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Account Manipulation: Device Registration, Sub-technique T1098.005 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
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Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.</p><p>MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-1') id="scite-ref-1-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and "PrintNightmare" Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022."data-reference="CISA MFA PrintNightmare"><sup><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="0" aria-describedby="qtip-0">[1]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-2') id="scite-ref-2-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Kelly Jackson Higgins. (2021, January 7). FireEye's Mandia: 'Severity-Zero Alert' Led to Discovery of SolarWinds Attack. Retrieved April 18, 2022."data-reference="DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds"><sup><a href="https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="1" aria-describedby="qtip-1">[2]</a></sup></span> In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-3') id="scite-ref-3-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023."data-reference="Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022"><sup><a href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="2" aria-describedby="qtip-2">[3]</a></sup></span></p><p>Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-4') id="scite-ref-4-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, March 3). Deep-dive to Azure AD device join. Retrieved March 9, 2022."data-reference="AADInternals - Device Registration"><sup><a href="https://o365blog.com/post/devices/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="3" aria-describedby="qtip-3">[4]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-5') id="scite-ref-5-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, September 6). Bypassing conditional access by faking device compliance. Retrieved March 4, 2022."data-reference="AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass"><sup><a href="https://o365blog.com/post/mdm" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="4" aria-describedby="qtip-4">[5]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-6') id="scite-ref-6-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022."data-reference="Microsoft DEV-0537"><sup><a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="5" aria-describedby="qtip-5">[6]</a></sup></span> </p><p>Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct <a href="/techniques/T1534">Internal Spearphishing</a> campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-7') id="scite-ref-7-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, January 26). Evolved phishing: Device registration trick adds to phishers’ toolbox for victims without MFA. Retrieved March 4, 2022."data-reference="Microsoft - Device Registration"><sup><a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="6" aria-describedby="qtip-6">[7]</a></sup></span> Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a <a href="/techniques/T1499/002">Service Exhaustion Flood</a> on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-8') id="scite-ref-8-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, January 31). BPRT unleashed: Joining multiple devices to Azure AD and Intune. Retrieved March 4, 2022."data-reference="AADInternals - BPRT"><sup><a href="https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="7" aria-describedby="qtip-7">[8]</a></sup></span></p> </div> </div> <div class="col-md-4"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"> <div class="row card-data" id="card-id"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">ID: </span>T1098.005 </div> </div> <!--stop-indexing-for-search--> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Sub-technique of: </span> <a href="/techniques/T1098">T1098</a> </div> </div> <!--start-indexing-for-search--> <div id="card-tactics" class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The tactic objectives that the (sub-)technique can be used to accomplish">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Tactics:</span> <a href="/tactics/TA0003">Persistence</a>, <a href="/tactics/TA0004">Privilege Escalation</a> </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The system an adversary is operating within; could be an operating system or application">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Platforms: </span>Identity Provider, Windows </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Contributors: </span>Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security; Arun Seelagan, CISA; Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank; Mike Moran; Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Version: </span>1.3 </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Created: </span>04 March 2022 </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Last Modified: </span>25 September 2024 </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="text-center pt-2 version-button live"> <div class="live"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Permalink to this version of T1098.005" href="/versions/v16/techniques/T1098/005/" data-test-ignore="true">Version Permalink</a> </div> <div class="permalink"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Go to the live version of T1098.005" href="/versions/v16/techniques/T1098/005/" data-test-ignore="true">Live Version</a><!--do not change this line without also changing versions.py--> </div> </div> </div> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="examples">Procedure Examples</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table table-bordered table-alternate mt-2"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Name</th> <th scope="col">Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/software/S0677"> S0677 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/software/S0677"> AADInternals </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/software/S0677">AADInternals</a> can register a device to Azure AD.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-9') id="scite-ref-9-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022."data-reference="AADInternals Documentation"><sup><a href="https://o365blog.com/aadinternals" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="8" aria-describedby="qtip-8">[9]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/groups/G0016"> G0016 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/groups/G0016"> APT29 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/groups/G0016">APT29</a> has enrolled their own devices into compromised cloud tenants, including enrolling a device in MFA to an Azure AD environment following a successful password guessing attack against a dormant account.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-3') id="scite-ref-3-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023."data-reference="Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022"><sup><a href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="2" aria-describedby="qtip-2">[3]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-10') id="scite-ref-10-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="UK National Cyber Security Center et al. (2024, February). SVR cyber actors adapt tactics for initial cloud access. Retrieved March 1, 2024."data-reference="NCSC et al APT29 2024"><sup><a href="https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2024/240226.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="9" aria-describedby="qtip-9">[10]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/campaigns/C0027"> C0027 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/campaigns/C0027"> C0027 </a> </td> <td> <p>During <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0027">C0027</a>, <a href="/groups/G1015">Scattered Spider</a> registered devices for MFA to maintain persistence through victims' VPN.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-11') id="scite-ref-11-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Parisi, T. (2022, December 2). Not a SIMulation: CrowdStrike Investigations Reveal Intrusion Campaign Targeting Telco and BPO Companies. Retrieved June 30, 2023."data-reference="Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022"><sup><a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/analysis-of-intrusion-campaign-targeting-telecom-and-bpo-companies/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="10" aria-describedby="qtip-10">[11]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/campaigns/C0024"> C0024 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/campaigns/C0024"> SolarWinds Compromise </a> </td> <td> <p>During the <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024">SolarWinds Compromise</a>, <a href="/groups/G0016">APT29</a> registered devices in order to enable mailbox syncing via the <code>Set-CASMailbox</code> command.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-12') id="scite-ref-12-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020."data-reference="Volexity SolarWinds"><sup><a href="https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="11" aria-describedby="qtip-11">[12]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="mitigations">Mitigations</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table table-bordered table-alternate mt-2"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Mitigation</th> <th scope="col">Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1032"> M1032 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1032"> Multi-factor Authentication </a> </td> <td> <p>Require multi-factor authentication to register devices in Entra ID.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-7') id="scite-ref-7-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, January 26). Evolved phishing: Device registration trick adds to phishers’ toolbox for victims without MFA. Retrieved March 4, 2022."data-reference="Microsoft - Device Registration"><sup><a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="6" aria-describedby="qtip-6">[7]</a></sup></span> Configure multi-factor authentication systems to disallow enrolling new devices for inactive accounts.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-1') id="scite-ref-1-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and "PrintNightmare" Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022."data-reference="CISA MFA PrintNightmare"><sup><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="0" aria-describedby="qtip-0">[1]</a></sup></span> When first enrolling MFA, use conditional access policies to restrict device enrollment to trusted locations or devices, and consider using temporary access passes as an initial MFA solution to enroll a device.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-3') id="scite-ref-3-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023."data-reference="Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022"><sup><a href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="2" aria-describedby="qtip-2">[3]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id="detection">Detection</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table datasources-table table-bordered"> <thead> <tr> <th class="p-2" scope="col">ID</th> <th class="p-2 nowrap" scope="col">Data Source</th> <th class="p-2 nowrap" scope="col">Data Component</th> <th class="p-2" scope="col">Detects</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0026"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0026">DS0026</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0026">Active Directory</a> </td> <!-- Add first data component here --> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0026/#Active%20Directory%20Object%20Creation">Active Directory Object Creation</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor for the registration or joining of new device objects in Active Directory. Raise alerts when new devices are registered or joined without using MFA.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-13') id="scite-ref-13-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Microsoft. (2020, September 16). Azure Active Directory security operations for devices. Retrieved February 21, 2023."data-reference="Microsoft Azure AD Security Operations for Devices"><sup><a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="12" aria-describedby="qtip-12">[13]</a></sup></span></p><p>Analytic 1 - Device registration events with suspicious user agents, unusual OS types, OS versions, or display names.</p><p>Note: To detect the registration of potentially malicious devices using hijacked admin credentials or from unusual IP addresses.</p><p><code> index="m365_audit_logs" Workload="AzureActiveDirectory" Operation IN ("Add registered owner to device", "Add device", "Add registered users to device")| search ActorUserPrincipalName!="expected_admin_user"| table CreationTime, ActorUserPrincipalName, IPAddress, ExtendedProperties, ModifiedProperties</code></p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0015"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0015">DS0015</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0015">Application Log</a> </td> <!-- Add first data component here --> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0015/#Application%20Log%20Content">Application Log Content</a> </td> <td> <p>Entra ID creates several log entries when new devices are enrolled, which can be monitored for unexpected device registrations.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-8') id="scite-ref-8-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, January 31). BPRT unleashed: Joining multiple devices to Azure AD and Intune. Retrieved March 4, 2022."data-reference="AADInternals - BPRT"><sup><a href="https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="7" aria-describedby="qtip-7">[8]</a></sup></span> Additionally, joined devices can be viewed via the Entra ID portal.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-14') id="scite-ref-14-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Microsoft. (2022, February 18). Manage device identities by using the Azure portal. Retrieved April 13, 2022."data-reference="Microsoft Manage Device Identities"><sup><a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/device-management-azure-portal" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="13" aria-describedby="qtip-13">[14]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0002"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0002">DS0002</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0002">User Account</a> </td> <!-- Add first data component here --> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0002/#User%20Account%20Modification">User Account Modification</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor user accounts for new and suspicious device associations, such as those originating from unusual sources, occurring at unusual times, or following a suspicious login.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-6') id="scite-ref-6-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022."data-reference="Microsoft DEV-0537"><sup><a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="5" aria-describedby="qtip-5">[6]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id="references">References</h2> <div class="row"> <div class="col"> <ol> <li> <span id="scite-1" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-1" href="https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a" target="_blank"> Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-2" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-2" href="https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack" target="_blank"> Kelly Jackson Higgins. (2021, January 7). FireEye's Mandia: 'Severity-Zero Alert' Led to Discovery of SolarWinds Attack. Retrieved April 18, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-3" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-3" href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft" target="_blank"> Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-4" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-4" href="https://o365blog.com/post/devices/" target="_blank"> Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, March 3). Deep-dive to Azure AD device join. Retrieved March 9, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-5" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-5" href="https://o365blog.com/post/mdm" target="_blank"> Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, September 6). Bypassing conditional access by faking device compliance. Retrieved March 4, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-6" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-6" href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/" target="_blank"> Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-7" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-7" href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa" target="_blank"> Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, January 26). Evolved phishing: Device registration trick adds to phishers’ toolbox for victims without MFA. Retrieved March 4, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> </ol> </div> <div class="col"> <ol start="8.0"> <li> <span id="scite-8" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-8" href="https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/" target="_blank"> Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, January 31). BPRT unleashed: Joining multiple devices to Azure AD and Intune. Retrieved March 4, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-9" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-9" href="https://o365blog.com/aadinternals" target="_blank"> Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-10" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-10" href="https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2024/240226.pdf" target="_blank"> UK National Cyber Security Center et al. (2024, February). SVR cyber actors adapt tactics for initial cloud access. Retrieved March 1, 2024. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-11" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-11" href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/analysis-of-intrusion-campaign-targeting-telecom-and-bpo-companies/" target="_blank"> Parisi, T. (2022, December 2). Not a SIMulation: CrowdStrike Investigations Reveal Intrusion Campaign Targeting Telco and BPO Companies. Retrieved June 30, 2023. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-12" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-12" href="https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/" target="_blank"> Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-13" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-13" href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices" target="_blank"> Microsoft. (2020, September 16). Azure Active Directory security operations for devices. Retrieved February 21, 2023. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-14" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-14" href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/device-management-azure-portal" target="_blank"> Microsoft. (2022, February 18). Manage device identities by using the Azure portal. 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