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Karl Schafer | University of California, Irvine - Academia.edu
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$('body').addClass('profile-viewed-by-owner'); } $socialProfiles = [{"id":16673360,"link":"https://webfiles.uci.edu/schaferk/www/index.html","name":"Homepage","link_domain":"webfiles.uci.edu","icon":"//www.google.com/s2/u/0/favicons?domain=webfiles.uci.edu"}]</script><div id="js-react-on-rails-context" style="display:none" data-rails-context="{"inMailer":false,"i18nLocale":"en","i18nDefaultLocale":"en","href":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer","location":"/KarlSchafer","scheme":"https","host":"uci.academia.edu","port":null,"pathname":"/KarlSchafer","search":null,"httpAcceptLanguage":null,"serverSide":false}"></div> <div class="js-react-on-rails-component" style="display:none" data-component-name="ProfileCheckPaperUpdate" data-props="{}" data-trace="false" data-dom-id="ProfileCheckPaperUpdate-react-component-151a1ba1-ac9a-4e5b-a976-086e3c3aa0a6"></div> <div id="ProfileCheckPaperUpdate-react-component-151a1ba1-ac9a-4e5b-a976-086e3c3aa0a6"></div> <div class="DesignSystem"><div 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For some other online papers, see: https://webfiles.uci.edu/schaferk/www/index.html<br /><div class="js-profile-less-about u-linkUnstyled u-tcGrayDarker u-textDecorationUnderline u-displayNone">less</div></div></div><div class="ri-section"><div class="ri-section-header"><span>Interests</span><a class="ri-more-link js-profile-ri-list-card" data-click-track="profile-user-info-primary-research-interest" data-has-card-for-ri-list="605841">View All (39)</a></div><div class="ri-tags-container"><a data-click-track="profile-user-info-expand-research-interests" data-has-card-for-ri-list="605841" href="https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Philosophy"><div id="js-react-on-rails-context" style="display:none" data-rails-context="{"inMailer":false,"i18nLocale":"en","i18nDefaultLocale":"en","href":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer","location":"/KarlSchafer","scheme":"https","host":"uci.academia.edu","port":null,"pathname":"/KarlSchafer","search":null,"httpAcceptLanguage":null,"serverSide":false}"></div> <div class="js-react-on-rails-component" style="display:none" data-component-name="Pill" data-props="{"color":"gray","children":["Philosophy"]}" data-trace="false" data-dom-id="Pill-react-component-43156d4e-3c7a-44f5-86d5-bf14c3095e43"></div> <div id="Pill-react-component-43156d4e-3c7a-44f5-86d5-bf14c3095e43"></div> </a><a data-click-track="profile-user-info-expand-research-interests" data-has-card-for-ri-list="605841" href="https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Kantian_ethics"><div class="js-react-on-rails-component" style="display:none" data-component-name="Pill" data-props="{"color":"gray","children":["Kantian ethics"]}" data-trace="false" data-dom-id="Pill-react-component-a9cf372f-dc45-4930-8104-29966c2f41eb"></div> <div id="Pill-react-component-a9cf372f-dc45-4930-8104-29966c2f41eb"></div> </a><a data-click-track="profile-user-info-expand-research-interests" data-has-card-for-ri-list="605841" href="https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Psychology"><div class="js-react-on-rails-component" style="display:none" data-component-name="Pill" data-props="{"color":"gray","children":["Moral Psychology"]}" data-trace="false" data-dom-id="Pill-react-component-38d637d9-47b6-4d60-9578-3bde24c218e9"></div> <div id="Pill-react-component-38d637d9-47b6-4d60-9578-3bde24c218e9"></div> </a><a data-click-track="profile-user-info-expand-research-interests" data-has-card-for-ri-list="605841" href="https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Immanuel_Kant"><div class="js-react-on-rails-component" style="display:none" data-component-name="Pill" data-props="{"color":"gray","children":["Immanuel Kant"]}" data-trace="false" data-dom-id="Pill-react-component-cd7c8bbd-876d-4383-8923-b556c4cd284c"></div> <div id="Pill-react-component-cd7c8bbd-876d-4383-8923-b556c4cd284c"></div> </a><a data-click-track="profile-user-info-expand-research-interests" data-has-card-for-ri-list="605841" href="https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaethics"><div class="js-react-on-rails-component" style="display:none" data-component-name="Pill" data-props="{"color":"gray","children":["Metaethics"]}" data-trace="false" data-dom-id="Pill-react-component-4ab1b697-a66c-4e83-a354-7aad06b5e4c9"></div> <div id="Pill-react-component-4ab1b697-a66c-4e83-a354-7aad06b5e4c9"></div> </a></div></div><div class="external-links-container"><ul class="profile-links new-profile js-UserInfo-social"><li class="left-most js-UserInfo-social-cv" data-broccoli-component="user-info.cv-button" data-click-track="profile-user-info-cv" data-cv-filename="CV.pdf" data-placement="top" data-toggle="tooltip" href="/KarlSchafer/CurriculumVitae"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--small" style="font-size: 20px; letter-spacing: 0.8px"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">CV</span></button></li><li class="profile-profiles js-social-profiles-container"><i class="fa fa-spin fa-spinner"></i></li></ul></div></div></div><div class="right-panel-container"><div class="user-content-wrapper"><div class="uploads-container" id="social-redesign-work-container"><div class="upload-header"><h2 class="ds2-5-heading-sans-serif-xs">Uploads</h2></div><div class="nav-container backbone-profile-documents-nav hidden-xs"><ul class="nav-tablist" role="tablist"><li class="nav-chip active" role="presentation"><a data-section-name="" data-toggle="tab" href="#all" role="tab">all</a></li><li class="nav-chip" role="presentation"><a class="js-profile-docs-nav-section u-textTruncate" data-click-track="profile-works-tab" data-section-name="Kant" data-toggle="tab" href="#kant" role="tab" title="Kant"><span>6</span> <span class="ds2-5-body-sm-bold">Kant</span></a></li><li class="nav-chip" role="presentation"><a class="js-profile-docs-nav-section u-textTruncate" data-click-track="profile-works-tab" data-section-name="Ethics-and-Metaethics" data-toggle="tab" href="#ethicsandmetaethics" role="tab" title="Ethics and Metaethics"><span>13</span> <span class="ds2-5-body-sm-bold">Ethics and Metaethics</span></a></li><li class="nav-chip" role="presentation"><a class="js-profile-docs-nav-section u-textTruncate" data-click-track="profile-works-tab" data-section-name="Hume" data-toggle="tab" href="#hume" role="tab" title="Hume"><span>5</span> <span class="ds2-5-body-sm-bold">Hume</span></a></li><li class="nav-chip" role="presentation"><a class="js-profile-docs-nav-section u-textTruncate" data-click-track="profile-works-tab" data-section-name="Epistemology" data-toggle="tab" href="#epistemology" role="tab" title="Epistemology"><span>6</span> <span class="ds2-5-body-sm-bold">Epistemology</span></a></li><li class="nav-chip more-tab" role="presentation"><a class="js-profile-documents-more-tab link-unstyled u-textTruncate" data-toggle="dropdown" role="tab">More <i class="fa fa-chevron-down"></i></a><ul class="js-profile-documents-more-dropdown dropdown-menu dropdown-menu-right profile-documents-more-dropdown" role="menu"><li role="presentation"><a data-click-track="profile-works-tab" data-section-name="Book-Reviews" data-toggle="tab" href="#bookreviews" role="tab" style="border: none;"><span>7</span> Book Reviews</a></li><li role="presentation"><a data-click-track="profile-works-tab" data-section-name="Papers" data-toggle="tab" href="#papers" role="tab" style="border: none;"><span>9</span> Papers</a></li></ul></li></ul></div><div class="divider ds-divider-16" style="margin: 0px;"></div><div class="documents-container backbone-social-profile-documents" style="width: 100%;"><div class="u-taCenter"></div><div class="profile--tab_content_container js-tab-pane tab-pane active" id="all"><div class="profile--tab_heading_container js-section-heading" data-section="Kant" id="Kant"><h3 class="profile--tab_heading_container">Kant by Karl Schafer</h3></div><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="45121041"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/45121041/The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on_the_Practice_of_Philosophy_and_the_Proper_Bounds_of_Skepticism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/65688514/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/45121041/The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on_the_Practice_of_Philosophy_and_the_Proper_Bounds_of_Skepticism">The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span> Cambridge Critical Guidebook to the Prolegomena</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understandin...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understanding on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. In particular, following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a “demarcation challenge” concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (say) natural scientific contexts from the illegitimate use of it in (say) dogmatic metaphysics. I will then go on to argue that Kant sees Hume’s tendency to slide into more radical forms of skepticism as a symptom of his failure to provide a systematic or principled account of this distinction. This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which (i) robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this and (ii) makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls “Formal Idealism”. In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between (i) philosophical methodology and (ii) the nature of our faculties.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="4b0a683cdd960914995ddbc1b8ff443c" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":65688514,"asset_id":45121041,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/65688514/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="45121041"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="45121041"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 45121041; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=45121041]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=45121041]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 45121041; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='45121041']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 45121041, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "4b0a683cdd960914995ddbc1b8ff443c" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=45121041]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":45121041,"title":"The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understanding on Kant’s critical philosophy. 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Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. In particular, following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a “demarcation challenge” concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (say) natural scientific contexts from the illegitimate use of it in (say) dogmatic metaphysics. I will then go on to argue that Kant sees Hume’s tendency to slide into more radical forms of skepticism as a symptom of his failure to provide a systematic or principled account of this distinction. This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which (i) robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this and (ii) makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls “Formal Idealism”. In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between (i) philosophical methodology and (ii) the nature of our faculties.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/45121041/The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on_the_Practice_of_Philosophy_and_the_Proper_Bounds_of_Skepticism","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2021-02-14T14:43:46.349-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"other","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":65688514,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/65688514/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"KantHumeVolume.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/65688514/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/65688514/KantHumeVolume-libre.pdf?1613347071=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552834\u0026Signature=OIQg5Atzczr3DHrbjtvJfTYtFBtI4w95R4gdtfYPXHhShupHlmflI6UCMpA013QWaAJtfsA2uB2QdxrhQVxY97ZXfyRqzzHwtPCA4gr2mFmBvQCJUnGEaCI7sOs6vUS-8ZoNqQAkXm4KjoUx8N0eWGqZ5jRiKW-~GV52n5J509gXE~K5kUN55tohLotajHCN-AnFf6bQGsqww7MdfDb4Pg45XB5beKbu9Hud7JZZIZk6QPzsYDlf8urJ-lTMq26e4Y~X6Gs1WY0IBKzf-Gdg2h-hTHMHTrNT5oTnS1fD3oXSovzsORkHLy9CaotW2jkx6OohzNvfuKkOWsIf~6hvLQ__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on_the_Practice_of_Philosophy_and_the_Proper_Bounds_of_Skepticism","translated_slug":"","page_count":17,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":65688514,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/65688514/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"KantHumeVolume.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/65688514/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/65688514/KantHumeVolume-libre.pdf?1613347071=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552835\u0026Signature=Ltxr2s~jP-Z5UMBb7HuSGlcgv71droxuFj9nB2jiFE6ieBRo8XpmWKbGlNwbLeKTp9aVvR36PkzdnA5KpQtp3ws0U5iiRWX6pmsrc4DrIzThLmjScFjEYXG5BGqSdS0~DVBEs3yDbSrc-GsTlMjqbqfl8quqZFvEbuuJ3tKLNeWfy~6m2MBeuJvRpsQmObWyBL0NG2L2TT5s-jh2ij0nyD2TiTDgFWHSOHClSiFJ3tyZUADlHhjQL1f4uckFXUrHTsy68NoLM2sD1r7-BP4MhEfgGMjOIEmK9G~FxWFvh3IX-dAtWXE8BXw1FNoLMW8k9--VhnDKjKwxh5Y3v4eVHA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":849,"name":"Kant","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Kant"},{"id":891,"name":"Metaphilosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphilosophy"},{"id":16031,"name":"Immanuel Kant","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Immanuel_Kant"},{"id":19942,"name":"David Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/David_Hume"},{"id":29711,"name":"Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Skepticism"},{"id":30424,"name":"Prolegomena","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Prolegomena"},{"id":174265,"name":"Transcendental Idealism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Transcendental_Idealism"},{"id":300475,"name":"Kant and Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Kant_and_Hume"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="45029109"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/45029109/Kant_on_Method"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Kant on Method" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/65688512/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/45029109/Kant_on_Method">Kant on Method</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>The Oxford Handbook of Kant</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. Begins by discussing how Kant conceives of the proper ends of rational inquiry, and how those ends inform his conception of the proper methodology for philosophy. Then discusses the foundational role that self-conscious capacities play within Kant's philosophical system. Concludes by discussing Kant's famous claim that the philosopher - unlike the mathematician - must be a legislator, and not an artist, of reason.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="3e902d63acb24fce553d8c985939d704" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":65688512,"asset_id":45029109,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/65688512/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="45029109"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="45029109"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 45029109; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=45029109]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=45029109]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 45029109; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='45029109']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 45029109, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "3e902d63acb24fce553d8c985939d704" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=45029109]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":45029109,"title":"Kant on Method","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="38312071"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/38312071/Kant_Constitutivism_as_Capacities_First_Philosophy"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Kant: Constitutivism as Capacities-First Philosophy" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/58361201/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/38312071/Kant_Constitutivism_as_Capacities_First_Philosophy">Kant: Constitutivism as Capacities-First Philosophy</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Explorations</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” pr...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="51afb0b9eee7feacc8f932055967d754" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":58361201,"asset_id":38312071,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/58361201/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="38312071"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="38312071"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 38312071; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=38312071]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=38312071]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 38312071; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='38312071']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 38312071, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "51afb0b9eee7feacc8f932055967d754" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=38312071]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":38312071,"title":"Kant: Constitutivism as Capacities-First Philosophy","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”.","publication_name":"Philosophical Explorations"},"translated_abstract":"Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="16524714"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/16524714/Practical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54436601/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/16524714/Practical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves">Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Kantian Freedom (OUP)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. This much should be uncontroversial. What is much more controversial is the precise kind of cognitive relation to things-in-themselves that Kant believes is possible from a practical point of view. Traditionally, interpreters have tended to regard such “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves as (at best) a poor step-cousin of its theoretical counterpart – as a sort of mere “rational faith” unworthy of serious comparison with genuine theoretical knowledge or cognition. But this seriously underestimates the degree to which Kant believes we can achieve “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves from a practical point of view – or at least, it does so insofar as we focus on our practical self-understanding as noumenally free agents. At least in this case, far from representing an impoverished cousin of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge, our practical awareness of ourselves as free possesses all of the central marks of cognition and knowledge in Kant’s sense of these two terms – albeit on distinctively practical grounds.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="ebd6d7313381954e0b3917dbc21df091" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":54436601,"asset_id":16524714,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54436601/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="16524714"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="16524714"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 16524714; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=16524714]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=16524714]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 16524714; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='16524714']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 16524714, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "ebd6d7313381954e0b3917dbc21df091" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=16524714]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":16524714,"title":"Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. 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At least in this case, far from representing an impoverished cousin of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge, our practical awareness of ourselves as free possesses all of the central marks of cognition and knowledge in Kant’s sense of these two terms – albeit on distinctively practical grounds.","publication_name":"Kantian Freedom (OUP)"},"translated_abstract":"Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. This much should be uncontroversial. What is much more controversial is the precise kind of cognitive relation to things-in-themselves that Kant believes is possible from a practical point of view. Traditionally, interpreters have tended to regard such “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves as (at best) a poor step-cousin of its theoretical counterpart – as a sort of mere “rational faith” unworthy of serious comparison with genuine theoretical knowledge or cognition. But this seriously underestimates the degree to which Kant believes we can achieve “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves from a practical point of view – or at least, it does so insofar as we focus on our practical self-understanding as noumenally free agents. At least in this case, far from representing an impoverished cousin of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge, our practical awareness of ourselves as free possesses all of the central marks of cognition and knowledge in Kant’s sense of these two terms – albeit on distinctively practical grounds.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/16524714/Practical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-10-06T17:28:36.004-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":54436601,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54436601/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"FreedomMoralLawShort2.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54436601/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Practical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Thi.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/54436601/FreedomMoralLawShort2-libre.pdf?1505430873=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPractical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Thi.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552835\u0026Signature=cX67PuKLZQ4Q4pcJ1gcb8jxU4BrRzKpkCXLRjkTZFW5TJx2trXimiQmqxI9UH3FBblOsusM5JXdAF1OQ~yu8JmKTauIzEoUWGhXBWcA-7ufq5tNlp7CWSk86gOwlyq8opfHah3en8EhTMorYKvYmDdzQA6X0v9dlM0Oi0FVfHLJ5N2sidQM5oRVls363pgVTCLWffD-eRnn9DpeYWZkb30squ7VjF3rbTD-ScGbz9AjuszwHNiWPE~bnL~ZSgAm7m~Ls~lLFDXCOKQIKmihau3HBoHb7WOxpa~Q04o0HRZon8IysqCJTvl1y41nwfDHXgzoOH5WGfFO52iycBoCatw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Practical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves","translated_slug":"","page_count":27,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":54436601,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54436601/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"FreedomMoralLawShort2.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54436601/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Practical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Thi.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/54436601/FreedomMoralLawShort2-libre.pdf?1505430873=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPractical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Thi.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552835\u0026Signature=cX67PuKLZQ4Q4pcJ1gcb8jxU4BrRzKpkCXLRjkTZFW5TJx2trXimiQmqxI9UH3FBblOsusM5JXdAF1OQ~yu8JmKTauIzEoUWGhXBWcA-7ufq5tNlp7CWSk86gOwlyq8opfHah3en8EhTMorYKvYmDdzQA6X0v9dlM0Oi0FVfHLJ5N2sidQM5oRVls363pgVTCLWffD-eRnn9DpeYWZkb30squ7VjF3rbTD-ScGbz9AjuszwHNiWPE~bnL~ZSgAm7m~Ls~lLFDXCOKQIKmihau3HBoHb7WOxpa~Q04o0HRZon8IysqCJTvl1y41nwfDHXgzoOH5WGfFO52iycBoCatw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":849,"name":"Kant","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Kant"},{"id":911,"name":"17th Century \u0026 Early Modern Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/17th_Century_and_Early_Modern_Philosophy"},{"id":8291,"name":"Kant's Practical Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Kants_Practical_Philosophy"},{"id":10240,"name":"18th Century Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/18th_Century_Philosophy"},{"id":16031,"name":"Immanuel Kant","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Immanuel_Kant"},{"id":38772,"name":"Early Modern Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Early_Modern_Philosophy"},{"id":42816,"name":"Kantian ethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Kantian_ethics"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="28374256"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/28374256/Kants_Conception_of_Cognition_and_our_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Kant's Conception of Cognition and our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56709232/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/28374256/Kants_Conception_of_Cognition_and_our_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves">Kant's Conception of Cognition and our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (OUP)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate content constraint. In doing so, I stress the differences between Kant's conception of cognition and our contemporary conception of propositional knowledge, while connecting together important strands in the recent scholarly literature on these topics. Finally, I make use of this improved understanding of cognition to better understand why Kant claims that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, while also appearing to claim that we can know a good deal about what things-in-themselves are like.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="95ba869a457f3a12c9a7d2ac2d3a7543" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":56709232,"asset_id":28374256,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/56709232/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="28374256"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="28374256"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 28374256; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=28374256]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=28374256]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 28374256; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='28374256']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 28374256, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "95ba869a457f3a12c9a7d2ac2d3a7543" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=28374256]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":28374256,"title":"Kant's Conception of Cognition and our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate content constraint. In doing so, I stress the differences between Kant's conception of cognition and our contemporary conception of propositional knowledge, while connecting together important strands in the recent scholarly literature on these topics. Finally, I make use of this improved understanding of cognition to better understand why Kant claims that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, while also appearing to claim that we can know a good deal about what things-in-themselves are like.","publication_name":"The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (OUP)"},"translated_abstract":"In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate content constraint. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="29927669"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/29927669/Intuitions_and_Objects_in_Allaiss_Manifest_Reality"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Intuitions and Objects in Allais's Manifest Reality" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/50386596/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/29927669/Intuitions_and_Objects_in_Allaiss_Manifest_Reality">Intuitions and Objects in Allais's Manifest Reality</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Studies</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Manifest Reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant's transcendental idealism...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Manifest Reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant's transcendental idealism. So there is a great deal in Allais's discussion to celebrate. But I want to focus here on two aspects of her views that I am not yet sure about: First, Allais's understanding of the relationship between concepts and intuitions. And second, her characterization of the manner in which intuitions are object-dependent. I'll close by making some general remarks about the significance of this for Allais's understanding of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="4c1f7716dd714f1b24791ce529eaf651" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":50386596,"asset_id":29927669,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/50386596/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="29927669"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="29927669"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 29927669; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=29927669]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=29927669]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 29927669; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='29927669']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 29927669, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "4c1f7716dd714f1b24791ce529eaf651" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=29927669]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":29927669,"title":"Intuitions and Objects in Allais's Manifest Reality","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Manifest Reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant's transcendental idealism. 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profile--work_container" data-work-id="37848589"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/37848589/A_Brief_History_of_Rationality_Reason_Reasonableness_Rationality_and_Reasons"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of A Brief History of Rationality: Reason, Reasonableness, Rationality, and Reasons" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/57852563/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/37848589/A_Brief_History_of_Rationality_Reason_Reasonableness_Rationality_and_Reasons">A Brief History of Rationality: Reason, Reasonableness, Rationality, and Reasons</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Manuscrito</span><span>, 2018</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">The title really says it all, doesn't it?</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="a10e66d56d769475868b78c2d41084d3" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":57852563,"asset_id":37848589,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/57852563/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="37848589"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa 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about reasons ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In this essay, I begin to develop and defend an alternative form of constitutivism about reasons which begins, not with a conception of agency structured around autonomy, but rather with a conception of rationality structured around understanding. In doing so, I discuss the relationship between understanding and the sort of reflection that gives rise to the concept of a reason, the relationship between theoretical and practical understanding, and the connections between understanding and explanatory and intersubjective reasoning. In doing so, my goal is not to often anything like a complete defense of this way of thinking about constitutivism, but rather to offer some reasons for taking it seriously as an alternative to the more popular autonomy-focused forms of constitutivism.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="a9d7bc1dcd193286a3a61aecb8f1b0fb" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":53414467,"asset_id":33356599,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/53414467/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="33356599"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="33356599"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 33356599; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=33356599]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=33356599]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 33356599; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='33356599']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 33356599, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "a9d7bc1dcd193286a3a61aecb8f1b0fb" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=33356599]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":33356599,"title":"Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In this essay, I begin to develop and defend an alternative form of constitutivism about reasons which begins, not with a conception of agency structured around autonomy, but rather with a conception of rationality structured around understanding. 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I also discuss how this sort of "rationalist constructivist" ought to think about the relationship between reasons and rationality.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="0b6f85254ca4046e3e73bcfcc89d2cbf" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37823119,"asset_id":12790561,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37823119/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="12790561"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="12790561"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 12790561; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=12790561]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=12790561]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 12790561; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='12790561']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 12790561, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "0b6f85254ca4046e3e73bcfcc89d2cbf" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=12790561]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":12790561,"title":"Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1): Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In the first half of this two-part essay, I argue that Kantian constructivism is most attractive when it takes as its foundation a thoroughly non-trivial conception of reason or rationality - which has both theoretical and practical manifestations. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="12920134"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/12920134/Realism_and_Constructivism_in_Kantian_Metaethics_2_The_Kantian_Conception_of_Rationality_and_Rationalist_Constructivism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2): The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37881164/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/12920134/Realism_and_Constructivism_in_Kantian_Metaethics_2_The_Kantian_Conception_of_Rationality_and_Rationalist_Constructivism">Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2): The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophy Compass</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at t...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at the heart of the form of rationalist constructivism laid out in its first half. Along the way, I discuss some recent arguments for a version of this view due to Michael Smith and Julia Markovits. I then discuss some of the advantages of the resulting view - focusing on metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational questions.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="14f556b5cb78a3b3894ee971070e2933" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37881164,"asset_id":12920134,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37881164/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="12920134"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="12920134"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 12920134; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=12920134]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=12920134]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 12920134; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='12920134']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 12920134, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "14f556b5cb78a3b3894ee971070e2933" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=12920134]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":12920134,"title":"Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2): The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at the heart of the form of rationalist constructivism laid out in its first half. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="13983229"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/13983229/The_Modesty_of_the_Moral_Point_of_View"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of The Modesty of the Moral Point of View" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38172290/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/13983229/The_Modesty_of_the_Moral_Point_of_View">The Modesty of the Moral Point of View</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Weighing Reasons (OUP)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Ha...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Harman - have argued that there is a sense in which morality itself does not treat moral reasons as consistently overriding. In the present essay I develop and extend this idea from a somewhat different perspective. In doing so, I offer an alternative way of formalizing the idea that morality is modest about the weight of moral reasons, thereby making more explicit the connections between this thesis and similar issues in the epistemic sphere. In addition, I discuss how these ideas affect our thinking about the nature of self-effacement, the significance of reflective endorsement, the weight that moral reasons ought to be given in all things consideration, and the plausibility of “indirect” moral theories. Finally, I stress that it is possible to see morality as modest about the weight of specifically moral reasons, while also seeing all practical reasons as grounded in morality more indirectly – namely, by seeing morality as determining the weight that both moral and non-moral considerations deserve to have in all things considered deliberation.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="e18dd1a20fa259abc54982c3bdcb51e9" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":38172290,"asset_id":13983229,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38172290/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="13983229"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="13983229"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 13983229; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=13983229]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=13983229]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 13983229; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='13983229']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 13983229, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "e18dd1a20fa259abc54982c3bdcb51e9" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=13983229]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":13983229,"title":"The Modesty of the Moral Point of View","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Harman - have argued that there is a sense in which morality itself does not treat moral reasons as consistently overriding. 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Then I argue that a moral realist can resist both of these strategies by calling into question the epistemological presuppositions on which they rest. Nonetheless, I conclude that these arguments point to a legitimate source of dissatisfaction about many forms of moral realism. I conclude by discussing the way forward that these conclusions indicate.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="1cd255917f905564c331b687bd8cafda" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":42847084,"asset_id":20979901,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/42847084/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="20979901"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="20979901"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 20979901; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=20979901]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=20979901]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 20979901; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='20979901']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 20979901, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "1cd255917f905564c331b687bd8cafda" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=20979901]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":20979901,"title":"Evolutionary Debunking Arguments, Explanatory Structure, and the Appeal of Anti-Realism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In this essay, I distinguish two different epistemological strategies an anti-realist might pursue in developing an \"evolutionary debunking\" of moral realism. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11709434"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709434/Evolution_and_Normative_Scepticism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Evolution and Normative Scepticism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149525/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709434/Evolution_and_Normative_Scepticism">Evolution and Normative Scepticism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative re...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. In what follows, I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I consider several possible arguments from evolutionary theory and normative realism to normative scepticism and explain where they go wrong. I then offer a more general diagnosis of the tendency to accept such arguments and why this tendency should be resisted.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="a265eec4d71919c858b066444ee23094" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37149525,"asset_id":11709434,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149525/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11709434"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11709434"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11709434; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11709434]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11709434]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11709434; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11709434']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11709434, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "a265eec4d71919c858b066444ee23094" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11709434]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11709434,"title":"Evolution and Normative Scepticism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="34762965"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/34762965/Metaethical_Quietism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Metaethical Quietism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54621885/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/34762965/Metaethical_Quietism">Metaethical Quietism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--coauthors"><span>by </span><span><a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer">Karl Schafer</a> and <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://independent.academia.edu/DougKremm">Doug Kremm</a></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (Routledge)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">A brief exploration of the nature of, and motivations for, contemporary forms of metaethical quie...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">A brief exploration of the nature of, and motivations for, contemporary forms of metaethical quietism. Also outlines some of the prominent objections to such positions and discusses some of the limitations of these objections from the quietist's perspective. 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I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability of the resulting account.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="f126bd1f4f306369b2752f723d0e0ec5" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37246586,"asset_id":11850281,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37246586/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11850281"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11850281"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11850281; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11850281]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11850281]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11850281; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11850281']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11850281, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "f126bd1f4f306369b2752f723d0e0ec5" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11850281]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11850281,"title":"Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"I consider sophisticated forms of relativism and their effectiveness at responding to the skeptical argument from moral disagreement. 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I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability of the resulting account.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11850281/Assessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_Moral_Disagreement","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-04-08T08:46:05.694-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37246586,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37246586/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"RelativismDisagreement.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37246586/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Assessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_M.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37246586/RelativismDisagreement-libre.pdf?1428507955=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DAssessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_M.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=M8RqMiWA0MgHVgBlxHIYX9cjhZiZKHkXHxkjpFE0BJ9y0t2~sum-4-la7ZHHZSzzBbb13ztSSXhidrDHxrEFA4ZgyKWrAJRJtRJ3lCQ2mfEb1qJpIUytPygBWFbjPdEtzbb9eNYKwG5mOrwd7j713Lvpl-OauYhjVMgwNveeZ0jeZgfYt3KJZx~3zoXthMb672JIK5ToCz6JsF3JuYDPlJKJKjET3xlCGgr54iuRy4YRa-7qJ07Wxq1o6XY-4B3tAfyAbMoAQbQ38KxwtHdltuEwCPfBk-~f5QL16WSiGq8uQ~818eu0lZx8pl-NLo0rj02FMNi3LOxGu7TcDhnOWg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Assessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_Moral_Disagreement","translated_slug":"","page_count":19,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":37246586,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37246586/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"RelativismDisagreement.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37246586/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Assessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_M.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37246586/RelativismDisagreement-libre.pdf?1428507955=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DAssessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_M.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=M8RqMiWA0MgHVgBlxHIYX9cjhZiZKHkXHxkjpFE0BJ9y0t2~sum-4-la7ZHHZSzzBbb13ztSSXhidrDHxrEFA4ZgyKWrAJRJtRJ3lCQ2mfEb1qJpIUytPygBWFbjPdEtzbb9eNYKwG5mOrwd7j713Lvpl-OauYhjVMgwNveeZ0jeZgfYt3KJZx~3zoXthMb672JIK5ToCz6JsF3JuYDPlJKJKjET3xlCGgr54iuRy4YRa-7qJ07Wxq1o6XY-4B3tAfyAbMoAQbQ38KxwtHdltuEwCPfBk-~f5QL16WSiGq8uQ~818eu0lZx8pl-NLo0rj02FMNi3LOxGu7TcDhnOWg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":905,"name":"Meta-Ethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Meta-Ethics"},{"id":4004,"name":"Contextualism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Contextualism"},{"id":13341,"name":"Relativism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Relativism"},{"id":14806,"name":"Metaethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaethics"},{"id":30890,"name":"Epistemology of Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology_of_Disagreement"},{"id":51956,"name":"Expressivism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Expressivism"},{"id":60940,"name":"Moral Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Disagreement"},{"id":87515,"name":"Moral Semantics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Semantics"},{"id":159608,"name":"Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Disagreement"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11709439"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709439/Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Realism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149532/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709439/Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Realism">Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of t...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspec- tives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement pres- ent in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="40da7de11955bd0a26bc194010d97560" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37149532,"asset_id":11709439,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149532/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11709439"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11709439"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11709439; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11709439]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11709439]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11709439; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11709439']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11709439, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "40da7de11955bd0a26bc194010d97560" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11709439]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11709439,"title":"Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. 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I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11709439/Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Realism","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-03-29T10:15:40.363-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37149532,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149532/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"FaultlessDisagreementPPR.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149532/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Rea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37149532/FaultlessDisagreementPPR-libre.pdf?1427649460=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DFaultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Rea.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=QYlEfPEi32Am1KQmtulpedPzsuV4lwZlU0rO1eW2DICOBxpWa~dcRA61tTrxNfXMGB2R76Ir4vrRMS4lMsa64T-GgdWcRTfYw0Iu0TgPj6uk~NoqkQdvjtZVl9NaQLH~FDHe-hN8Rv~bhDCht7FjOeNBv~F50vBLKhC4APDvwYVpOj3FG3qIeNksTpKNFmc~mduR6WlQh6cd2WJh2oIriLXaKHL-oXunpha5Rg~ZMoV~qTrn-u7gZ0TdjQ9~HHPk1t7xx~kBqxDXxawxwzSk98TX5ir7xXKEQzMx2DyhSOAI4WKuir3JSuo07qsAxF89T56PI~spqo~0VsMGuebF-g__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Realism","translated_slug":"","page_count":22,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":37149532,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149532/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"FaultlessDisagreementPPR.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149532/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Rea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37149532/FaultlessDisagreementPPR-libre.pdf?1427649460=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DFaultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Rea.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=QYlEfPEi32Am1KQmtulpedPzsuV4lwZlU0rO1eW2DICOBxpWa~dcRA61tTrxNfXMGB2R76Ir4vrRMS4lMsa64T-GgdWcRTfYw0Iu0TgPj6uk~NoqkQdvjtZVl9NaQLH~FDHe-hN8Rv~bhDCht7FjOeNBv~F50vBLKhC4APDvwYVpOj3FG3qIeNksTpKNFmc~mduR6WlQh6cd2WJh2oIriLXaKHL-oXunpha5Rg~ZMoV~qTrn-u7gZ0TdjQ9~HHPk1t7xx~kBqxDXxawxwzSk98TX5ir7xXKEQzMx2DyhSOAI4WKuir3JSuo07qsAxF89T56PI~spqo~0VsMGuebF-g__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":808,"name":"Aesthetics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Aesthetics"},{"id":13341,"name":"Relativism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Relativism"},{"id":159608,"name":"Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Disagreement"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="profile--tab_heading_container js-section-heading" data-section="Hume" id="Hume"><h3 class="profile--tab_heading_container">Hume by Karl Schafer</h3></div><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="34570793"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/34570793/The_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correctness_and_Cognition_in_Hume"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of The Artificial Virtues of Thought: Correctness and Cognition in Hume" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54436579/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/34570793/The_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correctness_and_Cognition_in_Hume">The Artificial Virtues of Thought: Correctness and Cognition in Hume</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>forthcoming in Philosopher's Imprint</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Discusses two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition - focusing on issues relating th...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Discusses two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition - focusing on issues relating the normativity of thought and language use. I argue that Hume has far more resources to respond to these objections than might at first appear to be the case - focusing on the under-explored connection between Hume's of cognition, his account of public language, and his account of the artificial virtues.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="c9fa35d181598e6181f3fc47474f1878" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":54436579,"asset_id":34570793,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54436579/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="34570793"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="34570793"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 34570793; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=34570793]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=34570793]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 34570793; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='34570793']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 34570793, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "c9fa35d181598e6181f3fc47474f1878" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=34570793]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":34570793,"title":"The Artificial Virtues of Thought: Correctness and Cognition in Hume","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Discusses two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition - focusing on issues relating the normativity of thought and language use. 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I argue that Hume has far more resources to respond to these objections than might at first appear to be the case - focusing on the under-explored connection between Hume's of cognition, his account of public language, and his account of the artificial virtues.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/34570793/The_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correctness_and_Cognition_in_Hume","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2017-09-14T16:01:01.281-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"other","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":54436579,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54436579/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"ArtificalVirtuesCognition-IMPRINTFINAL.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54436579/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"The_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correc.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/54436579/ArtificalVirtuesCognition-IMPRINTFINAL-libre.pdf?1505430420=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correc.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=JSAM~XS5g9Q0xtw6flkL6WBt~rPQKaaaVjn7FGDSqv-lqg~VyiODoy6NSRE4jivpQFLUnAcCVJMvwiN7leIrhqTIeO8EXEbLfZ15eav4yeR~F7Q~ShrW9nzybS7JR3ebCNBZtoZS6A-df7dWO06wUMt0rxryoGUXCkCtoiXInjG2AR7bF5fczxrJdwKBa-xYrfHHiCHl-jWYttKBRe6qN1OqKIY00CEIkTYh5GhxeKbRRJmN0TZOx7Qwnc9hG1yc2CdgeBxJoXeWCNJ6zhHfmeqdDg7hkJm~7cPyYFa-K-G1bIRgJQKnLOP9FnWDTUbL2FixjFwE7qyzeZsCdq9vrA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"The_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correctness_and_Cognition_in_Hume","translated_slug":"","page_count":28,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":54436579,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54436579/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"ArtificalVirtuesCognition-IMPRINTFINAL.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54436579/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"The_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correc.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/54436579/ArtificalVirtuesCognition-IMPRINTFINAL-libre.pdf?1505430420=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correc.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=JSAM~XS5g9Q0xtw6flkL6WBt~rPQKaaaVjn7FGDSqv-lqg~VyiODoy6NSRE4jivpQFLUnAcCVJMvwiN7leIrhqTIeO8EXEbLfZ15eav4yeR~F7Q~ShrW9nzybS7JR3ebCNBZtoZS6A-df7dWO06wUMt0rxryoGUXCkCtoiXInjG2AR7bF5fczxrJdwKBa-xYrfHHiCHl-jWYttKBRe6qN1OqKIY00CEIkTYh5GhxeKbRRJmN0TZOx7Qwnc9hG1yc2CdgeBxJoXeWCNJ6zhHfmeqdDg7hkJm~7cPyYFa-K-G1bIRgJQKnLOP9FnWDTUbL2FixjFwE7qyzeZsCdq9vrA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":911,"name":"17th Century \u0026 Early Modern Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/17th_Century_and_Early_Modern_Philosophy"},{"id":19942,"name":"David Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/David_Hume"},{"id":38772,"name":"Early Modern Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Early_Modern_Philosophy"},{"id":62339,"name":"History of early modern philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/History_of_early_modern_philosophy"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> </div><div class="profile--tab_content_container js-tab-pane tab-pane" data-section-id="5784801" id="kant"><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="45121041"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/45121041/The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on_the_Practice_of_Philosophy_and_the_Proper_Bounds_of_Skepticism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/65688514/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/45121041/The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on_the_Practice_of_Philosophy_and_the_Proper_Bounds_of_Skepticism">The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span> Cambridge Critical Guidebook to the Prolegomena</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understandin...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understanding on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. In particular, following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a “demarcation challenge” concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (say) natural scientific contexts from the illegitimate use of it in (say) dogmatic metaphysics. I will then go on to argue that Kant sees Hume’s tendency to slide into more radical forms of skepticism as a symptom of his failure to provide a systematic or principled account of this distinction. This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which (i) robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this and (ii) makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls “Formal Idealism”. In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between (i) philosophical methodology and (ii) the nature of our faculties.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="4b0a683cdd960914995ddbc1b8ff443c" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":65688514,"asset_id":45121041,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/65688514/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="45121041"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="45121041"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 45121041; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=45121041]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=45121041]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 45121041; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='45121041']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 45121041, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "4b0a683cdd960914995ddbc1b8ff443c" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=45121041]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":45121041,"title":"The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understanding on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. In particular, following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a “demarcation challenge” concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (say) natural scientific contexts from the illegitimate use of it in (say) dogmatic metaphysics. I will then go on to argue that Kant sees Hume’s tendency to slide into more radical forms of skepticism as a symptom of his failure to provide a systematic or principled account of this distinction. This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which (i) robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this and (ii) makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls “Formal Idealism”. In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between (i) philosophical methodology and (ii) the nature of our faculties.","publication_name":" Cambridge Critical Guidebook to the Prolegomena"},"translated_abstract":"The focus of this essay will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and the impact of that understanding on Kant’s critical philosophy. 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This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which (i) robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this and (ii) makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls “Formal Idealism”. In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between (i) philosophical methodology and (ii) the nature of our faculties.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/45121041/The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on_the_Practice_of_Philosophy_and_the_Proper_Bounds_of_Skepticism","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2021-02-14T14:43:46.349-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"other","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":65688514,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/65688514/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"KantHumeVolume.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/65688514/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/65688514/KantHumeVolume-libre.pdf?1613347071=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552834\u0026Signature=OIQg5Atzczr3DHrbjtvJfTYtFBtI4w95R4gdtfYPXHhShupHlmflI6UCMpA013QWaAJtfsA2uB2QdxrhQVxY97ZXfyRqzzHwtPCA4gr2mFmBvQCJUnGEaCI7sOs6vUS-8ZoNqQAkXm4KjoUx8N0eWGqZ5jRiKW-~GV52n5J509gXE~K5kUN55tohLotajHCN-AnFf6bQGsqww7MdfDb4Pg45XB5beKbu9Hud7JZZIZk6QPzsYDlf8urJ-lTMq26e4Y~X6Gs1WY0IBKzf-Gdg2h-hTHMHTrNT5oTnS1fD3oXSovzsORkHLy9CaotW2jkx6OohzNvfuKkOWsIf~6hvLQ__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on_the_Practice_of_Philosophy_and_the_Proper_Bounds_of_Skepticism","translated_slug":"","page_count":17,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":65688514,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/65688514/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"KantHumeVolume.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/65688514/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"The_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/65688514/KantHumeVolume-libre.pdf?1613347071=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_Beach_of_Skepticism_Kant_and_Hume_on.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552835\u0026Signature=Ltxr2s~jP-Z5UMBb7HuSGlcgv71droxuFj9nB2jiFE6ieBRo8XpmWKbGlNwbLeKTp9aVvR36PkzdnA5KpQtp3ws0U5iiRWX6pmsrc4DrIzThLmjScFjEYXG5BGqSdS0~DVBEs3yDbSrc-GsTlMjqbqfl8quqZFvEbuuJ3tKLNeWfy~6m2MBeuJvRpsQmObWyBL0NG2L2TT5s-jh2ij0nyD2TiTDgFWHSOHClSiFJ3tyZUADlHhjQL1f4uckFXUrHTsy68NoLM2sD1r7-BP4MhEfgGMjOIEmK9G~FxWFvh3IX-dAtWXE8BXw1FNoLMW8k9--VhnDKjKwxh5Y3v4eVHA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":849,"name":"Kant","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Kant"},{"id":891,"name":"Metaphilosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaphilosophy"},{"id":16031,"name":"Immanuel Kant","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Immanuel_Kant"},{"id":19942,"name":"David Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/David_Hume"},{"id":29711,"name":"Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Skepticism"},{"id":30424,"name":"Prolegomena","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Prolegomena"},{"id":174265,"name":"Transcendental Idealism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Transcendental_Idealism"},{"id":300475,"name":"Kant and Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Kant_and_Hume"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="45029109"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/45029109/Kant_on_Method"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Kant on Method" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/65688512/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/45029109/Kant_on_Method">Kant on Method</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>The Oxford Handbook of Kant</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. Begins by discussing how Kant conceives of the proper ends of rational inquiry, and how those ends inform his conception of the proper methodology for philosophy. Then discusses the foundational role that self-conscious capacities play within Kant's philosophical system. Concludes by discussing Kant's famous claim that the philosopher - unlike the mathematician - must be a legislator, and not an artist, of reason.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="3e902d63acb24fce553d8c985939d704" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":65688512,"asset_id":45029109,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/65688512/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="45029109"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="45029109"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 45029109; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=45029109]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=45029109]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 45029109; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='45029109']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 45029109, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "3e902d63acb24fce553d8c985939d704" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=45029109]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":45029109,"title":"Kant on Method","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="38312071"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/38312071/Kant_Constitutivism_as_Capacities_First_Philosophy"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Kant: Constitutivism as Capacities-First Philosophy" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/58361201/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/38312071/Kant_Constitutivism_as_Capacities_First_Philosophy">Kant: Constitutivism as Capacities-First Philosophy</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Explorations</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” pr...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="51afb0b9eee7feacc8f932055967d754" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":58361201,"asset_id":38312071,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/58361201/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="38312071"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="38312071"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 38312071; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=38312071]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=38312071]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 38312071; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='38312071']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 38312071, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "51afb0b9eee7feacc8f932055967d754" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=38312071]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":38312071,"title":"Kant: Constitutivism as Capacities-First Philosophy","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="16524714"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/16524714/Practical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54436601/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/16524714/Practical_Cognition_and_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves">Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Kantian Freedom (OUP)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. This much should be uncontroversial. What is much more controversial is the precise kind of cognitive relation to things-in-themselves that Kant believes is possible from a practical point of view. Traditionally, interpreters have tended to regard such “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves as (at best) a poor step-cousin of its theoretical counterpart – as a sort of mere “rational faith” unworthy of serious comparison with genuine theoretical knowledge or cognition. But this seriously underestimates the degree to which Kant believes we can achieve “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves from a practical point of view – or at least, it does so insofar as we focus on our practical self-understanding as noumenally free agents. At least in this case, far from representing an impoverished cousin of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge, our practical awareness of ourselves as free possesses all of the central marks of cognition and knowledge in Kant’s sense of these two terms – albeit on distinctively practical grounds.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="ebd6d7313381954e0b3917dbc21df091" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":54436601,"asset_id":16524714,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54436601/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="16524714"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="16524714"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 16524714; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=16524714]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=16524714]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 16524714; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='16524714']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 16524714, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "ebd6d7313381954e0b3917dbc21df091" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=16524714]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":16524714,"title":"Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. 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At least in this case, far from representing an impoverished cousin of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge, our practical awareness of ourselves as free possesses all of the central marks of cognition and knowledge in Kant’s sense of these two terms – albeit on distinctively practical grounds.","publication_name":"Kantian Freedom (OUP)"},"translated_abstract":"Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. This much should be uncontroversial. What is much more controversial is the precise kind of cognitive relation to things-in-themselves that Kant believes is possible from a practical point of view. Traditionally, interpreters have tended to regard such “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves as (at best) a poor step-cousin of its theoretical counterpart – as a sort of mere “rational faith” unworthy of serious comparison with genuine theoretical knowledge or cognition. But this seriously underestimates the degree to which Kant believes we can achieve “practical cognition” of things-in-themselves from a practical point of view – or at least, it does so insofar as we focus on our practical self-understanding as noumenally free agents. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="28374256"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/28374256/Kants_Conception_of_Cognition_and_our_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Kant's Conception of Cognition and our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56709232/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/28374256/Kants_Conception_of_Cognition_and_our_Knowledge_of_Things_in_Themselves">Kant's Conception of Cognition and our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (OUP)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate content constraint. In doing so, I stress the differences between Kant's conception of cognition and our contemporary conception of propositional knowledge, while connecting together important strands in the recent scholarly literature on these topics. Finally, I make use of this improved understanding of cognition to better understand why Kant claims that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, while also appearing to claim that we can know a good deal about what things-in-themselves are like.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="95ba869a457f3a12c9a7d2ac2d3a7543" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":56709232,"asset_id":28374256,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/56709232/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="28374256"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="28374256"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 28374256; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=28374256]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=28374256]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 28374256; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='28374256']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 28374256, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "95ba869a457f3a12c9a7d2ac2d3a7543" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=28374256]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":28374256,"title":"Kant's Conception of Cognition and our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate content constraint. In doing so, I stress the differences between Kant's conception of cognition and our contemporary conception of propositional knowledge, while connecting together important strands in the recent scholarly literature on these topics. Finally, I make use of this improved understanding of cognition to better understand why Kant claims that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, while also appearing to claim that we can know a good deal about what things-in-themselves are like.","publication_name":"The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (OUP)"},"translated_abstract":"In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate content constraint. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="29927669"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/29927669/Intuitions_and_Objects_in_Allaiss_Manifest_Reality"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Intuitions and Objects in Allais's Manifest Reality" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/50386596/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/29927669/Intuitions_and_Objects_in_Allaiss_Manifest_Reality">Intuitions and Objects in Allais's Manifest Reality</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Studies</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Manifest Reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant's transcendental idealism...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Manifest Reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant's transcendental idealism. So there is a great deal in Allais's discussion to celebrate. But I want to focus here on two aspects of her views that I am not yet sure about: First, Allais's understanding of the relationship between concepts and intuitions. And second, her characterization of the manner in which intuitions are object-dependent. I'll close by making some general remarks about the significance of this for Allais's understanding of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="4c1f7716dd714f1b24791ce529eaf651" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":50386596,"asset_id":29927669,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/50386596/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="29927669"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="29927669"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 29927669; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=29927669]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=29927669]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 29927669; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='29927669']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 29927669, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "4c1f7716dd714f1b24791ce529eaf651" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=29927669]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":29927669,"title":"Intuitions and Objects in Allais's Manifest Reality","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Manifest Reality is easily one of the best books in a long time on Kant's transcendental idealism. 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I'll close by making some general remarks about the significance of this for Allais's understanding of the metaphysics of transcendental 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class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/37848589/A_Brief_History_of_Rationality_Reason_Reasonableness_Rationality_and_Reasons"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of A Brief History of Rationality: Reason, Reasonableness, Rationality, and Reasons" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/57852563/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/37848589/A_Brief_History_of_Rationality_Reason_Reasonableness_Rationality_and_Reasons">A Brief History of Rationality: Reason, Reasonableness, Rationality, and Reasons</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Manuscrito</span><span>, 2018</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">The title really 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about reasons ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In this essay, I begin to develop and defend an alternative form of constitutivism about reasons which begins, not with a conception of agency structured around autonomy, but rather with a conception of rationality structured around understanding. In doing so, I discuss the relationship between understanding and the sort of reflection that gives rise to the concept of a reason, the relationship between theoretical and practical understanding, and the connections between understanding and explanatory and intersubjective reasoning. In doing so, my goal is not to often anything like a complete defense of this way of thinking about constitutivism, but rather to offer some reasons for taking it seriously as an alternative to the more popular autonomy-focused forms of constitutivism.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="a9d7bc1dcd193286a3a61aecb8f1b0fb" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":53414467,"asset_id":33356599,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/53414467/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="33356599"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="33356599"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 33356599; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=33356599]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=33356599]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 33356599; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='33356599']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 33356599, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "a9d7bc1dcd193286a3a61aecb8f1b0fb" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=33356599]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":33356599,"title":"Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In this essay, I begin to develop and defend an alternative form of constitutivism about reasons which begins, not with a conception of agency structured around autonomy, but rather with a conception of rationality structured around understanding. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="12790561"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/12790561/Realism_and_Constructivism_in_Kantian_Metaethics_1_Realism_and_Constructivism_in_a_Kantian_Context"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1): Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37823119/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/12790561/Realism_and_Constructivism_in_Kantian_Metaethics_1_Realism_and_Constructivism_in_a_Kantian_Context">Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1): Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophy Compass</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In the first half of this two-part essay, I argue that Kantian constructivism is most attractive ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In the first half of this two-part essay, I argue that Kantian constructivism is most attractive when it takes as its foundation a thoroughly non-trivial conception of reason or rationality - which has both theoretical and practical manifestations. I also discuss how this sort of "rationalist constructivist" ought to think about the relationship between reasons and rationality.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="0b6f85254ca4046e3e73bcfcc89d2cbf" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37823119,"asset_id":12790561,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37823119/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="12790561"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="12790561"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 12790561; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=12790561]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=12790561]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 12790561; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='12790561']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 12790561, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "0b6f85254ca4046e3e73bcfcc89d2cbf" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=12790561]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":12790561,"title":"Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1): Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In the first half of this two-part essay, I argue that Kantian constructivism is most attractive when it takes as its foundation a thoroughly non-trivial conception of reason or rationality - which has both theoretical and practical manifestations. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="12920134"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/12920134/Realism_and_Constructivism_in_Kantian_Metaethics_2_The_Kantian_Conception_of_Rationality_and_Rationalist_Constructivism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2): The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37881164/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/12920134/Realism_and_Constructivism_in_Kantian_Metaethics_2_The_Kantian_Conception_of_Rationality_and_Rationalist_Constructivism">Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2): The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophy Compass</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at t...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at the heart of the form of rationalist constructivism laid out in its first half. Along the way, I discuss some recent arguments for a version of this view due to Michael Smith and Julia Markovits. I then discuss some of the advantages of the resulting view - focusing on metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational questions.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="14f556b5cb78a3b3894ee971070e2933" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37881164,"asset_id":12920134,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37881164/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="12920134"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="12920134"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 12920134; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=12920134]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=12920134]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 12920134; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='12920134']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 12920134, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "14f556b5cb78a3b3894ee971070e2933" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=12920134]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":12920134,"title":"Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2): The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at the heart of the form of rationalist constructivism laid out in its first half. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="13983229"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/13983229/The_Modesty_of_the_Moral_Point_of_View"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of The Modesty of the Moral Point of View" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38172290/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/13983229/The_Modesty_of_the_Moral_Point_of_View">The Modesty of the Moral Point of View</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Weighing Reasons (OUP)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Ha...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Harman - have argued that there is a sense in which morality itself does not treat moral reasons as consistently overriding. In the present essay I develop and extend this idea from a somewhat different perspective. In doing so, I offer an alternative way of formalizing the idea that morality is modest about the weight of moral reasons, thereby making more explicit the connections between this thesis and similar issues in the epistemic sphere. In addition, I discuss how these ideas affect our thinking about the nature of self-effacement, the significance of reflective endorsement, the weight that moral reasons ought to be given in all things consideration, and the plausibility of “indirect” moral theories. Finally, I stress that it is possible to see morality as modest about the weight of specifically moral reasons, while also seeing all practical reasons as grounded in morality more indirectly – namely, by seeing morality as determining the weight that both moral and non-moral considerations deserve to have in all things considered deliberation.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="e18dd1a20fa259abc54982c3bdcb51e9" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":38172290,"asset_id":13983229,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38172290/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNSw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="13983229"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="13983229"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 13983229; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=13983229]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=13983229]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 13983229; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='13983229']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 13983229, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "e18dd1a20fa259abc54982c3bdcb51e9" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=13983229]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":13983229,"title":"The Modesty of the Moral Point of View","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In recent years, several philosophers - including Joshua Gert, Douglas Portmore, and Elizabeth Harman - have argued that there is a sense in which morality itself does not treat moral reasons as consistently overriding. 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Then I argue that a moral realist can resist both of these strategies by calling into question the epistemological presuppositions on which they rest. Nonetheless, I conclude that these arguments point to a legitimate source of dissatisfaction about many forms of moral realism. I conclude by discussing the way forward that these conclusions indicate.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="1cd255917f905564c331b687bd8cafda" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":42847084,"asset_id":20979901,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/42847084/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="20979901"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="20979901"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 20979901; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=20979901]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=20979901]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 20979901; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='20979901']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 20979901, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "1cd255917f905564c331b687bd8cafda" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=20979901]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":20979901,"title":"Evolutionary Debunking Arguments, Explanatory Structure, and the Appeal of Anti-Realism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In this essay, I distinguish two different epistemological strategies an anti-realist might pursue in developing an \"evolutionary debunking\" of moral realism. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11709434"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709434/Evolution_and_Normative_Scepticism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Evolution and Normative Scepticism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149525/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709434/Evolution_and_Normative_Scepticism">Evolution and Normative Scepticism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative re...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. In what follows, I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I consider several possible arguments from evolutionary theory and normative realism to normative scepticism and explain where they go wrong. I then offer a more general diagnosis of the tendency to accept such arguments and why this tendency should be resisted.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="a265eec4d71919c858b066444ee23094" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37149525,"asset_id":11709434,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149525/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11709434"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11709434"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11709434; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11709434]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11709434]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11709434; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11709434']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11709434, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "a265eec4d71919c858b066444ee23094" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11709434]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11709434,"title":"Evolution and Normative Scepticism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. 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I then offer a more general diagnosis of the tendency to accept such arguments and why this tendency should be resisted.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11709434/Evolution_and_Normative_Scepticism","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-03-29T10:14:36.276-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37149525,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149525/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Evolution.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149525/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Evolution_and_Normative_Scepticism.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37149525/Evolution-libre.pdf?1427649462=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DEvolution_and_Normative_Scepticism.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=efH6nD2syFyNrrTDlayGQmvzBTYBwscuZUBRBBdYyeowmbLFl9F4~Vg5Vu7zmw3L5ZtPkJMPog-Dq5x51y5~oLXutEWf1IJv2ax1uNO1ldrYzmh-G0x69Wd4xEURcqLFHIH3E0f-yDSVy9w5HsbBDvBz67HOy8FZAHfobLdSAx2-7Oy5VuL9U1i-pDBsXM2f2VQ8GFVw7v6uBPaJlDk7nyq~KrbHVeaArhvSHd8pgBfiV9216iw0nxrgKRRqECLAsFmuagqPpYeQsUh7TaafaYn-rd9iFBU5SQpJvUJnr0vPVgF~0ZXWzr232~H68lYfVU7lLuvgJJS5GCSOqZyB~Q__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Evolution_and_Normative_Scepticism","translated_slug":"","page_count":20,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":37149525,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149525/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Evolution.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149525/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Evolution_and_Normative_Scepticism.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37149525/Evolution-libre.pdf?1427649462=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DEvolution_and_Normative_Scepticism.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=efH6nD2syFyNrrTDlayGQmvzBTYBwscuZUBRBBdYyeowmbLFl9F4~Vg5Vu7zmw3L5ZtPkJMPog-Dq5x51y5~oLXutEWf1IJv2ax1uNO1ldrYzmh-G0x69Wd4xEURcqLFHIH3E0f-yDSVy9w5HsbBDvBz67HOy8FZAHfobLdSAx2-7Oy5VuL9U1i-pDBsXM2f2VQ8GFVw7v6uBPaJlDk7nyq~KrbHVeaArhvSHd8pgBfiV9216iw0nxrgKRRqECLAsFmuagqPpYeQsUh7TaafaYn-rd9iFBU5SQpJvUJnr0vPVgF~0ZXWzr232~H68lYfVU7lLuvgJJS5GCSOqZyB~Q__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":10882,"name":"Evolution","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Evolution"},{"id":14806,"name":"Metaethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaethics"},{"id":25071,"name":"Moral Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Epistemology"},{"id":98700,"name":"Moral Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Skepticism"},{"id":1839534,"name":"Evolutionary Debunking Arguments","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Evolutionary_Debunking_Arguments"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="34762965"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/34762965/Metaethical_Quietism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Metaethical Quietism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54621885/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/34762965/Metaethical_Quietism">Metaethical Quietism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--coauthors"><span>by </span><span><a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer">Karl Schafer</a> and <a class="" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-authors" href="https://independent.academia.edu/DougKremm">Doug Kremm</a></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (Routledge)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">A brief exploration of the nature of, and motivations for, contemporary forms of metaethical quie...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">A brief exploration of the nature of, and motivations for, contemporary forms of metaethical quietism. Also outlines some of the prominent objections to such positions and discusses some of the limitations of these objections from the quietist's perspective. (For the Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, McPherson and Plunkett, eds.)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="ebc586c2d42f3fbb08df8945b3029275" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":54621885,"asset_id":34762965,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54621885/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="34762965"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="34762965"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 34762965; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=34762965]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=34762965]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 34762965; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='34762965']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 34762965, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "ebc586c2d42f3fbb08df8945b3029275" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=34762965]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":34762965,"title":"Metaethical Quietism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"A brief exploration of the nature of, and motivations for, contemporary forms of metaethical quietism. 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In order to do so, I argue that the relativist must do justice to our intuitions about the depth of moral disagreement, while also explaining why it can be rational to be relatively insensitive to such disagreements. I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability of the resulting account.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="f126bd1f4f306369b2752f723d0e0ec5" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37246586,"asset_id":11850281,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37246586/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11850281"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11850281"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11850281; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11850281]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11850281]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11850281; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11850281']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11850281, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "f126bd1f4f306369b2752f723d0e0ec5" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11850281]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11850281,"title":"Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"I consider sophisticated forms of relativism and their effectiveness at responding to the skeptical argument from moral disagreement. 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I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability of the resulting account.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11850281/Assessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_Moral_Disagreement","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-04-08T08:46:05.694-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37246586,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37246586/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"RelativismDisagreement.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37246586/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Assessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_M.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37246586/RelativismDisagreement-libre.pdf?1428507955=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DAssessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_M.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=M8RqMiWA0MgHVgBlxHIYX9cjhZiZKHkXHxkjpFE0BJ9y0t2~sum-4-la7ZHHZSzzBbb13ztSSXhidrDHxrEFA4ZgyKWrAJRJtRJ3lCQ2mfEb1qJpIUytPygBWFbjPdEtzbb9eNYKwG5mOrwd7j713Lvpl-OauYhjVMgwNveeZ0jeZgfYt3KJZx~3zoXthMb672JIK5ToCz6JsF3JuYDPlJKJKjET3xlCGgr54iuRy4YRa-7qJ07Wxq1o6XY-4B3tAfyAbMoAQbQ38KxwtHdltuEwCPfBk-~f5QL16WSiGq8uQ~818eu0lZx8pl-NLo0rj02FMNi3LOxGu7TcDhnOWg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Assessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_Moral_Disagreement","translated_slug":"","page_count":19,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":37246586,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37246586/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"RelativismDisagreement.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37246586/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Assessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_M.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37246586/RelativismDisagreement-libre.pdf?1428507955=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DAssessor_Relativism_and_the_Problem_of_M.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=M8RqMiWA0MgHVgBlxHIYX9cjhZiZKHkXHxkjpFE0BJ9y0t2~sum-4-la7ZHHZSzzBbb13ztSSXhidrDHxrEFA4ZgyKWrAJRJtRJ3lCQ2mfEb1qJpIUytPygBWFbjPdEtzbb9eNYKwG5mOrwd7j713Lvpl-OauYhjVMgwNveeZ0jeZgfYt3KJZx~3zoXthMb672JIK5ToCz6JsF3JuYDPlJKJKjET3xlCGgr54iuRy4YRa-7qJ07Wxq1o6XY-4B3tAfyAbMoAQbQ38KxwtHdltuEwCPfBk-~f5QL16WSiGq8uQ~818eu0lZx8pl-NLo0rj02FMNi3LOxGu7TcDhnOWg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":905,"name":"Meta-Ethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Meta-Ethics"},{"id":4004,"name":"Contextualism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Contextualism"},{"id":13341,"name":"Relativism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Relativism"},{"id":14806,"name":"Metaethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaethics"},{"id":30890,"name":"Epistemology of Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology_of_Disagreement"},{"id":51956,"name":"Expressivism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Expressivism"},{"id":60940,"name":"Moral Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Disagreement"},{"id":87515,"name":"Moral Semantics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Semantics"},{"id":159608,"name":"Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Disagreement"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11709439"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709439/Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Realism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149532/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709439/Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Realism">Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of t...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspec- tives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement pres- ent in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="40da7de11955bd0a26bc194010d97560" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37149532,"asset_id":11709439,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149532/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11709439"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11709439"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11709439; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11709439]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11709439]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11709439; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11709439']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11709439, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "40da7de11955bd0a26bc194010d97560" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11709439]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11709439,"title":"Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspec- tives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement pres- ent in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.","publication_name":"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research"},"translated_abstract":"It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspec- tives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement pres- ent in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11709439/Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Realism","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-03-29T10:15:40.363-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37149532,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149532/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"FaultlessDisagreementPPR.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149532/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Rea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37149532/FaultlessDisagreementPPR-libre.pdf?1427649460=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DFaultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Rea.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=QYlEfPEi32Am1KQmtulpedPzsuV4lwZlU0rO1eW2DICOBxpWa~dcRA61tTrxNfXMGB2R76Ir4vrRMS4lMsa64T-GgdWcRTfYw0Iu0TgPj6uk~NoqkQdvjtZVl9NaQLH~FDHe-hN8Rv~bhDCht7FjOeNBv~F50vBLKhC4APDvwYVpOj3FG3qIeNksTpKNFmc~mduR6WlQh6cd2WJh2oIriLXaKHL-oXunpha5Rg~ZMoV~qTrn-u7gZ0TdjQ9~HHPk1t7xx~kBqxDXxawxwzSk98TX5ir7xXKEQzMx2DyhSOAI4WKuir3JSuo07qsAxF89T56PI~spqo~0VsMGuebF-g__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Realism","translated_slug":"","page_count":22,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":37149532,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37149532/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"FaultlessDisagreementPPR.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37149532/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Faultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Rea.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37149532/FaultlessDisagreementPPR-libre.pdf?1427649460=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DFaultless_Disagreement_and_Aesthetic_Rea.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=QYlEfPEi32Am1KQmtulpedPzsuV4lwZlU0rO1eW2DICOBxpWa~dcRA61tTrxNfXMGB2R76Ir4vrRMS4lMsa64T-GgdWcRTfYw0Iu0TgPj6uk~NoqkQdvjtZVl9NaQLH~FDHe-hN8Rv~bhDCht7FjOeNBv~F50vBLKhC4APDvwYVpOj3FG3qIeNksTpKNFmc~mduR6WlQh6cd2WJh2oIriLXaKHL-oXunpha5Rg~ZMoV~qTrn-u7gZ0TdjQ9~HHPk1t7xx~kBqxDXxawxwzSk98TX5ir7xXKEQzMx2DyhSOAI4WKuir3JSuo07qsAxF89T56PI~spqo~0VsMGuebF-g__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":808,"name":"Aesthetics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Aesthetics"},{"id":13341,"name":"Relativism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Relativism"},{"id":159608,"name":"Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Disagreement"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> </div><div class="profile--tab_content_container js-tab-pane tab-pane" data-section-id="5784800" id="hume"><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="34570793"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/34570793/The_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correctness_and_Cognition_in_Hume"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of The Artificial Virtues of Thought: Correctness and Cognition in Hume" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/54436579/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/34570793/The_Artificial_Virtues_of_Thought_Correctness_and_Cognition_in_Hume">The Artificial Virtues of Thought: Correctness and Cognition in Hume</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>forthcoming in Philosopher's Imprint</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Discusses two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition - focusing on issues relating th...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Discusses two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition - focusing on issues relating the normativity of thought and language use. I argue that Hume has far more resources to respond to these objections than might at first appear to be the case - focusing on the under-explored connection between Hume's of cognition, his account of public language, and his account of the artificial virtues.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="c9fa35d181598e6181f3fc47474f1878" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":54436579,"asset_id":34570793,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/54436579/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="34570793"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="34570793"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 34570793; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=34570793]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=34570793]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 34570793; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='34570793']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 34570793, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "c9fa35d181598e6181f3fc47474f1878" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=34570793]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":34570793,"title":"The Artificial Virtues of Thought: Correctness and Cognition in Hume","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Discusses two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition - focusing on issues relating the normativity of thought and language use. 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="14715106"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/14715106/Hume_on_Practical_Reason_Against_the_Normative_Authority_of_Reason"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38400604/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/14715106/Hume_on_Practical_Reason_Against_the_Normative_Authority_of_Reason">Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Oxford Handbook of David Hume (OUP)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Hume is often taken to be the father of “double Humeanism” about practical reason. Double Humean...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Hume is often taken to be the father of “double Humeanism” about practical reason. Double Humeanism combines together two views that are often attributed to Hume: a view about motivational psychology – often referred to as the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM) – and a view about normative reasons for action – often called the Humean Theory of Practical Reasons (HTR). In this essay I argue that Hume accepted neither HTM nor HTR. But this does not rob Hume's views about these issues of contemporary interest. Rather, it allows us to see what was truly radical about these views - namely, a certain sort of skepticism about the normative authority of reason itself.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="13399395278259aba0c322e418ccbd7f" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":38400604,"asset_id":14715106,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38400604/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="14715106"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="14715106"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 14715106; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=14715106]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=14715106]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 14715106; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='14715106']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 14715106, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "13399395278259aba0c322e418ccbd7f" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=14715106]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":14715106,"title":"Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Hume is often taken to be the father of “double Humeanism” about practical reason. 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data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11709469/Curious_Virtues_in_Humes_Epistemology">Curious Virtues in Hume's Epistemology</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosopher's Imprint</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Offers an account of Hume's response to skepticism in terms of his account of the epistemic virtu...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Offers an account of Hume's response to skepticism in terms of his account of the epistemic virtues, focusing on the role of the passions of curiosity and ambition.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a 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href="https://www.academia.edu/11950010/Hume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Representation"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Hume’s Unified Theory of Mental Representation" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37308335/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11950010/Hume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Representation">Hume’s Unified Theory of Mental Representation</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>European Journal of Philosophy</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">On its face, Hume’s account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one h...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">On its face, Hume’s account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume’s treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume’s discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume’s discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume’s thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="172730a2b62193fdfbddb47de256c2f7" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37308335,"asset_id":11950010,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37308335/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11950010"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11950010"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11950010; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11950010]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11950010]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11950010; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11950010']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11950010, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "172730a2b62193fdfbddb47de256c2f7" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11950010]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11950010,"title":"Hume’s Unified Theory of Mental Representation","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"On its face, Hume’s account of mental representation involves at least two elements. 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I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume’s thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.","publication_name":"European Journal of Philosophy"},"translated_abstract":"On its face, Hume’s account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume’s treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume’s discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume’s discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume’s thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11950010/Hume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Representation","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-04-14T16:26:25.431-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37308335,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37308335/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"HumeRepresentation.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37308335/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Hume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Represen.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37308335/HumeRepresentation-libre.pdf?1429054040=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DHume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Represen.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=GnBeyrV0vZNVDGC6JI8CrlGSE~bmjND6k2yLJVUsDuN3NmdxGj5fajmOjVEsZFy9FFYHW9~xMK-mFdgsqLwL~GHa4qk4zXlEAMzizGcGsO~9K9XqD3IvKfVRFtMnU9zImk0NYamA4vxBwf6cYAuwG~r~dHt5VF32UbMGxPGTJ9eTcFbiGBw-0GLASEC~6TNXima-nlTn4o2xCHeVoVR6gbj~O3K4sh-qtQqcVxn~NrAyNGxP9pp7HlTHAouaZaA6IbmH5VbUQy1yQfjmZtqMfgjt4zLltyjYuljzjEDwgKuGOLJlWbkyQQEJcd4B07-td~PVllFkYcn1AUxgOx1idQ__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Hume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Representation","translated_slug":"","page_count":28,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":37308335,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37308335/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"HumeRepresentation.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37308335/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Hume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Represen.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37308335/HumeRepresentation-libre.pdf?1429054040=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DHume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Represen.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=GnBeyrV0vZNVDGC6JI8CrlGSE~bmjND6k2yLJVUsDuN3NmdxGj5fajmOjVEsZFy9FFYHW9~xMK-mFdgsqLwL~GHa4qk4zXlEAMzizGcGsO~9K9XqD3IvKfVRFtMnU9zImk0NYamA4vxBwf6cYAuwG~r~dHt5VF32UbMGxPGTJ9eTcFbiGBw-0GLASEC~6TNXima-nlTn4o2xCHeVoVR6gbj~O3K4sh-qtQqcVxn~NrAyNGxP9pp7HlTHAouaZaA6IbmH5VbUQy1yQfjmZtqMfgjt4zLltyjYuljzjEDwgKuGOLJlWbkyQQEJcd4B07-td~PVllFkYcn1AUxgOx1idQ__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":889,"name":"Non-Conceptual Content","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Non-Conceptual_Content"},{"id":2357,"name":"Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Hume"},{"id":4136,"name":"Mental Representation","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Mental_Representation"},{"id":10499,"name":"Functionalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Functionalism"},{"id":10501,"name":"Mental Representation and Content","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Mental_Representation_and_Content"},{"id":19942,"name":"David Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/David_Hume"},{"id":20761,"name":"Concepts","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Concepts"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11761547"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11761547/Practical_Reasoning_and_Practical_Reasons_in_Hume"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Practical Reasoning and Practical Reasons in Hume" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37185204/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11761547/Practical_Reasoning_and_Practical_Reasons_in_Hume">Practical Reasoning and Practical Reasons in Hume</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Hume Studies</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Hume’s discussion of the role of reason in the practical sphere is often read to imply two broad,...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Hume’s discussion of the role of reason in the practical sphere is often read to imply two broad, negative claims: first, that passions and actions can (at most) only be regarded as responsive to reasons in so far as they are either in agreement with or contrary to the instrumental implications of other passions or desires. And second, that there is no properly practical form of inference or reasoning. I argue that Hume’s general understanding of practical reason does not support either of these claims. Rather, Hume’s explicit discussion of these issues—like his discussion of the nature of probable inference—is intended to lay the foundation for a naturalist account of practical thought that we would today regard as embodying a substantive, non-instrumentalist theory of practical rationality. This account will, indeed, make reason the “slave of the passions,” but in a very different sense than the one familiar from most contemporary discussions of Hume.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="e8a564ed51f2764937e55c8c5137b68f" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37185204,"asset_id":11761547,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37185204/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11761547"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11761547"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11761547; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11761547]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11761547]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11761547; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11761547']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11761547, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "e8a564ed51f2764937e55c8c5137b68f" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11761547]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11761547,"title":"Practical Reasoning and Practical Reasons in Hume","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Hume’s discussion of the role of reason in the practical sphere is often read to imply two broad, negative claims: first, that passions and actions can (at most) only be regarded as responsive to reasons in so far as they are either in agreement with or contrary to the instrumental implications of other passions or desires. And second, that there is no properly practical form of inference or reasoning. I argue that Hume’s general understanding of practical reason does not support either of these claims. Rather, Hume’s explicit discussion of these issues—like his discussion of the nature of probable inference—is intended to lay the foundation for a naturalist account of practical thought that we would today regard as embodying a substantive, non-instrumentalist theory of practical rationality. This account will, indeed, make reason the “slave of the passions,” but in a very different sense than the one familiar from most contemporary discussions of Hume.","publication_name":"Hume Studies"},"translated_abstract":"Hume’s discussion of the role of reason in the practical sphere is often read to imply two broad, negative claims: first, that passions and actions can (at most) only be regarded as responsive to reasons in so far as they are either in agreement with or contrary to the instrumental implications of other passions or desires. And second, that there is no properly practical form of inference or reasoning. I argue that Hume’s general understanding of practical reason does not support either of these claims. Rather, Hume’s explicit discussion of these issues—like his discussion of the nature of probable inference—is intended to lay the foundation for a naturalist account of practical thought that we would today regard as embodying a substantive, non-instrumentalist theory of practical rationality. This account will, indeed, make reason the “slave of the passions,” but in a very different sense than the one familiar from most contemporary discussions of Hume.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11761547/Practical_Reasoning_and_Practical_Reasons_in_Hume","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-04-01T15:57:21.038-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37185204,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37185204/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"HumePracticalReasonHS.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37185204/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Practical_Reasoning_and_Practical_Reason.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37185204/HumePracticalReasonHS-libre.pdf?1427929148=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPractical_Reasoning_and_Practical_Reason.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=cQ9J4bj4tG4mk-Z4~h75cDtPkP6LylaoUKV4pI3KSjIzCT496BobBTnhTwt1ZwyxXaLI30bbY68~TdCNHAawDVZsRlJXyMB75~dscG-ptF59epdfbarnxAzYONvG5cV9M5Kp2dGwV8jB1DGmOEV4A827RQ0ulh8Fppr3vKY5Jb2mGJI2dQEP6rcN1zkkK~tjISpiYPBHl~Lre~WyNfHkllqVTMYxBMgzzCPvdj~6p8za6Z61Y2qDrCZfwq2~xG8MwkqeILdTu6zWwO~BlwoWbCVyn6EqQ9AuB210UspZGJ6g0rbpi2aVGwPW~wRPL10FAyJseoQKLqJpZk6FZHTuVQ__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Practical_Reasoning_and_Practical_Reasons_in_Hume","translated_slug":"","page_count":21,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":37185204,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37185204/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"HumePracticalReasonHS.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37185204/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Practical_Reasoning_and_Practical_Reason.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37185204/HumePracticalReasonHS-libre.pdf?1427929148=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPractical_Reasoning_and_Practical_Reason.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=cQ9J4bj4tG4mk-Z4~h75cDtPkP6LylaoUKV4pI3KSjIzCT496BobBTnhTwt1ZwyxXaLI30bbY68~TdCNHAawDVZsRlJXyMB75~dscG-ptF59epdfbarnxAzYONvG5cV9M5Kp2dGwV8jB1DGmOEV4A827RQ0ulh8Fppr3vKY5Jb2mGJI2dQEP6rcN1zkkK~tjISpiYPBHl~Lre~WyNfHkllqVTMYxBMgzzCPvdj~6p8za6Z61Y2qDrCZfwq2~xG8MwkqeILdTu6zWwO~BlwoWbCVyn6EqQ9AuB210UspZGJ6g0rbpi2aVGwPW~wRPL10FAyJseoQKLqJpZk6FZHTuVQ__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":905,"name":"Meta-Ethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Meta-Ethics"},{"id":2357,"name":"Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Hume"},{"id":14248,"name":"Practical Reasoning","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Practical_Reasoning"},{"id":14806,"name":"Metaethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaethics"},{"id":19942,"name":"David Hume","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/David_Hume"},{"id":38034,"name":"Practical Reasons and Rationality","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Practical_Reasons_and_Rationality"},{"id":1256617,"name":"Humean Theory of Reasons","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Humean_Theory_of_Reasons"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> </div><div class="profile--tab_content_container js-tab-pane tab-pane" data-section-id="5784803" id="epistemology"><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="40376011"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/40376011/A_Kantian_virtue_epistemology_rational_capacities_and_transcendental_arguments"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/60624911/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/40376011/A_Kantian_virtue_epistemology_rational_capacities_and_transcendental_arguments">A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Synthese</span><span>, 2018</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In this paper, I'll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspect...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In this paper, I'll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines (1) a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with (2) a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. In discussing these connections, I'll proceed as follows. First, I'll describe the sorts of epistemological questions I'll be focusing on, and the framework within which I'll try to address them. Then I'll say a bit about the connections between this framework on Kant's own views. Next, I'll explain in more detail how the two main elements of this framework relate to one another by explaining how a certain sort of "transcendental argument" allows us to derive conclusions about the requirements of rationality from facts about the nature of rational capacities. Then, I'll briefly illustrate these connections with two examples: (1) the rationality of explanatory inference like inference to the best explanation and (2) the rationality of perceptual belief. Finally, I'll conclude by saying a bit about the relevance of this ideas for debates about the rationality of basic beliefs or prior probabilities. Keywords Kant · Epistemology · Rationality · Virtue epistemology · Transcendental arguments · Understanding · Inference to the best explanation · Perception · Skepticism This paper sketches an approach to epistemology inspired by two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. I believe both of these elements play an important role in Kant's epistemology. But their precise character and their role in Kant's philosophy is the</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="5c0fdf5fb01b5321d27d79f3a5d73c3a" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":60624911,"asset_id":40376011,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/60624911/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="40376011"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="40376011"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 40376011; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=40376011]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=40376011]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 40376011; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='40376011']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 40376011, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "5c0fdf5fb01b5321d27d79f3a5d73c3a" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=40376011]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":40376011,"title":"A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In this paper, I'll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines (1) a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with (2) a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. In discussing these connections, I'll proceed as follows. First, I'll describe the sorts of epistemological questions I'll be focusing on, and the framework within which I'll try to address them. Then I'll say a bit about the connections between this framework on Kant's own views. Next, I'll explain in more detail how the two main elements of this framework relate to one another by explaining how a certain sort of \"transcendental argument\" allows us to derive conclusions about the requirements of rationality from facts about the nature of rational capacities. Then, I'll briefly illustrate these connections with two examples: (1) the rationality of explanatory inference like inference to the best explanation and (2) the rationality of perceptual belief. Finally, I'll conclude by saying a bit about the relevance of this ideas for debates about the rationality of basic beliefs or prior probabilities. Keywords Kant · Epistemology · Rationality · Virtue epistemology · Transcendental arguments · Understanding · Inference to the best explanation · Perception · Skepticism This paper sketches an approach to epistemology inspired by two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. I believe both of these elements play an important role in Kant's epistemology. But their precise character and their role in Kant's philosophy is the","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2018,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Synthese"},"translated_abstract":"In this paper, I'll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines (1) a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with (2) a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. In discussing these connections, I'll proceed as follows. First, I'll describe the sorts of epistemological questions I'll be focusing on, and the framework within which I'll try to address them. Then I'll say a bit about the connections between this framework on Kant's own views. Next, I'll explain in more detail how the two main elements of this framework relate to one another by explaining how a certain sort of \"transcendental argument\" allows us to derive conclusions about the requirements of rationality from facts about the nature of rational capacities. Then, I'll briefly illustrate these connections with two examples: (1) the rationality of explanatory inference like inference to the best explanation and (2) the rationality of perceptual belief. Finally, I'll conclude by saying a bit about the relevance of this ideas for debates about the rationality of basic beliefs or prior probabilities. Keywords Kant · Epistemology · Rationality · Virtue epistemology · Transcendental arguments · Understanding · Inference to the best explanation · Perception · Skepticism This paper sketches an approach to epistemology inspired by two aspects of Kant's philosophical project. I believe both of these elements play an important role in Kant's epistemology. But their precise character and their role in Kant's philosophy is the","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/40376011/A_Kantian_virtue_epistemology_rational_capacities_and_transcendental_arguments","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2019-09-17T09:54:54.212-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"other","co_author_tags":[{"id":33027842,"work_id":40376011,"tagging_user_id":605841,"tagged_user_id":null,"co_author_invite_id":1312627,"email":"s***k@pitt.edu","display_order":2,"name":"Karl Schafer","title":"A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments"}],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":60624911,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/60624911/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Schafer2018_Article_AKantianVirtueEpistemologyRati20190917-35317-1ar4rvk.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/60624911/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"A_Kantian_virtue_epistemology_rational_c.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/60624911/Schafer2018_Article_AKantianVirtueEpistemologyRati20190917-35317-1ar4rvk-libre.pdf?1568739945=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DA_Kantian_virtue_epistemology_rational_c.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=Bkaz2FYPr~2jYKQNX2MKSjkDIezYusGnzQMkvE27Q9LuCmkoQ-~faPZqyrlvGidQY7xpv5kfC4UfEGgxmu2TRJodS-Rkheun8TdNOO27X2B~n9JRIQhrWA8dZZChj7EJXlZ4zz2LN6BBla3m3GiUathBFFZ3NUkXOb-UtHTJx9N4y8HRoPiukny3jxjNvmwQwpjP3NPcugYC4~YJ~7NXyHEEKb6gXykTrFZLBiKjDHJaNjJkX6v6HRGatG87kx2bkEvKqasS0q6YZKHfS9qH4HfJLdI2fcW3-ueqxAoMkzt8RfsNVQCsOCBb3YnCU5MoATKae-m9euDEMT-TwuWkRg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"A_Kantian_virtue_epistemology_rational_capacities_and_transcendental_arguments","translated_slug":"","page_count":24,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":60624911,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/60624911/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Schafer2018_Article_AKantianVirtueEpistemologyRati20190917-35317-1ar4rvk.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/60624911/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"A_Kantian_virtue_epistemology_rational_c.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/60624911/Schafer2018_Article_AKantianVirtueEpistemologyRati20190917-35317-1ar4rvk-libre.pdf?1568739945=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DA_Kantian_virtue_epistemology_rational_c.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=Bkaz2FYPr~2jYKQNX2MKSjkDIezYusGnzQMkvE27Q9LuCmkoQ-~faPZqyrlvGidQY7xpv5kfC4UfEGgxmu2TRJodS-Rkheun8TdNOO27X2B~n9JRIQhrWA8dZZChj7EJXlZ4zz2LN6BBla3m3GiUathBFFZ3NUkXOb-UtHTJx9N4y8HRoPiukny3jxjNvmwQwpjP3NPcugYC4~YJ~7NXyHEEKb6gXykTrFZLBiKjDHJaNjJkX6v6HRGatG87kx2bkEvKqasS0q6YZKHfS9qH4HfJLdI2fcW3-ueqxAoMkzt8RfsNVQCsOCBb3YnCU5MoATKae-m9euDEMT-TwuWkRg__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":3468,"name":"Virtue Ethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Virtue_Ethics"},{"id":9302,"name":"Understanding","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Understanding"},{"id":13031,"name":"Transcendental Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Transcendental_Philosophy"},{"id":15236,"name":"Virtue Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Virtue_Epistemology"},{"id":16031,"name":"Immanuel Kant","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Immanuel_Kant"},{"id":18142,"name":"Transcendental Arguments","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Transcendental_Arguments"},{"id":29711,"name":"Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Skepticism"},{"id":52867,"name":"Rationality","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Rationality"},{"id":295669,"name":"Epistemic Rationality","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemic_Rationality"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="36707121"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/36707121/Epistemic_Planning_Epistemic_Internalism_and_Luminosity"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56646993/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/36707121/Epistemic_Planning_Epistemic_Internalism_and_Luminosity">Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Metaepistemology (OUP)</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to develop such an argument. In doing so, I distinguish a variety of ways that argument might be understood, and discuss how both internalists and externalists might make use of the ideas within it. Then I argue that, despite these complexities, the doxastic planning model continues to support a modest form of epistemic internalism. I conclude by showing that, far from conflicting with “anti- luminosity” arguments in epistemology, this form of internalism is best understood as a natural reaction to these arguments.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="21079343a8bba35785add055e7db1295" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":56646993,"asset_id":36707121,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/56646993/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="36707121"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="36707121"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 36707121; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=36707121]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=36707121]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 36707121; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='36707121']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 36707121, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "21079343a8bba35785add055e7db1295" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=36707121]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":36707121,"title":"Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to develop such an argument. In doing so, I distinguish a variety of ways that argument might be understood, and discuss how both internalists and externalists might make use of the ideas within it. Then I argue that, despite these complexities, the doxastic planning model continues to support a modest form of epistemic internalism. I conclude by showing that, far from conflicting with “anti- luminosity” arguments in epistemology, this form of internalism is best understood as a natural reaction to these arguments.","publication_name":"Metaepistemology (OUP)"},"translated_abstract":"In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to develop such an argument. In doing so, I distinguish a variety of ways that argument might be understood, and discuss how both internalists and externalists might make use of the ideas within it. Then I argue that, despite these complexities, the doxastic planning model continues to support a modest form of epistemic internalism. I conclude by showing that, far from conflicting with “anti- luminosity” arguments in epistemology, this form of internalism is best understood as a natural reaction to these arguments.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/36707121/Epistemic_Planning_Epistemic_Internalism_and_Luminosity","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2018-05-24T10:18:32.201-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"other","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":56646993,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56646993/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"MetaepistemologySchafer.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/56646993/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Epistemic_Planning_Epistemic_Internalism.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/56646993/MetaepistemologySchafer-libre.pdf?1527182394=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DEpistemic_Planning_Epistemic_Internalism.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=VLk9XBuifqk~MN99vthhGZyn8Vh49swWNux-vCgvZkDAoyzWNdnu4eiiUfMKpfmXu5dHEIL70vHiX1HZFeHk1Xla7TrIj9lc8fYR7JSxpKt8XLCD9zkZ0cgOdA3pH1dxttr~LKOcwIneTqsWzVn8i0k5l3WUjL1vbCfIKMAU6NDe-0TjntKDTdkInUCs~zWeTBYlKM9PKgF2YWf4cop2WPf6Zh2gpGYTqEK9W5fid6CHMsbHFxcRooTUjjxA3IHRruP5wFV8QYYFUHahghYdl683PzbAwgvNBzHdrgq5wXkOMhPQ7egYMJediBkYejfWmh23FLSicRFalx25MdOCwQ__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Epistemic_Planning_Epistemic_Internalism_and_Luminosity","translated_slug":"","page_count":15,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":56646993,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56646993/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"MetaepistemologySchafer.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/56646993/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Epistemic_Planning_Epistemic_Internalism.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/56646993/MetaepistemologySchafer-libre.pdf?1527182394=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DEpistemic_Planning_Epistemic_Internalism.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=VLk9XBuifqk~MN99vthhGZyn8Vh49swWNux-vCgvZkDAoyzWNdnu4eiiUfMKpfmXu5dHEIL70vHiX1HZFeHk1Xla7TrIj9lc8fYR7JSxpKt8XLCD9zkZ0cgOdA3pH1dxttr~LKOcwIneTqsWzVn8i0k5l3WUjL1vbCfIKMAU6NDe-0TjntKDTdkInUCs~zWeTBYlKM9PKgF2YWf4cop2WPf6Zh2gpGYTqEK9W5fid6CHMsbHFxcRooTUjjxA3IHRruP5wFV8QYYFUHahghYdl683PzbAwgvNBzHdrgq5wXkOMhPQ7egYMJediBkYejfWmh23FLSicRFalx25MdOCwQ__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":23404,"name":"Internalism/Externalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Internalism_Externalism"},{"id":47813,"name":"Planning","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Planning"},{"id":51956,"name":"Expressivism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Expressivism"},{"id":52867,"name":"Rationality","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Rationality"},{"id":176853,"name":"Luminosity","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Luminosity"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="14984876"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/14984876/Doxastic_Planning_and_Epistemic_Internalism"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Doxastic Planning and Epistemic Internalism" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38496875/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/14984876/Doxastic_Planning_and_Epistemic_Internalism">Doxastic Planning and Epistemic Internalism</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Synthese</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="1dc9d0f5c9912480b8568ab95ceafff5" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":38496875,"asset_id":14984876,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38496875/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="14984876"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="14984876"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 14984876; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=14984876]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=14984876]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 14984876; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='14984876']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 14984876, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "1dc9d0f5c9912480b8568ab95ceafff5" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=14984876]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":14984876,"title":"Doxastic Planning and Epistemic Internalism","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.","publication_name":"Synthese"},"translated_abstract":"In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/14984876/Doxastic_Planning_and_Epistemic_Internalism","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-08-17T08:50:35.369-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":38496875,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38496875/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"PlanningInternalism.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38496875/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Doxastic_Planning_and_Epistemic_Internal.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/38496875/PlanningInternalism-libre.pdf?1439826505=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DDoxastic_Planning_and_Epistemic_Internal.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=MTjQzPHAUgSZDV7KEwgroFUJOIWKN6LktMQ1i2NTkt~zinHEN0Qx~9BP2HQIo2BcPs0dIMTnsrWBdflkI6aoRhqUjER5sWsIb9RXsRifUTA0vil4wS2oflEjr6W2MiUpaiejp83Jle9HEyiHA9SFSYqMDW2xjImSDsCX4Dpm5e4S66U9YBG81mSSb2bLRlWi1yGA734iufHcvkBjTemXtk3UTpACBxN7zifsPowJbTEdMJD6K7bG6rOKCZ58Cgzxe8QoURB8O1hN4wtjZJh8fwbewGW4nQ5xHKi~YTscjbOXFr6sEPBkM~oYSjJ2LP-HCZWgtNEz~P3JTlY95BVWrw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Doxastic_Planning_and_Epistemic_Internalism","translated_slug":"","page_count":21,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":38496875,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38496875/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"PlanningInternalism.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38496875/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNiw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"Doxastic_Planning_and_Epistemic_Internal.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/38496875/PlanningInternalism-libre.pdf?1439826505=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DDoxastic_Planning_and_Epistemic_Internal.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=MTjQzPHAUgSZDV7KEwgroFUJOIWKN6LktMQ1i2NTkt~zinHEN0Qx~9BP2HQIo2BcPs0dIMTnsrWBdflkI6aoRhqUjER5sWsIb9RXsRifUTA0vil4wS2oflEjr6W2MiUpaiejp83Jle9HEyiHA9SFSYqMDW2xjImSDsCX4Dpm5e4S66U9YBG81mSSb2bLRlWi1yGA734iufHcvkBjTemXtk3UTpACBxN7zifsPowJbTEdMJD6K7bG6rOKCZ58Cgzxe8QoURB8O1hN4wtjZJh8fwbewGW4nQ5xHKi~YTscjbOXFr6sEPBkM~oYSjJ2LP-HCZWgtNEz~P3JTlY95BVWrw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":14806,"name":"Metaethics","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaethics"},{"id":20108,"name":"Internalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Internalism"},{"id":23404,"name":"Internalism/Externalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Internalism_Externalism"},{"id":24648,"name":"Metaepistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Metaepistemology"},{"id":44096,"name":"Knowledge","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Knowledge"},{"id":47813,"name":"Planning","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Planning"},{"id":49350,"name":"Externalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Externalism"},{"id":51956,"name":"Expressivism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Expressivism"},{"id":52867,"name":"Rationality","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Rationality"},{"id":295669,"name":"Epistemic Rationality","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemic_Rationality"},{"id":568132,"name":"Doxastic Agency","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Doxastic_Agency"},{"id":832628,"name":"Epistemic Expressivism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemic_Expressivism"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); 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On Self-Trust and Rational Symmetry" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38802850/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/15815867/How_Common_is_Peer_Disagreement_On_Self_Trust_and_Rational_Symmetry">How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self-Trust and Rational Symmetry</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural (if controversial) conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well-known views in the literature. The upshot of this discussion is that, if the Rational Symmetry View is correct, much of the action in the epistemology of disagreement relates—not to how one should treat those one regards as an “epistemic peer” in the sense popular in that literature—but rather to who one should treat as such.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="95db53643ec232d9bee9547fa8e81437" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":38802850,"asset_id":15815867,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38802850/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNyw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="15815867"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="15815867"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 15815867; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=15815867]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=15815867]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 15815867; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='15815867']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 15815867, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "95db53643ec232d9bee9547fa8e81437" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=15815867]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":15815867,"title":"How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self-Trust and Rational Symmetry","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural (if controversial) conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well-known views in the literature. The upshot of this discussion is that, if the Rational Symmetry View is correct, much of the action in the epistemology of disagreement relates—not to how one should treat those one regards as an “epistemic peer” in the sense popular in that literature—but rather to who one should treat as such.","publication_name":"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research"},"translated_abstract":"In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural (if controversial) conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well-known views in the literature. The upshot of this discussion is that, if the Rational Symmetry View is correct, much of the action in the epistemology of disagreement relates—not to how one should treat those one regards as an “epistemic peer” in the sense popular in that literature—but rather to who one should treat as such.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/15815867/How_Common_is_Peer_Disagreement_On_Self_Trust_and_Rational_Symmetry","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-09-17T11:27:44.922-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":38802850,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38802850/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"SymmetryPPR.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38802850/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNyw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"How_Common_is_Peer_Disagreement_On_Self.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/38802850/SymmetryPPR-libre.pdf?1442597058=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DHow_Common_is_Peer_Disagreement_On_Self.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=Te9AZezEEaQ80JjfCTtGaPXH0ue0CgUPfwqtfZhcMcN-zjANl4pkNJ4uxnsMNEeF6UqCRaFrpG6lPWSE-gopVhIpUFhm-wULyz44a5Giw-tQHWpxtr8vY26kwanLtuTgrOxMA2NF8nAo4JyEu89puIpdmmDiVd4BLPAg3H0K3RLCMGZPPbiKfoUZvfS14AvkBp88QbzcWWieYGKATH1NiI343S2AmZn01HFn9vjDwy6JipRgPMFSu8BYXk2KQLkPAyf3XqM7p65bJeCMdE5NDjIHlrK~Lxlgh~oid-l5jeUL0LQv8TZZ4NWUyF0P-9lX~Sy0u--67uJDaizf8yqEcA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"How_Common_is_Peer_Disagreement_On_Self_Trust_and_Rational_Symmetry","translated_slug":"","page_count":22,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":38802850,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/38802850/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"SymmetryPPR.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38802850/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNyw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"How_Common_is_Peer_Disagreement_On_Self.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/38802850/SymmetryPPR-libre.pdf?1442597058=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DHow_Common_is_Peer_Disagreement_On_Self.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552836\u0026Signature=Te9AZezEEaQ80JjfCTtGaPXH0ue0CgUPfwqtfZhcMcN-zjANl4pkNJ4uxnsMNEeF6UqCRaFrpG6lPWSE-gopVhIpUFhm-wULyz44a5Giw-tQHWpxtr8vY26kwanLtuTgrOxMA2NF8nAo4JyEu89puIpdmmDiVd4BLPAg3H0K3RLCMGZPPbiKfoUZvfS14AvkBp88QbzcWWieYGKATH1NiI343S2AmZn01HFn9vjDwy6JipRgPMFSu8BYXk2KQLkPAyf3XqM7p65bJeCMdE5NDjIHlrK~Lxlgh~oid-l5jeUL0LQv8TZZ4NWUyF0P-9lX~Sy0u--67uJDaizf8yqEcA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":850,"name":"Testimony","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Testimony"},{"id":3043,"name":"Trust","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Trust"},{"id":13833,"name":"Social Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Social_Epistemology"},{"id":30890,"name":"Epistemology of Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology_of_Disagreement"},{"id":98095,"name":"Epistemology of Testimony","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology_of_Testimony"},{"id":159608,"name":"Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Disagreement"},{"id":373449,"name":"Peer Disagreement","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Peer_Disagreement"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11818339"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11818339/The_rationalism_in_Anil_Gupta_s_Empiricism_and_Experience"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37226305/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11818339/The_rationalism_in_Anil_Gupta_s_Empiricism_and_Experience">The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Philosophical Studies</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="cd116cf310981c9e294ce20256b38f1f" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37226305,"asset_id":11818339,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37226305/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNyw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11818339"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11818339"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11818339; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11818339]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11818339]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11818339; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11818339']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 11818339, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "cd116cf310981c9e294ce20256b38f1f" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11818339]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11818339,"title":"The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions.","publication_name":"Philosophical Studies"},"translated_abstract":"In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11818339/The_rationalism_in_Anil_Gupta_s_Empiricism_and_Experience","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-04-06T15:37:34.374-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":605841,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37226305,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37226305/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"GuptaPS.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37226305/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNyw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"The_rationalism_in_Anil_Gupta_s_Empirici.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37226305/GuptaPS-libre.pdf?1428359967=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_rationalism_in_Anil_Gupta_s_Empirici.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552837\u0026Signature=KyobFiiJ1bxwZ1t2bLDnDkBIXCoNwdCSYnBOh2~aIE5XCIgL4r-5Z3Mm38yRVrwTinNpO8rziI4z7WZhc62cJReTBmtfHIaIWUZ1ngf9Au-BpurjlJPtdqc3ezUaw-57yx6oXIEwn7YdH3bITfZC535VCb0g2ESiedheHFRwXkGOFVIs4z7sTnvqdAwgMx8vZxU23M~-sZZxw3ie1F9tTdK~ORzWhG2fh46ijwUTEuxlUcP0LkPIzrPgjXeXPTe391vyFUNCYTrbfY2CsGnqIZUf~8SbMqFCrSmhIP8Tiump24qBBKiqWRVAiaVir64nzzXTxQNenrBXulb~DMe7kA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"The_rationalism_in_Anil_Gupta_s_Empiricism_and_Experience","translated_slug":"","page_count":15,"language":"en","content_type":"Work","owner":{"id":605841,"first_name":"Karl","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Schafer","page_name":"KarlSchafer","domain_name":"uci","created_at":"2011-07-25T20:21:26.985-07:00","display_name":"Karl Schafer","url":"https://uci.academia.edu/KarlSchafer"},"attachments":[{"id":37226305,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37226305/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"GuptaPS.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37226305/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNyw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&","bulk_download_file_name":"The_rationalism_in_Anil_Gupta_s_Empirici.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37226305/GuptaPS-libre.pdf?1428359967=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DThe_rationalism_in_Anil_Gupta_s_Empirici.pdf\u0026Expires=1732552837\u0026Signature=KyobFiiJ1bxwZ1t2bLDnDkBIXCoNwdCSYnBOh2~aIE5XCIgL4r-5Z3Mm38yRVrwTinNpO8rziI4z7WZhc62cJReTBmtfHIaIWUZ1ngf9Au-BpurjlJPtdqc3ezUaw-57yx6oXIEwn7YdH3bITfZC535VCb0g2ESiedheHFRwXkGOFVIs4z7sTnvqdAwgMx8vZxU23M~-sZZxw3ie1F9tTdK~ORzWhG2fh46ijwUTEuxlUcP0LkPIzrPgjXeXPTe391vyFUNCYTrbfY2CsGnqIZUf~8SbMqFCrSmhIP8Tiump24qBBKiqWRVAiaVir64nzzXTxQNenrBXulb~DMe7kA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":815,"name":"Epistemology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Epistemology"},{"id":913,"name":"Empiricism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Empiricism"},{"id":5178,"name":"Phenomenology","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Phenomenology"},{"id":18187,"name":"Rationalism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Rationalism"},{"id":29711,"name":"Skepticism","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Skepticism"},{"id":60193,"name":"Experience","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Experience"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); 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Hume on Motivation and Virtue for NDPR.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="78be57a29ef5ad519e493d6d508c31b8" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":56584627,"asset_id":36651241,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/56584627/download_file?st=MTczMjU0OTIzNyw4LjIyMi4yMDguMTQ2&s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="36651241"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="36651241"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 36651241; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=36651241]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=36651241]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 36651241; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='36651241']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 36651241, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "78be57a29ef5ad519e493d6d508c31b8" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=36651241]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":36651241,"title":"Review of Hume on Motivation and Virtue","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Review of Charles Pidgen (ed.) 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$(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") }); </script> </div><div class="profile--tab_content_container js-tab-pane tab-pane" data-section-id="8536532" id="papers"><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="70565015"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/70565015/Hume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Representation"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Hume’s Unified Theory of Mental Representation" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/70565015/Hume_s_Unified_Theory_of_Mental_Representation">Hume’s Unified Theory of Mental Representation</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Abstract: Hume’s account of mental representation appears to involve two distinct elements, the r...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Abstract: Hume’s account of mental representation appears to involve two distinct elements, the relationship between which is far from completely clear. On the one hand, Hume often writes as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume’s treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association plays within Hume’s discussion of these issues. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume’s discussion of these issues involves attributing to him a unified account of mental rep...</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="70565015"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span><span id="work-strip-rankings-button-container"></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="70565015"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 70565015; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=70565015]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=70565015]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 70565015; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='70565015']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span><span><script>$(function() { new Works.PaperRankView({ workId: 70565015, container: "", }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-f77ea15d77ce96025a6048a514272ad8becbad23c641fc2b3bd6e24ca6ff1932.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (false){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "-1" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=70565015]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":70565015,"title":"Hume’s Unified Theory of Mental Representation","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Abstract: Hume’s account of mental representation appears to involve two distinct elements, the relationship between which is far from completely clear. 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But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association plays within Hume’s discussion of these issues. 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