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class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Case_I"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.1</span> <span>Case I</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Case_I-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Case_II" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Case_II"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.2</span> <span>Case II</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Case_II-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-False_premises_and_generalized_Gettier-style_problems" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1 vector-toc-list-item-expanded"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#False_premises_and_generalized_Gettier-style_problems"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4</span> <span>False premises and generalized Gettier-style problems</span> </div> </a> <button aria-controls="toc-False_premises_and_generalized_Gettier-style_problems-sublist" class="cdx-button cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--icon-only vector-toc-toggle"> <span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-expand"></span> <span>Toggle False premises and generalized Gettier-style problems subsection</span> </button> <ul id="toc-False_premises_and_generalized_Gettier-style_problems-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-The_generalized_problem" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#The_generalized_problem"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.1</span> <span>The generalized problem</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-The_generalized_problem-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Objections_to_the_"no_false_premises"_approach" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Objections_to_the_"no_false_premises"_approach"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.2</span> <span>Objections to the "no false premises" approach</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Objections_to_the_"no_false_premises"_approach-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Constructing_Gettier_problems" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1 vector-toc-list-item-expanded"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Constructing_Gettier_problems"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">5</span> <span>Constructing Gettier problems</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Constructing_Gettier_problems-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Responses_to_Gettier" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1 vector-toc-list-item-expanded"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Responses_to_Gettier"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6</span> <span>Responses to Gettier</span> </div> </a> <button aria-controls="toc-Responses_to_Gettier-sublist" class="cdx-button cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--icon-only vector-toc-toggle"> <span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-expand"></span> <span>Toggle Responses to Gettier subsection</span> </button> <ul id="toc-Responses_to_Gettier-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-The_fourth_condition_(JTB_+_G)_approaches" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#The_fourth_condition_(JTB_+_G)_approaches"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.1</span> <span>The fourth condition (JTB + G) approaches</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-The_fourth_condition_(JTB_+_G)_approaches-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Goldman's_causal_theory" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Goldman's_causal_theory"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.1.1</span> <span>Goldman's causal theory</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Goldman's_causal_theory-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Lehrer–Paxson's_defeasibility_condition" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Lehrer–Paxson's_defeasibility_condition"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.1.2</span> <span>Lehrer–Paxson's defeasibility condition</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Lehrer–Paxson's_defeasibility_condition-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Pragmatism" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Pragmatism"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.1.3</span> <span>Pragmatism</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Pragmatism-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Revisions_of_JTB_approaches" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Revisions_of_JTB_approaches"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.2</span> <span>Revisions of JTB approaches</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Revisions_of_JTB_approaches-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Fred_Dretske's_conclusive_reasons_and_Robert_Nozick's_truth-tracking" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Fred_Dretske's_conclusive_reasons_and_Robert_Nozick's_truth-tracking"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.2.1</span> <span>Fred Dretske's conclusive reasons and Robert Nozick's truth-tracking</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Fred_Dretske's_conclusive_reasons_and_Robert_Nozick's_truth-tracking-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Robert_Fogelin's_perspectival_account" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Robert_Fogelin's_perspectival_account"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.3</span> <span>Robert Fogelin's perspectival account</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Robert_Fogelin's_perspectival_account-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Richard_Kirkham's_skepticism" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Richard_Kirkham's_skepticism"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.3.1</span> <span>Richard Kirkham's skepticism</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Richard_Kirkham's_skepticism-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Attempts_to_dissolve_the_problem" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Attempts_to_dissolve_the_problem"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.4</span> <span>Attempts to dissolve the problem</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Attempts_to_dissolve_the_problem-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Experimental_research" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Experimental_research"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6.5</span> <span>Experimental research</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Experimental_research-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-See_also" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1 vector-toc-list-item-expanded"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#See_also"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">7</span> <span>See also</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-See_also-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-References" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1 vector-toc-list-item-expanded"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#References"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">8</span> <span>References</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-References-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Further_reading" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1 vector-toc-list-item-expanded"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Further_reading"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">9</span> <span>Further reading</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Further_reading-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-External_links" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1 vector-toc-list-item-expanded"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#External_links"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">10</span> <span>External links</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-External_links-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </div> </div> </nav> </div> </div> <div class="mw-content-container"> <main id="content" class="mw-body"> <header class="mw-body-header vector-page-titlebar"> <nav aria-label="Contents" class="vector-toc-landmark"> <div id="vector-page-titlebar-toc" class="vector-dropdown vector-page-titlebar-toc vector-button-flush-left" > <input type="checkbox" id="vector-page-titlebar-toc-checkbox" role="button" aria-haspopup="true" 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Available in 24 languages" > <label id="p-lang-btn-label" for="p-lang-btn-checkbox" class="vector-dropdown-label cdx-button cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--action-progressive mw-portlet-lang-heading-24" aria-hidden="true" ><span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-language-progressive mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-language-progressive"></span> <span class="vector-dropdown-label-text">24 languages</span> </label> <div class="vector-dropdown-content"> <div class="vector-menu-content"> <ul class="vector-menu-content-list"> <li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ar mw-list-item"><a href="https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A9_%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%87" title="مسألة غيتييه – Arabic" lang="ar" hreflang="ar" data-title="مسألة غيتييه" data-language-autonym="العربية" data-language-local-name="Arabic" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>العربية</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-cs mw-list-item"><a href="https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier%C5%AFv_probl%C3%A9m" title="Gettierův problém – Czech" lang="cs" hreflang="cs" data-title="Gettierův problém" data-language-autonym="Čeština" data-language-local-name="Czech" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Čeština</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-de mw-list-item"><a href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier-Problem" title="Gettier-Problem – German" lang="de" hreflang="de" data-title="Gettier-Problem" data-language-autonym="Deutsch" data-language-local-name="German" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Deutsch</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-et mw-list-item"><a href="https://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettieri_probleem" title="Gettieri probleem – Estonian" lang="et" hreflang="et" data-title="Gettieri probleem" data-language-autonym="Eesti" data-language-local-name="Estonian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Eesti</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-el mw-list-item"><a href="https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A0%CF%81%CF%8C%CE%B2%CE%BB%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%B1_%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85_%CE%93%CE%BA%CE%AD%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%B5%CF%81" title="Πρόβλημα του Γκέτιερ – Greek" lang="el" hreflang="el" data-title="Πρόβλημα του Γκέτιερ" data-language-autonym="Ελληνικά" data-language-local-name="Greek" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Ελληνικά</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-es mw-list-item"><a href="https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problema_de_Gettier" title="Problema de Gettier – Spanish" lang="es" hreflang="es" data-title="Problema de Gettier" data-language-autonym="Español" data-language-local-name="Spanish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Español</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fa mw-list-item"><a href="https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%84%D9%87_%DA%AF%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%87" title="مسئله گتیه – Persian" lang="fa" hreflang="fa" data-title="مسئله گتیه" data-language-autonym="فارسی" data-language-local-name="Persian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>فارسی</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fr mw-list-item"><a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probl%C3%A8me_de_Gettier" title="Problème de Gettier – French" lang="fr" hreflang="fr" data-title="Problème de Gettier" data-language-autonym="Français" data-language-local-name="French" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Français</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ko mw-list-item"><a href="https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EA%B2%8C%ED%8B%B0%EC%96%B4_%EB%AC%B8%EC%A0%9C" title="게티어 문제 – Korean" lang="ko" hreflang="ko" data-title="게티어 문제" data-language-autonym="한국어" data-language-local-name="Korean" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>한국어</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-it mw-list-item"><a href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problema_di_Gettier" title="Problema di Gettier – Italian" lang="it" hreflang="it" data-title="Problema di Gettier" data-language-autonym="Italiano" data-language-local-name="Italian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Italiano</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-nl mw-list-item"><a href="https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier-probleem" title="Gettier-probleem – Dutch" lang="nl" hreflang="nl" data-title="Gettier-probleem" data-language-autonym="Nederlands" data-language-local-name="Dutch" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Nederlands</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ja mw-list-item"><a href="https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%82%B2%E3%83%86%E3%82%A3%E3%82%A2%E5%95%8F%E9%A1%8C" title="ゲティア問題 – Japanese" lang="ja" hreflang="ja" data-title="ゲティア問題" data-language-autonym="日本語" data-language-local-name="Japanese" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>日本語</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pl mw-list-item"><a href="https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_Gettiera" title="Problem Gettiera – Polish" lang="pl" hreflang="pl" data-title="Problem Gettiera" data-language-autonym="Polski" data-language-local-name="Polish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Polski</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pt mw-list-item"><a href="https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problema_de_Gettier" title="Problema de Gettier – Portuguese" lang="pt" hreflang="pt" data-title="Problema de Gettier" data-language-autonym="Português" data-language-local-name="Portuguese" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Português</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ro mw-list-item"><a href="https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probleme_de_tip_Gettier" title="Probleme de tip Gettier – Romanian" lang="ro" hreflang="ro" data-title="Probleme de tip Gettier" data-language-autonym="Română" data-language-local-name="Romanian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Română</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ru mw-list-item"><a href="https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B0_%D0%93%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0" title="Проблема Геттиера – Russian" lang="ru" hreflang="ru" data-title="Проблема Геттиера" data-language-autonym="Русский" data-language-local-name="Russian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Русский</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sk mw-list-item"><a href="https://sk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettierov_probl%C3%A9m" title="Gettierov problém – Slovak" lang="sk" hreflang="sk" data-title="Gettierov problém" data-language-autonym="Slovenčina" data-language-local-name="Slovak" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Slovenčina</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ckb mw-list-item"><a href="https://ckb.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C_%DA%AF%DB%8E%D8%AA%DB%8C%DB%95" title="پرسی گێتیە – Central Kurdish" lang="ckb" hreflang="ckb" data-title="پرسی گێتیە" data-language-autonym="کوردی" data-language-local-name="Central Kurdish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>کوردی</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fi mw-list-item"><a href="https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettierin_ongelma" title="Gettierin ongelma – Finnish" lang="fi" hreflang="fi" data-title="Gettierin ongelma" data-language-autonym="Suomi" data-language-local-name="Finnish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Suomi</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sv mw-list-item"><a href="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettierproblemet" title="Gettierproblemet – Swedish" lang="sv" hreflang="sv" data-title="Gettierproblemet" data-language-autonym="Svenska" data-language-local-name="Swedish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Svenska</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-tr mw-list-item"><a href="https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_Problemi" title="Gettier Problemi – Turkish" lang="tr" hreflang="tr" data-title="Gettier Problemi" data-language-autonym="Türkçe" data-language-local-name="Turkish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Türkçe</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-uk mw-list-item"><a href="https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B0_%D0%93%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%94" title="Проблема Геттьє – Ukrainian" lang="uk" hreflang="uk" data-title="Проблема Геттьє" data-language-autonym="Українська" data-language-local-name="Ukrainian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Українська</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-zh-yue mw-list-item"><a href="https://zh-yue.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%91%9B%E6%8F%90%E9%9B%85%E5%95%8F%E9%A1%8C" title="葛提雅問題 – Cantonese" lang="yue" hreflang="yue" data-title="葛提雅問題" data-language-autonym="粵語" data-language-local-name="Cantonese" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>粵語</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-zh mw-list-item"><a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%91%9B%E6%A2%AF%E5%B0%94%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98" title="葛梯尔问题 – Chinese" lang="zh" hreflang="zh" data-title="葛梯尔问题" data-language-autonym="中文" data-language-local-name="Chinese" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>中文</span></a></li> </ul> <div class="after-portlet after-portlet-lang"><span class="wb-langlinks-edit wb-langlinks-link"><a href="https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Special:EntityPage/Q1059362#sitelinks-wikipedia" title="Edit interlanguage links" class="wbc-editpage">Edit links</a></span></div> </div> </div> </div> </header> <div class="vector-page-toolbar"> <div class="vector-page-toolbar-container"> <div id="left-navigation"> <nav aria-label="Namespaces"> <div id="p-associated-pages" class="vector-menu vector-menu-tabs mw-portlet mw-portlet-associated-pages" > <div class="vector-menu-content"> <ul class="vector-menu-content-list"> <li id="ca-nstab-main" class="selected vector-tab-noicon mw-list-item"><a href="/wiki/Gettier_problem" 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id="siteSub" class="noprint">From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia</div> </div> <div id="contentSub"><div id="mw-content-subtitle"></div></div> <div id="mw-content-text" class="mw-body-content"><div class="mw-content-ltr mw-parser-output" lang="en" dir="ltr"><div class="shortdescription nomobile noexcerpt noprint searchaux" style="display:none">Philosophical problem about what constitutes knowledge</div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1236090951">.mw-parser-output .hatnote{font-style:italic}.mw-parser-output div.hatnote{padding-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.5em}.mw-parser-output .hatnote i{font-style:normal}.mw-parser-output .hatnote+link+.hatnote{margin-top:-0.5em}@media print{body.ns-0 .mw-parser-output .hatnote{display:none!important}}</style><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">See also: <a href="/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma" title="Münchhausen trilemma">Münchhausen trilemma</a></div> <p>The <b>Gettier problem</b>, in the field of <a href="/wiki/Epistemology" title="Epistemology">epistemology</a>, is a landmark <a href="/wiki/Philosophy" title="Philosophy">philosophical</a> problem concerning the understanding of <a href="/wiki/Descriptive_knowledge" class="mw-redirect" title="Descriptive knowledge">descriptive knowledge</a>. Attributed to American philosopher <a href="/wiki/Edmund_Gettier" title="Edmund Gettier">Edmund Gettier</a>, Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases") challenge the long-held <a href="/wiki/Justified_true_belief" class="mw-redirect" title="Justified true belief">justified true belief</a> (JTB) account of knowledge. The JTB account holds that knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief; if all three conditions (justification, truth, and belief) are met of a given claim, then we have knowledge of that claim. In his 1963 three-page paper titled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?",<sup id="cite_ref-Gettier1963_1-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Gettier1963-1"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>1<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-2"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Gettier attempts to illustrate by means of two counterexamples that there are cases where individuals can have a justified, true belief regarding a claim but still fail to know it because the reasons for the belief, while justified, turn out to be false. Thus, Gettier claims to have shown that the JTB account is inadequate because it does not account for all of the <a href="/wiki/Necessary_and_sufficient" class="mw-redirect" title="Necessary and sufficient">necessary and sufficient</a> conditions for knowledge. </p><p>The terms "Gettier problem", "Gettier case", or even the adjective "Gettiered", are sometimes used to describe any case in the field of epistemology that purports to repudiate the JTB account of knowledge. </p><p>Responses to Gettier's paper have been numerous. Some reject Gettier's examples as inadequate justification, while others seek to adjust the JTB account of knowledge and blunt the force of these counterexamples. Gettier problems have even found their way into sociological experiments in which researchers have studied intuitive responses to Gettier cases from people of varying demographics.<sup id="cite_ref-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-3"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>3<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p> <meta property="mw:PageProp/toc" /> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="History">History</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=1" title="Edit section: History"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>The question of what constitutes "knowledge" is as old as philosophy itself. Early instances are found in <a href="/wiki/Plato%27s_dialogues" class="mw-redirect" title="Plato's dialogues">Plato's dialogues</a>, notably <i><a href="/wiki/Meno" title="Meno">Meno</a></i> (97a–98b) and <i><a href="/wiki/Theaetetus_(dialogue)" title="Theaetetus (dialogue)">Theaetetus</a></i>. Gettier himself was not actually the first to raise the problem named after him; its existence was acknowledged by both <a href="/wiki/Alexius_Meinong" title="Alexius Meinong">Alexius Meinong</a> and <a href="/wiki/Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a>, the latter of which discussed the problem in his book <i>Human knowledge: Its scope and limits</i>. In fact, the problem has been known since the <a href="/wiki/Middle_Ages" title="Middle Ages">Middle Ages</a>, and both Indian philosopher <a href="/wiki/Dharmottara" title="Dharmottara">Dharmottara</a> and <a href="/wiki/Scholasticism" title="Scholasticism">scholastic</a> logician <a href="/wiki/Pietro_Pomponazzi" title="Pietro Pomponazzi">Peter of Mantua</a> presented examples of it.<sup id="cite_ref-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-4"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>4<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p><p>Dharmottara, in his commentary <abbr title="circa">c.</abbr><span style="white-space:nowrap;"> 770 AD</span> on <a href="/wiki/Dharmakirti" title="Dharmakirti">Dharmakirti</a>'s <i>Ascertainment of Knowledge</i>, gives the following two examples:<sup id="cite_ref-nagelvsi_5-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-nagelvsi-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-6" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-6"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-7" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-7"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>7<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1244412712">.mw-parser-output .templatequote{overflow:hidden;margin:1em 0;padding:0 32px}.mw-parser-output .templatequotecite{line-height:1.5em;text-align:left;margin-top:0}@media(min-width:500px){.mw-parser-output .templatequotecite{padding-left:1.6em}}</style><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>A fire has just been lit to roast some meat. The fire hasn’t started sending up any smoke, but the smell of the meat has attracted a cloud of insects. From a distance, an observer sees the dark swarm above the horizon and mistakes it for smoke. "There’s a fire burning at that spot," the distant observer says. Does the observer <i>know</i> that there is a fire burning in the distance?<sup id="cite_ref-nagelvsi_5-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-nagelvsi-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712"><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>A desert traveller is searching for water. He sees, in the valley ahead, a shimmering blue expanse. Unfortunately, it’s a mirage. But fortunately, when he reaches the spot where there appeared to be water, there actually is water, hidden under a rock. Did the traveller <i>know</i>, as he stood on the hilltop hallucinating, that there was water ahead?<sup id="cite_ref-nagelvsi_5-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-nagelvsi-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote> <p>Various theories of knowledge, including some of the proposals that emerged in Western philosophy after Gettier in 1963, were debated by Indo-Tibetan epistemologists before and after Dharmottara.<sup id="cite_ref-nagelvsi_5-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-nagelvsi-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-8" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-8"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>8<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> In particular, <a href="/wiki/Ga%E1%B9%85ge%C5%9Ba" title="Gaṅgeśa">Gaṅgeśa</a> in the 14th century advanced a detailed causal theory of knowledge.<sup id="cite_ref-nagelvsi_5-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-nagelvsi-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p><p>Russell's case, called the stopped clock case, goes as follows:<sup id="cite_ref-9" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-9"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>9<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Alice sees a clock that reads two o'clock and believes that the time is two o'clock. It is, in fact, two o'clock. There's a problem, however: unknown to Alice, the clock she's looking at stopped twelve hours ago. Alice thus has an accidentally true, justified belief. Russell provides an answer of his own to the problem. Edmund Gettier's formulation of the problem was important as it coincided with the rise of the sort of <a href="/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy)" title="Naturalism (philosophy)">philosophical naturalism</a> promoted by <a href="/wiki/W._V._O._Quine" class="mw-redirect" title="W. V. O. Quine">W. V. O. Quine</a> and others, and was used as a justification for a shift towards <a href="/wiki/Internalism_and_externalism" title="Internalism and externalism">externalist</a> theories of justification.<sup id="cite_ref-McGrews_on_Gettier_10-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-McGrews_on_Gettier-10"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>10<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> <a href="/wiki/John_L._Pollock" title="John L. Pollock">John L. Pollock</a> and Joseph Cruz have stated that the Gettier problem has "fundamentally altered the character of contemporary epistemology" and has become "a central problem of epistemology since it poses a clear barrier to analyzing knowledge".<sup id="cite_ref-11" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-11"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>11<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 13–14">: 13–14 </span></sup> </p><p><a href="/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga" title="Alvin Plantinga">Alvin Plantinga</a> rejects the historical analysis: </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712"><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>According to the inherited lore of the epistemological tribe, the JTB [justified true belief] account enjoyed the status of epistemological orthodoxy until 1963, when it was shattered by Edmund Gettier... Of course, there is an interesting historical irony here: it isn't easy to find many really explicit statements of a JTB analysis of knowledge prior to Gettier. It is almost as if a distinguished critic created a tradition in the very act of destroying it.<sup id="cite_ref-PlantingaWCD_12-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-PlantingaWCD-12"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>12<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 6–7">: 6–7 </span></sup></p></blockquote> <p>Despite this, Plantinga <i>does</i> accept that some philosophers before Gettier have advanced a JTB account of knowledge, specifically <a href="/wiki/C._I._Lewis" title="C. I. Lewis">C. I. Lewis</a> and <a href="/wiki/A._J._Ayer" title="A. J. Ayer">A. J. Ayer</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-PlantingaWCD_12-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-PlantingaWCD-12"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>12<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 7">: 7 </span></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Knowledge_as_justified_true_belief_(JTB)"><span id="Knowledge_as_justified_true_belief_.28JTB.29"></span>Knowledge as justified true belief (JTB)</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=2" title="Edit section: Knowledge as justified true belief (JTB)"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>The JTB account of knowledge is the claim that knowledge can be conceptually analyzed as justified true belief, which is to say that the <i>meaning</i> of sentences such as "Smith knows that it rained today" can be given with the following set of conditions, which are <a href="/wiki/Necessary_and_sufficient_conditions" class="mw-redirect" title="Necessary and sufficient conditions">necessary and sufficient</a> for knowledge to obtain: </p> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r996643573">.mw-parser-output .block-indent{padding-left:3em;padding-right:0;overflow:hidden}</style><div class="block-indent">A subject <var>S</var> <i>knows</i> that a proposition <var>P</var> is true <a href="/wiki/If_and_only_if" title="If and only if">if and only if</a>: <ol><li><var>P</var> is true, and</li> <li><var>S</var> believes that <var>P </var> is true, and</li> <li><var>S</var> is <a href="/wiki/Theory_of_justification" class="mw-redirect" title="Theory of justification">justified</a> in believing that <var>P</var> is true</li></ol></div> <p>The JTB account was first credited to <a href="/wiki/Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a>, though Plato argued against this very account of knowledge in the <i><a href="/wiki/Theaetetus_(dialogue)" title="Theaetetus (dialogue)">Theaetetus</a></i> (210a). This account of knowledge is what Gettier subjected to criticism. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Gettier's_two_original_counterexamples"><span id="Gettier.27s_two_original_counterexamples"></span>Gettier's two original counterexamples</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=3" title="Edit section: Gettier's two original counterexamples"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>Gettier's paper used counterexamples to argue that there are cases of beliefs that are both true and justified—therefore satisfying all three conditions for knowledge on the JTB account—but that do not appear to be genuine cases of knowledge. Therefore, Gettier argued, his counterexamples show that the JTB account of knowledge is false, and thus that a different conceptual analysis is needed to correctly track what we mean by "knowledge". </p><p>Gettier's case is based on two counterexamples to the JTB analysis, both involving a fictional character named Smith. Each relies on two claims. Firstly, that justification is preserved by <a href="/wiki/Entailment" class="mw-redirect" title="Entailment">entailment</a>, and secondly that this applies coherently to Smith's putative "belief". That is, that if Smith is justified in believing P, and Smith realizes that the truth of P entails the truth of Q, then Smith would <i>also</i> be justified in believing Q. Gettier calls these counterexamples "Case I" and "Case II": </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Case_I">Case I</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=4" title="Edit section: Case I"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r996643573"><div class="block-indent">Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. <p>Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would, in the end, be selected and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. </p><p>Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. </p> But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not <i>know</i> that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in his pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.<sup id="cite_ref-Gettier1963_1-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Gettier1963-1"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>1<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Case_II">Case II</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=5" title="Edit section: Case II"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r996643573"><div class="block-indent">Smith, it is claimed by the hidden <a href="/wiki/Interlocutor_(linguistics)" title="Interlocutor (linguistics)">interlocutor</a>, has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of <a href="/wiki/Disjunction_introduction" title="Disjunction introduction">disjunction introduction</a>) that "Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona", even though Smith has no information whatsoever about the location of Brown. In fact, Jones does not own a Ford, but by sheer coincidence, Brown really is in Barcelona. Again, Smith had a belief that was true and justified, but not knowledge.</div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="False_premises_and_generalized_Gettier-style_problems">False premises and generalized Gettier-style problems</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=6" title="Edit section: False premises and generalized Gettier-style problems"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>In both of Gettier's actual examples (see also <a href="/wiki/Counterfactual_conditional" title="Counterfactual conditional">counterfactual conditional</a>), the justified true belief came about, if Smith's purported claims are disputable, as the result of entailment (but see also <a href="/wiki/Material_conditional" title="Material conditional">material conditional</a>) from justified false beliefs that "Jones will get the job" (in case I), and that "Jones owns a Ford" (in case II). This led some early responses to Gettier to conclude that the <a href="/wiki/Definition_of_knowledge" class="mw-redirect" title="Definition of knowledge">definition of knowledge</a> could be easily adjusted, so that knowledge was justified true belief that does not depend on <a href="/wiki/False_premise" title="False premise">false premises</a>. The interesting issue that arises is then of how to know which premises are in reality false or true when deriving a conclusion, because as in the Gettier cases, one sees that premises can be very reasonable to believe and be likely true, but unknown to the believer there are confounding factors and extra information that may have been missed while concluding something. The question that arises is therefore to what extent would one have to be able to go about attempting to "prove" all premises in the argument before solidifying a conclusion. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="The_generalized_problem">The generalized problem</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=7" title="Edit section: The generalized problem"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><span class="anchor" id="The_sheep_in_the_field"></span>In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field", <a href="/wiki/Roderick_Chisholm" title="Roderick Chisholm">Roderick Chisholm</a> asks us to imagine that someone, X, is standing outside a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep). X believes there is a sheep in the field, and in fact, X is right because there is a sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, X has a justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field.<sup id="cite_ref-13" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-13"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>13<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p><p><span class="anchor" id="The_Pyromaniac"></span>Another scenario by <a href="/wiki/Brian_Skyrms" title="Brian Skyrms">Brian Skyrms</a> is "The Pyromaniac", in which a struck match lights not for the reasons the pyromaniac imagines but because of some unknown "Q radiation".<sup id="cite_ref-14" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-14"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>14<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p><p><span class="anchor" id="Fake_barns"></span>A different perspective on the issue is given by <a href="/wiki/Alvin_Goldman" title="Alvin Goldman">Alvin Goldman</a> in the "fake barns" scenario (crediting <a href="/wiki/Carl_Ginet" title="Carl Ginet">Carl Ginet</a> with the example). In this one, a man is driving in the countryside, and sees what looks exactly like a barn. Accordingly, he thinks that he is seeing a barn. In fact, that is what he is doing. But what he does not know is that the neighborhood generally consists of many fake barns — <a href="/wiki/Potemkin_village" title="Potemkin village">barn facades designed to look exactly like real barns when viewed from the road</a>. Since, if he had been looking at one of them, he would have been unable to tell the difference, his "knowledge" that he was looking at a barn would seem to be poorly founded.<sup id="cite_ref-15" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-15"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>15<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Objections_to_the_"no_false_premises"_approach"><span id="Objections_to_the_.22no_false_premises.22_approach"></span>Objections to the "no false premises" approach</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=8" title="Edit section: Objections to the "no false premises" approach"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1251242444">.mw-parser-output .ambox{border:1px solid #a2a9b1;border-left:10px solid #36c;background-color:#fbfbfb;box-sizing:border-box}.mw-parser-output .ambox+link+.ambox,.mw-parser-output .ambox+link+style+.ambox,.mw-parser-output .ambox+link+link+.ambox,.mw-parser-output .ambox+.mw-empty-elt+link+.ambox,.mw-parser-output .ambox+.mw-empty-elt+link+style+.ambox,.mw-parser-output .ambox+.mw-empty-elt+link+link+.ambox{margin-top:-1px}html body.mediawiki .mw-parser-output .ambox.mbox-small-left{margin:4px 1em 4px 0;overflow:hidden;width:238px;border-collapse:collapse;font-size:88%;line-height:1.25em}.mw-parser-output .ambox-speedy{border-left:10px solid #b32424;background-color:#fee7e6}.mw-parser-output .ambox-delete{border-left:10px solid #b32424}.mw-parser-output .ambox-content{border-left:10px solid #f28500}.mw-parser-output .ambox-style{border-left:10px solid #fc3}.mw-parser-output .ambox-move{border-left:10px solid #9932cc}.mw-parser-output .ambox-protection{border-left:10px solid #a2a9b1}.mw-parser-output .ambox .mbox-text{border:none;padding:0.25em 0.5em;width:100%}.mw-parser-output .ambox .mbox-image{border:none;padding:2px 0 2px 0.5em;text-align:center}.mw-parser-output .ambox .mbox-imageright{border:none;padding:2px 0.5em 2px 0;text-align:center}.mw-parser-output .ambox .mbox-empty-cell{border:none;padding:0;width:1px}.mw-parser-output .ambox .mbox-image-div{width:52px}@media(min-width:720px){.mw-parser-output .ambox{margin:0 10%}}@media print{body.ns-0 .mw-parser-output .ambox{display:none!important}}</style><table class="box-More_citations_needed plainlinks metadata ambox ambox-content ambox-Refimprove" role="presentation"><tbody><tr><td class="mbox-image"><div class="mbox-image-div"><span typeof="mw:File"><a href="/wiki/File:Question_book-new.svg" class="mw-file-description"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/99/Question_book-new.svg/50px-Question_book-new.svg.png" decoding="async" width="50" height="39" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/99/Question_book-new.svg/75px-Question_book-new.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/99/Question_book-new.svg/100px-Question_book-new.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="512" data-file-height="399" /></a></span></div></td><td class="mbox-text"><div class="mbox-text-span">This article <b>needs additional citations for <a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability" title="Wikipedia:Verifiability">verification</a></b>.<span class="hide-when-compact"> Please help <a href="/wiki/Special:EditPage/Gettier_problem" title="Special:EditPage/Gettier problem">improve this article</a> by <a href="/wiki/Help:Referencing_for_beginners" title="Help:Referencing for beginners">adding citations to reliable sources</a>. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.<br /><small><span class="plainlinks"><i>Find sources:</i> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.google.com/search?as_eq=wikipedia&q=%22Gettier+problem%22">"Gettier problem"</a> – <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.google.com/search?tbm=nws&q=%22Gettier+problem%22+-wikipedia&tbs=ar:1">news</a> <b>·</b> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.google.com/search?&q=%22Gettier+problem%22&tbs=bkt:s&tbm=bks">newspapers</a> <b>·</b> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks:1&q=%22Gettier+problem%22+-wikipedia">books</a> <b>·</b> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22Gettier+problem%22">scholar</a> <b>·</b> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/action/doBasicSearch?Query=%22Gettier+problem%22&acc=on&wc=on">JSTOR</a></span></small></span> <span class="date-container"><i>(<span class="date">October 2021</span>)</i></span><span class="hide-when-compact"><i> (<small><a href="/wiki/Help:Maintenance_template_removal" title="Help:Maintenance template removal">Learn how and when to remove this message</a></small>)</i></span></div></td></tr></tbody></table> <p>The "no false premises" (or "no false lemmas") solution which was proposed early in the discussion has been criticized,<sup id="cite_ref-16" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-16"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>16<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> as more general Gettier-style problems were then constructed or contrived in which the justified true belief is said to not seem to be the result of a chain of reasoning from a justified false belief. For example: </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r996643573"><div class="block-indent">After arranging to meet with Mark for help with homework, Luke arrives at the appointed time and place. Walking into Mark's office Luke clearly sees Mark at his desk; Luke immediately forms the belief "Mark is in the room. He can help me with my logic homework". Luke is justified in his belief; he clearly sees Mark at his desk. In fact, it is <i>not</i> Mark that Luke saw, but rather a hologram, perfect in every respect, giving the appearance of Mark diligently grading papers at his desk. Nevertheless, Mark <i>is</i> in the room; he is crouched under his desk reading <a href="/wiki/Gottlob_Frege" title="Gottlob Frege">Frege</a>. Luke's belief that Mark is in the room is true (he is in the room, under his desk) and justified (Mark's hologram is giving the appearance of Mark hard at work).</div> <p>It is argued that it seems as though Luke does not "know" that Mark is in the room, even though it is claimed he has a justified true belief that Mark is in the room, but it is not nearly so clear that the <i>perceptual belief</i> that "Mark is in the room" was inferred from any premises at all, let alone any false ones, nor led to significant conclusions on its own; Luke did not seem to be reasoning about anything; "Mark is in the room" seems to have been part of what he <i>seemed to see</i>. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Constructing_Gettier_problems">Constructing Gettier problems</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=9" title="Edit section: Constructing Gettier problems"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>The main idea behind Gettier's examples is that the justification for the belief is flawed or incorrect, but the belief turns out to be true by sheer luck. <a href="/wiki/Linda_Zagzebski" title="Linda Zagzebski">Linda Zagzebski</a> shows that any analysis of knowledge in terms of true belief and some other element of justification that is independent from truth, will be liable to Gettier cases.<sup id="cite_ref-17" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-17"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>17<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> She offers a formula for generating Gettier cases: </p><p>(1) start with a case of justified false belief; </p><p>(2) amend the example, making the element of justification strong enough for knowledge, but the belief false by sheer chance; </p><p>(3) amend the example again, adding another element of chance such that the belief is true, but which leaves the element of justification unchanged; </p><p>This will generate an example of a belief that is sufficiently justified (on some analysis of knowledge) to be knowledge, which is true, and which is intuitively not an example of knowledge. In other words, Gettier cases can be generated for any analysis of knowledge that involves a justification criterion and a truth criterion, which are highly correlated but have some degree of independence. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Responses_to_Gettier">Responses to Gettier</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=10" title="Edit section: Responses to Gettier"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>The Gettier problem is formally a problem in <a href="/wiki/First-order_logic" title="First-order logic">first-order logic</a>, but the introduction by Gettier of terms such as <i>believes</i> and <i>knows</i> moves the discussion into the field of epistemology. Here, the sound (true) arguments ascribed to Smith then need also to be valid (believed) and convincing (justified) if they are to issue in the real-world discussion about <i>justified true belief</i>.<sup id="cite_ref-18" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-18"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>18<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p><p>Responses to Gettier problems have fallen into three categories: </p> <ul><li><b>Affirmations of the JTB account:</b> This response affirms the JTB account of knowledge, but rejects Gettier cases. Typically, the proponent of this response rejects Gettier cases because, they say, Gettier cases involve insufficient levels of justification. Knowledge actually requires higher levels of justification than Gettier cases involve.</li> <li><b>Fourth condition responses:</b> This response accepts the problem raised by Gettier cases, and affirms that JTB is <i>necessary</i> (but not <i>sufficient</i>) for knowledge. A proper account of knowledge, according to this type of view, will contain at least fourth condition (JTB + ?). With the fourth condition in place, Gettier counterexamples (and other similar counterexamples) will not work, and we will have an adequate set of criteria that are both necessary and sufficient for knowledge.</li> <li><b>Justification replacement response:</b> This response also accepts the problem raised by Gettier cases. However, instead of invoking a fourth condition, it seeks to replace Justification itself for some other third condition (?TB) (or remove it entirely) that will make counterexamples obsolete.</li></ul> <p>One response, therefore, is that in none of the above cases was the belief justified because it is impossible to justify anything that is not true. Conversely, the fact that a proposition turns out to be untrue is proof that it was not sufficiently justified in the first place. Under this interpretation, the JTB definition of knowledge survives. This shifts the problem to a definition of justification, rather than knowledge. Another view is that justification and non-justification are not in <a href="/wiki/Binary_opposition" title="Binary opposition">binary opposition</a>. Instead, justification is a matter of degree, with an idea being more or less justified. This account of justification is supported by philosophers such as <a href="/wiki/Paul_Boghossian" title="Paul Boghossian">Paul Boghossian</a><sup id="cite_ref-Boghossian_on_Justification_19-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Boghossian_on_Justification-19"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>19<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> <a rel="nofollow" class="external autonumber" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHTYzyzRt70">[1]</a> and <a href="/wiki/Stephen_Hicks" title="Stephen Hicks">Stephen Hicks</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external autonumber" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141222000209/http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/hicks-ep-full.pdf">[2]</a><a rel="nofollow" class="external autonumber" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZhK6XOT3uAA">[3]</a>. In common sense usage, an idea can not only be more justified or less justified but it can also be partially justified (Smith's boss told him X) and partially unjustified (Smith's boss is a liar). Gettier's cases involve propositions that were true, believed, but which had weak justification. In case 1, the premise that the testimony of Smith's boss is "strong evidence" is rejected. The case itself depends on the boss being either wrong or deceitful (Jones did not get the job) and therefore unreliable. In case 2, Smith again has accepted a questionable idea (Jones owns a Ford) with unspecified justification. Without justification, both cases do not undermine the JTB account of knowledge. </p><p>Other epistemologists accept Gettier's conclusion. Their responses to the Gettier problem, therefore, consist of trying to find alternative analyses of knowledge. They have struggled to discover and agree upon as a beginning any single notion of truth, or belief, or justifying which is wholly and obviously accepted. Truth, belief, and justifying have not yet been satisfactorily defined,<sup class="noprint Inline-Template Template-Fact" style="white-space:nowrap;">[<i><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed" title="Wikipedia:Citation needed"><span title="This claim needs references to reliable sources. (September 2015)">citation needed</span></a></i>]</sup> so that JTB (justified true belief) may be defined satisfactorily is still problematical, on account or otherwise of Gettier's examples. Gettier, for many years a professor at the <a href="/wiki/University_of_Massachusetts_Amherst" title="University of Massachusetts Amherst">University of Massachusetts Amherst</a> later also was interested in the <a href="/wiki/Epistemic_logic" class="mw-redirect" title="Epistemic logic">epistemic logic</a> of <a href="/wiki/Jaako_Hintikka" class="mw-redirect" title="Jaako Hintikka">Hintikka</a>, a Finnish philosopher at <a href="/wiki/Boston_University" title="Boston University">Boston University</a>, who published <i>Knowledge and Belief</i> in 1962.<sup id="cite_ref-20" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-20"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>20<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="The_fourth_condition_(JTB_+_G)_approaches"><span id="The_fourth_condition_.28JTB_.2B_G.29_approaches"></span>The fourth condition (JTB + G) approaches</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=11" title="Edit section: The fourth condition (JTB + G) approaches"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>The most common direction for this sort of response to take is what might be called a "JTB + G" analysis: that is, an analysis based on finding some <i>fourth</i> condition—a "no-Gettier-problem" condition—which, when added to the conditions of justification, truth, and belief, will yield a set of separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Goldman's_causal_theory"><span id="Goldman.27s_causal_theory"></span>Goldman's causal theory</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=12" title="Edit section: Goldman's causal theory"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>One such response is that of <a href="/wiki/Alvin_Goldman" title="Alvin Goldman">Alvin Goldman</a> (1967), who suggested the addition of a <i>causal</i> condition: a subject's belief is justified, for Goldman, only if the truth of a belief has <i>caused</i> the subject to have that belief (in the appropriate way); and for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, the subject must <i>also</i> be able to "correctly reconstruct" (mentally) that causal chain. Goldman's analysis would rule out Gettier cases in that Smith's beliefs are not caused by the truths of those beliefs; it is merely <i>accidental</i> that Smith's beliefs in the Gettier cases happen to be true, or that the prediction made by Smith: "The winner of the job will have 10 coins", on the basis of his putative belief, (see also <a href="/wiki/Bundle_theory" title="Bundle theory">bundling</a>) came true in this one case. This theory is challenged by the difficulty of giving a principled explanation of how an appropriate causal relationship differs from an inappropriate one (without the circular response of saying that the appropriate sort of causal relationship is the knowledge-producing one); or retreating to a position in which justified true belief is weakly defined as the consensus of learned opinion. The latter would be useful, but not as useful nor desirable as the unchanging definitions of scientific concepts such as momentum. Thus, adopting a causal response to the Gettier problem usually requires one to adopt (as Goldman gladly does) some form of <a href="/wiki/Reliabilism" title="Reliabilism">reliabilism</a> about <a href="/wiki/Justification_(epistemology)" title="Justification (epistemology)">justification</a>. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Lehrer–Paxson's_defeasibility_condition"><span id="Lehrer.E2.80.93Paxson.27s_defeasibility_condition"></span>Lehrer–Paxson's defeasibility condition</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=13" title="Edit section: Lehrer–Paxson's defeasibility condition"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><a href="/wiki/Keith_Lehrer" title="Keith Lehrer">Keith Lehrer</a> and Thomas Paxson (1969) proposed another response, by adding a <i><a href="/wiki/Epistemology#Indefeasibility_condition" title="Epistemology">defeasibility condition</a></i> to the JTB analysis. On their account, knowledge is <i><b>undefeated</b> justified true belief</i>—which is to say that a justified true belief counts as knowledge if and only if it is also the case that there is no further truth that, had the subject known it, would have defeated her present justification for the belief. (Thus, for example, Smith's justification for <a href="/wiki/Epistemic_modality" title="Epistemic modality">believing</a> that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is his justified belief that Jones will get the job, combined with his justified belief that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. But if Smith had known the truth that Jones will <i>not</i> get the job, that would have defeated the justification for his belief.) </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Pragmatism">Pragmatism</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=14" title="Edit section: Pragmatism"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><a href="/wiki/Pragmatism" title="Pragmatism">Pragmatism</a> was developed as a philosophical doctrine by <a href="/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce" title="Charles Sanders Peirce">C.S.Peirce</a> and <a href="/wiki/William_James" title="William James">William James</a> (1842–1910). In Peirce's view, the truth is nominally defined as a sign's correspondence to its object and pragmatically defined as the ideal final opinion to which sufficient investigation <i>would</i> lead sooner or later. James' <a href="/wiki/William_James#Epistemology" title="William James">epistemological</a> model of truth was that which <i>works</i> in the way of belief, and a belief was true if in the long run it <i>worked</i> for all of us, and guided us expeditiously through our semihospitable world. Peirce argued that <a href="/wiki/Metaphysics" title="Metaphysics">metaphysics</a> could be cleaned up by a pragmatic approach. </p> <blockquote> <p>Consider what effects that might <i>conceivably</i> have practical bearings you <i>conceive</i> the objects of your <i>conception</i> to have. Then, your <i>conception</i> of those effects is the whole of your <i>conception</i> of the object.<sup id="cite_ref-21" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-21"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>21<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p> </blockquote> <p>From a pragmatic viewpoint of the kind often ascribed to James, defining on a particular occasion whether a particular belief can rightly be said to be both true and justified is seen as no more than an exercise in <a href="/wiki/Pedant" class="mw-redirect" title="Pedant">pedantry</a>, but being able to <a href="/wiki/Decision_making" class="mw-redirect" title="Decision making">discern</a> whether that belief led to fruitful outcomes is a fruitful <a href="/wiki/Action_(philosophy)" title="Action (philosophy)">enterprise</a>. Peirce emphasized <a href="/wiki/Fallibilism" title="Fallibilism">fallibilism</a>, considered the assertion of absolute certainty a barrier to inquiry,<sup id="cite_ref-22" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-22"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>22<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> and in 1901 defined truth as follows: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth."<sup id="cite_ref-23" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-23"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>23<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> In other words, any unqualified assertion is likely to be at least a little wrong or, if right, still right for not entirely the right reasons. Therefore, one is more veracious by being Socratic, including recognition of one's own ignorance and knowing one may be proved wrong. This is the case, even though in practical matters one sometimes must act, if one is to act at all, with a decision and complete confidence.<sup id="cite_ref-24" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-24"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Revisions_of_JTB_approaches">Revisions of JTB approaches</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=15" title="Edit section: Revisions of JTB approaches"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>The difficulties involved in producing a viable fourth condition have led to claims that attempting to repair the JTB account is a deficient strategy. For example, one might argue that what the Gettier problem shows is not the need for a fourth independent condition in addition to the original three, but rather that the attempt to build up an account of knowledge by conjoining a set of independent conditions was misguided from the outset. Those who have adopted this approach generally argue that epistemological terms like <a href="/wiki/Theory_of_justification" class="mw-redirect" title="Theory of justification">justification</a>, <a href="/wiki/Evidence" title="Evidence">evidence</a>, <a href="/wiki/Certainty" title="Certainty">certainty</a>, etc. should be analyzed in terms of a primitive notion of <i>knowledge,</i> rather than vice versa. Knowledge is understood as <i>factive,</i> that is, as embodying a sort of epistemological "tie" between a truth and a belief. The JTB account is then criticized for trying to get and encapsulate the factivity of knowledge "on the cheap", as it were, or via a circular argument, by replacing an irreducible notion of factivity with the conjunction of some of the properties that accompany it (in particular, truth and justification). Of course, the introduction of irreducible primitives into a philosophical theory is always problematical (some would say a sign of desperation<sup class="noprint Inline-Template Template-Fact" style="white-space:nowrap;">[<i><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed" title="Wikipedia:Citation needed"><span title="This claim needs references to reliable sources. (December 2021)">citation needed</span></a></i>]</sup>), and such anti-reductionist accounts are unlikely to please those who have other reasons to hold fast to the method behind JTB+G accounts. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Fred_Dretske's_conclusive_reasons_and_Robert_Nozick's_truth-tracking"><span id="Fred_Dretske.27s_conclusive_reasons_and_Robert_Nozick.27s_truth-tracking"></span>Fred Dretske's conclusive reasons and Robert Nozick's truth-tracking</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=16" title="Edit section: Fred Dretske's conclusive reasons and Robert Nozick's truth-tracking"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><a href="/wiki/Fred_Dretske" title="Fred Dretske">Fred Dretske</a> developed an account of knowledge which he called "conclusive reasons",<sup id="cite_ref-25" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-25"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>25<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> revived by <a href="/wiki/Robert_Nozick" title="Robert Nozick">Robert Nozick</a> as what he called the <i>subjunctive</i> or truth-tracking account.<sup id="cite_ref-26" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-26"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>26<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Nozick's formulation posits that proposition p is an instance of knowledge when: </p> <ol><li>p is true</li> <li>S believes that p</li> <li>if p were true, S would believe that p</li> <li>if p weren't true, S wouldn't believe that p</li></ol> <p>Nozick's definition is intended to preserve Goldman's intuition that Gettier cases should be ruled out by disacknowledging "accidentally" true justified beliefs, but without risking the potentially onerous consequences of building a causal requirement into the analysis. This tactic though, invites the riposte that Nozick's account merely hides the problem and does not solve it, for it leaves open the question of <i>why</i> Smith would not have had his belief if it had been false. The most promising answer seems to be that it is because Smith's belief was <i>caused</i> by the truth of what he believes; but that puts us back in the causalist camp. </p><p>Criticisms and counter examples (notably the <i>Grandma case</i>) prompted a revision, which resulted in the alteration of (3) and (4) to limit themselves to the same method (i.e. vision): </p> <ol><li>p is true</li> <li>S believes that p</li> <li>if p were true, S <i>(using M)</i> would believe that p</li> <li>if p weren't true, S <i>(using method M)</i> wouldn't believe that p</li></ol> <p><a href="/wiki/Saul_Kripke" title="Saul Kripke">Saul Kripke</a> has pointed out that this view remains problematic and uses a counterexample called the <i>Fake Barn Country example</i>, which describes a certain locality containing a number of fake barns or facades of barns. In the midst of these fake barns is one real barn, which is painted red. There is one more piece of crucial information for this example - the fake barns cannot be painted red. </p><p>Jones is driving along the highway, looks up and happens to see the real barn, and so forms the belief: </p> <ul><li>I see a barn.</li></ul> <p>Though Jones has gotten lucky, he could have just as easily been deceived and not have known it. Therefore, it doesn't fulfill premise 4, for if Jones saw a fake barn he wouldn't have any idea it was a fake barn. So this is not knowledge. </p><p>An alternate example is if Jones looks up and forms the belief: </p> <ul><li>I see a red barn.</li></ul> <p>According to Nozick's view this fulfills all four premises. Therefore, this is knowledge, since Jones couldn't have been wrong, since the fake barns cannot be painted red. This is a troubling account however, since it seems the first statement <i>I see a barn</i> can be inferred from <i>I see a red barn</i>; however by Nozick's view the first belief is <i>not</i> knowledge and the second is knowledge. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Robert_Fogelin's_perspectival_account"><span id="Robert_Fogelin.27s_perspectival_account"></span>Robert Fogelin's perspectival account</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=17" title="Edit section: Robert Fogelin's perspectival account"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>In the first chapter of his book <i>Pyrronian Reflexions on Truth and Justification</i>,<sup id="cite_ref-27" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-27"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>27<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> <a href="/wiki/Robert_Fogelin" title="Robert Fogelin">Robert Fogelin</a> gives a diagnosis that leads to a dialogical solution to Gettier's problem. The problem always arises when the given justification has nothing to do with what really makes the proposition true. Now, he notes that in such cases there is always a mismatch between the information available to the person who makes the knowledge-claim of some proposition p and the information available to the evaluator of this knowledge-claim (even if the evaluator is the same person in a later time). A Gettierian counterexample arises when the justification given by the person who makes the knowledge-claim cannot be accepted by the knowledge evaluator because it does not fit with his wider informational setting. For instance, in the case of the fake barn the evaluator knows that a superficial inspection from someone who does not know the peculiar circumstances involved isn't a justification acceptable as making the proposition p (that it is a real barn) true.<sup id="cite_ref-28" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-28"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>28<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Richard_Kirkham's_skepticism"><span id="Richard_Kirkham.27s_skepticism"></span>Richard Kirkham's skepticism</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=18" title="Edit section: Richard Kirkham's skepticism"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><a href="/wiki/Richard_Kirkham" title="Richard Kirkham">Richard Kirkham</a> has proposed that it is best to start with a definition of knowledge so strong that giving a counterexample to it is logically impossible. Whether it can be weakened without becoming subject to a counterexample should then be checked. He concludes that there will always be a counterexample to any definition of knowledge in which the believer's evidence does not logically necessitate the belief. Since in most cases the believer's evidence does not necessitate a belief, Kirkham embraces skepticism about knowledge; but he notes that a belief can still be rational even if it is not an item of knowledge. (See also: <a href="/wiki/Fallibilism" title="Fallibilism">fallibilism</a>) </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Attempts_to_dissolve_the_problem">Attempts to dissolve the problem</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=19" title="Edit section: Attempts to dissolve the problem"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>One might respond to Gettier by finding a way to avoid his conclusion(s) in the first place. However, it can hardly be argued that knowledge is justified true belief if there are cases that are justified true belief without being knowledge; thus, those who want to avoid Gettier's conclusions have to find some way to defuse Gettier's counterexamples. In order to do so, within the parameters of the particular counter-example or <a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/exemplar" class="extiw" title="wikt:exemplar">exemplar</a>, they must then either accept that </p> <ol><li>Gettier's cases are not really cases of justified true belief, or</li> <li>Gettier's cases really are cases of knowledge after all,</li></ol> <p>or, demonstrate a case in which it is possible to circumvent surrender to the exemplar by eliminating any necessity for it to be considered that JTB apply in just those areas that Gettier has rendered obscure, without thereby lessening the force of JTB to apply in those cases where it actually is crucial. Then, though Gettier's cases <i>stipulate</i> that Smith has a certain belief and that his belief is true, it seems that in order to propose (1), one must argue that Gettier, (or, that is, the writer responsible for the particular form of words on this present occasion known as case (1), and who makes assertion's about Smith's "putative" beliefs), goes wrong because he has the wrong notion of <i>justification.</i> Such an argument often depends on an <a href="/wiki/Externalism" title="Externalism">externalist</a> account on which "justification" is understood in such a way that whether or not a belief is "justified" depends not just on the internal state of the believer, but also on how that internal state is related to the outside world. Externalist accounts typically are constructed such that Smith's putative beliefs in Case I and Case II are not really justified (even though it seems to Smith that they are), because his beliefs are not lined up with the world in the right way, or that it is possible to show that it is invalid to assert that "Smith" has any significant "particular" belief at all, in terms of JTB or otherwise. Such accounts, of course, face the same burden as causalist responses to Gettier: they have to explain what sort of relationship between the world and the believer counts as a justificatory relationship. </p><p>Those who accept (2) are by far in the minority in analytic philosophy; generally, those who are willing to accept it are those who have independent reasons to say that more things count as knowledge than the intuitions that led to the JTB account would acknowledge.<sup id="cite_ref-29" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-29"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>29<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Chief among these is <a href="/wiki/Epistemic_minimalism" title="Epistemic minimalism">epistemic minimalists</a>, <a href="/wiki/Crispin_Sartwell" title="Crispin Sartwell">Crispin Sartwell</a>, who hold that all true belief, including both Gettier's cases and lucky guesses, counts as knowledge. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Experimental_research">Experimental research</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=20" title="Edit section: Experimental research"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>Some early work in the field of <a href="/wiki/Experimental_philosophy" title="Experimental philosophy">experimental philosophy</a> suggested that traditional intuitions about Gettier cases might vary cross-culturally.<sup id="cite_ref-30" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-30"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>30<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> However, subsequent studies have consistently failed to replicate these results, instead finding that participants from different cultures do share the traditional intuition.<sup id="cite_ref-31" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-31"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>31<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-32" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-32"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-33" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-33"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>33<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> More recent studies have been providing evidence for the opposite hypothesis, that people from a variety of different cultures have similar intuitions in these cases.<sup id="cite_ref-34" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-34"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>34<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="See_also">See also</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=21" title="Edit section: See also"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Knowledge-first_epistemology" class="mw-redirect" title="Knowledge-first epistemology">Knowledge-first epistemology</a></li></ul> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="References">References</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=22" title="Edit section: References"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1239543626">.mw-parser-output .reflist{margin-bottom:0.5em;list-style-type:decimal}@media screen{.mw-parser-output .reflist{font-size:90%}}.mw-parser-output .reflist .references{font-size:100%;margin-bottom:0;list-style-type:inherit}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns-2{column-width:30em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns-3{column-width:25em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns{margin-top:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns ol{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns li{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}.mw-parser-output .reflist-upper-alpha{list-style-type:upper-alpha}.mw-parser-output .reflist-upper-roman{list-style-type:upper-roman}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-alpha{list-style-type:lower-alpha}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-greek{list-style-type:lower-greek}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-roman{list-style-type:lower-roman}</style><div class="reflist"> <div class="mw-references-wrap mw-references-columns"><ol class="references"> <li id="cite_note-Gettier1963-1"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Gettier1963_1-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Gettier1963_1-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1238218222">.mw-parser-output cite.citation{font-style:inherit;word-wrap:break-word}.mw-parser-output .citation q{quotes:"\"""\"""'""'"}.mw-parser-output .citation:target{background-color:rgba(0,127,255,0.133)}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-free.id-lock-free a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Lock-green.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited.id-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration.id-lock-registration a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Lock-gray-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription.id-lock-subscription a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Lock-red-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg")right 0.1em center/12px no-repeat}body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-free a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon a{background-size:contain;padding:0 1em 0 0}.mw-parser-output .cs1-code{color:inherit;background:inherit;border:none;padding:inherit}.mw-parser-output .cs1-hidden-error{display:none;color:var(--color-error,#d33)}.mw-parser-output .cs1-visible-error{color:var(--color-error,#d33)}.mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{display:none;color:#085;margin-left:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-left{padding-left:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-right{padding-right:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .citation .mw-selflink{font-weight:inherit}@media screen{.mw-parser-output .cs1-format{font-size:95%}html.skin-theme-clientpref-night .mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{color:#18911f}}@media screen and (prefers-color-scheme:dark){html.skin-theme-clientpref-os .mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{color:#18911f}}</style><cite id="CITEREFGettier1963" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="/wiki/Edmund_Gettier" title="Edmund Gettier">Gettier, Edmund L.</a> (1 June 1963). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article-abstract/23/6/121/109949">"Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"</a>. <i>Analysis</i>. <b>23</b> (6): 121–123. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fanalys%2F23.6.121">10.1093/analys/23.6.121</a><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">5 April</span> 2018</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Analysis&rft.atitle=Is+Justified+True+Belief+Knowledge%3F&rft.volume=23&rft.issue=6&rft.pages=121-123&rft.date=1963-06-01&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1093%2Fanalys%2F23.6.121&rft.aulast=Gettier&rft.aufirst=Edmund+L.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fanalysis%2Farticle-abstract%2F23%2F6%2F121%2F109949&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-2"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-2">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf">"Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"</a></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-3"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-3">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFPopiel2016" class="citation thesis cs1">Popiel, Maximilian (2016). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2216&context=etd"><i>A Systematic Review of Studies Using Gettier-Type Thought Experiments</i></a> (Thesis). University of Denver<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2020-12-25</span></span>. <q>One use of the Gettier cases has been to test cross-cultural differences on epistemic intuitions.</q></cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adissertation&rft.title=A+Systematic+Review+of+Studies+Using+Gettier-Type+Thought+Experiments&rft.inst=University+of+Denver&rft.date=2016&rft.aulast=Popiel&rft.aufirst=Maximilian&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fdigitalcommons.du.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D2216%26context%3Detd&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-4"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-4">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFIchikawaSteup2018" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis/">"The Analysis of Knowledge"</a>. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> (Summer 2018 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University<span class="reference-accessdate">. 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Oxford University Press. p. 58. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780199661268" title="Special:BookSources/9780199661268"><bdi>9780199661268</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Knowledge%3A+A+Very+Short+Introduction&rft.pages=58&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press&rft.date=2014&rft.isbn=9780199661268&rft.aulast=Nagel&rft.aufirst=Jennifer&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3Da_2KBAAAQBAJ%26pg%3DPA58&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-6"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-6">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDreyfus1997" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Georges_Dreyfus" title="Georges Dreyfus">Dreyfus, Georges B.J</a> (1997). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=0YU37h9TplwC&pg=PA292"><i>Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations</i></a>. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. p. 292. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780791430972" title="Special:BookSources/9780791430972"><bdi>9780791430972</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Recognizing+Reality%3A+Dharmakirti%27s+Philosophy+and+its+Tibetan+Interpretations&rft.place=Albany%2C+NY&rft.pages=292&rft.pub=SUNY+Press&rft.date=1997&rft.isbn=9780791430972&rft.aulast=Dreyfus&rft.aufirst=Georges+B.J&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3D0YU37h9TplwC%26pg%3DPA292&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-7"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-7">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFStoltz2007" class="citation journal cs1">Stoltz, Jonathan (2007). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://ir.stthomas.edu/context/cas_phil_pub/article/1118/viewcontent/Stoltz_Gettier.pdf">"Gettier and Factivity in Indo-Tibetan Epistemology"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. <i>Philosophical Quarterly</i>. <b>57</b> (228): 394–415. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9213.2007.493.x">10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.493.x</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Philosophical+Quarterly&rft.atitle=Gettier+and+Factivity+in+Indo-Tibetan+Epistemology&rft.volume=57&rft.issue=228&rft.pages=394-415&rft.date=2007&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.1467-9213.2007.493.x&rft.aulast=Stoltz&rft.aufirst=Jonathan&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fir.stthomas.edu%2Fcontext%2Fcas_phil_pub%2Farticle%2F1118%2Fviewcontent%2FStoltz_Gettier.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-8"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-8">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFGaneri2007" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Jonardon_Ganeri" title="Jonardon Ganeri">Ganeri, Jonardon</a> (2007). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=5dITDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA132"><i>The Concealed Art of The Soul: Theories of Self and Practices of Truth in Indian Ethics and Epistemology</i></a>. Oxford University Press. pp. 132–138. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-920241-6" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-19-920241-6"><bdi>978-0-19-920241-6</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=The+Concealed+Art+of+The+Soul%3A+Theories+of+Self+and+Practices+of+Truth+in+Indian+Ethics+and+Epistemology&rft.pages=132-138&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press&rft.date=2007&rft.isbn=978-0-19-920241-6&rft.aulast=Ganeri&rft.aufirst=Jonardon&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3D5dITDAAAQBAJ%26pg%3DPA132&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-9"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-9">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFScheffler1965" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Israel_Scheffler" title="Israel Scheffler">Scheffler, Israel</a> (1965). <span class="id-lock-registration" title="Free registration required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/conditionsofknow00sche"><i>Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education</i></a></span>. Chicago: Scott, Foresman. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-226-73668-6" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-226-73668-6"><bdi>978-0-226-73668-6</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Conditions+of+Knowledge%3A+An+Introduction+to+Epistemology+and+Education&rft.place=Chicago&rft.pub=Scott%2C+Foresman&rft.date=1965&rft.isbn=978-0-226-73668-6&rft.aulast=Scheffler&rft.aufirst=Israel&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Farchive.org%2Fdetails%2Fconditionsofknow00sche&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-McGrews_on_Gettier-10"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-McGrews_on_Gettier_10-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFMcGrewMcGrew2007" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Timothy_J._McGrew" title="Timothy J. McGrew">McGrew, Timothy</a>; McGrew, Lydia (2007). "Chapter 1: Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem". <i>Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason</i>. Routledge. pp. 7–34. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-415-77067-5" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-415-77067-5"><bdi>978-0-415-77067-5</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=Chapter+1%3A+Internalism+and+the+Collapse+of+the+Gettier+Problem&rft.btitle=Internalism+and+Epistemology%3A+The+Architecture+of+Reason&rft.pages=7-34&rft.pub=Routledge&rft.date=2007&rft.isbn=978-0-415-77067-5&rft.aulast=McGrew&rft.aufirst=Timothy&rft.au=McGrew%2C+Lydia&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-11"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-11">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFPollockCruz1999" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/John_L._Pollock" title="John L. Pollock">Pollock, John L.</a>; Cruz, Joseph (1999). <i>Contemporary Theories of Knowledge</i> (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-8476-8936-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-8476-8936-1"><bdi>978-0-8476-8936-1</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Contemporary+Theories+of+Knowledge&rft.edition=2nd&rft.pub=Rowman+%26+Littlefield+Publishers&rft.date=1999&rft.isbn=978-0-8476-8936-1&rft.aulast=Pollock&rft.aufirst=John+L.&rft.au=Cruz%2C+Joseph&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-PlantingaWCD-12"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-PlantingaWCD_12-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-PlantingaWCD_12-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFPlantinga1992" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga" title="Alvin Plantinga">Plantinga, Alvin</a> (1992). <i>Warrant: The Current Debate</i>. Oxford University Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-507862-6" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-19-507862-6"><bdi>978-0-19-507862-6</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Warrant%3A+The+Current+Debate&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press&rft.date=1992&rft.isbn=978-0-19-507862-6&rft.aulast=Plantinga&rft.aufirst=Alvin&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-13"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-13">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFChisholm1966" class="citation book cs1">Chisholm, Roderick (1966). <i>Theory of Knowledge</i>. p. 23.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Theory+of+Knowledge&rft.pages=23&rft.date=1966&rft.aulast=Chisholm&rft.aufirst=Roderick&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-14"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-14">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFSkyrms1967" class="citation journal cs1">Skyrms, Brian (22 June 1967). 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"Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge". <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i>. <b>73</b> (20): 771–791. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2025679">10.2307/2025679</a>. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025679">2025679</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:163160027">163160027</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Philosophy&rft.atitle=Discrimination+and+Perceptual+Knowledge&rft.volume=73&rft.issue=20&rft.pages=771-791&rft.date=1976-11-18&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A163160027%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F2025679%23id-name%3DJSTOR&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.2307%2F2025679&rft.aulast=Goldman&rft.aufirst=Alvin+I.&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-16"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-16">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFLevin2006" class="citation journal cs1">Levin, Michael (2006-07-05). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-5470-2">"Gettier Cases without False Lemmas?"</a>. <i>Erkenntnis</i>. <b>64</b> (3): 381–392. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10670-005-5470-2">10.1007/s10670-005-5470-2</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0165-0106">0165-0106</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:121760269">121760269</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Erkenntnis&rft.atitle=Gettier+Cases+without+False+Lemmas%3F&rft.volume=64&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=381-392&rft.date=2006-07-05&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A121760269%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.issn=0165-0106&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1007%2Fs10670-005-5470-2&rft.aulast=Levin&rft.aufirst=Michael&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs10670-005-5470-2&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-17"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-17">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFZagzebski1994" class="citation journal cs1">Zagzebski, Linda (1994). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philarchive.org/rec/ZAGTIO">"Zagzebski, L. (1994). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems"</a>. <i>The Philosophical Quarterly</i>. <b>44</b> (174): 65–73. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2220147">10.2307/2220147</a>. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2220147">2220147</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:170535616">170535616</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+Philosophical+Quarterly&rft.atitle=Zagzebski%2C+L.+%281994%29.+The+Inescapability+of+Gettier+Problems&rft.volume=44&rft.issue=174&rft.pages=65-73&rft.date=1994&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A170535616%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F2220147%23id-name%3DJSTOR&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.2307%2F2220147&rft.aulast=Zagzebski&rft.aufirst=Linda&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fphilarchive.org%2Frec%2FZAGTIO&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-18"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-18">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">James Pryor. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/epist2004/notes/gettier.html">Theory of Knowledge - The Gettier Problem</a> (archive)</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Boghossian_on_Justification-19"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Boghossian_on_Justification_19-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFPaul_Boghossian2007" class="citation cs2">Paul Boghossian (2007), <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fear-of-knowledge-9780199230419?cc=us&lang=en&"><i>Fear of Knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism</i></a>, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-923041-9" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-19-923041-9"><bdi>978-0-19-923041-9</bdi></a></cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Fear+of+Knowledge%3A+Against+relativism+and+constructivism&rft.place=Oxford%2C+UK&rft.pub=Clarendon+Press&rft.date=2007&rft.isbn=978-0-19-923041-9&rft.au=Paul+Boghossian&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fglobal.oup.com%2Facademic%2Fproduct%2Ffear-of-knowledge-9780199230419%3Fcc%3Dus%26lang%3Den%26&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span>, Chapter 7, p 95–101.</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-20"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-20">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.umass.edu/chronicle/archives/00/08-25/philosopher41.html">Philosopher</a> umass.edu <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070207020019/http://www.umass.edu/chronicle/archives/00/08-25/philosopher41.html">Archived</a> 2007-02-07 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-21"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-21">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">See p. 481 in Peirce, C. S. (1905), "Issues of Pragmaticism", The <i>Monist</i>, vol. 15, pp. 481–499, <i>Google Book Search Beta</i> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/monist18instgoog">Eprint</a>, <i>Internet Archive</i> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/monistquart15hegeuoft">Eprint</a>. Reprinted in <i>Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce</i> v. 5 paragraphs 438–463, see 438, and in <i>Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings</i>, pp. 203–226)</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-22"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-22">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Peirce, C. S. (1899), "F.R.L." [First Rule of Logic], unpaginated manuscript, c. 1899, CP 1.135–140. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm">Eprint</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm">Archived</a> January 6, 2012, at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>.</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-23"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-23">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718–720 in J.M. Baldwin. ed., <i><a href="/wiki/James_Mark_Baldwin#dpp" title="James Mark Baldwin">Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology</a></i>, vol. 2. Reprinted, CP 5.565–573.</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-24"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-24">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Peirce, C.S. (1898), "Philosophy and the Conduct of Life", Lecture 1 of the Cambridge (MA) Conferences Lectures, published in <i>Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce</i> v. 1, paragraphs 616–48 in part and in <i>Reasoning and the Logic of Things</i>, Ketner (ed., intro.) and Putnam (intro., commentary), 105–22, reprinted in <i>The Essential Peirce</i>, v. 2, 27–41.</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-25"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-25">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFDretske1971" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="/wiki/Fred_Dretske" title="Fred Dretske">Dretske, Fred</a> (May 1971). "Conclusive reasons". <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i>. <b>49</b> (1): 1–22. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00048407112341001">10.1080/00048407112341001</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Australasian+Journal+of+Philosophy&rft.atitle=Conclusive+reasons&rft.volume=49&rft.issue=1&rft.pages=1-22&rft.date=1971-05&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1080%2F00048407112341001&rft.aulast=Dretske&rft.aufirst=Fred&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-26"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-26">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFNozick1981" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Robert_Nozick" title="Robert Nozick">Nozick, Robert</a> (1981). <span class="id-lock-registration" title="Free registration required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780674664791"><i>Philosophical Explanations</i></a></span>. Harvard University Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-674-66479-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-674-66479-1"><bdi>978-0-674-66479-1</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Philosophical+Explanations&rft.pub=Harvard+University+Press&rft.date=1981&rft.isbn=978-0-674-66479-1&rft.aulast=Nozick&rft.aufirst=Robert&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Farchive.org%2Fdetails%2Fisbn_9780674664791&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-27"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-27">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.example">Oxford, Oxford University Press</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130713130641/http://example/">Archived</a> 2013-07-13 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>, 1994</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-28"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-28">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">For a precise formulation of Fogelin's view, see Claudio Costa <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.example"><i>Lines of Thought: Rethinking Philosophical Assumptions</i></a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130713130641/http://example/">Archived</a> 2013-07-13 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>, CSP, 2014, ch. 5.</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-29"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-29">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFZaltaNodelman2010" class="citation journal cs1">Zalta, Edward; Nodelman, Uri (2010). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.3789%2Fisqv22n4.2010.04">"Funding Models for Collaborative Information Resources and Repositories: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Experience"</a>. <i>Information Standards Quarterly</i>. <b>22</b> (4): 15. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.3789%2Fisqv22n4.2010.04">10.3789/isqv22n4.2010.04</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1041-0031">1041-0031</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Information+Standards+Quarterly&rft.atitle=Funding+Models+for+Collaborative+Information+Resources+and+Repositories%3A+The+Stanford+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy+Experience&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=4&rft.pages=15&rft.date=2010&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.3789%2Fisqv22n4.2010.04&rft.issn=1041-0031&rft.aulast=Zalta&rft.aufirst=Edward&rft.au=Nodelman%2C+Uri&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.3789%252Fisqv22n4.2010.04&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-30"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-30">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFWeinbergNicholsStich2001" class="citation journal cs1">Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen (Spring–Fall 2001). "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions". <i>Philosophical Topics</i>. <b>29</b> (1–2): 429–460. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.5840%2Fphiltopics2001291%2F217">10.5840/philtopics2001291/217</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:17885700">17885700</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Philosophical+Topics&rft.atitle=Normativity+and+Epistemic+Intuitions&rft.chron=spring%E2%80%93fall&rft.volume=29&rft.issue=1%E2%80%932&rft.pages=429-460&rft.date=2001&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.5840%2Fphiltopics2001291%2F217&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A17885700%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.aulast=Weinberg&rft.aufirst=Jonathan+M.&rft.au=Nichols%2C+Shaun&rft.au=Stich%2C+Stephen&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-31"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-31">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFKimYuan2015" class="citation journal cs1">Kim, Minsun; Yuan, Yuan (2015). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMNCD">"No cross-cultural differences in the Gettier car case intuition: A replication study of Weinberg et al. 2001"</a>. <i>Episteme</i>. <b>12</b> (3): 355–361. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fepi.2015.17">10.1017/epi.2015.17</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:145552371">145552371</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Episteme&rft.atitle=No+cross-cultural+differences+in+the+Gettier+car+case+intuition%3A+A+replication+study+of+Weinberg+et+al.+2001&rft.volume=12&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=355-361&rft.date=2015&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1017%2Fepi.2015.17&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A145552371%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.aulast=Kim&rft.aufirst=Minsun&rft.au=Yuan%2C+Yuan&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Frec%2FKIMNCD&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-32"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-32">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFSeyedsayamdost2014" class="citation journal cs1">Seyedsayamdost, Hamid (2014). "On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication". <i>Episteme</i>. <b>12</b> (1): 95–116. <a href="/wiki/CiteSeerX_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="CiteSeerX (identifier)">CiteSeerX</a> <span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.697.8000">10.1.1.697.8000</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fepi.2014.27">10.1017/epi.2014.27</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:146363660">146363660</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Episteme&rft.atitle=On+Normativity+and+Epistemic+Intuitions%3A+Failure+of+Replication&rft.volume=12&rft.issue=1&rft.pages=95-116&rft.date=2014&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fciteseerx.ist.psu.edu%2Fviewdoc%2Fsummary%3Fdoi%3D10.1.1.697.8000%23id-name%3DCiteSeerX&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A146363660%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1017%2Fepi.2014.27&rft.aulast=Seyedsayamdost&rft.aufirst=Hamid&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-33"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-33">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFNagel2012" class="citation journal cs1">Nagel, Jennifer (November 2012). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philpapers.org/rec/NAGIAE">"Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology"</a>. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i>. <b>85</b> (3): 495–527. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1933-1592.2012.00634.x">10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00634.x</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Philosophy+and+Phenomenological+Research&rft.atitle=Intuitions+and+Experiments%3A+A+Defense+of+the+Case+Method+in+Epistemology&rft.volume=85&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=495-527&rft.date=2012-11&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.1933-1592.2012.00634.x&rft.aulast=Nagel&rft.aufirst=Jennifer&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Frec%2FNAGIAE&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-34"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-34">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFMacheryStichRoseChatterjee2015" class="citation journal cs1">Machery, Edouard; Stich, Stephen; Rose, David; Chatterjee, Amita; Karasawa, Kaori; Struchiner, Noel; Sirker, Smita; Usui, Naoki; Hashimoto, Takaaki (August 2015). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fnous.12110">"Gettier Across Cultures"</a>. <i>Noûs</i>. <b>51</b> (3): 645–664. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fnous.12110">10.1111/nous.12110</a></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=No%C3%BBs&rft.atitle=Gettier+Across+Cultures&rft.volume=51&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=645-664&rft.date=2015-08&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1111%2Fnous.12110&rft.aulast=Machery&rft.aufirst=Edouard&rft.au=Stich%2C+Stephen&rft.au=Rose%2C+David&rft.au=Chatterjee%2C+Amita&rft.au=Karasawa%2C+Kaori&rft.au=Struchiner%2C+Noel&rft.au=Sirker%2C+Smita&rft.au=Usui%2C+Naoki&rft.au=Hashimoto%2C+Takaaki&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1111%252Fnous.12110&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> </ol></div></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Further_reading">Further reading</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=23" title="Edit section: Further reading"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1184024115">.mw-parser-output .div-col{margin-top:0.3em;column-width:30em}.mw-parser-output .div-col-small{font-size:90%}.mw-parser-output .div-col-rules{column-rule:1px solid #aaa}.mw-parser-output .div-col dl,.mw-parser-output .div-col ol,.mw-parser-output .div-col ul{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .div-col li,.mw-parser-output .div-col dd{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}</style><div class="div-col" style="column-width: 30em;"> <ul><li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFAlai2011" class="citation journal cs1">Alai, Mario (2011). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www2.units.it/episteme/L&PS_Vol9No1/L&PS_Vol9No1_2011_48_Alai.pdf">"Subjective and Objective Justification in the Solution of Gettier's Problem"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. <i>L&PS - Logic and Philosophy of Science</i>. <b>IX</b> (1): 493–501<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">13 November</span> 2019</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=L%26PS+-+Logic+and+Philosophy+of+Science&rft.atitle=Subjective+and+Objective+Justification+in+the+Solution+of+Gettier%27s+Problem&rft.volume=IX&rft.issue=1&rft.pages=493-501&rft.date=2011&rft.aulast=Alai&rft.aufirst=Mario&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww2.units.it%2Fepisteme%2FL%26PS_Vol9No1%2FL%26PS_Vol9No1_2011_48_Alai.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li>Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter D. Klein (eds.), <i>Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem</i>, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 2017. <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-198-72455-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-198-72455-1">978-0-198-72455-1</a></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFFloridi2004" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="/wiki/Luciano_Floridi" title="Luciano Floridi">Floridi, Luciano</a> (2004). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070926151838/http://www.philosophyofinformation.net/pdf/otluotgp.pdf">"On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. <i>Synthese</i>. <b>142</b> (1): 61–79. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1023%2FB%3ASYNT.0000047709.27594.c4">10.1023/B:SYNT.0000047709.27594.c4</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:9602099">9602099</a>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.philosophyofinformation.net/pdf/otluotgp.pdf">the original</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span> on 2007-09-26.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Synthese&rft.atitle=On+the+Logical+Unsolvability+of+the+Gettier+Problem&rft.volume=142&rft.issue=1&rft.pages=61-79&rft.date=2004&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1023%2FB%3ASYNT.0000047709.27594.c4&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A9602099%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft.aulast=Floridi&rft.aufirst=Luciano&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophyofinformation.net%2Fpdf%2Fotluotgp.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Alvin_Goldman" title="Alvin Goldman">Alvin Goldman</a>: "A Causal Theory of Knowing" in <cite>The Journal of Philosophy</cite> v. 64 (1967), pp. 357–372.</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Stephen_Hetherington" title="Stephen Hetherington">Stephen Hetherington</a>, <i>Knowledge and the Gettier Problem</i>, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge), 2016. <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-107-14956-4" title="Special:BookSources/978-1-107-14956-4">978-1-107-14956-4</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Richard_Kirkham" title="Richard Kirkham">Richard Kirkham</a>, "Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?" <cite>Mind</cite>, 93, 1984.</li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFLehrerPaxson1969" class="citation journal cs1">Lehrer, Keith; Paxson, Thomas Jr. (24 April 1969). "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief". <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i>. <b>66</b> (8): 225–237. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2024435">10.2307/2024435</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0022-362X">0022-362X</a>. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024435">2024435</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:141673516">141673516</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Philosophy&rft.atitle=Knowledge%3A+Undefeated+Justified+True+Belief&rft.volume=66&rft.issue=8&rft.pages=225-237&rft.date=1969-04-24&rft.issn=0022-362X&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A141673516%23id-name%3DS2CID&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F2024435%23id-name%3DJSTOR&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.2307%2F2024435&rft.aulast=Lehrer&rft.aufirst=Keith&rft.au=Paxson%2C+Thomas+Jr.&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFSwain1974" class="citation journal cs1">Swain, Marshall (January 1974). "Epistemic Defeasibility". <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i>. <b>II</b> (1). University of Illinois Press: 15–25. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.4324%2F9780415249126-P012-1">10.4324/9780415249126-P012-1</a>. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009512">20009512</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=American+Philosophical+Quarterly&rft.atitle=Epistemic+Defeasibility&rft.volume=II&rft.issue=1&rft.pages=15-25&rft.date=1974-01&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.4324%2F9780415249126-P012-1&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F20009512%23id-name%3DJSTOR&rft.aulast=Swain&rft.aufirst=Marshall&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul> </div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="External_links">External links</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Gettier_problem&action=edit&section=24" title="Edit section: External links"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <ul><li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170324194044/http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/gettierphilreading.pdf">Text of the article</a></li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://philpapers.org/browse/the-gettier-problem">Gettier problem</a> at <a href="/wiki/PhilPapers" title="PhilPapers">PhilPapers</a></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite id="CITEREFZalta" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1"><a href="/wiki/Edward_N._Zalta" title="Edward N. Zalta">Zalta, Edward N.</a> (ed.). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/">"The Analysis of Knowledge"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=The+Analysis+of+Knowledge&rft.btitle=Stanford+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fknowledge-analysis%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.inphoproject.org/idea/1550">Gettier problem</a> at the <a href="/wiki/Indiana_Philosophy_Ontology_Project" class="mw-redirect" title="Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project">Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project</a></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite class="citation encyclopaedia cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier">"Gettier problem"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Internet_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=Gettier+problem&rft.btitle=Internet+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iep.utm.edu%2Fgettier&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222"><cite class="citation encyclopaedia cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/safety-c">"Safety Condition for Knowledge"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Internet_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=Safety+Condition+for+Knowledge&rft.btitle=Internet+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iep.utm.edu%2Fsafety-c&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AGettier+problem" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul> <div class="navbox-styles"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1129693374">.mw-parser-output .hlist dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist ul{margin:0;padding:0}.mw-parser-output .hlist dd,.mw-parser-output .hlist dt,.mw-parser-output .hlist li{margin:0;display:inline}.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline ul,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl ul,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol ul,.mw-parser-output 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aria-labelledby="Epistemology" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks hlist mw-collapsible mw-collapsed navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="2"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1129693374"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1239400231">.mw-parser-output .navbar{display:inline;font-size:88%;font-weight:normal}.mw-parser-output .navbar-collapse{float:left;text-align:left}.mw-parser-output .navbar-boxtext{word-spacing:0}.mw-parser-output .navbar ul{display:inline-block;white-space:nowrap;line-height:inherit}.mw-parser-output .navbar-brackets::before{margin-right:-0.125em;content:"[ "}.mw-parser-output .navbar-brackets::after{margin-left:-0.125em;content:" ]"}.mw-parser-output .navbar li{word-spacing:-0.125em}.mw-parser-output .navbar a>span,.mw-parser-output .navbar a>abbr{text-decoration:inherit}.mw-parser-output .navbar-mini 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J. Ayer">A. J. Ayer</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/George_Berkeley" title="George Berkeley">George Berkeley</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Laurence_BonJour" title="Laurence BonJour">Laurence BonJour</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Gilles_Deleuze" title="Gilles Deleuze">Gilles Deleuze</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Keith_DeRose" title="Keith DeRose">Keith DeRose</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_Dewey" title="John Dewey">John Dewey</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Fred_Dretske" title="Fred Dretske">Fred Dretske</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Edmund_Gettier" title="Edmund Gettier">Edmund Gettier</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Alvin_Goldman" title="Alvin Goldman">Alvin Goldman</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Nelson_Goodman" title="Nelson Goodman">Nelson Goodman</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Paul_Grice" title="Paul Grice">Paul Grice</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Anil_Gupta_(philosopher)" title="Anil Gupta (philosopher)">Anil Gupta</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Susan_Haack" title="Susan Haack">Susan Haack</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard" title="Søren Kierkegaard">Søren Kierkegaard</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Peter_D._Klein" title="Peter D. Klein">Peter Klein</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Saul_Kripke" title="Saul Kripke">Saul Kripke</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Hilary_Kornblith" title="Hilary Kornblith">Hilary Kornblith</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher)" title="David Lewis (philosopher)">David Lewis</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_Locke" title="John Locke">John Locke</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/G._E._Moore" title="G. E. Moore">G. E. Moore</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_McDowell" title="John McDowell">John McDowell</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Robert_Nozick" title="Robert Nozick">Robert Nozick</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga" title="Alvin Plantinga">Alvin Plantinga</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Duncan_Pritchard" title="Duncan Pritchard">Duncan Pritchard</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/James_Pryor" title="James Pryor">James Pryor</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Willard_Van_Orman_Quine" title="Willard Van Orman Quine">W. V. O. Quine</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Thomas_Reid" title="Thomas Reid">Thomas Reid</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Gilbert Ryle</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Wilfrid_Sellars" title="Wilfrid Sellars">Wilfrid Sellars</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Susanna_Siegel" title="Susanna Siegel">Susanna Siegel</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ernest_Sosa" title="Ernest Sosa">Ernest Sosa</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/P._F._Strawson" title="P. F. Strawson">P. F. Strawson</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Timothy_Williamson" title="Timothy Williamson">Timothy Williamson</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein" title="Ludwig Wittgenstein">Ludwig Wittgenstein</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Nicholas_Wolterstorff" title="Nicholas Wolterstorff">Nicholas Wolterstorff</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Vienna_Circle" title="Vienna Circle">Vienna Circle</a></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/List_of_epistemologists" title="List of epistemologists">more...</a></i></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="/wiki/Category:Epistemological_theories" title="Category:Epistemological theories">Theories</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Coherentism" title="Coherentism">Coherentism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Constructivist_epistemology" class="mw-redirect" title="Constructivist epistemology">Constructivism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Contextualism" title="Contextualism">Contextualism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Empiricism" title="Empiricism">Empiricism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Evolutionary_epistemology" title="Evolutionary epistemology">Evolutionary epistemology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Fallibilism" title="Fallibilism">Fallibilism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Feminist_epistemology" title="Feminist epistemology">Feminist epistemology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Fideism" title="Fideism">Fideism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Foundationalism" title="Foundationalism">Foundationalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Semantic_holism" title="Semantic holism">Holism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Infinitism" title="Infinitism">Infinitism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Innatism" title="Innatism">Innatism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism" title="Naïve realism">Naïve realism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Naturalized_epistemology" title="Naturalized epistemology">Naturalized epistemology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Phenomenalism" title="Phenomenalism">Phenomenalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Positivism" title="Positivism">Positivism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Rationalism" title="Rationalism">Rationalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Reductionism" title="Reductionism">Reductionism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Reliabilism" title="Reliabilism">Reliabilism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism" title="Direct and indirect realism">Representational realism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Philosophical_skepticism" title="Philosophical skepticism">Skepticism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Transcendental_idealism" title="Transcendental idealism">Transcendental idealism</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="/wiki/Category:Concepts_in_epistemology" title="Category:Concepts in epistemology">Concepts</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori" title="A priori and a posteriori"><i>A priori</i> knowledge</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori" title="A priori and a posteriori"><i>A posteriori</i> knowledge</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Philosophical_analysis" title="Philosophical analysis">Analysis</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction" title="Analytic–synthetic distinction">Analytic–synthetic distinction</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Belief" title="Belief">Belief</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Common_sense" title="Common sense">Common sense</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Descriptive_knowledge" class="mw-redirect" title="Descriptive knowledge">Descriptive knowledge</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Exploratory_thought" title="Exploratory thought">Exploratory thought</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Epistemic_injustice" title="Epistemic injustice">Epistemic injustice</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Epistemic_virtue" title="Epistemic virtue">Epistemic virtue</a></li> <li><a class="mw-selflink selflink">Gettier problem</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Inductive_reasoning" title="Inductive reasoning">Induction</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Internalism_and_externalism" title="Internalism and externalism">Internalism and externalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Justification_(epistemology)" title="Justification (epistemology)">Justification</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Knowledge" title="Knowledge">Knowledge</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Objectivity_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Objectivity (philosophy)">Objectivity</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Privileged_access" class="mw-redirect" title="Privileged access">Privileged access</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Problem_of_induction" title="Problem of induction">Problem of induction</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">Problem of other minds</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Perception" title="Perception">Perception</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Procedural_knowledge" title="Procedural knowledge">Procedural knowledge</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Proposition" title="Proposition">Proposition</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Regress_argument" class="mw-redirect" title="Regress argument">Regress argument</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Simplicity" title="Simplicity">Simplicity</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Truth" title="Truth">Truth</a></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Index_of_epistemology_articles" title="Index of epistemology articles">more...</a></i></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Related articles</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Outline_of_epistemology" title="Outline of epistemology">Outline of epistemology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Faith_and_rationality" title="Faith and 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