South African-Latin American Maritime Co-operation: Towards a South Atlantic RIM Community? - Diplomats and Defenders

<html> <head><script type="text/javascript" src="/_static/js/bundle-playback.js?v=HxkREWBo" charset="utf-8"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="/_static/js/wombat.js?v=txqj7nKC" charset="utf-8"></script> <script>window.RufflePlayer=window.RufflePlayer||{};window.RufflePlayer.config={"autoplay":"on","unmuteOverlay":"hidden"};</script> <script type="text/javascript" src="/_static/js/ruffle/ruffle.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript"> __wm.init("https://web.archive.org/web"); __wm.wombat("http://www.iss.co.za:80/Pubs/Monographs/No9/Mills.html","20081014223958","https://web.archive.org/","web","/_static/", "1224023998"); </script> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/_static/css/banner-styles.css?v=S1zqJCYt" /> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/_static/css/iconochive.css?v=3PDvdIFv" />  <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> <title>South African-Latin American Maritime Co-operation: Towards a South Atlantic RIM Community? - Diplomats and Defenders - Monograph No 9, 1997</title> <meta name="GENERATOR" content="Adobe PageMill 2.0 Mac"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="/web/20081014223958cs_/http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/mandy_docs.css"> </head> <body bgcolor="white" leftmargin="0" topmargin="0"> <center> <a name="Anchor-58442"></a> <table cool width="543" height="6697" usegridx usegridy showgridx showgridy gridx="16" gridy="16" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" align="left"> <tr height="16"> <td width="16" height="6696" rowspan="2"></td> <td width="526" height="16"></td> <td width="1" height="16"><spacer type="block" width="1" height="16"></td> </tr> <tr height="6680"> <td width="526" height="6680" align="left" xpos="16" content valign="top" csheight="6680"> <center> <center> <h2>South African-Latin American Maritime Co-operation: Towards a South Atlantic RIM Community?<br> <br> </h2> <hr noshade size="1" width="75%"> <h3><i>Dr Greg Mills<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-Much-39141">1</a></font><br> National Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg</i><font face="Arial,Helvetica,Geneva,Swiss,SunSans-Regular" size="3"><i><br> <br> </i><b><a href="Contents.html">Published in Monograph No. 9, Diplomats and Defenders, February 1997</a></b></font></h3> </center> <p></p> </center> <h4><b>INTRODUCTION<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>For many South Africans, most of Latin America has been epitomised by instability and, thus, by unreliability. This image was formed by the decades of economic and political upheaval  where telephone number hyper-inflation figures and military interventions combined to produce a volatile and unattractive cocktail for outside partners.<br> <br> But this situation has altered radically and fundamentally. Democracy has been installed and is maintained, and the installation of democracy has gone hand-in-hand with economic reform. This has given the continent a totally different image to that of ten years ago. Brazil, for example, considered by many to be the regional hegemon, producing some forty per cent of Latin America's GDP, has successfully left behind 31 years of military junta (1954-85), and has implemented the the so-called 'Washington Consensus' or 'neo-liberal project', a by now common package of macro-economic structural adjustment programmes. These include liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation  a package with which the South African Government is also familiar.<br> <br> Broadly speaking, the thrust towards regional co-operation and, in its purest form, regional integration, falls into three distinct categories, notably, political, economic, and security. Each of these will be considered in turn in the course of assessing the potential for naval co-operation across the South Atlantic.<br> </h5> <h4><b>POLITICAL REFORM: THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL DEMOCRACY<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>The significance of the virtually simultaneous democratic transformation in Latin America and in South Africa should not be underestimated when considering the possibilities of regional co-operation. Although the process of contemporary regional co-operation and integration is often characterised by detailed and sometimes tedious high-level meetings and negotiations on economic matters, such as trade quotas and tariff reduction strategies, "<i>behind that process lies a sense of values  whether it be to promote peace, or defend socialism, or overcome poverty or further democracy</i>."<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-See-33463">2</a></font><br> <br> Given that regional integration and co-operation is also mostly a 'top-down' process (driven by the leadership <i>élite</i>), governments have to perceive that their best interests are served by integration, as they view the process through the prism of their own interests. In other words, governments will not be inspired to co-operate and, ultimately, share sovereign interests, unless integration and co-operation will promote both their "<i>sense of values</i>", which tend to be long term, and their interests, which may be short or long term.<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-Barber-1518">3</a></font><br> <br> The democratic symbiosis between Southern Africa and Latin America goes beyond just the advent of democracy, however important and crucial that has been for both regions. Just as the end of civil conflict in Angola and Mozambique and the metamorphosis of South Africa's regional military involvement from the negative (destabilisation) to the positive has facilitated Southern African co-operation, the steady improvement in Argentine-British relations after the Falklands/Malvinas campaign of 1982 has also defused tensions in Latin America.<br> <br> To put it simply, successful regional co-operation and integration requires, as James Barber has put it, "<i>a sufficient recognition of shared values and common aims, alongside individual interests</i>."<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-Ibid-53753">4</a></font> South Africa, like Latin American nations, will inevitably be drawn to co-operate with states that mirror its own political values and are consistent with its own political and economic status.<br> <br> While the advent of a new 'globalised' age has paradoxically standardised expectations about national political and economic systems, it has at the same time brought with it inevitable demands to alter the manner in which states interact and in which international organisations are structured. Countries with similar political values (and with similar problems) could lobby together, for example, over reform of the United Nations system. Regional leaders in Southern Africa and Latin America, in particular South Africa and Brazil, have potential stakes in an expanded UN Security Council  though both will have to manage regional sensitivities over their role carefully. The notion of south-south linkages also creates a certain political solidarity with the nations of the nascent South Atlantic Rim  however misplaced the concept of a 'south identity' is in an era where the ideal of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) is <i>passé</i>.<br> </h5> <h4><b>GLOBALISATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM: A FOREIGN POLICY LINK?<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>In this new 'globalised' age, South Africa's foreign policy is essentially underpinned by economic factors. The foreign policy and diplomacy of a democratic South Africa will have to be based on an understanding about its self-interests in this global village. Self-interest will remain in existence for as long as the nation-state is still around, and despite the globalisation of economics and politics. South Africa's national interest, like that of other states, may be said to be underscored by the values enshrined in the <b>Constitution</b>, and encompasses the security of the state and its citizens, the promotion of their social and economic well-being, as well as the encouragement of global peace, regional stability and development.<br> <br> In this, Pretoria will thus have to take into account the needs of its citizens in a continually evolving global order and define its foreign policy objectives accordingly.<br> <br> Following the end of the Cold War, the most notable global trend is towards political and economic liberalisation in which a body of ideas around free trade and democratic governance is emerging. States are now expected to conform to standards of democratically accountable and transparent governance and macro-economic management. International support and investment are increasingly conditional on compliance with these standards. Indeed, in this regard foreign policy needs a significant economic product to sell, which government has to provide to the Department of Foreign Affairs and other diplomatic assets abroad, including the South African Navy (SAN).<br> <br> Compliance with these globalising trends can only foster co-operation and trade. It should be noted in this regard that South Africa's trade with Latin American states has steadily improved:<br> </h5> <ul> <h5> <li>for the Mercosur group countries (Southern Cone Market: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and now also Chile), the trade volume has more than doubled from 1993 to 1995 (R1,75 billion to R3,8 billion); and<br> <br> <li>for the Andean Group (comprising Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia, where South Africa still does not have any diplomatic missions), it has risen by 156 per cent (R157 million to R403 million) over the same period.<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-SAIIA-32277">5</a></font> </h5> <h5> </h5> </ul> <h4><b>THE SECURITY DIMENSION<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>As noted above, the states of Southern Africa and Latin America face many common problems, in part derived from similarities in their colonial past. Both regions have emerged from decades of authoritarian rule, and are suffering high crime rates, violence, corruption and economic instability. Both are concerned with the need to uplift poor communities, and with the effect that liberal economic reforms will have on these groups  hence, for example, the continued demand in South Africa for the effective implementation of its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and in Latin America for spending on its 'social agenda'.<br> <br> Essentially, states will be brought together by both institutional and functional security concerns. While there is undoubtedly a degree of overlap between these areas, the institutional structures are not necessarily solely driven by practical concerns and often perform politically sentimental roles.<br> <br> In this new age, too, it is also not realistic to speak of naval or military threats. Rather, the new mantra should be that of assessing functional security issues in terms of vulnerabilities, despite the fact that some Latin American countries still use each other as measuring sticks of force structures and capabilities.<br> <br> What are the vulnerabilities that draw the states of Southern Africa and Latin America closer?<br> </h5> <h4><b>The need to establish effective regional security regimes<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>Given the past history of Southern Africa, there is clearly a need to institute an effective regional security regime to show, at least, that the region is grappling with its myriad of security challenges. This will also serve to give confidence to investors and help to offset the endemic bout of Afro-pessimism.<br> <br> Here the importance and symbolism of transregional linkages, such as that between Mercosur and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), should also be noted.<br> </h5> <h4><b>Combating drug-trafficking<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>The fourth ministerial meeting of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) held in Somerset West in April 1996, noted with concern the threat posed by drug-trafficking, and urged member states to accede to the three main United Nations drug conventions as soon as possible. Drug-trafficking is a problem that obviously demands international solutions, and there is a peculiar Southern African Nigerian-Brazilian nexus that demands policing. According to the US Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Gelbard, Brazil is a "<i>cocaine source country for Nigerian traffickers</i>" who ply their trade, among others, to the Cape Verde, Portugal, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. "<i>Brazil</i>", he noted, "<i>is the primary staging area for Nigerian cocaine shipments because of its close historic ties to Africa and its large ethnic African population [while i]n 1993, Nigerians were responsible for more than half the cocaine that was seized in South Africa, and that percentage may be rising</i>." The Brazilian Federal Police claims that 80 85 per cent of drugs enter and leave Brazil by sea today.<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-See-13405">6</a></font><br> <br> Although this trend presents a global threat, it is one where regional co-operation may reap immediate dividends. This is most important for young, vulnerable democracies. Along with the careful management and policing of fish stocks in the maritime domain, it is clear that the spread of drugs is an area where functional needs could encourage greater regional co-operation.<br> <br> <b>Effective protection and management of marine resources and the environment </b><br> This involves co-operation by institutional structures, but also demands that the regions share information to ensure that the maximum benefit is derived from the limited resources of both regions. The areas of potential co-operation include, for example:<br> </h5> <ul> <h5> <li>joint exercises;<br> <br> <li>officer exchanges,<br> <br> <li>the sharing of information about ship-building and ship-modernisation;<br> <br> <li>joint Antarctic exploration;<br> <br> <li>pollution control; and<br> <br> <li>the sharing of intelligence. </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> </ul> <h5>It should be noted that the <b>United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea</b> (UNCLOS III) allows South Africa to extend its marine resources jurisdiction along the circumpolar Antarctic convergence belt through its sovereignty over the Prince Edward Island group. South Africa has declared a 200 nautical mile limit fishing zone around these islands. It has also constructed a new base, SANAE IV, in Queen Maud Land on Antarctica, and is involved in a number of collaborative international projects in the area. These include the Southern Hemisphere Radar Project to monitor physical changes in the southern hemisphere and oceans. Antarctica is "<i>a laboratory for global change and developments</i>", which is connected to land only by the sea.<br> <br> South Africa is also a member of the Valdivia Group, alongside Argentina, New Zealand, Chile, Australia and Uruguay. The group was established with the specific intention of focusing attention on issues of mutual environmental concern.<br> </h5> <h4><b>Navigation and Hydrography<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>This includes the need to ensure safe passage and general safety at sea, as well as to undertake hydrographic mapping under the terms of UNCLOS III. In South Africa's case, these tasks assume a regional responsibility given the de facto absence of naval capabilities elsewhere in Southern Africa. As with co-operation, for example, over Antarctic missions, a sharing of logistics demands would apparently carry some benefit.<br> </h5> <h4><b>Disarmament and Arms Control<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>This would include, for example, collaboration over the establishment of a southern hemispheric nuclear free zone.<br> </h5> <h4><b>MARITIME CO-OPERATION: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES?<br> <br> Multilateral Co-operation<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>The most notable Southern African-Latin American institution that sets out tasks and responsibilities is the aforementioned Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic. Created in 1986 as a result of a Brazilian initiative and partly as a counter to the mooted South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO), the Zone is based on four 'windows' of action:<br> </h5> <ul> <h5> <li>the environmental window which is concerned with the protection of marine resources in the South Atlantic;<br> <br> <li>a window for the denuclearisation of the area;<br> <br> <li>a window for interpersonal contact (known as the 'sports window'); and<br> <br> <li>a window that focuses on economics and commercial initiatives. </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> </ul> <h5>The goal to establish a 'Community' or 'Commonwealth' of Portuguese-speaking countries is seen to be complementary to the Zone's broader aims.<br> <br> The South Atlantic Maritime Area Co-ordination (CAMAS), founded in 1966 in terms of the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR,) is today well-established. This is a merchant shipping control organisation in which Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina exchange data on a daily basis on shipping passing through a designated South Atlantic maritime area. South Africa has observer status on CAMAS. These states also stage the biannual combined naval operations known as ATLASUR (Atlantic South). The first was held off Uruguay and Argentina in 1993, and the second from 19-24 May 1995 in South African waters. The next exercise is again scheduled for South Africa in 1997.<br> <br> The mooted linkage between SADC and Mercosur could potentially include defence naval obligations which could further strengthen these ties. In this regard, there is a need for South Africa to draw the Southern African region into ATLASUR or other joint forms of involvement given the total lack of naval capacity in SADC states. This could also be extended to training and, potentially, also to the sale/lease/donation of equipment from South to Southern Africa. There are some interesting possibilities with regard to what might happen with the old Minister-class strike-craft, should the proposed corvettes be procured by South Africa.<br> <br> Peacekeeping is another area of potential multilateral co-operation. In this regard, South Africa could share experiences with Brazil which has sent around 1 200 troops to UNAVEM in Angola (including 250 Marines), and has previously participated in UNOMOZ in Mozambique. Chile contributed forces to the UN operation in Cambodia. In another area, Argentina also possesses unusual southern hemisphere combat experience, having sent a naval force to take part in the UN Gulf mission in 1990-91.<br> <br> Embryonic regional co-operation could also be assisted by a number of recent developments. South Africa took part in the annual US-Latin American naval exercises, known as UNITAS, for the first time in 1996. SAS Drakensberg participated in Phase Zero out of Puerto Rico in July.<br> <br> Secondly, both Brazil and South Africa have been involved in supporting Namibia's fishing rights: Brazil through assistance in the training of naval personnel and in harbour construction; South Africa through policing initiatives. Clearly, there is some degree of complementarity, but there are also some realistic competitive tensions around regional involvement.<br> <br> Thirdly, personnel exchanges and technological co-operation between Brazil and South Africa (two SAN officers were on secondment with the Brazilian Navy in 1996), and South Africa and Chile (where technical assistance continues today, albeit at a lower level than in the 1980s), may also act as a catalyst for greater regional contact.<br> </h5> <h4><b>Bilateral Co-operation<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>This could include, for example, the combat of drug-trafficking, joint naval technology exchange, and ship-building and repair.<br> <br> There are a number of areas in the exchange of technology where South Africa could stand to gain from increased co-operation with Brazil. For one, Brazil possesses an impressive ship-repair and building capacity. In addition to Brazil's ten civilian yards, the facility at the Arsenal de Marinha do Rio de Janeiro (commonly known as 'the Arsenal') has been building ships since as far back as 1789. The first armoured frigate was constructed in 1874. Possessing three dry-docks (including the largest in Latin America capable of accommodating vessels up to 224 metres in length) as well as a locally-built floating dry-dock (Almirante Schieck) that is large enough to accommodate vessels of up to 3 500 tonnes, the Arsenal has constructed 127 warships since 1935. Recent examples include:<br> </h5> <ul> <h5> <li>two Type-209 (known locally as the Tupi-class) submarines (with a third under construction);<br> <br> <li>four Niteroi-class frigates (based on the Vosper-Thornycroft Mk10 design);<br> <br> <li>the training ship Brasil (based on the Niteroi-class);<br> <br> <li>four Inhauma-class corvettes (with a fifth now laid down); and<br> <br> <li>two Vosper (Singapore) 46 metre, 200 tonne patrol boats (with two constructed by a civilian yard, and two more on order locally). </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> </ul> <h5>In addition, the major surface combatants, including the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais, have all received regular repair and upgrading at the Arsenal. The Institutio de Pesquisas da Marinha (IPqM)  the naval Research and Development centre based on the Ilha do Governador in Rio de Janeiro  has maintained its usefulness in updating equipment and substituting local for imported items since 1959. Interestingly, while on the backburner, plans to construct nuclear submarines are still under way.<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-Employing-33057">7</a></font><br> <br> At another level, it should also be noted that Brazil possesses the largest government-controlled tanker and combined commercial fleet (in terms of dead weight tonnes (dwt)), ahead of Russia, the Pacific Rim Countries, India and Iran, with the US only in sixth place.<br> <br> Chile, too, has repair-yards within easy reach of Antarctica. The facility at Talcahuano is still operational, with three floating docks and two dry-docks. The extensive refits, among others, of their County-class destroyers were carried out at Chilean facilities. There are currently plans afoot (in addition to the acquisition of the Upholder-class submarines from the UK) to construct patrol craft, landing craft (LSMs and LSTs), a 4 700 tonne transport vessel, and service ships locally. Asmar Shipbuilding in Chile has recently delivered a 75 metre, 1 300 tonne Guardian-class offshore patrol vessel to Mauritius which will be operated there by the Indian Navy.<br> <br> There is also the possibility of bilateral exercises, such as those held annually between Argentina and Brazil, known as AREX (Armada Republica de Argentina Exercise). They commenced in 1994, and were in part motivated by the unserviceability of the Argentine aircraft carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo, and the need for carrier pilot training. The Chilean Navy is also keen to be involved in joint exercises, as well as in training and technology exchanges, picking up again on the close relationship enjoyed by the two countries, albeit under different regimes, in the 1970s and 1980s.<br> </h5> <h4><b>Lessons<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>South Africa can also learn lessons from Latin American navies. The Chilean Navy, for example, has managed through a combination of shrewd political posturing, an eye for the right purchase opportunities and modernisation programmes, to maintain a relatively up-to-date naval force. Between 1900-90, this was achieved at around 25 per cent of the resources spent by Argentina (and despite the international arms embargo against Chile). For example, the four County-class destroyers purchased second-hand from the Royal Navy in the 1980s for US $15 million each, were modernised at a cost of around US $35 million each. These vessels are expected to serve well into the next century.<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-See-58026">8</a></font> South Africa could also perhaps draw on the Chilean experience with the operation of the 'marinised' Super Puma helicopter, known locally as the Cougar.<br> <br> As can be noted from the above, Brazil has managed, with a combination of cheap purchases from abroad  the four Type-22 class frigates were recently acquired from the Royal Navy at a cost of only US $40 million each and are expected to continue to serve for another twenty years  to update elderly equipment and construct new vessels to maintain a force level commensurate with its maritime responsibilities. Even though Brazilian naval officers complain that they do not have the assets to patrol their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) effectively and to fulfil other expected tasks, the continued revitalisation of its force structure at least narrows the gap between roles and means to bridgeable dimensions and signals the seriousness of Brazilian intentions. This is something that South Africa's politicians will have to consider.<br> <br> The ability to procure vessels at considerably lower cost and to keep them serviceable, raises some interesting possibilities should South Africa's corvette purchase, for whatever reasons, not go ahead.<br> </h5> <h4><b>PROBLEM AREAS<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>There are manifest problems in the approach of simply listing areas where South Africa would like to form links and institutional relationships. These wishes, unless they are to be nothing more than unrealistic ambitions, need to be rooted in the realities of the financial, material and personnel resources available.<br> <br> At the 1996 ZPCSA meeting, South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad argued: "<i>South Africa would recommend that at this meeting we focus on matters such as environmental protection, managing the resources of the ocean, prevention of pollution, surveillance and sea rescue and general monitoring of the ocean ... South Africa accepts the obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment as set out in the various conventions adopted internationally for this purpose in the past decade and more. We look forward to also pursue these principles within the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic. We must protect this great body of water which divides us, but at the same time serves as the link between all of us</i>."<br> <br> The allocation of such tasks would be fine in an ideal world, but not in the one in which we live. A critical point should be stressed with regard to South Africa's participation in such forums or missions. It is not enough for politicians simply to commit South Africa to participation in an expanded ZPCSA or to the Valdivia Group (whatever form that body might take in the future), without taking into account all the 'normal' functions and tasks expected of the naval forces. These include:<br> </h5> <ul> <h5> <li>its primary task  the defence of South Africa's sovereign interests;<br> <br> <li>upholding international maritime law and responsibilities;<br> <br> <li>the safeguarding of South Africa's own maritime interests, including the safety of life at sea;<br> <br> <li>the monitoring of shipping;<br> <br> <li>the preservation of maritime resources;<br> <br> <li>the rendering of humanitarian aid;<br> <br> <li>diplomatic visits; as well as<br> <br> <li>the control of illegal immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism and piracy. </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> </ul> <h5>However, if South Africa wants to expand its links with Latin America in the maritime domain, and if it wants to take up its rightful place and play a meaningful role in world affairs by accepting the responsibilities that go with the image of a responsible power, it will have to possess the necessary capabilities to enforce these political ideals. To this end, the SAN will have to be provided with the tools necessary to carry out all these expanded roles. Without these, it will be necessary to make some difficult choices.<br> <br> Consider, briefly, in this regard, the naval forces available to some of South Africa's potential South Atlantic Rim partners:<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-For-40242">9</a></font><br> </h5> <ul> <h5> <li>Argentine: 20 500 personnel (including 3 000 naval aviation officers and 4 000 marines); four submarines; six destroyers; seven frigates; two Fast Attack Crafts (FACs); one combat support ship; two oceanographic research vessels; and one icebreaker;<br> <br> <li>Brazil: 50 000 personnel (including 1 250 naval aviation officers and 15 000 marines); one aircraft carrier; six submarines; one destroyer; eleven frigates; thirty plus patrol and coastal vessels; four amphibious craft; 26 support craft; and thirty plus armed helicopters;<br> <br> <li>Chile: 27 500 personnel; nine destroyers and frigates; four submarines; six FACs; twenty helicopters and 31 fixed-wing naval aircraft; and<br> <br> <li>Uruguay: 5 000 personnel (including 280 naval aviation officers and 430 naval infantry), three frigates, four mine-sweepers, three support ships, and one oceanographic support vessel. </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> </ul> <h5>In other words, South Africa's naval complement is little better than that of Uruguay, a country that has a coastline of 1 000 kilometres (South Africa's is 3 000 kilometres), and a population of 3,1 million (42 million in South Africa). Yet, if an attempt is made to find a model for South African naval responsibilities, Argentina or Chile would probably be the closest fits: medium powers with populations of 33 and 14 million respectively, and with interests in Antarctica.<font size="1"><a href="#Anchor-Chile-40966">10</a></font> Unlike South Africa, however, both possess considerably greater naval forces, at least on paper, and most certainly are not the only maritime powers in Latin America with the regional responsibilities this implies.<br> </h5> <h4><b>CONCLUSIONS<br> <br> </b></h4> <h5>The nations of Southern Africa and Latin America share many of the same problems. Both regions are attempting to cope with domestic inequalities and to integrate their economies into a new globalised age. The sentiment expressed by the Chilean Under-Secretary for the Navy, Pablo Cabrera, in an interview during October 1996, is probably shared by many across the South Atlantic: "<i>We feel that our borders are no longer land borders; in this globalised age we are bordered by oceans. Environmental problems cross these borders with impunity. Through the oceans we feel we are close to many countries and can face common problems together with other nations with similar policies. South Africa is one of these countries. Our experiences, particularly with transition and governance issues, can be used to create a better understanding between both countries. UNCLOS is another field. As middle-sized countries, we play key regional roles. We have to work together with imagination and creativity in order to get together in trade and in the sharing of technology. There are many things we can do together through the fragile environment which is the oceans</i>."<br> <br> There is clearly a need, however, for a long term approach to South Africa's co operation with Latin America. Some questions need to be answered in this regard:<br> </h5> <ul> <h5> <li>Should this occur through SADC?<br> <br> <li>What should the role of ZPCSA be?<br> <br> <li>How would co-operation in environmental and other maritime issues be attained? </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> </ul> <h5>At the moment, the approach is <i>ad hoc</i> and unco-ordinated, and this could place an intolerable premium on the participation of the SAN in co-operative ventures. It would be 'intolerable', because, although the SAN would apparently like to encourage co operation across the South Atlantic (and with good reason, given the potential for synergy), it does not have the means to do so properly at present when compared to the navies of Latin America. Should South Africa be a junior partner in this relationship, particularly as the country will be representing the maritime interests and sum capability of Southern Africa, whether it wants to or not?<br> <br> There is the prospect, as the Brazilian Vice-President, Marco Maciel put it recently, of setting up partnerships across the South Atlantic based on common interests and goals. In each region there are countries at similar levels of economic development, there is a need to consolidate democracy, and there is a common call for hemispheric denuclearisation. These emerging nations are all grappling with the (sometimes) conflicting strains of nationalism, regionalism, and globalism. In the naval realm, the big challenge for the countries of the South Atlantic rim is "<i>how to conceive a navy for the next century</i>." There is thus considerable scope to improve trade, investment and security ties, and also to form links that will enable each of these countries to learn from the experiences of each other. The sea, which separates the two regions, could also serve to bring them closer together.<br> </h5> <h4><b>ENDNOTES<br> </b></h4> <ol> <h5> <li><a name="Anchor-Much-39141"></a>Much of the information was gathered during a trip to Brazil and Chile in September October 1996. Meetings were held with academics, government and military personnel, and a conference on <b>Brasil-Africa du Sol</b>, organised by the Institutio de Pesquisa de Relacoes Internacionais (International Relations Research Institute), Rio de Janeiro, 24-25 September 1996 was attended. The author expresses his gratitude to those who assisted him on his trip. The views expressed here are, however, his sole responsibility.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-See-33463"></a>See J Barber, <i>Regional Co-operation and Integration: South Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur),</i> paper presented at the conference on <b>Brasil-Africa du Sol</b>, <i>ibid</i>.; for related views, see also G Mills, <i>A Comparative Perspective on South Africa's and Brazil's Foreign Policies, ibid</i>.; and D Venter, <i>South Africa, Brazil and South Atlantic Security: Towards a Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic, ibid</i>.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-Barber-1518"></a>Barber, <i>ibid</i>.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-Ibid-53753"></a><i>Ibid</i>.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-SAIIA-32277"></a>SAIIA, <b>South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 1996</b>, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg, 1996, pp. 335-343.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-See-13405"></a>See R Gelbard, <i>Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa</i>, paper presented at a conference on <b>War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Armies, Drugs and Trade</b>, SAIIA, the World Peace Foundation and the Institute for Security Studies, Jan Smuts House, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 4-5 August 1996.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-Employing-33057"></a>Employing 300 civilian and 160 military personnel, IPqM has successfully developed a number of items for the Brazilian Navy since its creation under the military junta in 1959, including: sonar transducers; chaff rockets; sonar software; sea and limpet mines; gyroscopes; computerised integrated command, communication, control and intelligence (C3I) systems (allegedly at one-quarter of the price of the nearest commercially-available equivalent); and, for the Inhauma-class corvettes, Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) systems.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-See-58026"></a>See E Meneses, <i>Maintaining a Regional Navy with Very Limited Resources: The Chilean Case, 1900-1990</i>, <b>Defense Analysis</b>, 7(4), 1991, pp. 345-362; C Marambio, <i>La Armada de Chile</i>, <b>Technologie Militar</b> (Tecmil), 6/91, pp. 26-33. It is important to note one point when examining the respective military budgets of Brazil and Chile and comparing them with South Africa. In Chile's case, the military budget is 1,6 per cent of GNP, divided between the Army (42 per cent), Navy (35 per cent) and Air Force (23 per cent). This figure does not include the amount allocated for pensions nor, importantly, for capital expenditure. The latter figure annually amounts to ten per cent of the turnover of the country's copper mines, normally about US$400 million. This figure has steadily increased with the improvements in the copper production capability and the world price. The amount is divided equally between the three service arms. The Brazilian defence budget has reduced to the present 0,5 per cent of GNP (of which the Navy receives fifty per cent and the other two arms 25 per cent each), though it is 'topped up' in a number of ways. Firstly, the Navy receives one per cent of the royalties of the oil industry (Petrobras) to enable it to fulfil its patrol capability. Brazil produced 8,9 billion barrels of oil in 1995. In addition, according to Vice Admiral Mario Jorge Ferreira Braga, the Executive Secretary of the Science and Technology Section of the Brazilian Navy (SECONCITEM), much of the naval equipment Rand D costs are met by other ministries, such as those for the Environment, Science and Technology, and Energy. The exact military budget is therefore difficult to ascertain.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-For-40242"></a>For a thorough appraisal of Latin American naval issues, see M Morris, <i>The Challenges for Latin America</i>, in G Mills (ed.), <b>Maritime Policy for Developing Nations</b>, SAIIA and CDISS, Johannesburg, 1995; J C da Silva, <i>Brazilian Naval Power, ibid</i>.; J I de Abelleyra, <i>Argentina, ibid</i>.<br> <br> <li><a name="Anchor-Chile-40966"></a>Chile has substantial base interests in the Antarctic. The largest of these is run by the Air Force, which includes facilities for 150 personnel, a school, and an air base, operating helicopters and Twin-Otter aircraft. </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> <h5> </h5> </ol> <center> <h3></h3> <h3><br> <font face="Arial,Helvetica,Geneva,Swiss,SunSans-Regular"><b><a href="#Anchor-42477"><img src="/web/20081014223958im_/http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/totop.gif" width="21" height="20" border="0"></a></b></font></h3> </center> </td> <td width="1" height="6680"><spacer type="block" width="1" height="6680"></td> </tr> <tr height="1" cntrlrow> <td width="16" height="1"><spacer type="block" width="16" height="1"></td> <td width="526" height="1"><spacer type="block" width="526" height="1"></td> <td width="1" height="1"></td> </tr> </table> <a name="Anchor-42477"></a></center> </body> </html>

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South African-Latin American Maritime Co-operation: Towards a South Atlantic RIM Community? - Diplomats and Defenders - Monograph No 9, 1997