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<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War - Robert Jervis - Google Books</title><link rel="stylesheet" href="/books/css/_a33f2a89320471e58c940b9287b9d4eb/kl_viewport_kennedy_full_bundle.css" type="text/css" /><link rel="stylesheet"href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Product+Sans:wght@400"><script src="/books/javascript/v2_a33f2a89320471e58c940b9287b9d4eb__en.js"></script><script>_OC_Hooks = ["_OC_Page", "_OC_SearchReload", "_OC_TocReload", "_OC_EmptyFunc", "_OC_SearchPage", "_OC_QuotePage" ];for (var _OC_i = 0; _OC_i < _OC_Hooks.length; _OC_i++) {eval("var " + _OC_Hooks[_OC_i] + ";");}function _OC_InitHooks () {for (var i = 0; i < _OC_Hooks.length; i++) {var func = arguments[i];eval( _OC_Hooks[i] + " = func;");}}</script><link rel="canonical" href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Why_Intelligence_Fails.html?id=_4qwreIHR_MC"/><meta property="og:url" content="https://books.google.com/books/about/Why_Intelligence_Fails.html?id=_4qwreIHR_MC"/><meta name="title" content="Why Intelligence Fails"/><meta name="description" content="The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified.In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. 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Intelligence Fails","subtitle":"Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War","attribution":"By Robert Jervis","additional_info":{"[JsonBookInfo]":{"BuyLinks":[{"Seller":"Cornell University 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have no quality information about this book.","volume_id":"_4qwreIHR_MC","permission_info":"Pages displayed by permission of \u003ca class=link_aux href=\"https://books.google.com.sg/url?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026pg=PA53\u0026q=http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu\u0026clientid=ca-print-cornell_university_press\u0026linkid=1\u0026usg=AOvVaw2gLZARRDOOx144atnb0_mi\u0026source=gbs_pub_info_r\"\u003eCornell University Press\u003c/a\u003e","is_ebook":false,"volumeresult":{"has_flowing_text":true,"has_scanned_text":true,"can_download_pdf":false,"can_download_epub":false,"is_pdf_drm_enabled":false,"is_epub_drm_enabled":false},"publisher":"Cornell University Press","publication_date":"2010.12.15","subject":"Political Science","num_pages":248,"sample_url":"https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026source=gbs_vpt_hover","synposis":"The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified.In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. ","my_library_url":"https://www.google.com/accounts/Login?service=print\u0026continue=https://books.google.com.sg/books%3Fop%3Dlibrary\u0026hl=en","is_magazine":false,"is_public_domain":false,"last_page":{"pid":"PA238","order":248,"title":"238"}},{"enableUserFeedbackUI":true,"pseudocontinuous":true,"is_cobrand":false,"sign_in_url":"https://www.google.com/accounts/Login?service=print\u0026continue=https://books.google.com.sg/books%3Fid%3D_4qwreIHR_MC%26q%3DNFAC%26redir_esc%3Dy%26hl%3Den\u0026hl=en","isEntityPageViewport":false,"showViewportOnboarding":false,"showViewportPlainTextOnboarding":false},{"page":[{"pid":"PA53","highlights":[{"X":468,"Y":73,"W":26,"H":13},{"X":467,"Y":311,"W":26,"H":13},{"X":468,"Y":342,"W":26,"H":13},{"X":180,"Y":586,"W":27,"H":13},{"X":109,"Y":731,"W":26,"H":13}],"flags":8,"order":63,"vq":"NFAC"}]},null,{"number_of_results":83,"search_results":[{"page_id":"PR7","page_number":"vii","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e Performance on Iran\u0026#39;s Domestic Crisis , Mid - 1977-7 November 1978 CIA Comments on the Report 34 109 3. The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure : What Everyone Knows Is Wrong 123 4. The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and\u0026nbsp;...","page_url":"https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026pg=PR7\u0026vq=NFAC"},{"page_id":"PA7","page_number":"7","snippet_text":"... (\u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e) (what before and after this period was the Directorate of Intelligence). In the spring of 1977, Bowie asked me to serve for a year as a scholar in residence. This was an intriguing opportunity, but it was not clear exactly what I\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA11","page_number":"11","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e, and academic connections allowed me access to all levels of the organization. I was able to see how information was filtered and how people at different levels misunderstood one another. At one point Arnold Horelick, National\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA15","page_number":"15","snippet_text":"... (\u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e), was testifying before Con- gress that the unrest in Iran, although troubling, seemed to be diminishing. A few weeks later, however, a new round of riots was so serious that the Shah installed a military government and arrested\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA21","page_number":"21","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e drew from them . In the interests of keeping this chapter to a manageable length I have deleted some of this material . Such cuts are indicated by ellipses , and are distinguished from redactions which are marked by angle brackets\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA22","page_number":"22","snippet_text":"... was elected president and William Casey took over as DCI, he not only replaced \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e with the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) but changed its internal organization from a functional to a geographic one, [22] Why Intelligence Fails."},{"page_id":"PA28","page_number":"28","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e was slow to see that the situation was quite dangerous, something that was true whether or not it ended in revolution. For what it is worth, I do think the revolution was inevitable by the middle or end of November, especially\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA29","page_number":"29","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e, decided to send it only to branch chiefs at OPA and not to let it go outside \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e. I would be curious to know what the branch chiefs did with it. Consistent with her memo and conversation with me, Boatner presumably would have\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA33","page_number":"33","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e EIWR GOI IIM INR Acronyms Defense Intelligence Agency Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center Economic Intelligence Weekly Report Government of Iran Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Bureau of Intelligence and Research\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA34","page_number":"34","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e performance in treating the Iranian situation from the summer of 1977 to November 1978, when it became clear that the Shah\u0026#39;s regime might not survive. We have therefore examined only the information that was available to \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e at\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA35","page_number":"35","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e judgment unreasonable? Did \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ignore or misinterpret events in ways and to an extent that consumers can legitimately expect should not and will not occur? Although we cannot give a short and precise answer to this ques- tion\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA38","page_number":"38","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysts had been working on Iran for a few years. The senior political analyst, \u0026lt;name redacted\u0026gt; knew the language and culture of the country extremely well. \u0026lt;4 lines redacted\u0026gt; 4. Third, and linked to the previous point, although\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA39","page_number":"39","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e was trying to anticipate were not sudden ones which adversaries were trying to hide from us. A number of the problems that come up in trying to foresee coups or surprise attacks did not arise here. There was time in which to assess\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA40","page_number":"40","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e does not usually do. \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e had to gauge many segments of society, not just a few familiar individuals and institutions. 11. A fifth inherent difficulty was that the opposition developed gradually from the fall of 1977 on. Studies\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA41","page_number":"41","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e received little information about the opposition or indeed about anyone outside the elite. Further discussion of this point can be found on pp. 127–129 below. This meant that \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e not only lacked current information during the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA42","page_number":"42","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e are in order. First, the analysts feel they have little influence over the information they receive. Although they participated in the FOCUS review and have some input into the deter- mination of collection priorities, this does\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA43","page_number":"43","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e tracked specific events and the flow of field reports quite well. Given the preexisting beliefs about Iran, the Shah, and the opposition; given the paucity and ambiguity of the information from the field; given the normal \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA44","page_number":"44","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e product can rarely be faulted for failure to convey the information in the latest field reports. But there was ... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e produces, and is considered by most ORPA analysts to be the most important \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e publication after the PDB\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA45","page_number":"45","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e produces some longer analytical papers. Two on Iran appeared during the period under review. One, Iran in the 1980s (August 1977),—and its executive summary (October 1977)—are discussed at several places in this report. The other\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA47","page_number":"47","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e did not go over the political analysts \u0026#39; arguments with them , probing for weak spots and searching for alternative interpretations that needed to be aired . * Correctives 16. Evidence . From reading most \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e documents one cannot\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA48","page_number":"48","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysis on Iran did not do this. At times, it admitted puzzlement. But usually it gave a single, quite coherent, explanation.* What is most important is not that many of those explanations turned out to be incorrect—since the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA49","page_number":"49","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e , it is not likely to thrive because it asks analysts to discuss positions that they disagree with and which they know are not likely to be accepted . 23. Predictions as an Analytical Tool . As Richards Heuer has pointed out\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA50","page_number":"50","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e received and occasionally made similar statements . No one noted that they had been made before , when the protests had been much milder . If analysts had been pushed to say not only that a crackdown would occur if things got\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA51","page_number":"51","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e production on Iran did not err grievously in this area. In describ- ing the religious opposition to the Shah, \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e publications used “fundamentalist,” “conservative,” and occasionally “dissident” as adjectives. When an analyst was\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA52","page_number":"52","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e and its predecessor by discipline con- tributes to this. So do the small number of analysts \u0026lt;line redacted\u0026gt; and the infre- quent communication across disciplinary lines. An additional factor is the tradition in ORPA\u0026#39;s predecessor\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA53","page_number":"53","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysts and those from other agencies—ORPA and OER analysts rarely had thorough talks about what was happening in Iran. 37. The senior political analyst knew several outside experts fairly well, but not so well as to be in close\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA54","page_number":"54","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e and outside disagreed with them and losing opportunities to have their argu- ments challenged and rebutted; the NIO suffered by losing some of the information and insights held by the analysts and by not being able to develop his\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA55","page_number":"55","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e should make strenuous efforts to assure that its understanding of various countries; i.e. the crucial background beliefs against which the interpreta- tion of specific events is done, is as deep as possible. As with employing\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA57","page_number":"57","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e to decide that such a paper should be produced and another ten days for the State Department to draft it . Apparently influenced by the mid - September lull , the paper concluded that “ The Shah no longer appears to be in immediate\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA58","page_number":"58","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e covered this event on 20 January, noting that there had been greater loss of life than the government had indicated and judging that “religious dissidents would be considered a more serious threat if they were thought to be allied\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA59","page_number":"59","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e noted that this appointment showed how seriously the Shah viewed the situation, but also that the appointment might be taken by Muslim leaders as a capitulation. (NID, 28 August). There is reason to believe that some of them did\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA60","page_number":"60","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e people did consider the situation and, no doubt influenced by their judgment of the army\u0026#39;s loyalty and by the “he\u0026#39;s down, he\u0026#39;s up, but he\u0026#39;s more up than down” tenor of field reports on the Shah\u0026#39;s moods, considered that he would\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA61","page_number":"61","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e conclude that “ the Shah has delayed so long in tak- ing decisive action that he has reduced substantially his earlier good chance of pre- serving the Pahlavi dynasty with powers like those of the past . ” \u0026lt; 4 lines redacted \u0026gt;\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA62","page_number":"62","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e publications, that the greatest dangers would arise in the mid-1980s when oil revenues decreased, social problems accumu- lated, and the Shah tried to arrange the transition to his son\u0026#39;s rule helped to distract attention from the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA63","page_number":"63","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysis was the problem of liberalizing a repressive regime. This problem was men- tioned with some frequency, but there was no detailed and careful discussion of how great the problem was or how the Shah might cope with it. This\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA65","page_number":"65","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysis was alert to the general problems posed by liberalization quite early and generally not only did a good job of summarizing the reports from the field but also adopted a slightly more pessimistic—and more accurate—view than\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA66","page_number":"66","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e production said little about the consequences of liberal- ization. On 11 September 1978 the NID reported that the imposition of law had not weakened the Shah\u0026#39;s commitment to liberalization and on 14 September the analysts made the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA67","page_number":"67","snippet_text":"Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War Robert Jervis. 19. When \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysts returned to the dilemmas of liberalization in late October, they sounded the same themes they had a month earlier: “The political liberalization\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA68","page_number":"68","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 September 1978 in which he argued that much of the explanation for the apparent abatement of the crisis was the combination of martial law and new freedom of press and\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA70","page_number":"70","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysts took a similar position . On 11 May 1978 the NID concluded that \u0026quot; The Shah is gambling that his program of modernization has enough political sup- port to allow him to take stern measures , if necessary , against the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA71","page_number":"71","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e did a better job of reporting events than of analyzing their probable causes and effects. 9. Similarly, tension between the Shah\u0026#39;s sustained commitment to liberaliza- tion and his ability and will to crack down could have been\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA72","page_number":"72","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysts were concluding that the Shah\u0026#39;s survival was problematical. Throughout the period of this study, the United States had believed it possible and necessary for the Shah to liberalize. In late 1977 and early 1978 this meant a\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA73","page_number":"73","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e . The belief that it wasn\u0026#39;t necessary indicated that \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e assumption was irrelevant , because the contingency it assumed would not arise . \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysts could have tried to find out why the State Department disagreed with them\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA74","page_number":"74","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e did not do as good a job as it could have in carefully analyzing the evidence or in alerting consumers to the fact that clearly disconfirming information would not arrive in time to give them warning that the Shah was in deep\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA75","page_number":"75","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e should have realized that the belief that a split was possible was not easily disconfirmable and alerted the consum- ers to the problem. 2. Furthermore, the belief that the opposition would split did not sit too well with the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA76","page_number":"76","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e . \u0026lt; 1 line redacted \u0026gt; the common belief in \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e was that the opposition would split , D / \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e stressed the heterogeneous nature of the opposition in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 September 1978\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA77","page_number":"77","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e basic analysis of the religious community , conducted before the current crisis , is compatible with the Embassy\u0026#39;s perception but put much more emphasis on their opposition , stressing that “ the Moslem clergy are among some of\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA78","page_number":"78","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysis made few comments on these questions. Although \u0026lt;identification redacted\u0026gt; paper on the religious-based opposition on 10 Feb- ruary talked of the differences within the religious community, the government at that time was\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA83","page_number":"83","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e finished intelligence said almost nothing about this until September. The Embassy cable of 17 August which questions the ability of the moderates to break with Khomeini did not make its way into finished intelligence. 26. In the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA84","page_number":"84","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e products can be faulted for not clarify- ing the lines of argument, noting any inconsistencies, or pulling together the existing evidence (which here, as on so many other points, was not extensive). The issues were not posed\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA85","page_number":"85","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e analysis. The person who placed the greatest stress on the importance of the religious groups was \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e senior Iranian political analyst. He had an extensive knowledge of Islam, had included analysis of the influence of\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA86","page_number":"86","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e, had. 5. The field reported little about the articulated beliefs of the religious protest- ers. \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysts had little to rely on in trying to determine the strength of religious protest; there was no data that indicated the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA87","page_number":"87","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e did not know - and still does not know - what sort of structure and organization it had . How did people get the word of whether to demonstrate , whether to be belligerent or to treat the soldiers as brothers ? When riots ensued\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA88","page_number":"88","snippet_text":"... the possible role of nationalism. \u0026lt;footnote redacted\u0026gt; This factor is not mentioned in any of the official reporting or \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e analysis and only received occasional mention in the mass media . It could [88] Why Intelligence Fails."},{"page_id":"PA89","page_number":"89","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e had said : “ The Americans ... have helped impose upon the Iranian people a ruler who ... has turned Iran into an official colony of the United States . ” It ridiculed the Shah\u0026#39;s claim that he had brought Iran “ into the ranks of\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA91","page_number":"91","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e produced, the leading analyst made the following point: “Since religious, social, political, and economic affairs are considered inseparable, the mujtahed [religious scholar] can dispense guidance on political matters and oppose\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA92","page_number":"92","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e production, that the religious opposition to the Shah was essentially driven by dislike of modernization, made analysts insensi- tive to the bits and pieces of evidence indicating that the bases of opposition were far wider. This\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA95","page_number":"95","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e production took note of the Shah\u0026#39;s changed mood at the end of the summer . Thus : \u0026quot; The Shah , described by the US Ambassador as dispirited by recent events .... \u0026quot; ( NID 30 August 1978 ) ; “ The Shah was described by the Ambassador\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA96","page_number":"96","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e attention in the NID on 16 September: “There are signs of cautious optimism among influential Iranians in ... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e to have raised a warning flag. Not that it could have known what was wrong with him; but the reasons for his\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA97","page_number":"97","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e had from the field were occasional impressions , such as the Embassy\u0026#39;s assessment that the “ silent majority ” supported retention of the Shah , although perhaps with reduced powers ( Tehran 10421 , 25 October 1978 ) , and its view\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA98","page_number":"98","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e. Even if many merchants were coerced into closing their shops (this was asserted by the Embassy and certainly is plausible, although little evidence was produced to substantiate the claim), the closures were a warning sign. They\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA100","page_number":"100","snippet_text":"... of all \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e economic analysis on Iran ; we judge that to be outside the terms of our charter . It gave extensive attention to Iranian oil matters and to Iran\u0026#39;s external economic relations . [ 100 ] Why Intelligence Fails."},{"page_id":"PA104","page_number":"104","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e from appreciating the political consequences of socio-economic problems in Iran. As we noted above, maldistribution of wealth, inflation, and accompanying strains were among the elements which caused ordinary Iranians to\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA105","page_number":"105","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e a sense of how the cooperation was working out, the kinds of frictions that were arising, and the degree of the commitment on all sides to continue a functioning alliance. Fur- thermore, analysts might have learned more about the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA106","page_number":"106","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e production seems to have been partly a matter of choice and partly a matter of necessity. Choice because it was believed that interactions among the elite would strongly influence the future of the country, especially when the Shah\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA107","page_number":"107","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e. The former, however, in fact displayed more doubt about the Shah\u0026#39;s ability to maintain his power than did the latter. The opposite side of this coin is that if policy were strongly influenc- ing evaluations, one would expect news\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA108","page_number":"108","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e failure to assess the deterioration of the Shah\u0026#39;s position during 1978. Life is never that simple. We have cited a number of reasons—inadequate information, pre-existing beliefs, mind sets, a small and isolated community of\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA109","page_number":"109","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e failed to antici- pate the course of events in Iran that took place late in 1978. It is also correct to say that \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e did receive some evidence that pointed to the Shah\u0026#39;s vulnerability. On the critical question of whether or not \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA110","page_number":"110","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e weaknesses it expressed be remedied , at least in part ? ( c ) If so , how should this be done ? 2. Knorr to Bowie , 18 July 1979 Subject : Earlier Estimates on Iran Estimates on Iran : 1960–1975 , The RecORD \u0026lt; 3 pages of summary\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA111","page_number":"111","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e (as the rest of the analytic community) performed inadequately with respect to Iran in 1978 primarily because the analysts held a firm pre-crisis view of Iran which caused them to give inadequate weight to pieces of evidence\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA112","page_number":"112","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e management and there were two principal reasons for my making this recommendation: • the rather violent Community reaction to the suggestions in Admiral Turner\u0026#39;s 1977 AWACS letter that the Shah\u0026#39;s government might be subject to\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA113","page_number":"113","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e at the end of July 1978, so I have minimal official knowledge of Iranian related events thereafter. 4. Bowie, 20 July 1979 Subject: Iran Post-Mortem These comments are my first reaction upon completing the report on the \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e per\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA117","page_number":"117","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e at the time ... not ... the quality of that information or ... what might have been done to improve it. (Introductory Note) 6. The authors note “several deficiencies in the information available”, but they state that “the subject\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA119","page_number":"119","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e performance during the period reviewed — criticisms which in turn generally reinforce their predi- lections on desirable organizational mold . The point is not so much that the authors \u0026#39; arguments are right or wrong , but that\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA120","page_number":"120","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e Performance . • ( b ) Analytic Performance Apart from suggestions of how the authors believe they would have handled certain aspects of the problem differently , their judg- ments on the specific conclusions reached by the\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA121","page_number":"121","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ignore or misinterpret events in ways and to an extent that consumers can legitimately expect should not and ... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u0026#39;s\u003c/b\u003e several offices concerned with Iran ? With what results ? Was this , in practice , an analyst or a\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA122","page_number":"122","snippet_text":"... \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e - DDO relationships during the period ? Were there differences in \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e and Station assessment ? If not , this bears on \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e performance . If so , whose management responsibility was it to probe for discrepant bases ? The study does\u0026nbsp;..."},{"page_id":"PA229","page_number":"229","snippet_text":"... ( \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ) , 61–62 Betts , Richard , 150 , 220n.54 Bill , James , 87n Bismarck , Otto von , 194 Blair , Tony , 125-126 , 132 blame , 1 , 3 , 125 , 157 , 158 , 1981.6 Blee , David , 28 , 111-113 Blix , Hans , 208n.43 Boatner , Helene , 27\u0026nbsp;...","page_url":"https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026pg=PA229\u0026vq=NFAC"},{"page_id":"PA231","page_number":"231","snippet_text":"... (\u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e), 39, 40, 52 Embassy reports. See Tehran Embassy reports empathy, 38, 145–146, 148, 195, 211n.92, 212n.104. See also Rashomon effect ethnocentrism, 68 evidence disconfirmation, 48, 70–71, 75, 190–191 and intelligence reform, 47–48\u0026nbsp;...","page_url":"https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026pg=PA231\u0026vq=NFAC"},{"page_id":"PA232","page_number":"232","snippet_text":"... ( \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ) , 79 “ Iran : Massive Rise in Food Import Needs \u0026quot; ( \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ) , 102 \u0026quot; Iran : New Government Maintains Low Economic Profile ” ( \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ) , 102 “ Iran : Prospects for the Shah ” ( \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ) , 44 , 59-60 “ Iran : Roots of Discontent\u0026nbsp;...","page_url":"https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026pg=PA232\u0026vq=NFAC"},{"page_id":"PA233","page_number":"233","snippet_text":"... ( \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ) , 39 , 45 , 55 , 97n , 100-101 Iran - Iraq War , 169–170 , 219n.45 Iran National Intelligence Estimate ( NIE ) ( 1978 ) , 55-57 and analyst isolation , 52–53 on anti - Shah feeling , 99 and CIA responses to Jervis report , 28\u0026nbsp;...","page_url":"https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026pg=PA233\u0026vq=NFAC"},{"page_id":"PA234","page_number":"234","snippet_text":"... ( \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ) , 7 , 15 , 28. See also Iranian Revo- lution intelligence failure National Front ( Iran ) , 18 , 59 , 81–82 , 83 , 105 . See also Iranian opposition National Ground Intelligence Center ( NGIC ) , 143 , 211n.86 National\u0026nbsp;...","page_url":"https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026pg=PA234\u0026vq=NFAC"},{"page_id":"PA235","page_number":"235","snippet_text":"... ( \u003cb\u003eNFAC\u003c/b\u003e ) , 37 politicization , 171–174 ambiguities of , 172–173 , 220nn.54,56 and blame , 125 politicization ( cont . ) blatant examples of , 172. 22-23 , 52 , 200n.13 and imperfection of reform , 178-179 intellectual community , 22 , 24\u0026nbsp;...","page_url":"https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=_4qwreIHR_MC\u0026pg=PA235\u0026vq=NFAC"}],"search_query_escaped":"NFAC"},{});</script></div></div></div><script>(function() {var href = window.location.href;if (href.indexOf('?') !== -1) {var parameters = href.split('?')[1].split('&');for (var i = 0; i < parameters.length; i++) {var param = parameters[i].split('=');if (param[0] == 'focus') {var elem = document.getElementById(param[1]);if (elem) {elem.focus();}}}}})();</script>