Command and Control, Tactic TA0011 - Enterprise

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class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/versions/v9/">Home</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/versions/v9/tactics/enterprise">Tactics</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/versions/v9/tactics/enterprise">Enterprise</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item">Command and Control</li> </ol> <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="v-" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="v--tab"></div> <div class="row"> <div class="col-xl-12"> <div class="jumbotron jumbotron-fluid"> <div class="container-fluid"> <h1> Command and Control </h1> <div class="row"> <div class="col-md-8"> <div class="description-body"> <p>The adversary is trying to communicate with compromised systems to control them.</p><p>Command and Control consists of techniques that adversaries may use to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network. Adversaries commonly attempt to mimic normal, expected traffic to avoid detection. There are many ways an adversary can establish command and control with various levels of stealth depending on the victim鈥檚 network structure and defenses.</p> </div> </div> <div class="col-md-4"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"> <div class="card-data"><span class="h5 card-title">ID:</span> TA0011</div> <div class="card-data"><span class="h5 card-title">Created: </span>17 October 2018</div> <div class="card-data"><span class="h5 card-title">Last Modified: </span>19 July 2019</div> </div> </div> <div class="text-center pt-2 version-button permalink"> <div class="live"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Permalink to this version of TA0011" href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0011/" data-test-ignore="true">Version Permalink</a> </div> <div class="permalink"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Go to the live version of TA0011" href="/tactics/TA0011/" data-test-ignore="true">Live Version</a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="techniques">Techniques</h2><h6 class="table-object-count">Techniques: 16</h6> <table class="table-techniques"> <thead> <tr> <td colspan="2">ID</td> <td>Name</td> <td>Description</td> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071"> T1071 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071"> Application Layer Protocol </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/001"> .001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/001"> Web Protocols </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/002"> .002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/002"> File Transfer Protocols </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/003"> .003 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/003"> Mail Protocols </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/004"> .004 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/004"> DNS </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1092"> T1092 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1092"> Communication Through Removable Media </a> </td> <td> Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1091">Replication Through Removable Media</a>. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132"> T1132 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132"> Data Encoding </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132/001"> .001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132/001"> Standard Encoding </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132/002"> .002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132/002"> Non-Standard Encoding </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001"> T1001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001"> Data Obfuscation </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/001"> .001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/001"> Junk Data </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/002"> .002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/002"> Steganography </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/003"> .003 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/003"> Protocol Impersonation </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568"> T1568 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568"> Dynamic Resolution </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/001"> .001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/001"> Fast Flux DNS </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/002"> .002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/002"> Domain Generation Algorithms </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/003"> .003 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/003"> DNS Calculation </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573"> T1573 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573"> Encrypted Channel </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573/001"> .001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573/001"> Symmetric Cryptography </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573/002"> .002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573/002"> Asymmetric Cryptography </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver鈥檚 public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1008"> T1008 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1008"> Fallback Channels </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1105"> T1105 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1105"> Ingress Tool Transfer </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1104"> T1104 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1104"> Multi-Stage Channels </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1095"> T1095 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1095"> Non-Application Layer Protocol </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1571"> T1571 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1571"> Non-Standard Port </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1572"> T1572 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1572"> Protocol Tunneling </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090"> T1090 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090"> Proxy </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0040">HTRAN</a>, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/001"> .001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/001"> Internal Proxy </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0040">HTRAN</a>, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/002"> .002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/002"> External Proxy </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0040">HTRAN</a>, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/003"> .003 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/003"> Multi-hop Proxy </a> </td> <td> To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. A particular variant of this behavior is to use onion routing networks, such as the publicly available TOR network. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/004"> .004 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/004"> Domain Fronting </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored). </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1219"> T1219 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1219"> Remote Access Software </a> </td> <td> An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205"> T1205 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205"> Traffic Signaling </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/001">Port Knocking</a>), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/001"> .001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/001"> Port Knocking </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. </td> </tr> <tr class="technique"> <td colspan="2"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102"> T1102 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102"> Web Service </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/001"> .001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/001"> Dead Drop Resolver </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/002"> .002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/002"> Bidirectional Communication </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. </td> </tr> <tr class="sub technique"> <td></td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/003"> .003 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/003"> One-Way Communication </a> </td> <td> Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response. </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div>  <div class="overlay search" id="search-overlay" style="display: none;"> <div class="overlay-inner">  <div class="search-header"> <div class="search-input"> <input type="text" id="search-input" placeholder="search"> </div> <div class="search-icons"> <div class="search-parsing-icon spinner-border" style="display: none" id="search-parsing-icon"></div> <div class="close-search-icon" id="close-search-icon">×</div> </div> </div>  <div id="search-body" class="search-body"> <div class="results" id="search-results">  </div> <div id="load-more-results" class="load-more-results"> <button class="btn btn-default" id="load-more-results-button">load more results</button> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <footer class="footer p-3"> <div class="container-fluid"> <div class="row"> <div class="col-4 col-sm-4 col-md-3"> <div class="footer-center-responsive my-auto"> <a href="https://www.mitre.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="MITRE"> <img src="/versions/v9/theme/images/mitrelogowhiteontrans.gif" class="mitre-logo-wtrans"> </a> </div> </div> <div class="col-2 col-sm-2 footer-responsive-break"></div> <div class="col-6 col-sm-6 text-center"> <p> 漏 2015-2021, The MITRE Corporation. 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