CINXE.COM

<!DOCTYPE html> <html><head> <TITLE>Martin J. Osborne | IDEAS/RePEc</TITLE> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/css/bootstrap.min.css" integrity="sha384-Gn5384xqQ1aoWXA+058RXPxPg6fy4IWvTNh0E263XmFcJlSAwiGgFAW/dAiS6JXm" crossorigin="anonymous"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="/css/font-awesome.min.css">   <link href="/css/normalnew.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"/> <link href="/css/pushy.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"/> <link rel="icon" type="image.jpg" href="/favicon.ico">  <script type='text/javascript'> var captchaContainer = null; var loadCaptcha = function() { captchaContainer = grecaptcha.render('captcha_container', { 'sitekey' : '6LdQebIaAAAAACSKxvbloyrkQ_q-MqhOAGgD5PQV', 'callback' : function(response) { console.log(response); } }); }; </script> <META NAME="keywords" CONTENT="Martin J. Osborne, Economics, Author, Research, IDEAS"> <META NAME="description" CONTENT="Martin J. Osborne: current contact information and listing of economic research of this author provided by RePEc/IDEAS"> <META NAME="twitter:card" content="summary"> <META NAME="twitter:site" content="@repec_org"> <META NAME="twitter:title" content="Martin J. Osborne on RePEc/IDEAS"> <META NAME="twitter:description" content="Current information and listing of economic research for Martin J. Osborne with RePEc Short-ID pos1"> <META NAME="twitter:image" content="https://ideas.repec.org/RePEc.gif"> <script type="application/ld+json"> { "@context": "http://schema.org", "@type": "Person", "familyName": "Osborne", "givenName": "Martin", "name": "Martin J. Osborne", "url": "https://ideas.repec.org//e/pos1.html", "description": "Profile of economist Martin J. Osborne with RePEc Short-ID pos1" } </script> </head> <body>  <script async src="https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js?id=G-G63YGSJVZ7"></script> <script> window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; function gtag(){dataLayer.push(arguments);} gtag('js', new Date()); gtag('config', 'G-G63YGSJVZ7'); </script> <div class="container"> <div id="header" class="row"> <nav class="navbar navbar-collapse navbar-expand-md" role="navigation"> <a class="navbar-brand" href="/"> <img width="125" src="/ideas4.jpg" border="0" alt="IDEAS home"> </a> <button class="navbar-toggler" type="button" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobilesearch" aria-controls="mobilesearch" aria-expanded="false" aria-label="Toggle navigation"> <span class="navbar-toggler-icon"><i class="fa fa-search"></i></span> </button> <div class="collapse" id="mobilesearch"> <div class="form-inline"> <form method="GET" action="/cgi-bin/htsearch2" id="mobilesearch" role="search" class="card card-body"> <div class="input-group"> <input class="form-control" type="text" name="q" value="" placeholder="Search econ literature"> <span class="input-group-btn"> <input class="btn btn-default btn-lg fa" type="submit" value="" style="color:white;background-color:#2d4e8b;"> </span> </div> <a href="/search.html" class="advanced-search">Advanced search</a> </form> </div> </div> <button class="navbar-toggler" type="button" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobilemenu" aria-controls="mobilemenu" aria-expanded="false" aria-label="Toggle navigation"> <span class="navbar-toggler-icon"><i class="fa fa-bars"></i></span> </button> <div class="collapse" id="mobilemenu"> <ul class="navbar-nav mr-auto"> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/">Economic literature:</a> <a href="/i/p.html">papers</A>, <a href="/i/a.html">articles</A>, <a href="/i/c.html">software</A>, <a href="/i/h.html">chapters</A>, <a href="/i/b.html">books</A>. </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/i/e.html">Authors</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="http://edirc.repec.org/">Institutions</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/top/">Rankings</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/help.html" target="_blank">Help/FAQ <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/cgi-bin/myideas.cgi">MyIDEAS <I class="fa fa-lightbulb-o"></I></a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <span class="nav-text">More options at page bottom</span> </li> </ul> </div> <div class="d-none d-md-inline"> <ul class="nav nav-fill" id="topnav"> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/">Economic literature</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/i/e.html">Authors</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="http://edirc.repec.org/">Institutions</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/top/">Rankings</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/help.html" target="_blank">Help/FAQ <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" href="/cgi-bin/myideas.cgi" style="color:blue;">MyIDEAS <I class="fa fa-lightbulb-o"></I> <small>(now with weekly email digests)</small></a> </li> </ul> </div> </nav> </div> <div class="row"> <div class="col-12" style="margin-top: -10px;"> <div id="sidebar" class="sidebar-nav-fixed pull-right d-none d-print-none d-md-inline col-md-3"> <div class="inline-form"> <form method="GET" action="/cgi-bin/htsearch2" id="topsearch" role="search" class="navbar-form navbar-right"> <div class="input-group"> <input class="form-control" type="text" name="q" value="" placeholder="Search econ literature"> <input class="btn fa" type="submit" value="" style="color:white;background-color:#2d4e8b;"> </div> <a href="/search.html" class="advanced-search">Advanced search</a> </form> </div> <div id="menu"> <h3>Browse Econ Literature</h3> <ul> <li><a href="/i/p.html">Working papers</a></li> <li><a href="/i/a.html">Journals</a></li> <li><a href="/i/c.html">Software components</a></li> <li><a href="/i/b.html">Books</a></li> <li><a href="/i/h.html">Book chapters</a></li> <li><a href="/j/">JEL classification</a></li> </ul> <h3>More features</h3> <ul> <li><a href="http://nep.repec.org/">Subscribe to new research</a></li> <li><a href="https://biblio.repec.org/">RePEc Biblio</a></li> <li><a href="https://authors.repec.org/">Author registration</a></li> <li><A href="/v/"><font color="red">Economics Virtual Seminar Calendar</font></a> NEW!</li> </ul> </div> </div> <div class="d-none d-print-block"> <img width="145" src="/ideas4.jpg" border="0" alt="IDEAS home"> Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/e/pos1.html </div> <div id="main" class="col-12 col-md-9"> <div class="site-overlay"></div> <div class="d-print-none"> <div id="messages" class="col-xs-12"> <span class="share-block"> <a class="share-twitter fa fa-twitter" href="#" title="Share on Twitter"></a>   <share-to-mastodon message="Found on RePEc/IDEAS:" url='https://ideas.repec.org/e/pos1.html'><img src="/images/mastodon.svg" height=15></share-to-mastodon> <a href="https://bsky.app/intent/compose?text=Found%20on%20RePEc/IDEAS:%20https://ideas.repec.org/e/pos1.html%20💡" target="_NEW"><img src="/images/bluesky.svg" height=15></a> <a class="share-facebook fa fa-facebook" href="#" title="Share on Facebook"></a> <a class="share-reddit fa fa-reddit" href="#" title="Share on Reddit"></a> <a class="share-linkedin fa fa-linkedin" href="#" title="Share on LinkedIn"></a>   <a class="share-email fa fa-envelope" href="#" title="Share by Email"></a> <a class="share-print fa fa-print" href="#" title="Print this page"></a> </span> <span id="myideas"> <a href="/cgi-bin/myideas.cgi" data-toggle="tooltip" title="MyIDEAS: not logged in"> <i class="fa fa-lightbulb-o"></i> <i class="fa fa-lock"></i> </a> <A HREF="/cgi-bin/myideas.cgi#myiauthors1"><I class="fa fa-users"></I> My authors</A> <i class="fa fa-user-plus"></i> <span onclick="loadDoc('https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/myiadd2.cgi',myFunction);return true;">Follow this author</span> </span> <script> function loadDoc(url,cfunc) { var xhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); xhttp.onreadystatechange = function() { if (xhttp.readyState == 4 && xhttp.status == 200) { cfunc(xhttp); } }; xhttp.open("GET", url, true); xhttp.send(); } function myFunction(xhttp) { document.getElementById("response").innerHTML = xhttp.responseText; } </script><span id="response"></span> </div> </div> <div id="content-block"> <div id="title"> <H1>Martin J. Osborne </H1></div> <ul class="nav nav-pills" id="myTab" role="tablist"> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" id="person-tab" data-toggle="tab" href="#person" role="tab" aria-controls="person" aria-selected="true">Personal details</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" id="affiliation-tab" data-toggle="tab" href="#affiliation" role="tab" aria-controls="affiliation" aria-selected="true">Affiliation</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link active" id="research-tab" data-toggle="tab" href="#research" role="tab" aria-controls="research" aria-selected="true">Research</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" id="cites-tab" href="/e/c/pos1.html" role="tab" aria-controls="cites" aria-selected="true">Citations</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" id="more-tab" data-toggle="tab" href="#more" role="tab" aria-controls="more" aria-selected="true">More</a> </li> <li class="nav-item"> <a class="nav-link" id="correct-tab" data-toggle="tab" href="#correct" role="tab" aria-controls="correct" aria-selected="true">Corrections</a> </li> </ul> <div class="tab-content" id="myTabContent"> <div class="tab-pane fade" id="person" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="person-tab"> <h2>Personal Details</h2> <table class="table table-condensed"> <tbody> <tr> <td>First Name:</td><td>Martin</td> </tr><tr> <td>Middle Name:</td><td>J.</td> </tr><tr> <td>Last Name:</td><td>Osborne</td> </tr><tr> <td>Suffix:</td><td></td> </tr><tr> <td>RePEc Short-ID:</td><td>pos1</td> </tr><tr> <td class="emaillabel"></td><td> [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]</td></tr><tr> <td class="homelabel"></td><td><A HREF="http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/index.html" target="_blank">http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/index.html <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></A></td> </tr><tr> <td class="postallabel"></td><td>Department of Economics 150 St. George Street University of Toronto Toronto M5S 3G7 CANADA</td> </tr><tr> <td class="phonelabel"></td><td></td> </tr><tr><td>Terminal Degree:</td><td>1979 Department of Economics; Stanford University (from <A HREF="https://genealogy.repec.org/pages/pos1.html">RePEc Genealogy</a>)</td> </tr></tbody></table></div> <div class="tab-pane fade" id="affiliation" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="affiliation-tab"> <h2>Affiliation</H2> <h3> Department of Economics<BR>University of Toronto</h3><span class="locationlabel"> Toronto, Canada</span><BR> <span class="homelabel"> <A HREF="http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/" target="_blank">http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/ <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></A></span><BR> <span class="handlelabel"> RePEc:edi:deutoca </span>(<A HREF="http://edirc.repec.org/data/deutoca.html">more details at EDIRC</A>) </div> <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="research" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="research-tab"> <h2>Research output</h2><form method="post" action="/cgi-bin/refs.cgi" enctype="multipart/form-data" target="refs" class="form-inline" role="form" style="margin-bottom: 10px;"> <input type="hidden" name="handle" value="repec:ags:isfiwp:275482#repec:cla:levarc:506439000000000037#repec:cla:levarc:506439000000000050#repec:cla:levrem:666156000000000515#repec:cla:levrem:814577000000000225#repec:cvs:starer:82-06#repec:cvs:starer:82-07#repec:cvs:starer:83-06#repec:cvs:starer:83-08#repec:cvs:starer:83-09#repec:cwl:cwldpp:628#repec:cwl:cwldpp:668#repec:fth:michet:89-26#repec:fth:teavfo:4-97#repec:hal:journl:hal-02517283#repec:mcm:deptwp:1985-02#repec:mcm:deptwp:1992-02#repec:mcm:deptwp:1995-01#repec:mcm:deptwp:1997-02#repec:mlb:wpaper:844#repec:mtl:montde:2018-01#repec:mtl:montec:03-2018#repec:tor:tecipa:mturner-98-02#repec:tor:tecipa:tecipa-174#repec:tor:tecipa:tecipa-231#repec:tor:tecipa:tecipa-286#repec:tor:tecipa:tecipa-296#repec:tor:tecipa:tecipa-565#repec:tor:tecipa:tecipa-599#repec:tor:tecipa:tecipa-778#repec:tor:tecipa:tecipa-786#RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:4:p:834-47#RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:4:p:927-943#RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:1351-1354#RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:2:p:261-301#RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:4:p:911-22#RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:22:y:1983:i:1:p:59-74#RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:434-441#RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:133-151#RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:32:y:1984:i:2:p:301-316#RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:38:y:1986:i:2:p:238-260#RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:1:p:22-36#RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:40:y:2000:i:1:p:41-62#RePEc:hop:hopeec:v:28:y:1996:i:1:p:81-82#RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:27:y:1986:i:1:p:223-37#RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:28:y:1987:i:2:p:413-28#RePEc:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:625:p:208-232.#RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:111:y:1996:i:1:p:65-96.#RePEc:oup:restud:v:51:y:1984:i:1:p:111-127.#RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:5:p:974-1005#RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:118:y:2010:i:1:p:156-187#RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:4:p:1489-1504#RePEc:eee:gamchp:1-07#RePEc:mtp:titles:0262650401#RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780195322484"> <div class="pull-left" style="padding-right: 2px;"> <input type="submit" class="btn btn-default fa" name="ref" value="Export references "> as </div> <div class="col-xs-8" style="padding-left: 0;"> <select name="output" size="1"> <option value="0">HTML</option> <option value="0.5">HTML with abstract</option> <option value="1">plain text</option> <option value="1.5">plain text with abstract</option> <option value="2">BibTeX</option> <option value="3">RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite)</option> <option value="4">ReDIF</option> <option value="6">JSON</option> </select> </div> </form>Jump to: <A HREF="#papers">Working papers</a> <A HREF="#articles">Articles</a> <A HREF="#chapters">Chapters</a> <A HREF="#books">Books</a> <A NAME="papers"></A><H3>Working papers</H3><OL class="list-group"> <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne, 2024. "<B><A HREF="/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-778.html">Comment on a passage in "Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective" by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-778, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne, 2024. "<B><A HREF="/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-786.html">Sequential entry into electoral competition when the possibility of ties is limited</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-786, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. <LI class="list-group-item downnone"> M. Remzi Sanver & Martin Osborne & Sean Horan, 2019. "<B><A HREF="/p/hal/journl/hal-02517283.html">Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/hal/journl.html">Post-Print</A> hal-02517283, HAL. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/iecrev/v60y2019i4p1489-1504.html">Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules And Majority Rule: A Generalization Of May'S Theorem To Many Alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/wly/iecrev.html">International Economic Review</A>, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1489-1504, November. </UL></div><div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> HORAN, Sean & OSBORNE, Martin J. & SANVER, M. Remzi, 2018. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mtl/montde/2018-01.html">Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mtl/montde.html">Cahiers de recherche</A> 2018-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Sean HORAN & Martin J. OSBORNE & M. Remzi SANVER, 2018. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mtl/montec/03-2018.html">Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules and Majority Rule : A Generalization of May’s Theorem to Many Alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mtl/montec.html">Cahiers de recherche</A> 03-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en Ã©conomie quantitative, CIREQ. <LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-599.html">Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-599, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Colin Stewart, 2016. "<B><A HREF="/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-565.html">Information aggregation with costly reporting</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-565, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J Osborne & Jeffrey S Rosenthal & Colin Stewart, 2020. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/econjl/v130y2020i625p208-232..html">Information Aggregation with Costly Reporting</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/oup/econjl.html">The Economic Journal</A>, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(625), pages 208-232. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2010. "<B><A HREF="/p/cla/levarc/506439000000000050.html">Party formation in collective decision-making</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cla/levarc.html">Levine's Working Paper Archive</A> 506439000000000050, David K. Levine. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2002. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mlb/wpaper/844.html">Party Formation Incollective Decision-Making</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mlb/wpaper.html">Department of Economics - Working Papers Series</A> 844, The University of Melbourne. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "<B><A HREF="/p/cla/levrem/814577000000000225.html">A Course in Game Theory</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cla/levrem.html">Levine's Bibliography</A> 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262650401.html">A Course in Game Theory</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mtp/titles.html">MIT Press Books</A>, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2007. "<B><A HREF="/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-296.html">Party formation in single-issue politics [revised]</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-296, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2007. "<B><A HREF="/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-286.html">Cost benefit analysis vs. referenda</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-286, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne, 2006. "<B><A HREF="/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-231.html">Strategic and extensive games</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-231, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "<B><A HREF="/p/cla/levrem/666156000000000515.html">Bargaining and Markets</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cla/levrem.html">Levine's Bibliography</A> 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2005. "<B><A HREF="/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-174.html">Party formation in single-issue politics</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-174, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/jeurec/v6y2008i5p974-1005.html">Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/tpr/jeurec.html">Journal of the European Economic Association</A>, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "<B><A HREF="/p/cla/levarc/506439000000000037.html">Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cla/levarc.html">Levine's Working Paper Archive</A> 506439000000000037, David K. Levine. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2003. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v45y2003i2p434-441.html">Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/gamebe.html">Games and Economic Behavior</A>, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 434-441, November. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "<B><A HREF="/p/tor/tecipa/mturner-98-02.html">Meetings with costly participation</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v90y2000i4p927-943.html">Meetings with Costly Participation</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/aea/aecrev.html">American Economic Review</A>, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997. "<B><A HREF="/p/fth/teavfo/4-97.html">Games with Procedurally Rational Players</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/fth/teavfo.html">Papers</A> 4-97, Tel Aviv. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v88y1998i4p834-47.html">Games with Procedurally Rational Players</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/aea/aecrev.html">American Economic Review</A>, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 834-847, September. </UL></div><div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mcm/deptwp/1997-02.html">Games with Procedurally Rational Players</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mcm/deptwp.html">Department of Economics Working Papers</A> 1997-02, McMaster University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "<B><A HREF="/p/mcm/deptwp/1995-01.html">A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/mcm/deptwp.html">Department of Economics Working Papers</A> 1995-01, McMaster University. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v111y1996i1p65-96..html">A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/oup/qjecon.html">The Quarterly Journal of Economics</A>, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne, 1992. "<B><A HREF="/p/mcm/deptwp/1992-02.html">Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/mcm/deptwp.html">Department of Economics Working Papers</A> 1992-02, McMaster University. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne Martin J., 1993. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v5y1993i1p133-151.html">Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/gamebe.html">Games and Economic Behavior</A>, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1990. "<B><A HREF="/p/ags/isfiwp/275482.html">Noncooperative Models of Bargaining</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/ags/isfiwp.html">Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers</A> 275482, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/gamchp/1-07.html">Noncooperative models of bargaining</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/gamchp.html">Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications</A>, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), <A HREF="/b/eee/gamhes/1.html">Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications</A>, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier. </UL></div><div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/michet/89-26.html">Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/fth/michet.html">Papers</A> 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1985. "<B><A HREF="/p/mcm/deptwp/1985-02.html">Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/mcm/deptwp.html">Department of Economics Working Papers</A> 1985-02, McMaster University. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v55y1987i4p911-22.html">Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/ecm/emetrp.html">Econometrica</A>, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 911-922, July. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "<B><A HREF="/p/cvs/starer/83-09.html">Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cvs/starer.html">Working Papers</A> 83-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/ier/iecrev/v28y1987i2p413-28.html">Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/ier/iecrev.html">International Economic Review</A>, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 413-428, June. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "<B><A HREF="/p/cvs/starer/83-08.html">Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cvs/starer.html">Working Papers</A> 83-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v38y1986i2p238-260.html">Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/jetheo.html">Journal of Economic Theory</A>, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 238-260, April. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "<B><A HREF="/p/cvs/starer/83-06.html">Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cvs/starer.html">Working Papers</A> 83-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. <div class="publishedas"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v22y1983i1p59-74.html">Profit-sharing in a collusive industry</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/eecrev.html">European Economic Review</A>, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 59-74, June. </UL></div><div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1983. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/668.html">Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/cwl/cwldpp.html">Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers</A> 668, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1982. "<B><A HREF="/p/cvs/starer/82-06.html">Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cvs/starer.html">Working Papers</A> 82-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1982. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/628.html">Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/cwl/cwldpp.html">Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers</A> 628, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1982. "<B><A HREF="/p/cvs/starer/82-07.html">Are Large Firms More Powerful Than Small Ones?</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cvs/starer.html">Working Papers</A> 82-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. </ol> <A NAME="articles"></A><H3>Articles</H3><OL class="list-group"> <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J Osborne & Jeffrey S Rosenthal & Colin Stewart, 2020. "<B><A HREF="/a/oup/econjl/v130y2020i625p208-232..html">Information Aggregation with Costly Reporting</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/oup/econjl.html">The Economic Journal</A>, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(625), pages 208-232. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Colin Stewart, 2016. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-565.html">Information aggregation with costly reporting</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-565, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "<B><A HREF="/a/wly/iecrev/v60y2019i4p1489-1504.html">Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules And Majority Rule: A Generalization Of May'S Theorem To Many Alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/wly/iecrev.html">International Economic Review</A>, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1489-1504, November. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> HORAN, Sean & OSBORNE, Martin J. & SANVER, M. Remzi, 2018. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mtl/montde/2018-01.html">Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mtl/montde.html">Cahiers de recherche</A> 2018-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. <LI class="list-group-item downnone"> M. Remzi Sanver & Martin Osborne & Sean Horan, 2019. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-02517283.html">Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/hal/journl.html">Post-Print</A> hal-02517283, HAL. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Sean HORAN & Martin J. OSBORNE & M. Remzi SANVER, 2018. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mtl/montec/03-2018.html">Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules and Majority Rule : A Generalization of May’s Theorem to Many Alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mtl/montec.html">Cahiers de recherche</A> 03-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en Ã©conomie quantitative, CIREQ. <LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Sean Horan & Martin J. Osborne & M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-599.html">Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-599, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2010. "<B><A HREF="/a/ucp/jpolec/v118y2010i1p156-187.html">Cost Benefit Analyses versus Referenda</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/ucp/jpolec.html">Journal of Political Economy</A>, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(1), pages 156-187, February. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "<B><A HREF="/a/tpr/jeurec/v6y2008i5p974-1005.html">Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/tpr/jeurec.html">Journal of the European Economic Association</A>, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2005. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-174.html">Party formation in single-issue politics</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> tecipa-174, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 2005. "<B><A HREF="/a/aea/aecrev/v95y2005i4p1351-1354.html">Meetings with Costly Participation: Reply</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/aea/aecrev.html">American Economic Review</A>, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1351-1354, September. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2003. "<B><A HREF="/a/eee/gamebe/v45y2003i2p434-441.html">Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/eee/gamebe.html">Games and Economic Behavior</A>, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 434-441, November. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/506439000000000037.html">Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/cla/levarc.html">Levine's Working Paper Archive</A> 506439000000000037, David K. Levine. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "<B><A HREF="/a/aea/aecrev/v90y2000i4p927-943.html">Meetings with Costly Participation</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/aea/aecrev.html">American Economic Review</A>, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/tor/tecipa/mturner-98-02.html">Meetings with costly participation</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/tor/tecipa.html">Working Papers</A> mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J., 2000. "<B><A HREF="/a/eee/matsoc/v40y2000i1p41-62.html">Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/eee/matsoc.html">Mathematical Social Sciences</A>, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 41-62, July. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "<B><A HREF="/a/aea/aecrev/v88y1998i4p834-47.html">Games with Procedurally Rational Players</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/aea/aecrev.html">American Economic Review</A>, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 834-847, September. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/teavfo/4-97.html">Games with Procedurally Rational Players</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/fth/teavfo.html">Papers</A> 4-97, Tel Aviv. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mcm/deptwp/1997-02.html">Games with Procedurally Rational Players</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mcm/deptwp.html">Department of Economics Working Papers</A> 1997-02, McMaster University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "<B><A HREF="/a/oup/qjecon/v111y1996i1p65-96..html">A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/oup/qjecon.html">The Quarterly Journal of Economics</A>, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mcm/deptwp/1995-01.html">A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mcm/deptwp.html">Department of Economics Working Papers</A> 1995-01, McMaster University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne & Paul S. Walker, 1996. "<B><A HREF="/a/hop/hopeec/v28y1996i1p81-82.html">A Note on â€œThe Early History of the Theory of Strategic Games from Waldegrave to Borelâ€ by Robert W. Dimand and Mary Ann Dimand</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/hop/hopeec.html">History of Political Economy</A>, Duke University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 81-82, Spring. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "<B><A HREF="/a/cje/issued/v28y1995i2p261-301.html">Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/cje/issued.html">Canadian Journal of Economics</A>, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne Martin J., 1993. "<B><A HREF="/a/eee/gamebe/v5y1993i1p133-151.html">Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/eee/gamebe.html">Games and Economic Behavior</A>, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne, 1992. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mcm/deptwp/1992-02.html">Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mcm/deptwp.html">Department of Economics Working Papers</A> 1992-02, McMaster University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J., 1990. "<B><A HREF="/a/eee/jetheo/v50y1990i1p22-36.html">Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/eee/jetheo.html">Journal of Economic Theory</A>, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 22-36, February. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "<B><A HREF="/a/ier/iecrev/v28y1987i2p413-28.html">Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/ier/iecrev.html">International Economic Review</A>, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 413-428, June. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cvs/starer/83-09.html">Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/cvs/starer.html">Working Papers</A> 83-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "<B><A HREF="/a/ecm/emetrp/v55y1987i4p911-22.html">Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/ecm/emetrp.html">Econometrica</A>, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 911-922, July. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1985. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mcm/deptwp/1985-02.html">Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/mcm/deptwp.html">Department of Economics Working Papers</A> 1985-02, McMaster University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "<B><A HREF="/a/eee/jetheo/v38y1986i2p238-260.html">Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/eee/jetheo.html">Journal of Economic Theory</A>, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 238-260, April. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cvs/starer/83-08.html">Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/cvs/starer.html">Working Papers</A> 83-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. </UL></div><LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "<B><A HREF="/a/ier/iecrev/v27y1986i1p223-37.html">The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/ier/iecrev.html">International Economic Review</A>, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 223-237, February. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Martin J. Osborne, 1984. "<B><A HREF="/a/oup/restud/v51y1984i1p111-127..html">Capitalist-Worker Conflict and Involuntary Unemployment</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/oup/restud.html">The Review of Economic Studies</A>, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 111-127. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J., 1984. "<B><A HREF="/a/eee/jetheo/v32y1984i2p301-316.html">Why do some goods bear higher taxes than others?</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/eee/jetheo.html">Journal of Economic Theory</A>, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 301-316, April. <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "<B><A HREF="/a/eee/eecrev/v22y1983i1p59-74.html">Profit-sharing in a collusive industry</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/eee/eecrev.html">European Economic Review</A>, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 59-74, June. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1983. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/668.html">Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/cwl/cwldpp.html">Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers</A> 668, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University. <LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cvs/starer/83-06.html">Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/cvs/starer.html">Working Papers</A> 83-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. </UL></div></ol> <A NAME="chapters"></A><H3>Chapters</H3><OL class="list-group"> <LI class="list-group-item downgate"> Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "<B><A HREF="/h/eee/gamchp/1-07.html">Noncooperative models of bargaining</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/eee/gamchp.html">Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications</A>, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), <A HREF="/b/eee/gamhes/1.html">Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications</A>, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/michet/89-26.html">Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/fth/michet.html">Papers</A> 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory. <LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1990. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/isfiwp/275482.html">Noncooperative Models of Bargaining</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/ags/isfiwp.html">Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers</A> 275482, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research. </UL></div></ol> <A NAME="books"></A><H3>Books</H3><OL class="list-group"> <LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Osborne, Martin J., 2009. "<B><A HREF="/b/oxp/obooks/9780195322484.html">Introduction to Game Theory: International Edition</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/oxp/obooks.html">OUP Catalogue</A>, Oxford University Press, number 9780195322484. <LI class="list-group-item downnone"> Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "<B><A HREF="/b/mtp/titles/0262650401.html">A Course in Game Theory</A></B>," <A HREF="/s/mtp/titles.html">MIT Press Books</A>, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December. <div class="otherversion"><UL><LI class="list-group-item downfree"> Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "<B><A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levrem/814577000000000225.html">A Course in Game Theory</A></B>," <A HREF="https://ideas.repec.org/s/cla/levrem.html">Levine's Bibliography</A> 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics. </UL></div></ol> </div> <div class="tab-pane fade" id="more" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="more-tab"> <h2>More information</h2> Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.<h3>Statistics</h3> <h4><A HREF="http://logec.repec.org/RAS/pos1.htm">Access and download statistics</A> for all items</H4> <h3>Rankings</h3> This author is among the <A HREF="/top/top.person.all.html">top 5% authors</A> according to these criteria:<OL> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.all.html#pos1">Average Rank Score</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.scworks.html#pos1">Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.wscworks.html#pos1">Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.ascworks.html#pos1">Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.awscworks.html#pos1">Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.nbcites.html#pos1">Number of Citations</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.dcites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.sccites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.dsccites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.wsccites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.wdsccites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.anbcites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.adcites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.asccites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.adsccites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.awsccites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.awdsccites.html#pos1">Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.ncauthors.html#pos1">Number of Registered Citing Authors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.rcauthors.html#pos1">Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.scpages.html#pos1">Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.wscpages.html#pos1">Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.ascpages.html#pos1">Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.awscpages.html#pos1">Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.aabsviews.html#pos1">Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.euclid.html#pos1">Euclidian citation score</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.nepcites.html#pos1">Breadth of citations across fields</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.windex.html#pos1">Wu-Index</A></LI> <LI><A HREF="/top/top.person.students.html#pos1">Record of graduates</A></LI> </OL> <h3><A HREF="https://collec.repec.org/nodes/o/s/1.html">Co-authorship network on CollEc</A></H3> <h3>NEP Fields</h3> <A HREF="http://nep.repec.org/">NEP</a> is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 13 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.<OL> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-cdm/">NEP-CDM</A>: <b>Collective Decision-Making</b> (7) <A HREF="/n/nep-cdm/2004-06-07.html">2004-06-07</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-cdm/2005-04-09.html">2005-04-09</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-cdm/2007-04-21.html">2007-04-21</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-cdm/2007-08-08.html">2007-08-08</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-cdm/2010-12-18.html">2010-12-18</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-cdm/2018-04-23.html">2018-04-23</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-cdm/2024-10-21.html">2024-10-21</A>. Author is <A HREF="/i/ecdm.html">listed</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-mic/">NEP-MIC</A>: <b>Microeconomics</b> (6) <A HREF="/n/nep-mic/2005-02-27.html">2005-02-27</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-mic/2006-05-06.html">2006-05-06</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-mic/2009-05-30.html">2009-05-30</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-mic/2016-10-09.html">2016-10-09</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-mic/2018-04-23.html">2018-04-23</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-mic/2024-10-21.html">2024-10-21</A>. Author is <A HREF="/i/emic.html">listed</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-gth/">NEP-GTH</A>: Game Theory (4) <A HREF="/n/nep-gth/2005-02-27.html">2005-02-27</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-gth/2006-05-06.html">2006-05-06</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-gth/2009-05-30.html">2009-05-30</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-gth/2024-10-21.html">2024-10-21</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-pol/">NEP-POL</A>: Positive Political Economics (3) <A HREF="/n/nep-pol/2005-04-09.html">2005-04-09</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-pol/2007-08-08.html">2007-08-08</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-pol/2024-10-21.html">2024-10-21</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-hpe/">NEP-HPE</A>: History and Philosophy of Economics (2) <A HREF="/n/nep-hpe/2006-05-06.html">2006-05-06</A> <A HREF="/n/nep-hpe/2024-07-08.html">2024-07-08</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-des/">NEP-DES</A>: Economic Design (1) <A HREF="/n/nep-des/2018-04-23.html">2018-04-23</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-exp/">NEP-EXP</A>: Experimental Economics (1) <A HREF="/n/nep-exp/2009-05-30.html">2009-05-30</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-his/">NEP-HIS</A>: Business, Economic and Financial History (1) <A HREF="/n/nep-his/2024-07-08.html">2024-07-08</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-ind/">NEP-IND</A>: Industrial Organization (1) <A HREF="/n/nep-ind/2005-02-27.html">2005-02-27</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-net/">NEP-NET</A>: Network Economics (1) <A HREF="/n/nep-net/2010-12-18.html">2010-12-18</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-pbe/">NEP-PBE</A>: Public Economics (1) <A HREF="/n/nep-pbe/2007-04-21.html">2007-04-21</A></li> <LI><A HREF="/n/nep-upt/">NEP-UPT</A>: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) <A HREF="/n/nep-upt/2010-12-18.html">2010-12-18</A></li></OL> </div> <div class="tab-pane fade" id="correct" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="correct-tab"> <h2>Corrections</H2> <P>All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see <A HREF="/corrections.html">these instructions</A>. </p><P> To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Martin J. Osborne should log into the <A HREF="https://authors.repec.org/">RePEc Author Service</A>. </P><P> To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations. </P><P> To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, <A HREF="http://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/addrelated.cgi">use this form</A>. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically. <P> Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services. </div> </div> </div> <div id="footer" class="row d-print-none"> <div class="col-sm-6 more-services"> <h3 style="border-bottom: 1px solid #111; position: relative; right:0.9em;">More services and features</h3> <div class="row"> <div class="list-group col"> <a href="/cgi-bin/myideas.cgi" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">MyIDEAS</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Follow serials, authors, keywords & more</p> </a> <a href="http://authors.repec.org/" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Author registration</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Public profiles for Economics researchers</p> </a> <a href="http://ideas.repec.org/top/" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Rankings</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Various research rankings in Economics</p> </a> <a href="http://genealogy.repec.org/" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">RePEc Genealogy</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Who was a student of whom, using RePEc</p> </a> <a href="http://biblio.repec.org/" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">RePEc Biblio</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Curated articles & papers on economics topics</p> </a> </div> <div class="list-group col"> <a href="http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/" class="list-group-item" target="_blank"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">MPRA <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Upload your paper to be listed on RePEc and IDEAS</p> </a> <a href="http://nep.repec.org/" class="list-group-item" target="_blank"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">New papers by email <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Subscribe to new additions to RePEc</p> </a> <a href="http://www.econacademics.org/" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">EconAcademics</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Blog aggregator for economics research</p> </a> <a href="http://plagiarism.repec.org/" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Plagiarism</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Cases of plagiarism in Economics</p> </a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="col-sm more-services"> <h3 style="border-bottom: 1px solid #111;">About RePEc</h3> <div class="list-group col"> <a href="http://repec.org/" class="list-group-item" target="_blank"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">RePEc home <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Initiative for open bibliographies in Economics</p> </a> <a href="http://blog.repec.org/" class="list-group-item" target="_blank"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Blog <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">News about RePEc</p> </a> <a href="/help.html" class="list-group-item" target="_blank"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Help/FAQ <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Questions about IDEAS and RePEc</p> </a> <a href="/team.html" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">RePEc team</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">RePEc volunteers</p> </a> <a href="/archives.html" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Participating archives</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Publishers indexing in RePEc</p> </a> <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/privacy.html" class="list-group-item" target="_blank"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Privacy statement <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></h4> </a> </div> </div> <div class="col-sm more-services"> <h3 style="border-bottom: 1px solid #111;">Help us</h3> <div class="list-group col"> <a href="/corrections.html" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Corrections</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Found an error or omission?</p> </a> <a href="/volunteers.html" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Volunteers</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Opportunities to help RePEc</p> </a> <a href="/participate.html" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Get papers listed</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Have your research listed on RePEc</p> </a> <a href="/stepbystep.html" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Open a RePEc archive</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Have your institution's/publisher's output listed on RePEc</p> </a> <a href="/getdata.html" class="list-group-item"> <h4 class="list-group-item-heading">Get RePEc data</h4> <p class="list-group-item-text">Use data assembled by RePEc</p> </a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="row"> <div class="col-12" style="text-align: center; padding-top: 10px;"> <div id="sidelogos"> <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/">IDEAS</a> is a <a href="http://repec.org/" target="_blank">RePEc <i class="fa fa-external-link"></i></a> service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers. </div> </div> </div> </div> </div>  <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.2.1.min.js"></script> <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/popper.js/1.12.9/umd/popper.min.js" integrity="sha384-ApNbgh9B+Y1QKtv3Rn7W3mgPxhU9K/ScQsAP7hUibX39j7fakFPskvXusvfa0b4Q" crossorigin="anonymous"></script> <script src="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/js/bootstrap.min.js" integrity="sha384-JZR6Spejh4U02d8jOt6vLEHfe/JQGiRRSQQxSfFWpi1MquVdAyjUar5+76PVCmYl" crossorigin="anonymous"></script> <script type="module" src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@justinribeiro/share-to-mastodon@0.2.0/dist/share-to-mastodon.js"> <script src="/css/ideas.js"></script> <script src="/css/pushy.js"></script> <script> $(document).ready(function() { // show active tab on reload if (location.hash !== '') $('a[href="' + location.hash + '"]').tab('show'); // remember the hash in the URL without jumping // $('a[data-toggle="tab"]').on('shown.bs.tab', function(e) { // if(history.pushState) { // history.pushState(null, null, '#'+$(e.target).attr('href').substr(1)); // } else { // location.hash = '#'+$(e.target).attr('href').substr(1); // } // }); }); </script> </BODY> </HTML>