. There is one model for every protein in each physicochemical context, and models of the same protein produced in different contexts are compatible with one another. ‘Integrating’ multiple models amounts to extrapolating from one context to another; this is possible because the effect of context on protein folding is relatively weak and predictable. Modest monism better describes the practice of protein structure determination than integrative pluralism and enables greater attention to how context affects protein folding. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BOLAMP-abstract2").hide();$("BOLAMP-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BOLAMP"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BOLAMP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BOLAMP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BOLAMP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BOLAMP','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BOLAMP"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eRAMPOG-2" onclick="ee('click','RAMPOG-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','RAMPOG-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','RAMPOG-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/RAMPOG-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Philosophy of GodForm: Power Authorities, Functional Position Levels, Religion and Science.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Refet Ramiz" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Refet%20Ramiz"><span class="name">Refet Ramiz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy Study</em> 11 (3):166-215.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this work, author expressed new R-Synthesis specifically. Good and/or correct perspective that must be behind the definitions and administration generally expressed. New perspective of the philosophy explained generally. Philosophy of GodForm is defined and expressed as connected/related with the following concepts: (a) basic principles, (b) 17 upper constructional philosophies, (c) 14 lower constructional philosophies, (d) eight basic philosophies. As special cases, Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, Philosophy of Wireless Administration and others defined as hybrid philosophies. 17 specific components/units which<span id="RAMPOG-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("RAMPOG-2-abstract2").show();$("RAMPOG-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="RAMPOG-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> can be considered to define the basic principles of the related formation, are proposed to be designed by GodForm and defined by the author. Philosophy of GodForm and its relation with Values and Positions specifically defined. New Era Theory and New Era Belief explained generally. Some specific religions/beliefs are defined as variants/forms of the Progressive Religion. Good and/or correct power authorities (R-Power Authority) are defined due to 29 categories. Functional position levels defined for the R-Power Authorities with a unique table. As result of the R-Synthesis, functional position levels of some philosophers, some scientists, and of Prophet Jesus, Prophet Mohamed, Prophets Mouses, Buddha, and of Confucius generally/specifically defined. Integration and past/present effects of some R-Power Authorities in 5 x 5 Ideal Political Construction specifically explained. New Era Belief, Concepts of GodX and Science relation explained with the following concepts: (1) Religion of GodForm, (2) Knowledge of GodX, (3) Nature of GodX. With this respect, some other characteristics of 7 GodX power authorities expressed with details as complementary information. Following concepts/systems defined to arrange and solve some/most/all religious problems, which are determined with R-Synthesis: (a) Religious Responsibilities and Positions, (b) Ideal Religious Administration, (c) Sustainable/Continuable Political Administration System, (d) Community Values Council/Authority for each world country, (e) Progressive Councils. 15 general religious position categories defined to express their good and/or correct meanings/values/responsibilities in the religious system. 21 general/specific cases/programs defined due to New Era Belief to solve possible past/present/future community values problems, to have continuous, judicious, and progressive administration about the 36 kinds of community values. Progressive Councils, which are related with the CUS-WW-HO, are defined. Progressive Religion Council and some of the related religious responsibilities expressed for the kind progressive religion studies due to the Philosophy of Progressive Religions. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("RAMPOG-2-abstract2").hide();$("RAMPOG-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/RAMPOG-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-RAMPOG-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('RAMPOG-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-RAMPOG-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('RAMPOG-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-RAMPOG-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBENWRE" onclick="ee('click','BENWRE')" onmouseover="ee('over','BENWRE')" onmouseout="ee('out','BENWRE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BENWRE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">What relational egalitarians should (not) believe.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andreas Bengtson" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Andreas%20Bengtson"><span class="name">Andreas Bengtson</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lauritz Munch" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Lauritz%20Munch"><span class="name">Lauritz Munch</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals; and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up (1). </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BENWRE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BENWRE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BENWRE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BENWRE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BENWRE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BENWRE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eARPIAN" onclick="ee('click','ARPIAN')" onmouseover="ee('over','ARPIAN')" onmouseout="ee('out','ARPIAN')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ARPIAN"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">It Ain't Necessarily So.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nomy Arpaly" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Nomy%20Arpaly"><span class="name">Nomy Arpaly</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Oxford Studies in Metaethics</em> 13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">While Neo-Aristotelians argue quite plausibly that it is hard to get to eudaemonia if one is wicked, I argue that they fail to show that the seeker of flourishing has a reason to become virtuous (as opposed to morally mediocre). </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/ARPIAN"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ARPIAN" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ARPIAN')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ARPIAN" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ARPIAN','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ARPIAN"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSWIPOI" onclick="ee('click','SWIPOI')" onmouseover="ee('over','SWIPOI')" onmouseout="ee('out','SWIPOI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/SWIPOI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Philosophy of immunology.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bartlomiej Swiatczak" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Bartlomiej%20Swiatczak"><span class="name">Bartlomiej Swiatczak</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alfred I. Tauber" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Alfred I.%20Tauber"><span class="name">Alfred I. Tauber</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</em> 2020.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Philosophy of immunology is a subfield of philosophy of biology dealing with ontological and epistemological issues related to the studies of the immune system. While speculative investigations and abstract analyses have always been part of immune theorizing, until recently philosophers have largely ignored immunology. Yet the implications for understanding the philosophical basis of organismal functions framed by immunity offer new perspectives on fundamental questions of biology and medicine. Developed in the context of history of medicine, theoretical biology, and medical anthropology,<span id="SWIPOI-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWIPOI-abstract2").show();$("SWIPOI-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SWIPOI-abstract2" style="display:none"> philosophy of immunology differs from these related branches of study in its focus on traditional philosophical questions concerning identity, individuality, ecology, cognition, scientific methodology and theory construction. This broad agenda derives from immunology’s multifaceted research program that has developed from its initial clinical challenges of host defense, transplantation, autoimmunity, tumor immunology, and allergy. In addition to these well-established research areas, immunity is now understood to play a central role in other physiological functions, development, ecology, and evolutionary mechanics. Holding together these diverse domains of inquiry lie philosophical commitments oriented by organismal identity. In this regard, pertinent issues are raised concerning cognition (organization of immune perception and information processing), the character of individuality (framed by the ecological context of immune-mediated assimilation and rejection), and the dynamics of complex systems (understood as holistic systems biology). Indeed, immunology, in the context of cognitive science, evolutionary biology, environmental sciences, and development provides multi-focal perspectives for philosophy of science. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWIPOI-abstract2").hide();$("SWIPOI-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/SWIPOI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SWIPOI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SWIPOI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SWIPOI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SWIPOI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/SWIPOI"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 3 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SWIPOI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSWISWE" onclick="ee('click','SWISWE')" onmouseover="ee('over','SWISWE')" onmouseout="ee('out','SWISWE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/SWISWE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Struggle within: evolution and ecology of somatic cell populations.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bartlomiej Swiatczak" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Bartlomiej%20Swiatczak"><span class="name">Bartlomiej Swiatczak</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences</em> 78 (21):6797-6806.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The extent to which normal (nonmalignant) cells of the body can evolve through mutation and selection during the lifetime of the organism has been a major unresolved issue in evolutionary and developmental studies. On the one hand, stable mul- ticellular individuality seems to depend on genetic homogeneity and suppression of evolutionary conflicts at the cellular level. On the other hand, the example of clonal selection of lymphocytes indicates that certain forms of somatic mutation and selection are concordant with the organism-level<span id="SWISWE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWISWE-abstract2").show();$("SWISWE-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SWISWE-abstract2" style="display:none"> fitness. Recent DNA sequencing and tissue physiology studies sug- gest that in addition to adaptive immune cells also neurons, epithelial cells, epidermal cells, hematopoietic stem cells and functional cells in solid bodily organs are subject to evolutionary forces during the lifetime of an organism. Here we refer to these recent studies and suggest that the expanding list of somatically evolving cells modifies idealized views of biological individuals as radically different from collectives. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWISWE-abstract2").hide();$("SWISWE-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/SWISWE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SWISWE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SWISWE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SWISWE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SWISWE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/SWISWE"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SWISWE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eREITRA-2" onclick="ee('click','REITRA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','REITRA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','REITRA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/REITRA-2"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Thomas Reid: An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense: A Critical Edition.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Derek R. Brookes" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Derek R.%20Brookes"><span class="name">Derek R. Brookes</span></a> (ed.) - <span class="pubYear">1997</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Edinburgh University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Thomas Reid (1710–96) is increasingly being seen as a highly significant philosopher and a central figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. This new edition of Reid's classic philosophical text in the philosophy of mind at long last gives scholars a complete, critically edited text of the Inquiry. The critical text is based on the fourth life-time edition (1785). A selection of related documents showing the development of Reid's thought, textual notes, bibliographical details of previous editions and a full introduction by the<span id="REITRA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REITRA-2-abstract2").show();$("REITRA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="REITRA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> editor makes this an important contribution to the study of this increasingly respected philosopher. -/- Key Features - Complete, critically edited text of the Inquiry accompanied by a judicious selection of manuscript evidence relating to its composition - Comprehensive Introduction providing an historical and philosophical account of the formation of the Inquiry - Detailed textual notes which include bibliographical details and allusions, translations, references to secondary literature and selected passages from Reid's manuscripts. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REITRA-2-abstract2").hide();$("REITRA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/REITRA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-REITRA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('REITRA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-REITRA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('REITRA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/REITRA-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 28 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-REITRA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGARRAO-3" onclick="ee('click','GARRAO-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','GARRAO-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','GARRAO-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/GARRAO-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Rethinking Acts of Conscience: Personal Integrity, Civility, and the Common Good.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ernesto V. Garcia" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Ernesto V.%20Garcia"><span class="name">Ernesto V. Garcia</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy</em> 97 (4):461-483.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">**Runner-up for the 2021 Royal Institute for Philosophy Essay Prize: What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a<span id="GARRAO-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GARRAO-3-abstract2").show();$("GARRAO-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GARRAO-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to, that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to, that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GARRAO-3-abstract2").hide();$("GARRAO-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/GARRAO-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GARRAO-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GARRAO-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GARRAO-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GARRAO-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GARRAO-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLICTI-2" onclick="ee('click','LICTI-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','LICTI-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','LICTI-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/LICTI-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Tricky Intuitions.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Piotr Lichacz" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Piotr%20Lichacz"><span class="name">Piotr Lichacz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Roczniki Filozoficzne</em> 70 (2):249-258.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This article is a critical discussion of the book Setting Health-Care Priorities by Torbjörn Tännsjö. This critique targets mainly Tännsjö’s method, but also several unjustified conclusions and some implicit assumptions. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/LICTI-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LICTI-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LICTI-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LICTI-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LICTI-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LICTI-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eZICCPA" onclick="ee('click','ZICCPA')" onmouseover="ee('over','ZICCPA')" onmouseout="ee('out','ZICCPA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ZICCPA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Cognitive Projects and the Trustworthiness of Positive Truth.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Matteo Zicchetti" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Matteo%20Zicchetti"><span class="name">Matteo Zicchetti</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Erkenntnis</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The aim of this paper is twofold: first, I provide a cluster of theories of truth in classical logic that is consistent with global reflection principles: the theories of positive truth. After that, I analyse the epistemic value of such theories. I do so employing the framework of cognitive projects introduced by Wright, and employed—in the context of theories of truth—by Fischer et al.. In particular, I will argue that theories of positive truth are trustworthy, analogously to the theories of<span id="ZICCPA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ZICCPA-abstract2").show();$("ZICCPA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ZICCPA-abstract2" style="display:none"> full disquotational truth. Moreover, I argue that, for a given cognitive project, if the acceptance of trustworthy theories is taken to be an epistemic norm of cognitive project, then one has good reasons to accept theories of positive truth over other rival theories of truth in classical logic. On the other hand, the latter theories are deemed epistemically unacceptable. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ZICCPA-abstract2").hide();$("ZICCPA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/ZICCPA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ZICCPA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ZICCPA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ZICCPA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ZICCPA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/ZICCPA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ZICCPA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLESCC" onclick="ee('click','KLESCC')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLESCC')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLESCC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLESCC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Sellars's Core Critique of C. I. Lewis: Against the Equation of Aboutness with Givenness.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Griffin Klemick" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Griffin%20Klemick"><span class="name">Griffin Klemick</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Many have taken Sellars’s critique of empiricism in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) to be aimed at his teacher C. I. Lewis. But if so, why do the famous arguments of its opening sections carry so little force against Lewis’s views? Understandably, some respond by denying that Lewis’s epistemology is among the positions targeted by Sellars. But this is incorrect. Indeed, Sellars had earlier offered more trenchant (if already familiar) critiques of Lewis’s epistemology. What is original about EPM<span id="KLESCC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLESCC-abstract2").show();$("KLESCC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KLESCC-abstract2" style="display:none"> is that it criticizes empiricist positions like Lewis’s not because of their foundationalism, but because of their psychologism about meaning. Since psychologism turns out to be unacceptable by Lewis’s own lights, EPM has a compelling (if implicit) critique of Lewis to offer after all, one that strikes at the heart of his philosophical system. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLESCC-abstract2").hide();$("KLESCC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLESCC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KLESCC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLESCC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLESCC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLESCC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLESCC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWAREC-4" onclick="ee('click','WAREC-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','WAREC-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','WAREC-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/WAREC-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Electronic Coins.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Craig Warmke" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Craig%20Warmke"><span class="name">Craig Warmke</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Cryptoeconomic Systems</em> 2 (1).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In the bitcoin whitepaper, Satoshi Nakamoto (2008: 2) defines an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Many have since defined a bitcoin as a chain of digital signatures. This latter definition continues to appear in reports from central banks, advocacy centers, and governments, as well as in academic papers across the disciplines of law, economics, computer science, cryptography, management, and philosophy. Some have even used it to argue that what we now call bitcoin is not the real bitcoin.<span id="WAREC-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WAREC-4-abstract2").show();$("WAREC-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WAREC-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> The definition fails, however. This is important because the Chain Definition obscures Satoshi’s solution to a dilemma in the design of electronic cash, as well as the truth about bitcoin’s privacy and fungibility. In this article, I explain why the Chain Definition fails and what Satoshi likely endorsed instead. Along the way, I untangle some issues around bitcoin fungibility and clarify some others around the ontology of digital assets. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WAREC-4-abstract2").hide();$("WAREC-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/WAREC-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WAREC-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WAREC-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WAREC-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WAREC-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WAREC-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKOMAJA" onclick="ee('click','KOMAJA')" onmouseover="ee('over','KOMAJA')" onmouseout="ee('out','KOMAJA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KOMAJA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">African Jurisprudence as Historical Co-extension of Diffused Legal Theories.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Leye Komolafe" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Leye%20Komolafe"><span class="name">Leye Komolafe</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya</em> 8 (1):51-68.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">African jurisprudence, like African philosophy, continues to be hotly debated. This article contends that the debate straddles the uniqueness claim which either emphasises the existence or possibility of a peculiar legal framework on the continent, and a historical co-extensional position reiterating that African jurisprudence is a continuum of other legal traditions. The article argues that there is no uniquely African jurisprudence, and that what obtains within the structures of jurisprudence on the continent also exists within various legal traditions elsewhere, and<span id="KOMAJA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KOMAJA-abstract2").show();$("KOMAJA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KOMAJA-abstract2" style="display:none"> as such can at best be described as ‘jurisprudence in Africa’ rather than ‘African jurisprudence’. It defends this thesis through analytic and comparative explications of the content of natural law theory and legal positivism as experienced on the continent. It concedes that relics of the colonial legal experience create contestations that inform scholars’ calls for a return to traditional legal systems. It concludes that a reconstructive jurisprudence in Africa must take cognisance of the continent’s historical and evolutionary legal experiences, but that a unified or monolithic theory may not be sufficient to address the choice of functional jurisprudence. Keywords African jurisprudence, jurisprudence in Africa, African legal evolution, diffused legal theories. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KOMAJA-abstract2").hide();$("KOMAJA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KOMAJA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KOMAJA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KOMAJA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KOMAJA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KOMAJA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KOMAJA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eALSTLF" onclick="ee('click','ALSTLF')" onmouseover="ee('over','ALSTLF')" onmouseout="ee('out','ALSTLF')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ALSTLF"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Too Late: Fanon, the dismembered past, and a phenomenology of racialized time.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alia Al-Saji" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Alia%20Al-Saji"><span class="name">Alia Al-Saji</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Leswin Laubscher, Derek Hook & Miraj U. Desai (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/LAUFPA-2">Fanon, Phenomenology and Psychology</a></em>. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 177–193.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This essay asks after the lateness that affectively structures Fanon's phenomenology of racialized temporality in Black Skin,White Masks. I broach this through the concepts of possibility, “affective ankylosis”, and by taking seriously the dismembered past that haunts Fanon's text. The colonization of the past involves a bifurcation of time and of memory. To the “burning past,” wherein colonized experience is stuck and to which we remain sensitive, is contrasted the colonial construction of white, western time as progressive and futural—a construction<span id="ALSTLF-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ALSTLF-abstract2").show();$("ALSTLF-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ALSTLF-abstract2" style="display:none"> that relies on the very indifference, ankylosis, and closure of this time to the multiple, lived temporalities of colonized others. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ALSTLF-abstract2").hide();$("ALSTLF-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/ALSTLF"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ALSTLF" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ALSTLF')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ALSTLF" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ALSTLF','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/ALSTLF"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ALSTLF"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSOYTIJ" onclick="ee('click','SOYTIJ')" onmouseover="ee('over','SOYTIJ')" onmouseout="ee('out','SOYTIJ')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/SOYTIJ"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Truth in Journalism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Zeynep Soysal" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Zeynep%20Soysal"><span class="name">Zeynep Soysal</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In James E. Katz & Kate K. Mays (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KATJAT">Journalism and Truth in an Age of Social Media</a></em>. Oxford University Press. pp. 103–116.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In order to fulfill their role in society, professional journalists must deliver truths. But truth-telling is not the only requirement of the goal of journalism. What is more, some of the other requirements of journalism can make it difficult for journalists to deliver truths, and may even force them to depart from truth in certain ways. In this paper, I make the requirements of the goal of journalism explicit, and I explain how conflicts between them can arise. I then make<span id="SOYTIJ-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SOYTIJ-abstract2").show();$("SOYTIJ-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SOYTIJ-abstract2" style="display:none"> some suggestions for balancing these requirements that could help journalists regain the trust of the public. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SOYTIJ-abstract2").hide();$("SOYTIJ-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/SOYTIJ"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SOYTIJ" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SOYTIJ')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SOYTIJ" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SOYTIJ','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SOYTIJ"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSTATNO-13" onclick="ee('click','STATNO-13')" onmouseover="ee('over','STATNO-13')" onmouseout="ee('out','STATNO-13')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/STATNO-13"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Notion of Infinity in Plotinus and Cantor.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Giannis Stamatellos" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Giannis%20Stamatellos"><span class="name">Giannis Stamatellos</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Dionysis Mentzeniotis" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Dionysis%20Mentzeniotis"><span class="name">Dionysis Mentzeniotis</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2008</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Jure Zovko & John Dillon (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ZOVPAF">Platonism and Forms of Intelligence</a></em>. Akademie Verlag. pp. 213-230.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/STATNO-13"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-STATNO-13" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('STATNO-13')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-STATNO-13" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('STATNO-13','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-STATNO-13"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSTAPVE" onclick="ee('click','STAPVE')" onmouseover="ee('over','STAPVE')" onmouseout="ee('out','STAPVE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/STAPVE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Plotinus: Virtue Ethics.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Giannis Stamatellos" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Giannis%20Stamatellos"><span class="name">Giannis Stamatellos</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Plotinus: Virtue Ethics This article focuses on the virtue ethics of Plotinus and its implications for later accounts of virtue ethics, particularly in Porphyry and Iamblichus. Plotinus' ethical theory is discussed in relation to the aim of the virtuous person to become godlike, the role of disposition in the soul's intellectualization, the four … Continue reading Plotinus: Virtue Ethics. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/STAPVE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-STAPVE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('STAPVE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-STAPVE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('STAPVE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-STAPVE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBROSO-2" onclick="ee('click','BROSO-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','BROSO-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','BROSO-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BROSO-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Span Operators.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Berit Brogaard" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Berit%20Brogaard"><span class="name">Berit Brogaard</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2007</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Analysis</em> 67 (1):72-79.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">I argue that David Lewis is too quick to deny the presentist the right to employ span operators. There is no reason why the presentist could not help herself to both primitive tensed slice operators and primitive span operators. She would then have another device available to eliminate ambiguities and explain why sentences with embedded contradictions may nevertheless be true. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BROSO-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BROSO-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BROSO-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BROSO-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BROSO-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/BROSO-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 13 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BROSO-2"></span></div></div></li> </ol> </div> </div> <div id="allrecent" class="tab-pane fade"> <div id="entries" class=""><ol class="entryList"> <li id="eHAWOW" onclick="ee('click','HAWOW')" onmouseover="ee('over','HAWOW')" onmouseout="ee('out','HAWOW')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/HAWOW"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">On Words.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by John Hawthorne" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/John%20Hawthorne"><span class="name">John Hawthorne</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ernie Lepore" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Ernie%20Lepore"><span class="name">Ernie Lepore</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2011</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Philosophy</em> 108 (9):447-485.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Under what conditions are two utterances utterances of the same word? What are words? That these questions have not received much attention is rather surprising: after all, philosophers and linguists frequently appeal to considerations about word and sentence identity in connection with a variety of puzzles and problems that are foundational to the very subject matter of philosophy of language and linguistics.1 Kaplan’s attention to words is thus to be applauded. And there is no doubt that his discussion contains many<span id="HAWOW-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAWOW-abstract2").show();$("HAWOW-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HAWOW-abstract2" style="display:none"> useful insights. Nevertheless, we find his picture deeply flawed for a variety of crosscutting reasons. Our aim in this paper is to further advance an understanding of the nature of words, both by remedying the problems with Kaplan’s account, and also by achieving a suitable perspective on what the metaphysical investigation of word identity can hope to achieve. Our discussion divides into four parts. In Part One, we examine and critique Kaplan’s discussion of a contrast integral to his own account: that between the type-token and the stage-continuant conceptions of words. In Part Two, we present three constraints on any account of words and two further themes in Kaplan’s discussion central to his conception of words – the role of repetition and the constitutive authority of intentions. While these ideas have laudable motivations, we argue they are far from the best way of making good on the insights that drive them. The final two sections take a skeptical turn. In Part Three, we express doubt about Kaplan’s presumption of the importance of what he calls ‘common currency names’, thus raising a suspicion that he may be in pursuit of chimera. Finally, in Part Four, we express pessimism about whether interesting answers to question above will be forthcoming, and suggest that the legitimacy of our word ontology need not depend on the availability of such answers. Along the way, we tease apart a number of metaphysical questions in the vicinity of the topic of word individuation – questions that are often not disentangled – and consider how the discussion of the previous parts bears on them.. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAWOW-abstract2").hide();$("HAWOW-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/HAWOW"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HAWOW" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HAWOW')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HAWOW" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HAWOW','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/HAWOW"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 67 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HAWOW"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePRIOBS" onclick="ee('click','PRIOBS')" onmouseover="ee('over','PRIOBS')" onmouseout="ee('out','PRIOBS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/PRIOBS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Of black sheep and wrhite crows: Extending the bilingual dual coding theory to memory for idioms.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lena Pritchett" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Lena%20Pritchett"><span class="name">Lena Pritchett</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jyotsna Vaid" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Jyotsna%20Vaid"><span class="name">Jyotsna Vaid</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sumeyra Tosun" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Sumeyra%20Tosun"><span class="name">Sumeyra Tosun</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2016</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Cogent Psychology</em> 3 (1):1-18.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Are idioms stored in memory in ways that preserve their surface form or language or are they represented amodally? We examined this question using an inci- dental cued recall paradigm in which two word idiomatic expressions were presented to adult bilinguals proficient in Russian and English. Stimuli included phrases with idiomat- ic equivalents in both languages (e.g. “empty words/пycтыe cлoвa”) or in one language only (English—e.g. “empty suit/пycтoй кocтюм” or Russian—e.g. “empty sound/пycтoй звyк”), or in neither language (e.g. “empty rain/пycтoй<span id="PRIOBS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PRIOBS-abstract2").show();$("PRIOBS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PRIOBS-abstract2" style="display:none"> дoждь”). If idioms are stored in a language-specific format, then phrases with idiomatic equivalents in both languages would have dual representation, and should therefore be more easily recalled than phrases with idiomatic meaning in only one language. This result was obtained. As such, the findings support the dual-coding theory of memory and are also compatible with models of the bilingual lexicon that include language tags or nodes. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PRIOBS-abstract2").hide();$("PRIOBS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/PRIOBS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-PRIOBS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PRIOBS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PRIOBS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PRIOBS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/PRIOBS"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PRIOBS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTOSMAS" onclick="ee('click','TOSMAS')" onmouseover="ee('over','TOSMAS')" onmouseout="ee('out','TOSMAS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/TOSMAS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Making a story make sense: Does evidentiality matter in discourse coherence?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sumeyra Tosun" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Sumeyra%20Tosun"><span class="name">Sumeyra Tosun</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jyotsna Vaid" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Jyotsna%20Vaid"><span class="name">Jyotsna Vaid</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2016</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Applied Psycholinguistics</em> 37:1337-1367.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Evidentiality refers to the linguistic marking of the nature/directness of source of evidence of an asserted event. Some languages (e.g., Turkish) mark source obligatorily in their grammar, while other languages (e.g., English) provide only lexical options for conveying source. The present study examined whether or under what conditions firsthand source information is relied on more than nonfirsthand sources in establishing discourse coherence. Turkish- and English-speaking participants read a series of somewhat incongruous two-sentence narratives and were to come up with a<span id="TOSMAS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TOSMAS-abstract2").show();$("TOSMAS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TOSMAS-abstract2" style="display:none"> way of completing each narrative so that it would form a coherent story. Each narrative contrasted two source types (firsthand vs. hearsay, firsthand vs. inference, or inference vs. hearsay) and two information types (general vs. particular information) each presented first or second. Analysis of story completions showed greater overall reliance on firsthand information when it was presented second and referred to a particular event. When the firsthand source occurred first and the particular event occurred second, the latter was favored, especially by Turkish participants. Taken together, the findings suggest that evidentiality interacts with information type in establishing discourse coherence and that both firsthand and particular information are relied on more when presented later rather than earlier in discourse. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TOSMAS-abstract2").hide();$("TOSMAS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/TOSMAS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-TOSMAS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TOSMAS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TOSMAS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TOSMAS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TOSMAS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVAIPAR" onclick="ee('click','VAIPAR')" onmouseover="ee('over','VAIPAR')" onmouseout="ee('out','VAIPAR')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/VAIPAR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Perceiving and responding to embarrassing predicaments across languages: Cultural influences on the mental lexicon.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jyotsna Vaid" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Jyotsna%20Vaid"><span class="name">Jyotsna Vaid</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hyun Choi" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Hyun%20Choi"><span class="name">Hyun Choi</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hsin-Chin Chen" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Hsin-Chin%20Chen"><span class="name">Hsin-Chin Chen</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael Friedman" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael%20Friedman"><span class="name">Michael Friedman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2008</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Mental Lexicon</em> 3 (1):121-147.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The experience of embarrassment was explored in two experiments comparing monolingual and bilingual speakers from cultures varying in the degree of elabo- ration of the embarrassment lexicon. In Experiment 1, narratives in English or Korean depicting three types of embarrassing predicaments were to be rated on their embarrassability and humorousness by Korean-English bilinguals, Korean monolinguals, and Euro-American monolinguals. All groups judged certain predicaments (involving social gaffes) to be the most embarrassing. However, significant group and language differences occurred in judgments of<span id="VAIPAR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VAIPAR-abstract2").show();$("VAIPAR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VAIPAR-abstract2" style="display:none"> the inten- sity of embarrassment and amusement judgments evoked. Euro-Americans ex- hibited higher overall levels of amusement than the two Korean groups who, in turn, reported higher levels of embarrassment, particularly for certain predica- ment types and contexts (ingroup members present). Further, for the bilinguals, inept performance predicaments in English were judged more embarrassing than those in Korean, whereas all predicament types were judged more amusing when framed with English emotion labels. Bilinguals also appeared to show a heightened embarrassability relative to both monolingual groups. Experiment 2 found lexical selection differences in open-ended responses to embarrassing predicaments depicted in each language, with Euro-Americans preferring to give justifications or use humor to minimize the embarrassment and Korean-English bilinguals preferring to give apologies or say nothing. The findings are interpret- ed to reflect the influence of culturally-mediated schemas guiding the activation and processing of emotion vocabulary. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VAIPAR-abstract2").hide();$("VAIPAR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/VAIPAR"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VAIPAR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VAIPAR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VAIPAR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VAIPAR','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/VAIPAR"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VAIPAR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVAIAEO" onclick="ee('click','VAIAEO')" onmouseover="ee('over','VAIAEO')" onmouseout="ee('out','VAIAEO')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/VAIAEO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">An examination of women's professional visibility in cognitive psychology.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jyotsna Vaid" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Jyotsna%20Vaid"><span class="name">Jyotsna Vaid</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lisa Geraci" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Lisa%20Geraci"><span class="name">Lisa Geraci</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2016</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Feminism and Psychology</em> 26 (3):292-319.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Mainstream psychological research has been characterized as androcentric in its construction of males as the norm. Does an androcentric bias also characterize the professional visibility of psychologists? We examined this issue for cognitive psychology, where the gender distribution in doctoral degrees has been roughly equal for several decades. Our investigation revealed that, across all indicators surveyed, male cognitive psychologists are more visible than their female counterparts: they are over-represented in professional society governance, as editors-in-chief of leading journals in the field,<span id="VAIAEO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VAIAEO-abstract2").show();$("VAIAEO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VAIAEO-abstract2" style="display:none"> as Fellows in professional societies, and as recipients of prestigious senior level awards. Taken together, our findings indicate that a gender parity in doctoral degrees in cognitive psychology does not translate into a parity in professional visibility. We discuss a variety of potential reasons for the observed gender gap and suggest that, without attention to gendered structures of status and power, as noted by Shields, existing gender hierarchies may persist and be reproduced. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VAIAEO-abstract2").hide();$("VAIAEO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/VAIAEO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VAIAEO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VAIAEO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VAIAEO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VAIAEO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VAIAEO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCUFILQ" onclick="ee('click','CUFILQ')" onmouseover="ee('over','CUFILQ')" onmouseout="ee('out','CUFILQ')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/CUFILQ"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Il <em>Lexicon quod Theaeteti vocatur</em> e il codice Palatino greco 173 di Platone.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Domenico Cufalo" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Domenico%20Cufalo"><span class="name">Domenico Cufalo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2015</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Maria Tziatzi (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/TZILBZ">Lemmata. Beiträge zum Andenken an Christos Theodoridis / Essays in Honour of Christos Theodoridis</a></em>. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 452-472.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this paper, I have been able to demonstrate that the so-called Lexicon Theeteti is an apographon of Pal. gr. 173, a well known Plato's manuscript of Xth century. The codex Laurentianus 57,24, which contains the lexicon, previously dated to XIV/XV century, was also backdated to the first half of XIVth century. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/CUFILQ"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-CUFILQ" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CUFILQ')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CUFILQ" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CUFILQ','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CUFILQ"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKUHOTV" onclick="ee('click','KUHOTV')" onmouseover="ee('over','KUHOTV')" onmouseout="ee('out','KUHOTV')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KUHOTV"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">On the Very Idea of a Minimal Proposition.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hsiu-Lin Ku" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Hsiu-Lin%20Ku"><span class="name">Hsiu-Lin Ku</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2017</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">NTU Philosophical Review</em> 53:35-74.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off,<span id="KUHOTV-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KUHOTV-abstract2").show();$("KUHOTV-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KUHOTV-abstract2" style="display:none"> invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KUHOTV-abstract2").hide();$("KUHOTV-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KUHOTV"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KUHOTV" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KUHOTV')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KUHOTV" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KUHOTV','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KUHOTV"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKUTST" onclick="ee('click','KUTST')" onmouseover="ee('over','KUTST')" onmouseout="ee('out','KUTST')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KUTST"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Semantic Theory and the Availability Principle.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hsiu-Lin Ku" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Hsiu-Lin%20Ku"><span class="name">Hsiu-Lin Ku</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2014</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">NTU Philosophical Review</em> 48:123-158.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper aims to defend François Recanati’s Availability Principle approach to semantics by illuminating and responding to two major challenges from minimalists, in particular from Emma Borg: the first concerns the notion of intuitive content and “awareness-of” presupposed in the Availability Principle, and the second concerns whether the principle makes a semantic theory unfit with normativity and compositionality. I lead the discussion toward the kernel question--the bearer of the semantic content--and show that the Availability Principle is appropriate if we respect<span id="KUTST-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KUTST-abstract2").show();$("KUTST-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KUTST-abstract2" style="display:none"> the empirical basis of meaning. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KUTST-abstract2").hide();$("KUTST-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KUTST"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KUTST" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KUTST')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KUTST" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KUTST','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KUTST"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eRABSFT" onclick="ee('click','RABSFT')" onmouseover="ee('over','RABSFT')" onmouseout="ee('out','RABSFT')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/RABSFT"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Structural fixed-point theorems.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Brian Rabern" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Brian%20Rabern"><span class="name">Brian Rabern</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Landon Rabern" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Landon%20Rabern"><span class="name">Landon Rabern</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The semantic paradoxes are associated with self-reference or referential circularity. However, there are infinitary versions of the paradoxes, such as Yablo's paradox, that do not involve this form of circularity. It remains an open question what relations of reference between collections of sentences afford the structure necessary for paradoxicality -- these are the so-called "dangerous" directed graphs. Building on Rabern, et. al (2013) we reformulate this problem in terms of fixed points of certain functions, thereby boiling it down to get<span id="RABSFT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("RABSFT-abstract2").show();$("RABSFT-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="RABSFT-abstract2" style="display:none"> a purely mathematical problem. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("RABSFT-abstract2").hide();$("RABSFT-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/RABSFT"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-RABSFT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('RABSFT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-RABSFT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('RABSFT','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-RABSFT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBENPAT-21" onclick="ee('click','BENPAT-21')" onmouseover="ee('over','BENPAT-21')" onmouseout="ee('out','BENPAT-21')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-06</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BENPAT-21"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Samuel%20Bendeck Sotillos"><span class="name">Samuel Bendeck Sotillos</span></a> (ed.) - <span class="pubYear">2013</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, presents<span id="BENPAT-21-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BENPAT-21-abstract2").show();$("BENPAT-21-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BENPAT-21-abstract2" style="display:none"> the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BENPAT-21-abstract2").hide();$("BENPAT-21-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BENPAT-21"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BENPAT-21" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BENPAT-21')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BENPAT-21" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BENPAT-21','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BENPAT-21"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBRIQWI" onclick="ee('click','BRIQWI')" onmouseover="ee('over','BRIQWI')" onmouseout="ee('out','BRIQWI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-04</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BRIQWI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">All Worlds in One: Reassessing the Forest-Armstrong Argument.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Phillip Bricker" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Phillip%20Bricker"><span class="name">Phillip Bricker</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BRIMME">Modal Matters: Essays in Metaphysics</a></em>. Oxford: OUP. pp. 278-314.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The Forrest-Armstrong argument, as reconfigured by David Lewis, is a reductio against an unrestricted principle of recombination. There is a gap in the argument which Lewis thought could be bridged by an appeal to recombination. After presenting the argument, I show that no plausible principle of recombination can bridge the gap. But other plausible principles of plenitude can bridge the gap, both principles of plenitude for world contents and principles of plenitude for world structures. I conclude that the Forrest-Armstrong argument,<span id="BRIQWI-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BRIQWI-abstract2").show();$("BRIQWI-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BRIQWI-abstract2" style="display:none"> when fortified in one of these ways, demands that unrestricted recombination be rejected. The appropriate restriction comes from a consideration of what world structures are possible. I argue that, although there are too many worlds to form a set, for any world, the individuals at that world do form a set. To defend it I invoke a principle of Limitation of Size together with an iterative conception of structure. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BRIQWI-abstract2").hide();$("BRIQWI-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BRIQWI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BRIQWI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BRIQWI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BRIQWI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BRIQWI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/BRIQWI"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BRIQWI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eHAMOGS" onclick="ee('click','HAMOGS')" onmouseover="ee('over','HAMOGS')" onmouseout="ee('out','HAMOGS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-04</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/HAMOGS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">On Galen Strawson's central approach to the self.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Manhal Hamdo" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Manhal%20Hamdo"><span class="name">Manhal Hamdo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2023</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Theoria</em> 89 (1):42-56.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The crux of this paper is to provide a concentrated critical evaluation of Galen Strawson's innovative approach to the self. To that end, I will first attempt to concisely introduce his general thesis, which seems appropriate to be broken up into two major pieces: the phenomenology (experience) of the self, what the self would have to be; and the metaphysics of the self (i.e., a query refers to its metaphysics [its existence and nature]: whether there is any). Explaining and discussing<span id="HAMOGS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAMOGS-abstract2").show();$("HAMOGS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HAMOGS-abstract2" style="display:none"> Strawson's twofold account of the self is my first target in this paper. And it is with these two parts that I take issues. Accordingly, I shall determinedly try to develop a counterargument according to which Strawson's establishment of his entire enterprise of the self is based merely on unjustified intuitive generalisation. Next, I will put more effort into making some more argumentative points, mainly to show how his metaphysics does not give much thought to some vital matters of the self in comparison with the systems of metaphysics of his forebears of Western philosophers. What all this means is that Strawsonian metaphysical analysis of the self so conceived and so described appears philosophically to drive itself to justly be placed in an ahistorical context. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAMOGS-abstract2").hide();$("HAMOGS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/HAMOGS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HAMOGS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HAMOGS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HAMOGS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HAMOGS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HAMOGS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLEBCAS" onclick="ee('click','LEBCAS')" onmouseover="ee('over','LEBCAS')" onmouseout="ee('out','LEBCAS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-04</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/LEBCAS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Citizens and States in Spinoza’s Political Treatise.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael LeBuffe" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael%20LeBuffe"><span class="name">Michael LeBuffe</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Mind</em> 130 (519):809-832.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In his Political Treatise, Spinoza repeatedly compares states to human beings. In this interpretation of the comparisons, I present a progressively more restrictive account of Spinoza’s views about the nature of human beings in the Ethics and show at each step how those views inform the account of states in the Political Treatise. Because, like human beings, states are individuals, they strive to persevere in existence. Because, like human beings, states are composed of parts that are individuals, states' parts also<span id="LEBCAS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LEBCAS-abstract2").show();$("LEBCAS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LEBCAS-abstract2" style="display:none"> strive to persevere in being. Finally, because in states, as in human beings, a change to the power of striving of a part can be at the same time a change to the whole that differs in kind, strong states can be bad for their citizens and states that serve their citizens well may nevertheless be weak. Spinoza’s principal project in the Political Treatise is to design states that are stable and good for their citizens. This account of the comparisons shows why that project is so difficult: one cannot design a good state simply by designing a stable state. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LEBCAS-abstract2").hide();$("LEBCAS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/LEBCAS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LEBCAS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LEBCAS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LEBCAS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LEBCAS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LEBCAS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBOLAMP" onclick="ee('click','BOLAMP')" onmouseover="ee('over','BOLAMP')" onmouseout="ee('out','BOLAMP')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BOLAMP"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">A Monist Proposal: Against Integrative Pluralism About Protein Structure.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Agnes Bolinska" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Agnes%20Bolinska"><span class="name">Agnes Bolinska</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Erkenntnis</em>:1-23.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Mitchell & Gronenborn propose that we account for the presence of multiple models of protein structure, each produced in different contexts, through the framework of integrative pluralism. I argue that two interpretations of this framework are available, neither of which captures the relationship between a model and the protein structure it represents or between multiple models of protein structure. Further, it inclines us toward concluding prematurely that models of protein structure are right in their contexts and makes extrapolation of findings<span id="BOLAMP-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BOLAMP-abstract2").show();$("BOLAMP-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BOLAMP-abstract2" style="display:none"> from one context to another seem unwarranted. Instead, protein structure determination ought to be understood as modestly monistic. There is one model for every protein in each physicochemical context, and models of the same protein produced in different contexts are compatible with one another. ‘Integrating’ multiple models amounts to extrapolating from one context to another; this is possible because the effect of context on protein folding is relatively weak and predictable. Modest monism better describes the practice of protein structure determination than integrative pluralism and enables greater attention to how context affects protein folding. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BOLAMP-abstract2").hide();$("BOLAMP-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BOLAMP"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BOLAMP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BOLAMP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BOLAMP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BOLAMP','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BOLAMP"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBONAEA-4" onclick="ee('click','BONAEA-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','BONAEA-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','BONAEA-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BONAEA-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Art (Entrée académique).</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Constant Bonard" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Constant%20Bonard"><span class="name">Constant Bonard</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Steve Humbert-Droz" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Steve%20Humbert-Droz"><span class="name">Steve Humbert-Droz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em>Encyclopédie Philosophique</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Dans cette entrée, après une introduction qui servira de cadre à notre discussion (section 1.), nous allons présenter et analyser des définitions du concept « Art ». Nous discuterons brièvement les définitions classiques les plus influentes puis nous nous concentrerons sur les principales définitions contemporaines. -/- Nous verrons pourquoi les définitions classiques sont aujourd’hui considérées comme insatisfaisantes (2.a.), et comment les philosophes, à partir de la seconde moitié du XXème siècle ont tenté de pallier leurs défauts. Dans les grandes lignes,<span id="BONAEA-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BONAEA-4-abstract2").show();$("BONAEA-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BONAEA-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> le problème principal soulevé à l’encontre des théories classiques est qu’elles cherchent toutes l’essence de l’art dans un trait caractéristique qui serait reconnaissable dans les œuvres elles-mêmes. Les théories contemporaines répondent à ce problème principalement de quatre façons, comme on le verra dans les sections 2.b à 2.d. Les théories sceptiques (2.b.) défendent qu’il est dès lors impossible de définir l’art – qu’on peut au mieux en donner certains caractères typiques, des airs de famille. Les théories relationnalistes (2.c.) défendent que ce qui fait qu’une chose est de l’art est à trouver en dehors de celle-ci, notamment dans les relations qu’elle entretient avec son contexte de création ou de présentation. Les théories néo-classiques (2.d.) continuent à chercher l’essence de l’art dans un trait caractéristique reconnaissable dans les œuvres elles-mêmes tout en prenant en compte les réactions sceptiques ou relationnalistes. Enfin, la théorie du ‘renvoi de la balle’ (2.e.) défend que l’on ne peut pas définir l’art mais seulement des sous-catégories comme la musique, la sculpture, les installations, les performances, etc. -/- Nous présenterons les avantages et les inconvénients principaux des théories contemporaines. Nous verrons qu’aucune n’est dénuée de problèmes, expliquant pourquoi il n’existe pas de consensus sur une définition de l’art aujourd’hui. Nous verrons également que – à l’exception d’un certain scepticisme qui jette, semble-t-il, trop vite l’éponge – chacune de ces théories amène, par son originalité, à une compréhension nouvelle et plus profonde de cette notion extrêmement complexe qu’est le concept « Art ». (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BONAEA-4-abstract2").hide();$("BONAEA-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BONAEA-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BONAEA-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BONAEA-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BONAEA-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BONAEA-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/BONAEA-4"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BONAEA-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVAZPDP" onclick="ee('click','VAZPDP')" onmouseover="ee('over','VAZPDP')" onmouseout="ee('out','VAZPDP')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/VAZPDP"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Pas de panique ?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Juliette Vazard" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Juliette%20Vazard"><span class="name">Juliette Vazard</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bonard Constant Charles" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Bonard%20Constant Charles"><span class="name">Bonard Constant Charles</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum</em> 16 (1):4-17.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this essay, we tackle the misconception that panic is simply a state of being « overwhelmed by your fear. » Panic, in our view, is not an extreme fear that necessarily pushes the person into dysfunctional, counterproductive and irrational behaviors. On the contrary, as we will try to show here, it is an emotion in its own right that has its own cognitive and motivational functions. We will analyze panic here as a reaction to a danger perceived as major,<span id="VAZPDP-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VAZPDP-abstract2").show();$("VAZPDP-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VAZPDP-abstract2" style="display:none"> imminent and without clear solution, in the sense that the subject does not have a determined action plan to react to the danger. Panic thus implies special access to certain information or certain facts – a perception or apprehension of danger and its precise properties – and it is in this that it has a cognitive function. On the motivational level, we will defend the idea that panic involves tendencies to action appropriate to the situation as it is perceived. Contrary to popular opinion and that of philosophers,we will therefore propose away of conceiving panic as being able to be functional and thus, rational, insofar as this emotion helps us to reach our goals given the means of which we dispose. Contrary to what we might think, in some situations it is worth panicking. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VAZPDP-abstract2").hide();$("VAZPDP-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/VAZPDP"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VAZPDP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VAZPDP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VAZPDP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VAZPDP','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VAZPDP"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBONMES-2" onclick="ee('click','BONMES-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','BONMES-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','BONMES-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BONMES-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Émotions et sensibilité aux valeurs : quatre conceptions philosophiques contemporaines.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Constant Bonard" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Constant%20Bonard"><span class="name">Constant Bonard</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale</em> 2:209-229.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">RÉSUMÉ. Cet article examine plusieurs façons de comprendre les émotions comme des réactions évaluatives. Il existe un consensus dans les sciences affectives qui veut que les émotions paradigmatiques soient faites de quatre composants : catégorisation du stimulus, tendances à l’action, changements corporels et aspect phénoménal. L’article expose les quatre principales théories dans la philosophie contemporaine des émotions et montre qu’elles ont tendance à se focaliser sur l’un ou l’autre des quatre composants des émotions pour expliquer leur nature évaluative. La conclusion<span id="BONMES-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BONMES-2-abstract2").show();$("BONMES-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BONMES-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> est qu’il est possible de rendre compte des émotions comme réactions évaluatives à ces quatre niveaux et que, pour cette raison, les conceptions présentées sont plus complémentaires qu’on ne le suppose généralement. ABSTRACT. This article examines several ways of understanding emotions as evaluative reactions. There is a consensus in affective sciences that paradigmatic emotions are made up of four components: appraisal process, action tendencies, bodily changes, and phenomenal character. The article outlines the four main theories in contemporary philosophy of emotions and shows that they tend to focus on one of the four components of emotions to explain their evaluative nature. The conclusion is that it is possible to account for emotions as evaluative reactions through the four components and that, for this reason, the theories presented are more complementary than is generally assumed. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BONMES-2-abstract2").hide();$("BONMES-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BONMES-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BONMES-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BONMES-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BONMES-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BONMES-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/BONMES-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 2 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BONMES-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eRAMPOG-2" onclick="ee('click','RAMPOG-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','RAMPOG-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','RAMPOG-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/RAMPOG-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Philosophy of GodForm: Power Authorities, Functional Position Levels, Religion and Science.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Refet Ramiz" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Refet%20Ramiz"><span class="name">Refet Ramiz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy Study</em> 11 (3):166-215.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this work, author expressed new R-Synthesis specifically. Good and/or correct perspective that must be behind the definitions and administration generally expressed. New perspective of the philosophy explained generally. Philosophy of GodForm is defined and expressed as connected/related with the following concepts: (a) basic principles, (b) 17 upper constructional philosophies, (c) 14 lower constructional philosophies, (d) eight basic philosophies. As special cases, Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, Philosophy of Wireless Administration and others defined as hybrid philosophies. 17 specific components/units which<span id="RAMPOG-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("RAMPOG-2-abstract2").show();$("RAMPOG-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="RAMPOG-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> can be considered to define the basic principles of the related formation, are proposed to be designed by GodForm and defined by the author. Philosophy of GodForm and its relation with Values and Positions specifically defined. New Era Theory and New Era Belief explained generally. Some specific religions/beliefs are defined as variants/forms of the Progressive Religion. Good and/or correct power authorities (R-Power Authority) are defined due to 29 categories. Functional position levels defined for the R-Power Authorities with a unique table. As result of the R-Synthesis, functional position levels of some philosophers, some scientists, and of Prophet Jesus, Prophet Mohamed, Prophets Mouses, Buddha, and of Confucius generally/specifically defined. Integration and past/present effects of some R-Power Authorities in 5 x 5 Ideal Political Construction specifically explained. New Era Belief, Concepts of GodX and Science relation explained with the following concepts: (1) Religion of GodForm, (2) Knowledge of GodX, (3) Nature of GodX. With this respect, some other characteristics of 7 GodX power authorities expressed with details as complementary information. Following concepts/systems defined to arrange and solve some/most/all religious problems, which are determined with R-Synthesis: (a) Religious Responsibilities and Positions, (b) Ideal Religious Administration, (c) Sustainable/Continuable Political Administration System, (d) Community Values Council/Authority for each world country, (e) Progressive Councils. 15 general religious position categories defined to express their good and/or correct meanings/values/responsibilities in the religious system. 21 general/specific cases/programs defined due to New Era Belief to solve possible past/present/future community values problems, to have continuous, judicious, and progressive administration about the 36 kinds of community values. Progressive Councils, which are related with the CUS-WW-HO, are defined. Progressive Religion Council and some of the related religious responsibilities expressed for the kind progressive religion studies due to the Philosophy of Progressive Religions. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("RAMPOG-2-abstract2").hide();$("RAMPOG-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/RAMPOG-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-RAMPOG-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('RAMPOG-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-RAMPOG-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('RAMPOG-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-RAMPOG-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBENWRE" onclick="ee('click','BENWRE')" onmouseover="ee('over','BENWRE')" onmouseout="ee('out','BENWRE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BENWRE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">What relational egalitarians should (not) believe.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andreas Bengtson" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Andreas%20Bengtson"><span class="name">Andreas Bengtson</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lauritz Munch" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Lauritz%20Munch"><span class="name">Lauritz Munch</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals; and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up (1). </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BENWRE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BENWRE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BENWRE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BENWRE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BENWRE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BENWRE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGANSCI-2" onclick="ee('click','GANSCI-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','GANSCI-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','GANSCI-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/GANSCI-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Superiority Conceit in Buddhist Traditions: A Historical Perspective, by Bhikkhu Analayo. <span class="hint">[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Chandima Gangodawila" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Chandima%20Gangodawila"><span class="name">Chandima Gangodawila</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Buddhist Studies Review</em> 39 (1):158-163.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Superiority Conceit in Buddhist Traditions: A Historical Perspective, by Bhikkhu Analayo. Wisdom Publications, 2021. 184pp. Hb. $24.95, ISBN-13: 9781614297192; Ebook $12.99, ISBN-10:1614297193. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/GANSCI-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GANSCI-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GANSCI-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GANSCI-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GANSCI-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GANSCI-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eARPIAN" onclick="ee('click','ARPIAN')" onmouseover="ee('over','ARPIAN')" onmouseout="ee('out','ARPIAN')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ARPIAN"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">It Ain't Necessarily So.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nomy Arpaly" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Nomy%20Arpaly"><span class="name">Nomy Arpaly</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Oxford Studies in Metaethics</em> 13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">While Neo-Aristotelians argue quite plausibly that it is hard to get to eudaemonia if one is wicked, I argue that they fail to show that the seeker of flourishing has a reason to become virtuous (as opposed to morally mediocre). </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/ARPIAN"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ARPIAN" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ARPIAN')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ARPIAN" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ARPIAN','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ARPIAN"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSWIPOI" onclick="ee('click','SWIPOI')" onmouseover="ee('over','SWIPOI')" onmouseout="ee('out','SWIPOI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/SWIPOI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Philosophy of immunology.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bartlomiej Swiatczak" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Bartlomiej%20Swiatczak"><span class="name">Bartlomiej Swiatczak</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alfred I. Tauber" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Alfred I.%20Tauber"><span class="name">Alfred I. Tauber</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</em> 2020.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Philosophy of immunology is a subfield of philosophy of biology dealing with ontological and epistemological issues related to the studies of the immune system. While speculative investigations and abstract analyses have always been part of immune theorizing, until recently philosophers have largely ignored immunology. Yet the implications for understanding the philosophical basis of organismal functions framed by immunity offer new perspectives on fundamental questions of biology and medicine. Developed in the context of history of medicine, theoretical biology, and medical anthropology,<span id="SWIPOI-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWIPOI-abstract2").show();$("SWIPOI-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SWIPOI-abstract2" style="display:none"> philosophy of immunology differs from these related branches of study in its focus on traditional philosophical questions concerning identity, individuality, ecology, cognition, scientific methodology and theory construction. This broad agenda derives from immunology’s multifaceted research program that has developed from its initial clinical challenges of host defense, transplantation, autoimmunity, tumor immunology, and allergy. In addition to these well-established research areas, immunity is now understood to play a central role in other physiological functions, development, ecology, and evolutionary mechanics. Holding together these diverse domains of inquiry lie philosophical commitments oriented by organismal identity. In this regard, pertinent issues are raised concerning cognition (organization of immune perception and information processing), the character of individuality (framed by the ecological context of immune-mediated assimilation and rejection), and the dynamics of complex systems (understood as holistic systems biology). Indeed, immunology, in the context of cognitive science, evolutionary biology, environmental sciences, and development provides multi-focal perspectives for philosophy of science. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWIPOI-abstract2").hide();$("SWIPOI-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/SWIPOI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SWIPOI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SWIPOI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SWIPOI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SWIPOI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/SWIPOI"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 3 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SWIPOI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSWIGSR-2" onclick="ee('click','SWIGSR-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','SWIGSR-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','SWIGSR-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/SWIGSR-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Genomic Stress Responses Drive Lymphocyte Evolvability: An Ancient and Ubiquitous Mechanism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bartlomiej Swiatczak" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Bartlomiej%20Swiatczak"><span class="name">Bartlomiej Swiatczak</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Bioessays</em> 42 (10):2000032.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Somatic diversification of antigen receptor genes depends on the activity of enzymes whose homologs participate in a mutagenic DNA repair in unicellular species. Indeed, by engaging error-prone polymerases, gap filling molecules and altered mismatch repair pathways, lymphocytes utilize conserved components of genomic stress response systems, which can already be found in bacteria and archaea. These ancient systems of mutagenesis and repair act to increase phenotypic diversity of microbial cell populations and operate to enhance their ability to produce fit variants during<span id="SWIGSR-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWIGSR-2-abstract2").show();$("SWIGSR-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SWIGSR-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> stress. Coopted by lymphocytes, the ancient mutagenic processing systems retained their diversification functions instilling the adaptive immune cells with enhanced evolvability and defensive capacity to resist infection and damage. As reviewed here, the ubiquity and conserved character of specialized variation-generating mechanisms from bacteria to lymphocytes highlight the importance of these mechanisms for evolution of life in general. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWIGSR-2-abstract2").hide();$("SWIGSR-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/SWIGSR-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SWIGSR-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SWIGSR-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SWIGSR-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SWIGSR-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SWIGSR-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSWISWE" onclick="ee('click','SWISWE')" onmouseover="ee('over','SWISWE')" onmouseout="ee('out','SWISWE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-03</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/SWISWE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Struggle within: evolution and ecology of somatic cell populations.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bartlomiej Swiatczak" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Bartlomiej%20Swiatczak"><span class="name">Bartlomiej Swiatczak</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences</em> 78 (21):6797-6806.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The extent to which normal (nonmalignant) cells of the body can evolve through mutation and selection during the lifetime of the organism has been a major unresolved issue in evolutionary and developmental studies. On the one hand, stable mul- ticellular individuality seems to depend on genetic homogeneity and suppression of evolutionary conflicts at the cellular level. On the other hand, the example of clonal selection of lymphocytes indicates that certain forms of somatic mutation and selection are concordant with the organism-level<span id="SWISWE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWISWE-abstract2").show();$("SWISWE-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SWISWE-abstract2" style="display:none"> fitness. Recent DNA sequencing and tissue physiology studies sug- gest that in addition to adaptive immune cells also neurons, epithelial cells, epidermal cells, hematopoietic stem cells and functional cells in solid bodily organs are subject to evolutionary forces during the lifetime of an organism. Here we refer to these recent studies and suggest that the expanding list of somatically evolving cells modifies idealized views of biological individuals as radically different from collectives. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SWISWE-abstract2").hide();$("SWISWE-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/SWISWE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SWISWE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SWISWE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SWISWE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SWISWE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/SWISWE"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SWISWE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eREITRA-2" onclick="ee('click','REITRA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','REITRA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','REITRA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/REITRA-2"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Thomas Reid: An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense: A Critical Edition.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Derek R. Brookes" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Derek R.%20Brookes"><span class="name">Derek R. Brookes</span></a> (ed.) - <span class="pubYear">1997</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Edinburgh University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Thomas Reid (1710–96) is increasingly being seen as a highly significant philosopher and a central figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. This new edition of Reid's classic philosophical text in the philosophy of mind at long last gives scholars a complete, critically edited text of the Inquiry. The critical text is based on the fourth life-time edition (1785). A selection of related documents showing the development of Reid's thought, textual notes, bibliographical details of previous editions and a full introduction by the<span id="REITRA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REITRA-2-abstract2").show();$("REITRA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="REITRA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> editor makes this an important contribution to the study of this increasingly respected philosopher. -/- Key Features - Complete, critically edited text of the Inquiry accompanied by a judicious selection of manuscript evidence relating to its composition - Comprehensive Introduction providing an historical and philosophical account of the formation of the Inquiry - Detailed textual notes which include bibliographical details and allusions, translations, references to secondary literature and selected passages from Reid's manuscripts. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REITRA-2-abstract2").hide();$("REITRA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/REITRA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-REITRA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('REITRA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-REITRA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('REITRA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/REITRA-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 28 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-REITRA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGARRAO-3" onclick="ee('click','GARRAO-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','GARRAO-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','GARRAO-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/GARRAO-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Rethinking Acts of Conscience: Personal Integrity, Civility, and the Common Good.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ernesto V. Garcia" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Ernesto V.%20Garcia"><span class="name">Ernesto V. Garcia</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy</em> 97 (4):461-483.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">**Runner-up for the 2021 Royal Institute for Philosophy Essay Prize: What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a<span id="GARRAO-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GARRAO-3-abstract2").show();$("GARRAO-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GARRAO-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to, that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to, that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GARRAO-3-abstract2").hide();$("GARRAO-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/GARRAO-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GARRAO-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GARRAO-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GARRAO-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GARRAO-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GARRAO-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLICTI-2" onclick="ee('click','LICTI-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','LICTI-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','LICTI-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/LICTI-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Tricky Intuitions.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Piotr Lichacz" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Piotr%20Lichacz"><span class="name">Piotr Lichacz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Roczniki Filozoficzne</em> 70 (2):249-258.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This article is a critical discussion of the book Setting Health-Care Priorities by Torbjörn Tännsjö. This critique targets mainly Tännsjö’s method, but also several unjustified conclusions and some implicit assumptions. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/LICTI-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LICTI-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LICTI-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LICTI-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LICTI-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LICTI-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eZICCPA" onclick="ee('click','ZICCPA')" onmouseover="ee('over','ZICCPA')" onmouseout="ee('out','ZICCPA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ZICCPA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Cognitive Projects and the Trustworthiness of Positive Truth.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Matteo Zicchetti" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Matteo%20Zicchetti"><span class="name">Matteo Zicchetti</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Erkenntnis</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The aim of this paper is twofold: first, I provide a cluster of theories of truth in classical logic that is consistent with global reflection principles: the theories of positive truth. After that, I analyse the epistemic value of such theories. I do so employing the framework of cognitive projects introduced by Wright, and employed—in the context of theories of truth—by Fischer et al.. In particular, I will argue that theories of positive truth are trustworthy, analogously to the theories of<span id="ZICCPA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ZICCPA-abstract2").show();$("ZICCPA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ZICCPA-abstract2" style="display:none"> full disquotational truth. Moreover, I argue that, for a given cognitive project, if the acceptance of trustworthy theories is taken to be an epistemic norm of cognitive project, then one has good reasons to accept theories of positive truth over other rival theories of truth in classical logic. On the other hand, the latter theories are deemed epistemically unacceptable. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ZICCPA-abstract2").hide();$("ZICCPA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/ZICCPA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ZICCPA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ZICCPA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ZICCPA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ZICCPA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/ZICCPA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ZICCPA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLICNAT-3" onclick="ee('click','LICNAT-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','LICNAT-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','LICNAT-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/LICNAT-3"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Neuroetyka a Tomasz z Akwinu: o użytecznosci myśli średniowiecznej we współczesnych debatach etycznych.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Piotr Lichacz" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Piotr%20Lichacz"><span class="name">Piotr Lichacz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/LICNAT-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LICNAT-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LICNAT-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LICNAT-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LICNAT-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LICNAT-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTOREYE-2" onclick="ee('click','TOREYE-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','TOREYE-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','TOREYE-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/TOREYE-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Evidencia y Explicación en Economía.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ignacio Andrés Torres-Ulloa" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Ignacio Andrés%20Torres-Ulloa"><span class="name">Ignacio Andrés Torres-Ulloa</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (1):107-136.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">En economía, la investigación se divide en dos grandes metodologías: los modelos teórico-matemáticos y los estudios empíricos. Estudiando modelos teóricos y métodos empíricos ) se da cuenta de las limitaciones de ambos métodos. Se concluye que ninguno de estos puede generar explicaciones de cómo en realidad suceden las cosas, sino que solo de cómo posiblemente suceden. La razón es que ambos necesitan un enlace interpretativo que permita extrapolar desde su propio sistema hacia un sistema objetivo. Los modelos tienen dominio general<span id="TOREYE-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TOREYE-2-abstract2").show();$("TOREYE-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TOREYE-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> y pueden dar cuenta de mecanismos. Los RCTs, al contrario, son válidos internamente y están conectados al mundo real, pero su dominio es muy específico. Aunque ninguno logre responder preguntas amplias de un fenómeno de interés, pueden complementarse para generar extrapolaciones más confiables sobre un sistema objetivo. Sin embargo, esto solo podrá hacerse si se conocen bien los mecanismos y el contexto en que ocurre una evidencia. Palabras clave: Causalidad, Mecanismos, Capacidades, Epistemología de la Economía, Generalización de Evidencia. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TOREYE-2-abstract2").hide();$("TOREYE-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/TOREYE-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-TOREYE-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TOREYE-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TOREYE-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TOREYE-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TOREYE-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eORTEEL" onclick="ee('click','ORTEEL')" onmouseover="ee('over','ORTEEL')" onmouseout="ee('out','ORTEEL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ORTEEL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Euclides entre los árabes.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Norma Ivonne Ortega Zarazúa" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Norma Ivonne%20Ortega Zarazúa"><span class="name">Norma Ivonne Ortega Zarazúa</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (1):76-105.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Es común escuchar que el mundo Occidental debe a los árabes el descubrimiento del álgebra. No obstante, el desarrollo de esta disciplina puede interpretarse como un crisol de distintas tradiciones científicas que fue posible gracias a la clasificación, traducción y crítica tanto de los clásicos como de las obras que los árabes obtuvieron de los pueblos que conquistaron. Entre estos trabajos se encontraba Los Elementos de Euclides. Los Elementos fueron cuidadosamente traducidos durante el califato de Al-Ma’mūn por el matemático Mohammed<span id="ORTEEL-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ORTEEL-abstract2").show();$("ORTEEL-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ORTEEL-abstract2" style="display:none"> ibn-Musa Al-Khwārizmī, autor de Al-jabr wa’l muqābalah, quien sentó los fundamentos de la disciplina que más tarde sería conocida como álgebra y quien, en la primera parte de su obra, nos proporciona tres métodos para resolver tres tipos de ecuaciones que llama “ecuaciones combinadas”. A lo largo de este artículo se ofrecen argumentos para sostener que los métodos para resolver estas ecuaciones constituyen una reinterpretación, en el terreno algebraico, de los teoremas 6, 7 y 8 del segundo libro de Los Elementos de Euclides. Mi objetivo es dar respuesta a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué lectura de Los elementos Euclides posibilitó la emergencia del álgebra en el mundo árabe? Para responderla necesario explorar el acercamiento que los árabes tuvieron con el Libro II de Los Elementos, con el fin de proponer una interpretación de los posibles factores que los llevaron a formular el álgebra. Esto último, en particular, se encuentra en la primera parte de la obra de Al-Khwārizmī. Palabras clave: Álgebra, Al-Khwārizmī, Euclides, Ecuación, Teorema. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ORTEEL-abstract2").hide();$("ORTEEL-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/ORTEEL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ORTEEL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ORTEEL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ORTEEL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ORTEEL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ORTEEL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eNAVIBE" onclick="ee('click','NAVIBE')" onmouseover="ee('over','NAVIBE')" onmouseout="ee('out','NAVIBE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/NAVIBE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Individualidad biológica en la práctica científica.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Francisco Javier Navarro Cárdenas" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Francisco Javier%20Navarro Cárdenas"><span class="name">Francisco Javier Navarro Cárdenas</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (1):56-74.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">La biología utiliza múltiples criterios para individuar fenómenos biológicos. Frente a esta diversidad, los enfoques monistas proponen criterios fundamentales para el reconocimiento unívoco de individuos, esto es, formas únicas de dividir el mundo biológico en entidades individuales. El pluralismo, por otro lado, argumenta que no deberíamos restringir el estudio de la individualidad a concepciones únicas, reconociendo, en su lugar, diferentes tipos de individuos. En este artículo, analizaré cómo ciertos enfoques monistas y pluralistas enfrentan la pluralidad de criterios de individuación utilizados<span id="NAVIBE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("NAVIBE-abstract2").show();$("NAVIBE-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="NAVIBE-abstract2" style="display:none"> por la práctica científica. Siguiendo las recientes aproximaciones epistemológicas y pragmáticas en filosofía de la individualidad biológica, argumentaré por qué la diversidad de individuaciones no suele representar un inconveniente para la biología y por qué contribuye a nuestro conocimiento del mundo biológico. La conclusión general será que requerimos múltiples maneras de individuar la naturaleza para poder cumplir los diversos objetivos epistémicos de la biología, una labor que las aproximaciones monistas no suelen visibilizar. Palabras clave: Individuo Biológico, Pluralidad, Pluralismo, Monismo. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("NAVIBE-abstract2").hide();$("NAVIBE-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/NAVIBE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-NAVIBE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('NAVIBE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-NAVIBE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('NAVIBE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-NAVIBE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGINEOD" onclick="ee('click','GINEOD')" onmouseover="ee('over','GINEOD')" onmouseout="ee('out','GINEOD')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/GINEOD"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">El origen del rubor.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Santiago Ginnobili" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Santiago%20Ginnobili"><span class="name">Santiago Ginnobili</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 3 (1):20-43.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Algunos aspectos de La expresión de las emociones de Charles Darwin pueden resultar intrigantes, pues, en la explicación de cómo tales expresiones se originan, Darwin casi nunca apela a la selección natural. En cambio, apela principalmente a la idea de que movimientos voluntarios se asocian a emociones, volviéndose por hábito innatos e involuntarios al heredarse a la descendencia. Si bien Darwin da varias razones para defender esta explicación, en este trabajo trataré de mostrar que, si se entiende el libro sobre<span id="GINEOD-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GINEOD-abstract2").show();$("GINEOD-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GINEOD-abstract2" style="display:none"> las expresiones en relación con los objetivos explícitos e implícitos de El origen del hombre, el asunto se entiende mejor. En particular, resulta interesante la tesis que Desmond y Moore plantean respecto a la importancia de los ideales antiesclavistas de Darwin a la hora del tratamiento de las razas. Defenderé en este trabajo que el enfoque de Desmond y Moore puede extenderse al libro acerca de las expresiones. Específicamente, estableceré vínculos entre la explicación del origen de las razas y la explicación del origen del rubor. Palabras clave: Charles Darwin, La expresión de las emociones, El origen del hombre, Rubor, Antiesclavismo. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GINEOD-abstract2").hide();$("GINEOD-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/GINEOD"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GINEOD" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GINEOD')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GINEOD" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GINEOD','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GINEOD"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBARURD-4" onclick="ee('click','BARURD-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','BARURD-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','BARURD-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BARURD-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Una revisión de la condicionalización bayesiana.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Rodrigo Iván Barrera Guajardo" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Rodrigo Iván%20Barrera Guajardo"><span class="name">Rodrigo Iván Barrera Guajardo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (1):24-54.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">La epistemología bayesiana tiene como concepto capital la condicionalización simple. Para comprender de buena forma cómo opera esta regla, se debe dar cuenta de la concepción subjetiva de la probabilidad. Sobre la base de lo anterior es posible esclarecer alcances y límites de la condicionalización simple. En general, cuando esta regla enfrenta una dificultad se hacen esfuerzos por resolver dicha particular cuestión, pero no es usual encontrar propuestas unificadas con la intención de resolver varias de las complicaciones subyacentes al bayesianismo<span id="BARURD-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BARURD-4-abstract2").show();$("BARURD-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BARURD-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> ortodoxo. Por lo mismo, el propósito de esta investigación es justamente proponer aquello: un marco bayesiano ampliado que tendrá por objeto solucionar más de una cuestión particular. Más específicamente, el problema de la incorregibilidad, el problema del surgimiento del cero, el problema de la evidencia antigua y el problema de las teorías nuevas. Lo anterior se logrará adicionando al bayesianismo ortodoxo dos cuestiones, a saber, la condicionalización épsilon y una reconstrucción racional. Palabras clave: Probabilidad Subjetiva, Grados de Creencia, Dogmatismo Bayesiano, Evidencia Antigua, Nuevas Teorías. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BARURD-4-abstract2").hide();$("BARURD-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BARURD-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BARURD-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BARURD-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BARURD-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BARURD-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BARURD-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLEPFA-2" onclick="ee('click','KLEPFA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLEPFA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLEPFA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLEPFA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Prospects for an Objective Pragmatism: Frank Ramsey on Truth, Meaning, and Justification.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Griffin Klemick" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Griffin%20Klemick"><span class="name">Griffin Klemick</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2017</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Sami Pihlström (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/PIHPAO-3">Pragmatism and Objectivity</a></em>. London, UK: pp. 46-71.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLEPFA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KLEPFA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLEPFA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLEPFA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLEPFA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLEPFA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLESMQ" onclick="ee('click','KLESMQ')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLESMQ')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLESMQ')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLESMQ"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Sellars’ metaethical quasi-realism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Griffin Klemick" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Griffin%20Klemick"><span class="name">Griffin Klemick</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Synthese</em> 197 (5):2215-2243.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this article, I expound and defend an interpretation of Sellars as a metaethical quasi-realist. Sellars analyzes moral discourse in non-cognitivist terms: in particular, he analyzes “ought”-statements as expressions of collective intentions deriving from a collective commitment to provide for the general welfare. But he also endorses a functional-role theory of meaning, on which a statement’s meaning is grounded in its being governed by semantical rules concerning language entry, intra-linguistic, and language departure transitions, and a theory of truth as correct<span id="KLESMQ-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLESMQ-abstract2").show();$("KLESMQ-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KLESMQ-abstract2" style="display:none"> assertibility relative to such semantical rules. On these non-representationalist theories, even though moral statements are expressions of intentions and not fundamentally descriptive, they nevertheless count as assertorically meaningful, and some count as positively true. I further argue that this interpretation is capable not only of explaining Sellars’ explicitly metaethical writings, but also of unifying his scientific realism with his commitment to the ineliminable and indispensable role of the language of intentions: if this linguistic framework does not play an explanatory role, but only an expressive role, this explains both why Sellars’ commitment to it does not contravene his naturalism, as well as why, given the necessity of such language for our practical engagement with the world, the scientific image of humans in the world will only be completed once such language supplements it to enable us to relate practically to it. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLESMQ-abstract2").hide();$("KLESMQ-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLESMQ"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KLESMQ" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLESMQ')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLESMQ" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLESMQ','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/KLESMQ"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 3 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLESMQ"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLECIL" onclick="ee('click','KLECIL')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLECIL')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLECIL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLECIL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">C. I. Lewis was a Foundationalist After All.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Griffin Klemick" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Griffin%20Klemick"><span class="name">Griffin Klemick</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">History of Philosophy Quarterly</em> 37 (1):77-99.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">While C. I. Lewis was traditionally interpreted as an epistemological foundationalist throughout his major works, virtually every recent treatment of Lewis's epistemology dissents. But the traditional interpretation is correct: Lewis believed that apprehensions of "the given" are certain independently of support from, and constitute the ultimate warrant for, objective empirical beliefs. This interpretation proves surprisingly capable of accommodating apparently contrary textual evidence. The non-foundationalist reading, by contrast, simply cannot explain Lewis's explicit opposition to coherentism and his insistence that only apprehensions<span id="KLECIL-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLECIL-abstract2").show();$("KLECIL-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KLECIL-abstract2" style="display:none"> of the given enable us to answer the regress problem -- and so vindicate the possibility of empirical justification. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLECIL-abstract2").hide();$("KLECIL-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLECIL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KLECIL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLECIL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLECIL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLECIL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/KLECIL"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 3 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLECIL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLESCC" onclick="ee('click','KLESCC')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLESCC')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLESCC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLESCC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Sellars's Core Critique of C. I. Lewis: Against the Equation of Aboutness with Givenness.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Griffin Klemick" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Griffin%20Klemick"><span class="name">Griffin Klemick</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Many have taken Sellars’s critique of empiricism in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) to be aimed at his teacher C. I. Lewis. But if so, why do the famous arguments of its opening sections carry so little force against Lewis’s views? Understandably, some respond by denying that Lewis’s epistemology is among the positions targeted by Sellars. But this is incorrect. Indeed, Sellars had earlier offered more trenchant (if already familiar) critiques of Lewis’s epistemology. What is original about EPM<span id="KLESCC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLESCC-abstract2").show();$("KLESCC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KLESCC-abstract2" style="display:none"> is that it criticizes empiricist positions like Lewis’s not because of their foundationalism, but because of their psychologism about meaning. Since psychologism turns out to be unacceptable by Lewis’s own lights, EPM has a compelling (if implicit) critique of Lewis to offer after all, one that strikes at the heart of his philosophical system. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLESCC-abstract2").hide();$("KLESCC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLESCC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KLESCC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLESCC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLESCC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLESCC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLESCC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLVAEDU" onclick="ee('click','LVAEDU')" onmouseover="ee('over','LVAEDU')" onmouseout="ee('out','LVAEDU')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/LVAEDU"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Esbozo de una concepción particularista de las Leyes Lógicas.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Miguel Agustín Álvarez Lisboa" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Miguel Agustín%20Álvarez Lisboa"><span class="name">Miguel Agustín Álvarez Lisboa</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (1):04-22.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">El Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico afirma que la Lógica es como cualquier otra ciencia. Si esta afirmación es cierta, entonces ella no sólo es revisable, sino que además todo lo que se puede decir sobre las ciencias aplica, mutatis mutandis, para la misma. El propósito de este artículo es explorar esta consecuencia del Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico, acercando a la Filosofía de la Lógica el marco teórico de las Máquinas Nomológicas de Nancy Cartwright. De acuerdo con esta visión, lo que hay de verdadero en<span id="LVAEDU-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LVAEDU-abstract2").show();$("LVAEDU-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LVAEDU-abstract2" style="display:none"> las teorías científicas no está en el mundo sino en sus modelos: sistemas altamente controlados, estables, artificiales y específicos, dentro de los cuales se manifiestan regularidades sistematizables y enseñables. Mi afirmación es que lo mismo puede decirse de la Lógica: ella no captura las Leyes del Pensamiento o de la Razón, porque el pensamiento y la razón no están gobernados necesariamente por leyes. Sobre lo que sí puede decirse que versan las Leyes de la Lógica son metafísicas posibles: historias acerca de qué son las proposiciones, el pensamiento, la verdad y la validez. A fin de ilustrar y defender esta tesis, presento un ejemplo de Máquina Nomológica de la Lógica Clásica, basada en una lectura original del Tractatus de Wittgenstein, e investigo algunas de sus consecuencias. Mi conclusión es que esta imagen de la Lógica impacta en el problema de la revisión de la Lógica Clásica, en la medida en que muestra que dicha revisión no necesariamente responde a un proceso racional de adecuación de la teoría a los hechos porque los “hechos” relevantes no son anteriores a la teoría misma, sino que están moldeados y conducidos por ella. Palabras clave: Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico, Abductivismo, Máquinas Nomológicas, Revisión Lógica, Filosofía de la Lógica. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LVAEDU-abstract2").hide();$("LVAEDU-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/LVAEDU"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LVAEDU" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LVAEDU')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LVAEDU" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LVAEDU','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LVAEDU"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSILLLD-3" onclick="ee('click','SILLLD-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','SILLLD-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','SILLLD-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/SILLLD-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Leibniz lector de Locke.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Camilo Silva" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Camilo%20Silva"><span class="name">Camilo Silva</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (2):70-91.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">La presente contribución tiene por objeto examinar y describir la génesis y la elaboración de los Nuevos Ensayos sobre el entendimiento humano de Leibniz ). El interés de este estudio recae no sólo en transparentar la articulación histórica y teórica en que tienen lugar las etapas que preceden la redacción misma de los Nuevos Ensayos de Leibniz -equivalente a un período de casi diez años y que coincide con el punto de arranque de la maduración definitiva de su filosofía-, sino<span id="SILLLD-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SILLLD-3-abstract2").show();$("SILLLD-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SILLLD-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> también en atenuar la connotación estrictamente epistemológica que suele atribuírsele a dicha obra, subrayando las motivaciones metafísicas y teológicas que lo impulsaron a redactarla en respuesta al Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano de Locke. Palabras clave: Dios, Leibniz, Locke, Nuevos Ensayos, Materialismo, Metafísica, Substancia, Teología. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SILLLD-3-abstract2").hide();$("SILLLD-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/SILLLD-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SILLLD-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SILLLD-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SILLLD-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SILLLD-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SILLLD-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMUOLPP" onclick="ee('click','MUOLPP')" onmouseover="ee('over','MUOLPP')" onmouseout="ee('out','MUOLPP')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/MUOLPP"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">La pregunta por la economía de mercado.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Álvaro Muñoz Ferrer" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Álvaro%20Muñoz Ferrer"><span class="name">Álvaro Muñoz Ferrer</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (2):54-68.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">El presente artículo tiene por objetivo plantear la pregunta por la técnica económica en el sentido heideggeriano del preguntar. Con “sentido heideggeriano” nos referimos al modo en el que Heidegger plantea la pregunta por la técnica a partir de la perturbación que provoca la técnica moderna. En otras palabras, nos preguntamos por “la” técnica económica inspirados por las consecuencias – pasadas, actuales y potenciales – de la técnica económica moderna: la economía de mercado. El trabajo procederá de la siguiente manera.<span id="MUOLPP-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MUOLPP-abstract2").show();$("MUOLPP-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MUOLPP-abstract2" style="display:none"> En primer lugar, planteamos la pregunta por la técnica económica explicando los motivos que nos llevan a ella y la inspiración heideggeriana de esta pregunta. En particular, apuntamos al fenómeno de la crisis económica en su sentido contemporáneo. En segundo lugar, buscaremos mostrar que, tal como hizo Heidegger con la técnica, no es posible hablar de “la” economía, sino que será necesario distinguir entre una economía antigua y una economía moderna. En tercer lugar, recurriremos al estudio histórico-antropológico de Karl Polanyi para describir la distinción entre ambos modos de concebir lo económico. En cuarto lugar, a partir de la descripción anterior mostraremos que la economía de mercado no es un mero instrumento para la producción de condiciones materiales, pues está caracterizada por una esencia provocante. Finalmente, concluiremos en torno a las consecuencias y posibilidades de esta descripción filosófica de la economía de mercado. Palabras clave: Economía de mercado, Martin Heidegger, Karl Polanyi, Filosofía de la economía. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MUOLPP-abstract2").hide();$("MUOLPP-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/MUOLPP"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MUOLPP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MUOLPP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MUOLPP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MUOLPP','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MUOLPP"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMORLMM-2" onclick="ee('click','MORLMM-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','MORLMM-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','MORLMM-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-02</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/MORLMM-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">La matemática mixta en las investigaciones de G. W. Leibniz.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Gustavo Morales" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/José Gustavo%20Morales"><span class="name">José Gustavo Morales</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (2):42-52.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Para favorecer la interacción disciplinar y recuperar la dimensión práctica del conocimiento matemático en la escuela secundaria, Yves Chevallard plantea la necesidad de introducir en los programas de estudio la matemática mixta. La matemática mixta, cuyo apogeo tuvo lugar en Europa entre los siglos XVI y XVIII, se propone el abordaje de problemas surgidos por fuera de la propia matemática valiéndose de nociones mecánicas -como la de centro de gravedad y fuerza centrífuga- y del empleo de variados instrumentos para realizar<span id="MORLMM-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MORLMM-2-abstract2").show();$("MORLMM-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MORLMM-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> las construcciones requeridas. En este trabajo consideramos a la matemática mixta en la cultura matemática de la segunda mitad del siglo XVII y, en dicho contexto, presentamos dos casos de la práctica matemática de G. W. Leibniz en los que la investigación matemática involucra el diseño de máquinas. La consideración de tales casos permite situar a la matemática mixta, siguiendo la terminología de Ian Hacking, en un terreno medio entre representar e intervenir. El terreno medio entre representar e intervenir es un valle fértil donde la matemática aporta a, y se nutre de, una multiplicidad de otros dominios. También es una vía de acceso para historizar el conocimiento matemático, destacando las condiciones materiales para su desarrollo y el importante rol de los problemas. Palabras clave: Práctica matemática, Resolución de problemas, Siglo XVII, Máquinas, Cultura material. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MORLMM-2-abstract2").hide();$("MORLMM-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/MORLMM-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MORLMM-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MORLMM-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MORLMM-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MORLMM-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MORLMM-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGERLMS" onclick="ee('click','GERLMS')" onmouseover="ee('over','GERLMS')" onmouseout="ee('out','GERLMS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/GERLMS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">La «matemática situada» como propuesta de reflexión epistémica en clave histórico-social sobre la práctica matemática.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Héctor Horacio Gerván" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Héctor Horacio%20Gerván"><span class="name">Héctor Horacio Gerván</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 2 (2):01-25.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">La presente investigación tiene como propósito general asumir un posicionamiento filosófico en clave histórico-social y de tipo anti-relativista para analizar el desarrollo histórico de la matemática, el cual aplicaremos a un caso en particular: la matemática del antiguo Egipto. Para ello se discutirán y criticarán, en primera instancia, determinadas posiciones filosóficas afines al cuasi-empirismo en matemática que, siendo relativistas, permitirán delinear nuestro propio posicionamiento en contraste: la existencia de una «matemática situada». Esta categoría filosófica tendrá como sustento teórico la noción<span id="GERLMS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GERLMS-abstract2").show();$("GERLMS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GERLMS-abstract2" style="display:none"> de conocimiento situado. Además, las implicaciones de esta son, según sostenemos, tanto filosóficas como historiográficas, ya que servirá para analizar las características del corpus de problemas matemáticos egipcios registrados en los diversos papiros matemáticos. En particular, haremos referencia a las expresiones lingüísticas egipcias para denotar las diversas operaciones aritméticas y el carácter algorítmico de los problemas, así como también la cuestión epistemológica de la empiria y cómo la perspectiva situada permite superar la dicotomía entre una matemática pura y otra aplicada, que consideramos no es ubicua para abordar la interpretación de la práctica matemática del antiguo país del Nilo. Palabras clave: Filosofía de la matemática, Anti-relativismo, Matemática situada, Extrañeza del pasado, Matemática egipcia. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GERLMS-abstract2").hide();$("GERLMS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/GERLMS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GERLMS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GERLMS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GERLMS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GERLMS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GERLMS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVALPCE" onclick="ee('click','VALPCE')" onmouseover="ee('over','VALPCE')" onmouseout="ee('out','VALPCE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/VALPCE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Problemas contemporáneos en la filosofía de la bioquímica.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gabriel Felipe Vallejos Baccelliere" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Gabriel Felipe%20Vallejos Baccelliere"><span class="name">Gabriel Felipe Vallejos Baccelliere</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 3 (1):45-77.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Si bien en la filosofía de las ciencias ya se han explorado algunos ejemplos provenientes de la bioquímica como casos de estudio, la filosofía de la bioquímica es una subdisciplina naciente. En este artículo estudiaremos dos problemas filosóficos de relevancia contemporánea en esta ciencia. Por un lado, examinaremos las bases epistemológicas del problema del plegamiento de proteínas. En particular lo relacionado con la predicción de la estructura tridimensional de las proteínas a partir de su secuencia, asunto que ha dado mucho<span id="VALPCE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VALPCE-abstract2").show();$("VALPCE-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VALPCE-abstract2" style="display:none"> que hablar debido a los nuevos avances utilizando deep learning. Por otro lado, exploraremos el problema in-vitro/in-vivo y, más generalmente, el problema de la extrapolación en las ciencias biológicas. Finalmente, a partir de las consecuencias de ambos temas consideraremos algunas reflexiones filosóficas generales acerca del reduccionismo, el pluralismo y el lugar de la bioquímica en las ciencias biológicas. Palabras clave: Bioquímica, Plegamiento de proteínas, In-vitro/in-vivo, Pluralismo, Reduccionismo. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VALPCE-abstract2").hide();$("VALPCE-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/VALPCE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VALPCE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VALPCE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VALPCE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VALPCE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/VALPCE"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 2 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VALPCE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCAPLTG" onclick="ee('click','CAPLTG')" onmouseover="ee('over','CAPLTG')" onmouseout="ee('out','CAPLTG')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/CAPLTG"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">¿La transferencia genética horizontal, la simbiogénesis, la especiación por hibridación y la introgresión traen realmente dificultades para la concepción cladogenética de la evolución?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gustavo Caponi" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Gustavo%20Caponi"><span class="name">Gustavo Caponi</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Culturas Cientificas</em> 3 (1):03-18.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">En los últimos años, algunos autores han venido sosteniendo que la validez de la representación arborescente del patrón filético generado por la evolución está siendo menoscabada por el reconocimiento del impacto evolutivo que tendrían la transferencia genética horizontal, la simbiogénesis, la especiación por hibridación y la introgresión. Esa concepción o representación cladogenética de la evolución sólo nos dejaría ver un aspecto parcial de las relaciones de filiación que conectan a los diferentes linajes de seres vivos; ocultando otro aspecto cuya representación<span id="CAPLTG-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CAPLTG-abstract2").show();$("CAPLTG-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CAPLTG-abstract2" style="display:none"> más adecuada sería un reticulado de relaciones entre taxones. Con todo, aún sin poner en tela de juicio la frecuencia y la relevancia explicativa de dichos fenómenos, en este trabajo se intentará mostrar que su admisión y reconocimiento no tiene por qué ir en detrimento de esa concepción cladogenética de la evolución cuya relativización se está pregonando. Por el contrario, la comprensión y la representación de tales fenómenos supone dicha concepción. Palabras clave: Filogénesis, Especiación por hibridación, Introgresión, Simbiogénesis, TGH. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CAPLTG-abstract2").hide();$("CAPLTG-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/CAPLTG"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-CAPLTG" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CAPLTG')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CAPLTG" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CAPLTG','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CAPLTG"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCALBR-12" onclick="ee('click','CALBR-12')" onmouseover="ee('over','CALBR-12')" onmouseout="ee('out','CALBR-12')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/CALBR-12"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Review of Larry Hickman, Dewey, Instrumentalism and Technology. <span class="hint">[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by H. G. Callaway" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/H. G.%20Callaway"><span class="name">H. G. Callaway</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Guy W. Stroh" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Guy W.%20Stroh"><span class="name">Guy W. Stroh</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1996</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Value Inquiry</em> 30 (1-2):345-361.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This book appears in The Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Technology, edited by Don Ihde. Hickman emphasizes Dewey as a philosopher of technology and aims to make Dewey's perspective and contributions available to specialists. Still, as claimed on the book jacket, Hickman aims at a "comprehensive yet accessible overview of Dewey's instrumentalism," in light of "each major aspect of Dewey's philosophical work." The link between the two projects is the interpretation of Dewey's instrumentalism as "a critique of technology" (p.<span id="CALBR-12-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CALBR-12-abstract2").show();$("CALBR-12-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CALBR-12-abstract2" style="display:none"> xi). (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CALBR-12-abstract2").hide();$("CALBR-12-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/CALBR-12"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-CALBR-12" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CALBR-12')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CALBR-12" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CALBR-12','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CALBR-12"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWAREC-4" onclick="ee('click','WAREC-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','WAREC-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','WAREC-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/WAREC-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Electronic Coins.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Craig Warmke" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Craig%20Warmke"><span class="name">Craig Warmke</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Cryptoeconomic Systems</em> 2 (1).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In the bitcoin whitepaper, Satoshi Nakamoto (2008: 2) defines an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Many have since defined a bitcoin as a chain of digital signatures. This latter definition continues to appear in reports from central banks, advocacy centers, and governments, as well as in academic papers across the disciplines of law, economics, computer science, cryptography, management, and philosophy. Some have even used it to argue that what we now call bitcoin is not the real bitcoin.<span id="WAREC-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WAREC-4-abstract2").show();$("WAREC-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WAREC-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> The definition fails, however. This is important because the Chain Definition obscures Satoshi’s solution to a dilemma in the design of electronic cash, as well as the truth about bitcoin’s privacy and fungibility. In this article, I explain why the Chain Definition fails and what Satoshi likely endorsed instead. Along the way, I untangle some issues around bitcoin fungibility and clarify some others around the ontology of digital assets. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WAREC-4-abstract2").hide();$("WAREC-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/WAREC-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WAREC-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WAREC-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WAREC-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WAREC-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WAREC-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKOMAJA" onclick="ee('click','KOMAJA')" onmouseover="ee('over','KOMAJA')" onmouseout="ee('out','KOMAJA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KOMAJA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">African Jurisprudence as Historical Co-extension of Diffused Legal Theories.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Leye Komolafe" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Leye%20Komolafe"><span class="name">Leye Komolafe</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya</em> 8 (1):51-68.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">African jurisprudence, like African philosophy, continues to be hotly debated. This article contends that the debate straddles the uniqueness claim which either emphasises the existence or possibility of a peculiar legal framework on the continent, and a historical co-extensional position reiterating that African jurisprudence is a continuum of other legal traditions. The article argues that there is no uniquely African jurisprudence, and that what obtains within the structures of jurisprudence on the continent also exists within various legal traditions elsewhere, and<span id="KOMAJA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KOMAJA-abstract2").show();$("KOMAJA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KOMAJA-abstract2" style="display:none"> as such can at best be described as ‘jurisprudence in Africa’ rather than ‘African jurisprudence’. It defends this thesis through analytic and comparative explications of the content of natural law theory and legal positivism as experienced on the continent. It concedes that relics of the colonial legal experience create contestations that inform scholars’ calls for a return to traditional legal systems. It concludes that a reconstructive jurisprudence in Africa must take cognisance of the continent’s historical and evolutionary legal experiences, but that a unified or monolithic theory may not be sufficient to address the choice of functional jurisprudence. Keywords African jurisprudence, jurisprudence in Africa, African legal evolution, diffused legal theories. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KOMAJA-abstract2").hide();$("KOMAJA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/KOMAJA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KOMAJA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KOMAJA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KOMAJA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KOMAJA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KOMAJA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eALSWIA" onclick="ee('click','ALSWIA')" onmouseover="ee('over','ALSWIA')" onmouseout="ee('out','ALSWIA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ALSWIA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Weariness.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alia Al-Saji" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Alia%20Al-Saji"><span class="name">Alia Al-Saji</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy Today</em> 64 (4):821-826.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Though fatigue appears a constant of this pandemic year, I argue that we may not all be living the same pandemic. I highlight the non-belonging of most racialized and colonized peoples to a world where flourishing is taken for granted as norm. To think this, I use the term “weariness.” I want to evoke, wearing out, wearing down, as well as the medical concept of weathering. Drawing on Césaire, Fanon, Hartman, Scott, and Spillers, my concept of weariness articulates an exhausting<span id="ALSWIA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ALSWIA-abstract2").show();$("ALSWIA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ALSWIA-abstract2" style="display:none"> and enduring experience—the eroding, grating, and crumbling of racialized flesh—through repetitive colonial duration, not simply for a year, but over a longue durée. I read this as a wounding that needs to be thought not simply in terms of health outcomes and disease, but in terms of affective experience and dismembered possibility. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ALSWIA-abstract2").hide();$("ALSWIA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/ALSWIA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ALSWIA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ALSWIA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ALSWIA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ALSWIA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ALSWIA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eALSTLF" onclick="ee('click','ALSTLF')" onmouseover="ee('over','ALSTLF')" onmouseout="ee('out','ALSTLF')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-03-01</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ALSTLF"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Too Late: Fanon, the dismembered past, and a phenomenology of racialized time.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alia Al-Saji" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Alia%20Al-Saji"><span class="name">Alia Al-Saji</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Leswin Laubscher, Derek Hook & Miraj U. Desai (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/LAUFPA-2">Fanon, Phenomenology and Psychology</a></em>. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 177–193.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This essay asks after the lateness that affectively structures Fanon's phenomenology of racialized temporality in Black Skin,White Masks. I broach this through the concepts of possibility, “affective ankylosis”, and by taking seriously the dismembered past that haunts Fanon's text. The colonization of the past involves a bifurcation of time and of memory. To the “burning past,” wherein colonized experience is stuck and to which we remain sensitive, is contrasted the colonial construction of white, western time as progressive and futural—a construction<span id="ALSTLF-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ALSTLF-abstract2").show();$("ALSTLF-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ALSTLF-abstract2" style="display:none"> that relies on the very indifference, ankylosis, and closure of this time to the multiple, lived temporalities of colonized others. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ALSTLF-abstract2").hide();$("ALSTLF-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/ALSTLF"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ALSTLF" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ALSTLF')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ALSTLF" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ALSTLF','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/ALSTLF"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ALSTLF"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMORDDC-3" onclick="ee('click','MORDDC-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','MORDDC-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','MORDDC-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/MORDDC-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Desarrollo de competencias en el ámbito de la filosofía aplicada.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Fabio Morandin-Ahuerma" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Fabio%20Morandin-Ahuerma"><span class="name">Fabio Morandin-Ahuerma</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2012</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Héctor Julián Vargas Rubín & María de Lourdes Watty Urquidi (eds.), <em>Innovación educativa, experiencias desde el ámbito del proyecto aula</em>. Xalapa, Veracruz: Universidad Veracruzana. pp. 1033-1035.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">En este trabajo se aborda el problema del diseño instruccional a través del estudio por competencias dentro de las humanidades, especialmente de la filosofía. Se concluye que es posible un abordaje metodológico enfocado al cumplimiento de metas específicas en el educando en el desarrollo de competencias genéricas y profesionales. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/MORDDC-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MORDDC-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MORDDC-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MORDDC-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MORDDC-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MORDDC-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSOYTIJ" onclick="ee('click','SOYTIJ')" onmouseover="ee('over','SOYTIJ')" onmouseout="ee('out','SOYTIJ')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/SOYTIJ"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Truth in Journalism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Zeynep Soysal" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Zeynep%20Soysal"><span class="name">Zeynep Soysal</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In James E. Katz & Kate K. Mays (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/KATJAT">Journalism and Truth in an Age of Social Media</a></em>. Oxford University Press. pp. 103–116.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In order to fulfill their role in society, professional journalists must deliver truths. But truth-telling is not the only requirement of the goal of journalism. What is more, some of the other requirements of journalism can make it difficult for journalists to deliver truths, and may even force them to depart from truth in certain ways. In this paper, I make the requirements of the goal of journalism explicit, and I explain how conflicts between them can arise. I then make<span id="SOYTIJ-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SOYTIJ-abstract2").show();$("SOYTIJ-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SOYTIJ-abstract2" style="display:none"> some suggestions for balancing these requirements that could help journalists regain the trust of the public. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SOYTIJ-abstract2").hide();$("SOYTIJ-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/SOYTIJ"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SOYTIJ" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SOYTIJ')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SOYTIJ" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SOYTIJ','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SOYTIJ"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSTAHOA" onclick="ee('click','STAHOA')" onmouseover="ee('over','STAHOA')" onmouseout="ee('out','STAHOA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/STAHOA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Heraclitus on Analogy: a Critical Note.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Giannis Stamatellos" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Giannis%20Stamatellos"><span class="name">Giannis Stamatellos</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Ancient Philosophy</em> 16 (1):208-212.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The aim of this critical note is to discuss Heraclitus' use of analogy as a pattern of thought not only with argumentative value but also ontological and epistemological status. Heraclitus' analogy is of two kinds and is expressed in the use of the adverbs ὥσπερ ("as") and ὅκωσπερ ("just as"). The first is used as an explanatory device, while the second denotes the ontological homogeneity of logos. Analogy reveals not only the inherent opposition of logos in each single thing, but<span id="STAHOA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("STAHOA-abstract2").show();$("STAHOA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="STAHOA-abstract2" style="display:none"> also the interdependent common interrelation between things. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("STAHOA-abstract2").hide();$("STAHOA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/STAHOA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-STAHOA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('STAHOA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-STAHOA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('STAHOA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-STAHOA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSTATNO-13" onclick="ee('click','STATNO-13')" onmouseover="ee('over','STATNO-13')" onmouseout="ee('out','STATNO-13')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/STATNO-13"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Notion of Infinity in Plotinus and Cantor.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Giannis Stamatellos" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Giannis%20Stamatellos"><span class="name">Giannis Stamatellos</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Dionysis Mentzeniotis" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Dionysis%20Mentzeniotis"><span class="name">Dionysis Mentzeniotis</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2008</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Jure Zovko & John Dillon (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/ZOVPAF">Platonism and Forms of Intelligence</a></em>. Akademie Verlag. pp. 213-230.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/STATNO-13"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-STATNO-13" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('STATNO-13')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-STATNO-13" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('STATNO-13','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-STATNO-13"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSTAPVE" onclick="ee('click','STAPVE')" onmouseover="ee('over','STAPVE')" onmouseout="ee('out','STAPVE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/STAPVE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Plotinus: Virtue Ethics.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Giannis Stamatellos" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Giannis%20Stamatellos"><span class="name">Giannis Stamatellos</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Plotinus: Virtue Ethics This article focuses on the virtue ethics of Plotinus and its implications for later accounts of virtue ethics, particularly in Porphyry and Iamblichus. Plotinus' ethical theory is discussed in relation to the aim of the virtuous person to become godlike, the role of disposition in the soul's intellectualization, the four … Continue reading Plotinus: Virtue Ethics. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/STAPVE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-STAPVE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('STAPVE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-STAPVE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('STAPVE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-STAPVE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBROSO-2" onclick="ee('click','BROSO-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','BROSO-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','BROSO-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2023-02-28</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/rec/BROSO-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Span Operators.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Berit Brogaard" href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/s/Berit%20Brogaard"><span class="name">Berit Brogaard</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2007</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Analysis</em> 67 (1):72-79.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">I argue that David Lewis is too quick to deny the presentist the right to employ span operators. There is no reason why the presentist could not help herself to both primitive tensed slice operators and primitive span operators. She would then have another device available to eliminate ambiguities and explain why sentences with embedded contradictions may nevertheless be true. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/archive/BROSO-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BROSO-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BROSO-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BROSO-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BROSO-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20230307015312im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20230307015312/https://philarchive.org/citations/BROSO-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 13 citations</a>   <span 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