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D.","url":"https://usfq.academia.edu/AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","image":"https://0.academia-photos.com/27609009/7855055/33945391/s200_alvaro.ledesma_albornoz.jpg","sameAs":["https://www.linkedin.com/in/Alv"]},"dateCreated":"2015-03-10T19:08:26-07:00","dateModified":"2025-03-31T10:56:25-07:00","name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","description":"Realizó estudios de música clásica y piano entre los años 2006 y 2014 en el Conservatorio Superior de música Jaime Mola, donde se graduó con honores y luego trabajó impartiendo los cursos de Teoría musical y Música de cámara. Cursó un mayor en Artes Liberales con enfoque en Filosofía y un minor en Psicología en la Universidad San Francisco de Quito entre los años 2009 y 2013, absolviendo con los honores Summa cum laude y Ranking #1 en el Colegio de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades. Entre enero del 2014 y diciembre del 2015 realizó una Maestría en Filosofía en la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, terminando con los honores de Dos votos de distinción (Magna cum laude). En el año 2014 fue recipiente de la Beca para Doctorandos extranjeros de la Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo de Chile. Inmediatamente después de sus estudios de Maestría fue aceptado como Candidato a Doctor por la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile bajo la tutela del reconocido investigador en fenomenología Prof. Dr. Francisco De Lara. De junio del 2016 a abril del 2017 realizó una estancia de investigación en el Archivo Husserl de Freiburg, Alemania. Esta estancia llevó a una Cotutela con la Albert-Ludwigs Universität de Freiburg bajo la tutela del entonces Decano de la Facultad de Filosofía y Director de los archivos Husserl y Waldenfels de Freiburg, Prof. Dr. Hans-Helmuth Gander. En mayo del 2020 se graduó de Doctor en Filosofía por las Universidades Albert-Lugwigs Universität Freiburg y Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile con los honores Summa cum laude y Distinción Máxima, respectivamente. El foco de su investigación fue la metodología hermenéutico-fenomenológica de Martin Heidegger y su aplicación práctica en el análisis de la constitución del sentido de lo ético. Su tesis doctoral, con título Das Verständnis des Ethischen. 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D." border="0" onerror="if (this.src != '//a.academia-assets.com/images/s200_no_pic.png') this.src = '//a.academia-assets.com/images/s200_no_pic.png';" width="200" height="200" src="https://0.academia-photos.com/27609009/7855055/33945391/s200_alvaro.ledesma_albornoz.jpg" /></div><div class="title-container"><h1 class="ds2-5-heading-sans-serif-sm">Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.</h1><div class="affiliations-container fake-truncate js-profile-affiliations"><div><a class="u-tcGrayDarker" href="https://usfq.academia.edu/">Universidad San Francisco de Quito</a>, <a class="u-tcGrayDarker" href="https://usfq.academia.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Documents">Philosophy</a>, <span class="u-tcGrayDarker">Faculty Member</span></div><div><a class="u-tcGrayDarker" href="https://uni-freiburg.academia.edu/">Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg</a>, <a class="u-tcGrayDarker" href="https://uni-freiburg.academia.edu/Departments/Philosophisches_Seminar/Documents">Philosophisches Seminar</a>, <span class="u-tcGrayDarker">PhD Graduate</span></div><div><a class="u-tcGrayDarker" href="https://uc-cl.academia.edu/">Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile</a>, <a class="u-tcGrayDarker" href="https://uc-cl.academia.edu/Departments/Instituto_de_Filosof%C3%ADa/Documents">Instituto de Filosofía</a>, <span class="u-tcGrayDarker">Graduate Student</span></div></div></div></div><div class="sidebar-cta-container"><button class="ds2-5-button hidden profile-cta-button grow js-profile-follow-button" data-broccoli-component="user-info.follow-button" data-click-track="profile-user-info-follow-button" data-follow-user-fname="Alvaro" data-follow-user-id="27609009" data-follow-user-source="profile_button" data-has-google="false"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 20px" translate="no">add</span>Follow</button><button class="ds2-5-button hidden profile-cta-button grow js-profile-unfollow-button" data-broccoli-component="user-info.unfollow-button" data-click-track="profile-user-info-unfollow-button" data-unfollow-user-id="27609009"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 20px" translate="no">done</span>Following</button></div></div><div class="user-stats-container"><a><div class="stat-container js-profile-followers"><p class="label">Followers</p><p class="data">55</p></div></a><a><div class="stat-container js-profile-followees" data-broccoli-component="user-info.followees-count" data-click-track="profile-expand-user-info-following"><p class="label">Following</p><p class="data">25</p></div></a><span><div class="stat-container"><p class="label"><span class="js-profile-total-view-text">Public Views</span></p><p class="data"><span class="js-profile-view-count"></span></p></div></span></div><div class="user-bio-container"><div class="profile-bio fake-truncate js-profile-about" style="margin: 0px;">Realizó estudios de música clásica y piano entre los años 2006 y 2014 en el Conservatorio Superior de música Jaime Mola, donde se graduó con honores y luego trabajó impartiendo los cursos de Teoría musical y Música de cámara. Cursó un mayor en Artes Liberales con enfoque en Filosofía y un minor en Psicología en la Universidad San Francisco de Quito entre los años 2009 y 2013, absolviendo con los honores Summa cum laude y Ranking #1 en el Colegio de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades. Entre enero del 2014 y diciembre del 2015 realizó una Maestría en Filosofía en la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, terminando con los honores de Dos votos de distinción (Magna cum laude). En el año 2014 fue recipiente de la Beca para Doctorandos extranjeros de la Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo de Chile. Inmediatamente después de sus estudios de Maestría fue aceptado como Candidato a Doctor por la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile bajo la tutela del reconocido investigador en fenomenología Prof. Dr. Francisco De Lara. De junio del 2016 a abril del 2017 realizó una estancia de investigación en el Archivo Husserl de Freiburg, Alemania. Esta estancia llevó a una Cotutela con la Albert-Ludwigs Universität de Freiburg bajo la tutela del entonces Decano de la Facultad de Filosofía y Director de los archivos Husserl y Waldenfels de Freiburg, Prof. Dr. Hans-Helmuth Gander. En mayo del 2020 se graduó de Doctor en Filosofía por las Universidades Albert-Lugwigs Universität Freiburg y Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile con los honores Summa cum laude y Distinción Máxima, respectivamente. El foco de su investigación fue la metodología hermenéutico-fenomenológica de Martin Heidegger y su aplicación práctica en el análisis de la constitución del sentido de lo ético. Su tesis doctoral, con título Das Verständnis des Ethischen. Eine hermeneutisch-phänomenologische Analyse der alltäglichen Erfahrung des Ethischen im Anschluss an Martin Heidegger, fue aceptada para publicación en la prestigiosa Editorial de Filosofía Karl Alber Verlag / Herder en Freiburg, Alemania y fue publicada con la ayuda de una beca otorgada por la Geschwister Boehringer Ingelheim Stiftung für Gesteswissenschaften. <br /><br />Actualmente es Profesor Investigador de la Universidad San Francisco de Quito, donde imparte cursos en las áreas de Filosofía y Artes Liberales e investiga temas relacionados con la Filosofía de Martín Heidegger, Fenomenología, Metodología, Ética y la Historia de las ideas.<br /><b>Address: </b>Quito, Ecuador<br /><div class="js-profile-less-about u-linkUnstyled u-tcGrayDarker u-textDecorationUnderline u-displayNone">less</div></div></div><div class="suggested-academics-container"><div class="suggested-academics--header"><h3 class="ds2-5-heading-sans-serif-xs">Related Authors</h3></div><ul 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D.</h3></div><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="127967618"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/127967618/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/121619999/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/127967618/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial">Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Isegoría</span><span>, 2018</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una ‘irregularidad del sentimiento’ al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (humano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente “culpable”?</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="14ae5c25aaea249cb526a3f2db21e4e3" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":121619999,"asset_id":127967618,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/121619999/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="127967618"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="127967618"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 127967618; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=127967618]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=127967618]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 127967618; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='127967618']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "14ae5c25aaea249cb526a3f2db21e4e3" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=127967618]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":127967618,"title":"Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una ‘irregularidad del sentimiento’ al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (humano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente “culpable”?","publisher":"Editorial CSIC","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2018,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Isegoría"},"translated_abstract":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una ‘irregularidad del sentimiento’ al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (humano). 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Formal Indication and its Methodical Tasks in Martin Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/100089512/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/98848693/La_indicaci%C3%B3n_formal_y_sus_tareas_met%C3%B3dicas_en_la_fenomenolog%C3%ADa_hermen%C3%A9utica_de_Martin_Heidegger_Formal_Indication_and_its_Methodical_Tasks_in_Martin_Heidegger_s_Hermeneutic_Phenomenology">La indicación formal y sus tareas metódicas en la fenomenología-hermenéutica de Martin Heidegger. Formal Indication and its Methodical Tasks in Martin Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Studia Heideggeriana Vol. XII</span><span>, 2023</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Resumen: En su primer período friburgués y en su perío-do marburgués Martin Heidegger desarro...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Resumen: En su primer período friburgués y en su perío-do  marburgués  Martin  Heidegger  desarrolla  el  método  hermenéutico fenomenológico con motivo de aprehender el sentido original de la vida en su ser vivida. La indica-ción  formal  es  el  elemento  de  conceptualización  que  el  autor  articula  en  correspondencia  a  las  particularidades  del  fenómeno-vida  y  a  su  aprehensión.  El  presente  artí-culo tiene por objetivo la presentación clara y concreta de la idea y las diferentes tareas metódicas que pertenecen a este elemento.<br /><br />Abstract: In his first Freiburg period and in his Marburg period, Martin Heidegger developed the phenomenologi-cal hermeneutic method in order to apprehend the original meaning of life in its performative-character. The formal indication is the element of conceptualization that the au-thor articulates in correspondence to the particularities of the phenomenon-life and its apprehension. The objective of this article is the clear and concrete presentation of the idea and the different methodical tasks that belong to this element.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="6f23fcba9ebcf26460dab682bbc24a2c" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":100089512,"asset_id":98848693,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/100089512/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="98848693"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="98848693"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 98848693; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=98848693]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=98848693]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 98848693; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='98848693']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "6f23fcba9ebcf26460dab682bbc24a2c" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=98848693]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":98848693,"title":"La indicación formal y sus tareas metódicas en la fenomenología-hermenéutica de Martin Heidegger. 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The formal indication is the element of conceptualization that the au-thor articulates in correspondence to the particularities of the phenomenon-life and its apprehension. The objective of this article is the clear and concrete presentation of the idea and the different methodical tasks that belong to this element.","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2023,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Studia Heideggeriana Vol. XII"},"translated_abstract":"Resumen: En su primer período friburgués y en su perío-do marburgués Martin Heidegger desarrolla el método hermenéutico fenomenológico con motivo de aprehender el sentido original de la vida en su ser vivida. La indica-ción formal es el elemento de conceptualización que el autor articula en correspondencia a las particularidades del fenómeno-vida y a su aprehensión. 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La entrevista se tradujo del alemán al castellano</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="75b0cd0e2028cc1b6179b08be205904f" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":88202859,"asset_id":82519320,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/88202859/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="82519320"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="82519320"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 82519320; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=82519320]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=82519320]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 82519320; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='82519320']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "75b0cd0e2028cc1b6179b08be205904f" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=82519320]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":82519320,"title":"Traducción de la entrevista a Hans-Georg Gadamer: “¿Podemos revivir el antiguo sentido amplio de la retórica?” Dirigida por Ansgar Kemmann","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Kemmann entrevista a Gadamer sobre su experiencia con Martín Heidegger, su filosofía y el sentido filosófico de la retórica. 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A pesar de un análisis profundo de su procedencia, operatividad, sentido, etc., la literatura académica no ha logrado destacar un aspecto fundamental de este método, a saber, su potencial filosófico independiente, esto es, su capacidad de ser usado para una reflexión filosófica que no se compromete con las investigaciones concretas realizadas por su autor. En este contexto, el presente artículo persigue dos objetivos. Por un lado, se procura describir de manera clara y ordenada los aspectos metódicos de la fenomenología hermenéutica a partir de las motivaciones propias que le dan forma y, por otro lado, se busca fundamentar la posibilidad de un uso filosófico de este método para investigaciones independientes.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="09de470a3d97dc3829cd8c65f33025f7" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":86736594,"asset_id":80313279,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/86736594/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="80313279"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="80313279"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 80313279; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=80313279]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=80313279]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 80313279; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='80313279']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "09de470a3d97dc3829cd8c65f33025f7" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=80313279]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":80313279,"title":"El método hermenéutico-fenomenológico de Martin Heidegger y la posibilidad de una investigación filosófica independiente","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"La cuestión del método en la filosofía temprana de Martin Heidegger ha sido objeto de estudio de varios trabajos académicos importantes. 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Natural equality as the Objective Basis for Moral Judgments: A Consideration of the Irregularity of Sentiments of the Impartial Spectator" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/58118225/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/38090706/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial_Natural_equality_as_the_Objective_Basis_for_Moral_Judgments_A_Consideration_of_the_Irregularity_of_Sentiments_of_the_Impartial_Spectator">Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial. Natural equality as the Objective Basis for Moral Judgments: A Consideration of the Irregularity of Sentiments of the Impartial Spectator</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>ISEGORÍA. Revista de Filosofía Moral y Política</span><span>, 2018</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una 'irregularidad del sentimiento' al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (hu-mano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente "culpable"? Palabras clave: Smith; igualdad; sentimientos irregulares; azar; remordimiento. <br />ABSTRACT. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith recognizes that in certain occasions even the most impartial of all spectators experience an 'irregularity of sentiment' in judging the moral value of an action. An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. Having indicated this, an important question arises: Why does the innocent, who is not unjust but who is the material cause of the factual injury of another, feels a kind of remorse facing the act and somehow feels "guilty"?</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="56da0e427913f054a9ce3c4aca7e6760" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":58118225,"asset_id":38090706,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/58118225/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="38090706"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="38090706"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 38090706; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=38090706]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=38090706]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 38090706; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='38090706']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "56da0e427913f054a9ce3c4aca7e6760" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=38090706]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":38090706,"title":"Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial. Natural equality as the Objective Basis for Moral Judgments: A Consideration of the Irregularity of Sentiments of the Impartial Spectator","translated_title":"","metadata":{"doi":"10.3989/isegoria.2018.059.06","volume":"59","abstract":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una 'irregularidad del sentimiento' al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (hu-mano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente \"culpable\"? Palabras clave: Smith; igualdad; sentimientos irregulares; azar; remordimiento. \nABSTRACT. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith recognizes that in certain occasions even the most impartial of all spectators experience an 'irregularity of sentiment' in judging the moral value of an action. An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. 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En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente \"culpable\"? Palabras clave: Smith; igualdad; sentimientos irregulares; azar; remordimiento. \nABSTRACT. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith recognizes that in certain occasions even the most impartial of all spectators experience an 'irregularity of sentiment' in judging the moral value of an action. An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. Having indicated this, an important question arises: Why does the innocent, who is not unjust but who is the material cause of the factual injury of another, feels a kind of remorse facing the act and somehow feels \"guilty\"?","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/38090706/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial_Natural_equality_as_the_Objective_Basis_for_Moral_Judgments_A_Consideration_of_the_Irregularity_of_Sentiments_of_the_Impartial_Spectator","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2019-01-04T22:22:33.249-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":58118225,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/58118225/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"1033-1033-1-PB.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/58118225/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/58118225/1033-1033-1-PB-libre.pdf?1546669821=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DIgualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=RS3IMpFEmXVkSG8VRTR9Mm8f1IgsqvXLQXRyxok3L~QQqlpSKezwNN3Yqnpv5BiZnfm8Quvk1Zq2ZJggtJeGL-HMTMymDjCspNyCWo3ONdc13CKOiIS9ifiWByw5fn8lgsxdBG3eXtVl2HGOKwdTl1IFVGxoMQ6Fq-CV99vQQHtVCTXxD8EE288CSyGV7pYDxP2002RVFxgkZmt98LuNCDT1jUrWNJu0KDwwbYlXlTFKTzg~iE04XR-6nYlZvZ4IpypIviT4mK759bfZSp7sBzqLJ3MCHjNQmu6MXL6EkD5Ibf2M~2xY2DXM-UEaN8elmpNzlZkR2bpWRN6UKgFu-A__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideración_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial_Natural_equality_as_the_Objective_Basis_for_Moral_Judgments_A_Consideration_of_the_Irregularity_of_Sentiments_of_the_Impartial_Spectator","translated_slug":"","page_count":24,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una 'irregularidad del sentimiento' al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (hu-mano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente \"culpable\"? Palabras clave: Smith; igualdad; sentimientos irregulares; azar; remordimiento. \nABSTRACT. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith recognizes that in certain occasions even the most impartial of all spectators experience an 'irregularity of sentiment' in judging the moral value of an action. An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. Having indicated this, an important question arises: Why does the innocent, who is not unjust but who is the material cause of the factual injury of another, feels a kind of remorse facing the act and somehow feels \"guilty\"?","owner":{"id":27609009,"first_name":"Alvaro","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","page_name":"AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","domain_name":"usfq","created_at":"2015-03-10T19:08:26.614-07:00","display_name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","url":"https://usfq.academia.edu/AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD"},"attachments":[{"id":58118225,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/58118225/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"1033-1033-1-PB.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/58118225/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/58118225/1033-1033-1-PB-libre.pdf?1546669821=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DIgualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=RS3IMpFEmXVkSG8VRTR9Mm8f1IgsqvXLQXRyxok3L~QQqlpSKezwNN3Yqnpv5BiZnfm8Quvk1Zq2ZJggtJeGL-HMTMymDjCspNyCWo3ONdc13CKOiIS9ifiWByw5fn8lgsxdBG3eXtVl2HGOKwdTl1IFVGxoMQ6Fq-CV99vQQHtVCTXxD8EE288CSyGV7pYDxP2002RVFxgkZmt98LuNCDT1jUrWNJu0KDwwbYlXlTFKTzg~iE04XR-6nYlZvZ4IpypIviT4mK759bfZSp7sBzqLJ3MCHjNQmu6MXL6EkD5Ibf2M~2xY2DXM-UEaN8elmpNzlZkR2bpWRN6UKgFu-A__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":18373,"name":"Moral Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Philosophy"},{"id":18681,"name":"Adam Smith","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Adam_Smith"},{"id":21284,"name":"Guilt/shame (Psychology)","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Guilt_shame_Psychology_"},{"id":59602,"name":"Moral Luck","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Luck"},{"id":208924,"name":"Guilt","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Guilt"},{"id":345592,"name":"Remorse","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Remorse"},{"id":1031024,"name":"Theory of Moral Sentiment","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Theory_of_Moral_Sentiment"},{"id":2778278,"name":"La Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/La_Teor%C3%ADa_de_los_Sentimientos_Morales"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-38090706-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="33139108"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/33139108/Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_fallacies_Their_fore_predicative_interpretation_and_illustration_by_division_es_Las_falacias_Secundum_quid_y_del_accidente_en_Arist%C3%B3teles_Su_interpretaci%C3%B3n_ante_predicativa_e_ilustraci%C3%B3n_por_divisi%C3%B3n"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Aristotle’s Secundum quid and accident fallacies. Their fore-predicative interpretation and illustration by division [es] Las falacias Secundum quid y del accidente en Aristóteles. Su interpretación ante-predicativa e ilustración por división" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/53229644/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/33139108/Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_fallacies_Their_fore_predicative_interpretation_and_illustration_by_division_es_Las_falacias_Secundum_quid_y_del_accidente_en_Arist%C3%B3teles_Su_interpretaci%C3%B3n_ante_predicativa_e_ilustraci%C3%B3n_por_divisi%C3%B3n">Aristotle’s Secundum quid and accident fallacies. Their fore-predicative interpretation and illustration by division [es] Las falacias Secundum quid y del accidente en Aristóteles. Su interpretación ante-predicativa e ilustración por división</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía</span><span>, 2017</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications the...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications<br />the extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici<br />Elenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented<br />by Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism.<br />This consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that<br />the analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the<br />fallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level<br />of reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is<br />proposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction.<br />[es] A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa,<br />las falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los<br />Sophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que<br />las falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa<br />y no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas.<br />Con esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá<br />la tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el<br />nivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo<br />inclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permite dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="c4c16e111b135f17931bb42c09ad38f7" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":53229644,"asset_id":33139108,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/53229644/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="33139108"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="33139108"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 33139108; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=33139108]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=33139108]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 33139108; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='33139108']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "c4c16e111b135f17931bb42c09ad38f7" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=33139108]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":33139108,"title":"Aristotle’s Secundum quid and accident fallacies. Their fore-predicative interpretation and illustration by division [es] Las falacias Secundum quid y del accidente en Aristóteles. Su interpretación ante-predicativa e ilustración por división","translated_title":"","metadata":{"doi":"10.5209/ASHF.55649","issue":"1","volume":"34","abstract":"Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications\nthe extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici\nElenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented\nby Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism.\nThis consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that\nthe analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the\nfallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level\nof reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is\nproposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction.\n[es] A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa,\nlas falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los\nSophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que\nlas falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa\ny no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas.\nCon esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá\nla tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el\nnivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo\ninclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permite dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.","publisher":"Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía","page_numbers":"11-33","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2017,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía"},"translated_abstract":"Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications\nthe extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici\nElenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented\nby Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism.\nThis consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that\nthe analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the\nfallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level\nof reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is\nproposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction.\n[es] A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa,\nlas falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los\nSophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que\nlas falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa\ny no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas.\nCon esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá\nla tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el\nnivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo\ninclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permite dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/33139108/Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_fallacies_Their_fore_predicative_interpretation_and_illustration_by_division_es_Las_falacias_Secundum_quid_y_del_accidente_en_Arist%C3%B3teles_Su_interpretaci%C3%B3n_ante_predicativa_e_ilustraci%C3%B3n_por_divisi%C3%B3n","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2017-05-22T04:06:58.906-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":53229644,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/53229644/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"55649-109219-7-PB.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/53229644/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_f.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/53229644/55649-109219-7-PB-libre.pdf?1495451479=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DAristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_f.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=gy4hlPInlMWrtORfI8y2U5PieGenmT~Xzd5j4awbRT4uqpHUTSmUQcncdj4S~2-FYhJwrnx6yZAoHR8bQNzTCdQ1h-HuCYWAlKwLmRVskbenBvTaqEBd7Hjwd5CO76Qx-igo2jNr-Vg7OGmMfgTnDBlEvezbDPcYXMiWBMtqMnumpQMgxjD3ipfN90Fu3l4yKZBhDd55Ege2oIre0yvgpXazEx56923fS9lTdEPI6CHCFZyuRou0CS3eT5wx0ft9DmFSECGFtVTANMkgjxu91F13ELwrxtK-AEgAUaH0IfmO6Rd677xFHgp~qHghl7ZyOr5VCVmR80xYBAJ13XmunA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_fallacies_Their_fore_predicative_interpretation_and_illustration_by_division_es_Las_falacias_Secundum_quid_y_del_accidente_en_Aristóteles_Su_interpretación_ante_predicativa_e_ilustración_por_división","translated_slug":"","page_count":23,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications\nthe extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici\nElenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented\nby Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism.\nThis consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that\nthe analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the\nfallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level\nof reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is\nproposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction.\n[es] A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa,\nlas falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los\nSophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que\nlas falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa\ny no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas.\nCon esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá\nla tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el\nnivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo\ninclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permite dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.","owner":{"id":27609009,"first_name":"Alvaro","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","page_name":"AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","domain_name":"usfq","created_at":"2015-03-10T19:08:26.614-07:00","display_name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","url":"https://usfq.academia.edu/AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD"},"attachments":[{"id":53229644,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/53229644/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"55649-109219-7-PB.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/53229644/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_f.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/53229644/55649-109219-7-PB-libre.pdf?1495451479=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DAristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_f.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=gy4hlPInlMWrtORfI8y2U5PieGenmT~Xzd5j4awbRT4uqpHUTSmUQcncdj4S~2-FYhJwrnx6yZAoHR8bQNzTCdQ1h-HuCYWAlKwLmRVskbenBvTaqEBd7Hjwd5CO76Qx-igo2jNr-Vg7OGmMfgTnDBlEvezbDPcYXMiWBMtqMnumpQMgxjD3ipfN90Fu3l4yKZBhDd55Ege2oIre0yvgpXazEx56923fS9lTdEPI6CHCFZyuRou0CS3eT5wx0ft9DmFSECGFtVTANMkgjxu91F13ELwrxtK-AEgAUaH0IfmO6Rd677xFHgp~qHghl7ZyOr5VCVmR80xYBAJ13XmunA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":2019,"name":"Aristotle","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Aristotle"},{"id":51282,"name":"Fallacies","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Fallacies"},{"id":132929,"name":"Aristoteles","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Aristoteles"},{"id":137087,"name":"Sophistici elenchi","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Sophistici_elenchi"}],"urls":[{"id":45068161,"url":"https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ASHF/article/view/55649"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-33139108-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11964310"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11964310/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Razon instrumental ciencia y dominio" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37318912/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11964310/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio">Razon instrumental ciencia y dominio</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Eikasia Revista de Filosofía</span><span>, 2015</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Resumen: A través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Resumen: <br />A través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta una relación entre ciencia, instrumentalización de la razón y dominio. Si bien el dominio comienza como “dominio de la naturaleza”, paulatinamente su alcance llega a abarcar al hombre. El dominio se introduce en la dinámica social a través del trabajo, pero el problema fundamental está cuando éste se esparce a toda la esfera social a través del consumo y la forma de vida. El afán por un pensamiento que sólo se valida en términos científicos recaerá en la invalidación del pensar mismo.<br /><br />Palabras clave: Razón instrumental, dominio, ciencia, pensamiento, consumo.<br /><br /><br /><br />Abstract: <br />Through the concept of "instrumental reason" developed by Horkheimer, we present a relationship between science, instrumentalization of reason and domination. If domination started with a "mastery of nature", in time it has envolved mankind. Domination is introduced, in the social dynamics, through work, but the main problem occurs when it spreads through the entire social sphere as consumption and way of living. The desire for a cientific way of thinking, that has value only in cientific terms, will fall in a invalidity of thinking itself.<br /><br />Keywords: Instrumental Reason, domination, science, thought, consumption.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="f4801d2bb45c98beb398d8677b635166" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37318912,"asset_id":11964310,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37318912/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11964310"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11964310"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11964310; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11964310]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11964310]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11964310; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11964310']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "f4801d2bb45c98beb398d8677b635166" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11964310]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11964310,"title":"Razon instrumental ciencia y dominio","translated_title":"","metadata":{"doi":"10.57027/eikasia.63.777","volume":"63","abstract":"Resumen: \nA través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta una relación entre ciencia, instrumentalización de la razón y dominio. Si bien el dominio comienza como “dominio de la naturaleza”, paulatinamente su alcance llega a abarcar al hombre. El dominio se introduce en la dinámica social a través del trabajo, pero el problema fundamental está cuando éste se esparce a toda la esfera social a través del consumo y la forma de vida. El afán por un pensamiento que sólo se valida en términos científicos recaerá en la invalidación del pensar mismo.\n\nPalabras clave: Razón instrumental, dominio, ciencia, pensamiento, consumo.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nThrough the concept of \"instrumental reason\" developed by Horkheimer, we present a relationship between science, instrumentalization of reason and domination. If domination started with a \"mastery of nature\", in time it has envolved mankind. Domination is introduced, in the social dynamics, through work, but the main problem occurs when it spreads through the entire social sphere as consumption and way of living. The desire for a cientific way of thinking, that has value only in cientific terms, will fall in a invalidity of thinking itself.\n\nKeywords: Instrumental Reason, domination, science, thought, consumption.","publisher":"Eikasia","page_numbers":"127-141","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2015,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Eikasia Revista de Filosofía"},"translated_abstract":"Resumen: \nA través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta una relación entre ciencia, instrumentalización de la razón y dominio. Si bien el dominio comienza como “dominio de la naturaleza”, paulatinamente su alcance llega a abarcar al hombre. El dominio se introduce en la dinámica social a través del trabajo, pero el problema fundamental está cuando éste se esparce a toda la esfera social a través del consumo y la forma de vida. El afán por un pensamiento que sólo se valida en términos científicos recaerá en la invalidación del pensar mismo.\n\nPalabras clave: Razón instrumental, dominio, ciencia, pensamiento, consumo.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nThrough the concept of \"instrumental reason\" developed by Horkheimer, we present a relationship between science, instrumentalization of reason and domination. If domination started with a \"mastery of nature\", in time it has envolved mankind. Domination is introduced, in the social dynamics, through work, but the main problem occurs when it spreads through the entire social sphere as consumption and way of living. The desire for a cientific way of thinking, that has value only in cientific terms, will fall in a invalidity of thinking itself.\n\nKeywords: Instrumental Reason, domination, science, thought, consumption.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11964310/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-04-15T17:10:29.438-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37318912,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37318912/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio_Alvaro_Ledesma.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37318912/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37318912/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio_Alvaro_Ledesma-libre.pdf?1429143121=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DRazon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=QeTacEQAJQftRPaSkrXL0hKKbenCkJTDiMbFDHLcOr-10Y2~118C6VJjEUhK9SKJq0y5-yGHX8aw4omegwQAivQGMXfHJeE12WMfT1MYd1-BEBPpmRUEkLtY1VZA9pbzksyRvWDWesWPV7yB4WXrlVQlTaYkFKEtllDN77jsh8lraBzNyrPjOKi9uMDx4T~NMIye3wAxFFfFhBZxoR4LD~cZaZJI1Wlh9KMyYDuap1egYjQPH8TsgWSsP4ypH5teTINt-n94ps-1m54GUZyGRenmxqJ1lmvObiP~mSIWP8m2ImGezkEsxdq8YzKbAtFtWwHDKi5GStmdXseW0BxUTw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio","translated_slug":"","page_count":16,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"Resumen: \nA través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta una relación entre ciencia, instrumentalización de la razón y dominio. Si bien el dominio comienza como “dominio de la naturaleza”, paulatinamente su alcance llega a abarcar al hombre. El dominio se introduce en la dinámica social a través del trabajo, pero el problema fundamental está cuando éste se esparce a toda la esfera social a través del consumo y la forma de vida. El afán por un pensamiento que sólo se valida en términos científicos recaerá en la invalidación del pensar mismo.\n\nPalabras clave: Razón instrumental, dominio, ciencia, pensamiento, consumo.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nThrough the concept of \"instrumental reason\" developed by Horkheimer, we present a relationship between science, instrumentalization of reason and domination. If domination started with a \"mastery of nature\", in time it has envolved mankind. Domination is introduced, in the social dynamics, through work, but the main problem occurs when it spreads through the entire social sphere as consumption and way of living. The desire for a cientific way of thinking, that has value only in cientific terms, will fall in a invalidity of thinking itself.\n\nKeywords: Instrumental Reason, domination, science, thought, consumption.","owner":{"id":27609009,"first_name":"Alvaro","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","page_name":"AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","domain_name":"usfq","created_at":"2015-03-10T19:08:26.614-07:00","display_name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","url":"https://usfq.academia.edu/AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD"},"attachments":[{"id":37318912,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37318912/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio_Alvaro_Ledesma.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37318912/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37318912/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio_Alvaro_Ledesma-libre.pdf?1429143121=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DRazon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=QeTacEQAJQftRPaSkrXL0hKKbenCkJTDiMbFDHLcOr-10Y2~118C6VJjEUhK9SKJq0y5-yGHX8aw4omegwQAivQGMXfHJeE12WMfT1MYd1-BEBPpmRUEkLtY1VZA9pbzksyRvWDWesWPV7yB4WXrlVQlTaYkFKEtllDN77jsh8lraBzNyrPjOKi9uMDx4T~NMIye3wAxFFfFhBZxoR4LD~cZaZJI1Wlh9KMyYDuap1egYjQPH8TsgWSsP4ypH5teTINt-n94ps-1m54GUZyGRenmxqJ1lmvObiP~mSIWP8m2ImGezkEsxdq8YzKbAtFtWwHDKi5GStmdXseW0BxUTw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":5339,"name":"Max Horkheimer","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Max_Horkheimer"},{"id":22576,"name":"Frankfurt School","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Frankfurt_School"},{"id":140652,"name":"Instrumental Rationality","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Instrumental_Rationality"},{"id":395816,"name":"Escuela de Frankfurt","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Escuela_de_Frankfurt"},{"id":1186655,"name":"Adorno/Horkheimer","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Adorno_Horkheimer"}],"urls":[{"id":45068304,"url":"https://www.revistadefilosofia.org/index.php/ERF/article/view/777"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-11964310-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11964297"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11964297/Plat%C3%B3n_y_Descartes_Misolog%C3%ADa_y_M%C3%A9todo_en_el_Fed%C3%B3n_y_las_Meditaciones_Metaf%C3%ADsicas"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Platón y Descartes. Misología y Método en el Fedón y las Meditaciones Metafísicas " class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37318898/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11964297/Plat%C3%B3n_y_Descartes_Misolog%C3%ADa_y_M%C3%A9todo_en_el_Fed%C3%B3n_y_las_Meditaciones_Metaf%C3%ADsicas">Platón y Descartes. Misología y Método en el Fedón y las Meditaciones Metafísicas </a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Eikasia Revista de Filosofía</span><span>, 2015</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Resumen: Podríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metód...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Resumen: <br />Podríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metódica. Y es sólo por esto que podemos comparar su método analítico, que se utiliza en las Meditaciones Metafísicas, con el método hipotético que Platón expone en el Fedón. A través de una comparación de los dos métodos nos encontramos con que ambos métodos funcionan mediante el establecimiento de una primera hipótesis (una primera declaración) y luego deducir lógicamente lo que se deriva de ella. Su convicción, en materia metafísica, es pasar de la causa a los efectos y no viceversa.<br /><br />Palabras clave: Misología, método, Descartes, Platón, hipótesis.<br /><br /><br /><br />Abstract: <br />We could think that Descartes is a misologist if we don't understand that his doubt is only methodical. And it's only because of this that we can compare his analitical method, used in the Methaphysic Meditations, with the hypothetical method that Plato exposes in the Phaedo. Through a comparison of the two methods we find out that both methods operate by establishing a first hypothesis (a first statement) and then deducing logically what derives from it. Their conviction, in methaphysical manners, is to go from the cause to the effects and not viceversa.<br /><br />Key words : Misology, method, Descartes, Plato, hypothesis.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="bd808001308830796bda433055cb17e4" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37318898,"asset_id":11964297,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37318898/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11964297"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11964297"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11964297; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11964297]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11964297]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11964297; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11964297']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "bd808001308830796bda433055cb17e4" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11964297]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11964297,"title":"Platón y Descartes. Misología y Método en el Fedón y las Meditaciones Metafísicas ","translated_title":"","metadata":{"volume":"61","abstract":"Resumen: \nPodríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metódica. Y es sólo por esto que podemos comparar su método analítico, que se utiliza en las Meditaciones Metafísicas, con el método hipotético que Platón expone en el Fedón. A través de una comparación de los dos métodos nos encontramos con que ambos métodos funcionan mediante el establecimiento de una primera hipótesis (una primera declaración) y luego deducir lógicamente lo que se deriva de ella. Su convicción, en materia metafísica, es pasar de la causa a los efectos y no viceversa.\n\nPalabras clave: Misología, método, Descartes, Platón, hipótesis.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nWe could think that Descartes is a misologist if we don't understand that his doubt is only methodical. And it's only because of this that we can compare his analitical method, used in the Methaphysic Meditations, with the hypothetical method that Plato exposes in the Phaedo. Through a comparison of the two methods we find out that both methods operate by establishing a first hypothesis (a first statement) and then deducing logically what derives from it. Their conviction, in methaphysical manners, is to go from the cause to the effects and not viceversa.\n\nKey words : Misology, method, Descartes, Plato, hypothesis. \n","publisher":"Eikasia Revista de Filosofía","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2015,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Eikasia Revista de Filosofía"},"translated_abstract":"Resumen: \nPodríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metódica. Y es sólo por esto que podemos comparar su método analítico, que se utiliza en las Meditaciones Metafísicas, con el método hipotético que Platón expone en el Fedón. 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Y es sólo por esto que podemos comparar su método analítico, que se utiliza en las Meditaciones Metafísicas, con el método hipotético que Platón expone en el Fedón. A través de una comparación de los dos métodos nos encontramos con que ambos métodos funcionan mediante el establecimiento de una primera hipótesis (una primera declaración) y luego deducir lógicamente lo que se deriva de ella. Su convicción, en materia metafísica, es pasar de la causa a los efectos y no viceversa.\n\nPalabras clave: Misología, método, Descartes, Platón, hipótesis.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nWe could think that Descartes is a misologist if we don't understand that his doubt is only methodical. And it's only because of this that we can compare his analitical method, used in the Methaphysic Meditations, with the hypothetical method that Plato exposes in the Phaedo. 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D.</h3></div></div><div class="profile--tab_content_container js-tab-pane tab-pane" data-section-id="2851922" id="papers"><div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="127967618"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/127967618/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/121619999/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/127967618/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial">Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Isegoría</span><span>, 2018</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una ‘irregularidad del sentimiento’ al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (humano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente “culpable”?</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="14ae5c25aaea249cb526a3f2db21e4e3" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":121619999,"asset_id":127967618,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/121619999/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="127967618"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="127967618"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 127967618; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=127967618]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=127967618]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 127967618; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='127967618']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "14ae5c25aaea249cb526a3f2db21e4e3" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=127967618]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":127967618,"title":"Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una ‘irregularidad del sentimiento’ al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (humano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente “culpable”?","publisher":"Editorial CSIC","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2018,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Isegoría"},"translated_abstract":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una ‘irregularidad del sentimiento’ al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (humano). 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Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente “culpable”?","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/127967618/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2025-03-02T11:58:24.326-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":121619999,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/121619999/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"1027.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/121619999/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/121619999/1027-libre.pdf?1740947143=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DIgualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457146\u0026Signature=WRXAtdVSbIoKs1gpCsn98qqM1YI5EH0r7ZOhc0zx-dqPr5bW4FrFaNOlObvdx-exWG5OPvSd~cscVBh6lD6qSHY00IsAkaYrhEg1uIChfpexCBgmgJBJYWiq2txrj~qczfZBYBNuKnAgskCU3UI9KVp9vnv--4qhowzJxtHhSBbiRI~Cg9--XbWSycdAXdd1HCbsudQjka84NSXE~e-e0CqzNGLZwTLhQa4Mnp6sSAsvpSQeBmDokp3m5o61Jg3~mSVcwek9QkY6IhRWVqUfxT6gAYyUoi0TCOtSzJqsDwe3zr9Po1fRNaBulK~3bQCTCHpiOY-Id9SaA5Uih6p77w__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideración_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial","translated_slug":"","page_count":24,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una ‘irregularidad del sentimiento’ al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. 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Formal Indication and its Methodical Tasks in Martin Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/100089512/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/98848693/La_indicaci%C3%B3n_formal_y_sus_tareas_met%C3%B3dicas_en_la_fenomenolog%C3%ADa_hermen%C3%A9utica_de_Martin_Heidegger_Formal_Indication_and_its_Methodical_Tasks_in_Martin_Heidegger_s_Hermeneutic_Phenomenology">La indicación formal y sus tareas metódicas en la fenomenología-hermenéutica de Martin Heidegger. Formal Indication and its Methodical Tasks in Martin Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Studia Heideggeriana Vol. XII</span><span>, 2023</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Resumen: En su primer período friburgués y en su perío-do marburgués Martin Heidegger desarro...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Resumen: En su primer período friburgués y en su perío-do  marburgués  Martin  Heidegger  desarrolla  el  método  hermenéutico fenomenológico con motivo de aprehender el sentido original de la vida en su ser vivida. La indica-ción  formal  es  el  elemento  de  conceptualización  que  el  autor  articula  en  correspondencia  a  las  particularidades  del  fenómeno-vida  y  a  su  aprehensión.  El  presente  artí-culo tiene por objetivo la presentación clara y concreta de la idea y las diferentes tareas metódicas que pertenecen a este elemento.<br /><br />Abstract: In his first Freiburg period and in his Marburg period, Martin Heidegger developed the phenomenologi-cal hermeneutic method in order to apprehend the original meaning of life in its performative-character. The formal indication is the element of conceptualization that the au-thor articulates in correspondence to the particularities of the phenomenon-life and its apprehension. The objective of this article is the clear and concrete presentation of the idea and the different methodical tasks that belong to this element.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="6f23fcba9ebcf26460dab682bbc24a2c" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":100089512,"asset_id":98848693,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/100089512/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="98848693"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="98848693"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 98848693; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=98848693]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=98848693]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 98848693; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='98848693']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "6f23fcba9ebcf26460dab682bbc24a2c" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=98848693]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":98848693,"title":"La indicación formal y sus tareas metódicas en la fenomenología-hermenéutica de Martin Heidegger. 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La entrevista se tradujo del alemán al castellano</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="75b0cd0e2028cc1b6179b08be205904f" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":88202859,"asset_id":82519320,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/88202859/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="82519320"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="82519320"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 82519320; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=82519320]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=82519320]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 82519320; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='82519320']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "75b0cd0e2028cc1b6179b08be205904f" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=82519320]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":82519320,"title":"Traducción de la entrevista a Hans-Georg Gadamer: “¿Podemos revivir el antiguo sentido amplio de la retórica?” Dirigida por Ansgar Kemmann","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"Kemmann entrevista a Gadamer sobre su experiencia con Martín Heidegger, su filosofía y el sentido filosófico de la retórica. 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A pesar de un análisis profundo de su procedencia, operatividad, sentido, etc., la literatura académica no ha logrado destacar un aspecto fundamental de este método, a saber, su potencial filosófico independiente, esto es, su capacidad de ser usado para una reflexión filosófica que no se compromete con las investigaciones concretas realizadas por su autor. En este contexto, el presente artículo persigue dos objetivos. Por un lado, se procura describir de manera clara y ordenada los aspectos metódicos de la fenomenología hermenéutica a partir de las motivaciones propias que le dan forma y, por otro lado, se busca fundamentar la posibilidad de un uso filosófico de este método para investigaciones independientes.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="09de470a3d97dc3829cd8c65f33025f7" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":86736594,"asset_id":80313279,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/86736594/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="80313279"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="80313279"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 80313279; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=80313279]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=80313279]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 80313279; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='80313279']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "09de470a3d97dc3829cd8c65f33025f7" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=80313279]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":80313279,"title":"El método hermenéutico-fenomenológico de Martin Heidegger y la posibilidad de una investigación filosófica independiente","translated_title":"","metadata":{"abstract":"La cuestión del método en la filosofía temprana de Martin Heidegger ha sido objeto de estudio de varios trabajos académicos importantes. 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Por un lado, se procura describir de manera clara y ordenada los aspectos metódicos de la fenomenología hermenéutica a partir de las motivaciones propias que le dan forma y, por otro lado, se busca fundamentar la posibilidad de un uso filosófico de este método para investigaciones independientes.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/80313279/El_m%C3%A9todo_hermen%C3%A9utico_fenomenol%C3%B3gico_de_Martin_Heidegger_y_la_posibilidad_de_una_investigaci%C3%B3n_filos%C3%B3fica_independiente","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2022-05-30T15:18:10.535-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":86736594,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/86736594/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"137.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/86736594/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"El_metodo_hermeneutico_fenomenologico_de.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/86736594/137-libre.pdf?1653949995=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DEl_metodo_hermeneutico_fenomenologico_de.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457146\u0026Signature=MI7CfrSKqBFY2CBP-lB3g2Q77QAdje-LsqHJJcLs~7Nf4th7hWegc217DOpivYa1Fzz~Svsv2Jla6MI0B~ppIAJRbNtCkCM5Sf-rW2C2J7MCcA-IHXN31Px8B41OguvyCDAKmP~~V8NWWV-~MvKgJu4pXFQWw6EZqPvmnEX0ee9lcHjgPTiqoNOo8VZHuCG1P-BPV~6LoVd7sq2zWIRcdmBpjCbSKnPMGB5ZqCSLSPQPosF0oohW68CZILuRKPhFvQeSnuVn43CbBhHBhOiVj9x5U7E2An6WC~F0oWnZP6WfGaIm82wegC-HyHyGWajgSoQR8ViMoNQU6o1cvugNJw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"El_método_hermenéutico_fenomenológico_de_Martin_Heidegger_y_la_posibilidad_de_una_investigación_filosófica_independiente","translated_slug":"","page_count":18,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"La cuestión del método en la filosofía temprana de Martin Heidegger ha sido objeto de estudio de varios trabajos académicos importantes. A pesar de un análisis profundo de su procedencia, operatividad, sentido, etc., la literatura académica no ha logrado destacar un aspecto fundamental de este método, a saber, su potencial filosófico independiente, esto es, su capacidad de ser usado para una reflexión filosófica que no se compromete con las investigaciones concretas realizadas por su autor. En este contexto, el presente artículo persigue dos objetivos. Por un lado, se procura describir de manera clara y ordenada los aspectos metódicos de la fenomenología hermenéutica a partir de las motivaciones propias que le dan forma y, por otro lado, se busca fundamentar la posibilidad de un uso filosófico de este método para investigaciones independientes.","owner":{"id":27609009,"first_name":"Alvaro","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","page_name":"AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","domain_name":"usfq","created_at":"2015-03-10T19:08:26.614-07:00","display_name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. 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Natural equality as the Objective Basis for Moral Judgments: A Consideration of the Irregularity of Sentiments of the Impartial Spectator" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/58118225/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/38090706/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial_Natural_equality_as_the_Objective_Basis_for_Moral_Judgments_A_Consideration_of_the_Irregularity_of_Sentiments_of_the_Impartial_Spectator">Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial. Natural equality as the Objective Basis for Moral Judgments: A Consideration of the Irregularity of Sentiments of the Impartial Spectator</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>ISEGORÍA. Revista de Filosofía Moral y Política</span><span>, 2018</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una 'irregularidad del sentimiento' al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (hu-mano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente "culpable"? Palabras clave: Smith; igualdad; sentimientos irregulares; azar; remordimiento. <br />ABSTRACT. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith recognizes that in certain occasions even the most impartial of all spectators experience an 'irregularity of sentiment' in judging the moral value of an action. An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. Having indicated this, an important question arises: Why does the innocent, who is not unjust but who is the material cause of the factual injury of another, feels a kind of remorse facing the act and somehow feels "guilty"?</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="56da0e427913f054a9ce3c4aca7e6760" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":58118225,"asset_id":38090706,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/58118225/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="38090706"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="38090706"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 38090706; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=38090706]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=38090706]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 38090706; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='38090706']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "56da0e427913f054a9ce3c4aca7e6760" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=38090706]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":38090706,"title":"Igualdad natural como la base objetiva de los juicios morales: una consideración sobre los sentimientos irregulares del Espectador Imparcial. Natural equality as the Objective Basis for Moral Judgments: A Consideration of the Irregularity of Sentiments of the Impartial Spectator","translated_title":"","metadata":{"doi":"10.3989/isegoria.2018.059.06","volume":"59","abstract":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una 'irregularidad del sentimiento' al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. Un ejemplo de esta irregularidad puede hallarse en los casos donde, por influencia del azar, la consecuencia de la acción no se sigue directamente del diseño del agente (hu-mano). En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente \"culpable\"? Palabras clave: Smith; igualdad; sentimientos irregulares; azar; remordimiento. \nABSTRACT. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith recognizes that in certain occasions even the most impartial of all spectators experience an 'irregularity of sentiment' in judging the moral value of an action. An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. 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En el presente artículo se abordará esta problemática para, a través de ella, fundamentar la siguiente tesis: el reconocimiento de la igualdad natural entre todos los agentes morales es el punto objetivo que debe fundar todo juicio moral. Una vez mostrado ello, una pregunta digna de abordaje surgirá: ¿Por qué el inocente, aquel que no es injusto pero es causa material del daño fáctico, siente una especie de remordimiento frente al acto y de cierta forma se siente \"culpable\"? Palabras clave: Smith; igualdad; sentimientos irregulares; azar; remordimiento. \nABSTRACT. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith recognizes that in certain occasions even the most impartial of all spectators experience an 'irregularity of sentiment' in judging the moral value of an action. An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. Having indicated this, an important question arises: Why does the innocent, who is not unjust but who is the material cause of the factual injury of another, feels a kind of remorse facing the act and somehow feels \"guilty\"?","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/38090706/Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideraci%C3%B3n_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial_Natural_equality_as_the_Objective_Basis_for_Moral_Judgments_A_Consideration_of_the_Irregularity_of_Sentiments_of_the_Impartial_Spectator","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2019-01-04T22:22:33.249-08:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":58118225,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/58118225/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"1033-1033-1-PB.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/58118225/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/58118225/1033-1033-1-PB-libre.pdf?1546669821=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DIgualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=RS3IMpFEmXVkSG8VRTR9Mm8f1IgsqvXLQXRyxok3L~QQqlpSKezwNN3Yqnpv5BiZnfm8Quvk1Zq2ZJggtJeGL-HMTMymDjCspNyCWo3ONdc13CKOiIS9ifiWByw5fn8lgsxdBG3eXtVl2HGOKwdTl1IFVGxoMQ6Fq-CV99vQQHtVCTXxD8EE288CSyGV7pYDxP2002RVFxgkZmt98LuNCDT1jUrWNJu0KDwwbYlXlTFKTzg~iE04XR-6nYlZvZ4IpypIviT4mK759bfZSp7sBzqLJ3MCHjNQmu6MXL6EkD5Ibf2M~2xY2DXM-UEaN8elmpNzlZkR2bpWRN6UKgFu-A__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_de_los_juicios_morales_una_consideración_sobre_los_sentimientos_irregulares_del_Espectador_Imparcial_Natural_equality_as_the_Objective_Basis_for_Moral_Judgments_A_Consideration_of_the_Irregularity_of_Sentiments_of_the_Impartial_Spectator","translated_slug":"","page_count":24,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"En su obra The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith bien advierte que existen ciertas ocasiones en las cuales hasta el más imparcial de los espectadores siente una 'irregularidad del sentimiento' al juzgar el valor moral de una acción. 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An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. Having indicated this, an important question arises: Why does the innocent, who is not unjust but who is the material cause of the factual injury of another, feels a kind of remorse facing the act and somehow feels \"guilty\"?","owner":{"id":27609009,"first_name":"Alvaro","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","page_name":"AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","domain_name":"usfq","created_at":"2015-03-10T19:08:26.614-07:00","display_name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","url":"https://usfq.academia.edu/AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD"},"attachments":[{"id":58118225,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/58118225/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"1033-1033-1-PB.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/58118225/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Igualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/58118225/1033-1033-1-PB-libre.pdf?1546669821=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DIgualdad_natural_como_la_base_objetiva_d.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=RS3IMpFEmXVkSG8VRTR9Mm8f1IgsqvXLQXRyxok3L~QQqlpSKezwNN3Yqnpv5BiZnfm8Quvk1Zq2ZJggtJeGL-HMTMymDjCspNyCWo3ONdc13CKOiIS9ifiWByw5fn8lgsxdBG3eXtVl2HGOKwdTl1IFVGxoMQ6Fq-CV99vQQHtVCTXxD8EE288CSyGV7pYDxP2002RVFxgkZmt98LuNCDT1jUrWNJu0KDwwbYlXlTFKTzg~iE04XR-6nYlZvZ4IpypIviT4mK759bfZSp7sBzqLJ3MCHjNQmu6MXL6EkD5Ibf2M~2xY2DXM-UEaN8elmpNzlZkR2bpWRN6UKgFu-A__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":18373,"name":"Moral Philosophy","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Philosophy"},{"id":18681,"name":"Adam Smith","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Adam_Smith"},{"id":21284,"name":"Guilt/shame (Psychology)","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Guilt_shame_Psychology_"},{"id":59602,"name":"Moral Luck","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Moral_Luck"},{"id":208924,"name":"Guilt","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Guilt"},{"id":345592,"name":"Remorse","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Remorse"},{"id":1031024,"name":"Theory of Moral Sentiment","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Theory_of_Moral_Sentiment"},{"id":2778278,"name":"La Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/La_Teor%C3%ADa_de_los_Sentimientos_Morales"}],"urls":[]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-38090706-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="33139108"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/33139108/Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_fallacies_Their_fore_predicative_interpretation_and_illustration_by_division_es_Las_falacias_Secundum_quid_y_del_accidente_en_Arist%C3%B3teles_Su_interpretaci%C3%B3n_ante_predicativa_e_ilustraci%C3%B3n_por_divisi%C3%B3n"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Aristotle’s Secundum quid and accident fallacies. Their fore-predicative interpretation and illustration by division [es] Las falacias Secundum quid y del accidente en Aristóteles. Su interpretación ante-predicativa e ilustración por división" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/53229644/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/33139108/Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_fallacies_Their_fore_predicative_interpretation_and_illustration_by_division_es_Las_falacias_Secundum_quid_y_del_accidente_en_Arist%C3%B3teles_Su_interpretaci%C3%B3n_ante_predicativa_e_ilustraci%C3%B3n_por_divisi%C3%B3n">Aristotle’s Secundum quid and accident fallacies. Their fore-predicative interpretation and illustration by division [es] Las falacias Secundum quid y del accidente en Aristóteles. Su interpretación ante-predicativa e ilustración por división</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía</span><span>, 2017</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications the...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications<br />the extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici<br />Elenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented<br />by Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism.<br />This consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that<br />the analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the<br />fallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level<br />of reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is<br />proposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction.<br />[es] A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa,<br />las falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los<br />Sophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que<br />las falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa<br />y no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas.<br />Con esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá<br />la tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el<br />nivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo<br />inclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permite dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="c4c16e111b135f17931bb42c09ad38f7" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":53229644,"asset_id":33139108,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/53229644/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="33139108"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="33139108"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 33139108; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=33139108]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=33139108]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 33139108; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='33139108']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "c4c16e111b135f17931bb42c09ad38f7" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=33139108]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":33139108,"title":"Aristotle’s Secundum quid and accident fallacies. Their fore-predicative interpretation and illustration by division [es] Las falacias Secundum quid y del accidente en Aristóteles. Su interpretación ante-predicativa e ilustración por división","translated_title":"","metadata":{"doi":"10.5209/ASHF.55649","issue":"1","volume":"34","abstract":"Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications\nthe extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici\nElenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented\nby Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism.\nThis consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that\nthe analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the\nfallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level\nof reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is\nproposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction.\n[es] A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa,\nlas falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los\nSophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que\nlas falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa\ny no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas.\nCon esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá\nla tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el\nnivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo\ninclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permite dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.","publisher":"Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía","page_numbers":"11-33","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2017,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía"},"translated_abstract":"Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications\nthe extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici\nElenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented\nby Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism.\nThis consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that\nthe analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the\nfallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level\nof reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is\nproposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction.\n[es] A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa,\nlas falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los\nSophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que\nlas falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa\ny no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas.\nCon esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá\nla tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el\nnivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo\ninclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permite dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/33139108/Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_fallacies_Their_fore_predicative_interpretation_and_illustration_by_division_es_Las_falacias_Secundum_quid_y_del_accidente_en_Arist%C3%B3teles_Su_interpretaci%C3%B3n_ante_predicativa_e_ilustraci%C3%B3n_por_divisi%C3%B3n","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2017-05-22T04:06:58.906-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":53229644,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/53229644/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"55649-109219-7-PB.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/53229644/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_f.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/53229644/55649-109219-7-PB-libre.pdf?1495451479=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DAristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_f.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=gy4hlPInlMWrtORfI8y2U5PieGenmT~Xzd5j4awbRT4uqpHUTSmUQcncdj4S~2-FYhJwrnx6yZAoHR8bQNzTCdQ1h-HuCYWAlKwLmRVskbenBvTaqEBd7Hjwd5CO76Qx-igo2jNr-Vg7OGmMfgTnDBlEvezbDPcYXMiWBMtqMnumpQMgxjD3ipfN90Fu3l4yKZBhDd55Ege2oIre0yvgpXazEx56923fS9lTdEPI6CHCFZyuRou0CS3eT5wx0ft9DmFSECGFtVTANMkgjxu91F13ELwrxtK-AEgAUaH0IfmO6Rd677xFHgp~qHghl7ZyOr5VCVmR80xYBAJ13XmunA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_fallacies_Their_fore_predicative_interpretation_and_illustration_by_division_es_Las_falacias_Secundum_quid_y_del_accidente_en_Aristóteles_Su_interpretación_ante_predicativa_e_ilustración_por_división","translated_slug":"","page_count":23,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications\nthe extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici\nElenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented\nby Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism.\nThis consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that\nthe analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the\nfallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level\nof reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is\nproposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction.\n[es] A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa,\nlas falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los\nSophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que\nlas falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa\ny no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas.\nCon esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá\nla tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el\nnivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo\ninclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permite dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.","owner":{"id":27609009,"first_name":"Alvaro","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","page_name":"AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","domain_name":"usfq","created_at":"2015-03-10T19:08:26.614-07:00","display_name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","url":"https://usfq.academia.edu/AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD"},"attachments":[{"id":53229644,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/53229644/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"55649-109219-7-PB.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/53229644/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Aristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_f.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/53229644/55649-109219-7-PB-libre.pdf?1495451479=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DAristotle_s_Secundum_quid_and_accident_f.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=gy4hlPInlMWrtORfI8y2U5PieGenmT~Xzd5j4awbRT4uqpHUTSmUQcncdj4S~2-FYhJwrnx6yZAoHR8bQNzTCdQ1h-HuCYWAlKwLmRVskbenBvTaqEBd7Hjwd5CO76Qx-igo2jNr-Vg7OGmMfgTnDBlEvezbDPcYXMiWBMtqMnumpQMgxjD3ipfN90Fu3l4yKZBhDd55Ege2oIre0yvgpXazEx56923fS9lTdEPI6CHCFZyuRou0CS3eT5wx0ft9DmFSECGFtVTANMkgjxu91F13ELwrxtK-AEgAUaH0IfmO6Rd677xFHgp~qHghl7ZyOr5VCVmR80xYBAJ13XmunA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"research_interests":[{"id":2019,"name":"Aristotle","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Aristotle"},{"id":51282,"name":"Fallacies","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Fallacies"},{"id":132929,"name":"Aristoteles","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Aristoteles"},{"id":137087,"name":"Sophistici elenchi","url":"https://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Sophistici_elenchi"}],"urls":[{"id":45068161,"url":"https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ASHF/article/view/55649"}]}, dispatcherData: dispatcherData }); $(this).data('initialized', true); } }); $a.trackClickSource(".js-work-strip-work-link", "profile_work_strip") if (false) { Aedu.setUpFigureCarousel('profile-work-33139108-figures'); } }); </script> <div class="js-work-strip profile--work_container" data-work-id="11964310"><div class="profile--work_thumbnail hidden-xs"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-thumbnail" href="https://www.academia.edu/11964310/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio"><img alt="Research paper thumbnail of Razon instrumental ciencia y dominio" class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37318912/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11964310/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio">Razon instrumental ciencia y dominio</a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Eikasia Revista de Filosofía</span><span>, 2015</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Resumen: A través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta ...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Resumen: <br />A través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta una relación entre ciencia, instrumentalización de la razón y dominio. Si bien el dominio comienza como “dominio de la naturaleza”, paulatinamente su alcance llega a abarcar al hombre. El dominio se introduce en la dinámica social a través del trabajo, pero el problema fundamental está cuando éste se esparce a toda la esfera social a través del consumo y la forma de vida. El afán por un pensamiento que sólo se valida en términos científicos recaerá en la invalidación del pensar mismo.<br /><br />Palabras clave: Razón instrumental, dominio, ciencia, pensamiento, consumo.<br /><br /><br /><br />Abstract: <br />Through the concept of "instrumental reason" developed by Horkheimer, we present a relationship between science, instrumentalization of reason and domination. If domination started with a "mastery of nature", in time it has envolved mankind. Domination is introduced, in the social dynamics, through work, but the main problem occurs when it spreads through the entire social sphere as consumption and way of living. The desire for a cientific way of thinking, that has value only in cientific terms, will fall in a invalidity of thinking itself.<br /><br />Keywords: Instrumental Reason, domination, science, thought, consumption.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="f4801d2bb45c98beb398d8677b635166" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37318912,"asset_id":11964310,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37318912/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11964310"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11964310"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11964310; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11964310]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11964310]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11964310; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11964310']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "f4801d2bb45c98beb398d8677b635166" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11964310]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11964310,"title":"Razon instrumental ciencia y dominio","translated_title":"","metadata":{"doi":"10.57027/eikasia.63.777","volume":"63","abstract":"Resumen: \nA través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta una relación entre ciencia, instrumentalización de la razón y dominio. Si bien el dominio comienza como “dominio de la naturaleza”, paulatinamente su alcance llega a abarcar al hombre. El dominio se introduce en la dinámica social a través del trabajo, pero el problema fundamental está cuando éste se esparce a toda la esfera social a través del consumo y la forma de vida. El afán por un pensamiento que sólo se valida en términos científicos recaerá en la invalidación del pensar mismo.\n\nPalabras clave: Razón instrumental, dominio, ciencia, pensamiento, consumo.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nThrough the concept of \"instrumental reason\" developed by Horkheimer, we present a relationship between science, instrumentalization of reason and domination. If domination started with a \"mastery of nature\", in time it has envolved mankind. Domination is introduced, in the social dynamics, through work, but the main problem occurs when it spreads through the entire social sphere as consumption and way of living. The desire for a cientific way of thinking, that has value only in cientific terms, will fall in a invalidity of thinking itself.\n\nKeywords: Instrumental Reason, domination, science, thought, consumption.","publisher":"Eikasia","page_numbers":"127-141","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2015,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Eikasia Revista de Filosofía"},"translated_abstract":"Resumen: \nA través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta una relación entre ciencia, instrumentalización de la razón y dominio. Si bien el dominio comienza como “dominio de la naturaleza”, paulatinamente su alcance llega a abarcar al hombre. El dominio se introduce en la dinámica social a través del trabajo, pero el problema fundamental está cuando éste se esparce a toda la esfera social a través del consumo y la forma de vida. El afán por un pensamiento que sólo se valida en términos científicos recaerá en la invalidación del pensar mismo.\n\nPalabras clave: Razón instrumental, dominio, ciencia, pensamiento, consumo.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nThrough the concept of \"instrumental reason\" developed by Horkheimer, we present a relationship between science, instrumentalization of reason and domination. If domination started with a \"mastery of nature\", in time it has envolved mankind. Domination is introduced, in the social dynamics, through work, but the main problem occurs when it spreads through the entire social sphere as consumption and way of living. The desire for a cientific way of thinking, that has value only in cientific terms, will fall in a invalidity of thinking itself.\n\nKeywords: Instrumental Reason, domination, science, thought, consumption.","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11964310/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-04-15T17:10:29.438-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37318912,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37318912/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio_Alvaro_Ledesma.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37318912/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37318912/Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio_Alvaro_Ledesma-libre.pdf?1429143121=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DRazon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=QeTacEQAJQftRPaSkrXL0hKKbenCkJTDiMbFDHLcOr-10Y2~118C6VJjEUhK9SKJq0y5-yGHX8aw4omegwQAivQGMXfHJeE12WMfT1MYd1-BEBPpmRUEkLtY1VZA9pbzksyRvWDWesWPV7yB4WXrlVQlTaYkFKEtllDN77jsh8lraBzNyrPjOKi9uMDx4T~NMIye3wAxFFfFhBZxoR4LD~cZaZJI1Wlh9KMyYDuap1egYjQPH8TsgWSsP4ypH5teTINt-n94ps-1m54GUZyGRenmxqJ1lmvObiP~mSIWP8m2ImGezkEsxdq8YzKbAtFtWwHDKi5GStmdXseW0BxUTw__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Razon_instrumental_ciencia_y_dominio","translated_slug":"","page_count":16,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"Resumen: \nA través del concepto de “razón instrumental” desarrollado por Horkheimer, se presenta una relación entre ciencia, instrumentalización de la razón y dominio. Si bien el dominio comienza como “dominio de la naturaleza”, paulatinamente su alcance llega a abarcar al hombre. El dominio se introduce en la dinámica social a través del trabajo, pero el problema fundamental está cuando éste se esparce a toda la esfera social a través del consumo y la forma de vida. El afán por un pensamiento que sólo se valida en términos científicos recaerá en la invalidación del pensar mismo.\n\nPalabras clave: Razón instrumental, dominio, ciencia, pensamiento, consumo.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nThrough the concept of \"instrumental reason\" developed by Horkheimer, we present a relationship between science, instrumentalization of reason and domination. If domination started with a \"mastery of nature\", in time it has envolved mankind. Domination is introduced, in the social dynamics, through work, but the main problem occurs when it spreads through the entire social sphere as consumption and way of living. The desire for a cientific way of thinking, that has value only in cientific terms, will fall in a invalidity of thinking itself.\n\nKeywords: Instrumental Reason, domination, science, thought, consumption.","owner":{"id":27609009,"first_name":"Alvaro","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","page_name":"AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","domain_name":"usfq","created_at":"2015-03-10T19:08:26.614-07:00","display_name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. 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Misología y Método en el Fedón y las Meditaciones Metafísicas " class="work-thumbnail" src="https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37318898/thumbnails/1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="wp-workCard wp-workCard_itemContainer"><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--title"><a class="js-work-strip-work-link text-gray-darker" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-title" href="https://www.academia.edu/11964297/Plat%C3%B3n_y_Descartes_Misolog%C3%ADa_y_M%C3%A9todo_en_el_Fed%C3%B3n_y_las_Meditaciones_Metaf%C3%ADsicas">Platón y Descartes. Misología y Método en el Fedón y las Meditaciones Metafísicas </a></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span>Eikasia Revista de Filosofía</span><span>, 2015</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item"><span class="js-work-more-abstract-truncated">Resumen: Podríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metód...</span><a class="js-work-more-abstract" data-broccoli-component="work_strip.more_abstract" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-more-abstract" href="javascript:;"><span> more </span><span><i class="fa fa-caret-down"></i></span></a><span class="js-work-more-abstract-untruncated hidden">Resumen: <br />Podríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metódica. Y es sólo por esto que podemos comparar su método analítico, que se utiliza en las Meditaciones Metafísicas, con el método hipotético que Platón expone en el Fedón. A través de una comparación de los dos métodos nos encontramos con que ambos métodos funcionan mediante el establecimiento de una primera hipótesis (una primera declaración) y luego deducir lógicamente lo que se deriva de ella. Su convicción, en materia metafísica, es pasar de la causa a los efectos y no viceversa.<br /><br />Palabras clave: Misología, método, Descartes, Platón, hipótesis.<br /><br /><br /><br />Abstract: <br />We could think that Descartes is a misologist if we don't understand that his doubt is only methodical. And it's only because of this that we can compare his analitical method, used in the Methaphysic Meditations, with the hypothetical method that Plato exposes in the Phaedo. Through a comparison of the two methods we find out that both methods operate by establishing a first hypothesis (a first statement) and then deducing logically what derives from it. Their conviction, in methaphysical manners, is to go from the cause to the effects and not viceversa.<br /><br />Key words : Misology, method, Descartes, Plato, hypothesis.</span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--actions"><span class="work-strip-bookmark-button-container"></span><a id="bd808001308830796bda433055cb17e4" class="wp-workCard--action" rel="nofollow" data-click-track="profile-work-strip-download" data-download="{"attachment_id":37318898,"asset_id":11964297,"asset_type":"Work","button_location":"profile"}" href="https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37318898/download_file?s=profile"><span><i class="fa fa-arrow-down"></i></span><span>Download</span></a><span class="wp-workCard--action visible-if-viewed-by-owner inline-block" style="display: none;"><span class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper profile-work-strip-edit-button-wrapper" data-work-id="11964297"><a class="js-profile-work-strip-edit-button" tabindex="0"><span><i class="fa fa-pencil"></i></span><span>Edit</span></a></span></span></div><div class="wp-workCard_item wp-workCard--stats"><span><span><span class="js-view-count view-count u-mr2x" data-work-id="11964297"><i class="fa fa-spinner fa-spin"></i></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11964297; window.Academia.workViewCountsFetcher.queue(workId, function (count) { var description = window.$h.commaizeInt(count) + " " + window.$h.pluralize(count, 'View'); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11964297]").text(description); $(".js-view-count[data-work-id=11964297]").attr('title', description).tooltip(); }); });</script></span></span><span><span class="percentile-widget hidden"><span class="u-mr2x work-percentile"></span></span><script>$(function () { var workId = 11964297; window.Academia.workPercentilesFetcher.queue(workId, function (percentileText) { var container = $(".js-work-strip[data-work-id='11964297']"); container.find('.work-percentile').text(percentileText.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + percentileText.slice(1)); container.find('.percentile-widget').show(); container.find('.percentile-widget').removeClass('hidden'); }); });</script></span></div><div id="work-strip-premium-row-container"></div></div></div><script> require.config({ waitSeconds: 90 })(["https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/wow_profile-a9bf3a2bc8c89fa2a77156577594264ee8a0f214d74241bc0fcd3f69f8d107ac.js","https://a.academia-assets.com/assets/work_edit-ad038b8c047c1a8d4fa01b402d530ff93c45fee2137a149a4a5398bc8ad67560.js"], function() { // from javascript_helper.rb var dispatcherData = {} if (true){ window.WowProfile.dispatcher = window.WowProfile.dispatcher || _.clone(Backbone.Events); dispatcherData = { dispatcher: window.WowProfile.dispatcher, downloadLinkId: "bd808001308830796bda433055cb17e4" } } $('.js-work-strip[data-work-id=11964297]').each(function() { if (!$(this).data('initialized')) { new WowProfile.WorkStripView({ el: this, workJSON: {"id":11964297,"title":"Platón y Descartes. Misología y Método en el Fedón y las Meditaciones Metafísicas ","translated_title":"","metadata":{"volume":"61","abstract":"Resumen: \nPodríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metódica. Y es sólo por esto que podemos comparar su método analítico, que se utiliza en las Meditaciones Metafísicas, con el método hipotético que Platón expone en el Fedón. A través de una comparación de los dos métodos nos encontramos con que ambos métodos funcionan mediante el establecimiento de una primera hipótesis (una primera declaración) y luego deducir lógicamente lo que se deriva de ella. Su convicción, en materia metafísica, es pasar de la causa a los efectos y no viceversa.\n\nPalabras clave: Misología, método, Descartes, Platón, hipótesis.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nWe could think that Descartes is a misologist if we don't understand that his doubt is only methodical. And it's only because of this that we can compare his analitical method, used in the Methaphysic Meditations, with the hypothetical method that Plato exposes in the Phaedo. Through a comparison of the two methods we find out that both methods operate by establishing a first hypothesis (a first statement) and then deducing logically what derives from it. Their conviction, in methaphysical manners, is to go from the cause to the effects and not viceversa.\n\nKey words : Misology, method, Descartes, Plato, hypothesis. \n","publisher":"Eikasia Revista de Filosofía","publication_date":{"day":null,"month":null,"year":2015,"errors":{}},"publication_name":"Eikasia Revista de Filosofía"},"translated_abstract":"Resumen: \nPodríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metódica. Y es sólo por esto que podemos comparar su método analítico, que se utiliza en las Meditaciones Metafísicas, con el método hipotético que Platón expone en el Fedón. A través de una comparación de los dos métodos nos encontramos con que ambos métodos funcionan mediante el establecimiento de una primera hipótesis (una primera declaración) y luego deducir lógicamente lo que se deriva de ella. Su convicción, en materia metafísica, es pasar de la causa a los efectos y no viceversa.\n\nPalabras clave: Misología, método, Descartes, Platón, hipótesis.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nWe could think that Descartes is a misologist if we don't understand that his doubt is only methodical. And it's only because of this that we can compare his analitical method, used in the Methaphysic Meditations, with the hypothetical method that Plato exposes in the Phaedo. Through a comparison of the two methods we find out that both methods operate by establishing a first hypothesis (a first statement) and then deducing logically what derives from it. Their conviction, in methaphysical manners, is to go from the cause to the effects and not viceversa.\n\nKey words : Misology, method, Descartes, Plato, hypothesis. \n","internal_url":"https://www.academia.edu/11964297/Plat%C3%B3n_y_Descartes_Misolog%C3%ADa_y_M%C3%A9todo_en_el_Fed%C3%B3n_y_las_Meditaciones_Metaf%C3%ADsicas","translated_internal_url":"","created_at":"2015-04-15T17:07:48.654-07:00","preview_url":null,"current_user_can_edit":null,"current_user_is_owner":null,"owner_id":27609009,"coauthors_can_edit":true,"document_type":"paper","co_author_tags":[],"downloadable_attachments":[{"id":37318898,"title":"","file_type":"pdf","scribd_thumbnail_url":"https://attachments.academia-assets.com/37318898/thumbnails/1.jpg","file_name":"Misologia_y_Metodo_en_el_Fedon_y_las_Meditaciones_Metafisicas_Alvaro_Ledesma.pdf","download_url":"https://www.academia.edu/attachments/37318898/download_file","bulk_download_file_name":"Platon_y_Descartes_Misologia_y_Metodo_en.pdf","bulk_download_url":"https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37318898/Misologia_y_Metodo_en_el_Fedon_y_las_Meditaciones_Metafisicas_Alvaro_Ledesma-libre.pdf?1429142839=\u0026response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DPlaton_y_Descartes_Misologia_y_Metodo_en.pdf\u0026Expires=1743457147\u0026Signature=dX4ByNqWG436Bgz6FeQpHF~6yKlBWD7xW9wNgCw5ToJXki857~-V~ZqF-yMjiQIMn-NRF0FOPsrmu2Uh4SP1NjYzdNPwOMN3j1IH4W7x-u63tIq6F1lXBeFZyDiaMt3i3Cz~XzxXXO1yu2M-LHpI6EbQlFz5FCHDQTUkLPWZQ1iP6mJbY7LOr2ewpdLN3J4IBLWMMdY61CJnOsHhGNYxUsnc0nTUUj31O1LzPjkZL33sJ5NR3WVcWKwZzPt7ZeW3r7kN-SAFxORnrqygWkL5p6kKinCUsjyzzCDMHid-~qS1CJExV6nvTMlRoj204JnpZnMztsdEENQCrvO2538uZA__\u0026Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA"}],"slug":"Platón_y_Descartes_Misología_y_Método_en_el_Fedón_y_las_Meditaciones_Metafísicas","translated_slug":"","page_count":12,"language":"es","content_type":"Work","summary":"Resumen: \nPodríamos pensar que Descartes es misólogo si no comprendemos que su duda sólo es metódica. Y es sólo por esto que podemos comparar su método analítico, que se utiliza en las Meditaciones Metafísicas, con el método hipotético que Platón expone en el Fedón. A través de una comparación de los dos métodos nos encontramos con que ambos métodos funcionan mediante el establecimiento de una primera hipótesis (una primera declaración) y luego deducir lógicamente lo que se deriva de ella. Su convicción, en materia metafísica, es pasar de la causa a los efectos y no viceversa.\n\nPalabras clave: Misología, método, Descartes, Platón, hipótesis.\n\n\n\nAbstract: \nWe could think that Descartes is a misologist if we don't understand that his doubt is only methodical. And it's only because of this that we can compare his analitical method, used in the Methaphysic Meditations, with the hypothetical method that Plato exposes in the Phaedo. Through a comparison of the two methods we find out that both methods operate by establishing a first hypothesis (a first statement) and then deducing logically what derives from it. Their conviction, in methaphysical manners, is to go from the cause to the effects and not viceversa.\n\nKey words : Misology, method, Descartes, Plato, hypothesis. \n","owner":{"id":27609009,"first_name":"Alvaro","middle_initials":null,"last_name":"Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. D.","page_name":"AlvaroLedesmaAlbornozPhD","domain_name":"usfq","created_at":"2015-03-10T19:08:26.614-07:00","display_name":"Alvaro Ledesma Albornoz, Ph. 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