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Thompson" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/David L.%20Thompson"><span class="name">David L. Thompson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Kosgaard claims that selves/agents self-constitute during actions by relying on principles such as Kant’s Categorical Imperative. This intellectualist approach neglects the body. Merleau-Ponty considers the “lived body” and its perceptual world as the source of the unity of action, an approach that I extrapolate to all biological organisms. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/THOBAT-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-THOBAT-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('THOBAT-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-THOBAT-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('THOBAT-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-THOBAT-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSCHEPE-2" onclick="ee('click','SCHEPE-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','SCHEPE-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','SCHEPE-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHEPE-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Karl Schafer" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Karl%20Schafer"><span class="name">Karl Schafer</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), <em>Metaepistemology</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to develop such an argument. In doing so, I distinguish a variety of ways that argument might be understood, and discuss how both internalists and externalists might make use of the ideas within it. Then I argue that, despite these complexities,<span id="SCHEPE-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SCHEPE-2-abstract2").show();$("SCHEPE-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SCHEPE-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> the doxastic planning model continues to support a modest form of epistemic internalism. I conclude by showing that, far from conflicting with “anti-luminosity” arguments in epistemology, this form of internalism is best understood as a natural reaction to these arguments. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SCHEPE-2-abstract2").hide();$("SCHEPE-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SCHEPE-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SCHEPE-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SCHEPE-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SCHEPE-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SCHEPE-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SCHEPE-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eJENAS" onclick="ee('click','JENAS')" onmouseover="ee('over','JENAS')" onmouseout="ee('out','JENAS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/JENAS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">APDA 2021 Survey of Philosophy PhD Students and Recent Graduates: Demographic Data, Program Ratings, Academic Job Placement, and Non-Academic Careers.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Carolyn Dicey Jennings" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Carolyn Dicey%20Jennings"><span class="name">Carolyn Dicey Jennings</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alex Dayer" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alex%20Dayer"><span class="name">Alex Dayer</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Metaphilosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Doctoral graduates in philosophy are an excellent source of information about the discipline: they are at the cutting edge of research trends, have an inside view of research-focused departments, and their employment prospects provide early insights on the future health of the discipline. We report on the results of a survey sent to recent PhD graduates and current students, as well as data gathering efforts by Academic Placement Data and Analysis that have taken place over the past ten years. In<span id="JENAS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("JENAS-abstract2").show();$("JENAS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="JENAS-abstract2" style="display:none"> this report we especially focus on demographic representation, program ratings, academic job placement, and non-academic careers. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("JENAS-abstract2").hide();$("JENAS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/JENAS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-JENAS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('JENAS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-JENAS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('JENAS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-JENAS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTOPHEA" onclick="ee('click','TOPHEA')" onmouseover="ee('over','TOPHEA')" onmouseout="ee('out','TOPHEA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/TOPHEA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Brett Topey" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Brett%20Topey"><span class="name">Brett Topey</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence—i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty—is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it's claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim is incorrect. In particular, I motivate a minimal constraint on a reasonable treatment<span id="TOPHEA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TOPHEA-abstract2").show();$("TOPHEA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TOPHEA-abstract2" style="display:none"> of the evolution of self-locating beliefs over time and show that calibrationism is compatible with any generalized Bayesian approach that respects this constraint. I then use this result to argue that remaining steadfast isn't the response to higher-order evidence that maximizes expected accuracy. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TOPHEA-abstract2").hide();$("TOPHEA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/TOPHEA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-TOPHEA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TOPHEA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TOPHEA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TOPHEA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TOPHEA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eELMOMD" onclick="ee('click','ELMOMD')" onmouseover="ee('over','ELMOMD')" onmouseout="ee('out','ELMOMD')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ELMOMD"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Ontology-Driven Multicriteria Decision Support for Victim Evacuation.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Linda Elmhadhbi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Linda%20Elmhadhbi"><span class="name">Linda Elmhadhbi</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Mohamed-Hedi Karray" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Mohamed-Hedi%20Karray"><span class="name">Mohamed-Hedi Karray</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bernard Archimède" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Bernard%20Archimède"><span class="name">Bernard Archimède</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by J. Neil Otte" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/J. Neil%20Otte"><span class="name">J. Neil Otte</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Barry Smith" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Barry%20Smith"><span class="name">Barry Smith</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making</em>:1–30.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Abstract In light of the complexity of unfolding disasters, the diversity of rapidly evolving events, the enormous amount of generated information, and the huge pool of casualties, emergency responders (ERs) may be overwhelmed and in consequence poor decisions may be made. In fact, the possibility of transporting the wounded victims to one of several hospitals and the dynamic changes in healthcare resource availability make the decision process more complex. To tackle this problem, we propose a multicriteria decision support service, based<span id="ELMOMD-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ELMOMD-abstract2").show();$("ELMOMD-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ELMOMD-abstract2" style="display:none"> on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method, that aims to avoid overcrowding and outpacing the capacity of a hospital to effectively provide the best care to victims by finding out the most appropriate hospital that meets the victims’ needs. The proposed approach searches for the most appropriate healthcare institution that can effectively deal with the victims’ needs by considering the availability of the needed resources in the hospital, the victim’s wait time to receive the healthcare, and the transfer time that represents the hospital proximity to the disaster site. The evaluation and validation results showed that the assignment of hospitals was done successfully considering the needs of each victim and without overwhelming any single hospital. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ELMOMD-abstract2").hide();$("ELMOMD-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ELMOMD"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ELMOMD" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ELMOMD')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ELMOMD" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ELMOMD','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/citations/ELMOMD"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ELMOMD"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLEWPPO" onclick="ee('click','LEWPPO')" onmouseover="ee('over','LEWPPO')" onmouseout="ee('out','LEWPPO')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/LEWPPO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Principlist Pandemics: On Fraud Ethical Guidelines and the Importance of Transparency.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jonathan Lewis" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jonathan%20Lewis"><span class="name">Jonathan Lewis</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Udo Schuklenk" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Udo%20Schuklenk"><span class="name">Udo Schuklenk</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Michael Boylan (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BOYEPH">Ethical Public Health Policy Within Pandemics</a></em>. Cham: Springer.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The COVID-19 pandemic has coincided with the proliferation of ethical guidance documents to assist public health authorities, health care providers, practitioners and staff with responding to ethical challenges posed by the pandemic. Like ethical guidelines relating to infectious disease that have preceded them, what unites many COVID-19 guidance documents is their dependency on an under-developed approach to bioethical principlism, a normative framework that attempts to guide actions based on a list of prima facie, unranked ethical principles. By situating them in<span id="LEWPPO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LEWPPO-abstract2").show();$("LEWPPO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LEWPPO-abstract2" style="display:none"> relation to the key philosophical debates concerning bioethical principlism, we aim to explore the limits and limitations of pandemic ethical guidance documents as, specifically, ethics documents – documents that fulfil the functions of ethics as a fundamentally normative discipline. This means not only determining whether such ethical guidance documents can, in principle, provide adequate action guidance and action justification, but also, more importantly where pandemics are concerned, determining whether they support consistent decision making and transparent processes of justification. Having highlighted the problems with merely furnishing ethical guidelines with substantive ethical content in terms of principles and values, we argue that organizations that develop these documents should, instead, focus on the procedural dimensions of action guidance and action justification, which extend to questions regarding the make-up of the committees, panels and groups that develop such guidelines, the public transparency of justifications for specific pandemic-related advice or interventions and the development of explicit procedures for transparent and consistent decision making. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LEWPPO-abstract2").hide();$("LEWPPO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/LEWPPO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LEWPPO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LEWPPO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LEWPPO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LEWPPO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LEWPPO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDELCVU" onclick="ee('click','DELCVU')" onmouseover="ee('over','DELCVU')" onmouseout="ee('out','DELCVU')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DELCVU"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Consensus Versus Unanimity: Which Carries More Weight?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Finnur Dellsén" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Finnur%20Dellsén"><span class="name">Finnur Dellsén</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Around 97% of climate scientists endorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory that human activities are partly responsible for recent increases in global average temperatures. Clearly, this widespread endorsement of AGW is a reason for non-experts to believe in AGW. But what is the epistemic significance of the fact that some climate scientists do not endorse AGW? This paper contrasts expert unanimity, in which virtually no expert disagrees with some theory, with expert consensus, in which some non-negligible proportion either rejects<span id="DELCVU-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DELCVU-abstract2").show();$("DELCVU-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="DELCVU-abstract2" style="display:none"> or is uncertain about the theory. It is argued that, from a layperson’s point of view, an expert consensus is often stronger evidence for a theory’s truth than unanimity. Several lessons are drawn from this conclusion, e.g. concerning what laypeople should infer from expert pronouncements, how journalists should report on scientific theories, and how working scientists should communicate with the public. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DELCVU-abstract2").hide();$("DELCVU-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DELCVU"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DELCVU" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DELCVU')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DELCVU" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DELCVU','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DELCVU"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBRIELI" onclick="ee('click','BRIELI')" onmouseover="ee('over','BRIELI')" onmouseout="ee('out','BRIELI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BRIELI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Existential Loss in the Face of Mental Illness: Further Developing Perspectives on Personal Recovery in Mental Health Care.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bernice Brijan" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Bernice%20Brijan"><span class="name">Bernice Brijan</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Phenomenology and Mind</em>:250.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/BRIELI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BRIELI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BRIELI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BRIELI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BRIELI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BRIELI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eNOVTAF" onclick="ee('click','NOVTAF')" onmouseover="ee('over','NOVTAF')" onmouseout="ee('out','NOVTAF')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/NOVTAF"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Thinking as Folding: Deleuze’s Leibnizian Nomadology as a Non-Ontological Approach to Posthumanist Subjectivity.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Kyle Novak" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Kyle%20Novak"><span class="name">Kyle Novak</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy Today</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Rosi Braidotti has recently argued that the emerging scholarship on posthumanism should employ that she calls nomadic thinking. Braidotti identifies Deleuze’s work on Spinoza as the genesis of posthumanist ontology, yet Deleuze’s claims about nomadic thinking or nomadology come from his work on Leibniz. I argue that for posthumanist thought to theorize subjectivity beyond the human, it must use nomadology to overcome ontology itself. To make my argument, I demonstrate that while Braidotti is correct about Spinoza’s influence on Deleuze, his<span id="NOVTAF-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("NOVTAF-abstract2").show();$("NOVTAF-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="NOVTAF-abstract2" style="display:none"> work on Leibniz is necessary to adequately conceptualize nomadology. I employ Deleuze and Guattari’s figure of the Thought-brain as a model for subjectivity that they claim goes beyond the subject itself. Accordingly, I also look at some of the recent scholarship on Deleuze and the brain to illustrate what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the Thought-brain and how it could be used for conceptualizing posthuman subjectivity. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("NOVTAF-abstract2").hide();$("NOVTAF-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/NOVTAF"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-NOVTAF" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('NOVTAF')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-NOVTAF" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('NOVTAF','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-NOVTAF"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eHAZRLN" onclick="ee('click','HAZRLN')" onmouseover="ee('over','HAZRLN')" onmouseout="ee('out','HAZRLN')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/HAZRLN"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Reversing Logical Nihilism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Tristan Grøtvedt Haze" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Tristan Grøtvedt%20Haze"><span class="name">Tristan Grøtvedt Haze</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Synthese</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Gillian Russell has recently proposed counterexamples to such elementary argument forms as Conjunction Introduction (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Grass is green. Therefore, snow is white and grass is green’) and Identity (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Therefore, snow is white’). These purported counterexamples involve expressions that are sensitive to linguistic context—for example, a sentence which is true when it appears alone but false when embedded in a larger sentence. If they are genuine counterexamples, it looks as though logical nihilism—the view that<span id="HAZRLN-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAZRLN-abstract2").show();$("HAZRLN-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HAZRLN-abstract2" style="display:none"> there are no valid argument forms—might be true. In this paper, I argue that the purported counterexamples are not genuine, on the grounds that they equivocate. Having defused the threat of logical nihilism, I argue that the kind of linguistic context sensitivity at work in Russell’s purported counterexamples, if taken seriously, far from leading to logical nihilism, reveals new, previously undreamt-of valid forms. By way of proof of concept I present a simple logic, Solo-Only Propositional Logic (SOPL), designed to capture some of them. Along the way, some interesting subtleties about the fallacy of equivocation are revealed. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAZRLN-abstract2").hide();$("HAZRLN-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/HAZRLN"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HAZRLN" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HAZRLN')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HAZRLN" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HAZRLN','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HAZRLN"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROMBHP" onclick="ee('click','ROMBHP')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROMBHP')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROMBHP')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ROMBHP"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Black Hole Philosophy.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gustavo E. Romero" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Gustavo E.%20Romero"><span class="name">Gustavo E. Romero</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía</em> 53 (159):73–132.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Black holes are arguably the most extraordinary physical objects we know in the universe. Despite our thorough knowledge of black hole dynamics and our ability to solve Einstein’s equations in situations of ever increasing complexity, the deeper implications of the very existence of black holes for our understanding of space, time, causality, information, and many other things remain poorly understood. In this paper I survey some of these problems. If something is going to be clear from my presentation, I hope<span id="ROMBHP-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROMBHP-abstract2").show();$("ROMBHP-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ROMBHP-abstract2" style="display:none"> it will be that around black holes science and metaphysics become more interwoven than anywhere else in the universe. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROMBHP-abstract2").hide();$("ROMBHP-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ROMBHP"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROMBHP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROMBHP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROMBHP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROMBHP','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROMBHP"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMCAFOC" onclick="ee('click','MCAFOC')" onmouseover="ee('over','MCAFOC')" onmouseout="ee('out','MCAFOC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MCAFOC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">From One Conservative to Another: A Critique of Epistemic Conservatism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Blake McAllister" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Blake%20McAllister"><span class="name">Blake McAllister</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Southwest Philosophy Review</em> 37 (2).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Epistemic conservatism maintains that some beliefs are immediately justified simply because they are believed. The intuitive implausibility of this claim sets the burden of proof against it. Some epistemic conservatives have sought to lessen this burden by limiting its scope, but I show that they cannot remove it entirely. The only hope for epistemic conservativism is to appeal to its theoretical fruit. However, such a defense is undercut by the introduction of phenomenal conservatism, which accomplishes the same work from a<span id="MCAFOC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MCAFOC-abstract2").show();$("MCAFOC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MCAFOC-abstract2" style="display:none"> more intuitive starting point. Thus, if one opts for conservatism, better to choose the phenomenal kind. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MCAFOC-abstract2").hide();$("MCAFOC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MCAFOC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MCAFOC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MCAFOC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MCAFOC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MCAFOC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MCAFOC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROHETE" onclick="ee('click','ROHETE')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROHETE')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROHETE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ROHETE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Exploring the Ethics of Tuberculosis Human Challenge Models.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Abie Rohrig" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Abie%20Rohrig"><span class="name">Abie Rohrig</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Josh Morrison" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Josh%20Morrison"><span class="name">Josh Morrison</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jonathan Pugh" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jonathan%20Pugh"><span class="name">Jonathan Pugh</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Julian Savulescu" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Julian%20Savulescu"><span class="name">Julian Savulescu</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Helen McShane" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Helen%20McShane"><span class="name">Helen McShane</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">TB human challenge studies could accelerate TB vaccine development by reducing uncertainty in early-stage vaccine testing, selecting promising vaccine candidates for large-scale field trials, and identifying an immune correlate of protection. However, ethical concerns regarding the exposure of trial participants and bystanders to significant risk have been a limiting factor for TB human challenge models. We analyze the expected social value and risks of different types of TB human challenge models, and conclude that given the massive public health burden of<span id="ROHETE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROHETE-abstract2").show();$("ROHETE-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ROHETE-abstract2" style="display:none"> TB, challenge models with even scant probabilities of expediting TB vaccine authorization have enormous expected humanitarian value, saving between 33,000 and 1,375,000 lives over the next ten years. We argue that attenuated M.tb challenge trials can be conducted ethically, and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of conducting virulent M.tb challenge trials. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROHETE-abstract2").hide();$("ROHETE-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ROHETE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROHETE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROHETE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROHETE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROHETE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROHETE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWEBSAT-2" onclick="ee('click','WEBSAT-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WEBSAT-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WEBSAT-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WEBSAT-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Shame and the Ethical in Williams.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Aness Kim Webster" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Aness Kim%20Webster"><span class="name">Aness Kim Webster</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Stephen Bero" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Stephen%20Bero"><span class="name">Stephen Bero</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Andras Szigeti & Matthew Talbert (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SZIAFA">Agency, Fate, and Luck: Themes from Bernard Williams</a></em>. Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Bernard Williams’ Shame and Necessity (1993) was an influential early contribution to what has become a broader movement to rehabilitate shame as a moral emotion. But there is a tension in Williams’ discussion that presents an under-appreciated difficulty for efforts to rehabilitate shame. The tension arises between what Williams takes shame in its essence to be and what shame can do—the role that shame can be expected to play in ethical life. Williams can—and we argue, should—be read as avoiding the<span id="WEBSAT-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WEBSAT-2-abstract2").show();$("WEBSAT-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WEBSAT-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> difficulties stemming from this tension, but this requires a reevaluation of several of his central claims about shame’s role in ethical thought and experience. For instance, his broad claims that the “structures of shame” can “give a conception of one’s ethical identity” (93), and that shame “mediates … between ethical demands and the rest of life” (102), cannot be taken at face value. What emerges is a view that is in a sense less ambitious, but also more in tune with the spirit of Williams’ larger project. There may also, we suggest, be a more general lesson: We should be suspicious of the temptation to seek some special affinity between shame and ethical life, lest we distort our understanding of both. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WEBSAT-2-abstract2").hide();$("WEBSAT-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WEBSAT-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WEBSAT-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WEBSAT-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WEBSAT-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WEBSAT-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WEBSAT-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eUMBTAV" onclick="ee('click','UMBTAV')" onmouseover="ee('over','UMBTAV')" onmouseout="ee('out','UMBTAV')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/UMBTAV"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Towards a Value Sensitive Design Framework for Attaining Meaningful Human Control Over Autonomous Weapons Systems.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Steven Umbrello" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Steven%20Umbrello"><span class="name">Steven Umbrello</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Dissertation, Consortium FINO</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The international debate on the ethics and legality of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) as well as the call for a ban are primarily focused on the nebulous concept of fully autonomous AWS. More specifically, on AWS that are capable of target selection and engagement without human supervision or control. This thesis argues that such a conception of autonomy is divorced both from military planning and decision-making operations as well as the design requirements that govern AWS engineering and subsequently the tracking<span id="UMBTAV-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("UMBTAV-abstract2").show();$("UMBTAV-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="UMBTAV-abstract2" style="display:none"> and tracing of moral responsibility. To do this, this thesis marries two different levels of meaningful human control (MHC), termed levels of abstraction, to couple military operations with design ethics. In doing so, this thesis argues that the contentious notion of ‘full’ autonomy is not problematic under this two-tiered understanding of MHC. It proceeds to propose the value sensitive design (VSD) approach as a means for designing for MHC. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("UMBTAV-abstract2").hide();$("UMBTAV-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/UMBTAV"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-UMBTAV" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('UMBTAV')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-UMBTAV" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('UMBTAV','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-UMBTAV"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROSCWM-2" onclick="ee('click','ROSCWM-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROSCWM-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROSCWM-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ROSCWM-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Causes with Material Continuity.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lauren N. Ross" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Lauren N.%20Ross"><span class="name">Lauren N. Ross</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Biology and Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Recent philosophical work on causation has focused on distinctions across types of causal relationships. This paper argues for another distinction that has yet to receive attention in this work. This distinction has to do with whether causal relationships have “material continuity,” which refers to the reliable movement of material from cause to effect. This paper provides an analysis of material continuity and argues that causal relationships with this feature (1) are associated with a unique explanatory perspective, (2) are studied with<span id="ROSCWM-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROSCWM-2-abstract2").show();$("ROSCWM-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ROSCWM-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> distinct causal investigative methods, and (3) provide different types of causal control over their effects. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROSCWM-2-abstract2").hide();$("ROSCWM-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ROSCWM-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROSCWM-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROSCWM-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROSCWM-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROSCWM-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROSCWM-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDINEIA-5" onclick="ee('click','DINEIA-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','DINEIA-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','DINEIA-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DINEIA-5"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alexander Dinges" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alexander%20Dinges"><span class="name">Alexander Dinges</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2015</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Dissertation, Humboldt-University, Berlin</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DINEIA-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DINEIA-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DINEIA-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DINEIA-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DINEIA-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DINEIA-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eRAITLO" onclick="ee('click','RAITLO')" onmouseover="ee('over','RAITLO')" onmouseout="ee('out','RAITLO')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/RAITLO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Logic of the Evidential Conditional.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Eric Raidl" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Eric%20Raidl"><span class="name">Eric Raidl</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andrea Iacona" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Andrea%20Iacona"><span class="name">Andrea Iacona</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Vincenzo Crupi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Vincenzo%20Crupi"><span class="name">Vincenzo Crupi</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Review of Symbolic Logic</em>:1-13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In some recent works, Crupi and Iacona have outlined an analysis of ‘if’ based on Chrysippus’ idea that a conditional holds whenever the negation of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent. This paper presents a sound and complete system of conditional logic that accommodates their analysis. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a general method elaborated by Raidl, which applies to a wide range of systems of conditional logic. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/RAITLO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-RAITLO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('RAITLO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-RAITLO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('RAITLO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-RAITLO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePEZTEV" onclick="ee('click','PEZTEV')" onmouseover="ee('over','PEZTEV')" onmouseout="ee('out','PEZTEV')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/PEZTEV"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Epistemic Value of Explanation.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andrés Páez" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Andrés%20Páez"><span class="name">Andrés Páez</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically valuable<span id="PEZTEV-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PEZTEV-abstract2").show();$("PEZTEV-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PEZTEV-abstract2" style="display:none"> to an inquiring agent and to a scientific community. To be potentially explanatory, the information must state the relations of probabilistic relevance that the explanans bares to the explanandum. But a potential explanation con only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate the epistemic value of a potential explanation as a function of its credibility and its informational content. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PEZTEV-abstract2").hide();$("PEZTEV-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/PEZTEV"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-PEZTEV" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PEZTEV')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PEZTEV" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PEZTEV','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PEZTEV"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROMTMF-2" onclick="ee('click','ROMTMF-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROMTMF-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROMTMF-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ROMTMF-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Metaphysical Foundations of Physics (Foreword to Special Issue).</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Carlos Romero" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Carlos%20Romero"><span class="name">Carlos Romero</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Critica</em> 53 (159):3-13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This is the introduction to the special issue of Crítica on the metaphysics of physics, featuring papers by Valia Allori, Tim Maudlin and Gustavo Esteban Romero. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ROMTMF-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROMTMF-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROMTMF-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROMTMF-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROMTMF-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROMTMF-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWARTSP-2" onclick="ee('click','WARTSP-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WARTSP-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WARTSP-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WARTSP-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Second Person in Fichte and Levinas.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Owen Ware" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Owen%20Ware"><span class="name">Owen Ware</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael L. Morgan" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael L.%20Morgan"><span class="name">Michael L. Morgan</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal</em> 41 (2):1-20.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Levinas never engaged closely with Fichte’s work, but there are two places in the chapter “Substitution,” in Otherwise than Being (1974), where he mentions Fichte by name. The point that Levinas underscores in both of these passages is that the other’s encounter with the subject is not the outcome of the subject’s freedom; it is not posited by the subject, as Fichte has it, but is prior to any free activity. The aim of this paper is to deepen the comparison<span id="WARTSP-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WARTSP-2-abstract2").show();$("WARTSP-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WARTSP-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> between Levinas and Fichte, giving special attention to Fichte's own novel theory of intersubjectivity and the summons. One result that emerges from this treatment is that both Levinas and Fichte view the second person in a way that has no equivalent in the current philosophical landscape. On this reading, each thinker views responsibility to the other, not only as an immediate and particular obligation, but also as an asymmetrical relation that gives the other moral priority. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WARTSP-2-abstract2").hide();$("WARTSP-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WARTSP-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WARTSP-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WARTSP-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WARTSP-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WARTSP-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WARTSP-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSIMSAO-4" onclick="ee('click','SIMSAO-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','SIMSAO-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','SIMSAO-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SIMSAO-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Should an Ontological Pluralist Be a Quantificational Pluralist?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Byron Simmons" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Byron%20Simmons"><span class="name">Byron Simmons</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different fundamental ways of being. Recent defenders of this view—such as Kris McDaniel and Jason Turner—have taken these ways of being to be best captured by semantically primitive quantifier expressions ranging over different domains. They have thus endorsed, what I shall call, quantificational pluralism. I argue that this focus on quantification is a mistake. For, on this view, a quantificational structure—or a quantifier for short—will be whatever part or aspect of reality’s structure<span id="SIMSAO-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SIMSAO-4-abstract2").show();$("SIMSAO-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SIMSAO-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> that a quantifier expression carves out and reflects. But if quantificational pluralism is true, then a quantifier should be more natural than its corresponding domain; and since it does not appear to be the case that a quantifier is more natural than its corresponding domain, quantificational pluralism does not appear to be true. Thus, I claim, an ontological pluralist should not be a quantificational pluralist. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SIMSAO-4-abstract2").hide();$("SIMSAO-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SIMSAO-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SIMSAO-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SIMSAO-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SIMSAO-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SIMSAO-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SIMSAO-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMERHCS" onclick="ee('click','MERHCS')" onmouseover="ee('over','MERHCS')" onmouseout="ee('out','MERHCS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MERHCS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Humor, Common Sense and the Future of Metaphysics in the <em>Prolegomena</em>.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Melissa M. Merritt" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Melissa M.%20Merritt"><span class="name">Melissa M. Merritt</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Peter Thielke (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THIKPA">Kant's Prolegomena: A Critical Guide</a></em>. Cambridge, UK: pp. 9-26.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Kant’s Prolegomena is a piece of philosophical advertising: it exists to convince the open-minded “future teacher” of metaphysics that the true critical philosophy — i.e., the Critique — provides the only viable solution to the problem of metaphysics (i.e. its failure to make any genuine progress). To be effective, a piece of advertising needs to know its audience. This chapter argues that Kant takes his reader to have some default sympathies for the common-sense challenge to metaphysics originating from Thomas Reid<span id="MERHCS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MERHCS-abstract2").show();$("MERHCS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MERHCS-abstract2" style="display:none"> and his followers; this fact in turn explains his rhetorical strategies in the Prolegomena, particularly regarding the presentation of the problem of metaphysics. The chapter draws attention to the importance of Shaftesbury, who, with a nod to Horace, had argued for the deployment of humour to disarm fraudulent claims to epistemic and moral authority. Kant looks to Horace himself to poke fun at the common-sense challenge to metaphysics, and from there to indicate the general shape of the particular argumentative strategies of the Critique — that project that alone, in his view, can promise some kind of future for metaphysics. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MERHCS-abstract2").hide();$("MERHCS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MERHCS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MERHCS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MERHCS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MERHCS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MERHCS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MERHCS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMCDTAC" onclick="ee('click','MCDTAC')" onmouseover="ee('over','MCDTAC')" onmouseout="ee('out','MCDTAC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MCDTAC"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Towards a Contemporary Theodicy: Based on Critical Review of John Hick, David Griffin and Sri Aurobindo.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael Mcdonald" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael%20Mcdonald"><span class="name">Michael Mcdonald</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1995</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Dissertation, University of Hawai'i</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The author seeks to make the fewest changes that would allow Christianity to withstand the challenges of the problem of evil . The project includes a critical review of the theodicies of John Hick and David Griffin, and also draws upon the thought of Sri Aurobindo. ;From Augustinian thought, the author retains the emphasis upon moral evil. He argues that any theodicy resolving moral evil also resolves natural evil, and that natural evil, as such, would not create major barriers to<span id="MCDTAC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MCDTAC-abstract2").show();$("MCDTAC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MCDTAC-abstract2" style="display:none"> religious faith. ;The author accepts John Hick's ideas of epistemic distance and soul-making, with supplementation. But he rejects Hick's use of the Greater Good Defense, instead positing that evil cannot be justified. The only question is whether it can be healed. ;David Griffin's strategy of adjusting divine traits to solve the POE is rejected. Instead, the author modifies Christian ideas of human identity and human destiny. Griffin's definition of evil is also rejected. Instead, the author defines evil as "a horrendous violation of an important human value." ;The author posits that Aurobindo correctly identified the Christian doctrine of "one lifetime only" as posing major problems for theodicy. The Indian view of multiple lifetimes helps to resolve dysteleological evil. Karma does not solve the POE all by itself, the author holds, but a revised notion of karma as "a law of appropriate experience" can make an essential contribution. The Indian view of human identity in terms of Self and ego personality is also adopted, again with some modification. ;The author uses an analogy of evil with a wound to argue that all evil can be healed, and must be healed in the process of psycho-spiritual growth. The conclusion is that evil may be ultimate to the ego personality, but is not ultimate to the soul, as such. From the perspective of the Soul or Self, suffering can be self-chosen for important and positive reasons. ;In short, a total picture of human identity and destiny gained by borrowing and revising Indian doctrines enables the author to suggest a new format for the interpretation of evil. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MCDTAC-abstract2").hide();$("MCDTAC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MCDTAC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MCDTAC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MCDTAC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MCDTAC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MCDTAC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MCDTAC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWODOWA-2" onclick="ee('click','WODOWA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WODOWA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WODOWA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WODOWA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Of Witches and White Folks.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Daniel Wodak" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Daniel%20Wodak"><span class="name">Daniel Wodak</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A central debate in philosophy of race is between eliminativists and conservationists about what we ought do with ‘race’ talk. ‘Eliminativism’ is often defined such that it’s committed to holding that (a) ‘race’ is vacuous and races don’t exist, so (b) we should eliminate the term ‘race’ from our vocabulary. As a stipulative definition, that’s fine. But as an account of one of the main theoretical options in the debate, it’s a serious mistake. I offer three arguments for why eliminativism<span id="WODOWA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WODOWA-2-abstract2").show();$("WODOWA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WODOWA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> should not be tethered to vacuity or error theory, and three arguments for why the view shouldn’t be understood in terms of eliminating the term ‘race’ from our vocabulary. Instead, I propose we understand the debate as concerning whether certain uses of ordinary race terms are typically wrong. This proposal is quite simple, and naturally suggested by the common gloss that eliminativism about ‘race’ is akin to a commonsensical view about 'witch' talk. But nonetheless, I argue that it offers a significant recharacterization of this core debate in philosophy of race. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WODOWA-2-abstract2").hide();$("WODOWA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WODOWA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WODOWA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WODOWA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WODOWA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WODOWA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WODOWA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eREMNI-3" onclick="ee('click','REMNI-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','REMNI-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','REMNI-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/REMNI-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Nietzsche's Intuitions.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Justin Remhof" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Justin%20Remhof"><span class="name">Justin Remhof</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy</em> 64 (7):732-753.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">ABSTRACT This essay examines a particular rhetorical strategy Nietzsche uses to supply prima facie epistemic justification: appeals to intuition. I first investigate what Nietzsche thinks intuitions are, given that he never uses the term ‘intuition’ as we do in contemporary philosophy. I then examine how Nietzsche can simultaneously endorse naturalism and intuitive appeals. I finish by looking at why and how Nietzsche uses appeals to intuition to further his philosophical agenda. Answering these questions should provide a new and deeper understanding<span id="REMNI-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REMNI-3-abstract2").show();$("REMNI-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="REMNI-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> of how Nietzsche does philosophy. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REMNI-3-abstract2").hide();$("REMNI-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/REMNI-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-REMNI-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('REMNI-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-REMNI-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('REMNI-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-REMNI-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eELMAOA-5" onclick="ee('click','ELMAOA-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','ELMAOA-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','ELMAOA-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ELMAOA-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">An Ontological Approach to Enhancing Information Sharing in Disaster Response.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Linda Elmhadhbi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Linda%20Elmhadhbi"><span class="name">Linda Elmhadhbi</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Mohamed-Hedi Karray" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Mohamed-Hedi%20Karray"><span class="name">Mohamed-Hedi Karray</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bernard Archimède" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Bernard%20Archimède"><span class="name">Bernard Archimède</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by J. Neil Otte" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/J. Neil%20Otte"><span class="name">J. Neil Otte</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Barry Smith" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Barry%20Smith"><span class="name">Barry Smith</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Information</em> 12 (10).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Managing complex disaster situations is a challenging task because of the large number of actors involved and the critical nature of the events themselves. In particular, the different terminologies and technical vocabularies that are being exchanged among Emergency Responders may lead to misunderstandings. Maintaining a shared semantics for exchanged data is a major challenge. To help to overcome these issues, we elaborate a modular suite of ontologies called POLARISCO that formalizes the complex knowledge of the ERs. Such a shared vocabulary<span id="ELMAOA-5-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ELMAOA-5-abstract2").show();$("ELMAOA-5-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ELMAOA-5-abstract2" style="display:none"> resolves inconsistent terminologies and promotes semantic interoperability among ERs. In this work, we discuss developing POLARISCO as an extension of Basic Formal Ontology and the Common Core Ontologies. We conclude by presenting a real use-case to check the efficiency and applicability of the proposed ontology. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ELMAOA-5-abstract2").hide();$("ELMAOA-5-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ELMAOA-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ELMAOA-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ELMAOA-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ELMAOA-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ELMAOA-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ELMAOA-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMICHNT" onclick="ee('click','MICHNT')" onmouseover="ee('over','MICHNT')" onmouseout="ee('out','MICHNT')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MICHNT"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">How (Not) to Underestimate Unconscious Perception.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Matthias Michel" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Matthias%20Michel"><span class="name">Matthias Michel</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Mind and Language</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Studying consciousness requires contrasting conscious and unconscious perception. While many studies have reported unconscious perceptual effects, recent work has questioned whether such effects are genuinely unconscious, or whether they are due to weak conscious perception. Some philosophers and psychologists have reacted by denying that there is such a thing as unconscious perception, or by holding that unconscious perception has been previously overestimated. This article has two parts. In the first part, I argue that the most significant attack on unconscious perception<span id="MICHNT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MICHNT-abstract2").show();$("MICHNT-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MICHNT-abstract2" style="display:none"> commits the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of interpreting evidence that observers were conscious of something as evidence that they were conscious of the task-relevant features of the stimuli. In the second part, I contend that the criterion content fallacy is prevalent in consciousness research. For this reason, I hold that if unconscious perception exists, scientists studying consciousness could routinely underestimate it. I conclude with methodological recommendations for moving the debate forward. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MICHNT-abstract2").hide();$("MICHNT-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MICHNT"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MICHNT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MICHNT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MICHNT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MICHNT','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MICHNT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCHAASS-7" onclick="ee('click','CHAASS-7')" onmouseover="ee('over','CHAASS-7')" onmouseout="ee('out','CHAASS-7')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CHAASS-7"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Amit Chaturvedi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Amit%20Chaturvedi"><span class="name">Amit Chaturvedi</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Some have argued that a subject has an inner awareness of its conscious mental states by virtue of the non-introspective, reflexive awareness that any conscious state has of itself. But, what exactly is it like to have a ubiquitous and reflexive inner awareness of one’s conscious states, as distinct from one’s outer awareness of the apparent world? This essay derives a model of ubiquitous inner awareness (UIA) from Sebastian Watzl’s recent theory of attention as the activity of structuring consciousness into<span id="CHAASS-7-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CHAASS-7-abstract2").show();$("CHAASS-7-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CHAASS-7-abstract2" style="display:none"> an experiential center and periphery. I develop Watzl’s theory into an account of UIA by suggesting that a subject is acquainted with its own conscious mental states through being reflexively aware of how these states are structured by attention into a unified subjective perspective. I favorably compare this Watzl-inspired account of UIA against other contemporary analytic and classical Buddhist accounts of reflexive awareness and subjective character, which variously ground the inner awareness of conscious states on their intrinsic phenomenal quality of “for-me-ness,” their affective/hedonic valence, or a subject’s disposition to introspect them. The Watzl-inspired account also accommodates possible counter- examples to Watzl’s theory posed by states of minimal phenomenal experience such as lucid dreamless sleep and non-dual meditative awareness. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CHAASS-7-abstract2").hide();$("CHAASS-7-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CHAASS-7"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-CHAASS-7" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CHAASS-7')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CHAASS-7" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CHAASS-7','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CHAASS-7"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGUGUDL" onclick="ee('click','GUGUDL')" onmouseover="ee('over','GUGUDL')" onmouseout="ee('out','GUGUDL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/GUGUDL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Using Deep Learning to Detect Facial Markers of Complex Decision Making.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gianluca Guglielmo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Gianluca%20Guglielmo"><span class="name">Gianluca Guglielmo</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Irene Font Peradejordi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Irene%20Font Peradejordi"><span class="name">Irene Font Peradejordi</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michal Klincewicz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michal%20Klincewicz"><span class="name">Michal Klincewicz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Advances in Computer Games 2021)</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this paper, we report on an experiment with The Walking Dead (TWD), which is a narrative-driven adventure game where players have to survive in a post-apocalyptic world filled with zombies. We used OpenFace software to extract action unit (AU) intensities of facial expressions characteristic of decision-making processes and then we implemented a simple convolution neural network (CNN) to see which AUs are predictive of decision-making. Our results provide evidence that the pre-decision variations in action units 17 (chin raiser), 23<span id="GUGUDL-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GUGUDL-abstract2").show();$("GUGUDL-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GUGUDL-abstract2" style="display:none"> (lip tightener), and 25 (parting of lips) are predictive of decision-making processes. Furthermore, when combined, their predictive power increased up to 0.81 accuracy on the test set; we offer speculations about why it is that these particular three AUs were found to be connected to decision-making. Our results also suggest that machine learning methods in combination with video games may be used to accurately and automatically identify complex decision-making processes using AU intensity alone. Finally, our study offers a new method to test specifi c hypotheses about the relationships between higher-order cognitive processes and behavior, which relies on both narrative video games and easily accessible software, like OpenFace. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GUGUDL-abstract2").hide();$("GUGUDL-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/GUGUDL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GUGUDL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GUGUDL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GUGUDL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GUGUDL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GUGUDL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eREIQTY" onclick="ee('click','REIQTY')" onmouseover="ee('over','REIQTY')" onmouseout="ee('out','REIQTY')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/REIQTY"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">"Saying 'Thank You!' and Expressing Gratitude: A Response to Schwartz".</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Indrek Reiland" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Indrek%20Reiland"><span class="name">Indrek Reiland</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This is a short response piece to Jeremy Schwartz's "Saying 'Thank You' and Meaning It", published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020, 98, pp. 718-731. -/- Schwartz argues against the received view that 'Thank You! is for expressing gratitude, claiming instead that it is for expressing one's judgment that gratitude is appropriate or fitting. I argue against the judgment view while defending the received one. -/- I mainly consider the objection that the judgment view is implausible since it makes ‘Thank<span id="REIQTY-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REIQTY-abstract2").show();$("REIQTY-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="REIQTY-abstract2" style="display:none"> you!’ semantically indistinguishable from the declarative sentence ‘Gratitude is appropriate to you’ and show that Schwartz’s attempt to sidestep it relies on misunderstanding Kaplan's view of what it is for a sentence to be an expressive vs. a declarative. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REIQTY-abstract2").hide();$("REIQTY-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/REIQTY"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-REIQTY" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('REIQTY')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-REIQTY" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('REIQTY','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-REIQTY"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBURGCO-2" onclick="ee('click','BURGCO-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','BURGCO-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','BURGCO-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BURGCO-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Georg Cantor’s Ordinals, Absolute Infinity & Transparent Proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hermann G. W. Burchard" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Hermann G. W.%20Burchard"><span class="name">Hermann G. W. Burchard</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy Study</em> 9 (8).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Georg Cantor's absolute infinity, the paradoxical Burali-Forti class Ω of all ordinals, is a monstrous non-entity for which being called a "class" is an undeserved dignity. This must be the ultimate vexation for mathematical philosophers who hold on to some residual sense of realism in set theory. By careful use of Ω, we can rescue Georg Cantor's 1899 "proof" sketch of the Well-Ordering Theorem––being generous, considering his declining health. We take the contrapositive of Cantor's suggestion and add Zermelo's choice function.<span id="BURGCO-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BURGCO-2-abstract2").show();$("BURGCO-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BURGCO-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> This results in a concise and uncomplicated proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BURGCO-2-abstract2").hide();$("BURGCO-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/BURGCO-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BURGCO-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BURGCO-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BURGCO-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BURGCO-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BURGCO-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWHIAAA-7" onclick="ee('click','WHIAAA-7')" onmouseover="ee('over','WHIAAA-7')" onmouseout="ee('out','WHIAAA-7')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WHIAAA-7"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Daniel Whiting" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Daniel%20Whiting"><span class="name">Daniel Whiting</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Australasian Journal of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">What is aesthetic appreciation? In this paper, I approach this question in an indirection fashion. First, I introduce the Kantian notion of moral worthy action and an influential analysis of it. Next, I generalize that analysis from the moral to the aesthetic domain, and from actions to affects. Aesthetic appreciation, I suggest, consists in an aesthetically worthy affective response. After unpacking the proposal, I show that it has non-trivial implications while cohering with a number of existing insights concerning the nature<span id="WHIAAA-7-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WHIAAA-7-abstract2").show();$("WHIAAA-7-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WHIAAA-7-abstract2" style="display:none"> of appreciation and the constraints it is subject to. In closing, I note some limitations on the analogy between aesthetic appreciation and morally worthy action. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WHIAAA-7-abstract2").hide();$("WHIAAA-7-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WHIAAA-7"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WHIAAA-7" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WHIAAA-7')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WHIAAA-7" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WHIAAA-7','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WHIAAA-7"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTHOIAT-5" onclick="ee('click','THOIAT-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','THOIAT-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','THOIAT-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THOIAT-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Ideology and the Social Imaginary.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by JohnB Thompson" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/JohnB%20Thompson"><span class="name">JohnB Thompson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1982</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Theory and Society</em> 11 (5):659-681.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/THOIAT-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-THOIAT-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('THOIAT-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-THOIAT-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('THOIAT-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/citations/THOIAT-5"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 4 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-THOIAT-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSCHTBO-52" onclick="ee('click','SCHTBO-52')" onmouseover="ee('over','SCHTBO-52')" onmouseout="ee('out','SCHTBO-52')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTBO-52"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Karl Schafer" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Karl%20Schafer"><span class="name">Karl Schafer</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Peter Thielke (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THICCG">Cambridge Critical Guide to Kant’s Prolegomena</a></em>. Cambridge: Cambridge. pp. 111-132.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The focus of this chapter will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and its impact on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. Following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a ‘demarcation challenge’ concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in<span id="SCHTBO-52-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SCHTBO-52-abstract2").show();$("SCHTBO-52-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SCHTBO-52-abstract2" style="display:none"> (say) natural scientific contexts from the illegitimate use of it in (say) dogmatic metaphysics. I will then go on to argue that Kant sees Hume’s tendency to slide into more radical forms of skepticism as a symptom of his failure to provide a systematic or principled account of this distinction. This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which both robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this, and makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls ‘Formal Idealism.’ In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between, first, philosophical methodology and, second, the nature of our faculties. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SCHTBO-52-abstract2").hide();$("SCHTBO-52-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SCHTBO-52"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SCHTBO-52" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SCHTBO-52')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SCHTBO-52" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SCHTBO-52','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SCHTBO-52"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eANDQAS" onclick="ee('click','ANDQAS')" onmouseover="ee('over','ANDQAS')" onmouseout="ee('out','ANDQAS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ANDQAS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Queer and Straight.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Matthew Andler" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Matthew%20Andler"><span class="name">Matthew Andler</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Clare Chambers, Brian D. Earp & Lori Watson (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/EARRHO">Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality</a></em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Recent philosophical work on sexuality has focused primarily on sexual orientation. Yet, there’s another normatively significant phenomenon in the neighborhood: sexual identity. Here, I develop a cultural theory of queer and straight sexual identity. In particular, I argue that sexual identity is a matter of inclusion/exclusion in relation to queer and straight cultures, which are differentiated in terms of characteristic practices involving kinship and political resistance. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ANDQAS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ANDQAS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ANDQAS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ANDQAS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ANDQAS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ANDQAS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eHUGEFL" onclick="ee('click','HUGEFL')" onmouseover="ee('over','HUGEFL')" onmouseout="ee('out','HUGEFL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/HUGEFL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence).</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nick Hughes" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nick%20Hughes"><span class="name">Nick Hughes</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Epistemologists spend a great deal of time thinking about how we should respond to our evidence. They spend far less time thinking about the ways that evidence can be acquired in the first place. This is an oversight. Some ways of acquiring evidence are better than others. Many normative epistemologies struggle to accommodate this fact. In this article I develop one that can and does. I identify a phenomenon – epistemic feedback loops – in which evidence acquisition has gone awry,<span id="HUGEFL-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HUGEFL-abstract2").show();$("HUGEFL-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HUGEFL-abstract2" style="display:none"> with the result that even beliefs based on the evidence are irrational. Examples include evidence acquired under the influence of confirmation bias and evidence acquired under the influence of cognitively penetrated experiences caused by implicit bias. I then develop a theoretical framework which enables us to understand why beliefs that are the outputs of epistemic feedback loops are irrational. Finally, I argue that many popular approaches to epistemic normativity may need to be abandoned on the grounds that they cannot comfortably explain feedback loops. The scope of this last claim is broad: it includes almost all contemporary theories of justified/rational belief and of the epistemology of cognitive penetration. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HUGEFL-abstract2").hide();$("HUGEFL-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/HUGEFL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HUGEFL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HUGEFL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HUGEFL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HUGEFL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HUGEFL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eINGRDA-2" onclick="ee('click','INGRDA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','INGRDA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','INGRDA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/INGRDA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Representative Democracy and Social Equality.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sean Ingham" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sean%20Ingham"><span class="name">Sean Ingham</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">American Political Science Review</em>:1-13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">When are inequalities in political power undemocratic, and why? While some writers condemn any inequalities in political power as a deviation from the ideal of democracy, this view is vulnerable to the simple objection that representative democracies concentrate political power in the hands of elected officials rather than distributing it equally among citizens, but they are no less democratic for it. Building on recent literature that interprets democracy as part of a broader vision of social equality, I argue that concentrations<span id="INGRDA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("INGRDA-2-abstract2").show();$("INGRDA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="INGRDA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> of political power are incompatible with democracy, and with a commitment to social equality more generally, when they consist in some having greater arbitrary power to influence decisions according to their idiosyncratic preferences. A novel account of the relationship between power and social status clarifies the role of social equality in the justification of democracy, including a representative democracy in which public officials have more political power than ordinary citizens. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("INGRDA-2-abstract2").hide();$("INGRDA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/INGRDA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-INGRDA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('INGRDA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-INGRDA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('INGRDA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-INGRDA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLITEO-8" onclick="ee('click','KLITEO-8')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLITEO-8')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLITEO-8')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLITEO-8"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Ethics of Matching: Mobile and Web-Based Dating and Hook Up Platforms.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michal Klincewicz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michal%20Klincewicz"><span class="name">Michal Klincewicz</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lily E. Frank" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Lily E.%20Frank"><span class="name">Lily E. Frank</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Emma Jane" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Emma%20Jane"><span class="name">Emma Jane</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Brian D. Earp, Clare Chambers & Lori Watson (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/EARRHO">Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality</a></em>. Routledge.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLITEO-8"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KLITEO-8" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLITEO-8')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLITEO-8" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLITEO-8','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLITEO-8"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMETPOL" onclick="ee('click','METPOL')" onmouseover="ee('over','METPOL')" onmouseout="ee('out','METPOL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/METPOL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Problems of Living Meaningfully in Psychiatry and Philosophy.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Thaddeus Metz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Thaddeus%20Metz"><span class="name">Thaddeus Metz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Brazilian Journal of Psychiatry</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A brief critical notice of Dan J Stein's new book _Problems of Living: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Cognitive-Affective Science_. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/METPOL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-METPOL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('METPOL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-METPOL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('METPOL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-METPOL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTHONOL" onclick="ee('click','THONOL')" onmouseover="ee('over','THONOL')" onmouseout="ee('out','THONOL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THONOL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Norms of Life.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by David L. Thompson" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/David L.%20Thompson"><span class="name">David L. Thompson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear"></span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Biological organisms, languages and selves are normative entities, so must be understood in terms of norms. Mechanistic understanding is based on causal necessity, but normative understanding relies on a grasp of the contingencies of evolution, history and personal experience. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/THONOL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-THONOL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('THONOL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-THONOL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('THONOL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-THONOL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKRBNAS-2" onclick="ee('click','KRBNAS-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','KRBNAS-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','KRBNAS-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KRBNAS-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Normalisation and Subformula Property for a System of Intuitionistic Logic with General Introduction and Elimination Rules.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nils Kürbis" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nils%20Kürbis"><span class="name">Nils Kürbis</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Synthese</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper studies a formalisation of intuitionistic logic by Negri and von Plato which has general introduction and elimination rules. The philosophical importance of the system is expounded. Definitions of `maximal formula', `segment' and `maximal segment' suitable to the system are formulated and corresponding reduction procedures for maximal formulas and permutative reduction procedures for maximal segments given. Alternatives to the main method used are also considered. It is shown that deductions in the system convert into normal form and that deductions<span id="KRBNAS-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KRBNAS-2-abstract2").show();$("KRBNAS-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KRBNAS-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> in normal form have the subformula property. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KRBNAS-2-abstract2").hide();$("KRBNAS-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KRBNAS-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KRBNAS-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KRBNAS-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KRBNAS-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KRBNAS-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KRBNAS-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSTUGAT-4" onclick="ee('click','STUGAT-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','STUGAT-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','STUGAT-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/STUGAT-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">God and the Numbers.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Paul Studtmann" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Paul%20Studtmann"><span class="name">Paul Studtmann</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">According to Augustine, abstract objects are ideas in the Mind of God. Because numbers are a type of abstract object, it would follow that numbers are ideas in the Mind of God. Let us call such a view the Augustinian View of Numbers (AVN). In this paper, I present a formal theory for AVN. The theory stems from the symmetry conception of God as it appears in Studtmann (2021). I show that Robinson’s Arithmetic is a conservative extension of the axioms<span id="STUGAT-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("STUGAT-4-abstract2").show();$("STUGAT-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="STUGAT-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> in Studtmann’s original paper. The extension is made possible by identifying the set of natural numbers with God, 0 with Being, and the successor function with the essence function. The resulting theory can then be augmented to include Peano Arithmetic by adding a set-theoretic version of induction and a comprehension schema restricted to arithmetically definable properties. In addition to these formal matters, the paper provides a characterization of the mind of God. According to the characterization, the Being essences that constitute God’s mind act as both numbers and representations – each (except for Being itself) has all the properties of some number and encodes all the properties of that number’s predecessor. The conception of God that emerges by the end of the discussion is a conception of an infinite, ineffable, axiologically and metaphysically ultimate entity that contains objects that not only serve as numbers but also encode information about each other. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("STUGAT-4-abstract2").hide();$("STUGAT-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/STUGAT-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-STUGAT-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('STUGAT-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-STUGAT-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('STUGAT-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-STUGAT-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eJONIAS-5" onclick="ee('click','JONIAS-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','JONIAS-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','JONIAS-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/JONIAS-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Intention and Self Knowledge: Wittgenstein's Bequeathal A First Draft.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Les Jones" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Les%20Jones"><span class="name">Les Jones</span></a> - <span class="pubYear"></span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/JONIAS-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-JONIAS-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('JONIAS-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-JONIAS-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('JONIAS-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-JONIAS-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLICTEO-3" onclick="ee('click','LICTEO-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','LICTEO-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','LICTEO-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/LICTEO-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Epistemology of Moral Praise and Moral Criticism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jimmy Alfonso Licon" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jimmy Alfonso%20Licon"><span class="name">Jimmy Alfonso Licon</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Episteme</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Are strangers sincere in their moral praise and criticism? Here we apply signaling theory to argue ceteris paribus moral criticism is more likely sincere than praise; the former tends to be a higher-fidelity signal (in Western societies). To offer an example: emotions are often self-validating as a signal because they’re hard to fake. This epistemic insight matters: moral praise and criticism influence moral reputations, and affect whether others will cooperate with us. Though much of this applies to generic praise and<span id="LICTEO-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LICTEO-3-abstract2").show();$("LICTEO-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LICTEO-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> criticism too, moral philosophers should value sincere moral praise and moral criticism for several reasons: it (i) offers insight into how others actually view us as moral agents; (ii) offers feedback to help us improve our moral characters; and (iii) encourages some behaviors, and discourages others. And so as moral agents, we should care whether moral praise and moral criticism is sincere. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LICTEO-3-abstract2").hide();$("LICTEO-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/LICTEO-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LICTEO-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LICTEO-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LICTEO-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LICTEO-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LICTEO-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKNUSAA" onclick="ee('click','KNUSAA')" onmouseover="ee('over','KNUSAA')" onmouseout="ee('out','KNUSAA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KNUSAA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Shared action: An existential phenomenological account.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nicolai Knudsen" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nicolai%20Knudsen"><span class="name">Nicolai Knudsen</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences</em>:1-21.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible to account<span id="KNUSAA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KNUSAA-abstract2").show();$("KNUSAA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KNUSAA-abstract2" style="display:none"> for not only individual action and refer only to an individual) but also several distinct subtypes of shared action. My thesis is that behaviour counts as shared action if and only if it is caused by a solicitation in which either the goals, or the commitments, or both goals and commitments are joint, i.e., depend on several individuals. We thereby get three distinct subtypes of shared actions: jointly coordinated individually committed action, individually coordinated jointly committed action, and jointly coordinated jointly committed action. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KNUSAA-abstract2").hide();$("KNUSAA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KNUSAA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-KNUSAA" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('KNUSAA')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-KNUSAA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KNUSAA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KNUSAA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KNUSAA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KNUSAA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWALADF-2" onclick="ee('click','WALADF-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WALADF-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WALADF-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WALADF-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">A Dilemma for Reductive Compatibilism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Robert H. Wallace" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Robert H.%20Wallace"><span class="name">Robert H. Wallace</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Erkenntnis</em>:1-23.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A common compatibilist view says that we are free and morally responsible in virtue of the ability to respond aptly to reasons. Many hold a version of this view despite disagreement about whether free will requires the ability to do otherwise. The canonical version of this view is reductive. It reduces the pertinent ability to a set of modal properties that are more obviously compatible with determinism, like dispositions. I argue that this and any reductive view of abilities faces a<span id="WALADF-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WALADF-2-abstract2").show();$("WALADF-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WALADF-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> significant challenge: it cannot adequately explain the freedom-grounding element of this ability. The problem has the form of a dilemma. This leaves reasons-responsive compatibilists with two options: abandon theories of free will grounded in abilities or abandon reductive theories of abilities. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WALADF-2-abstract2").hide();$("WALADF-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WALADF-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WALADF-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WALADF-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WALADF-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WALADF-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WALADF-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMERKAS-2" onclick="ee('click','MERKAS-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','MERKAS-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','MERKAS-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MERKAS-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Kant and Stoic Affections.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Melissa Merritt" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Melissa%20Merritt"><span class="name">Melissa Merritt</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Canadian Journal of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">I examine the significance of the Stoic theory of pathē (and related topics) for Kant’s moral psychology, arguing against the received view that systematic differences block the possibility of Kant’s drawing anything more than rhetoric from his Stoic sources. More particularly, I take on the chronically underexamined assumption that Kant is committed to a psychological dualism in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, positing distinct rational and non-rational elements of human mentality. By contrast, Stoics take the mentality of an adult<span id="MERKAS-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MERKAS-2-abstract2").show();$("MERKAS-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MERKAS-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> human being to be rational through and through, while recognising that this rationality is not normally in a state of health or excellence. I show how Kant’s account of affections — chiefly the “affects” and “passions” that he identifies as targets of a duty of apathy — draws substantive lessons from his Stoic sources, and how he accepts on his own terms the monistic principles of Stoic moral psychology. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MERKAS-2-abstract2").hide();$("MERKAS-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MERKAS-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MERKAS-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MERKAS-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MERKAS-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MERKAS-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MERKAS-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSHAECH" onclick="ee('click','SHAECH')" onmouseover="ee('over','SHAECH')" onmouseout="ee('out','SHAECH')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SHAECH"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nathaniel Sharadin" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nathaniel%20Sharadin"><span class="name">Nathaniel Sharadin</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KYRMR">Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism</a></em>. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 121-143.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Epistemic consequentialism has been charged with ignoring the epistemic separateness of propositions and with (thereby) allowing trade-offs between propositions. Here, I do two things. First, I investigate the metaphor of the epistemic separateness of propositions. I argue that either (i) the metaphor is meaningfully unpacked in a way that is modeled on the moral separateness of persons, in which case it doesn’t support a ban on trade-offs or (ii) it isn’t meaningfully unpacked, in which case it really doesn’t support a<span id="SHAECH-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SHAECH-abstract2").show();$("SHAECH-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SHAECH-abstract2" style="display:none"> ban on trade-offs. Second, I consider the strategy of arguing against the trade-off permitting conception of epistemic rationality that is central to epistemic consequentialism on the basis of our intuitive verdicts about the permissibility of trade-offs in cases. I argue the execution of this strategy suffers a methodological mistake that, once corrected, vitiates the probative value of those intuitive verdicts. Hence the conclusion: the separateness of propositions provides no support for a ban on trade-offs, and an influential independent argument for such a ban is flawed. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SHAECH-abstract2").hide();$("SHAECH-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SHAECH"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SHAECH" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SHAECH')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SHAECH" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SHAECH','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SHAECH"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBAKAMC-2" onclick="ee('click','BAKAMC-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','BAKAMC-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','BAKAMC-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BAKAMC-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">A Monistic Conclusion to Aristotle’s <em>Ergon</em> Argument: The Human Good as the Best Achievement of a Human.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Samuel H. Baker" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Samuel H.%20Baker"><span class="name">Samuel H. Baker</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie</em> 103 (3):373-403.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Scholars have often thought that a monistic reading of Aristotle’s definition of the human good – in particular, one on which “best and most teleios virtue” refers to theoretical wisdom – cannot follow from the premises of the ergon argument. I explain how a monistic reading can follow from the premises, and I argue that this interpretation gives the correct rationale for Aristotle’s definition. I then explain that even though the best and most teleios virtue must be a single virtue,<span id="BAKAMC-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BAKAMC-2-abstract2").show();$("BAKAMC-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BAKAMC-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> that virtue could in principle be a whole virtue that arises from the combination of all the others. I also clarify that the definition of the human good aims at capturing the nature of human eudaimonia only in its primary case. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BAKAMC-2-abstract2").hide();$("BAKAMC-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/BAKAMC-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BAKAMC-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BAKAMC-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BAKAMC-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BAKAMC-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BAKAMC-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTRITLO-4" onclick="ee('click','TRITLO-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','TRITLO-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','TRITLO-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/TRITLO-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Logic of the Border.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ioannis Trisokkas" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Ioannis%20Trisokkas"><span class="name">Ioannis Trisokkas</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2014</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Russian Sociological Review</em> 13 (4):18-41.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In his Science of Logic Hegel purports to give an account of a dialectical logic that generates the totality of being’s fundamental structures. This totality does not exhaust the richness of being, but it exhausts the basis of this richness. Any phenomenon, whether cognitive, scientific, social or political, is based upon some or all of those structures. The paper presents and examines the logic of a structure which pervades each and every phenomenon: the border(die Grenze). It is analyzed as an<span id="TRITLO-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TRITLO-4-abstract2").show();$("TRITLO-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TRITLO-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> advanced manifestation of “determinateness,” an even more primitive structure of being, which makes explicit its intrinsic connection with not-being. What is distinctive about Hegel’s analysis is that it establishes a logical character concerning the concept of “border” that precedes empirical observation and a connection with space. The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Hegel’s dialectic of the border in such a way as to make this logical character apparent and convincing to contemporary audience, who begin from the assumption that all discourse about border has an empirical basis and presupposes reference to space. It will be argued that, contrary to received opinion, the very phenomenon of “border” has certain universal and necessary features which explain its very possibility, are completely a priori and are established prior to any reference to space. A discussion about “borders” that excludes any a priori investigation into this phenomenon from its domain simply fails to illuminate its most important dimension: its logical core or, if you will, its universal and necessary attributes. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TRITLO-4-abstract2").hide();$("TRITLO-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/TRITLO-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-TRITLO-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TRITLO-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TRITLO-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TRITLO-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TRITLO-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSIJGEG" onclick="ee('click','SIJGEG')" onmouseover="ee('over','SIJGEG')" onmouseout="ee('out','SIJGEG')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SIJGEG"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Grounding Eternal Generation.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Joshua Sijuwade" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Joshua%20Sijuwade"><span class="name">Joshua Sijuwade</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Faith and Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This article aims to provide an explication of the Christian doctrine of eternal generation. A model of the doctrine is formulated within the ground-theoretic framework of Jonathan Schaffer and E. Jonathan Lowe, which enables it to be explicated clearly and consistently, and two often raised objections against the doctrine can be successfully answered. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SIJGEG"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SIJGEG" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SIJGEG')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SIJGEG" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SIJGEG','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SIJGEG"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMIRRTM-2" onclick="ee('click','MIRRTM-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','MIRRTM-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','MIRRTM-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MIRRTM-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Refitting the Mirrors: On Structural Analogies in Epistemology and Action Theory.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lisa Miracchi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Lisa%20Miracchi"><span class="name">Lisa Miracchi</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by J. Adam Carter" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/J. Adam%20Carter"><span class="name">J. Adam Carter</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Synthese</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Structural analogies connect Williamson’s epistemology and action theory: for example, action is the direction-of-fit mirror image of knowledge, and knowledge stands to belief as action stands to intention. These structural analogies, for Williamson, are meant to illuminate more generally how ‘mirrors’ reversing direction of fit should be understood as connecting the spectrum of our cognitive and practically oriented mental states. This paper has two central aims, one negative and the other positive. The negative aim is to highlight some intractable problems<span id="MIRRTM-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MIRRTM-2-abstract2").show();$("MIRRTM-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MIRRTM-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> with Williamson’s preferred analogical picture, which links the cognitive and the practical through the nexus of direction-of-fit mirroring. The positive aim of the paper is to propose a better alternative. In particular, we show that an achievement-theoretic proposal captures what is in common across the range of attitudes that exhibit the kind of structure that knowledge-belief, action-desire/intention do, while at the same time avoiding the problems shown to face Williamson’s proposed picture. Moreover, we draw attention to several key theoretical benefits of embracing our proposed achievement-theoretic picture, including some of the key benefits of the knowledge-first programme that Williamson’s own analogies were designed to secure. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MIRRTM-2-abstract2").hide();$("MIRRTM-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MIRRTM-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MIRRTM-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MIRRTM-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MIRRTM-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MIRRTM-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MIRRTM-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDYCTAN" onclick="ee('click','DYCTAN')" onmouseover="ee('over','DYCTAN')" onmouseout="ee('out','DYCTAN')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DYCTAN"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by John Dyck" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/John%20Dyck"><span class="name">John Dyck</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Do aesthetic reasons have normative authority over us? Could there be anything like an aesthetic ‘ought’ or an aesthetic obligation? I argue that there are no aesthetic obligations. We have reasons to act certain ways regarding various aesthetic objects – most notably, reasons to attend to and appreciate those objects. But, I argue, these reasons never amount to duties. This is because aesthetic reasons are merely evaluative, not deontic. They can only entice us or invite us – they can never<span id="DYCTAN-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DYCTAN-abstract2").show();$("DYCTAN-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="DYCTAN-abstract2" style="display:none"> compel us. Beauty gives us goods without shoulds. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DYCTAN-abstract2").hide();$("DYCTAN-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DYCTAN"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DYCTAN" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DYCTAN')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DYCTAN" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DYCTAN','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DYCTAN"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGOLRFF" onclick="ee('click','GOLRFF')" onmouseover="ee('over','GOLRFF')" onmouseout="ee('out','GOLRFF')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/GOLRFF"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Revising Fiction, Fact, and Faith: A Philosophical Account.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nathaniel Goldberg" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nathaniel%20Goldberg"><span class="name">Nathaniel Goldberg</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Chris Gavaler" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Chris%20Gavaler"><span class="name">Chris Gavaler</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> New York: Routledge.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This book addresses how our revisionary practices account for relations between texts and how they are read. It offers an overarching philosophy of revision concerning works of fiction, fact, and faith, revealing unexpected insights about the philosophy of language, the metaphysics of fact and fiction, and the history and philosophy of science and religion. It will be of interest to a wide range of scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of literature, literary theory and criticism,<span id="GOLRFF-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GOLRFF-abstract2").show();$("GOLRFF-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GOLRFF-abstract2" style="display:none"> and history and philosophy of science and religion. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GOLRFF-abstract2").hide();$("GOLRFF-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/GOLRFF"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GOLRFF" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GOLRFF')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GOLRFF" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GOLRFF','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GOLRFF"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGOLSTE-2" onclick="ee('click','GOLSTE-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','GOLSTE-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','GOLSTE-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/GOLSTE-2"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Superhero Thought Experiments: Comic Book Philosophy.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nathaniel Goldberg" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nathaniel%20Goldberg"><span class="name">Nathaniel Goldberg</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Iowa City, IA, USA: University of Iowa.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">What would happen if lightning struck a tree in a swamp and transformed it into The Swampman, or if saving billions of lives required sacrificing millions first? The first is a philosophical thought experiment devised by Donald Davidson, the second a theme from a comic written by Alan Moore. I argue that that comics can be read as containing thought experiments and that such philosophical devises should be shared with students of all ages. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/GOLSTE-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GOLSTE-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GOLSTE-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GOLSTE-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GOLSTE-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GOLSTE-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eJECTWO" onclick="ee('click','JECTWO')" onmouseover="ee('over','JECTWO')" onmouseout="ee('out','JECTWO')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/JECTWO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">To Will One Thing.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alexander Jech" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alexander%20Jech"><span class="name">Alexander Jech</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2013</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">American Philosophical Quarterly</em> 50 (2):153-166.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Before committing suicide, Othello says, "Speak of me as I am; . . . speak of one who loved not wisely, but too well." Thinking of his love for Desdemona, we are not likely to agree with his assessment that he loved her "too well," especially if loving well is supposed to require some kind of dependability or concern for her well-being; we would be loath even to grant that he loved her "too much." Othello's love for his wife seems,<span id="JECTWO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("JECTWO-abstract2").show();$("JECTWO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="JECTWO-abstract2" style="display:none"> rather, to have been firmly subordinated to his love for his honor. Perhaps, then, his statement could be saved by saying that it was his honor that he loved too well, and that in devoting himself so completely to it, he did not love wisely. He needed a better way of coordinating his two concerns, one that wouldn't give him cause for regret—a way of loving well that was also wise. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("JECTWO-abstract2").hide();$("JECTWO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/JECTWO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-JECTWO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('JECTWO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-JECTWO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('JECTWO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/citations/JECTWO"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-JECTWO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eFOSPLA-2" onclick="ee('click','FOSPLA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','FOSPLA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','FOSPLA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/FOSPLA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Political Legitimacy as an Existential Predicament.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Thomas Fossen" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Thomas%20Fossen"><span class="name">Thomas Fossen</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Political Theory</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This essay contributes to developing a new approach to political legitimacy by asking what is involved in judging the legitimacy of a regime from a practical point of view. It is focused on one aspect of this question: the role of identity in such judgment. I examine three ways of understanding the significance of identity for political legitimacy: the foundational, associative, and agonistic picture. Neither view, I claim, persuasively captures the dilemmas of judgment in the face of disagreement and uncertainty<span id="FOSPLA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FOSPLA-2-abstract2").show();$("FOSPLA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="FOSPLA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> about who “I” am and who “we” are. I then propose a composite, pragmatic picture. This view casts the question of political legitimacy as an existential predicament: it is fundamentally a question about who you are—both as a person and as a member of collectives. The pragmatic picture integrates rational, prudential, and ethical qualities of good judgment that were heretofore associated with mutually exclusive ways of theorizing legitimacy. It also implies that the question of legitimacy cannot be resolved philosophically. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FOSPLA-2-abstract2").hide();$("FOSPLA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/FOSPLA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-FOSPLA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FOSPLA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FOSPLA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FOSPLA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FOSPLA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSISDBR" onclick="ee('click','SISDBR')" onmouseover="ee('over','SISDBR')" onmouseout="ee('out','SISDBR')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SISDBR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Does Being Rational Require Being Ideally Rational? `Rational' as a Relative and an Absolute Term.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Wes Siscoe" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Wes%20Siscoe"><span class="name">Wes Siscoe</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Topics</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A number of formal epistemologists have argued that perfect rationality requires probabilistic coherence, a requirement that they often claim applies only to ideal agents. However, in “Rationality as an Absolute Concept”, Roy Sorensen contends that ‘rational’ is an absolute term. Just as Peter Unger argued that being flat requires that a surface be completely free of bumps and blemishes, Sorensen claims that being rational requires being perfectly rational. However, when we combine these two views, they lead to counterintuitive results. If<span id="SISDBR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SISDBR-abstract2").show();$("SISDBR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SISDBR-abstract2" style="display:none"> being rational requires being perfectly rational, and only the probabilistically coherent are perfectly rational, then this indicts all ordinary agents as irrational. In this paper, I will attempt to resolve this conflict by arguing that Sorensen is only partly correct. One important sense of ‘rational,’ the sanctioning sense of ‘rational’, is an absolute term, but another important sense of ‘rational,’ the sense in which someone can have rational capacities, is not. I will, then, show that this distinction has important consequences for theorizing about ideal rationality, developing an account of the relationship between ordinary and ideal rationality. Because the sanctioning sense of ‘rational’ is absolute, it is rationally required to adopt the most rational attitude available, but which attitude is most rational can change depending on whether we are dealing with ideal agents or people more like ourselves. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SISDBR-abstract2").hide();$("SISDBR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SISDBR"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SISDBR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SISDBR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SISDBR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SISDBR','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SISDBR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eQUECEA" onclick="ee('click','QUECEA')" onmouseover="ee('over','QUECEA')" onmouseout="ee('out','QUECEA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/QUECEA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Conceptual Engineering and the Politics of Implementation.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Matthieu Queloz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Matthieu%20Queloz"><span class="name">Matthieu Queloz</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Friedemann Bieber" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Friedemann%20Bieber"><span class="name">Friedemann Bieber</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Conceptual engineering is thought to face an ‘implementation challenge’: the challenge of securing uptake of engineered concepts. But is the fact that implementation is challenging really a defect to be overcome? What kind of picture of political life would be implied by making engineering easy to implement? We contend that the ambition to obviate the implementation challenge goes against the very idea of liberal democratic politics. On the picture we draw, the implementation challenge can be overcome by institutionalizing control over<span id="QUECEA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("QUECEA-abstract2").show();$("QUECEA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="QUECEA-abstract2" style="display:none"> conceptual uptake, and there are contexts—such as professions that depend on coordinated conceptual innovation—in which there are good reasons to institutionalize control in this fashion. But the liberal fear of this power to control conceptual uptake ending up in the wrong hands, combined with the democratic demand for freedom of thought as a precondition of genuine consent, yields a liberal democratic rationale for keeping implementation challenging. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("QUECEA-abstract2").hide();$("QUECEA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/QUECEA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-QUECEA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('QUECEA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-QUECEA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('QUECEA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-QUECEA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGEOSPA" onclick="ee('click','GEOSPA')" onmouseover="ee('over','GEOSPA')" onmouseout="ee('out','GEOSPA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/GEOSPA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">SNARE Proteins as Molecular Masters of Interneuronal Communication.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Danko Georgiev" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Danko%20Georgiev"><span class="name">Danko Georgiev</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by James F. Glazebrook" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/James F.%20Glazebrook"><span class="name">James F. Glazebrook</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2010</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Biomedical Reviews</em> 21:17-23.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In the beginning of the 20th century the groundbreaking work of Ramon y Cajal firmly established the neuron doctrine, according to which neurons are the basic structural and functional units of the nervous system. Von Weldeyer coined the term “neuron” in 1891, but the huge leap forward in neuroscience was due to Cajal’s meticulous microscopic observations of brain sections stained with an improved version of Golgi’s la reazione nera (black reaction). The latter improvement of Golgi’s technique made it possible to<span id="GEOSPA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GEOSPA-abstract2").show();$("GEOSPA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GEOSPA-abstract2" style="display:none"> visualize the arborizations of single neurons that were “colored brownish black even to their finest branchlets, standing out with unsurpassable clarity upon a transparent yellow background. All was sharp as a sketch with Chinese ink”. The high quality of both the visualization of individual nerve cells and the work performed on studying the anatomy of the central nervous system lead Ramon y Cajal to the conclusion that axons output the nervous impulses to the dendrites or the soma of other target neurons. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GEOSPA-abstract2").hide();$("GEOSPA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/GEOSPA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GEOSPA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GEOSPA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GEOSPA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GEOSPA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/citations/GEOSPA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GEOSPA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGEOCCO-4" onclick="ee('click','GEOCCO-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','GEOCCO-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','GEOCCO-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/GEOCCO-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Computational Capacity of Pyramidal Neurons in the Cerebral Cortex.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Danko D. Georgiev" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Danko D.%20Georgiev"><span class="name">Danko D. Georgiev</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Stefan K. Kolev" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Stefan K.%20Kolev"><span class="name">Stefan K. Kolev</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Eliahu Cohen" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Eliahu%20Cohen"><span class="name">Eliahu Cohen</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by James F. Glazebrook" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/James F.%20Glazebrook"><span class="name">James F. Glazebrook</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Brain Research</em> 1748:147069.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The electric activities of cortical pyramidal neurons are supported by structurally stable, morphologically complex axo-dendritic trees. Anatomical differences between axons and dendrites in regard to their length or caliber reflect the underlying functional specializations, for input or output of neural information, respectively. For a proper assessment of the computational capacity of pyramidal neurons, we have analyzed an extensive dataset of three-dimensional digital reconstructions from the NeuroMorphoOrg database, and quantified basic dendritic or axonal morphometric measures in different regions and layers of<span id="GEOCCO-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GEOCCO-4-abstract2").show();$("GEOCCO-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GEOCCO-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> the mouse, rat or human cerebral cortex. Physical estimates of the total number and type of ions involved in neuronal electric spiking based on the obtained morphometric data, combined with energetics of neurotransmitter release and signaling fueled by glucose consumed by the active brain, support highly efficient cerebral computation performed at the thermodynamically allowed Landauer limit for implementation of irreversible logical operations. Individual proton tunneling events in voltage-sensing S4 protein alpha-helices of Na+, K+ or Ca2+ ion channels are ideally suited to serve as single Landauer elementary logical operations that are then amplified by selective ionic currents traversing the open channel pores. This miniaturization of computational gating allows the execution of over 1.2 zetta logical operations per second in the human cerebral cortex without combusting the brain by the released heat. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GEOCCO-4-abstract2").hide();$("GEOCCO-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/GEOCCO-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GEOCCO-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GEOCCO-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GEOCCO-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GEOCCO-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GEOCCO-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSJLNAT" onclick="ee('click','SJLNAT')" onmouseover="ee('over','SJLNAT')" onmouseout="ee('out','SJLNAT')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SJLNAT"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Non-Uniformism and the Epistemology of Philosophically Interesting Modal Claims.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ylwa Sjölin Wirling" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Ylwa%20Sjölin Wirling"><span class="name">Ylwa Sjölin Wirling</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Grazer Philosophische Studien</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Philosophers often make exotic-sounding modal claims, such as: “A timeless world is impossible”, “The laws of physics could have been different from what they are”, “There could have been an additional phenomenal colour”. Otherwise popular empiricist modal epistemologies in the contemporary literature cannot account for whatever epistemic justification we might have for making such modal claims. Those who do not, as a result of this, endorse scepticism with respect to their epistemic status typically suggest that they can be justified but<span id="SJLNAT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SJLNAT-abstract2").show();$("SJLNAT-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SJLNAT-abstract2" style="display:none"> have yet to develop some distinct, workable theory of how. That is, they endorse a form of non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality, according to which claims about philosophically interesting modal matters need to be justified differently from e.g. everyday or scientific modal claims, but they fail to provide any more detail. This article aims to fill this gap by outlining how such a non-uniformist view could be spelled out and what story about philosophically interesting modal justification it could contain. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SJLNAT-abstract2").hide();$("SJLNAT-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SJLNAT"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SJLNAT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SJLNAT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SJLNAT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SJLNAT','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SJLNAT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKARHAT-3" onclick="ee('click','KARHAT-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','KARHAT-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','KARHAT-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KARHAT-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Heidegger's Antigone: The Ethos of Poetic Existence.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Onur Karamercan" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Onur%20Karamercan"><span class="name">Onur Karamercan</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy</em> 11 (3):1063-1077.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this article, I elucidate Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Soph-ocles’ tragedy Antigone from a topological point of view by focusing on the place-character of Antigone’s poetic ethos. Antigone’s decision to defy Creon’s order and bury her brother Polynices is discussed as a movement that underpins her poetic disposition as a demigod. Antigone’s situatedness between gods and hu-mans is identified as the place of poetic dwelling, and the significance of Antig-one’s relation to the polis is explained. The main argument of the<span id="KARHAT-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KARHAT-3-abstract2").show();$("KARHAT-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KARHAT-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> article is two-fold: 1) When we read Antigone focusing on the notion of dwelling, we can better make sense how Heidegger’s engagement with the question of finitude closes the envisioned gap between ontology and ethics. 2) The idea of poetic dwelling is a confrontation with spatio-temporal limits of human existence, and requires a more holistic way of thinking about the place of humans in the world, thinking beyond being-action dichotomy. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KARHAT-3-abstract2").hide();$("KARHAT-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KARHAT-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KARHAT-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KARHAT-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KARHAT-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KARHAT-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KARHAT-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCONNAE-2" onclick="ee('click','CONNAE-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','CONNAE-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','CONNAE-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CONNAE-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">'Nous Alone Enters From Outside' Aristotelian Embryology and Early Christian Philosophy.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sophia Connell" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sophia%20Connell"><span class="name">Sophia Connell</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Ancient Philosophy</em> 2 (15):109-138.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In a work entitled On the Generation of Animals, Aristotle remarks that “intellect (nous) alone enters from outside (thurathen)”. Interpretations of this passage as dualistic dominate the history of ideas and allow for a joining together of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine on the soul. This, however, pulls against the well-known Aristotelian position that soul and body are intertwined and interdependent. The most influential interpretations thereby misrepresent Aristotle’s view on soul and lack any real engagement with his embryology. This paper seeks<span id="CONNAE-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CONNAE-2-abstract2").show();$("CONNAE-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CONNAE-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> to extract the account of intellect (nous) in Aristotelian embryology from this interpretative background and place it within the context of his mature biological thought. A clear account of the actual import of this statement in its relevant context is given before explaining how it has been misunderstood by various interpretative traditions. The paper finishes by touching on how early commentary by Christian writers, freed as it was from the imperative to synthesise Greek philosophy, differed from those that came after. While realising that Aristotle’s position would not aid them in their explanations of the soul’s survival after death, their engagement with Aristotle’s science allowed for other aspects of theology concerning the fittingness of soul to body. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CONNAE-2-abstract2").hide();$("CONNAE-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CONNAE-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-CONNAE-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CONNAE-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CONNAE-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CONNAE-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CONNAE-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMARNON-2" onclick="ee('click','MARNON-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','MARNON-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','MARNON-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MARNON-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Notes on Note-Making: Introduction.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by L. Marin" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/L.%20Marin"><span class="name">L. Marin</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sean Sturm" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sean%20Sturm"><span class="name">Sean Sturm</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Joris Vlieghe" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Joris%20Vlieghe"><span class="name">Joris Vlieghe</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Educational Philosophy and Theory</em> 13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This special issue aims to explore what is educational in the seemingly humble gesture of making notes: not only how and why the practice of note-taking is educative in and of itself, but also what it says about education as such. The contributions to the issue each highlight different aspects of note-making and approach it differently, but all assume that note-making is an educational practice that merits philosophical study. Interestingly, they mostly focus on note-making as a non-digital practice, perhaps because<span id="MARNON-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MARNON-2-abstract2").show();$("MARNON-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MARNON-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> most were written prior to the great digitisation ushered in by educational institutions’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Let us first address how we see the different aspects of note-making highlighted by the contributions to the issue. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MARNON-2-abstract2").hide();$("MARNON-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MARNON-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MARNON-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MARNON-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MARNON-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MARNON-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MARNON-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVANHTT-5" onclick="ee('click','VANHTT-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','VANHTT-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','VANHTT-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/VANHTT-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">How to Teach Engineering Ethics?: A Retrospective and Prospective Sketch of TU Delft’s Approach to Engineering Ethics Education.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by J. B. van Grunsven" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/J. B.%20van Grunsven"><span class="name">J. B. van Grunsven</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by L. Marin" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/L.%20Marin"><span class="name">L. Marin</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by T. W. Stone" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/T. W.%20Stone"><span class="name">T. W. Stone</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by S. Roeser" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/S.%20Roeser"><span class="name">S. Roeser</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by N. Doorn" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/N.%20Doorn"><span class="name">N. Doorn</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Advances in Engineering Education</em> 9 (4).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper provides a retrospective and prospective overview of TU Delft’s approach to engineering ethics education. For over twenty years, the Ethics and Philosophy of Technology Section at TU Delft has been at the forefront of engineering ethics education, offering education to a wide range of engineering and design students. The approach developed at TU Delft is deeply informed by the research of the Section, which is centered around Responsible Research and Innovation, Design for Values, and Risk Ethics. These theoretical<span id="VANHTT-5-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VANHTT-5-abstract2").show();$("VANHTT-5-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VANHTT-5-abstract2" style="display:none"> approaches are premised on the notion that technologies are inherently value-laden, and as such contain the possibility of fostering or hindering moral values. Each of these approaches encourages students to take a proactive attitude with respect to their projects and profession, thinking creatively about – and taking responsibility for – how to both prevent harm and do good via the technologies they help develop. To explain how this is put into practice, this paper sketches a brief history of ethics teaching at TU Delft, outlines current activities, and presents future plans for Bachelor and Master’s level engineering ethics education at TU Delft. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VANHTT-5-abstract2").hide();$("VANHTT-5-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/VANHTT-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VANHTT-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VANHTT-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VANHTT-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VANHTT-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VANHTT-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eFIECFT-4" onclick="ee('click','FIECFT-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','FIECFT-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','FIECFT-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/FIECFT-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Conversations From the Region: A Conversation with Sandra Leonie Field.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sandra Leonie Field" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sandra Leonie%20Field"><span class="name">Sandra Leonie Field</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Racher Du" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Racher%20Du"><span class="name">Racher Du</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alan Bechaz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alan%20Bechaz"><span class="name">Alan Bechaz</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Will Cailes" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Will%20Cailes"><span class="name">Will Cailes</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Thomas Spiteri" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Thomas%20Spiteri"><span class="name">Thomas Spiteri</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Australasia</em> 2021.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In May 2021, Alan Bechaz, Racher Du, Will Cailes and Thomas Spiteri interviewed Sandra Leonie Field for UPJA’s Conversations from the Region. A series of discussions that invites philosophers from or based in Australasia to share their student and academic experiences. The segment looks into what inspires people to study philosophy, how they pursue their philosophical interests, and gives our audiences a better idea of philosophy as an undergraduate. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/FIECFT-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-FIECFT-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FIECFT-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FIECFT-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FIECFT-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FIECFT-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eFIEMSA-2" onclick="ee('click','FIEMSA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','FIEMSA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','FIEMSA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/FIEMSA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Marx, Spinoza, and 'True Democracy'.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sandra Leonie Field" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sandra Leonie%20Field"><span class="name">Sandra Leonie Field</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Jason Maurice Yonover & Kristin Gjesdal (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/YONSIG">Spinoza in Germany: Political and Religious Thought in the Long Nineteenth Century</a></em>. New York: Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">It is common to assimilate Marx’s and Spinoza’s conceptions of democracy. In this chapter, I assess the relation between Marx’s early idea of “true democracy” and Spinozist democracy, both the historical influence and the theoretical affinity. Drawing on Marx’s student notebooks on Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, I show there was a historical influence. However, at the theoretical level, I argue that a sharp distinction must be drawn. Philosophically, Spinoza’s commitment to understanding politics through real concrete powers does not support with Marx’s<span id="FIEMSA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FIEMSA-2-abstract2").show();$("FIEMSA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="FIEMSA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> anti-institutional conception of true democracy. And as a matter of social theory, the gap between civil society and the state which so troubles Marx is a development of modernity that has not entered Spinoza's premodern field of view. Marx’s true democracy was also influenced by his study of Rousseau, and theoretically, it is just as close if not closer to Rousseau as to Spinoza. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FIEMSA-2-abstract2").hide();$("FIEMSA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/FIEMSA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-FIEMSA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FIEMSA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FIEMSA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FIEMSA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FIEMSA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eFALOWR" onclick="ee('click','FALOWR')" onmouseover="ee('over','FALOWR')" onmouseout="ee('out','FALOWR')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-17</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/FALOWR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Outsiders Within: Reflections on Being a First-Generation and/or Low-Income Philosopher.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Arianna Falbo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Arianna%20Falbo"><span class="name">Arianna Falbo</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Heather Stewart" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Heather%20Stewart"><span class="name">Heather Stewart</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy</em> 3 (20):1-6.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/FALOWR"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-FALOWR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FALOWR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FALOWR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FALOWR','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FALOWR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eOXEBMS" onclick="ee('click','OXEBMS')" onmouseover="ee('over','OXEBMS')" onmouseout="ee('out','OXEBMS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-17</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/OXEBMS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Body, Mind, and Spirit: The Crack in the Western Model.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Richard Oxenberg" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Richard%20Oxenberg"><span class="name">Richard Oxenberg</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A brief reflection on the mind-body problem and its implications for the way we conceive of ourselves and live our lives. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/OXEBMS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-OXEBMS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('OXEBMS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-OXEBMS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('OXEBMS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-OXEBMS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eEMECAD-2" onclick="ee('click','EMECAD-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','EMECAD-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','EMECAD-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-17</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/EMECAD-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Chance and Determinism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nina Emery" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nina%20Emery"><span class="name">Nina Emery</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2022</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KNOCTT">Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Physics</a></em>. Routledge.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This chapter focuses on the relations between objective probabilities in physical theories at different levels. In general philosophy of probability, it is frequently assumed that a fundamental deterministic theory cannot support probabilistic phenomena at any higher level, or more generally that there cannot be non-trivial probabilities in higher-level theories that are not encoded in probabilities at the lower level. These assumptions face significant challenges from some well-understood physical theories – I focus on statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics – where a<span id="EMECAD-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("EMECAD-2-abstract2").show();$("EMECAD-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="EMECAD-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> deterministic description at some lower level gives rise to an effectively probabilistic theory at some higher level; in each case, constraints arising from an objective physical limitation on the acquisition of evidence concerning the lower level plays a crucial role in supporting the higher-level probabilities. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("EMECAD-2-abstract2").hide();$("EMECAD-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/EMECAD-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-EMECAD-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('EMECAD-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-EMECAD-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('EMECAD-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-EMECAD-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVUOTHR" onclick="ee('click','VUOTHR')" onmouseover="ee('over','VUOTHR')" onmouseout="ee('out','VUOTHR')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-17</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/VUOTHR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Harsh Reality of Pursuing Innovations.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Quan-Hoang Vuong" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Quan-Hoang%20Vuong"><span class="name">Quan-Hoang Vuong</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2014</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Dolly Samson (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SAMPNN-2">Proc. 2nd Natl. Conf. on Higher Edu. Strategies for Management & Administration (Stamford Intl Uni. Bangkok, Thailand, Nov. 1, 2014)</a></em>. Bangkok, Thailand: Stamford International University. pp. 1-9.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This short conference paper serves as a distillation of a keynote address delivered at the the Second National Conference on Management and Higher Education Trends & Strategies for Management & Administration hosted by Bangkok-based Stamford International University (Thailand) on November 1, 2014. Innovation is discussed as the heart of entrepreneurial processes occurring in today's capitalist economic systems, including transition economies like China and Vietnam, which underscores economic competitiveness of firms and economies. But the innovation effort and process also face dilemma<span id="VUOTHR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VUOTHR-abstract2").show();$("VUOTHR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VUOTHR-abstract2" style="display:none"> of "entrepreneurial curse of innovation". Advantages and disadvantages are weighed for a more balanced view, especially in the context of outnumbering SMEs and given existence of pitfalls and traps along the innovation path of development. Toward the end, the value of the market is once again stressed amid the concern of subjective assumption and illusion about availability of market opportunities in the mind of innovators, which may contrast totally with the dismal outcome the actual market realities may show ex post. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VUOTHR-abstract2").hide();$("VUOTHR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/VUOTHR"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VUOTHR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VUOTHR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VUOTHR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VUOTHR','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VUOTHR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eZEHGCC" onclick="ee('click','ZEHGCC')" onmouseover="ee('over','ZEHGCC')" onmouseout="ee('out','ZEHGCC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ZEHGCC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Germany: Co-Creating Cooperative and Sharing Economies.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Soenke Zehle" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Soenke%20Zehle"><span class="name">Soenke Zehle</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hannes Käfer" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Hannes%20Käfer"><span class="name">Hannes Käfer</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Julia Hartnik" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Julia%20Hartnik"><span class="name">Julia Hartnik</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael Schmitz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael%20Schmitz"><span class="name">Michael Schmitz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Andrzej Klimczuk, Vida Česnuitytė & Gabriela Avram (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLITCE">The Collaborative Economy in Action: European Perspectives</a></em>. University of Limerick. pp. 139-152.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The chapter describes the sharing economy in Germany as a heterogeneous dynamic, combining local trends and histories with economic forms drawing on experiences mainly from across Europe and North America. Increasingly taken into account by policymakers in the regulation of markets and the redesign of innovation governance frameworks, “sharing” as a complex nexus linking the exercise of citizenship to sustainable consumption and informational self-determination in digital societies will continue to drive and frame the creation of value chains. Of particular interest<span id="ZEHGCC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ZEHGCC-abstract2").show();$("ZEHGCC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ZEHGCC-abstract2" style="display:none"> are linkages between sharing economies and the traditions of cooperativism, currently experiencing a renaissance. The latter is key because it shapes the context in which sharing economy initiatives exist and expand—an opening of definitions and narrative of innovation, of value, and of collaborative agency and cooperative management. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ZEHGCC-abstract2").hide();$("ZEHGCC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ZEHGCC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ZEHGCC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ZEHGCC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ZEHGCC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ZEHGCC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ZEHGCC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePERUKA" onclick="ee('click','PERUKA')" onmouseover="ee('over','PERUKA')" onmouseout="ee('out','PERUKA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/PERUKA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">United Kingdom: An Examination of the Configuration of the Sharing Economy, Pressing Issues, and Research Directions.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Rodrigo Perez-Vega" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Rodrigo%20Perez-Vega"><span class="name">Rodrigo Perez-Vega</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Brian Jones" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Brian%20Jones"><span class="name">Brian Jones</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Penny Travlou" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Penny%20Travlou"><span class="name">Penny Travlou</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Cristina Miguel" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Cristina%20Miguel"><span class="name">Cristina Miguel</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Andrzej Klimczuk, Vida Česnuitytė & Gabriela Avram (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLITCE">The Collaborative Economy in Action: European Perspectives</a></em>. University of Limerick. pp. 359-371.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This chapter aims to examine the configuration of the sharing economy in the United Kingdom. The chapter provides an examination of the key opportunities and challenges that this socio-economic model generates in the country. It includes an account of different sharing economy initiatives in the United Kingdom, including crowdfunding projects, tool libraries, timesharing banks, men’s sheds, and shared workspaces, commercial sharing economy services, micro-libraries, community-gardening projects, and paid online peer-to-peer accommodation. Increased consumer choice and economic benefits derived from an extended<span id="PERUKA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PERUKA-abstract2").show();$("PERUKA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PERUKA-abstract2" style="display:none"> economy around the sharing economy are identified as key opportunities. Key challenges relate to policymaking and taxation of businesses and participants in the sharing economy, as well as the wider enforcement of health and safety regulations and the impact that the recent pandemic is having on the industry. The chapter also provides an examination of the latest developments and regulations in this area. In addition, the chapter identifies the most pressing issues and possible future directions of research in this context. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PERUKA-abstract2").hide();$("PERUKA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/PERUKA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-PERUKA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PERUKA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PERUKA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PERUKA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PERUKA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLITCE-3" onclick="ee('click','KLITCE-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLITCE-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLITCE-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLITCE-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Collaborative Economy in Action: Context and Outline of Country Reports.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andrzej Klimczuk" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Andrzej%20Klimczuk"><span class="name">Andrzej Klimczuk</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Vida Česnuitytė" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Vida%20Česnuitytė"><span class="name">Vida Česnuitytė</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gabriela Avram" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Gabriela%20Avram"><span class="name">Gabriela Avram</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Andrzej Klimczuk, Vida Česnuitytė & Gabriela Avram (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLITCE">The Collaborative Economy in Action: European Perspectives</a></em>. University of Limerick. pp. 6-21.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The term collaborative economy itself is relatively new, and according to the European Commission, the term is used interchangeably with the term sharing economy. The term SE was frequently used when early models, such as Airbnb or ZipCar, appeared and gained popularity, especially in the United States, but it was afterwards substituted with the term CE in the European contexts. The country reports in this collection often use the two terms interchangeably, further illustrating the fact that a generally agreed definition<span id="KLITCE-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLITCE-3-abstract2").show();$("KLITCE-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KLITCE-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> is still missing. However, the ambition driving the term CE is to create specific European economic models with greater emphasis on the community's involvement. In Europe, it is still the case that the definition of the CE and SE remains fuzzy, including both non-profit and for-profit models, supported by both monetary and non-monetary exchanges among participants. The phenomenon is complex, covering various fields of activity, as well as operating at various levels, ranging from the international to the national, regional, and local. Some definitions focus mostly on sustainability, while others highlight technological and financial aspects and business models specific to the phenomenon. This chapter is organized as follows. First, a short overview of the basic theoretical approaches to CE is presented. Further, the structure of the book is discussed in detail, and the text closes with a summary. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLITCE-3-abstract2").hide();$("KLITCE-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLITCE-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KLITCE-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLITCE-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLITCE-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLITCE-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLITCE-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDUMTSO-8" onclick="ee('click','DUMTSO-8')" onmouseover="ee('over','DUMTSO-8')" onmouseout="ee('out','DUMTSO-8')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DUMTSO-8"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The State of the Sharing Economy in Croatia: Legal Framework and Impact on Various Economic Sectors.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Kosjenka Dumančić" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Kosjenka%20Dumančić"><span class="name">Kosjenka Dumančić</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Anita Čeh Časni" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Anita%20Čeh Časni"><span class="name">Anita Čeh Časni</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Andrzej Klimczuk, Vida Česnuitytė & Gabriela Avram (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLITCE">The Collaborative Economy in Action: European Perspectives</a></em>. Limerick: University of Limerick. pp. 90-99.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Since the sharing economy is a rather new phenomenon, there is still no official definition of it in the legal framework of Croatia. The continuous development of sharing economy started a few years after the 1998 global and domestic economic crisis stroked Croatia. Namely, a total of eight platforms in the sectors of transportation, accommodation, finance, and online skills could be identified. The total market share of these platforms amounts to estimated market revenue of roughly 106 million EUR. When compared<span id="DUMTSO-8-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DUMTSO-8-abstract2").show();$("DUMTSO-8-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="DUMTSO-8-abstract2" style="display:none"> to the other EU Member States, it could be noticed that Croatia falls within the group of countries with a below-average performance by a number of platforms per 1 million population, as well as in the level of revenues compared to national GDP. Figures that are more promising can be detected regarding the collaborative economy’s contribution to national employment, which positions Croatia within the EU average. Future studies should explain in greater depth how the sharing economy poses several new challenges for regulators in Croatia and countries across the EU. In particular, policymakers must comprehend the big picture and provide regulatory guidelines to manage the long-term changes in job markets, public safety, competition, and digital trust. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DUMTSO-8-abstract2").hide();$("DUMTSO-8-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DUMTSO-8"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DUMTSO-8" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DUMTSO-8')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DUMTSO-8" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DUMTSO-8','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DUMTSO-8"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePHISIA-3" onclick="ee('click','PHISIA-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','PHISIA-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','PHISIA-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/PHISIA-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Shared Intentionality and the Representation of Groups; or, How to Build a Socially Adept Robot.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ben Phillips" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Ben%20Phillips"><span class="name">Ben Phillips</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Behavioral and Brain Sciences</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Pietraszewski provides a compelling case that representations of certain interaction- types are the “cognitive primitives” that allow all tokens of group-in-conflict to be represented within the mind. Here, I argue that the folk concept GROUP encodes shared intentions and goals as more central than these interaction-types, and that providing a computational theory of social groups will be more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/PHISIA-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-PHISIA-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PHISIA-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PHISIA-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PHISIA-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PHISIA-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBRYTMC" onclick="ee('click','BRYTMC')" onmouseover="ee('over','BRYTMC')" onmouseout="ee('out','BRYTMC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BRYTMC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Material Conditions of Non-Domination: Property, Independence, and the Means of Production.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alexander Bryan" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alexander%20Bryan"><span class="name">Alexander Bryan</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">European Journal of Political Theory</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">While it is a point of agreement in contemporary republican political theory that property ownership is closely connected to freedom as non-domination, surprisingly little work has been done to elucidate the nature of this connection or the constraints on property regimes that might be required as a result. In this paper, I provide a systematic model of the boundaries within which republican property systems must sit and explore some of the wider implications that thinking of property in these terms may<span id="BRYTMC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BRYTMC-abstract2").show();$("BRYTMC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BRYTMC-abstract2" style="display:none"> have for republicans. The boundaries I focus on relate to the distribution of property and the application of types of property claims over particular kinds of goods. I develop this model from those elements of non-domination most directly related to the operation of a property regime: (a) economic independence, (b) limiting material inequalities, and (c) the promotion of common goods. The limits that emerge from this analysis support intuitive judgments that animate much republican discussion of property distribution. My account diverges from much orthodox republican theory, though, in challenging the primacy of private property rights in the realization of economic independence. The value of property on republican terms can be realized without private ownership of the means of production. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BRYTMC-abstract2").hide();$("BRYTMC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/BRYTMC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BRYTMC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BRYTMC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BRYTMC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BRYTMC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BRYTMC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDCRTAS" onclick="ee('click','DCRTAS')" onmouseover="ee('over','DCRTAS')" onmouseout="ee('out','DCRTAS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DCRTAS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Truths About Simpson's Paradox - Saving the Paradox From Falsity.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Don Dcruz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Don%20Dcruz"><span class="name">Don Dcruz</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Prasanta S.%20Bandyopadhyay"><span class="name">Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Venkata Raghavan" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Venkata%20Raghavan"><span class="name">Venkata Raghavan</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gordon Brittain Jr" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Gordon%20Brittain Jr"><span class="name">Gordon Brittain Jr</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2015</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In M. Banerjee & S. N. Krishna (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BANL-3">LNCS 8923</a></em>. Springer. pp. 58-75.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">There are three questions associated with Simpson’s paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP? and (iii) How to proceed when confronted with SP? An adequate analysis of the paradox starts by distinguishing these three questions. Then, by developing a formal account of SP, and substantiating it with a counterexample to causal accounts, we argue that there are no causal factors at play in answering questions (i) and (ii). Causality enters only in connection with action. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DCRTAS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DCRTAS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DCRTAS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DCRTAS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DCRTAS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DCRTAS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBANASM-3" onclick="ee('click','BANASM-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','BANASM-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','BANASM-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BANASM-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Are Scientific Models of Life Testable? A Lesson From Simpson's Paradox.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Prasanta S.%20Bandyopadhyay"><span class="name">Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Don Dcruz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Don%20Dcruz"><span class="name">Don Dcruz</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nolan Grunska" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nolan%20Grunska"><span class="name">Nolan Grunska</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Mark Greenwood" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Mark%20Greenwood"><span class="name">Mark Greenwood</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Sci</em> 1 (3).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">We address the need for a model by considering two competing theories regarding the origin of life: (i) the Metabolism First theory, and (ii) the RNA World theory. We discuss two interrelated points, namely: (i) Models are valuable tools for understanding both the processes and intricacies of origin-of-life issues, and (ii) Insights from models also help us to evaluate the core objection to origin-of-life theories, called “the inefficiency objection”, which is commonly raised by proponents of both the Metabolism First theory<span id="BANASM-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BANASM-3-abstract2").show();$("BANASM-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BANASM-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> and the RNA World theory against each other. We use Simpson’s Paradox (SP) as a tool for challenging this objection. We will use models in various senses, ranging from taking them as representations of reality to treating them as theories/accounts that provide heuristics for probing reality. In this paper, we will frequently use models and theories interchangeably. Additionally, we investigate Conway’s Game of Life and contrast it with our SP-based approach to emergence-of-life issues. Finally, we discuss some of the consequences of our view. A scientific model is testable in three senses: (i) a logical sense, (ii) a nomological sense, and (iii) a current technological sense. The SP-based model is testable in the first two senses but it is not feasible to test it using current technology. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BANASM-3-abstract2").hide();$("BANASM-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/BANASM-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BANASM-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BANASM-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BANASM-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BANASM-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BANASM-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDAVTPO-127" onclick="ee('click','DAVTPO-127')" onmouseover="ee('over','DAVTPO-127')" onmouseout="ee('out','DAVTPO-127')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DAVTPO-127"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Primacy of Intention and the Duty to Truth: A Gandhi-Inspired Argument for Retranslating <em>Hiṃsā_ and _Ahiṃsā</em>, with Connections to History, Ethics, and Civil Resistance.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Todd Davies" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Todd%20Davies"><span class="name">Todd Davies</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The words "violence" and "nonviolence" are increasingly misleading translations for the Sanskrit words hiṃsā and ahiṃsā -- which were used by Gandhi as the basis for his philosophy of satyāgraha. I argue for re-reading hiṃsā as “maleficence” and ahiṃsā as “beneficence.” These two more mind-referring English words – associated with religiously contextualized discourse of the past -- capture the primacy of intention implied by Gandhi’s core principles, better than “violence” and “nonviolence” do. Reflecting a political turn in moral accountability detectable<span id="DAVTPO-127-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DAVTPO-127-abstract2").show();$("DAVTPO-127-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="DAVTPO-127-abstract2" style="display:none"> through linguistic data, both the scope and the usage of the word “violence” have expanded dramatically. The expanded scope of “violence” reflects greater consciousness of the various forms that serious harm can take, but also makes it harder to convincingly characterize people and actions as “nonviolent.” New translations could clarify the distinction between hiṃsā and ahiṃsā, and thereby prevent some misunderstandings of Gandhi. Training in beneficence would reflect Gandhi’s psychological path to reducing avoidable harm: detachment from the ego, learning to love universally, and seeking truth by experiment. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DAVTPO-127-abstract2").hide();$("DAVTPO-127-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DAVTPO-127"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DAVTPO-127" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DAVTPO-127')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DAVTPO-127" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DAVTPO-127','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DAVTPO-127"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCALCDI" onclick="ee('click','CALCDI')" onmouseover="ee('over','CALCDI')" onmouseout="ee('out','CALCDI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CALCDI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Crítica Del Isomorfismo de Los Modelos Estructuralistas.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by David Calvo Vélez" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/David%20Calvo Vélez"><span class="name">David Calvo Vélez</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2006</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy</em> 25 (2):57-72.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CALCDI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-CALCDI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CALCDI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CALCDI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CALCDI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CALCDI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWILKPA-8" onclick="ee('click','WILKPA-8')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILKPA-8')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILKPA-8')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WILKPA-8"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Kinmaking, Progeneration, and Ethnography.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Robert A. Wilson" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Robert A.%20Wilson"><span class="name">Robert A. Wilson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Philosophers of biology and biologists themselves for the most part assume that the concept of kin is progenerative: what makes two individuals kin is a direct or indirect function of reproduction. Derivatively, kinship might likewise be presumed to be progenerative in nature. Yet a prominent view of kinship in contemporary cultural anthropology is a kind of constructivism or performativism that rejects such progenerativist views. This paper critically examines an influential line of thinking used to critique progenerativism and support performativism that<span id="WILKPA-8-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WILKPA-8-abstract2").show();$("WILKPA-8-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WILKPA-8-abstract2" style="display:none"> cites cross-cultural diversity in what I will call kinmaking. I challenge several key assumptions made in moving from this appeal to ethnography to conclusions about kinship and progeneration, arguing that closer scrutiny of both the ethnographic record and inferences that draw on it in fact support progenerative views of both kinship and kinmaking. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WILKPA-8-abstract2").hide();$("WILKPA-8-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WILKPA-8"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WILKPA-8" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILKPA-8')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILKPA-8" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILKPA-8','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILKPA-8"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWOOTIN-3" onclick="ee('click','WOOTIN-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','WOOTIN-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','WOOTIN-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-16</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WOOTIN-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Ignorance Norm and Paradoxical Assertions.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Elise Woodard" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Elise%20Woodard"><span class="name">Elise Woodard</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Topics</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Can agents rationally inquire into things that they know? On my view, the answer is yes. Call this view the Compatibility Thesis. One challenge to this thesis is to explain why assertions like “I know that p, but I’m wondering whether p” sound odd, if not Moore-Paradoxical. In response to this challenge, I argue that we can reject one or both premises that give rise to it. First, we can deny that inquiry requires interrogative attitudes. Second, we can deny the<span id="WOOTIN-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WOOTIN-3-abstract2").show();$("WOOTIN-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WOOTIN-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> ignorance norm, on which agents are not permitted to both know and have interrogative attitudes, such as wondering. I argue that there are compelling reasons to deny the former and reasons to question the latter. Both options pave the way for further work on further inquiry. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WOOTIN-3-abstract2").hide();$("WOOTIN-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WOOTIN-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WOOTIN-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WOOTIN-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WOOTIN-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WOOTIN-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WOOTIN-3"></span></div></div></li> </ol> </div> </div> <div id="allrecent" class="tab-pane fade"> <div id="entries" class=""><ol class="entryList"> <li id="eKOGIDC" onclick="ee('click','KOGIDC')" onmouseover="ee('over','KOGIDC')" onmouseout="ee('out','KOGIDC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KOGIDC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">I Didn’T Choose To Come Here And I Have No Say In Whether I Stay Or Leave This Planet.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Yamin Kogoya" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Yamin%20Kogoya"><span class="name">Yamin Kogoya</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">My journey here is a complete mystery; I didn't choose to come here, I can't remember anything, and I have no say in whether I stay or leave this planet. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KOGIDC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KOGIDC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KOGIDC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KOGIDC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KOGIDC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KOGIDC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTHOBAT-2" onclick="ee('click','THOBAT-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','THOBAT-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','THOBAT-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THOBAT-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Body as the Unity of Action.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by David L. Thompson" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/David L.%20Thompson"><span class="name">David L. Thompson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Kosgaard claims that selves/agents self-constitute during actions by relying on principles such as Kant’s Categorical Imperative. This intellectualist approach neglects the body. Merleau-Ponty considers the “lived body” and its perceptual world as the source of the unity of action, an approach that I extrapolate to all biological organisms. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/THOBAT-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-THOBAT-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('THOBAT-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-THOBAT-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('THOBAT-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-THOBAT-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eFISPPO-2" onclick="ee('click','FISPPO-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','FISPPO-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','FISPPO-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/FISPPO-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Pragmatical Paradox of Signature.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michaela Fiserova" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michaela%20Fiserova"><span class="name">Michaela Fiserova</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Signata</em> 9 (1):485-504.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The paper proposes to grasp handwritten signature as a metaphysical invention of the so-called “Western” civilization, where the signature is supposed to make possible juridical identification of the person who wrote it. However, despite this expectation of reliability, the Western handwritten signature is an aporetic sign, which is considered to be authentic (unrepeatable) and conventional (repeatable) at the same time. Because the signature is a sign of juridical identification and its authenticity can always be forged, Jacques Derrida tries to deconstruct<span id="FISPPO-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FISPPO-2-abstract2").show();$("FISPPO-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="FISPPO-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> the contradictory functioning of Western metaphysics, which leads to confusion in our expectations of authenticity and identity in our uses of signatures. By proposing a new reading of Derridean texts concerning writing, the paper focuses on the pragmatical paradox that grounds our contradictory legal politics of signing: because the exact manual reproduction of a line is impossible, no one can satisfy the legislative obligation to sign conformably to the model signature. That’s the aporia of trace’s recognition, which establishes the signature as a sign: on the one hand, the signature is supposed to represent the juridical identity of the person who traced it; on the other hand, the signature, which constantly changes its graphical form, makes every certain identification impossible. In order to question the juridical identity traditionally guaranteed by the signature, this paper invites to grasp the legal practice of signing as a subversive performativity, which is produced during the passage between recognition of juridical identity requested by the law and its simultaneous and inevitable transgression. Finally, the paper proposes a new approach to the signature as a visual performance of the self, based on a reevaluation of the altercation between Jacques Derrida and John Searle concerning the iterative character of traces and performatives. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("FISPPO-2-abstract2").hide();$("FISPPO-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/FISPPO-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-FISPPO-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FISPPO-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FISPPO-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FISPPO-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FISPPO-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSCHEPE-2" onclick="ee('click','SCHEPE-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','SCHEPE-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','SCHEPE-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHEPE-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Karl Schafer" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Karl%20Schafer"><span class="name">Karl Schafer</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), <em>Metaepistemology</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to develop such an argument. In doing so, I distinguish a variety of ways that argument might be understood, and discuss how both internalists and externalists might make use of the ideas within it. Then I argue that, despite these complexities,<span id="SCHEPE-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SCHEPE-2-abstract2").show();$("SCHEPE-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SCHEPE-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> the doxastic planning model continues to support a modest form of epistemic internalism. I conclude by showing that, far from conflicting with “anti-luminosity” arguments in epistemology, this form of internalism is best understood as a natural reaction to these arguments. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SCHEPE-2-abstract2").hide();$("SCHEPE-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SCHEPE-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SCHEPE-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SCHEPE-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SCHEPE-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SCHEPE-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SCHEPE-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eJENAS" onclick="ee('click','JENAS')" onmouseover="ee('over','JENAS')" onmouseout="ee('out','JENAS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/JENAS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">APDA 2021 Survey of Philosophy PhD Students and Recent Graduates: Demographic Data, Program Ratings, Academic Job Placement, and Non-Academic Careers.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Carolyn Dicey Jennings" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Carolyn Dicey%20Jennings"><span class="name">Carolyn Dicey Jennings</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alex Dayer" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alex%20Dayer"><span class="name">Alex Dayer</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Metaphilosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Doctoral graduates in philosophy are an excellent source of information about the discipline: they are at the cutting edge of research trends, have an inside view of research-focused departments, and their employment prospects provide early insights on the future health of the discipline. We report on the results of a survey sent to recent PhD graduates and current students, as well as data gathering efforts by Academic Placement Data and Analysis that have taken place over the past ten years. In<span id="JENAS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("JENAS-abstract2").show();$("JENAS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="JENAS-abstract2" style="display:none"> this report we especially focus on demographic representation, program ratings, academic job placement, and non-academic careers. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("JENAS-abstract2").hide();$("JENAS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/JENAS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-JENAS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('JENAS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-JENAS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('JENAS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-JENAS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSIITEO" onclick="ee('click','SIITEO')" onmouseover="ee('over','SIITEO')" onmouseout="ee('out','SIITEO')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SIITEO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Ethics of Climate Nudges: Central Issues for Applying Choice Architecture Interventions to Climate Policy.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Helena Siipi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Helena%20Siipi"><span class="name">Helena Siipi</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Polaris Koi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Polaris%20Koi"><span class="name">Polaris Koi</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">European Journal of Risk Regulation</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">While nudging has garnered plenty of interdisciplinary attention, the ethics of applying it to climate policy has been little discussed. However, not all ethical considerations surrounding nudging are straightforward to apply to climate nudges. In this article, we overview the state of the debate on the ethics of nudging and highlight themes that are either specific to or particularly important for climate nudges. These include: the justification of nudges that are not self-regarding; how to account for climate change denialists; transparency;<span id="SIITEO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SIITEO-abstract2").show();$("SIITEO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SIITEO-abstract2" style="display:none"> knowing the right or best behaviours; justice concerns; and whether the efficacy of nudges is sufficient for nudges to be justified as a response to the climate crisis. We conclude that climate nudges raise distinct ethical questions that ought to be considered in developing climate nudges. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SIITEO-abstract2").hide();$("SIITEO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SIITEO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SIITEO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SIITEO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SIITEO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SIITEO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SIITEO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVILLPE-3" onclick="ee('click','VILLPE-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','VILLPE-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','VILLPE-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/VILLPE-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">La problemática en torno al concepto de especie biológico y sus implicaciones éticas.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alejandro%20Villamor-Iglesias"><span class="name">Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Oximora</em> 13:328-341.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Far from being rigorously defined, the concept of species in a biologicalsense has suffered from imprecision since Charles Darwin. This is mainlydue to the absence of a definition that allows to combine within eachspecies the organisms that are considered part of it. The objective of thiswork is to show, on the one hand, the diversity of characterizations of theconcept of species as well as their respective problems and, on the other,the different sustainable ontological positions. As a consequence of theaforementioned imprecision,<span id="VILLPE-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VILLPE-3-abstract2").show();$("VILLPE-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VILLPE-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> the ethical consequences that this entails inthe debate about speciesism are analyzed. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VILLPE-3-abstract2").hide();$("VILLPE-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/VILLPE-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-VILLPE-3" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('VILLPE-3')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-VILLPE-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VILLPE-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VILLPE-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VILLPE-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VILLPE-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVILTSO-8" onclick="ee('click','VILTSO-8')" onmouseover="ee('over','VILTSO-8')" onmouseout="ee('out','VILTSO-8')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/VILTSO-8"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Suffering of Invertebrates: An Approach From Animal Ethics.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alejandro%20Villamor-Iglesias"><span class="name">Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía</em> 61:403-420.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Invertebrate animals are usually seen as a kind of “aliens” which do not deserve any moral consideration. However, there is a growing amount of evidenceindicating that many of them do have the capacity to experience pain. The samecriteria that are usually applied in order to infer that vertebrates are sentient beings (behavioral response, learning capacity, memory, a certain specific neurophysiological structure…) lead to the idea that many invertebrates aresentient as well. Therefore, under the skeptical premise that we have no directevidence<span id="VILTSO-8-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VILTSO-8-abstract2").show();$("VILTSO-8-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VILTSO-8-abstract2" style="display:none"> of the experience of pain in vertebrates, we are forced to hold that itexists in both vertebrates and invertebrates. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VILTSO-8-abstract2").hide();$("VILTSO-8-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/VILTSO-8"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VILTSO-8" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VILTSO-8')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VILTSO-8" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VILTSO-8','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VILTSO-8"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVILECE-3" onclick="ee('click','VILECE-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','VILECE-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','VILECE-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/VILECE-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">El conflicto entre los criterios morales centrados en la posesión de estados mentales y los asumidos por las éticas ambientales.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alejandro%20Villamor-Iglesias"><span class="name">Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Dilemata</em> 31:109-122.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The criteria granting moral considerability determines which entities ought to be taken into consideration in our ethical thinking. Accepting the relevance of axiology for normative theory, the attribution of considerability will depend on what theory of value we accept. Accord- ing to certain views, the possession of certain mental states is the moraly relevant factor. However, different views in the so-called “environmentalism ethics” claim that this is not a plausible axiological criterion. This paper will point at the different practical consequences<span id="VILECE-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VILECE-3-abstract2").show();$("VILECE-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VILECE-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> resulting from these views as well as the conflicts that may arise between them. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VILECE-3-abstract2").hide();$("VILECE-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/VILECE-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-VILECE-3" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('VILECE-3')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-VILECE-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VILECE-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VILECE-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VILECE-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VILECE-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eVILTOP" onclick="ee('click','VILTOP')" onmouseover="ee('over','VILTOP')" onmouseout="ee('out','VILTOP')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/VILTOP"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Overwhelming Prevalence of Suffering in Nature.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alejandro%20Villamor-Iglesias"><span class="name">Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Revista de Bioética y Derecho</em> 42:181-195.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">There are several reasons to believe that there is a predominance of suffering over wellbeing in nature. The difference grows exponentially when the suffering of invertebrates is taken into consideration. Given the relevance of the experience of pain when it comes to attributing moral considerability to an individual, the seriousness and implications of the above statements are significant due to the need to reconcile the interests of an enormous number of individuals who experience pain to some degree. Depending on the<span id="VILTOP-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VILTOP-abstract2").show();$("VILTOP-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="VILTOP-abstract2" style="display:none"> species and the ecosystem, there are variations that must be kept in mind with the aim of reducing the existing amount of suffering. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("VILTOP-abstract2").hide();$("VILTOP-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/VILTOP"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-VILTOP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('VILTOP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-VILTOP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('VILTOP','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-VILTOP"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTOPHEA" onclick="ee('click','TOPHEA')" onmouseover="ee('over','TOPHEA')" onmouseout="ee('out','TOPHEA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/TOPHEA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Brett Topey" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Brett%20Topey"><span class="name">Brett Topey</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence—i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty—is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it's claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim is incorrect. In particular, I motivate a minimal constraint on a reasonable treatment<span id="TOPHEA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TOPHEA-abstract2").show();$("TOPHEA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="TOPHEA-abstract2" style="display:none"> of the evolution of self-locating beliefs over time and show that calibrationism is compatible with any generalized Bayesian approach that respects this constraint. I then use this result to argue that remaining steadfast isn't the response to higher-order evidence that maximizes expected accuracy. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("TOPHEA-abstract2").hide();$("TOPHEA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/TOPHEA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-TOPHEA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('TOPHEA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-TOPHEA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('TOPHEA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-TOPHEA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eELMOMD" onclick="ee('click','ELMOMD')" onmouseover="ee('over','ELMOMD')" onmouseout="ee('out','ELMOMD')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ELMOMD"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Ontology-Driven Multicriteria Decision Support for Victim Evacuation.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Linda Elmhadhbi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Linda%20Elmhadhbi"><span class="name">Linda Elmhadhbi</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Mohamed-Hedi Karray" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Mohamed-Hedi%20Karray"><span class="name">Mohamed-Hedi Karray</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bernard Archimède" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Bernard%20Archimède"><span class="name">Bernard Archimède</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by J. Neil Otte" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/J. Neil%20Otte"><span class="name">J. Neil Otte</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Barry Smith" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Barry%20Smith"><span class="name">Barry Smith</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making</em>:1–30.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Abstract In light of the complexity of unfolding disasters, the diversity of rapidly evolving events, the enormous amount of generated information, and the huge pool of casualties, emergency responders (ERs) may be overwhelmed and in consequence poor decisions may be made. In fact, the possibility of transporting the wounded victims to one of several hospitals and the dynamic changes in healthcare resource availability make the decision process more complex. To tackle this problem, we propose a multicriteria decision support service, based<span id="ELMOMD-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ELMOMD-abstract2").show();$("ELMOMD-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ELMOMD-abstract2" style="display:none"> on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method, that aims to avoid overcrowding and outpacing the capacity of a hospital to effectively provide the best care to victims by finding out the most appropriate hospital that meets the victims’ needs. The proposed approach searches for the most appropriate healthcare institution that can effectively deal with the victims’ needs by considering the availability of the needed resources in the hospital, the victim’s wait time to receive the healthcare, and the transfer time that represents the hospital proximity to the disaster site. The evaluation and validation results showed that the assignment of hospitals was done successfully considering the needs of each victim and without overwhelming any single hospital. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ELMOMD-abstract2").hide();$("ELMOMD-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ELMOMD"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ELMOMD" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ELMOMD')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ELMOMD" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ELMOMD','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/citations/ELMOMD"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ELMOMD"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLEWPPO" onclick="ee('click','LEWPPO')" onmouseover="ee('over','LEWPPO')" onmouseout="ee('out','LEWPPO')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/LEWPPO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Principlist Pandemics: On Fraud Ethical Guidelines and the Importance of Transparency.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jonathan Lewis" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jonathan%20Lewis"><span class="name">Jonathan Lewis</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Udo Schuklenk" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Udo%20Schuklenk"><span class="name">Udo Schuklenk</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Michael Boylan (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BOYEPH">Ethical Public Health Policy Within Pandemics</a></em>. Cham: Springer.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The COVID-19 pandemic has coincided with the proliferation of ethical guidance documents to assist public health authorities, health care providers, practitioners and staff with responding to ethical challenges posed by the pandemic. Like ethical guidelines relating to infectious disease that have preceded them, what unites many COVID-19 guidance documents is their dependency on an under-developed approach to bioethical principlism, a normative framework that attempts to guide actions based on a list of prima facie, unranked ethical principles. By situating them in<span id="LEWPPO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LEWPPO-abstract2").show();$("LEWPPO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LEWPPO-abstract2" style="display:none"> relation to the key philosophical debates concerning bioethical principlism, we aim to explore the limits and limitations of pandemic ethical guidance documents as, specifically, ethics documents – documents that fulfil the functions of ethics as a fundamentally normative discipline. This means not only determining whether such ethical guidance documents can, in principle, provide adequate action guidance and action justification, but also, more importantly where pandemics are concerned, determining whether they support consistent decision making and transparent processes of justification. Having highlighted the problems with merely furnishing ethical guidelines with substantive ethical content in terms of principles and values, we argue that organizations that develop these documents should, instead, focus on the procedural dimensions of action guidance and action justification, which extend to questions regarding the make-up of the committees, panels and groups that develop such guidelines, the public transparency of justifications for specific pandemic-related advice or interventions and the development of explicit procedures for transparent and consistent decision making. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LEWPPO-abstract2").hide();$("LEWPPO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/LEWPPO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LEWPPO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LEWPPO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LEWPPO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LEWPPO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LEWPPO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDELCVU" onclick="ee('click','DELCVU')" onmouseover="ee('over','DELCVU')" onmouseout="ee('out','DELCVU')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DELCVU"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Consensus Versus Unanimity: Which Carries More Weight?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Finnur Dellsén" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Finnur%20Dellsén"><span class="name">Finnur Dellsén</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Around 97% of climate scientists endorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory that human activities are partly responsible for recent increases in global average temperatures. Clearly, this widespread endorsement of AGW is a reason for non-experts to believe in AGW. But what is the epistemic significance of the fact that some climate scientists do not endorse AGW? This paper contrasts expert unanimity, in which virtually no expert disagrees with some theory, with expert consensus, in which some non-negligible proportion either rejects<span id="DELCVU-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DELCVU-abstract2").show();$("DELCVU-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="DELCVU-abstract2" style="display:none"> or is uncertain about the theory. It is argued that, from a layperson’s point of view, an expert consensus is often stronger evidence for a theory’s truth than unanimity. Several lessons are drawn from this conclusion, e.g. concerning what laypeople should infer from expert pronouncements, how journalists should report on scientific theories, and how working scientists should communicate with the public. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DELCVU-abstract2").hide();$("DELCVU-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DELCVU"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DELCVU" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DELCVU')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DELCVU" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DELCVU','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DELCVU"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBRIELI" onclick="ee('click','BRIELI')" onmouseover="ee('over','BRIELI')" onmouseout="ee('out','BRIELI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BRIELI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Existential Loss in the Face of Mental Illness: Further Developing Perspectives on Personal Recovery in Mental Health Care.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bernice Brijan" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Bernice%20Brijan"><span class="name">Bernice Brijan</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Phenomenology and Mind</em>:250.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/BRIELI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BRIELI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BRIELI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BRIELI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BRIELI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BRIELI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eNOVTAF" onclick="ee('click','NOVTAF')" onmouseover="ee('over','NOVTAF')" onmouseout="ee('out','NOVTAF')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/NOVTAF"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Thinking as Folding: Deleuze’s Leibnizian Nomadology as a Non-Ontological Approach to Posthumanist Subjectivity.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Kyle Novak" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Kyle%20Novak"><span class="name">Kyle Novak</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy Today</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Rosi Braidotti has recently argued that the emerging scholarship on posthumanism should employ that she calls nomadic thinking. Braidotti identifies Deleuze’s work on Spinoza as the genesis of posthumanist ontology, yet Deleuze’s claims about nomadic thinking or nomadology come from his work on Leibniz. I argue that for posthumanist thought to theorize subjectivity beyond the human, it must use nomadology to overcome ontology itself. To make my argument, I demonstrate that while Braidotti is correct about Spinoza’s influence on Deleuze, his<span id="NOVTAF-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("NOVTAF-abstract2").show();$("NOVTAF-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="NOVTAF-abstract2" style="display:none"> work on Leibniz is necessary to adequately conceptualize nomadology. I employ Deleuze and Guattari’s figure of the Thought-brain as a model for subjectivity that they claim goes beyond the subject itself. Accordingly, I also look at some of the recent scholarship on Deleuze and the brain to illustrate what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the Thought-brain and how it could be used for conceptualizing posthuman subjectivity. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("NOVTAF-abstract2").hide();$("NOVTAF-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/NOVTAF"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-NOVTAF" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('NOVTAF')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-NOVTAF" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('NOVTAF','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-NOVTAF"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eHAZRLN" onclick="ee('click','HAZRLN')" onmouseover="ee('over','HAZRLN')" onmouseout="ee('out','HAZRLN')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/HAZRLN"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Reversing Logical Nihilism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Tristan Grøtvedt Haze" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Tristan Grøtvedt%20Haze"><span class="name">Tristan Grøtvedt Haze</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Synthese</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Gillian Russell has recently proposed counterexamples to such elementary argument forms as Conjunction Introduction (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Grass is green. Therefore, snow is white and grass is green’) and Identity (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Therefore, snow is white’). These purported counterexamples involve expressions that are sensitive to linguistic context—for example, a sentence which is true when it appears alone but false when embedded in a larger sentence. If they are genuine counterexamples, it looks as though logical nihilism—the view that<span id="HAZRLN-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAZRLN-abstract2").show();$("HAZRLN-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HAZRLN-abstract2" style="display:none"> there are no valid argument forms—might be true. In this paper, I argue that the purported counterexamples are not genuine, on the grounds that they equivocate. Having defused the threat of logical nihilism, I argue that the kind of linguistic context sensitivity at work in Russell’s purported counterexamples, if taken seriously, far from leading to logical nihilism, reveals new, previously undreamt-of valid forms. By way of proof of concept I present a simple logic, Solo-Only Propositional Logic (SOPL), designed to capture some of them. Along the way, some interesting subtleties about the fallacy of equivocation are revealed. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HAZRLN-abstract2").hide();$("HAZRLN-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/HAZRLN"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HAZRLN" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HAZRLN')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HAZRLN" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HAZRLN','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HAZRLN"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCASSCT" onclick="ee('click','CASSCT')" onmouseover="ee('over','CASSCT')" onmouseout="ee('out','CASSCT')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CASSCT"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">SENSO COMUM TEÓRICO DOS JURISTAS: UMA CARTOGRAFIA DA CRÍTICA EPISTEMOLÓGICA DE LUÍS ALBERTO WARAT.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by David Campos Castro" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/David Campos%20Castro"><span class="name">David Campos Castro</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Dissertation, Universidade de Brasília</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CASSCT"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CASSCT" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CASSCT')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CASSCT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CASSCT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CASSCT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CASSCT','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CASSCT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKIMCFD-2" onclick="ee('click','KIMCFD-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','KIMCFD-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','KIMCFD-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KIMCFD-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">College Factual Doctorate. <span class="hint">[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Kiyoung Kim" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Kiyoung%20Kim"><span class="name">Kiyoung Kim</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The major research universities in the United States had been investigated for the doctoral ranking of 2022 College Factual. The investigation had been performed as best as possible for the accuracy of data, but never be perfect nor exhaustive. Suggestion and advice are truly welcome (Kiyoung Kim, Professor of Law and Public Policy, College of Law and Social Studies, Chosun University, Gwang-ju, South Korea. I plan that the data would be used for the next research publication. The institutions had been<span id="KIMCFD-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KIMCFD-2-abstract2").show();$("KIMCFD-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KIMCFD-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> ordered alphabetically. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KIMCFD-2-abstract2").hide();$("KIMCFD-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KIMCFD-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KIMCFD-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KIMCFD-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KIMCFD-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KIMCFD-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KIMCFD-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eIBEEOP-3" onclick="ee('click','IBEEOP-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','IBEEOP-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','IBEEOP-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-22</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/IBEEOP-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Effects of Peer Health Education on Sexual Health Knowledge and Attitudes of Tertiary Institution Students in Imo State, Nigeria.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sally Nkechinyere Onyeka Ibe" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sally Nkechinyere Onyeka%20Ibe"><span class="name">Sally Nkechinyere Onyeka Ibe</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jerome O. Okafor" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jerome O.%20Okafor"><span class="name">Jerome O. Okafor</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Chikodi Ify Margaret Ezurike" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Chikodi Ify Margaret%20Ezurike"><span class="name">Chikodi Ify Margaret Ezurike</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Eunice Ogonna Osuala" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Eunice Ogonna%20Osuala"><span class="name">Eunice Ogonna Osuala</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Casmir Ifeanyi Chikere Ebirim" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Casmir Ifeanyi Chikere%20Ebirim"><span class="name">Casmir Ifeanyi Chikere Ebirim</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Chinyere Regina Nwufo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Chinyere Regina%20Nwufo"><span class="name">Chinyere Regina Nwufo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear"></span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This study was designed to determine effects of peer-health-education on sexual health knowledge and attitudes of tertiary institution students in Imo State Nigeria by determining the mean gain scores of sexual health knowledge and attitudes after peer health education. Quasi-experimental (pre-test-post-test) research design was employed. Two hundred students drawn from the University, Polytechnic and College of Education, using a multi-stage sampling technique participated in the peer sessions which were facilitated by trained peer educators. Data were analyzed using ANCOVA and Z-test.<span id="IBEEOP-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("IBEEOP-3-abstract2").show();$("IBEEOP-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="IBEEOP-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> Findings revealed improved knowledge and attitudes on sexual health, as depicted by positive mean gain scores. Age group 16 - 20 years had the highest mean gain score ( X = 22.31) of sexual health knowledge than the rest, while age group 26 - 30 years had the highest mean gain score ( X = 10.59) of sexual health attitudes. Males had higher mean gain score ( X = 26.05) of sexual health knowledge, while females had higher mean gain score ( X = 9.77) of sexual health attitudes. The first years (100 level students) had the highest mean gain score ( X = 25.71) of sexual health knowledge and also had the highest mean gain score ( X = 14.12) of sexual health attitudes. Level of study was significant both for knowledge and attitudes (P < 0.01). It is recommended that peer-health-education be explored further as a method of communicating sexual health issues to tertiary institution students and youths generally. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("IBEEOP-3-abstract2").hide();$("IBEEOP-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/IBEEOP-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-IBEEOP-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('IBEEOP-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-IBEEOP-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('IBEEOP-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-IBEEOP-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROMBHP" onclick="ee('click','ROMBHP')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROMBHP')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROMBHP')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ROMBHP"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Black Hole Philosophy.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gustavo E. Romero" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Gustavo E.%20Romero"><span class="name">Gustavo E. Romero</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía</em> 53 (159):73–132.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Black holes are arguably the most extraordinary physical objects we know in the universe. Despite our thorough knowledge of black hole dynamics and our ability to solve Einstein’s equations in situations of ever increasing complexity, the deeper implications of the very existence of black holes for our understanding of space, time, causality, information, and many other things remain poorly understood. In this paper I survey some of these problems. If something is going to be clear from my presentation, I hope<span id="ROMBHP-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROMBHP-abstract2").show();$("ROMBHP-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ROMBHP-abstract2" style="display:none"> it will be that around black holes science and metaphysics become more interwoven than anywhere else in the universe. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROMBHP-abstract2").hide();$("ROMBHP-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ROMBHP"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROMBHP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROMBHP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROMBHP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROMBHP','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROMBHP"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMCAFOC" onclick="ee('click','MCAFOC')" onmouseover="ee('over','MCAFOC')" onmouseout="ee('out','MCAFOC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MCAFOC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">From One Conservative to Another: A Critique of Epistemic Conservatism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Blake McAllister" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Blake%20McAllister"><span class="name">Blake McAllister</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Southwest Philosophy Review</em> 37 (2).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Epistemic conservatism maintains that some beliefs are immediately justified simply because they are believed. The intuitive implausibility of this claim sets the burden of proof against it. Some epistemic conservatives have sought to lessen this burden by limiting its scope, but I show that they cannot remove it entirely. The only hope for epistemic conservativism is to appeal to its theoretical fruit. However, such a defense is undercut by the introduction of phenomenal conservatism, which accomplishes the same work from a<span id="MCAFOC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MCAFOC-abstract2").show();$("MCAFOC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MCAFOC-abstract2" style="display:none"> more intuitive starting point. Thus, if one opts for conservatism, better to choose the phenomenal kind. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MCAFOC-abstract2").hide();$("MCAFOC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MCAFOC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MCAFOC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MCAFOC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MCAFOC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MCAFOC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MCAFOC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROHETE" onclick="ee('click','ROHETE')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROHETE')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROHETE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ROHETE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Exploring the Ethics of Tuberculosis Human Challenge Models.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Abie Rohrig" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Abie%20Rohrig"><span class="name">Abie Rohrig</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Josh Morrison" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Josh%20Morrison"><span class="name">Josh Morrison</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jonathan Pugh" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jonathan%20Pugh"><span class="name">Jonathan Pugh</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Julian Savulescu" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Julian%20Savulescu"><span class="name">Julian Savulescu</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Helen McShane" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Helen%20McShane"><span class="name">Helen McShane</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">TB human challenge studies could accelerate TB vaccine development by reducing uncertainty in early-stage vaccine testing, selecting promising vaccine candidates for large-scale field trials, and identifying an immune correlate of protection. However, ethical concerns regarding the exposure of trial participants and bystanders to significant risk have been a limiting factor for TB human challenge models. We analyze the expected social value and risks of different types of TB human challenge models, and conclude that given the massive public health burden of<span id="ROHETE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROHETE-abstract2").show();$("ROHETE-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ROHETE-abstract2" style="display:none"> TB, challenge models with even scant probabilities of expediting TB vaccine authorization have enormous expected humanitarian value, saving between 33,000 and 1,375,000 lives over the next ten years. We argue that attenuated M.tb challenge trials can be conducted ethically, and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of conducting virulent M.tb challenge trials. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROHETE-abstract2").hide();$("ROHETE-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ROHETE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROHETE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROHETE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROHETE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROHETE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROHETE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWEBSAT-2" onclick="ee('click','WEBSAT-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WEBSAT-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WEBSAT-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WEBSAT-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Shame and the Ethical in Williams.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Aness Kim Webster" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Aness Kim%20Webster"><span class="name">Aness Kim Webster</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Stephen Bero" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Stephen%20Bero"><span class="name">Stephen Bero</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Andras Szigeti & Matthew Talbert (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SZIAFA">Agency, Fate, and Luck: Themes from Bernard Williams</a></em>. Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Bernard Williams’ Shame and Necessity (1993) was an influential early contribution to what has become a broader movement to rehabilitate shame as a moral emotion. But there is a tension in Williams’ discussion that presents an under-appreciated difficulty for efforts to rehabilitate shame. The tension arises between what Williams takes shame in its essence to be and what shame can do—the role that shame can be expected to play in ethical life. Williams can—and we argue, should—be read as avoiding the<span id="WEBSAT-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WEBSAT-2-abstract2").show();$("WEBSAT-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WEBSAT-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> difficulties stemming from this tension, but this requires a reevaluation of several of his central claims about shame’s role in ethical thought and experience. For instance, his broad claims that the “structures of shame” can “give a conception of one’s ethical identity” (93), and that shame “mediates … between ethical demands and the rest of life” (102), cannot be taken at face value. What emerges is a view that is in a sense less ambitious, but also more in tune with the spirit of Williams’ larger project. There may also, we suggest, be a more general lesson: We should be suspicious of the temptation to seek some special affinity between shame and ethical life, lest we distort our understanding of both. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WEBSAT-2-abstract2").hide();$("WEBSAT-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WEBSAT-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WEBSAT-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WEBSAT-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WEBSAT-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WEBSAT-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WEBSAT-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWRIAAF-2" onclick="ee('click','WRIAAF-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WRIAAF-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WRIAAF-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WRIAAF-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">An Argument for Asynchronous Course Delivery in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jake Wright" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jake%20Wright"><span class="name">Jake Wright</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Teaching Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">I argue that campus closures and shifts to online instruction in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic created an obligation to offer courses asynchronously. This is because some students could not have reasonably foreseen circumstances making continued synchronous participation impossible. Offering synchronous participation options to students who could continue to participate thusly would have been unfair to students who could not participate synchronously. I also discuss why ex post facto consideration of this decision is warranted, noting that similar actions<span id="WRIAAF-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WRIAAF-2-abstract2").show();$("WRIAAF-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WRIAAF-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> may be necessary in the future and that other tough pedagogical cases share important similarities with this case. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WRIAAF-2-abstract2").hide();$("WRIAAF-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WRIAAF-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WRIAAF-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WRIAAF-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WRIAAF-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WRIAAF-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WRIAAF-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eUMBTAV" onclick="ee('click','UMBTAV')" onmouseover="ee('over','UMBTAV')" onmouseout="ee('out','UMBTAV')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/UMBTAV"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Towards a Value Sensitive Design Framework for Attaining Meaningful Human Control Over Autonomous Weapons Systems.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Steven Umbrello" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Steven%20Umbrello"><span class="name">Steven Umbrello</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Dissertation, Consortium FINO</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The international debate on the ethics and legality of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) as well as the call for a ban are primarily focused on the nebulous concept of fully autonomous AWS. More specifically, on AWS that are capable of target selection and engagement without human supervision or control. This thesis argues that such a conception of autonomy is divorced both from military planning and decision-making operations as well as the design requirements that govern AWS engineering and subsequently the tracking<span id="UMBTAV-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("UMBTAV-abstract2").show();$("UMBTAV-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="UMBTAV-abstract2" style="display:none"> and tracing of moral responsibility. To do this, this thesis marries two different levels of meaningful human control (MHC), termed levels of abstraction, to couple military operations with design ethics. In doing so, this thesis argues that the contentious notion of ‘full’ autonomy is not problematic under this two-tiered understanding of MHC. It proceeds to propose the value sensitive design (VSD) approach as a means for designing for MHC. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("UMBTAV-abstract2").hide();$("UMBTAV-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/UMBTAV"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-UMBTAV" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('UMBTAV')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-UMBTAV" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('UMBTAV','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-UMBTAV"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eASHROS" onclick="ee('click','ASHROS')" onmouseover="ee('over','ASHROS')" onmouseout="ee('out','ASHROS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ASHROS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Reduction of Solid Waste Dumps in Religious Places During Pandemic Outbreak in Bengaluru.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sangli Asheera Banu" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sangli%20Asheera Banu"><span class="name">Sangli Asheera Banu</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">International Journal of Applied Research</em> 7 (10):363-365.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Both biodegradable and non-biodegradable solid wastes are found in religious or worship places. Biodegradable waste consists of fruits, flowers, leaves, prepared food items, plantations, sweets and non-biodegradable waste consists of plastic covers, plastic plates, plastic cups, metal pieces, flags and so on. These were found during festivals, functions, yatras, urus, massive gatherings, and weddings in religious places. Large gatherings led to huge dumping of solid wastes in and around the religious places. The vendors and street hawkers after selling their goods<span id="ASHROS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ASHROS-abstract2").show();$("ASHROS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ASHROS-abstract2" style="display:none"> used to dump the leftover wastes near these places during the pre-pandemic period. During the pandemic outbreak from April 2020 to August 2020, the religious places were shut to the public leading to minimal or zero solid waste production. During lockdown relaxation from September 2020, these places were sanitized; people were restricted with minimal gatherings and instructed to follow COVID appropriate behaviour. Similarly during the second wave lockdown from May 2021 to August 2021, people were not allowed to visit these places which led to the reduction of solid waste production in religious places leading to reduction of air, water and soil pollution. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ASHROS-abstract2").hide();$("ASHROS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ASHROS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ASHROS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ASHROS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ASHROS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ASHROS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ASHROS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROSCWM-2" onclick="ee('click','ROSCWM-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROSCWM-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROSCWM-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ROSCWM-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Causes with Material Continuity.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lauren N. Ross" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Lauren N.%20Ross"><span class="name">Lauren N. Ross</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Biology and Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Recent philosophical work on causation has focused on distinctions across types of causal relationships. This paper argues for another distinction that has yet to receive attention in this work. This distinction has to do with whether causal relationships have “material continuity,” which refers to the reliable movement of material from cause to effect. This paper provides an analysis of material continuity and argues that causal relationships with this feature (1) are associated with a unique explanatory perspective, (2) are studied with<span id="ROSCWM-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROSCWM-2-abstract2").show();$("ROSCWM-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ROSCWM-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> distinct causal investigative methods, and (3) provide different types of causal control over their effects. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ROSCWM-2-abstract2").hide();$("ROSCWM-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ROSCWM-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROSCWM-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROSCWM-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROSCWM-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROSCWM-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROSCWM-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKALQPO" onclick="ee('click','KALQPO')" onmouseover="ee('over','KALQPO')" onmouseout="ee('out','KALQPO')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KALQPO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">"The Problem of Epistemic Regress" in Contemporary Epistemology and The Adequacy of Improved Solution Suggestions.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Yunus Kalkan" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Yunus%20Kalkan"><span class="name">Yunus Kalkan</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Felsefe Dünyasi</em> 71.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The Problem of Epistemic Regress in Contemporary Epistemology and The Adequacy of Improved Solution Suggestions One of the main problems of epistemology; whether our beliefs about the world are correct or not, that is to say, it’s the problem of whether we have suitable reasons or not to think that we have the enough knowledge. The value of our beliefs and its epistemic justifiability are being examined through this problem. In this respect, Undoubtedly; one of the greatest problem of contemporary<span id="KALQPO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KALQPO-abstract2").show();$("KALQPO-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KALQPO-abstract2" style="display:none"> epistemology is the problem of epistemic regress that is a problem of justification. On the other hand the solution suggestions developed for this problem, which is shown as a threat factor for the knowledge in point, don’t seem sufficient. In this article, the problem of epistemic regress which is emerging in the contemporary period will be discussed by examining the perspectives of tradition and contemporary epistemology. Four different and similar basic approaches that arise resulting from the problem of regress solution proposals brought by foundationalism, compatibilism, externalism and internalism will be analyzed. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KALQPO-abstract2").hide();$("KALQPO-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KALQPO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-KALQPO" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('KALQPO')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-KALQPO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KALQPO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KALQPO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KALQPO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KALQPO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDINEIA-5" onclick="ee('click','DINEIA-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','DINEIA-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','DINEIA-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DINEIA-5"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alexander Dinges" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alexander%20Dinges"><span class="name">Alexander Dinges</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2015</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Dissertation, Humboldt-University, Berlin</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DINEIA-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DINEIA-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DINEIA-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DINEIA-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DINEIA-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DINEIA-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKIMCFD" onclick="ee('click','KIMCFD')" onmouseover="ee('over','KIMCFD')" onmouseout="ee('out','KIMCFD')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KIMCFD"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">College Factual Doctoral. <span class="hint">[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Kiyoung Kim" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Kiyoung%20Kim"><span class="name">Kiyoung Kim</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The major research universities in the United States had been investigated for the doctoral ranking of 2022 College Factual. The investigation had been performed as best as possible for the accuracy of data, but never be perfect nor exhaustive about the search terms. Suggestion and advice are truly welcome (Kiyoung Kim, Professor of Law and Public Policy, College of Law and Social Studies, Chosun University, Gwang-ju, South Korea). I plan that the data would be used for the next research publication.<span id="KIMCFD-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KIMCFD-abstract2").show();$("KIMCFD-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KIMCFD-abstract2" style="display:none"> The institutions had been ordered alphabetically. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KIMCFD-abstract2").hide();$("KIMCFD-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KIMCFD"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KIMCFD" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KIMCFD')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KIMCFD" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KIMCFD','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KIMCFD"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMOHAPR" onclick="ee('click','MOHAPR')" onmouseover="ee('over','MOHAPR')" onmouseout="ee('out','MOHAPR')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MOHAPR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">A Postcolonial Reading of Nikolai Gogol’s Taras Bulba.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Midia Mohammadi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Midia%20Mohammadi"><span class="name">Midia Mohammadi</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ali Salami" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Ali%20Salami"><span class="name">Ali Salami</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">University of Chitral Journal of Linguistics and Literature</em> 4 (2):131-143.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The sixteenth-century Cossacks became the favourite topic of Ukrainian authors of the nineteenth century who dealt with national and individual identity issues. Nikolai Gogol, the celebrated Russian author who had Ukrainian origin and was born in a Cossack village, wrote the epic romance of Taras Bulba, which narrated the story of Cossacks and their struggle for preserving their independence. While the work has been previously studied under the light of postcolonial theoretical framework, using the concepts developed by Homi Bhabha to<span id="MOHAPR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MOHAPR-abstract2").show();$("MOHAPR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MOHAPR-abstract2" style="display:none"> scrutinize the situation and the destiny of the two main hybrid characters, Taras Bulba’s sons, takes a step further and reveals the deeply ingrained anxiety and ambivalence in the Cossack mentality. The article focuses on the two main hybrid characters who choose divergent paths upon encountering the conflict brought to them by the imperial power. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MOHAPR-abstract2").hide();$("MOHAPR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MOHAPR"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MOHAPR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MOHAPR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MOHAPR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MOHAPR','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MOHAPR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eRAITLO" onclick="ee('click','RAITLO')" onmouseover="ee('over','RAITLO')" onmouseout="ee('out','RAITLO')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/RAITLO"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Logic of the Evidential Conditional.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Eric Raidl" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Eric%20Raidl"><span class="name">Eric Raidl</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andrea Iacona" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Andrea%20Iacona"><span class="name">Andrea Iacona</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Vincenzo Crupi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Vincenzo%20Crupi"><span class="name">Vincenzo Crupi</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Review of Symbolic Logic</em>:1-13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In some recent works, Crupi and Iacona have outlined an analysis of ‘if’ based on Chrysippus’ idea that a conditional holds whenever the negation of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent. This paper presents a sound and complete system of conditional logic that accommodates their analysis. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a general method elaborated by Raidl, which applies to a wide range of systems of conditional logic. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/RAITLO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-RAITLO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('RAITLO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-RAITLO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('RAITLO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-RAITLO"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSANPCI-3" onclick="ee('click','SANPCI-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','SANPCI-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','SANPCI-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SANPCI-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Philosophical Considerations in Health: Conceptualizing to Educate—a Perspective on Neglected Tropical Diseases in Brazil.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Dilvani Oliveira Santos" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Dilvani Oliveira%20Santos"><span class="name">Dilvani Oliveira Santos</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ludmila Veiga Faria" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Ludmila Veiga%20Faria"><span class="name">Ludmila Veiga Faria</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Anna Fernandes S. C. Nascimento" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Anna Fernandes S. C.%20Nascimento"><span class="name">Anna Fernandes S. C. Nascimento</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper aims to recover the history of health concept evolution from its birth in Ancient Greece to the contemporary days, drawing an overview of the firsts philosophical thoughts about health in distinctive historical periods, analyzing how this concept has been impacted by knowledge improvement and both research and technological discoveries over time. In order to understand the persistence of Neglected Tropical Diseases which causes physical disabilities and social discrimination, this paper will focus on Leprosy and Cutaneous Leishmaniasis and its<span id="SANPCI-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SANPCI-3-abstract2").show();$("SANPCI-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SANPCI-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> relation to social inequality mainly in developing countries. These approaches on the understanding of the health-disease binomial are necessary to reflect on health in the course of human history and, from there, to promote joint actions both in the area of scientific research and health education. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SANPCI-3-abstract2").hide();$("SANPCI-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SANPCI-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SANPCI-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SANPCI-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SANPCI-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SANPCI-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SANPCI-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eATICCF" onclick="ee('click','ATICCF')" onmouseover="ee('over','ATICCF')" onmouseout="ee('out','ATICCF')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ATICCF"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Ciencia Colonial, Facultad de Medicina y Farmacia at Edukasyong Medikal: Kolonyal na Tugon sa Suliranin sa Sakit, Dantaon 19.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by John Adrianfer Atienza" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/John Adrianfer%20Atienza"><span class="name">John Adrianfer Atienza</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Tala Kasaysayan: An Online Journal of History</em> 2 (2):123-164.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Saksi ang huling bahagi ng ika-19 na dantaon sa panaka-nakang pagbaba’t pagtaas ng populasyon sa kapuluan. Isinaad na pangunahing sanhi ng malaking kabawasan sa bilang ng tao ay ang pagdapo at paglaganap ng sakit, tulad ng kolera sa kapuluan sa mga taong nabanggit. Kaalinsabay ng pagbaba’t pagtaas ng populasyon sa kapuluan, nasaksihan din sa kasagsagan ng dantaon ang malawakang pag-unlad ng agham na ginamit ng mga Espanyol bilang kanilang kalamangan sa hakbang ng kolonisasyon. Gayunman, hindi maitatatwa na nagdulot din ng<span id="ATICCF-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ATICCF-abstract2").show();$("ATICCF-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ATICCF-abstract2" style="display:none"> positibong aspekto ang kolonyal na agham sa kapuluan. Umusbong sa kapuluan ang iba’t ibang uri ng ciencia colonial na nag-ambag sa pag-unlad ng kapuluan. Isang uri ng kolonyal na agham namayagpag ay ang edukasyong medikal. Sa akda, susubukang bigyang katwiran ang edukasyong medikal at iba pang kaugnay na larangan bilang tugon ng pamahalaan sa mga suliraning nakaugnay sa sakit sa kapuluan. Sa pamamagitan ng datos ng populasyon at demograpiya, ilalahad ng akda ang naging epekto ng pagkalat ng sakit sa bilang ng tao. Nakatuon ang akda sa institusyunal na kasaysayan ng Facultad de Medicina y Farmacia ng Unibersidad ng Santo Tomas na lunan ng mga medicos na magsisilbing instrumento ng pamahalaang kolonyal sa hakbang upang sugpuin sa suliraning pangsakit sa Pilipinas. Sa huli, ilalahad ng akda ang naging resulta ng edukasyong medikal bilang tugon sa pagsugpo sa suliranin. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ATICCF-abstract2").hide();$("ATICCF-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ATICCF"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-ATICCF" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('ATICCF')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-ATICCF" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ATICCF')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ATICCF" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ATICCF','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ATICCF"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePEZTEV" onclick="ee('click','PEZTEV')" onmouseover="ee('over','PEZTEV')" onmouseout="ee('out','PEZTEV')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/PEZTEV"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Epistemic Value of Explanation.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andrés Páez" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Andrés%20Páez"><span class="name">Andrés Páez</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically valuable<span id="PEZTEV-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PEZTEV-abstract2").show();$("PEZTEV-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PEZTEV-abstract2" style="display:none"> to an inquiring agent and to a scientific community. To be potentially explanatory, the information must state the relations of probabilistic relevance that the explanans bares to the explanandum. But a potential explanation con only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate the epistemic value of a potential explanation as a function of its credibility and its informational content. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PEZTEV-abstract2").hide();$("PEZTEV-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/PEZTEV"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-PEZTEV" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PEZTEV')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PEZTEV" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PEZTEV','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PEZTEV"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eROMTMF-2" onclick="ee('click','ROMTMF-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROMTMF-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROMTMF-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-21</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ROMTMF-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Metaphysical Foundations of Physics (Foreword to Special Issue).</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Carlos Romero" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Carlos%20Romero"><span class="name">Carlos Romero</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Critica</em> 53 (159):3-13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This is the introduction to the special issue of Crítica on the metaphysics of physics, featuring papers by Valia Allori, Tim Maudlin and Gustavo Esteban Romero. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ROMTMF-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROMTMF-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROMTMF-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROMTMF-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROMTMF-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROMTMF-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWARTSP-2" onclick="ee('click','WARTSP-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WARTSP-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WARTSP-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WARTSP-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Second Person in Fichte and Levinas.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Owen Ware" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Owen%20Ware"><span class="name">Owen Ware</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael L. Morgan" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael L.%20Morgan"><span class="name">Michael L. Morgan</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal</em> 41 (2):1-20.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Levinas never engaged closely with Fichte’s work, but there are two places in the chapter “Substitution,” in Otherwise than Being (1974), where he mentions Fichte by name. The point that Levinas underscores in both of these passages is that the other’s encounter with the subject is not the outcome of the subject’s freedom; it is not posited by the subject, as Fichte has it, but is prior to any free activity. The aim of this paper is to deepen the comparison<span id="WARTSP-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WARTSP-2-abstract2").show();$("WARTSP-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WARTSP-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> between Levinas and Fichte, giving special attention to Fichte's own novel theory of intersubjectivity and the summons. One result that emerges from this treatment is that both Levinas and Fichte view the second person in a way that has no equivalent in the current philosophical landscape. On this reading, each thinker views responsibility to the other, not only as an immediate and particular obligation, but also as an asymmetrical relation that gives the other moral priority. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WARTSP-2-abstract2").hide();$("WARTSP-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WARTSP-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WARTSP-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WARTSP-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WARTSP-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WARTSP-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WARTSP-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSIMSAO-4" onclick="ee('click','SIMSAO-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','SIMSAO-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','SIMSAO-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SIMSAO-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Should an Ontological Pluralist Be a Quantificational Pluralist?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Byron Simmons" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Byron%20Simmons"><span class="name">Byron Simmons</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different fundamental ways of being. Recent defenders of this view—such as Kris McDaniel and Jason Turner—have taken these ways of being to be best captured by semantically primitive quantifier expressions ranging over different domains. They have thus endorsed, what I shall call, quantificational pluralism. I argue that this focus on quantification is a mistake. For, on this view, a quantificational structure—or a quantifier for short—will be whatever part or aspect of reality’s structure<span id="SIMSAO-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SIMSAO-4-abstract2").show();$("SIMSAO-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SIMSAO-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> that a quantifier expression carves out and reflects. But if quantificational pluralism is true, then a quantifier should be more natural than its corresponding domain; and since it does not appear to be the case that a quantifier is more natural than its corresponding domain, quantificational pluralism does not appear to be true. Thus, I claim, an ontological pluralist should not be a quantificational pluralist. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SIMSAO-4-abstract2").hide();$("SIMSAO-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SIMSAO-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SIMSAO-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SIMSAO-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SIMSAO-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SIMSAO-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SIMSAO-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMERWWF-2" onclick="ee('click','MERWWF-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','MERWWF-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','MERWWF-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MERWWF-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Wisdom Won From Illness: Essays in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, by Jonathan Lear: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017, Pp. 328, US$39.95. <span class="hint">[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Melissa McBay Merritt" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Melissa McBay%20Merritt"><span class="name">Melissa McBay Merritt</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Australasian Journal of Philosophy</em> 96 (3):625-625.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MERWWF-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MERWWF-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MERWWF-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MERWWF-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MERWWF-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MERWWF-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMERHCS" onclick="ee('click','MERHCS')" onmouseover="ee('over','MERHCS')" onmouseout="ee('out','MERHCS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MERHCS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Humor, Common Sense and the Future of Metaphysics in the <em>Prolegomena</em>.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Melissa M. Merritt" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Melissa M.%20Merritt"><span class="name">Melissa M. Merritt</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Peter Thielke (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THIKPA">Kant's Prolegomena: A Critical Guide</a></em>. Cambridge, UK: pp. 9-26.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Kant’s Prolegomena is a piece of philosophical advertising: it exists to convince the open-minded “future teacher” of metaphysics that the true critical philosophy — i.e., the Critique — provides the only viable solution to the problem of metaphysics (i.e. its failure to make any genuine progress). To be effective, a piece of advertising needs to know its audience. This chapter argues that Kant takes his reader to have some default sympathies for the common-sense challenge to metaphysics originating from Thomas Reid<span id="MERHCS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MERHCS-abstract2").show();$("MERHCS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MERHCS-abstract2" style="display:none"> and his followers; this fact in turn explains his rhetorical strategies in the Prolegomena, particularly regarding the presentation of the problem of metaphysics. The chapter draws attention to the importance of Shaftesbury, who, with a nod to Horace, had argued for the deployment of humour to disarm fraudulent claims to epistemic and moral authority. Kant looks to Horace himself to poke fun at the common-sense challenge to metaphysics, and from there to indicate the general shape of the particular argumentative strategies of the Critique — that project that alone, in his view, can promise some kind of future for metaphysics. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MERHCS-abstract2").hide();$("MERHCS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MERHCS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MERHCS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MERHCS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MERHCS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MERHCS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MERHCS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDUBNIA" onclick="ee('click','DUBNIA')" onmouseover="ee('over','DUBNIA')" onmouseout="ee('out','DUBNIA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DUBNIA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">(Non-)Human Identity and Radical Immanence: On Man-in-Person in François Laruelle's Non-Philosophy.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Alex Dubilet" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Alex%20Dubilet"><span class="name">Alex Dubilet</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2017</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Rocco Gangle & Julius Greve (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/GANSLA">Superpositions: Laruelle and the Humanities</a></em>. London, UK: pp. 31-45.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DUBNIA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DUBNIA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DUBNIA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DUBNIA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DUBNIA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DUBNIA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMCDTAC" onclick="ee('click','MCDTAC')" onmouseover="ee('over','MCDTAC')" onmouseout="ee('out','MCDTAC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MCDTAC"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Towards a Contemporary Theodicy: Based on Critical Review of John Hick, David Griffin and Sri Aurobindo.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michael Mcdonald" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michael%20Mcdonald"><span class="name">Michael Mcdonald</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1995</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Dissertation, University of Hawai'i</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The author seeks to make the fewest changes that would allow Christianity to withstand the challenges of the problem of evil . The project includes a critical review of the theodicies of John Hick and David Griffin, and also draws upon the thought of Sri Aurobindo. ;From Augustinian thought, the author retains the emphasis upon moral evil. He argues that any theodicy resolving moral evil also resolves natural evil, and that natural evil, as such, would not create major barriers to<span id="MCDTAC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MCDTAC-abstract2").show();$("MCDTAC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MCDTAC-abstract2" style="display:none"> religious faith. ;The author accepts John Hick's ideas of epistemic distance and soul-making, with supplementation. But he rejects Hick's use of the Greater Good Defense, instead positing that evil cannot be justified. The only question is whether it can be healed. ;David Griffin's strategy of adjusting divine traits to solve the POE is rejected. Instead, the author modifies Christian ideas of human identity and human destiny. Griffin's definition of evil is also rejected. Instead, the author defines evil as "a horrendous violation of an important human value." ;The author posits that Aurobindo correctly identified the Christian doctrine of "one lifetime only" as posing major problems for theodicy. The Indian view of multiple lifetimes helps to resolve dysteleological evil. Karma does not solve the POE all by itself, the author holds, but a revised notion of karma as "a law of appropriate experience" can make an essential contribution. The Indian view of human identity in terms of Self and ego personality is also adopted, again with some modification. ;The author uses an analogy of evil with a wound to argue that all evil can be healed, and must be healed in the process of psycho-spiritual growth. The conclusion is that evil may be ultimate to the ego personality, but is not ultimate to the soul, as such. From the perspective of the Soul or Self, suffering can be self-chosen for important and positive reasons. ;In short, a total picture of human identity and destiny gained by borrowing and revising Indian doctrines enables the author to suggest a new format for the interpretation of evil. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MCDTAC-abstract2").hide();$("MCDTAC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MCDTAC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MCDTAC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MCDTAC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MCDTAC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MCDTAC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MCDTAC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWODOWA-2" onclick="ee('click','WODOWA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WODOWA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WODOWA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WODOWA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Of Witches and White Folks.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Daniel Wodak" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Daniel%20Wodak"><span class="name">Daniel Wodak</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A central debate in philosophy of race is between eliminativists and conservationists about what we ought do with ‘race’ talk. ‘Eliminativism’ is often defined such that it’s committed to holding that (a) ‘race’ is vacuous and races don’t exist, so (b) we should eliminate the term ‘race’ from our vocabulary. As a stipulative definition, that’s fine. But as an account of one of the main theoretical options in the debate, it’s a serious mistake. I offer three arguments for why eliminativism<span id="WODOWA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WODOWA-2-abstract2").show();$("WODOWA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WODOWA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> should not be tethered to vacuity or error theory, and three arguments for why the view shouldn’t be understood in terms of eliminating the term ‘race’ from our vocabulary. Instead, I propose we understand the debate as concerning whether certain uses of ordinary race terms are typically wrong. This proposal is quite simple, and naturally suggested by the common gloss that eliminativism about ‘race’ is akin to a commonsensical view about 'witch' talk. But nonetheless, I argue that it offers a significant recharacterization of this core debate in philosophy of race. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WODOWA-2-abstract2").hide();$("WODOWA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WODOWA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WODOWA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WODOWA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WODOWA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WODOWA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WODOWA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eESCBOE" onclick="ee('click','ESCBOE')" onmouseover="ee('over','ESCBOE')" onmouseout="ee('out','ESCBOE')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ESCBOE"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Basis of Ethical Obligation? Covid-19 Vaccines.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ignacio Escañuela Romana" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Ignacio%20Escañuela Romana"><span class="name">Ignacio Escañuela Romana</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">On the basis of the problem of the possible compulsory nature of vaccines against Covid-19, this paper considers the sources that allow us to justify the imposition of collective measures. The social contract theory provides a rational basis for the universality of ethical and natural law obligations, including conditional respect for a protected domain of individual physical and moral integrity. However, the practical application of the covenant is subject to the uncertainty of what effective consequences the policies have. Ethical principles<span id="ESCBOE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ESCBOE-abstract2").show();$("ESCBOE-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ESCBOE-abstract2" style="display:none"> show the problem of application in the environment of epistemological uncertainty. Only in a free society, with free scrutiny and deliberation, can justified knowledge be achieved that allows social measures to be agreed upon. The characteristics of the case that is the subject of this article lead to the conclusion that Covid-19 vaccines are not ethically obligatory, universally, but they can generate reasoned health measures, promotion, and limitations, based on proven positive effects, as a technical matter. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ESCBOE-abstract2").hide();$("ESCBOE-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ESCBOE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ESCBOE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ESCBOE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ESCBOE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ESCBOE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ESCBOE"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eREMNI-3" onclick="ee('click','REMNI-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','REMNI-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','REMNI-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/REMNI-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Nietzsche's Intuitions.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Justin Remhof" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Justin%20Remhof"><span class="name">Justin Remhof</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy</em> 64 (7):732-753.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">ABSTRACT This essay examines a particular rhetorical strategy Nietzsche uses to supply prima facie epistemic justification: appeals to intuition. I first investigate what Nietzsche thinks intuitions are, given that he never uses the term ‘intuition’ as we do in contemporary philosophy. I then examine how Nietzsche can simultaneously endorse naturalism and intuitive appeals. I finish by looking at why and how Nietzsche uses appeals to intuition to further his philosophical agenda. Answering these questions should provide a new and deeper understanding<span id="REMNI-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REMNI-3-abstract2").show();$("REMNI-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="REMNI-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> of how Nietzsche does philosophy. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REMNI-3-abstract2").hide();$("REMNI-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/REMNI-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-REMNI-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('REMNI-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-REMNI-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('REMNI-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-REMNI-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eESCBDL" onclick="ee('click','ESCBDL')" onmouseover="ee('over','ESCBDL')" onmouseout="ee('out','ESCBDL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ESCBDL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">¿Bases de la obligación ética?: las vacunas contra el Covid-19.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Ignacio Escañuela Romana" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Ignacio%20Escañuela Romana"><span class="name">Ignacio Escañuela Romana</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">En base al problema de la posible obligatoriedad de las vacunas contra el Covid-19, este trabajo se plantea qué fuentes permiten fundar la imposición de medidas colectivas. La teoría del contrato social ofrece una base racional a la universalidad de las obligaciones éticas y de derecho natural, incluido el respeto condicionado a un ámbito protegido de integridad física y moral individual. Sin embargo, la aplicación práctica del pacto está sometida a la incertidumbre de qué consecuencias efectivas tienen las políticas. Los<span id="ESCBDL-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ESCBDL-abstract2").show();$("ESCBDL-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ESCBDL-abstract2" style="display:none"> principios éticos muestran el problema de la aplicación en el entorno de la incertidumbre epistemológica. Sólo en una sociedad libre, con libre escrutinio y deliberación, puede alcanzarse el conocimiento justificado que permita acordar las medidas sociales. Las características del caso objeto de este artículo conduce a la conclusión de que las vacunas del Covid-19 no son obligatorias éticamente, de forma universal, pero sí pueden generar medidas sanitarias razonadas, de promoción y limitaciones, en base a los efectos positivos probados, como una cuestión técnica. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ESCBDL-abstract2").hide();$("ESCBDL-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ESCBDL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-ESCBDL" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('ESCBDL')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-ESCBDL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ESCBDL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ESCBDL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ESCBDL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ESCBDL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eELMAOA-5" onclick="ee('click','ELMAOA-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','ELMAOA-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','ELMAOA-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ELMAOA-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">An Ontological Approach to Enhancing Information Sharing in Disaster Response.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Linda Elmhadhbi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Linda%20Elmhadhbi"><span class="name">Linda Elmhadhbi</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Mohamed-Hedi Karray" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Mohamed-Hedi%20Karray"><span class="name">Mohamed-Hedi Karray</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bernard Archimède" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Bernard%20Archimède"><span class="name">Bernard Archimède</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by J. Neil Otte" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/J. Neil%20Otte"><span class="name">J. Neil Otte</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Barry Smith" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Barry%20Smith"><span class="name">Barry Smith</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Information</em> 12 (10).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Managing complex disaster situations is a challenging task because of the large number of actors involved and the critical nature of the events themselves. In particular, the different terminologies and technical vocabularies that are being exchanged among Emergency Responders may lead to misunderstandings. Maintaining a shared semantics for exchanged data is a major challenge. To help to overcome these issues, we elaborate a modular suite of ontologies called POLARISCO that formalizes the complex knowledge of the ERs. Such a shared vocabulary<span id="ELMAOA-5-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ELMAOA-5-abstract2").show();$("ELMAOA-5-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ELMAOA-5-abstract2" style="display:none"> resolves inconsistent terminologies and promotes semantic interoperability among ERs. In this work, we discuss developing POLARISCO as an extension of Basic Formal Ontology and the Common Core Ontologies. We conclude by presenting a real use-case to check the efficiency and applicability of the proposed ontology. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ELMAOA-5-abstract2").hide();$("ELMAOA-5-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ELMAOA-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ELMAOA-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ELMAOA-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ELMAOA-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ELMAOA-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ELMAOA-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="e-11166" onclick="ee('click','-11166')" onmouseover="ee('over','-11166')" onmouseout="ee('out','-11166')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/-11166"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">المدينة المغربية من خلال الفيلم الأجنبي: طنجة نموذجا، عمان: دار زهدي للنشر والتوزيع، 2019، 207 ص.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by حمزة الأندلوسي" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/حمزة%20الأندلوسي"><span class="name">حمزة الأندلوسي</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">نسعى من خلال هذا الكتاب إلى دراسة تمثلات المخرجين الأجانب للمدينة المغربية باعتبارها نموذجا للفضاء الحضري الغريب عنهم، وذلك عبر تحليل مضمون أفلامهم التي دارت كل أحداثها أو بعض منها في مدينة طنجة -نموذج الدراسة-. أما دافعنا فيتجلى أولا في تقديم قراءة أنثربولوجية للعمل الفني تأتي في ظل الفقر البَيّن الذي يعتري المكتبة المغربية الأنثربولوجية والسوسيولوجية في هذا المجال؛ كما أننا نسعى ثانيا إلى بَلورة نص علمي ينبني في أسسه على النظريات الاستطيقية الكلاسيكية التي يستعين بها نقاد السينما عادة في<span id="-11166-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("-11166-abstract2").show();$("-11166-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="-11166-abstract2" style="display:none"> كتاباتهم، لكنه يتجاوزها من خلال انفتاحه على جهاز مفاهيمي ثري ينهل من مشارب علمية إنسانية عديدة، ومبرر ذلك يتعلق بطبيعة الصورة السينمائية المُرَكَّبَة، فهي من جهة تزخر بالدلالات السيميولوجية، كما تُظهر الوقائع السوسيولوجية، زيادة على كونها تُمَثِلُ انعكاسا ممكنا لإديولوجية ومخيال المخرج . (<span class="ll" onclick="$("-11166-abstract2").hide();$("-11166-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/-11166"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr--11166" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('-11166')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la--11166" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('-11166')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml--11166" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('-11166','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg--11166"></span></div></div></li> <li id="e-11165" onclick="ee('click','-11165')" onmouseover="ee('over','-11165')" onmouseout="ee('out','-11165')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/-11165"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">الجذور الأنثربولوجية للقيم الجمالية المغربية ومظاهر انعكاسها في السينما.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by حمزة الأندلوسي" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/حمزة%20الأندلوسي"><span class="name">حمزة الأندلوسي</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">مجلة الدراسات الثقافية واللغوية والفنية</em> 3 (12):198-217.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">تندرج هذه الدراسة ضمن مبحث أنثروبولوجيا الصورة، وتستهدف الحفر في الجذور الثقافية المُشكلة لجماليات التعبير الفني في المغرب مع التركيز على فن مخصوص هو السينما. في ذات السياق، سنعمل على تتبع السيرورة التاريخية للتفاعل الثقافي الذي شهده المجتمع المغربي، وذلك عبر تسليط الضوء على خصائص الموارد المختلفة التي نَهَلَ منها التعبير الفني، ونقصد هنا الإشارة إلى تفاعل الموارد الآتية وتلاقحها: المورد العربي-الإسلامي والمورد الأمازيغي والمورد المتوسطي والمورد الإفريقي-صحراوي؛ أما الجزء الثاني من الدراسة فيقتصر على تحليل الأساليب الفنية المُعتمدة في عدد<span id="-11165-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("-11165-abstract2").show();$("-11165-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="-11165-abstract2" style="display:none"> من الأفلام السينمائية المغربية، وذلك لغرض كشف النقاب عن المنطلقات الفكرية الخاصة بالمخرجين المغاربة، والتي تحدد تمثلاتهم للإنسان المغربي، وللتحولات الاجتماعية في المغرب، وأيضا تمثلاتهم حول مكانة كل من المرأة والرجل داخل المجتمع. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("-11165-abstract2").hide();$("-11165-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/-11165"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr--11165" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('-11165')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la--11165" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('-11165')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml--11165" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('-11165','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg--11165"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMICHNT" onclick="ee('click','MICHNT')" onmouseover="ee('over','MICHNT')" onmouseout="ee('out','MICHNT')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MICHNT"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">How (Not) to Underestimate Unconscious Perception.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Matthias Michel" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Matthias%20Michel"><span class="name">Matthias Michel</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Mind and Language</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Studying consciousness requires contrasting conscious and unconscious perception. While many studies have reported unconscious perceptual effects, recent work has questioned whether such effects are genuinely unconscious, or whether they are due to weak conscious perception. Some philosophers and psychologists have reacted by denying that there is such a thing as unconscious perception, or by holding that unconscious perception has been previously overestimated. This article has two parts. In the first part, I argue that the most significant attack on unconscious perception<span id="MICHNT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MICHNT-abstract2").show();$("MICHNT-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MICHNT-abstract2" style="display:none"> commits the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of interpreting evidence that observers were conscious of something as evidence that they were conscious of the task-relevant features of the stimuli. In the second part, I contend that the criterion content fallacy is prevalent in consciousness research. For this reason, I hold that if unconscious perception exists, scientists studying consciousness could routinely underestimate it. I conclude with methodological recommendations for moving the debate forward. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MICHNT-abstract2").hide();$("MICHNT-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MICHNT"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MICHNT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MICHNT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MICHNT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MICHNT','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MICHNT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCHAASS-7" onclick="ee('click','CHAASS-7')" onmouseover="ee('over','CHAASS-7')" onmouseout="ee('out','CHAASS-7')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CHAASS-7"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Amit Chaturvedi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Amit%20Chaturvedi"><span class="name">Amit Chaturvedi</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Some have argued that a subject has an inner awareness of its conscious mental states by virtue of the non-introspective, reflexive awareness that any conscious state has of itself. But, what exactly is it like to have a ubiquitous and reflexive inner awareness of one’s conscious states, as distinct from one’s outer awareness of the apparent world? This essay derives a model of ubiquitous inner awareness (UIA) from Sebastian Watzl’s recent theory of attention as the activity of structuring consciousness into<span id="CHAASS-7-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CHAASS-7-abstract2").show();$("CHAASS-7-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CHAASS-7-abstract2" style="display:none"> an experiential center and periphery. I develop Watzl’s theory into an account of UIA by suggesting that a subject is acquainted with its own conscious mental states through being reflexively aware of how these states are structured by attention into a unified subjective perspective. I favorably compare this Watzl-inspired account of UIA against other contemporary analytic and classical Buddhist accounts of reflexive awareness and subjective character, which variously ground the inner awareness of conscious states on their intrinsic phenomenal quality of “for-me-ness,” their affective/hedonic valence, or a subject’s disposition to introspect them. The Watzl-inspired account also accommodates possible counter- examples to Watzl’s theory posed by states of minimal phenomenal experience such as lucid dreamless sleep and non-dual meditative awareness. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CHAASS-7-abstract2").hide();$("CHAASS-7-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CHAASS-7"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-CHAASS-7" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CHAASS-7')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CHAASS-7" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CHAASS-7','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CHAASS-7"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGUGUDL" onclick="ee('click','GUGUDL')" onmouseover="ee('over','GUGUDL')" onmouseout="ee('out','GUGUDL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/GUGUDL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Using Deep Learning to Detect Facial Markers of Complex Decision Making.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gianluca Guglielmo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Gianluca%20Guglielmo"><span class="name">Gianluca Guglielmo</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Irene Font Peradejordi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Irene%20Font Peradejordi"><span class="name">Irene Font Peradejordi</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michal Klincewicz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michal%20Klincewicz"><span class="name">Michal Klincewicz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Advances in Computer Games 2021)</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this paper, we report on an experiment with The Walking Dead (TWD), which is a narrative-driven adventure game where players have to survive in a post-apocalyptic world filled with zombies. We used OpenFace software to extract action unit (AU) intensities of facial expressions characteristic of decision-making processes and then we implemented a simple convolution neural network (CNN) to see which AUs are predictive of decision-making. Our results provide evidence that the pre-decision variations in action units 17 (chin raiser), 23<span id="GUGUDL-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GUGUDL-abstract2").show();$("GUGUDL-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="GUGUDL-abstract2" style="display:none"> (lip tightener), and 25 (parting of lips) are predictive of decision-making processes. Furthermore, when combined, their predictive power increased up to 0.81 accuracy on the test set; we offer speculations about why it is that these particular three AUs were found to be connected to decision-making. Our results also suggest that machine learning methods in combination with video games may be used to accurately and automatically identify complex decision-making processes using AU intensity alone. Finally, our study offers a new method to test specifi c hypotheses about the relationships between higher-order cognitive processes and behavior, which relies on both narrative video games and easily accessible software, like OpenFace. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("GUGUDL-abstract2").hide();$("GUGUDL-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/GUGUDL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GUGUDL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GUGUDL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GUGUDL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GUGUDL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GUGUDL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKARDLU" onclick="ee('click','KARDLU')" onmouseover="ee('over','KARDLU')" onmouseout="ee('out','KARDLU')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KARDLU"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Der letzte Universalismus. Foucaults Freiheitsdenken und die Begründung von radikaler Demokratie im Postfundamentalismus.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Schubert Karsten" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Schubert%20Karsten"><span class="name">Schubert Karsten</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Oliver Flügel-Martinsen, Franziska Martinsen & Martin Saar (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/FLGDPI">Das Politische (in) der Politischen Theorie</a></em>. Nomos. pp. 43-58.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Die Debatte um die politische Differenz stellt Kontingenz und Konfliktualität als fundamentale Eigenschaften des Politischen heraus. Dies birgt ein Problem für die postfundamentalistische Demokratietheorie, die auf Augenhöhe mit dieser Debatte argumentieren will: Durch die Kontingentsetzung aller normativen Begründungen ist zunächst unklar, welche Art von demokratischen Institutionen wie begründet werden kann, und sogar, ob es überhaupt eine von der postfundamentalistischen Sozialontologie ausgehend argumentierende normative Begründung für demokratische Institutionen geben kann. Meine These ist, dass Freiheit, verstanden als kontinuierliche selbstreflexive Kritik, derjenige normative<span id="KARDLU-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KARDLU-abstract2").show();$("KARDLU-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KARDLU-abstract2" style="display:none"> Begriff ist, der sich aus der Sozialontologie von Konflikt und Kontingenz herleiten lässt. Anders gesagt: Freiheit als Kritik ist derjenige Universalismus, der sich aus der Ontologie des Partikularismus ableitet. Freiheit als Kritik kann dabei einerseits das Operieren einiger Institutionen in liberal-pluralistischen Demokratien beschreiben, und andererseits als radikaldemokratisch-normativer Kritikbegriff für die Analyse ihrer Dysfunktionalität dienen. Um diese These zu begründen, gehe ich zurück zu einem Theoretiker, der eine Grundlage der aktuellen Debatte um das Politische bildet: Foucault, dessen Machttheorie als Ansatz einer Sozialontologie der Kontingenz und Konfliktualität gelten kann. Gleichzeitig hat Foucault den Begriff der Freiheit als den zu dieser Ontologie passenden normativen Begriff herausgestellt. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KARDLU-abstract2").hide();$("KARDLU-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KARDLU"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-KARDLU" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('KARDLU')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-KARDLU" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KARDLU')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KARDLU" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KARDLU','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KARDLU"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eREIQTY" onclick="ee('click','REIQTY')" onmouseover="ee('over','REIQTY')" onmouseout="ee('out','REIQTY')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/REIQTY"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">"Saying 'Thank You!' and Expressing Gratitude: A Response to Schwartz".</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Indrek Reiland" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Indrek%20Reiland"><span class="name">Indrek Reiland</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This is a short response piece to Jeremy Schwartz's "Saying 'Thank You' and Meaning It", published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020, 98, pp. 718-731. -/- Schwartz argues against the received view that 'Thank You! is for expressing gratitude, claiming instead that it is for expressing one's judgment that gratitude is appropriate or fitting. I argue against the judgment view while defending the received one. -/- I mainly consider the objection that the judgment view is implausible since it makes ‘Thank<span id="REIQTY-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REIQTY-abstract2").show();$("REIQTY-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="REIQTY-abstract2" style="display:none"> you!’ semantically indistinguishable from the declarative sentence ‘Gratitude is appropriate to you’ and show that Schwartz’s attempt to sidestep it relies on misunderstanding Kaplan's view of what it is for a sentence to be an expressive vs. a declarative. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("REIQTY-abstract2").hide();$("REIQTY-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/REIQTY"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-REIQTY" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('REIQTY')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-REIQTY" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('REIQTY','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-REIQTY"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBURGCO-2" onclick="ee('click','BURGCO-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','BURGCO-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','BURGCO-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BURGCO-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Georg Cantor’s Ordinals, Absolute Infinity & Transparent Proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Hermann G. W. Burchard" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Hermann G. W.%20Burchard"><span class="name">Hermann G. W. Burchard</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2019</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy Study</em> 9 (8).</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Georg Cantor's absolute infinity, the paradoxical Burali-Forti class Ω of all ordinals, is a monstrous non-entity for which being called a "class" is an undeserved dignity. This must be the ultimate vexation for mathematical philosophers who hold on to some residual sense of realism in set theory. By careful use of Ω, we can rescue Georg Cantor's 1899 "proof" sketch of the Well-Ordering Theorem––being generous, considering his declining health. We take the contrapositive of Cantor's suggestion and add Zermelo's choice function.<span id="BURGCO-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BURGCO-2-abstract2").show();$("BURGCO-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BURGCO-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> This results in a concise and uncomplicated proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BURGCO-2-abstract2").hide();$("BURGCO-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/BURGCO-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BURGCO-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BURGCO-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BURGCO-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BURGCO-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BURGCO-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWHIAAA-7" onclick="ee('click','WHIAAA-7')" onmouseover="ee('over','WHIAAA-7')" onmouseout="ee('out','WHIAAA-7')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WHIAAA-7"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Daniel Whiting" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Daniel%20Whiting"><span class="name">Daniel Whiting</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Australasian Journal of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">What is aesthetic appreciation? In this paper, I approach this question in an indirection fashion. First, I introduce the Kantian notion of moral worthy action and an influential analysis of it. Next, I generalize that analysis from the moral to the aesthetic domain, and from actions to affects. Aesthetic appreciation, I suggest, consists in an aesthetically worthy affective response. After unpacking the proposal, I show that it has non-trivial implications while cohering with a number of existing insights concerning the nature<span id="WHIAAA-7-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WHIAAA-7-abstract2").show();$("WHIAAA-7-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WHIAAA-7-abstract2" style="display:none"> of appreciation and the constraints it is subject to. In closing, I note some limitations on the analogy between aesthetic appreciation and morally worthy action. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WHIAAA-7-abstract2").hide();$("WHIAAA-7-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WHIAAA-7"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WHIAAA-7" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WHIAAA-7')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WHIAAA-7" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WHIAAA-7','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WHIAAA-7"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eGOMUEA" onclick="ee('click','GOMUEA')" onmouseover="ee('over','GOMUEA')" onmouseout="ee('out','GOMUEA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/GOMUEA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Uma “exploração arqueológica” da ideia de vazio como recipiente a partir de Aristóteles, Physica 4.6 213a15-19.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gustavo Laet Gomes" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Gustavo Laet%20Gomes"><span class="name">Gustavo Laet Gomes</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Ancient Philosophy</em> 15 (2):77-103.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/GOMUEA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-GOMUEA" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('GOMUEA')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-GOMUEA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GOMUEA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GOMUEA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GOMUEA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GOMUEA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePERRNA-4" onclick="ee('click','PERRNA-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','PERRNA-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','PERRNA-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/PERRNA-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Realism, Naturalism, and Hazlett’s Challenge Concerning Epistemic Value.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Timothy Perrine" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Timothy%20Perrine"><span class="name">Timothy Perrine</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Value Inquiry</em>:1-19.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">According to Realism about Epistemic Value, there is such a thing as epistemic value and it is appropriate to evaluate things—e.g., beliefs—for epistemic value because there is such a thing as epistemic value. Allan Hazlett's A Luxury of the Understanding is a sustained critique of Realism. Hazlett challenges proponent of Realism to answer explanatory questions while not justifiably violating certain constraints, including two proposed naturalistic constraints. Hazlett argues they cannot. Here I defend Realism. I argue that it is easy for<span id="PERRNA-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PERRNA-4-abstract2").show();$("PERRNA-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PERRNA-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> proponents of Realism to answer Hazlett's explanatory questions. The interesting issue is whether those answers violate Hazlett's naturalistic constraints. My own view is that epistemic value is irreducible to natural properties; it thus violates Hazlett's proposed constraints. I argue that this is justifiable because Hazlett fails to convincingly motivate his naturalistic constraints and there is reason for thinking epistemic value is irreducible to natural properties anyway. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PERRNA-4-abstract2").hide();$("PERRNA-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/PERRNA-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-PERRNA-4" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('PERRNA-4')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-PERRNA-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PERRNA-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PERRNA-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PERRNA-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PERRNA-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCZACEC" onclick="ee('click','CZACEC')" onmouseover="ee('over','CZACEC')" onmouseout="ee('out','CZACEC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CZACEC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Clinical Ethics Consultations in the Opinion of Polish Physicians.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Marek Czarkowski" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Marek%20Czarkowski"><span class="name">Marek Czarkowski</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Joanna Różyńska" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Joanna%20Różyńska"><span class="name">Joanna Różyńska</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Bartosz Maćkiewicz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Bartosz%20Maćkiewicz"><span class="name">Bartosz Maćkiewicz</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jakub Zawiła-Niedźwiecki" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jakub%20Zawiła-Niedźwiecki"><span class="name">Jakub Zawiła-Niedźwiecki</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Journal of Bioethical Inquiry</em>:1-11.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Clinical Ethics Consultations are an important tool for physicians in solving difficult cases. They are extremely common in North America and to a lesser extent also present in Europe. However, there is little data on this practice in Poland. We present results of a survey of 521 physicians practising in Poland concerning their opinion on CECs and related practices. We analysed the data looking at such issues as CECs’ perceived availability, use of CECs, and perceived usefulness of such support. Physicians<span id="CZACEC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CZACEC-abstract2").show();$("CZACEC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CZACEC-abstract2" style="display:none"> in our study generally encounter hard ethics cases, even—surprisingly—those who do not work in hospitals. Most physicians have no CEC access, and those that do still do not employ CECs. However, physicians perceive this form of support as useful—even more so among actual users of CECs. We compared these findings with similar studies from other European countries and the North America. We point out peculiarities of our results as compared to those in other countries, with some possible explanations. We hope the results may encourage regulatory debate on the need to formally introduce CECs into the Polish healthcare system. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CZACEC-abstract2").hide();$("CZACEC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CZACEC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CZACEC" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CZACEC')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CZACEC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CZACEC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CZACEC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CZACEC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CZACEC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTHOIAT-5" onclick="ee('click','THOIAT-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','THOIAT-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','THOIAT-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-20</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THOIAT-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Ideology and the Social Imaginary.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by JohnB Thompson" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/JohnB%20Thompson"><span class="name">JohnB Thompson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1982</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Theory and Society</em> 11 (5):659-681.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/THOIAT-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-THOIAT-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('THOIAT-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-THOIAT-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('THOIAT-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/citations/THOIAT-5"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 4 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-THOIAT-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSCHTBO-52" onclick="ee('click','SCHTBO-52')" onmouseover="ee('over','SCHTBO-52')" onmouseout="ee('out','SCHTBO-52')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTBO-52"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Karl Schafer" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Karl%20Schafer"><span class="name">Karl Schafer</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Peter Thielke (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THICCG">Cambridge Critical Guide to Kant’s Prolegomena</a></em>. Cambridge: Cambridge. pp. 111-132.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The focus of this chapter will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and its impact on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. Following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a ‘demarcation challenge’ concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in<span id="SCHTBO-52-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SCHTBO-52-abstract2").show();$("SCHTBO-52-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SCHTBO-52-abstract2" style="display:none"> (say) natural scientific contexts from the illegitimate use of it in (say) dogmatic metaphysics. I will then go on to argue that Kant sees Hume’s tendency to slide into more radical forms of skepticism as a symptom of his failure to provide a systematic or principled account of this distinction. This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which both robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this, and makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls ‘Formal Idealism.’ In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between, first, philosophical methodology and, second, the nature of our faculties. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SCHTBO-52-abstract2").hide();$("SCHTBO-52-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SCHTBO-52"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SCHTBO-52" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SCHTBO-52')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SCHTBO-52" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SCHTBO-52','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SCHTBO-52"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMUSPSW" onclick="ee('click','MUSPSW')" onmouseover="ee('over','MUSPSW')" onmouseout="ee('out','MUSPSW')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MUSPSW"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Patient Satisfaction with Complete Denture Prosthesis Made By Clinical Year Students at the Faculty of Dentistry, Al Azhar University - Gaza.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Waseem Mushtaha" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Waseem%20Mushtaha"><span class="name">Waseem Mushtaha</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Haya Abu Harb" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Haya%20Abu Harb"><span class="name">Haya Abu Harb</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Walid Elhout" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Walid%20Elhout"><span class="name">Walid Elhout</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Abdelrhman Seyam" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Abdelrhman%20Seyam"><span class="name">Abdelrhman Seyam</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">International Journal of Academic Health and Medical Research (IJAHMR)</em> 4 (10):1-6.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Objective: Patients' satisfaction is one of the most important goals in complete denture therapy, and there are many factors influencing this parameter. This study aimed to determine patient satisfaction with conventional removable complete denture made by clinical year students at the Faculty of Dentistry, Al Azhar University - Gaza. Methods: A sample of 85 patient who had conventional removable complete denture made by clinical year students at the Faculty of Dentistry Al Azhar University - Gaza filled a questionnaire two months<span id="MUSPSW-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MUSPSW-abstract2").show();$("MUSPSW-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MUSPSW-abstract2" style="display:none"> after denture insertion. The questionnaire involving four sections including personal information, history, denture evaluation in aspects of mastication, speech, aesthetics and retention, and patient comfort. Results: Of the 85 patient studied, 81% were males, and the mean age was 60.3 years SD+-9.64. The majority (n= 67, 79 %) lost their teeth because of bad oral hygiene. The overall satisfaction level was (92.1%), and patients were more satisfied with their upper denture. A significant association was found between the patient satisfaction and prior denture use experience (p=0.013). No significant correlation was established between the patient satisfaction and their gender (p=0.188), age group (p=0.640) and employment status (p=0.667).Conclusion: The patients have shown a high level of overall satisfaction. A significant association was found between the overall satisfaction level of patients and prior denture use experience. No statistically significant association was observed between the overall satisfaction level of patients and with each of age group, employment status and gender. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MUSPSW-abstract2").hide();$("MUSPSW-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MUSPSW"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MUSPSW" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MUSPSW')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MUSPSW" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MUSPSW','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MUSPSW"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eONCGFS" onclick="ee('click','ONCGFS')" onmouseover="ee('over','ONCGFS')" onmouseout="ee('out','ONCGFS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ONCGFS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">GÜMÜŞ FİYATLARINDA SPEKÜLATİF BALONLARIN TESPİTİ: GSADF ANALİZİ.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Erdem Oncu" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Erdem%20Oncu"><span class="name">Erdem Oncu</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In <em>ANKARA V. INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CONGRESS</em>. pp. 391-397.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Ekonomik faaliyetlerde kullanılan ürünlerin tümü emtia olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Emtia piyasasına yapılan yatırımları üretim ekonomisi ile ilişkilidir. Üretimin arttığı dönemlerde ülkelerde ham made ihtiyacı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ortaya çıkan talep artışı emtia fiyatlarını artırmaktadır. Özelliklerde kriz dönemlerinde farklı olarak talep miktarı azalmaktadır. Kriz dönemlerinde talep miktarının azalışı emtia fiyatlarında oynak düşüşlere neden olmaktadır. Gümüş hem sanayide hem de yatırım amacıyla kullanılan değerli bir metaldir. Gümüş metali özellikle son yıllarda yenilebilir enerji için bir ham made durumuna gelmiştir. Bu duruma bağlı olarak gümüş talebinde<span id="ONCGFS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ONCGFS-abstract2").show();$("ONCGFS-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="ONCGFS-abstract2" style="display:none"> artışlar gözlenmiştir. Fakat, Covid-19 süreci başlangıcı itibari ile gümüş talebini sınırlamıştır. Özellik Covid-19 pandemi döneminde birçok ürünün fiyatlarında oynaklıklar görülmüştür. Gümüş ons fiyatında pandeminin ilanı itibari ile keskin bir düşüş görülmüştür. Fiyatlarda gözlenen düşüş hızlı bir toparlanma ile birlikte yerini büyük ölçekli artış hareketine bırakmıştır. Finansal varlıklardaki yatırımcıların Covid-19 dönemindeki temel endişesi yatırım portföylerini piyasadaki olumsuz hareketlerden korunmasıdır. Covid-19 salgınında yaşanan toparlanma ile birlikte yatırımcılar gümüş metalini güvenli liman olarak görmüşlerdir. Bu çalışmada, gümüş piyasasındaki balonun varlığı araştırmak üzere pandeminin başlangıç tarihi olan 11 Mart 2020 tarihi ile 30 Agustos 2021 arasındaki günlük ons gümüş fiyatı GSADF yöntemi ile incelenmiştir. Çalışmada yapılan analiz sonucunda 2020 yılı üçüncü çeyreğinde birden çok fiyat balonu oluştuğu gözlenmiştir. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("ONCGFS-abstract2").hide();$("ONCGFS-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ONCGFS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-ONCGFS" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('ONCGFS')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-ONCGFS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ONCGFS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ONCGFS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ONCGFS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ONCGFS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eANDQAS" onclick="ee('click','ANDQAS')" onmouseover="ee('over','ANDQAS')" onmouseout="ee('out','ANDQAS')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ANDQAS"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Queer and Straight.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Matthew Andler" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Matthew%20Andler"><span class="name">Matthew Andler</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Clare Chambers, Brian D. Earp & Lori Watson (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/EARRHO">Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality</a></em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Recent philosophical work on sexuality has focused primarily on sexual orientation. Yet, there’s another normatively significant phenomenon in the neighborhood: sexual identity. Here, I develop a cultural theory of queer and straight sexual identity. In particular, I argue that sexual identity is a matter of inclusion/exclusion in relation to queer and straight cultures, which are differentiated in terms of characteristic practices involving kinship and political resistance. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/ANDQAS"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ANDQAS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ANDQAS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ANDQAS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ANDQAS','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ANDQAS"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eHUNWID" onclick="ee('click','HUNWID')" onmouseover="ee('over','HUNWID')" onmouseout="ee('out','HUNWID')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/HUNWID"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">What is Desirable About Having a Child with a Romantic Partner?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Marcus William Hunt" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Marcus William%20Hunt"><span class="name">Marcus William Hunt</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophical Papers</em> 50 (2):187-210.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Most people desire to have a romantic relationship, and most people desire to have a child. The paper suggests one respect in which it is more desirable to have a child with a romantic partner rather than with someone other than a romantic partner, as platonic parents do. The first premise claims that the romantic relationship, and only this relationship, has a certain desire as a constitutive part. This is the desire to be as related to someone as one can<span id="HUNWID-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HUNWID-abstract2").show();$("HUNWID-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HUNWID-abstract2" style="display:none"> be. That this ‘desire for relatedness’ is a constitutive part of the romantic relationship explains why those related by a romantic relationship tend to become related in other ways and explains why romantic partners tend to desire to have relationships with those to whom their romantic partner is otherwise related. The second premise is that by having a child together romantic partners become related in an important and unique way, satisfying their desire for relatedness. Since platonic parents do not have the desire for relatedness toward one another they do not satisfy such a desire in having a child together. A brief review of the sociological literature on platonic parenting is included and eight objections are answered. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HUNWID-abstract2").hide();$("HUNWID-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/HUNWID"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HUNWID" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HUNWID')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HUNWID" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HUNWID','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HUNWID"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKUMDOA" onclick="ee('click','KUMDOA')" onmouseover="ee('over','KUMDOA')" onmouseout="ee('out','KUMDOA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KUMDOA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Development of a Water Body for Conservation of Aquatic Biodiversity in Botanic Garden of Indian Republic, Noida.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sheo Kumar" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sheo%20Kumar"><span class="name">Sheo Kumar</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">International Journal of Biological Innovations</em> 3 (2):342-354.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">As per Article 9 of Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Botanic Garden of Indian Republic (BGIR), NOIDA was established to conserve endemic and threatened plants of different habitats of the country under ex-situ conservation. Hence, an attempt is made to develop a prototype water body in sandy soil without using civil construction materials for biogenesis of aquatic flora and fauna and to conserve aquatic plants. To prevent water percolation, a thick layer of leftover bentonite wastes and a semi-permeable membrane was<span id="KUMDOA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KUMDOA-abstract2").show();$("KUMDOA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KUMDOA-abstract2" style="display:none"> laid. Further, to overcome the adverse effects and to boost biogenesis, water was reclaimed by addition of fresh raw dung and organic compost in requisite proportion. As a result, microbial growth/film on the bottom of the water body, planktons and other biota were generated by its own. Furthermore, 5 species of Nymphaea, and 1 each species of Nelumbo and Victoria were introduced. Under micro and macroscopic observations, different planktonic forms of flora and fauna were recorded and attracted avian fauna and other terrestrial creatures for feeding and drinking purposes. Besides, Ceratophyllum demersum, Hydrilla verticillata, Potamogeton crispus and Potamogeton nodosus also occurred naturally. Thus, the aim of developing a water body for conservation of aquatic biodiversity in BGIR is achieved. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KUMDOA-abstract2").hide();$("KUMDOA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KUMDOA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KUMDOA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KUMDOA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KUMDOA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KUMDOA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KUMDOA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eHUGEFL" onclick="ee('click','HUGEFL')" onmouseover="ee('over','HUGEFL')" onmouseout="ee('out','HUGEFL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/HUGEFL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence).</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nick Hughes" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nick%20Hughes"><span class="name">Nick Hughes</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Epistemologists spend a great deal of time thinking about how we should respond to our evidence. They spend far less time thinking about the ways that evidence can be acquired in the first place. This is an oversight. Some ways of acquiring evidence are better than others. Many normative epistemologies struggle to accommodate this fact. In this article I develop one that can and does. I identify a phenomenon – epistemic feedback loops – in which evidence acquisition has gone awry,<span id="HUGEFL-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HUGEFL-abstract2").show();$("HUGEFL-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="HUGEFL-abstract2" style="display:none"> with the result that even beliefs based on the evidence are irrational. Examples include evidence acquired under the influence of confirmation bias and evidence acquired under the influence of cognitively penetrated experiences caused by implicit bias. I then develop a theoretical framework which enables us to understand why beliefs that are the outputs of epistemic feedback loops are irrational. Finally, I argue that many popular approaches to epistemic normativity may need to be abandoned on the grounds that they cannot comfortably explain feedback loops. The scope of this last claim is broad: it includes almost all contemporary theories of justified/rational belief and of the epistemology of cognitive penetration. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("HUGEFL-abstract2").hide();$("HUGEFL-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/HUGEFL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HUGEFL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HUGEFL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HUGEFL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HUGEFL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HUGEFL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMAHHWT" onclick="ee('click','MAHHWT')" onmouseover="ee('over','MAHHWT')" onmouseout="ee('out','MAHHWT')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MAHHWT"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Book Review of The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral Enhancement (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2016), 340 Pp. <span class="hint">[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Kritika Maheshwari" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Kritika%20Maheshwari"><span class="name">Kritika Maheshwari</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2016</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Prolegomena</em> 15 (2):227-231.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Review of Harris Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral Enhancement, 340 pp. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MAHHWT"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MAHHWT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MAHHWT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MAHHWT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MAHHWT','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MAHHWT"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMAHINI" onclick="ee('click','MAHINI')" onmouseover="ee('over','MAHINI')" onmouseout="ee('out','MAHINI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MAHINI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">If Now Isn't the Most Influential Time Ever, When Is? <span class="hint">[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Kritika Maheshwari" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Kritika%20Maheshwari"><span class="name">Kritika Maheshwari</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">The Philosopher</em> 108:94-101.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MAHINI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MAHINI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MAHINI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MAHINI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MAHINI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MAHINI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eINGRDA-2" onclick="ee('click','INGRDA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','INGRDA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','INGRDA-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/INGRDA-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Representative Democracy and Social Equality.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Sean Ingham" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Sean%20Ingham"><span class="name">Sean Ingham</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">American Political Science Review</em>:1-13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">When are inequalities in political power undemocratic, and why? While some writers condemn any inequalities in political power as a deviation from the ideal of democracy, this view is vulnerable to the simple objection that representative democracies concentrate political power in the hands of elected officials rather than distributing it equally among citizens, but they are no less democratic for it. Building on recent literature that interprets democracy as part of a broader vision of social equality, I argue that concentrations<span id="INGRDA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("INGRDA-2-abstract2").show();$("INGRDA-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="INGRDA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> of political power are incompatible with democracy, and with a commitment to social equality more generally, when they consist in some having greater arbitrary power to influence decisions according to their idiosyncratic preferences. A novel account of the relationship between power and social status clarifies the role of social equality in the justification of democracy, including a representative democracy in which public officials have more political power than ordinary citizens. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("INGRDA-2-abstract2").hide();$("INGRDA-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/INGRDA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-INGRDA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('INGRDA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-INGRDA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('INGRDA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-INGRDA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLITEO-8" onclick="ee('click','KLITEO-8')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLITEO-8')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLITEO-8')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLITEO-8"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Ethics of Matching: Mobile and Web-Based Dating and Hook Up Platforms.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Michal Klincewicz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Michal%20Klincewicz"><span class="name">Michal Klincewicz</span></a>, <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Lily E. Frank" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Lily E.%20Frank"><span class="name">Lily E. Frank</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Emma Jane" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Emma%20Jane"><span class="name">Emma Jane</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Brian D. Earp, Clare Chambers & Lori Watson (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/EARRHO">Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality</a></em>. Routledge.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLITEO-8"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KLITEO-8" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLITEO-8')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLITEO-8" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLITEO-8','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLITEO-8"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMETPOL" onclick="ee('click','METPOL')" onmouseover="ee('over','METPOL')" onmouseout="ee('out','METPOL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/METPOL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Problems of Living Meaningfully in Psychiatry and Philosophy.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Thaddeus Metz" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Thaddeus%20Metz"><span class="name">Thaddeus Metz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Brazilian Journal of Psychiatry</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A brief critical notice of Dan J Stein's new book _Problems of Living: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Cognitive-Affective Science_. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/METPOL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-METPOL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('METPOL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-METPOL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('METPOL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-METPOL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eTHONOL" onclick="ee('click','THONOL')" onmouseover="ee('over','THONOL')" onmouseout="ee('out','THONOL')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/THONOL"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Norms of Life.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by David L. Thompson" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/David L.%20Thompson"><span class="name">David L. Thompson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear"></span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Biological organisms, languages and selves are normative entities, so must be understood in terms of norms. Mechanistic understanding is based on causal necessity, but normative understanding relies on a grasp of the contingencies of evolution, history and personal experience. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/THONOL"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-THONOL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('THONOL')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-THONOL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('THONOL','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-THONOL"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eAJVRDM" onclick="ee('click','AJVRDM')" onmouseover="ee('over','AJVRDM')" onmouseout="ee('out','AJVRDM')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/AJVRDM"><span class="pub_name recTitle"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Reading Derrida Margins of Philosophy - Irfan Ajvazi.</span></span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Irfan Ajvazi" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Irfan%20Ajvazi"><span class="name">Irfan Ajvazi</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> Idea Books.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Reading Derrida Margins of Philosophy - Irfan Ajvazi. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/AJVRDM"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-AJVRDM" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('AJVRDM')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-AJVRDM" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('AJVRDM','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-AJVRDM"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKRBNAS-2" onclick="ee('click','KRBNAS-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','KRBNAS-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','KRBNAS-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KRBNAS-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Normalisation and Subformula Property for a System of Intuitionistic Logic with General Introduction and Elimination Rules.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nils Kürbis" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nils%20Kürbis"><span class="name">Nils Kürbis</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Synthese</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper studies a formalisation of intuitionistic logic by Negri and von Plato which has general introduction and elimination rules. The philosophical importance of the system is expounded. Definitions of `maximal formula', `segment' and `maximal segment' suitable to the system are formulated and corresponding reduction procedures for maximal formulas and permutative reduction procedures for maximal segments given. Alternatives to the main method used are also considered. It is shown that deductions in the system convert into normal form and that deductions<span id="KRBNAS-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KRBNAS-2-abstract2").show();$("KRBNAS-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KRBNAS-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> in normal form have the subformula property. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KRBNAS-2-abstract2").hide();$("KRBNAS-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KRBNAS-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-KRBNAS-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KRBNAS-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KRBNAS-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KRBNAS-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KRBNAS-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="ePREKKM" onclick="ee('click','PREKKM')" onmouseover="ee('over','PREKKM')" onmouseout="ee('out','PREKKM')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/PREKKM"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Kilusang Kababaihan: Mga Tala.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Gantala Press" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Gantala%20Press"><span class="name">Gantala Press</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2020</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em>Gantala Press</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Sa kasaysayang ito, sinisikap naming tuntunin ang kilusang kababaihan sa Pilipinas kasabay ng kilusang kababaihan sa ibang bansa, partikular sa Estados Unidos na mas kilala o pamilyar na kasaysayan sa nakararami at mahigpit na kasalikop ng ating kasaysayan. Sasalok din ang kasaysayang ito sa tinatawag na “postcolonial feminism” na pinapalagay naming mas akma sa konteksto ng Pilipinas (kaysa mga kanluraning diskurso ng feminismo). Ang kasaysayang ito ay hindi sinulat ng propesyunal na historyador o akademiko; bagkus, ito ay mga panimulang tala<span id="PREKKM-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PREKKM-abstract2").show();$("PREKKM-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="PREKKM-abstract2" style="display:none"> sa pagsisikap ng aming kolektiba na mapalalim ang pang-unawa sa kilusang kababaihan at pananaw na feminista. Buhay at hindi pa tapos ang kasaysayang ito. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("PREKKM-abstract2").hide();$("PREKKM-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/PREKKM"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-PREKKM" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('PREKKM')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-PREKKM" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PREKKM')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PREKKM" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PREKKM','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PREKKM"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSTUGAT-4" onclick="ee('click','STUGAT-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','STUGAT-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','STUGAT-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/STUGAT-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">God and the Numbers.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Paul Studtmann" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Paul%20Studtmann"><span class="name">Paul Studtmann</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">According to Augustine, abstract objects are ideas in the Mind of God. Because numbers are a type of abstract object, it would follow that numbers are ideas in the Mind of God. Let us call such a view the Augustinian View of Numbers (AVN). In this paper, I present a formal theory for AVN. The theory stems from the symmetry conception of God as it appears in Studtmann (2021). I show that Robinson’s Arithmetic is a conservative extension of the axioms<span id="STUGAT-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("STUGAT-4-abstract2").show();$("STUGAT-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="STUGAT-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> in Studtmann’s original paper. The extension is made possible by identifying the set of natural numbers with God, 0 with Being, and the successor function with the essence function. The resulting theory can then be augmented to include Peano Arithmetic by adding a set-theoretic version of induction and a comprehension schema restricted to arithmetically definable properties. In addition to these formal matters, the paper provides a characterization of the mind of God. According to the characterization, the Being essences that constitute God’s mind act as both numbers and representations – each (except for Being itself) has all the properties of some number and encodes all the properties of that number’s predecessor. The conception of God that emerges by the end of the discussion is a conception of an infinite, ineffable, axiologically and metaphysically ultimate entity that contains objects that not only serve as numbers but also encode information about each other. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("STUGAT-4-abstract2").hide();$("STUGAT-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/STUGAT-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-STUGAT-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('STUGAT-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-STUGAT-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('STUGAT-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-STUGAT-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eJONIAS-5" onclick="ee('click','JONIAS-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','JONIAS-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','JONIAS-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/JONIAS-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Intention and Self Knowledge: Wittgenstein's Bequeathal A First Draft.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Les Jones" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Les%20Jones"><span class="name">Les Jones</span></a> - <span class="pubYear"></span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/JONIAS-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-JONIAS-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('JONIAS-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-JONIAS-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('JONIAS-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-JONIAS-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eLICTEO-3" onclick="ee('click','LICTEO-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','LICTEO-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','LICTEO-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/LICTEO-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">The Epistemology of Moral Praise and Moral Criticism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Jimmy Alfonso Licon" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Jimmy Alfonso%20Licon"><span class="name">Jimmy Alfonso Licon</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Episteme</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Are strangers sincere in their moral praise and criticism? Here we apply signaling theory to argue ceteris paribus moral criticism is more likely sincere than praise; the former tends to be a higher-fidelity signal (in Western societies). To offer an example: emotions are often self-validating as a signal because they’re hard to fake. This epistemic insight matters: moral praise and criticism influence moral reputations, and affect whether others will cooperate with us. Though much of this applies to generic praise and<span id="LICTEO-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LICTEO-3-abstract2").show();$("LICTEO-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="LICTEO-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> criticism too, moral philosophers should value sincere moral praise and moral criticism for several reasons: it (i) offers insight into how others actually view us as moral agents; (ii) offers feedback to help us improve our moral characters; and (iii) encourages some behaviors, and discourages others. And so as moral agents, we should care whether moral praise and moral criticism is sincere. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("LICTEO-3-abstract2").hide();$("LICTEO-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/LICTEO-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-LICTEO-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('LICTEO-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-LICTEO-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('LICTEO-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-LICTEO-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKLIPCZ" onclick="ee('click','KLIPCZ')" onmouseover="ee('over','KLIPCZ')" onmouseout="ee('out','KLIPCZ')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KLIPCZ"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Pandemia COVID-19 z perspektywy teorii ryzyka.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Andrzej Klimczuk" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Andrzej%20Klimczuk"><span class="name">Andrzej Klimczuk</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Andrzej Zybała, Artur Bartoszewicz & Krzysztof Księżopolski (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/ZYBPUE">Polska... Unia Europejska... Świat... w pandemii COVID-19 - wybrane zagadnienia. Wnioski dla kształtowania i prowadzenia polityki publicznej</a></em>. Warszawa: Elipsa. pp. 34-56.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Artykuł zawiera przegląd wybranych powiązań pandemii COVID-19 z teoriami ryzyka. W pierwszej kolejności przedstawiono podstawowe pojęcia dotyczące przygotowania i mobilizowania sieci podmiotów polityki publicznej do wspólnych działań w warunkach niepewności. W dalszej części omówiono zagadnienie gotowości na ryzyko wystąpienia pandemii i jej zwalczania. Następnie przedstawiono wybrane możliwe efekty społeczne, gospodarcze i polityczne pandemii COVID-19. W podsumowaniu wskazane zostały rekomendacje dotyczące zarządzania podmiotami publicznymi na dalszych etapach rozwoju pandemii i w okresie po pandemii oraz propozycje dalszych kierunków badań. // The article<span id="KLIPCZ-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLIPCZ-abstract2").show();$("KLIPCZ-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KLIPCZ-abstract2" style="display:none"> presents an overview of selected connections of the COVID-19 pandemic with risk theories. The study first explores the basic concepts of preparing and mobilizing networks of public policy actors to act together under conditions of uncertainty. The following section discusses the pandemic risk preparedness and fighting. Then, selected possible social, economic and political effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are discussed. In summary, recommendations regarding the public management in the further stages of the pandemic development and in the post-pandemic period were indicated, as well as proposals for further research directions. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KLIPCZ-abstract2").hide();$("KLIPCZ-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KLIPCZ"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-KLIPCZ" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('KLIPCZ')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-KLIPCZ" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KLIPCZ')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KLIPCZ" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KLIPCZ','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KLIPCZ"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eKNUSAA" onclick="ee('click','KNUSAA')" onmouseover="ee('over','KNUSAA')" onmouseout="ee('out','KNUSAA')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KNUSAA"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Shared action: An existential phenomenological account.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nicolai Knudsen" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nicolai%20Knudsen"><span class="name">Nicolai Knudsen</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences</em>:1-21.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible to account<span id="KNUSAA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KNUSAA-abstract2").show();$("KNUSAA-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="KNUSAA-abstract2" style="display:none"> for not only individual action and refer only to an individual) but also several distinct subtypes of shared action. My thesis is that behaviour counts as shared action if and only if it is caused by a solicitation in which either the goals, or the commitments, or both goals and commitments are joint, i.e., depend on several individuals. We thereby get three distinct subtypes of shared actions: jointly coordinated individually committed action, individually coordinated jointly committed action, and jointly coordinated jointly committed action. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("KNUSAA-abstract2").hide();$("KNUSAA-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/KNUSAA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-KNUSAA" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('KNUSAA')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-KNUSAA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('KNUSAA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-KNUSAA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('KNUSAA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-KNUSAA"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eDUTSCI" onclick="ee('click','DUTSCI')" onmouseover="ee('over','DUTSCI')" onmouseout="ee('out','DUTSCI')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/DUTSCI"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Street Children in India: A Study on Their Access to Health and Education.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nilika Dutta" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nilika%20Dutta"><span class="name">Nilika Dutta</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Street life is a challenge for survival, even for adults, and is yet more difficult for children. They live within the city but are unable to take advantage of the comforts of urban life. This study focused primarily on access to health and education in street children from 6 to 18 years old in the Indian metropolises of Mumbai and Kolkata. The study also aimed to assess the role of social work interventions in ensuring the rights of street children. A<span id="DUTSCI-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DUTSCI-abstract2").show();$("DUTSCI-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="DUTSCI-abstract2" style="display:none"> combination of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies was used. Convenience sampling was used to recruit 100 children. Data were collected on a one-to-one basis through semi-structured interview schedules and by non-participant observation. Findings revealed that extreme poverty was the primary cause for the increasing numbers of street children. Lack of awareness among illiterate parents regarding educational opportunities kept most children away from school attendance. Factors such as lack of an educational ambience at home made it difficult for the children to work on their lessons outside the premises of the institution. It was evident that those living with their parents had better access to health care facilities than did those living on their own; however, nongovernmental organizations made significant efforts to redress this imbalance, setting up health check-up camps at regular intervals. Although exposure to harsh reality at an early age had resulted in a premature loss of innocence in most, making them sometimes difficult to work with, the nongovernmental organizations were striving to ensure child participation and the growth of individual identity. The interventionists therefore focused on developing a rights-based approach, rather than a charitable one. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("DUTSCI-abstract2").hide();$("DUTSCI-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/DUTSCI"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-DUTSCI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DUTSCI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-DUTSCI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DUTSCI','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DUTSCI"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eWALADF-2" onclick="ee('click','WALADF-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WALADF-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WALADF-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/WALADF-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">A Dilemma for Reductive Compatibilism.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Robert H. Wallace" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Robert H.%20Wallace"><span class="name">Robert H. Wallace</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Erkenntnis</em>:1-23.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A common compatibilist view says that we are free and morally responsible in virtue of the ability to respond aptly to reasons. Many hold a version of this view despite disagreement about whether free will requires the ability to do otherwise. The canonical version of this view is reductive. It reduces the pertinent ability to a set of modal properties that are more obviously compatible with determinism, like dispositions. I argue that this and any reductive view of abilities faces a<span id="WALADF-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WALADF-2-abstract2").show();$("WALADF-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="WALADF-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> significant challenge: it cannot adequately explain the freedom-grounding element of this ability. The problem has the form of a dilemma. This leaves reasons-responsive compatibilists with two options: abandon theories of free will grounded in abilities or abandon reductive theories of abilities. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("WALADF-2-abstract2").hide();$("WALADF-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/WALADF-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WALADF-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WALADF-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WALADF-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WALADF-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WALADF-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eYANDHH" onclick="ee('click','YANDHH')" onmouseover="ee('over','YANDHH')" onmouseout="ee('out','YANDHH')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/YANDHH"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Does Hand Hygiene Reduce SARS-CoV-2 Transmission?</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Chao Yang" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Chao%20Yang"><span class="name">Chao Yang</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The world is experiencing severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic and in the absence of an effective vaccine or drug(s), the scenario is expected to prolong. Though trials are on to identify the effective and safe vaccine/drug among the several candidates, the results are expected to be delayed. Till then preventive measures remain the best option to contain the transmission of COVID-19 virus. Hand hygiene is one of the most important and widely publicized preventive measures apart from physical distancing,<span id="YANDHH-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("YANDHH-abstract2").show();$("YANDHH-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="YANDHH-abstract2" style="display:none"> cough and sneezing etiquettes, and wearing face masks. However, there are reports of increased incidence of dermatology consultations for hand eczema attributed to frequent hand washing/ sanitization in healthcare workers and the general public. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("YANDHH-abstract2").hide();$("YANDHH-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/YANDHH"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-YANDHH" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('YANDHH')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-YANDHH" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('YANDHH','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-YANDHH"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eMERKAS-2" onclick="ee('click','MERKAS-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','MERKAS-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','MERKAS-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MERKAS-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Kant and Stoic Affections.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Melissa Merritt" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Melissa%20Merritt"><span class="name">Melissa Merritt</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">forthcoming</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Canadian Journal of Philosophy</em>.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">I examine the significance of the Stoic theory of pathē (and related topics) for Kant’s moral psychology, arguing against the received view that systematic differences block the possibility of Kant’s drawing anything more than rhetoric from his Stoic sources. More particularly, I take on the chronically underexamined assumption that Kant is committed to a psychological dualism in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, positing distinct rational and non-rational elements of human mentality. By contrast, Stoics take the mentality of an adult<span id="MERKAS-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MERKAS-2-abstract2").show();$("MERKAS-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="MERKAS-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> human being to be rational through and through, while recognising that this rationality is not normally in a state of health or excellence. I show how Kant’s account of affections — chiefly the “affects” and “passions” that he identifies as targets of a duty of apathy — draws substantive lessons from his Stoic sources, and how he accepts on his own terms the monistic principles of Stoic moral psychology. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("MERKAS-2-abstract2").hide();$("MERKAS-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/MERKAS-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-MERKAS-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('MERKAS-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-MERKAS-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('MERKAS-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-MERKAS-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eSHAECH" onclick="ee('click','SHAECH')" onmouseover="ee('over','SHAECH')" onmouseout="ee('out','SHAECH')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/SHAECH"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Nathaniel Sharadin" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Nathaniel%20Sharadin"><span class="name">Nathaniel Sharadin</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2018</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/KYRMR">Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism</a></em>. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 121-143.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Epistemic consequentialism has been charged with ignoring the epistemic separateness of propositions and with (thereby) allowing trade-offs between propositions. Here, I do two things. First, I investigate the metaphor of the epistemic separateness of propositions. I argue that either (i) the metaphor is meaningfully unpacked in a way that is modeled on the moral separateness of persons, in which case it doesn’t support a ban on trade-offs or (ii) it isn’t meaningfully unpacked, in which case it really doesn’t support a<span id="SHAECH-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SHAECH-abstract2").show();$("SHAECH-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="SHAECH-abstract2" style="display:none"> ban on trade-offs. Second, I consider the strategy of arguing against the trade-off permitting conception of epistemic rationality that is central to epistemic consequentialism on the basis of our intuitive verdicts about the permissibility of trade-offs in cases. I argue the execution of this strategy suffers a methodological mistake that, once corrected, vitiates the probative value of those intuitive verdicts. Hence the conclusion: the separateness of propositions provides no support for a ban on trade-offs, and an influential independent argument for such a ban is flawed. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("SHAECH-abstract2").hide();$("SHAECH-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/SHAECH"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-SHAECH" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SHAECH')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SHAECH" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SHAECH','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SHAECH"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eBAKAMC-2" onclick="ee('click','BAKAMC-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','BAKAMC-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','BAKAMC-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-19</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/BAKAMC-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">A Monistic Conclusion to Aristotle’s <em>Ergon</em> Argument: The Human Good as the Best Achievement of a Human.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by Samuel H. Baker" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Samuel H.%20Baker"><span class="name">Samuel H. Baker</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie</em> 103 (3):373-403.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Scholars have often thought that a monistic reading of Aristotle’s definition of the human good – in particular, one on which “best and most teleios virtue” refers to theoretical wisdom – cannot follow from the premises of the ergon argument. I explain how a monistic reading can follow from the premises, and I argue that this interpretation gives the correct rationale for Aristotle’s definition. I then explain that even though the best and most teleios virtue must be a single virtue,<span id="BAKAMC-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BAKAMC-2-abstract2").show();$("BAKAMC-2-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="BAKAMC-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> that virtue could in principle be a whole virtue that arises from the combination of all the others. I also clarify that the definition of the human good aims at capturing the nature of human eudaimonia only in its primary case. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("BAKAMC-2-abstract2").hide();$("BAKAMC-2-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/BAKAMC-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-BAKAMC-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('BAKAMC-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-BAKAMC-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('BAKAMC-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-BAKAMC-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eOKPJDW" onclick="ee('click','OKPJDW')" onmouseover="ee('over','OKPJDW')" onmouseout="ee('out','OKPJDW')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/OKPJDW"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Jude Dibia’s Walking with Shadows and the Representation of Queerness in the Nigerian Context.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by James Otoburu Okpiliya" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/James Otoburu%20Okpiliya"><span class="name">James Otoburu Okpiliya</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2021</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">International Journal of Humanitatis Theoreticus</em> 5 (1):212-222.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Homosexuality and other ‘queer’ sexual orientations are steadily gaining prominence in the Nigerian society. This affords many gay activists and sympathisers the impetus to openly challenge the un-Africanness ideology of homosexuality. This article explores how new Nigerian writers use their works to reveal that homosexuality is not alien to Africa. The article argues that queer sexual preferences stem from the cleavages of imperialism and is also part of the inglorious and continuous domination of values by the West. Through textual analysis<span id="OKPJDW-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("OKPJDW-abstract2").show();$("OKPJDW-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="OKPJDW-abstract2" style="display:none"> of Jude Dibia’s Walking with Shadows, the article further argues that in Africa, sex is not only deeply rooted in traditional ideas and values but also a sacred reality expected to be done within marriage and between opposite sex. Thus, any contrary sense of sexual familiarity is viewed as a disruption on the cultural norms and practices of the people. The article adopts post-colonialism as theoretical framework and concludes that with the law prohibiting same-sex sexuality in Nigeria, homosexuals will continue to exist at the fringes of Nigeria’s sexual space. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("OKPJDW-abstract2").hide();$("OKPJDW-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/OKPJDW"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-OKPJDW" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('OKPJDW')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-OKPJDW" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('OKPJDW','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-OKPJDW"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORDDL-4" onclick="ee('click','CORDDL-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORDDL-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORDDL-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORDDL-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Desarrollo de la capacidad valorativa. Predeterminación genética y condicionamiento socio-cultural.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón Fabelo%20Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2007</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Epla Educap (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/EDUPDE">Proceso de Enseñanza-Aprendizaje: Bases Neurales y Contexto Socio Cultural</a></em>. Lima, Perú: pp. 145-159.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">El ensayo tiene como tema central el desarrollo de la capacidad valorativa y la participación que en este proceso tienen lo genético y lo sociocultural. Nos interesa mostrar las premisas biológicas generales de esa relación y enfatizar en la especificidad cualitativamente humana de su desarrollo, todo ello sobre todo desde el ángulo del vínculo entre las influencias genéticas y del medio y sus respectivos papeles en la determinación del desarrollo de aquella capacidad que a nivel humano identificamos como valoración. -/-<span id="CORDDL-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORDDL-4-abstract2").show();$("CORDDL-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CORDDL-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> . (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORDDL-4-abstract2").hide();$("CORDDL-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORDDL-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORDDL-4" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORDDL-4')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORDDL-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORDDL-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORDDL-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORDDL-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORDDL-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORLGC" onclick="ee('click','CORLGC')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORLGC')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORLGC')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORLGC"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">La globalización como espectáculo y el espectáculo de la globalización.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2004</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">El Cuervo</em> 16 (32):10-13.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">El trabajo evalúa el alcance de la caracterización realizada en 1967 por Guy Debord de la vida social contemporánea como sociedad del espectáculo. Se muestra la vigencia de aquel análisis en las condiciones de un capitalismo globalizado que redimensiona cada vez más, a través del espectáculo mediático, una relación enajenada con la realidad. Un factor de incuestionable importancia en el dominio que el capital hoy ejerce sobre la vida humana radica en la visión fetichizada y manipulada de la realidad que<span id="CORLGC-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORLGC-abstract2").show();$("CORLGC-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CORLGC-abstract2" style="display:none"> aquel logra por diversas vías fomentar, dejando ocultas las claves mismas que permitirían explicar este proceso. Las imágenes que por doquier se distribuyen a través de los medios masivos de comunicación, más que acercarnos al conocimiento de nuestro mundo, la mayor parte de las veces tienen la misión de alejarnos de él, recreando espectacularmente una realidad que, por esa misma razón y por mucho que en verdad nos afecte, parece alejarse cada vez más de nuestro alcance hasta ya no ser nuestra. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORLGC-abstract2").hide();$("CORLGC-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORLGC"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORLGC" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORLGC')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORLGC" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORLGC')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORLGC" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORLGC','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORLGC"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORRTY" onclick="ee('click','CORRTY')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORRTY')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORRTY')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORRTY"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Racionalidad ética y poder político.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2001</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Caja Negra</em> 1 (1):29-36.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Se trata de una reflexión que indaga en torno a la naturaleza de las relaciones posibles entre el ejercicio de la dominación política y los valores morales. El discurso justificador del poder, de raíces axiológicas, es revisado desde por lo menos tres miradores. El primero es el de Juan Jacobo Rousseau, el segundo el de Michael Foucault y, finalmente, el de Luis Villoro. La idea es encontrar la clave a un viejo y espinoso tema de la moral pública: la legitimidad<span id="CORRTY-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORRTY-abstract2").show();$("CORRTY-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CORRTY-abstract2" style="display:none"> objetiva de los valores superiores al interés particular. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORRTY-abstract2").hide();$("CORRTY-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORRTY"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORRTY" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORRTY')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORRTY" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORRTY')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORRTY" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORRTY','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORRTY"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORUPR" onclick="ee('click','CORUPR')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORUPR')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORUPR')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORUPR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Una problemática recurrente. La autenticidad filosófica en el pensamiento latinoamericano.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2000</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Enlaces</em> 7 (7):70-81.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">El problema de la autenticidad del filosofar latinoamericano es una de las temáticas más constantes y trascendentales de la historia del pensamiento subcontinental, asociada a la preocupación esencial por la autenticidad misma del latinoamericano, de su ser, de su cultura, preocupación que ha matizado toda la historia de nuestra América, desde que ésta fue conquistada por Europa. Este problema llegó a convertirse en una especie de obsesión o fiebre que se extendió prácticamente a todos los filósofos del continente. Esto no<span id="CORUPR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORUPR-abstract2").show();$("CORUPR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CORUPR-abstract2" style="display:none"> fue nada casual, implicaba una nueva conciencia de sí, un deseo de enfrentarse a Occidente, una asunción de la necesidad de libertad e independencia también en el plano teórico y espiritual, una lucha contra el intento de universalización exclusiva de los valores originados en Occidente... (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORUPR-abstract2").hide();$("CORUPR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORUPR"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORUPR" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORUPR')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORUPR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORUPR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORUPR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORUPR','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORUPR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORHUR" onclick="ee('click','CORHUR')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORHUR')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORHUR')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORHUR"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Hacia una reconstrucción axiológica del socialismo, el mercado y los valores humanos.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1999</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Rosa María Marrero (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/MARLTD-53">Las trampas de la globalización: paradigmas emancipatorios y nuevos escenarios en América Latina</a></em>. La Habana, Cuba: pp. 187-215.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">La experiencia histórica confirma la necesaria presencia de relaciones mercantiles en cualquier proyecto socialista diseñado hoy con un mínimo de realismo. Parece ya evidente que no es la mera exclusión o inclusión del mercado lo que distingue al socialismo y al capitalismo. Mas el alto consenso actual que el mercado ha logrado a su favor, no mitiga las importantes secuelas negativas que este origina cuando es dejado a su funcionamiento espontáneo. De ahí que todos los modelos socialistas que se discuten<span id="CORHUR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORHUR-abstract2").show();$("CORHUR-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CORHUR-abstract2" style="display:none"> en la actualidad tengan este asunto como uno de sus ejes centrales de análisis. Las relaciones mercantiles en el socialismo tienen necesariamente que ser reguladas y subordinadas a determinados valores, de manera que puedan ser garantizadas las cuotas de justicia social que tal tipo de sociedad incorpora a las relaciones humanas. ¿Cuáles son esas regulaciones? ¿Hasta dónde han de limitar el libre juego de las leyes del mercado? ¿Es, en principio, posible la moralización exterior de este último? Para aproximar una respuesta a estas interrogantes, se hace imprescindible reflexionar sobre otra cuestión: ¿qué implicaciones humanas tienen las relaciones mercantiles?, ¿por qué exigen reguladores especiales externos al trascender a la nueva sociedad socialista? (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORHUR-abstract2").hide();$("CORHUR-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORHUR"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORHUR" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORHUR')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORHUR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORHUR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORHUR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORHUR','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORHUR"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCOREME-4" onclick="ee('click','COREME-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','COREME-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','COREME-4')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/COREME-4"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">El marxismo en los umbrales del siglo XXI. Emancipación y valores en América Latina.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1996</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Editorial Félix Varela (ed.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/AGOEDD">El derrumbe del modelo eurosoviético: una visión desde Cuba</a></em>. La Habana, Cuba: pp. 292-324.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">En esta edición se adiciona, al ensayo “El marxismo en los umbrales del siglo XXI”, que había aparecido en solitario en las ediciones anteriores, otro ensayo titulado “Hacia una refundamentación valorativa del paradigma emancipatorio en América Latina”. El primero de ellos se pretende caracterizar críticamente en sus rasgos más generales las actitudes mejor dibujadas ante el marxismo hacia la década de los noventa del siglo XX para, sobre esta base, proyectar algunos de los principios de su renovación y las prioridades<span id="COREME-4-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("COREME-4-abstract2").show();$("COREME-4-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="COREME-4-abstract2" style="display:none"> más importantes que tienen en general las ciencias sociales en las condiciones de Cuba. En el segundo se analiza el papel que desempeña el componente valorativo en los marcos constitutivos del paradigma emancipador y su importancia para que este paradigma desempeñe su función orientadora y movilizadora . (<span class="ll" onclick="$("COREME-4-abstract2").hide();$("COREME-4-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/COREME-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-COREME-4" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('COREME-4')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-COREME-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('COREME-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-COREME-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('COREME-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-COREME-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORLVU" onclick="ee('click','CORLVU')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORLVU')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORLVU')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORLVU"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Los valores universales en el contexto de los problemas globales de la humanidad.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1994</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Revista Cubana de Ciencias Sociales</em> 28 (28):18-31.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Se ofrece un grupo de reflexiones acerca del vínculo entre dos conceptos de amplio uso en el lenguaje académico y no académico contemporáneo: valores universales y problemas globales. ¿Qué son los valores universales? ¿Por qué los seres humanos difieren en cuanto a su interpretación? ¿En qué medida el surgimiento y agudización de los problemas globales se asocia a una práctica distanciada de los verdaderos valores universales? ¿Qué hacer para que sean estos últimos los que en realidad sustenten las relaciones internacionales?<span id="CORLVU-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORLVU-abstract2").show();$("CORLVU-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CORLVU-abstract2" style="display:none"> ¿Qué papel desempeñan estos valores en la búsqueda de soluciones a los problemas globales? El presente trabajo pretende aproximar una respuesta a estas interrogantes. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORLVU-abstract2").hide();$("CORLVU-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORLVU"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORLVU" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORLVU')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORLVU" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORLVU')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORLVU" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORLVU','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORLVU"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORALE-2" onclick="ee('click','CORALE-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORALE-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORALE-2')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORALE-2"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">América Latina en la encrucijada entre los valores universales y propios.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1994</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">El Cuervo</em> 12 (12):11-17.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">En el ensayo se muestra y argumenta por qué debe considerarse la contradictoria relación entre los valores universales y propios como el más importante problema axiológico que ha enfrentado la praxis y el pensamiento latinoamericanos, al tiempo que se proyecta la solución teórica de ese problema como consecuencia posible y necesaria de su solución práctica. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORALE-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORALE-2" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORALE-2')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORALE-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORALE-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORALE-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORALE-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORALE-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORCSL-5" onclick="ee('click','CORCSL-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORCSL-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORCSL-5')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORCSL-5"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Consideraciones sobre la concepción axiológica de Miguel Bueno.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> & <a class="discreet" title="View other works by Teresa Pérez Guerra" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/Teresa Pérez%20Guerra"><span class="name">Teresa Pérez Guerra</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1988</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> In Cienfuegos", , Departamento de Filosofía Marxista-Leninista Del Instituto Superior Agroindustrial &Quot; & Camilo (eds.), <em><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CIEAPA">Anuario. Problemas actuales de la filosofía marxista-leninista</a></em>. La Habana, Cuba: pp. 184-199.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Se valoran las principales ideas axiológicas de filósofo mexicano Miguel Bueno, a través de una de sus obras medulares –“Contribución a la teoría de los valores”– con el objetivo de desentrañar, su comprensión tanto de la naturaleza de los valores, como de su jerarquía de los valores, aspectos estos nodales de la concepción axiológica del autor. Sobre esta base se realiza un enjuiciamiento crítico de sus propuestas teóricas. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORCSL-5"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORCSL-5" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORCSL-5')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORCSL-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORCSL-5')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORCSL-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORCSL-5','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORCSL-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCORDDL-3" onclick="ee('click','CORDDL-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','CORDDL-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','CORDDL-3')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/CORDDL-3"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">Dialéctica de lo general y lo particular en la verdad valorativa.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1987</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Revista Cubana de Ciencias Sociales</em> 5 (14):135-153.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">El trabajo aborda, desde una perspectiva marxista, un importante y complejo problema teórico asociado a la supuesta falsedad de toda ideología. Se trata del problema de la veracidad de la valoración, calificado más de una vez como de imposible solución, dado el vínculo de los juicios valorativos con las necesidades, intereses y otros fenómenos subjetivos de la conciencia humana. La negación de la existencia de la verdad valorativa conduce inevitablemente a su negación en la ideología, compuesta fundamentalmente por juicios valorativos<span id="CORDDL-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORDDL-3-abstract2").show();$("CORDDL-3-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="CORDDL-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> y, por lo tanto, sirve de sustento gnoseológico a las diversas variantes de la teoría de la desideologización. El enfoque crítico de estas consideraciones se desarrolla en el artículo sobre la base del análisis de la dialéctica de lo general y lo particular en la verdad valorativa, haciendo énfasis, ante todo, en la especificidad de esta última en comparación con cualquier otra verdad del conocimiento. (<span class="ll" onclick="$("CORDDL-3-abstract2").hide();$("CORDDL-3-absexp").show();">shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/archive/CORDDL-3"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="tr-CORDDL-3" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('CORDDL-3')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <div id="la-CORDDL-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CORDDL-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CORDDL-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CORDDL-3','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/web/20211023063609im_/https://philarchive.org/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CORDDL-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id="eCOREFV" onclick="ee('click','COREFV')" onmouseover="ee('over','COREFV')" onmouseout="ee('out','COREFV')" class="entry"><div style="float:right" class="subtle">2021-10-18</div><span class="citation"><a href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/rec/COREFV"><span class="articleTitle recTitle">El factor valorativo en el conocimiento científico.</span></a><a class="discreet" title="View other works by José Ramón Fabelo Corzo" href="/web/20211023063609/https://philarchive.org/s/José Ramón%20Fabelo Corzo"><span class="name">José Ramón Fabelo Corzo</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1986</span> - <span class="pubInfo"> <em class="pubName">Revista Cubana de Ciencias Sociales</em> 4 (11):108-125.</span></span><span class="toggle" style="display:none" data-target="extras">details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">En el trabajo se exponen algunas ideas generales acerca de la interrelación entre valoración y conocimiento, así como el análisis de determinadas formas concretas en que se realiza la acción del factor valorativo sobre la ciencia y su desarrollo. Se fundamenta la tesis de que todo conocimiento, cualquiera que sea la forma en que este se presente, posee un contenido valorativo, cuya dosis depende del carácter de la relación que guarda su objeto con los intereses, necesidades y fines del sujeto<span id="COREFV-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick="$("COREFV-abstract2").show();$("COREFV-absexp").hide()">...</span>)</span><span id="COREFV-abstract2" style="display:none"> cognoscente. La presencia de este componente valorativo en el conocimiento no conduce necesariamente a una reproducción desfigurada de la realidad, como muchas veces se afirma; ella ciertamente puede obstaculizar dicho conocimiento, pero puede también estimularlo. Se expresa que el papel de los factores valorativos en el proceso cognoscitivo tampoco debe sobreestimarse en menosprecio de la importancia de su contenido objetivo. Por último, se muestra que es precisamente a través del sujeto del conocimiento que se realiza el condicionamiento valorativo de la ciencia y su desarrollo. 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