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} .loading { visibility: hidden; } .detail-page .post-footer .cmt_iframe_holder { padding-top: 40px !important; } /** Desktop **/ @media (max-width: 900px) { .col-right { display: none; } .col-main { margin-right: 0; min-width: initial; } .footer-outer { display: none; } .cols-wrapper { min-width: initial; } .google-footer-outer { background-color: #f5f5f5; } } /** Tablet **/ @media (max-width: 712px) { .header-outer, .cols-wrapper, .footer-outer, .google-footer-outer { padding: 0 40px; } } /* An extra breakpoint accommodating for long blog titles. */ @media (max-width: 600px) { .header-left { height: 100%; position: initial; top: inherit; margin-top: 0; -webkit-transform: initial; transform: initial; } .header-title { margin-top: 18px; } .header-inner { height: auto; margin-bottom: 32px; margin-top: 32px; } .header-desc { margin-top: 12px; } .header-inner .google-logo { height: 70px; margin-top: 3px; } .header-inner .google-logo img { height: 70px; } .header-title h2 { font-size: 32px; 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//]]> </script> <noscript> <img alt='' height='1' src='https://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/activity/src=2542116;type=gblog;cat=googl0;ord=1?' width='1'/> </noscript>  <div class='header-outer'> <div class='header-inner'> <div class='section' id='header'><div class='widget Header' data-version='1' id='Header1'> <div class='header-left'> <div class='header-title'> <a class='google-logo' href='https://blog.chromium.org/'> <img alt="Chromium Blog" height="50" src="//1.bp.blogspot.com/-vkF7AFJOwBk/VkQxeAGi1mI/AAAAAAAARYo/57denvsQ8zA/s1600-r/logo_chromium.png"> </a> <a href='/.'> <h2> Chromium Blog </h2> </a> </div> <div class='header-desc'> News and developments from the open source browser project </div> </div> </div></div> </div> </div>  <div class='cols-wrapper loading'> <div class='col-main-wrapper'> <div class='col-main'> <div class='section' id='main'><div class='widget Blog' data-version='1' id='Blog1'> <div class='post' data-id='4397463372475627207' itemscope='' itemtype='http://schema.org/BlogPosting'> <h2 class='title' itemprop='name'> <a href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/chrome-79-beta-virtual-reality-comes-to.html' itemprop='url' title='Chrome 79 Beta: Virtual Reality Comes to the Web'> Chrome 79 Beta: Virtual Reality Comes to the Web </a> </h2> <div class='post-header'> <div class='published'> <span class='publishdate' itemprop='datePublished'> Thursday, October 31, 2019 </span> </div> </div> <div class='post-body'> <div class='post-content' itemprop='articleBody'> <script type='text/template'> Unless otherwise noted, changes described below apply to the newest Chrome beta channel release for Android, Chrome OS, Linux, macOS, and Windows. Learn more about the features listed here through the provided links or from the list on <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/features#milestone%3D79">ChromeStatus.com</a>. Chrome 79 is beta as of October 31, 2019.<br /> <h1> Virtual Reality Comes to the Web</h1> The WebXR Device API is shipping in Chrome. Developers can now create immersive experiences for smartphones and head-mounted displays. Other browsers will be supporting these specs soon, including Firefox Reality, Oculus Browser, Edge and Magic Leap's Helio browser, among others.<br /> <br /> This launch sets the foundation for immersive features to come, such as supporting augmented reality, tools, and expanding the real-world understanding of immersive experiences. Many experiences can be enhanced with immersive functionality. Examples include games, home buying, viewing products in your home before buying them and more. To get started with virtual reality and the new API, read <a href="https://web.dev/vr-comes-to-the-web/" target="_blank">Virtual reality comes to the web</a>.<br /> <br /> <span id="docs-internal-guid-ef6015aa-7fff-b93b-1bb1-568481141d91"><span style="font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 468px; overflow: hidden; width: 624px;"><img height="300" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/zFVgcyP5KmH5QEn4KK7VpxA9oCJ-ANHbeYoDemIq1LN2hsbelZ8pdBz0wTw8U6rVdSSrTGsHcUCkgC5LsO1xmmvheZIZNio-JDJkTV2weAm5nbVll2E5LZ9PzLVA1UVdatkYPNfr" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="400" /></span></span></span><br /> <h1> Origin Trials</h1> This version of Chrome introduces the origin trials described below. Origin trials allow you to try new features and give feedback on usability, practicality, and effectiveness to the web standards community. To register for any of the origin trials currently supported in Chrome, including the ones described below, visit the <a href="https://developers.chrome.com/origintrials/#/trials/active">Origin Trials dashboard</a>. To learn more about origin trials themselves, visit the <a href="https://github.com/GoogleChrome/OriginTrials/blob/gh-pages/developer-guide.md">Origin Trials Guide for Web Developers</a>.<br /> <h2> Support for rendersubtree Attribute</h2> Adds the<a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://developers.chrome.com/origintrials/%23/view_trial/3677189095748009985&sa=D&ust=1572453840152000&usg=AFQjCNH8LewYeenDV96GQPIVirVti9Ln9Q"> rendersubtree attribute</a> to all HTML elements, which locks a DOM element for display. When rendersubtree is set to <code>"invisible"</code>, the element's content is not drawn or hit-tested, allowing for rendering optimizations. The rendersubtree <code>"activatable"</code> token allows the browser to remove the invisible attribute, rendering the content, and making it visible.<br /> <h2> Wake Lock API based on Promises</h2> Adds an <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/12/wakelock">update of the Wake Lock API</a> that introduce promises and wake lock types. The Wake Lock API brought a standard, secure, and safe way to prevent some device features such as the screen or CPU cycles from going into power saving state. This update addresses some of the shortcomings of the older API which was limited to screen Wake Lock and didn't address certain security and privacy issues.<br /> <h1> Other Features in this Release</h1> <h2> Adaptive Icon Display for Installed PWAs on Android</h2> Android Oreo introduced <a href="https://developer.android.com/guide/practices/ui_guidelines/icon_design_adaptive">adaptive icons</a>, which enforced the same shape for all icons on the home screen and in the launcher. Before Android O icons could be any shape and there was no background behind each icon. For example, gmail was rectangular, and Play was a triangle. Consequently, such icons were placed in a white circle. With adaptive icon display, Android will automatically mask irregularly shaped icons to fit properly. To make PWA icons safe for display on Android O or later, read <a href="https://web.dev/maskable-icon/" target="_blank">Adaptive icon support in PWAs with maskable icons</a>.<br /> <h2> Autofocus Support for any Focusable HTML/SVG Element</h2> <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5654905853313024">Adds the <code>autofocus</code> attribute</a> to any focusable HTML or SVG element. The <code>autofocus</code> was previously supported for a limited number of HTML elements, and there were elements which could receive focus but didn't support the <code>autofocus</code> attribute. This feature fixes the inconsistencies.<br /> <h2> Compute img/video Aspect Ratio from Width Or Height HTML Attributes </h2> The aspect ratio of an image <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5695266130755584">is now computed</a> so that it can be used for sizing an image using CSS before it loads. This avoids unnecessary relayouts when the image loads.<br /> <h2> font-optical-sizing</h2> The <code><a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5685958032752640">font-optical-sizing</a></code> property<br /> automatically sets the font size to the opsz - optical sizing axis of variable fonts that support optical sizing. This improves styling and legibility of fonts depending on font size because the font chooses a glyph shape that works optimally at the given font size. For example, the glyph contrast is improved in fonts in heading sizes when compared to the same font at body text size. <br /> <h2> list-style-type: <string></h2> Allows a stylesheet to use an <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5893875400966144">arbitrary character for the list style marker</a>. Examples include "-", "+", "★" and "▸". Since CSS Level 2, <code>list-style-type</code> has supported keywords like <code>disc</code> or <code>decimal</code> to define the appearance of the list item marker.<br /> Without this, developers are often forced to hide the real marker and insert the arbitrary marker using a <code>::before</code> pseudo element via the content property. Unfortunately, the fake marker won't be nicely positioned by <code>list-style-position</code>.<br /> <h2> Reject Worklet.addModule() with a More Specific Error</h2> When <code>Worklet.addModule()</code> fails, a promise rejects with <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5116796497559552">a more specific error object</a> than it did previously. <code>Worklet.addModule()</code> can fail for various reasons, including, for example, network errors and syntax errors. Before this change, <code>Worklet.addModule()</code> rejected with <code>AbortError</code> regardless of the actual cause. That made it difficult for developers to debug worklets. After this change, <code>Worklet.addModule()</code> rejects with a clearer error such as <code>SyntaxError</code>.<br /> <h2> Retrieve a Service Worker Object Corresponding to a Worker Itself</h2> A service worker can <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/6678900060979200">now get its ServiceWorker object</a> with <code>self.serviceWorker</code> in a service worker script and its current state with <code>self.serviceWorker.state</code>. A service worker instance previously had no way to get its current lifecycle state. This removes the need for the hack wherein the current lifecycle state is tracked with a global variable, a method that is error prone and doesn't correctly capture waiting periods.<br /> <h2> Stop Evaluating Script Elements Moved Between Documents During Fetching</h2> Chrome <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/6025903192670208">no longer evaluates</a> scripts or fire <code>error</code> and <code>load</code> events if <code><script></code> elements are moved between documents during fetching. Script elements can still be moved between documents, but they won't be executed. This prevents possible security bugs caused by exploitation of <code><script></code> elements moved between documents.<br /> <h1> Deprecations, and Removals</h1> This version of Chrome introduces the deprecations and removals listed below. Visit ChromeStatus.com for lists of <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/features#browsers.chrome.status%3A%22Deprecated%22">current deprecations</a> and <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/features#browsers.chrome.status:%22Removed%22">previous removals</a>.<br /> <h3> -webkit-appearance Keywords for Arbitrary Elements </h3> <a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/4867142128238592">Changes -webkit-appearance keywords</a> to work only with specific element types. If a keyword is applied to a non-supported element, the element takes the default appearance. <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </script> <noscript> Unless otherwise noted, changes described below apply to the newest Chrome beta channel release for Android, Chrome OS, Linux, macOS, and Windows. Learn more about the features listed here through the provided links or from the list on <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/features#milestone%3D79">ChromeStatus.com</a>. Chrome 79 is beta as of October 31, 2019.<br /> <h1> Virtual Reality Comes to the Web</h1> The WebXR Device API is shipping in Chrome. Developers can now create immersive experiences for smartphones and head-mounted displays. Other browsers will be supporting these specs soon, including Firefox Reality, Oculus Browser, Edge and Magic Leap's Helio browser, among others.<br /> <br /> This launch sets the foundation for immersive features to come, such as supporting augmented reality, tools, and expanding the real-world understanding of immersive experiences. Many experiences can be enhanced with immersive functionality. Examples include games, home buying, viewing products in your home before buying them and more. To get started with virtual reality and the new API, read <a href="https://web.dev/vr-comes-to-the-web/" target="_blank">Virtual reality comes to the web</a>.<br /> <br /> <span id="docs-internal-guid-ef6015aa-7fff-b93b-1bb1-568481141d91"><span style="font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 468px; overflow: hidden; width: 624px;"><img height="300" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/zFVgcyP5KmH5QEn4KK7VpxA9oCJ-ANHbeYoDemIq1LN2hsbelZ8pdBz0wTw8U6rVdSSrTGsHcUCkgC5LsO1xmmvheZIZNio-JDJkTV2weAm5nbVll2E5LZ9PzLVA1UVdatkYPNfr" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="400" /></span></span></span><br /> <h1> Origin Trials</h1> This version of Chrome introduces the origin trials described below. Origin trials allow you to try new features and give feedback on usability, practicality, and effectiveness to the web standards community. To register for any of the origin trials currently supported in Chrome, including the ones described below, visit the <a href="https://developers.chrome.com/origintrials/#/trials/active">Origin Trials dashboard</a>. To learn more about origin trials themselves, visit the <a href="https://github.com/GoogleChrome/OriginTrials/blob/gh-pages/developer-guide.md">Origin Trials Guide for Web Developers</a>.<br /> <h2> Support for rendersubtree Attribute</h2> Adds the<a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://developers.chrome.com/origintrials/%23/view_trial/3677189095748009985&sa=D&ust=1572453840152000&usg=AFQjCNH8LewYeenDV96GQPIVirVti9Ln9Q"> rendersubtree attribute</a> to all HTML elements, which locks a DOM element for display. When rendersubtree is set to <code>"invisible"</code>, the element's content is not drawn or hit-tested, allowing for rendering optimizations. The rendersubtree <code>"activatable"</code> token allows the browser to remove the invisible attribute, rendering the content, and making it visible.<br /> <h2> Wake Lock API based on Promises</h2> Adds an <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/12/wakelock">update of the Wake Lock API</a> that introduce promises and wake lock types. The Wake Lock API brought a standard, secure, and safe way to prevent some device features such as the screen or CPU cycles from going into power saving state. This update addresses some of the shortcomings of the older API which was limited to screen Wake Lock and didn't address certain security and privacy issues.<br /> <h1> Other Features in this Release</h1> <h2> Adaptive Icon Display for Installed PWAs on Android</h2> Android Oreo introduced <a href="https://developer.android.com/guide/practices/ui_guidelines/icon_design_adaptive">adaptive icons</a>, which enforced the same shape for all icons on the home screen and in the launcher. Before Android O icons could be any shape and there was no background behind each icon. For example, gmail was rectangular, and Play was a triangle. Consequently, such icons were placed in a white circle. With adaptive icon display, Android will automatically mask irregularly shaped icons to fit properly. To make PWA icons safe for display on Android O or later, read <a href="https://web.dev/maskable-icon/" target="_blank">Adaptive icon support in PWAs with maskable icons</a>.<br /> <h2> Autofocus Support for any Focusable HTML/SVG Element</h2> <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5654905853313024">Adds the <code>autofocus</code> attribute</a> to any focusable HTML or SVG element. The <code>autofocus</code> was previously supported for a limited number of HTML elements, and there were elements which could receive focus but didn't support the <code>autofocus</code> attribute. This feature fixes the inconsistencies.<br /> <h2> Compute img/video Aspect Ratio from Width Or Height HTML Attributes </h2> The aspect ratio of an image <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5695266130755584">is now computed</a> so that it can be used for sizing an image using CSS before it loads. This avoids unnecessary relayouts when the image loads.<br /> <h2> font-optical-sizing</h2> The <code><a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5685958032752640">font-optical-sizing</a></code> property<br /> automatically sets the font size to the opsz - optical sizing axis of variable fonts that support optical sizing. This improves styling and legibility of fonts depending on font size because the font chooses a glyph shape that works optimally at the given font size. For example, the glyph contrast is improved in fonts in heading sizes when compared to the same font at body text size. <br /> <h2> list-style-type: <string></h2> Allows a stylesheet to use an <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5893875400966144">arbitrary character for the list style marker</a>. Examples include "-", "+", "★" and "▸". Since CSS Level 2, <code>list-style-type</code> has supported keywords like <code>disc</code> or <code>decimal</code> to define the appearance of the list item marker.<br /> Without this, developers are often forced to hide the real marker and insert the arbitrary marker using a <code>::before</code> pseudo element via the content property. Unfortunately, the fake marker won't be nicely positioned by <code>list-style-position</code>.<br /> <h2> Reject Worklet.addModule() with a More Specific Error</h2> When <code>Worklet.addModule()</code> fails, a promise rejects with <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5116796497559552">a more specific error object</a> than it did previously. <code>Worklet.addModule()</code> can fail for various reasons, including, for example, network errors and syntax errors. Before this change, <code>Worklet.addModule()</code> rejected with <code>AbortError</code> regardless of the actual cause. That made it difficult for developers to debug worklets. After this change, <code>Worklet.addModule()</code> rejects with a clearer error such as <code>SyntaxError</code>.<br /> <h2> Retrieve a Service Worker Object Corresponding to a Worker Itself</h2> A service worker can <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/6678900060979200">now get its ServiceWorker object</a> with <code>self.serviceWorker</code> in a service worker script and its current state with <code>self.serviceWorker.state</code>. A service worker instance previously had no way to get its current lifecycle state. This removes the need for the hack wherein the current lifecycle state is tracked with a global variable, a method that is error prone and doesn't correctly capture waiting periods.<br /> <h2> Stop Evaluating Script Elements Moved Between Documents During Fetching</h2> Chrome <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/6025903192670208">no longer evaluates</a> scripts or fire <code>error</code> and <code>load</code> events if <code><script></code> elements are moved between documents during fetching. Script elements can still be moved between documents, but they won't be executed. This prevents possible security bugs caused by exploitation of <code><script></code> elements moved between documents.<br /> <h1> Deprecations, and Removals</h1> This version of Chrome introduces the deprecations and removals listed below. Visit ChromeStatus.com for lists of <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/features#browsers.chrome.status%3A%22Deprecated%22">current deprecations</a> and <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/features#browsers.chrome.status:%22Removed%22">previous removals</a>.<br /> <h3> -webkit-appearance Keywords for Arbitrary Elements </h3> <a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/4867142128238592">Changes -webkit-appearance keywords</a> to work only with specific element types. If a keyword is applied to a non-supported element, the element takes the default appearance. <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </noscript> </div> </div> <div class='share'> <span class='twitter-custom social-wrapper' data-href='http://twitter.com/share?text=Chromium Blog:Chrome 79 Beta: Virtual Reality Comes to the Web&url=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/chrome-79-beta-virtual-reality-comes-to.html&via=ChromiumDev'> <img alt='Share on Twitter' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_twitter_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> <span class='fb-custom social-wrapper' data-href='https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/chrome-79-beta-virtual-reality-comes-to.html'> <img alt='Share on Facebook' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_facebook_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> </div> <div class='post-footer'> <div class='cmt_iframe_holder' data-href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/chrome-79-beta-virtual-reality-comes-to.html' data-viewtype='FILTERED_POSTMOD'></div> <a href='https://plus.google.com/112374322230920073195' rel='author' style='display:none;'> Google </a> <div class='label-footer'> <span class='labels-caption'> Labels: </span> <span class='labels'> <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/beta' rel='tag'> beta </a> </span> </div> </div> </div> <div class='post' data-id='5897901199938292604' itemscope='' itemtype='http://schema.org/BlogPosting'> <h2 class='title' itemprop='name'> <a href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/addressing-some-misconceptions-about.html' itemprop='url' title='Addressing some misconceptions about our plans for improving the security of DNS'> Addressing some misconceptions about our plans for improving the security of DNS </a> </h2> <div class='post-header'> <div class='published'> <span class='publishdate' itemprop='datePublished'> Monday, October 28, 2019 </span> </div> </div> <div class='post-body'> <div class='post-content' itemprop='articleBody'> <script type='text/template'> Whenever you type a URL into your browser (for example “redcross.org”), this information is sent to a domain name system (DNS) provider that converts that request into the unique numerical “IP address” (e.g. 162.6.217.119) that identifies websites on the Internet. Your browser then uses that numerical IP address to take you to the site you were looking for. Unfortunately, today the requests from your browser to the DNS provider are not encrypted (which makes you vulnerable to passive monitoring by strangers) nor authenticated (which makes you vulnerable to online attackers). This is especially true when you’re connected to public WiFi, for example at a cafe or airport, since anyone else using the network can see and track the websites you visit and maybe redirect your browser to a malicious website.<br /> <br /> In September, we announced an experiment in Chrome to improve online privacy and security by enabling secure DNS connections with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS" target="_blank">DNS-over-HTTPS</a> (DoH) for users already using DNS providers that support it. DoH is being developed by the <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/doh/about/" target="_blank">Internet standards community</a> as a step toward better security and privacy by encrypting the traffic between your browser and your DNS provider. It improves privacy by removing one of the ways used by malicious actors to observe the browsing habits of other users on the same network. DoH is also a significant security improvement, as it helps stop <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack" target="_blank">man-in-the-middle</a> attacks on DNS lookups. Many privacy-minded <a href="https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-and-partners-urge-us-lawmakers-support-new-doh-protocol-more-secure-internet" target="_blank">organizations</a>, <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/09/isps-worry-a-new-chrome-feature-will-stop-them-from-spying-on-you/" target="_blank">journalists</a>, other browser providers and <a href="https://www.aa.net.uk/dns/" target="_blank">internet service providers</a> (ISPs) agree that these changes will improve your privacy and security.<br /> <br /> Unfortunately, there has been some <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/9kembz/comcast-lobbying-against-doh-dns-over-https-encryption-browsing-data" target="_blank">misinformation and confusion</a> about the goals of our approach and whether DoH will impact existing content controls offered by ISPs. The confusion comes from two particular claims and we want to address both.<br /> <br /> The first claim is that Google is going to redirect user DNS traffic to Google's own DNS or another DoH-compliant DNS provider. That is incorrect. Because we believe in user choice and user control, we have no plans to force users to change their DNS provider. Today, there are many independent DNS providers, although ISPs serve <a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/FA43C305E2B9A35485258486004F6D0F/$file/18-1051-1808766.pdf" target="_blank">approximately 97% of user DNS needs</a>. As long as these service providers keep catering to user needs and concerns, it will remain a diverse ecosystem. We’re simply enabling support in Chrome for secure DoH connections if a user’s DNS provider of choice offers it. Chrome will check if the user’s DNS provider is among <a href="https://www.chromium.org/developers/dns-over-https" target="_blank">a list of participating DoH-compatible providers</a> and if so, it will enable DoH. If the DNS provider is not on the list, Chrome won’t enable DoH and will continue to operate as it does today. As DoH adoption increases, we expect to see the number of DoH-enabled DNS providers grow.<br /> <br /> The second claim we’ve seen is that the secure DoH connection will limit the family-safe content controls offered by some ISPs. In fact, any existing content controls of your DNS provider, including any protections for children, should remain active. DoH secures the URL data only while it’s in transit between your browser and the DNS provider, so your provider’s malware protection and parental control features will continue to work as they have in the past. As a proof point, CleanBrowsing offers the same parental control features on its <a href="https://cleanbrowsing.org/guides/dnsoverhttps" target="_blank">DoH service</a> as it does on its unencrypted service.<br /> <br /> As we <a href="https://blog.chromium.org/2019/09/experimenting-with-same-provider-dns.html" target="_blank">said last month</a>, we’re taking an incremental approach with this experiment, and our current plan is to enable DoH support for just 1% of our users, provided that they are already using a DoH compliant DNS provider. This will allow Google and DoH providers to test the performance and reliability of DoH. We’ll also monitor feedback <a href="https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/95315" target="_blank">from our users</a> and from other stakeholders, including ISPs. Most managed Chrome deployments such as schools and enterprises are excluded from the experiment by default. We also offer policies for administrators to control the feature. Finally, Chrome users may opt-out of the DoH experiment entirely by going to chrome://flags/#dns-over-https, starting in Chrome 79.<br /> <br /> We are optimistic about the opportunities DoH offers for improving user privacy and security, but we also understand the importance of DNS and that there could be implementation concerns we haven’t foreseen. That’s why we plan to move carefully and transparently. We’re open to feedback and welcome constructive collaboration and engagement. We are committed to ensure that the deployment of DoH does not create unintended consequences and we will continue to work with stakeholders including ISPs, DNS providers, and Internet and child safety advocates as we make progress.<br /> <br /> <br /> Posted by Kenji Baheux, Chrome Product Manager <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </script> <noscript> Whenever you type a URL into your browser (for example “redcross.org”), this information is sent to a domain name system (DNS) provider that converts that request into the unique numerical “IP address” (e.g. 162.6.217.119) that identifies websites on the Internet. Your browser then uses that numerical IP address to take you to the site you were looking for. Unfortunately, today the requests from your browser to the DNS provider are not encrypted (which makes you vulnerable to passive monitoring by strangers) nor authenticated (which makes you vulnerable to online attackers). This is especially true when you’re connected to public WiFi, for example at a cafe or airport, since anyone else using the network can see and track the websites you visit and maybe redirect your browser to a malicious website.<br /> <br /> In September, we announced an experiment in Chrome to improve online privacy and security by enabling secure DNS connections with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS" target="_blank">DNS-over-HTTPS</a> (DoH) for users already using DNS providers that support it. DoH is being developed by the <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/doh/about/" target="_blank">Internet standards community</a> as a step toward better security and privacy by encrypting the traffic between your browser and your DNS provider. It improves privacy by removing one of the ways used by malicious actors to observe the browsing habits of other users on the same network. DoH is also a significant security improvement, as it helps stop <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack" target="_blank">man-in-the-middle</a> attacks on DNS lookups. Many privacy-minded <a href="https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-and-partners-urge-us-lawmakers-support-new-doh-protocol-more-secure-internet" target="_blank">organizations</a>, <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/09/isps-worry-a-new-chrome-feature-will-stop-them-from-spying-on-you/" target="_blank">journalists</a>, other browser providers and <a href="https://www.aa.net.uk/dns/" target="_blank">internet service providers</a> (ISPs) agree that these changes will improve your privacy and security.<br /> <br /> Unfortunately, there has been some <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/9kembz/comcast-lobbying-against-doh-dns-over-https-encryption-browsing-data" target="_blank">misinformation and confusion</a> about the goals of our approach and whether DoH will impact existing content controls offered by ISPs. The confusion comes from two particular claims and we want to address both.<br /> <br /> The first claim is that Google is going to redirect user DNS traffic to Google's own DNS or another DoH-compliant DNS provider. That is incorrect. Because we believe in user choice and user control, we have no plans to force users to change their DNS provider. Today, there are many independent DNS providers, although ISPs serve <a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/FA43C305E2B9A35485258486004F6D0F/$file/18-1051-1808766.pdf" target="_blank">approximately 97% of user DNS needs</a>. As long as these service providers keep catering to user needs and concerns, it will remain a diverse ecosystem. We’re simply enabling support in Chrome for secure DoH connections if a user’s DNS provider of choice offers it. Chrome will check if the user’s DNS provider is among <a href="https://www.chromium.org/developers/dns-over-https" target="_blank">a list of participating DoH-compatible providers</a> and if so, it will enable DoH. If the DNS provider is not on the list, Chrome won’t enable DoH and will continue to operate as it does today. As DoH adoption increases, we expect to see the number of DoH-enabled DNS providers grow.<br /> <br /> The second claim we’ve seen is that the secure DoH connection will limit the family-safe content controls offered by some ISPs. In fact, any existing content controls of your DNS provider, including any protections for children, should remain active. DoH secures the URL data only while it’s in transit between your browser and the DNS provider, so your provider’s malware protection and parental control features will continue to work as they have in the past. As a proof point, CleanBrowsing offers the same parental control features on its <a href="https://cleanbrowsing.org/guides/dnsoverhttps" target="_blank">DoH service</a> as it does on its unencrypted service.<br /> <br /> As we <a href="https://blog.chromium.org/2019/09/experimenting-with-same-provider-dns.html" target="_blank">said last month</a>, we’re taking an incremental approach with this experiment, and our current plan is to enable DoH support for just 1% of our users, provided that they are already using a DoH compliant DNS provider. This will allow Google and DoH providers to test the performance and reliability of DoH. We’ll also monitor feedback <a href="https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/95315" target="_blank">from our users</a> and from other stakeholders, including ISPs. Most managed Chrome deployments such as schools and enterprises are excluded from the experiment by default. We also offer policies for administrators to control the feature. Finally, Chrome users may opt-out of the DoH experiment entirely by going to chrome://flags/#dns-over-https, starting in Chrome 79.<br /> <br /> We are optimistic about the opportunities DoH offers for improving user privacy and security, but we also understand the importance of DNS and that there could be implementation concerns we haven’t foreseen. That’s why we plan to move carefully and transparently. We’re open to feedback and welcome constructive collaboration and engagement. We are committed to ensure that the deployment of DoH does not create unintended consequences and we will continue to work with stakeholders including ISPs, DNS providers, and Internet and child safety advocates as we make progress.<br /> <br /> <br /> Posted by Kenji Baheux, Chrome Product Manager <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </noscript> </div> </div> <div class='share'> <span class='twitter-custom social-wrapper' data-href='http://twitter.com/share?text=Chromium Blog:Addressing some misconceptions about our plans for improving the security of DNS&url=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/addressing-some-misconceptions-about.html&via=ChromiumDev'> <img alt='Share on Twitter' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_twitter_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> <span class='fb-custom social-wrapper' data-href='https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/addressing-some-misconceptions-about.html'> <img alt='Share on Facebook' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_facebook_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> </div> <div class='post-footer'> <div class='cmt_iframe_holder' data-href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/addressing-some-misconceptions-about.html' data-viewtype='FILTERED_POSTMOD'></div> <a href='https://plus.google.com/112374322230920073195' rel='author' style='display:none;'> Google </a> <div class='label-footer'> <span class='labels-caption'> Labels: </span> <span class='labels'> <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/chrome' rel='tag'> chrome </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/DNS-over-HTTPS' rel='tag'> DNS-over-HTTPS </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/DoH' rel='tag'> DoH </a> </span> </div> </div> </div> <div class='post' data-id='8116590767701584869' itemscope='' itemtype='http://schema.org/BlogPosting'> <h2 class='title' itemprop='name'> <a href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/automatically-lazy-loading-offscreen.html' itemprop='url' title='Automatically lazy-loading offscreen images & iframes for Lite mode users'> Automatically lazy-loading offscreen images & iframes for Lite mode users </a> </h2> <div class='post-header'> <div class='published'> <span class='publishdate' itemprop='datePublished'> Thursday, October 24, 2019 </span> </div> </div> <div class='post-body'> <div class='post-content' itemprop='articleBody'> <script type='text/template'> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In Chrome 76, we introduced </span><a href="https://web.dev/native-lazy-loading" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">native lazy-loading</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> for images and iframes via the `loading` attribute - a developer opt-in. In Chrome 77, Chrome Android users with  </span><a href="https://blog.chromium.org/2019/04/data-saver-is-now-lite-mode.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Lite Mode</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> (Data Saver) enabled will benefit from native lazy-loading of images and iframes </span><a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/4969496953487360" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">automatically</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">.</span></span></div> <b id="docs-internal-guid-37270fa5-7fff-962a-e886-8140ed96340c" style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 339px; overflow: hidden; width: 602px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img height="339" src="https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/i2UfbjUx9E4OFGc6lqmH_qF3RwKw5yKu3VecpcdDM0znXUGFCSmHAx8IHcGi_NXOfCPVny7wmAmgXl1k5i3Nacm7gg4hbe22KFog8f4Yf-g1uJLb_pq6hSC0c_3qL_1EvWwf7ETQ" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="602" /></span></span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Lite mode has allowed Chrome to reduce users’ data usage by up to 60 percent, often by compressing the pages users request before downloading them. </span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Web pages commonly have images or embedded content that is out-of-view near the bottom of the page, and users typically don’t scroll all the way down to discover the<span style="font-family: inherit;">m. </span></span></span><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Toda</span>y, devices need to use resources loading this content, which is challenging for users on a limited data-plan or with a spotty network connection.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-b0be2d7d-7fff-e2a7-d347-e2a7efa3299f"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">When a user has Lite Mode enabled on Chrome for Android, Chrome will defer the load of below-the-fold images and iframes until the user scrolls near them. This is done without requiring developer action. Automatic lazy-loading helps to reduce network data use and memory use. It may also increase site speed, by prioritizing content visible to the user.</span></span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-faf70544-7fff-2a3d-b767-8997444cc907"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In our experiments, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">native lazy-loading of images and iframes yields a ~10% reduction in bytes downloaded per page at the 75th percentile</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> and an 8% reduction in overall downloaded bytes for the median user. Automatic lazy-loading also led to a 1-2% improvement in First Contentful Paint at the median, a 2% improvement in First Input Delay at the 95th percentile and a 0.7% improvement in median memory reduction per page. We expect increased benefits as we tune the feature.</span></span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Chrome’s native lazy-loading has different distance thresholds after which deferred content will start loading, based on factors such as the </span><a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/NetworkInformation/effectiveType" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">effective connection type</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. This distance is chosen so that content we’ve deferred almost always completes loading by the time it becomes visible. </span></span></div> <b id="docs-internal-guid-d5edaf66-7fff-7dfb-63ff-57261e863a29" style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Any <iframe> or <img> with the `loading` attribute value of `auto` will also be eligible for Lite Mode’s automatic lazy-loading. This includes <picture> elements and CSS background images.  </span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">It is important to note that automatic lazy-loading of images and iframes is </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">only</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> done if a user has Lite Mode enabled. Lite Mode is most heavily used in areas of the world with poor and expensive connectivity and we believe it is users in these regions that will benefit the most from the feature. Sites wishing to learn what percentage of users have Lite Mode turned on can monitor truthy values from the  </span><a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/NetworkInformation/saveData" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">SaveData</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> JavaScript API in their analytics.</span></span></div> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To enable Lite mode, select </span><span style="font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">Settings > Lite mode</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> and toggle the setting to On. We look forward to this feature helping users keep their page loads just a little bit lighter.</span></span></div> </div> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Posted by Addy Osmani, Scott Little and Raj T - lazy Chrome engineers.</span></span></div> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </script> <noscript> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In Chrome 76, we introduced </span><a href="https://web.dev/native-lazy-loading" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">native lazy-loading</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> for images and iframes via the `loading` attribute - a developer opt-in. In Chrome 77, Chrome Android users with  </span><a href="https://blog.chromium.org/2019/04/data-saver-is-now-lite-mode.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Lite Mode</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> (Data Saver) enabled will benefit from native lazy-loading of images and iframes </span><a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/4969496953487360" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">automatically</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">.</span></span></div> <b id="docs-internal-guid-37270fa5-7fff-962a-e886-8140ed96340c" style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 339px; overflow: hidden; width: 602px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img height="339" src="https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/i2UfbjUx9E4OFGc6lqmH_qF3RwKw5yKu3VecpcdDM0znXUGFCSmHAx8IHcGi_NXOfCPVny7wmAmgXl1k5i3Nacm7gg4hbe22KFog8f4Yf-g1uJLb_pq6hSC0c_3qL_1EvWwf7ETQ" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="602" /></span></span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Lite mode has allowed Chrome to reduce users’ data usage by up to 60 percent, often by compressing the pages users request before downloading them. </span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Web pages commonly have images or embedded content that is out-of-view near the bottom of the page, and users typically don’t scroll all the way down to discover the<span style="font-family: inherit;">m. </span></span></span><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Toda</span>y, devices need to use resources loading this content, which is challenging for users on a limited data-plan or with a spotty network connection.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-b0be2d7d-7fff-e2a7-d347-e2a7efa3299f"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">When a user has Lite Mode enabled on Chrome for Android, Chrome will defer the load of below-the-fold images and iframes until the user scrolls near them. This is done without requiring developer action. Automatic lazy-loading helps to reduce network data use and memory use. It may also increase site speed, by prioritizing content visible to the user.</span></span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-faf70544-7fff-2a3d-b767-8997444cc907"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In our experiments, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">native lazy-loading of images and iframes yields a ~10% reduction in bytes downloaded per page at the 75th percentile</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> and an 8% reduction in overall downloaded bytes for the median user. Automatic lazy-loading also led to a 1-2% improvement in First Contentful Paint at the median, a 2% improvement in First Input Delay at the 95th percentile and a 0.7% improvement in median memory reduction per page. We expect increased benefits as we tune the feature.</span></span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Chrome’s native lazy-loading has different distance thresholds after which deferred content will start loading, based on factors such as the </span><a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/NetworkInformation/effectiveType" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">effective connection type</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. This distance is chosen so that content we’ve deferred almost always completes loading by the time it becomes visible. </span></span></div> <b id="docs-internal-guid-d5edaf66-7fff-7dfb-63ff-57261e863a29" style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Any <iframe> or <img> with the `loading` attribute value of `auto` will also be eligible for Lite Mode’s automatic lazy-loading. This includes <picture> elements and CSS background images.  </span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">It is important to note that automatic lazy-loading of images and iframes is </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">only</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> done if a user has Lite Mode enabled. Lite Mode is most heavily used in areas of the world with poor and expensive connectivity and we believe it is users in these regions that will benefit the most from the feature. Sites wishing to learn what percentage of users have Lite Mode turned on can monitor truthy values from the  </span><a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/NetworkInformation/saveData" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">SaveData</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> JavaScript API in their analytics.</span></span></div> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To enable Lite mode, select </span><span style="font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">Settings > Lite mode</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> and toggle the setting to On. We look forward to this feature helping users keep their page loads just a little bit lighter.</span></span></div> </div> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Posted by Addy Osmani, Scott Little and Raj T - lazy Chrome engineers.</span></span></div> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </noscript> </div> </div> <div class='share'> <span class='twitter-custom social-wrapper' data-href='http://twitter.com/share?text=Chromium Blog:Automatically lazy-loading offscreen images & iframes for Lite mode users&url=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/automatically-lazy-loading-offscreen.html&via=ChromiumDev'> <img alt='Share on Twitter' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_twitter_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> <span class='fb-custom social-wrapper' data-href='https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/automatically-lazy-loading-offscreen.html'> <img alt='Share on Facebook' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_facebook_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> </div> <div class='post-footer'> <div class='cmt_iframe_holder' data-href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/automatically-lazy-loading-offscreen.html' data-viewtype='FILTERED_POSTMOD'></div> <a href='https://plus.google.com/112374322230920073195' rel='author' style='display:none;'> Google </a> <div class='label-footer'> <span class='labels-caption'> Labels: </span> <span class='labels'> <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/chrome' rel='tag'> chrome </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/Data%20Saver' rel='tag'> Data Saver </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/iframes' rel='tag'> iframes </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/images' rel='tag'> images </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/lazy-loading' rel='tag'> lazy-loading </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/Lite%20Mode' rel='tag'> Lite Mode </a> </span> </div> </div> </div> <div class='post' data-id='5505831639047150266' itemscope='' itemtype='http://schema.org/BlogPosting'> <h2 class='title' itemprop='name'> <a href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/developers-get-ready-for-new.html' itemprop='url' title='Developers: Get Ready for New SameSite=None; Secure Cookie Settings'> Developers: Get Ready for New SameSite=None; Secure Cookie Settings </a> </h2> <div class='post-header'> <div class='published'> <span class='publishdate' itemprop='datePublished'> Wednesday, October 23, 2019 </span> </div> </div> <div class='post-body'> <div class='post-content' itemprop='articleBody'> <script type='text/template'> <i>UPDATE (10/28/2019): We've revised the 2nd and 3rd bullet points in the section "How to Prepare; Known Complexities" below.</i><span style="color: #3c4043; font-family: "roboto" , "robotodraft" , "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 14px; letter-spacing: 0.2px;"><br /></span></span> In May, Chrome <a href="https://blog.chromium.org/2019/05/improving-privacy-and-security-on-web.html">announced</a> a secure-by-default model for cookies, enabled by a new cookie classification system (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-cookie-incrementalism-00">spec</a>). This initiative is part of our <a href="https://www.blog.google/products/chrome/building-a-more-private-web/">ongoing effort</a> to improve privacy and security across the web.<br /> Chrome plans to implement the new model with Chrome 80 in February 2020. Mozilla and Microsoft have also indicated intent to implement the new model in Firefox and Edge, on their own timelines. While the Chrome changes are still a few months away, It’s important that developers who manage cookies assess their readiness today. This blog post outlines high level concepts; please see <a href="https://web.dev/samesite-cookies-explained">SameSite Cookies Explained</a> on web.dev for developer guidance.<br /> <br /> <br /> <h3> Understanding Cross-Site and Same-Site Cookie Context</h3> <br /> Websites typically integrate external services for advertising, content recommendations, third party widgets, social embeds and other features. As you browse the web, these external services may store cookies in your browser and subsequently access those cookies to deliver personalized experiences or measure audience engagement. Every cookie has a domain associated with it. If the domain associated with a cookie matches an external service and not the website in the user’s address bar, this is considered a <i>cross-site</i> (or <i>“third party”</i>) context.<br /> <br /> Less obvious cross-site use cases include situations where an entity that owns multiple websites uses a cookie across those properties. Although the same entity owns the cookie and the websites, this still counts as cross-site or<i> </i>“third party” context when the cookie’s domain does not match the site(s) from which the cookie is accessed. <br /> <div align="center" dir="ltr" style="margin-left: 0pt;"> <table style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none;"><colgroup><col width="424"></col></colgroup><tbody> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 388px; overflow: hidden; width: 414px;"><img height="388" src="https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/K0TdWPVcr8pium5MnY2PMeFZj9rkqpY4Z_U9Z_C9yllN_GO2STNRWrwBmZNuXQ4ILocG5si0tmFZAk4QeIE2DyqRQ_8hRt2GZSZGflsw_YfMuyeu0Y6D4qtiUy3HVCYQKX6zlZ6G" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="414" /></span></span></div> </td></tr> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;">When an external resource on a web page accesses a cookie that does not match the site domain, this is </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;">cross-site or “third-party”</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;"> context.</span></div> </td></tr> </tbody></table> </div> <br /> <br /> In contrast, cookie access in a <i>same-site</i> (or <i>“first party”</i>) context occurs when a cookie’s domain matches the website domain in the user’s address bar. Same-site cookies are commonly used to keep people logged into individual websites, remember their preferences and support site analytics.<br /> <div> <br />   <br /> <div align="center" dir="ltr" style="margin-left: 0pt;"> <table style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none;"><colgroup><col width="424"></col></colgroup><tbody> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 388px; overflow: hidden; width: 414px;"><img height="388" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/AgtxHofbBpva_NgsyGLvLko9J6ZFgWBDk3zqFXz37zWCuokA0xfCciKug5A3-ze7FGlorSWfVoPnwiWC7ydHjkqePG4g09SNQE37eXZfj3oz7buWcTrUMgF6QvdDX__9ks3HJap_" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="414" /></span></span></div> </td></tr> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;">When a resource on a web page accesses a cookie that matches the site the user is visiting, this is </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;">same-site or “first party”</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;"> context.</span></div> </td></tr> </tbody></table> </div> <span class="post-author"><b style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></b></span> <br /> <br /> <h3> A New Model for Cookie Security and Transparency</h3> <br /> Today, if a cookie is only intended to be accessed in a first party context, the developer has the option to apply one of two settings (<span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=Lax</span> or <span style="font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;"><span style="background-color: #eeeeee;">SameSite=Strict</span><span style="background-color: white;">)</span></span> to prevent external access. However, very few developers follow this recommended practice, leaving a large number of same-site cookies needlessly exposed to threats such as <a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html">Cross-Site Request Forgery</a> attacks.<br /> <br /> To safeguard more websites and their users, the new secure-by-default model assumes all cookies should be protected from external access unless otherwise specified. Developers must use a new cookie setting, <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None</span>, to designate cookies for cross-site access. When the <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None</span> attribute is present, an additional <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">Secure</span> attribute must be used so cross-site cookies can only be accessed over HTTPS connections. This won’t mitigate all risks associated with cross-site access but it will provide protection against network attacks. <br /> <br /> Beyond the immediate security benefits, the explicit declaration of cross-site cookies enables greater transparency and user choice. For example, browsers could offer users fine-grained controls to manage cookies that are only accessed by a single site separately from cookies accessed across multiple sites. <br /> <br /> <br /> <h3> Chrome Enforcement Starting in February 2020</h3> <br /> With Chrome 80 in February, Chrome will treat cookies that have no declared SameSite value as <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=Lax</span> cookies. Only cookies with the <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None; Secure</span> setting will be available for external access, provided they are being accessed from secure connections. The Chrome Platform Status trackers for <a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/5088147346030592">SameSite=None</a> and <a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/5633521622188032">Secure</a> will continue to be updated with the latest launch information.<br /> <br /> Mozilla has affirmed their support of the new cookie classification model with their <a href="https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.platform/nx2uP0CzA9k/BNVPWDHsAQAJ">intent to implement</a> the <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None; Secure</span> requirements for cross-site cookies in Firefox. Microsoft recently <a href="https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/blink-dev/AknSSyQTGYs/8lMmI5DwEAAJ">announced</a> plans to begin implementing the model starting as an experiment in Microsoft Edge 80.<br /> <br /> <br /> <h3> How to Prepare; Known Complexities</h3> <br /> If you manage cross-site cookies, you will need to apply the SameSite=None; Secure setting to those cookies. Implementation should be straightforward for most developers, but we strongly encourage you to begin testing now to identify complexities and special cases, such as the following: <br /> <br /> <ul> <li>Not all languages and libraries support the None value yet, requiring developers to set the cookie header directly. This <a href="https://github.com/GoogleChromeLabs/samesite-examples">Github repository</a> provides instructions for implementing <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None</span>; Secure in a variety of languages, libraries and frameworks.</li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some browsers, including some versions of Chrome, Safari and UC Browser, might handle the  </span><span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">None</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> value in unintended ways, requiring developers to code exceptions for those clients. This includes Android WebViews powered by older versions of Chrome. Here’s a list of known <a href="https://www.chromium.org/updates/same-site/incompatible-clients" target="_blank">incompatible clients</a>.</span></li> <li>App developers are advised to declare the appropriate SameSite cookie settings for Android WebViews based on versions of Chrome that are compatible with the  None value, both for cookies accessed via HTTP(S) headers and via Android WebView's <a href="https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/CookieManager" target="_blank">CookieManager API</a>, although the new model will not be enforced on Android WebView until later.</li> <li>Enterprise IT administrators may need to implement <a href="https://www.chromium.org/administrators/policy-list-3/cookie-legacy-samesite-policies">special policies</a> to temporarily revert Chrome Browser to legacy behavior if some services such as single sign-on or internal applications are not ready for the February launch.</li> <li>If you have cookies that you access in both a first and third-party context, you might consider using separate cookies to get the security benefits of SameSite=Lax in the first-party context.</li> </ul> <a href="https://web.dev/samesite-cookies-explained">SameSite Cookies Explained</a> offers specific guidance for the situations above, and channels for raising issues and questions.<br /> <br /> To test the effect of the new Chrome behavior on your site or cookies you manage, you can go to chrome://flags in Chrome 76+ and enable the “SameSite by default cookies” and “Cookies without SameSite must be secure” experiments. In addition, these experiments will be automatically enabled for a subset of Chrome 79 Beta users. Some Beta users with the experiments enabled could experience incompatibility issues with services that do not yet support the new model; users can opt out of the Beta experiments by going to chrome://flags and disabling them. <br /> <br /> If you manage cookies that are only accessed in a same-site context (same-site cookies) there is no required action on your part; Chrome will automatically prevent those cookies from being accessed by external entities, even if the SameSite attribute is missing or no value is set. However we strongly recommend you apply an appropriate SameSite value (<span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">Lax</span> or <span style="background-color: #eeeeee;"><span style="font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">Strict</span></span>) and not rely on default browser behavior since not all browsers protect same-site cookies by default.<br /> <br /> Finally, if you’re concerned about the readiness of vendors and others who provide services to your website, you can check for Developer Tools console warnings in Chrome 77+ when a page contains cross-site cookies that are missing the required settings:<span class="post-author"><b style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></b></span> <br /> <br /> <div align="center" dir="ltr" style="margin-left: 0pt;"> <table style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none;"><colgroup><col width="617"></col></colgroup><tbody> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-fcce8baf-7fff-f71d-0e20-af0679597c34"><span style="color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 130px; overflow: hidden; width: 607px;"> <img alt="A cookie associated with a cross-site resource at (cookie domain) was set without the `SameSite` attribute. A future release of Chrome will only deliver cookies with cross-site requests if they are set with `SameSite=None` and `Secure`. You can review cookies in developer tools under Application>Storage>Cookies and see more details at https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5088147346030592 and https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5633521622188032.”" height="130" src="https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/AMjvE6tOlDJ8omG83qcir_OWvHdXTPM2PTFa_AVZa_2fbqBA85of3rU4-_d83Nm6m7W6ojc1gCGJkwsY3KljB2hHeCrcJH4H3G1ThES7wsceY34BrGF8a-srV0lKbsIjZBoi_Sl8" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" title="" width="607" /></span></span></span></div> </td></tr> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <br /></div> </td></tr> </tbody></table> </div> <span class="post-author"><br /></span> Some providers (including some Google services) will implement the necessary changes in the months leading up to Chrome 80 in February; you may wish to reach out to your partners to confirm their readiness.</div> <div> <br /></div> <div> <br /></div> <div> Posted by Barb Smith, Chrome and Web Platform Partnerships<br /> <br /></div> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </script> <noscript> <i>UPDATE (10/28/2019): We've revised the 2nd and 3rd bullet points in the section "How to Prepare; Known Complexities" below.</i><span style="color: #3c4043; font-family: "roboto" , "robotodraft" , "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 14px; letter-spacing: 0.2px;"><br /></span></span> In May, Chrome <a href="https://blog.chromium.org/2019/05/improving-privacy-and-security-on-web.html">announced</a> a secure-by-default model for cookies, enabled by a new cookie classification system (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-cookie-incrementalism-00">spec</a>). This initiative is part of our <a href="https://www.blog.google/products/chrome/building-a-more-private-web/">ongoing effort</a> to improve privacy and security across the web.<br /> Chrome plans to implement the new model with Chrome 80 in February 2020. Mozilla and Microsoft have also indicated intent to implement the new model in Firefox and Edge, on their own timelines. While the Chrome changes are still a few months away, It’s important that developers who manage cookies assess their readiness today. This blog post outlines high level concepts; please see <a href="https://web.dev/samesite-cookies-explained">SameSite Cookies Explained</a> on web.dev for developer guidance.<br /> <br /> <br /> <h3> Understanding Cross-Site and Same-Site Cookie Context</h3> <br /> Websites typically integrate external services for advertising, content recommendations, third party widgets, social embeds and other features. As you browse the web, these external services may store cookies in your browser and subsequently access those cookies to deliver personalized experiences or measure audience engagement. Every cookie has a domain associated with it. If the domain associated with a cookie matches an external service and not the website in the user’s address bar, this is considered a <i>cross-site</i> (or <i>“third party”</i>) context.<br /> <br /> Less obvious cross-site use cases include situations where an entity that owns multiple websites uses a cookie across those properties. Although the same entity owns the cookie and the websites, this still counts as cross-site or<i> </i>“third party” context when the cookie’s domain does not match the site(s) from which the cookie is accessed. <br /> <div align="center" dir="ltr" style="margin-left: 0pt;"> <table style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none;"><colgroup><col width="424"></col></colgroup><tbody> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 388px; overflow: hidden; width: 414px;"><img height="388" src="https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/K0TdWPVcr8pium5MnY2PMeFZj9rkqpY4Z_U9Z_C9yllN_GO2STNRWrwBmZNuXQ4ILocG5si0tmFZAk4QeIE2DyqRQ_8hRt2GZSZGflsw_YfMuyeu0Y6D4qtiUy3HVCYQKX6zlZ6G" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="414" /></span></span></div> </td></tr> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;">When an external resource on a web page accesses a cookie that does not match the site domain, this is </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;">cross-site or “third-party”</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;"> context.</span></div> </td></tr> </tbody></table> </div> <br /> <br /> In contrast, cookie access in a <i>same-site</i> (or <i>“first party”</i>) context occurs when a cookie’s domain matches the website domain in the user’s address bar. Same-site cookies are commonly used to keep people logged into individual websites, remember their preferences and support site analytics.<br /> <div> <br />   <br /> <div align="center" dir="ltr" style="margin-left: 0pt;"> <table style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none;"><colgroup><col width="424"></col></colgroup><tbody> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 388px; overflow: hidden; width: 414px;"><img height="388" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/AgtxHofbBpva_NgsyGLvLko9J6ZFgWBDk3zqFXz37zWCuokA0xfCciKug5A3-ze7FGlorSWfVoPnwiWC7ydHjkqePG4g09SNQE37eXZfj3oz7buWcTrUMgF6QvdDX__9ks3HJap_" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="414" /></span></span></div> </td></tr> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;">When a resource on a web page accesses a cookie that matches the site the user is visiting, this is </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;">same-site or “first party”</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre;"> context.</span></div> </td></tr> </tbody></table> </div> <span class="post-author"><b style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></b></span> <br /> <br /> <h3> A New Model for Cookie Security and Transparency</h3> <br /> Today, if a cookie is only intended to be accessed in a first party context, the developer has the option to apply one of two settings (<span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=Lax</span> or <span style="font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;"><span style="background-color: #eeeeee;">SameSite=Strict</span><span style="background-color: white;">)</span></span> to prevent external access. However, very few developers follow this recommended practice, leaving a large number of same-site cookies needlessly exposed to threats such as <a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html">Cross-Site Request Forgery</a> attacks.<br /> <br /> To safeguard more websites and their users, the new secure-by-default model assumes all cookies should be protected from external access unless otherwise specified. Developers must use a new cookie setting, <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None</span>, to designate cookies for cross-site access. When the <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None</span> attribute is present, an additional <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">Secure</span> attribute must be used so cross-site cookies can only be accessed over HTTPS connections. This won’t mitigate all risks associated with cross-site access but it will provide protection against network attacks. <br /> <br /> Beyond the immediate security benefits, the explicit declaration of cross-site cookies enables greater transparency and user choice. For example, browsers could offer users fine-grained controls to manage cookies that are only accessed by a single site separately from cookies accessed across multiple sites. <br /> <br /> <br /> <h3> Chrome Enforcement Starting in February 2020</h3> <br /> With Chrome 80 in February, Chrome will treat cookies that have no declared SameSite value as <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=Lax</span> cookies. Only cookies with the <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None; Secure</span> setting will be available for external access, provided they are being accessed from secure connections. The Chrome Platform Status trackers for <a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/5088147346030592">SameSite=None</a> and <a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/5633521622188032">Secure</a> will continue to be updated with the latest launch information.<br /> <br /> Mozilla has affirmed their support of the new cookie classification model with their <a href="https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.platform/nx2uP0CzA9k/BNVPWDHsAQAJ">intent to implement</a> the <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None; Secure</span> requirements for cross-site cookies in Firefox. Microsoft recently <a href="https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/blink-dev/AknSSyQTGYs/8lMmI5DwEAAJ">announced</a> plans to begin implementing the model starting as an experiment in Microsoft Edge 80.<br /> <br /> <br /> <h3> How to Prepare; Known Complexities</h3> <br /> If you manage cross-site cookies, you will need to apply the SameSite=None; Secure setting to those cookies. Implementation should be straightforward for most developers, but we strongly encourage you to begin testing now to identify complexities and special cases, such as the following: <br /> <br /> <ul> <li>Not all languages and libraries support the None value yet, requiring developers to set the cookie header directly. This <a href="https://github.com/GoogleChromeLabs/samesite-examples">Github repository</a> provides instructions for implementing <span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">SameSite=None</span>; Secure in a variety of languages, libraries and frameworks.</li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some browsers, including some versions of Chrome, Safari and UC Browser, might handle the  </span><span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">None</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> value in unintended ways, requiring developers to code exceptions for those clients. This includes Android WebViews powered by older versions of Chrome. Here’s a list of known <a href="https://www.chromium.org/updates/same-site/incompatible-clients" target="_blank">incompatible clients</a>.</span></li> <li>App developers are advised to declare the appropriate SameSite cookie settings for Android WebViews based on versions of Chrome that are compatible with the  None value, both for cookies accessed via HTTP(S) headers and via Android WebView's <a href="https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/CookieManager" target="_blank">CookieManager API</a>, although the new model will not be enforced on Android WebView until later.</li> <li>Enterprise IT administrators may need to implement <a href="https://www.chromium.org/administrators/policy-list-3/cookie-legacy-samesite-policies">special policies</a> to temporarily revert Chrome Browser to legacy behavior if some services such as single sign-on or internal applications are not ready for the February launch.</li> <li>If you have cookies that you access in both a first and third-party context, you might consider using separate cookies to get the security benefits of SameSite=Lax in the first-party context.</li> </ul> <a href="https://web.dev/samesite-cookies-explained">SameSite Cookies Explained</a> offers specific guidance for the situations above, and channels for raising issues and questions.<br /> <br /> To test the effect of the new Chrome behavior on your site or cookies you manage, you can go to chrome://flags in Chrome 76+ and enable the “SameSite by default cookies” and “Cookies without SameSite must be secure” experiments. In addition, these experiments will be automatically enabled for a subset of Chrome 79 Beta users. Some Beta users with the experiments enabled could experience incompatibility issues with services that do not yet support the new model; users can opt out of the Beta experiments by going to chrome://flags and disabling them. <br /> <br /> If you manage cookies that are only accessed in a same-site context (same-site cookies) there is no required action on your part; Chrome will automatically prevent those cookies from being accessed by external entities, even if the SameSite attribute is missing or no value is set. However we strongly recommend you apply an appropriate SameSite value (<span style="background-color: #eeeeee; font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">Lax</span> or <span style="background-color: #eeeeee;"><span style="font-family: "courier new" , "courier" , monospace;">Strict</span></span>) and not rely on default browser behavior since not all browsers protect same-site cookies by default.<br /> <br /> Finally, if you’re concerned about the readiness of vendors and others who provide services to your website, you can check for Developer Tools console warnings in Chrome 77+ when a page contains cross-site cookies that are missing the required settings:<span class="post-author"><b style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></b></span> <br /> <br /> <div align="center" dir="ltr" style="margin-left: 0pt;"> <table style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none;"><colgroup><col width="617"></col></colgroup><tbody> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-fcce8baf-7fff-f71d-0e20-af0679597c34"><span style="color: #434343; font-family: "roboto" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 130px; overflow: hidden; width: 607px;"> <img alt="A cookie associated with a cross-site resource at (cookie domain) was set without the `SameSite` attribute. A future release of Chrome will only deliver cookies with cross-site requests if they are set with `SameSite=None` and `Secure`. You can review cookies in developer tools under Application>Storage>Cookies and see more details at https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5088147346030592 and https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5633521622188032.”" height="130" src="https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/AMjvE6tOlDJ8omG83qcir_OWvHdXTPM2PTFa_AVZa_2fbqBA85of3rU4-_d83Nm6m7W6ojc1gCGJkwsY3KljB2hHeCrcJH4H3G1ThES7wsceY34BrGF8a-srV0lKbsIjZBoi_Sl8" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" title="" width="607" /></span></span></span></div> </td></tr> <tr style="height: 0pt;"><td style="border-bottom: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-left: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-right: solid #ffffff 1pt; border-top: solid #ffffff 1pt; overflow-wrap: break-word; overflow: hidden; padding: 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt 3.6pt; vertical-align: top;"><div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"> <br /></div> </td></tr> </tbody></table> </div> <span class="post-author"><br /></span> Some providers (including some Google services) will implement the necessary changes in the months leading up to Chrome 80 in February; you may wish to reach out to your partners to confirm their readiness.</div> <div> <br /></div> <div> <br /></div> <div> Posted by Barb Smith, Chrome and Web Platform Partnerships<br /> <br /></div> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </noscript> </div> </div> <div class='share'> <span class='twitter-custom social-wrapper' data-href='http://twitter.com/share?text=Chromium Blog:Developers: Get Ready for New SameSite=None; Secure Cookie Settings&url=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/developers-get-ready-for-new.html&via=ChromiumDev'> <img alt='Share on Twitter' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_twitter_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> <span class='fb-custom social-wrapper' data-href='https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/developers-get-ready-for-new.html'> <img alt='Share on Facebook' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_facebook_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> </div> <div class='post-footer'> <div class='cmt_iframe_holder' data-href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/developers-get-ready-for-new.html' data-viewtype='FILTERED_POSTMOD'></div> <a href='https://plus.google.com/112374322230920073195' rel='author' style='display:none;'> Google </a> <div class='label-footer'> <span class='labels-caption'> Labels: </span> <span class='labels'> <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/chrome' rel='tag'> chrome </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/cookies' rel='tag'> cookies </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/security' rel='tag'> security </a> </span> </div> </div> </div> <div class='post' data-id='2468803965407442972' itemscope='' itemtype='http://schema.org/BlogPosting'> <h2 class='title' itemprop='name'> <a href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/recent-site-isolation-improvements.html' itemprop='url' title='Recent Site Isolation improvements'> Recent Site Isolation improvements </a> </h2> <div class='post-header'> <div class='published'> <span class='publishdate' itemprop='datePublished'> Thursday, October 17, 2019 </span> </div> </div> <div class='post-body'> <div class='post-content' itemprop='articleBody'> <script type='text/template'> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In July 2018 </span><a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/07/mitigating-spectre-with-site-isolation.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">we launched Site Isolation in Chrome</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> as a way to secure desktop browsers against the risk of </span><a href="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">side-channel attacks like Spectre</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. We recently published a </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/reis" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">USENIX Security conference paper</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> highlighting the benefits of this launch. Today, we are pleased to announce further improvements we've rolled out in Chrome 77:</span></span></div> <ul style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;">Chrome for Android has enabled Site Isolation for sites where users enter passwords.</span></li> <li>O<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;">n desktop platforms, Site Isolation now helps defend against attacks from fully compromised renderer processes, not just side-channel attacks.</span></li> </ul> <h2 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 18pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Site Isolation on Android</span></span></h2> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Chrome 77 has brought </span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/site-isolation" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Site Isolation</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> and its benefits to Android users. Like Site Isolation on desktop, this launch leverages OS processes to make it harder for attackers to steal data from other websites. In particular, it offers the most effective </span><a href="https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/security/side-channel-threat-model.md" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">defense</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> against Spectre-like CPU vulnerabilities.</span></span></div> <b id="docs-internal-guid-195a13d0-7fff-c0f9-7794-9da570841977" style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">We wanted to ensure that Site Isolation does not adversely affect user experience in a resource-constrained environment like Android. This is why, unlike desktop platforms where we isolate </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">all </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">sites, Chrome on Android uses a slimmer form of Site Isolation, protecting fewer sites to keep overhead low. More specifically, Site Isolation is turned on only for high-value sites where users log in with a password. This protects sites with sensitive data that users likely care about, such as banks or shopping sites, while allowing process sharing among less critical sites.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Once Chrome observes a password interaction on a website, future visits to that site will be protected by Site Isolation. That means the site will be rendered in its own dedicated renderer process, walled off from other sites. Navigations to other sites will cause a tab to switch processes, and cross-site iframes are put into a different process, becoming "</span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/oop-iframes" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">out-of-process iframes</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">." Chrome keeps a list of isolated sites stored locally on the device and clears the list whenever users clear their browsing history or other site data. To bootstrap, Chrome also isolates a crowdsourced list of sites where mobile users have been entering passwords most frequently.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the most part, Site Isolation is a behind-the-scenes architectural change that should not change the experience for users or developers. As on desktop platforms, it does cause Chrome to create more processes, which comes with performance tradeoffs: on the plus side, each renderer process is smaller, shorter-lived, and has less contention internally, but there is about a 3-5% total memory overhead in real workloads. We continue to work hard to optimize this behavior to keep Chrome both fast and secure.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In Chrome 77, password-triggered Site Isolation has been enabled for 99% of users (with a 1% holdback to monitor and improve performance) on Android devices that have a sufficient amount of RAM (currently 2GB). While we investigate how to bring this support to more devices, users who desire the most complete protection for their devices may manually opt in to full Site Isolation via chrome://flags/#enable-site-per-process, which will isolate all websites but carry higher memory cost.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In the future, we plan to add support for more ways of detecting when a site should be protected by Site Isolation. For example, we're working on allowing website operators to opt in any site to Site Isolation, without requiring user login.</span></span></div> <h2 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 18pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Containing Compromised Renderers</span></span></h2> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">On desktop platforms, Site Isolation in Chrome 77 now helps defend against significantly stronger attacks. Our initial launch targeted Spectre-like attacks which could leak any data from a given renderer process. Site Isolation can now handle even severe attacks where </span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/site-isolation#TOC-Motivation" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">the renderer process is fully compromised</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> via a security bug, such as memory corruption bugs or Universal Cross-Site Scripting (</span><a href="https://ai.google/research/pubs/pub48028" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">UXSS</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">) logic errors.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For example, suppose an attacker discovered and exploited a memory corruption bug in Chrome's rendering engine, Blink. The bug might allow them to run arbitrary native code within the sandboxed renderer process, no longer constrained by the security checks in Blink. However, Chrome's browser process knows what site the renderer process is dedicated to, so it can restrict which cookies, passwords, and site data the entire process is allowed to receive. This makes it far more difficult for attackers to steal cross-site data.</span></span><br /> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="color: black; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In Chrome 77, Site Isolation helps protect many types of sensitive data from such compromised renderer processes:</span></div> <ul style="margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;"> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Authentication:</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Cookies and stored passwords can only be accessed by processes locked to the corresponding site.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Network data:</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Site Isolation uses </span><a href="https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/07/site-isolation#corb" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Cross-Origin Read Blocking</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> to filter sensitive resource types (e.g., HTML, XML, JSON, PDF) from a process, even if that process tries to lie to Chrome's network stack about its origin. Resources labeled with a </span><a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cross-Origin_Resource_Policy_(CORP)" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy header</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> are also protected.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Stored data and permissions:</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Renderer processes can only access stored data (e.g., localStorage) or permissions (e.g., microphone) based on the process's site lock. </span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Cross-origin messaging: </span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Chrome's browser process can verify the source origin of postMessage and BroadcastChannel messages, preventing the renderer process from lying about who sent the message.</span></li> </ul> <span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="color: black; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">We are continuing to improve compromised renderer protections in several ways:</span></div> <span style="color: black; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></span><br /> <ul style="margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;"> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Bringing these protections to Chrome for Android.</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> This requires extra work to handle the case where only certain sites are isolated.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Protecting CSRF defenses.</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> </span><a href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-fetch-metadata/" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Sec-Fetch-Site</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> and </span><a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Origin" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Origin</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> request headers can be verified to prevent compromised renderers from forging them.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Protecting more types of data.</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> We are investigating how to protect additional data types by default with Cross-Origin Read Blocking.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Removing exceptions.</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> We are working to remove cases where these protections may not yet apply. For example, a small set of extensions still have broader cross-site access from content scripts, </span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/extension-content-script-fetches" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">until they update to the new security model</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. We have already worked with extension authors to bring the affected Chrome user population down from 14% to 2%, as well as </span><a href="https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/chromium-extensions/0ei-UCHNm34/lDaXwQhzBAAJ" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">harden other extension security issues</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. Also, Site Isolation does not apply to Flash, which is currently disabled by default and is on a </span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/flash-roadmap" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">deprecation path</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">.</span></li> </ul> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span> <span style="background-color: transparent; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="font-size: 14.6667px; white-space: pre-wrap;">We're excited about the improvements this brings to Chrome's overall security model. As a result, we are broadening the scope of the <a href="https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/chrome-rewards/#special" target="_blank">Chrome Vulnerability Reward Program</a> to also cover cross-site data disclosure attacks that involve compromised renderers. For a limited time, security bugs affecting Site Isolation may be eligible for higher rewards than the usual amount for information disclosure bugs. We are grateful for the contributions from security researchers that we have received so far, and we look forward to working together further to improve the state of web security.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <br /></div> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></span> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span id="docs-internal-guid-3d46ebca-7fff-d96b-367f-5aebfbd320b7"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;">Posted by Alex Moshchuk and Łukasz Anforowicz, Site Isolators</span></span></span></span><br /> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;"><br /></span></span></span> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </script> <noscript> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In July 2018 </span><a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/07/mitigating-spectre-with-site-isolation.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">we launched Site Isolation in Chrome</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> as a way to secure desktop browsers against the risk of </span><a href="https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">side-channel attacks like Spectre</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. We recently published a </span><a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/reis" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">USENIX Security conference paper</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> highlighting the benefits of this launch. Today, we are pleased to announce further improvements we've rolled out in Chrome 77:</span></span></div> <ul style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;">Chrome for Android has enabled Site Isolation for sites where users enter passwords.</span></li> <li>O<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;">n desktop platforms, Site Isolation now helps defend against attacks from fully compromised renderer processes, not just side-channel attacks.</span></li> </ul> <h2 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 18pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Site Isolation on Android</span></span></h2> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Chrome 77 has brought </span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/site-isolation" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Site Isolation</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> and its benefits to Android users. Like Site Isolation on desktop, this launch leverages OS processes to make it harder for attackers to steal data from other websites. In particular, it offers the most effective </span><a href="https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/security/side-channel-threat-model.md" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">defense</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> against Spectre-like CPU vulnerabilities.</span></span></div> <b id="docs-internal-guid-195a13d0-7fff-c0f9-7794-9da570841977" style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">We wanted to ensure that Site Isolation does not adversely affect user experience in a resource-constrained environment like Android. This is why, unlike desktop platforms where we isolate </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">all </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">sites, Chrome on Android uses a slimmer form of Site Isolation, protecting fewer sites to keep overhead low. More specifically, Site Isolation is turned on only for high-value sites where users log in with a password. This protects sites with sensitive data that users likely care about, such as banks or shopping sites, while allowing process sharing among less critical sites.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Once Chrome observes a password interaction on a website, future visits to that site will be protected by Site Isolation. That means the site will be rendered in its own dedicated renderer process, walled off from other sites. Navigations to other sites will cause a tab to switch processes, and cross-site iframes are put into a different process, becoming "</span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/oop-iframes" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">out-of-process iframes</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">." Chrome keeps a list of isolated sites stored locally on the device and clears the list whenever users clear their browsing history or other site data. To bootstrap, Chrome also isolates a crowdsourced list of sites where mobile users have been entering passwords most frequently.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the most part, Site Isolation is a behind-the-scenes architectural change that should not change the experience for users or developers. As on desktop platforms, it does cause Chrome to create more processes, which comes with performance tradeoffs: on the plus side, each renderer process is smaller, shorter-lived, and has less contention internally, but there is about a 3-5% total memory overhead in real workloads. We continue to work hard to optimize this behavior to keep Chrome both fast and secure.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In Chrome 77, password-triggered Site Isolation has been enabled for 99% of users (with a 1% holdback to monitor and improve performance) on Android devices that have a sufficient amount of RAM (currently 2GB). While we investigate how to bring this support to more devices, users who desire the most complete protection for their devices may manually opt in to full Site Isolation via chrome://flags/#enable-site-per-process, which will isolate all websites but carry higher memory cost.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In the future, we plan to add support for more ways of detecting when a site should be protected by Site Isolation. For example, we're working on allowing website operators to opt in any site to Site Isolation, without requiring user login.</span></span></div> <h2 dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 6pt; margin-top: 18pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 16pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Containing Compromised Renderers</span></span></h2> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">On desktop platforms, Site Isolation in Chrome 77 now helps defend against significantly stronger attacks. Our initial launch targeted Spectre-like attacks which could leak any data from a given renderer process. Site Isolation can now handle even severe attacks where </span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/site-isolation#TOC-Motivation" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">the renderer process is fully compromised</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> via a security bug, such as memory corruption bugs or Universal Cross-Site Scripting (</span><a href="https://ai.google/research/pubs/pub48028" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">UXSS</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">) logic errors.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For example, suppose an attacker discovered and exploited a memory corruption bug in Chrome's rendering engine, Blink. The bug might allow them to run arbitrary native code within the sandboxed renderer process, no longer constrained by the security checks in Blink. However, Chrome's browser process knows what site the renderer process is dedicated to, so it can restrict which cookies, passwords, and site data the entire process is allowed to receive. This makes it far more difficult for attackers to steal cross-site data.</span></span><br /> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="color: black; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In Chrome 77, Site Isolation helps protect many types of sensitive data from such compromised renderer processes:</span></div> <ul style="margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;"> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Authentication:</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Cookies and stored passwords can only be accessed by processes locked to the corresponding site.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Network data:</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Site Isolation uses </span><a href="https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/07/site-isolation#corb" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Cross-Origin Read Blocking</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> to filter sensitive resource types (e.g., HTML, XML, JSON, PDF) from a process, even if that process tries to lie to Chrome's network stack about its origin. Resources labeled with a </span><a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cross-Origin_Resource_Policy_(CORP)" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy header</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> are also protected.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Stored data and permissions:</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Renderer processes can only access stored data (e.g., localStorage) or permissions (e.g., microphone) based on the process's site lock. </span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Cross-origin messaging: </span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Chrome's browser process can verify the source origin of postMessage and BroadcastChannel messages, preventing the renderer process from lying about who sent the message.</span></li> </ul> <span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <span style="color: black; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">We are continuing to improve compromised renderer protections in several ways:</span></div> <span style="color: black; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></span><br /> <ul style="margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;"> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Bringing these protections to Chrome for Android.</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> This requires extra work to handle the case where only certain sites are isolated.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Protecting CSRF defenses.</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> </span><a href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-fetch-metadata/" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Sec-Fetch-Site</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> and </span><a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Origin" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Origin</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> request headers can be verified to prevent compromised renderers from forging them.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Protecting more types of data.</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> We are investigating how to protect additional data types by default with Cross-Origin Read Blocking.</span></li> <li><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; font-weight: 700; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Removing exceptions.</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> We are working to remove cases where these protections may not yet apply. For example, a small set of extensions still have broader cross-site access from content scripts, </span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/extension-content-script-fetches" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">until they update to the new security model</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. We have already worked with extension authors to bring the affected Chrome user population down from 14% to 2%, as well as </span><a href="https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/chromium-extensions/0ei-UCHNm34/lDaXwQhzBAAJ" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">harden other extension security issues</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. Also, Site Isolation does not apply to Flash, which is currently disabled by default and is on a </span><a href="https://www.chromium.org/flash-roadmap" style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none; white-space: pre;"><span style="color: #1155cc; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">deprecation path</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">.</span></li> </ul> <span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span> <span style="background-color: transparent; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="font-size: 14.6667px; white-space: pre-wrap;">We're excited about the improvements this brings to Chrome's overall security model. As a result, we are broadening the scope of the <a href="https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/chrome-rewards/#special" target="_blank">Chrome Vulnerability Reward Program</a> to also cover cross-site data disclosure attacks that involve compromised renderers. For a limited time, security bugs affecting Site Isolation may be eligible for higher rewards than the usual amount for information disclosure bugs. We are grateful for the contributions from security researchers that we have received so far, and we look forward to working together further to improve the state of web security.</span></span></div> <b style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></b> <br /> <div dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> <br /></div> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></span> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span id="docs-internal-guid-3d46ebca-7fff-d96b-367f-5aebfbd320b7"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;">Posted by Alex Moshchuk and Łukasz Anforowicz, Site Isolators</span></span></span></span><br /> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;"><br /></span></span></span> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </noscript> </div> </div> <div class='share'> <span class='twitter-custom social-wrapper' data-href='http://twitter.com/share?text=Chromium Blog:Recent Site Isolation improvements&url=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/recent-site-isolation-improvements.html&via=ChromiumDev'> <img alt='Share on Twitter' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_twitter_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> <span class='fb-custom social-wrapper' data-href='https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/recent-site-isolation-improvements.html'> <img alt='Share on Facebook' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_facebook_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> </div> <div class='post-footer'> <div class='cmt_iframe_holder' data-href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/recent-site-isolation-improvements.html' data-viewtype='FILTERED_POSTMOD'></div> <a href='https://plus.google.com/112374322230920073195' rel='author' style='display:none;'> Google </a> <div class='label-footer'> <span class='labels-caption'> Labels: </span> <span class='labels'> <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/chrome' rel='tag'> chrome </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/csrf' rel='tag'> csrf </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/security' rel='tag'> security </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/site%20isolation' rel='tag'> site isolation </a> , <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/spectre' rel='tag'> spectre </a> </span> </div> </div> </div> <div class='post' data-id='7355821188908907840' itemscope='' itemtype='http://schema.org/BlogPosting'> <h2 class='title' itemprop='name'> <a href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/dm-verity-algorithm-change.html' itemprop='url' title='DM Verity Algorithm Change'> DM Verity Algorithm Change </a> </h2> <div class='post-header'> <div class='published'> <span class='publishdate' itemprop='datePublished'> Wednesday, October 16, 2019 </span> </div> </div> <div class='post-body'> <div class='post-content' itemprop='articleBody'> <script type='text/template'> One of the foundational security features of Chromebooks is Verified Boot, which protects our users from potentially malicious software being run on their devices. The last chain of verification in this process is to validate the integrity of the root file system (rootfs). This blog post describes a recent enhancement to this rootfs validation to increase the cryptographic strength against attackers. This enhancement was carefully implemented to ensure that it didn’t negatively impact the startup time of Chromebooks.<br /> <br /> <div> Chrome OS uses DM Verity [<b><a href="https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/verified-boot" target="_blank">1</a></b>] to verify the rootfs authenticity. This is to protect against malicious software such as rootkits [<b><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit" target="_blank">2</a></b>], as well as accidental corruptions. The underlying structure leverages a cryptographic hash tree approach along with a kernel crypto API. With the hash tree approach individual hashes of small blocks constituting the rootfs are computed first. Then the hash tree is built up to compute and verify a final hash value [<b><a href="https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/dm-verity" target="_blank">3</a></b>]. This incremental approach makes the verification process less resource intensive, and consequently faster.<br /> <br /> Until recently, the underlying hash algorithm used by DM Verity in Chrome OS has been SHA1. However, SHA1 has been found to be vulnerable to attacks a few years ago [<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1">4</a>] and more recently research by Google and the larger security community has demonstrated that SHA1 collisions are not just theory anymore but can happen in practice [<b>5, 6, 7</b>]. This necessitates the replacement of SHA1 with SHA2 or SHA3 when the use scenarios makes the attacks defined in the research studies feasible.<br /> <br /> On the other hand, the risks to DM Verity due to collision attacks are arguably low. This is because DM Verity uses a hash tree structure with disk data blocks as leaves to obtain the final hash. And to turn the collision attack into an exploit for DM Verity, the attacker would need to develop malware that would fit into a single and specific block and produce the same hash value as the original block using a chosen prefix attack. This would be computationally expensive.<br /> We decided to proactively upgrade DM Verity in Chrome OS to use SHA256 instead. Moving to SHA256 was difficult because it is computationally more expensive than SHA1 and potentially would have increased Chromebook boot time. This is why we spent significant time tuning our implementation and measuring its performance impact on a wide range of Chromebooks to ensure that you will get very similar performance with SHA256 that you had with SHA1 when you boot your Chromebook as shown here:<br /> <br /> <br /> <table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody> <tr><td style="text-align: center;"><img height="403" src="https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/aanX8tKEnOp7c8KhKoOcg7DPz8SLxUTIGKMDGFNVrwf5wCnehAXjbdKdCcoo4Ad3ZYEanVtzln9tgMsk7hzP7I16tkHiQTUMK_s2k8Jsesf-DqESST-jkBm2H25duEaUdT8XeWsU" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; margin-top: -37px;" title="Chart" width="654" /></td></tr> <tr><td class="tr-caption"><br /> Kernel boot time comparison in ms for (1)Veyron-minnie, (2)Cyan, (3)Octopus, (4)Sarien, (5)Samus, (6)Clapper, (7)Eve, (8)Bob<br /> <br /></td></tr> </tbody></table> With this change in place your Chromebook will be safer and remain blazing fast. This migration from SHA1 to SHA256 in DM Verity is ready to go and will be on Chromebooks starting with M77.</div> <div> <br /> Posted by Betul Soysal, Chrome OS security software engineer<br /> <br /> <h3> References:</h3> <ol> <li><a href="https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/verified-boot">https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/verified-boot</a></li> <li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit</a></li> <li><a href="https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/dm-verity">https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/dm-verity</a></li> <li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1</a></li> <li>Stevens, Marc, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini, and Yarik Markov. "The first collision for full SHA-1.(2017)." URL http://shattered. it/static/shattered. pdf 167 (2017): 169-177.</li> <li>Mezher, Monique, and Ahmed Ibrahim. "Introducing Practical SHA-1 Collisions to the Classroom." Proceedings of the 50th ACM Technical Symposium on Computer Science Education. ACM, 2019.</li> <li>Leurent, Gaëtan, and Thomas Peyrin. "From Collisions to Chosen-Prefix Collisions Application to Full SHA-1." In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 527-555. Springer, Cham, 2019.</li> </ol> </div> <div> <br /></div> <br /> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </script> <noscript> One of the foundational security features of Chromebooks is Verified Boot, which protects our users from potentially malicious software being run on their devices. The last chain of verification in this process is to validate the integrity of the root file system (rootfs). This blog post describes a recent enhancement to this rootfs validation to increase the cryptographic strength against attackers. This enhancement was carefully implemented to ensure that it didn’t negatively impact the startup time of Chromebooks.<br /> <br /> <div> Chrome OS uses DM Verity [<b><a href="https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/verified-boot" target="_blank">1</a></b>] to verify the rootfs authenticity. This is to protect against malicious software such as rootkits [<b><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit" target="_blank">2</a></b>], as well as accidental corruptions. The underlying structure leverages a cryptographic hash tree approach along with a kernel crypto API. With the hash tree approach individual hashes of small blocks constituting the rootfs are computed first. Then the hash tree is built up to compute and verify a final hash value [<b><a href="https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/dm-verity" target="_blank">3</a></b>]. This incremental approach makes the verification process less resource intensive, and consequently faster.<br /> <br /> Until recently, the underlying hash algorithm used by DM Verity in Chrome OS has been SHA1. However, SHA1 has been found to be vulnerable to attacks a few years ago [<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1">4</a>] and more recently research by Google and the larger security community has demonstrated that SHA1 collisions are not just theory anymore but can happen in practice [<b>5, 6, 7</b>]. This necessitates the replacement of SHA1 with SHA2 or SHA3 when the use scenarios makes the attacks defined in the research studies feasible.<br /> <br /> On the other hand, the risks to DM Verity due to collision attacks are arguably low. This is because DM Verity uses a hash tree structure with disk data blocks as leaves to obtain the final hash. And to turn the collision attack into an exploit for DM Verity, the attacker would need to develop malware that would fit into a single and specific block and produce the same hash value as the original block using a chosen prefix attack. This would be computationally expensive.<br /> We decided to proactively upgrade DM Verity in Chrome OS to use SHA256 instead. Moving to SHA256 was difficult because it is computationally more expensive than SHA1 and potentially would have increased Chromebook boot time. This is why we spent significant time tuning our implementation and measuring its performance impact on a wide range of Chromebooks to ensure that you will get very similar performance with SHA256 that you had with SHA1 when you boot your Chromebook as shown here:<br /> <br /> <br /> <table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody> <tr><td style="text-align: center;"><img height="403" src="https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/aanX8tKEnOp7c8KhKoOcg7DPz8SLxUTIGKMDGFNVrwf5wCnehAXjbdKdCcoo4Ad3ZYEanVtzln9tgMsk7hzP7I16tkHiQTUMK_s2k8Jsesf-DqESST-jkBm2H25duEaUdT8XeWsU" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; margin-top: -37px;" title="Chart" width="654" /></td></tr> <tr><td class="tr-caption"><br /> Kernel boot time comparison in ms for (1)Veyron-minnie, (2)Cyan, (3)Octopus, (4)Sarien, (5)Samus, (6)Clapper, (7)Eve, (8)Bob<br /> <br /></td></tr> </tbody></table> With this change in place your Chromebook will be safer and remain blazing fast. This migration from SHA1 to SHA256 in DM Verity is ready to go and will be on Chromebooks starting with M77.</div> <div> <br /> Posted by Betul Soysal, Chrome OS security software engineer<br /> <br /> <h3> References:</h3> <ol> <li><a href="https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/verified-boot">https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/verified-boot</a></li> <li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit</a></li> <li><a href="https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/dm-verity">https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/dm-verity</a></li> <li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1</a></li> <li>Stevens, Marc, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini, and Yarik Markov. "The first collision for full SHA-1.(2017)." URL http://shattered. it/static/shattered. pdf 167 (2017): 169-177.</li> <li>Mezher, Monique, and Ahmed Ibrahim. "Introducing Practical SHA-1 Collisions to the Classroom." Proceedings of the 50th ACM Technical Symposium on Computer Science Education. ACM, 2019.</li> <li>Leurent, Gaëtan, and Thomas Peyrin. "From Collisions to Chosen-Prefix Collisions Application to Full SHA-1." In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 527-555. Springer, Cham, 2019.</li> </ol> </div> <div> <br /></div> <br /> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </noscript> </div> </div> <div class='share'> <span class='twitter-custom social-wrapper' data-href='http://twitter.com/share?text=Chromium Blog:DM Verity Algorithm Change&url=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/dm-verity-algorithm-change.html&via=ChromiumDev'> <img alt='Share on Twitter' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_twitter_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> <span class='fb-custom social-wrapper' data-href='https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/dm-verity-algorithm-change.html'> <img alt='Share on Facebook' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_facebook_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> </div> <div class='post-footer'> <div class='cmt_iframe_holder' data-href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/dm-verity-algorithm-change.html' data-viewtype='FILTERED_POSTMOD'></div> <a href='https://plus.google.com/112374322230920073195' rel='author' style='display:none;'> Google </a> <div class='label-footer'> </div> </div> </div> <div class='post' data-id='3077012600021314319' itemscope='' itemtype='http://schema.org/BlogPosting'> <h2 class='title' itemprop='name'> <a href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/no-more-mixed-messages-about-https.html' itemprop='url' title='No More Mixed Messages About HTTPS'> No More Mixed Messages About HTTPS </a> </h2> <div class='post-header'> <div class='published'> <span class='publishdate' itemprop='datePublished'> Thursday, October 3, 2019 </span> </div> </div> <div class='post-body'> <div class='post-content' itemprop='articleBody'> <script type='text/template'> <i>Update (April 6, 2020): Mixed image autoupgrading was originally scheduled for Chrome 81, but will be delayed until at least Chrome 84. Check the <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/4926989725073408" target="_blank">Chrome Platform Status entry</a> for the latest information about when mixed images will be autoupgraded and blocked if they fail to load over https://. Sites with mixed images will continue to trigger the “Not Secure” warning. </i><br /> <br /> Today we’re announcing that Chrome will gradually start ensuring that https:// pages can only load secure https:// subresources. In a series of steps outlined below, we’ll start blocking <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/prevent-mixed-content/what-is-mixed-content" target="_blank">mixed content</a> (insecure http:// subresources on https:// pages) by default. This change will improve user privacy and security on the web, and present a clearer browser security UX to users.<br /> <br /> In the past several years, the web has made great <a href="https://transparencyreport.google.com/https/overview?hl=en" target="_blank">progress</a> in transitioning to HTTPS: Chrome users now spend over 90% of their browsing time on HTTPS on all major platforms. We’re now turning our attention to making sure that HTTPS configurations across the web are secure and up-to-date.<br /> <br /> HTTPS pages commonly suffer from a problem called mixed content, where subresources on the page are loaded insecurely over http://. Browsers block many types of mixed content by default, like scripts and iframes, but images, audio, and video are still allowed to load, which threatens users’ privacy and security. For example, an attacker could tamper with a mixed image of a stock chart to mislead investors, or inject a tracking cookie into a mixed resource load. Loading mixed content also leads to a confusing browser security UX, where the page is presented as neither secure nor insecure but somewhere in between.<br /> <br /> In a series of steps starting in Chrome 79, <u>Chrome will gradually move to blocking all mixed content by default</u>. To minimize breakage, we will autoupgrade mixed resources to https://, so sites will continue to work if their subresources are already available over https://. Users will be able to enable a setting to opt out of mixed content blocking on particular websites, and below we’ll describe the resources available to developers to help them find and fix mixed content.<br /> <br /> <h3> Timeline</h3> <br /> Instead of blocking all mixed content all at once, we’ll be rolling out this change in a series of steps.<br /> <br /> <ul> <li>In <b>Chrome 79</b>, releasing to stable channel in December 2019, we’ll introduce a new setting to unblock mixed content on specific sites. This setting will apply to mixed scripts, iframes, and other types of content that Chrome currently blocks by default. Users can toggle this setting by clicking the lock icon on any https:// page and clicking Site Settings. This will replace the shield icon that shows up at the right side of the omnibox for unblocking mixed content in previous versions of desktop Chrome.</li> </ul> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"> </div> <div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-cba12657-7fff-3431-611a-b8e6848d3199"><span style="font-family: "open sans" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: 1pt solid #d9d9d9; display: inline-block; height: 294px; overflow: hidden; width: 468px;"><img height="294" src="https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/Do9LbaFEYFjUlNs33YCypEYxQm8CYUzmPX_vixX97u-nY_TpL00dAG5fWkdfqQysjFs0gZVXoB-FxY_KVHmpXH7XL-ZSRsynGDKaN8_f8uCXSaNa8qHNIiBt_bpB-go8oXeGCc32" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="468" /></span></span></span></div> </div> <ul> <li>In <b>Chrome 80</b>, mixed audio and video resources will be autoupgraded to https://, and Chrome will block them by default if they fail to load over https://. Chrome 80 will be released to early release channels in January 2020. Users can unblock affected audio and video resources with the setting described above.</li> <li>Also in <b>Chrome 80</b>, mixed images will still be allowed to load, but they will cause Chrome to show a “Not Secure” chip in the omnibox. We anticipate that this is a clearer security UI for users and that it will motivate websites to migrate their images to HTTPS. Developers can use the <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Upgrade-Insecure-Requests" target="_blank">upgrade-insecure-requests</a> or <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/block-all-mixed-content" target="_blank">block-all-mixed-content</a> Content Security Policy directives to avoid this warning. Here is the planned treatment:</li> </ul> <div style="text-align: center;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-4c11fb52-7fff-2ad4-880e-43832f49bfab"><span style="font-family: "open sans" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: 1pt solid #d9d9d9; display: inline-block; height: 34px; overflow: hidden; width: 508px;"><img height="34" src="https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/wSUwu35n2473_vCK8OQ-TN3dLH1LLcMPeR0fp6xPwSMruzNuq9GaOzRhxKr1CbfNH5PRXCGdqSuI8RsuAM_4qte3CUiTaRX_MvZ-Okr9cBg8_kn4KLueiNqqHrcYDsfuvkTGyYwi" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="508" /></span></span></span></div> <ul> <li>In <b>Chrome 81</b>, mixed images will be autoupgraded to https://, and Chrome will block them by default if they fail to load over https://. Chrome 81 will be released to early release channels in February 2020.</li> </ul> <br /> <h3> Resources for developers</h3> Developers should migrate their mixed content to https:// immediately to avoid warnings and breakage. Here are some resources:<br /> <br /> <ul> <li>Use <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/prevent-mixed-content/fixing-mixed-content" target="_blank">Content Security Policy</a> and <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/tools/lighthouse/audits/mixed-content" target="_blank">Lighthouse</a>’s mixed content audit to discover and fix mixed content on your site.</li> <li>See <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/encrypt-in-transit/enable-https" target="_blank">this guide</a> for general advice on migrating servers to HTTPS.</li> <li>Check with your CDN, web host, or content management system to see if they have special tools for debugging mixed content. For example, Cloudflare offers a tool to rewrite mixed content to https://, and WordPress <a href="https://en-gb.wordpress.org/plugins/ssl-insecure-content-fixer/" target="_blank">plugins</a> are available as well.</li> </ul> Posted by Emily Stark and Carlos Joan Rafael Ibarra Lopez, Chrome security team<br /> <div> <br /></div> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </script> <noscript> <i>Update (April 6, 2020): Mixed image autoupgrading was originally scheduled for Chrome 81, but will be delayed until at least Chrome 84. Check the <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/4926989725073408" target="_blank">Chrome Platform Status entry</a> for the latest information about when mixed images will be autoupgraded and blocked if they fail to load over https://. Sites with mixed images will continue to trigger the “Not Secure” warning. </i><br /> <br /> Today we’re announcing that Chrome will gradually start ensuring that https:// pages can only load secure https:// subresources. In a series of steps outlined below, we’ll start blocking <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/prevent-mixed-content/what-is-mixed-content" target="_blank">mixed content</a> (insecure http:// subresources on https:// pages) by default. This change will improve user privacy and security on the web, and present a clearer browser security UX to users.<br /> <br /> In the past several years, the web has made great <a href="https://transparencyreport.google.com/https/overview?hl=en" target="_blank">progress</a> in transitioning to HTTPS: Chrome users now spend over 90% of their browsing time on HTTPS on all major platforms. We’re now turning our attention to making sure that HTTPS configurations across the web are secure and up-to-date.<br /> <br /> HTTPS pages commonly suffer from a problem called mixed content, where subresources on the page are loaded insecurely over http://. Browsers block many types of mixed content by default, like scripts and iframes, but images, audio, and video are still allowed to load, which threatens users’ privacy and security. For example, an attacker could tamper with a mixed image of a stock chart to mislead investors, or inject a tracking cookie into a mixed resource load. Loading mixed content also leads to a confusing browser security UX, where the page is presented as neither secure nor insecure but somewhere in between.<br /> <br /> In a series of steps starting in Chrome 79, <u>Chrome will gradually move to blocking all mixed content by default</u>. To minimize breakage, we will autoupgrade mixed resources to https://, so sites will continue to work if their subresources are already available over https://. Users will be able to enable a setting to opt out of mixed content blocking on particular websites, and below we’ll describe the resources available to developers to help them find and fix mixed content.<br /> <br /> <h3> Timeline</h3> <br /> Instead of blocking all mixed content all at once, we’ll be rolling out this change in a series of steps.<br /> <br /> <ul> <li>In <b>Chrome 79</b>, releasing to stable channel in December 2019, we’ll introduce a new setting to unblock mixed content on specific sites. This setting will apply to mixed scripts, iframes, and other types of content that Chrome currently blocks by default. Users can toggle this setting by clicking the lock icon on any https:// page and clicking Site Settings. This will replace the shield icon that shows up at the right side of the omnibox for unblocking mixed content in previous versions of desktop Chrome.</li> </ul> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"> </div> <div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-cba12657-7fff-3431-611a-b8e6848d3199"><span style="font-family: "open sans" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: 1pt solid #d9d9d9; display: inline-block; height: 294px; overflow: hidden; width: 468px;"><img height="294" src="https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/Do9LbaFEYFjUlNs33YCypEYxQm8CYUzmPX_vixX97u-nY_TpL00dAG5fWkdfqQysjFs0gZVXoB-FxY_KVHmpXH7XL-ZSRsynGDKaN8_f8uCXSaNa8qHNIiBt_bpB-go8oXeGCc32" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="468" /></span></span></span></div> </div> <ul> <li>In <b>Chrome 80</b>, mixed audio and video resources will be autoupgraded to https://, and Chrome will block them by default if they fail to load over https://. Chrome 80 will be released to early release channels in January 2020. Users can unblock affected audio and video resources with the setting described above.</li> <li>Also in <b>Chrome 80</b>, mixed images will still be allowed to load, but they will cause Chrome to show a “Not Secure” chip in the omnibox. We anticipate that this is a clearer security UI for users and that it will motivate websites to migrate their images to HTTPS. Developers can use the <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Upgrade-Insecure-Requests" target="_blank">upgrade-insecure-requests</a> or <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/block-all-mixed-content" target="_blank">block-all-mixed-content</a> Content Security Policy directives to avoid this warning. Here is the planned treatment:</li> </ul> <div style="text-align: center;"> <span id="docs-internal-guid-4c11fb52-7fff-2ad4-880e-43832f49bfab"><span style="font-family: "open sans" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: 1pt solid #d9d9d9; display: inline-block; height: 34px; overflow: hidden; width: 508px;"><img height="34" src="https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/wSUwu35n2473_vCK8OQ-TN3dLH1LLcMPeR0fp6xPwSMruzNuq9GaOzRhxKr1CbfNH5PRXCGdqSuI8RsuAM_4qte3CUiTaRX_MvZ-Okr9cBg8_kn4KLueiNqqHrcYDsfuvkTGyYwi" style="margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" width="508" /></span></span></span></div> <ul> <li>In <b>Chrome 81</b>, mixed images will be autoupgraded to https://, and Chrome will block them by default if they fail to load over https://. Chrome 81 will be released to early release channels in February 2020.</li> </ul> <br /> <h3> Resources for developers</h3> Developers should migrate their mixed content to https:// immediately to avoid warnings and breakage. Here are some resources:<br /> <br /> <ul> <li>Use <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/prevent-mixed-content/fixing-mixed-content" target="_blank">Content Security Policy</a> and <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/tools/lighthouse/audits/mixed-content" target="_blank">Lighthouse</a>’s mixed content audit to discover and fix mixed content on your site.</li> <li>See <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/encrypt-in-transit/enable-https" target="_blank">this guide</a> for general advice on migrating servers to HTTPS.</li> <li>Check with your CDN, web host, or content management system to see if they have special tools for debugging mixed content. For example, Cloudflare offers a tool to rewrite mixed content to https://, and WordPress <a href="https://en-gb.wordpress.org/plugins/ssl-insecure-content-fixer/" target="_blank">plugins</a> are available as well.</li> </ul> Posted by Emily Stark and Carlos Joan Rafael Ibarra Lopez, Chrome security team<br /> <div> <br /></div> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </noscript> </div> </div> <div class='share'> <span class='twitter-custom social-wrapper' data-href='http://twitter.com/share?text=Chromium Blog:No More Mixed Messages About HTTPS&url=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/no-more-mixed-messages-about-https.html&via=ChromiumDev'> <img alt='Share on Twitter' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_twitter_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> <span class='fb-custom social-wrapper' data-href='https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/no-more-mixed-messages-about-https.html'> <img alt='Share on Facebook' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_facebook_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> </div> <div class='post-footer'> <div class='cmt_iframe_holder' data-href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/no-more-mixed-messages-about-https.html' data-viewtype='FILTERED_POSTMOD'></div> <a href='https://plus.google.com/112374322230920073195' rel='author' style='display:none;'> Google </a> <div class='label-footer'> <span class='labels-caption'> Labels: </span> <span class='labels'> <a class='label' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/chrome%20security' rel='tag'> chrome security </a> </span> </div> </div> </div> <div class='post' data-id='8512494413900308292' itemscope='' itemtype='http://schema.org/BlogPosting'> <h2 class='title' itemprop='name'> <a href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/chrome-ui-for-deprecating-legacy-tls.html' itemprop='url' title='Chrome UI for Deprecating Legacy TLS Versions'> Chrome UI for Deprecating Legacy TLS Versions </a> </h2> <div class='post-header'> <div class='published'> <span class='publishdate' itemprop='datePublished'> Tuesday, October 1, 2019 </span> </div> </div> <div class='post-body'> <div class='post-content' itemprop='articleBody'> <script type='text/template'> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"> </div> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Update (April 6, 2020): The removal of legacy TLS versions was originally scheduled for Chrome 81, but is being delayed until at least Chrome 84. Chrome will continue to show the “Not Secure” indicator for sites using TLS 1.0 or 1.1, and Chrome 81 Beta will show the full page interstitial warning for affected sites. Our hope is that this will help alert affected site owners ahead of the delayed removal. Check the <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5759116003770368" target="_blank">Chrome Platform Status entry</a> for the latest information about the removal of TLS 1.0 and 1.1 support.</i></span><br /> <div> <br /></div> <br /> Last October <a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/modernizing-transport-security.html" target="_blank">we announced</a> our plans to remove support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1 in Chrome 81. In this post we’re announcing a pre-removal phase in which we’ll introduce a gentler warning UI, and previewing the UI that we’ll use to block TLS 1.0 and 1.1 in Chrome 81. Site administrators should immediately enable TLS 1.2 or later to avoid these UI treatments.<br /> <br /> While legacy TLS usage has decreased, we still see <a href="https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2634" target="_blank">over 0.5% of page loads</a> using these deprecated versions. To ease the transition to the final removal of support and to reduce user surprise when outdated configurations stop working, Chrome will discontinue support in two steps: first, showing new security indicators for sites using these deprecated versions; and second, blocking connections to these sites with a full page warning.<br /> <br /> <br /> <h3> Pre-removal warning</h3> Starting January 13, 2020, for Chrome 79 and higher, we will show a “Not Secure” indicator for sites using TLS 1.0 or 1.1 to alert users to the outdated configuration:<br /> <div> <br /></div> <div> <span id="docs-internal-guid-57e812bb-7fff-1353-3b3e-f50df777295d"><span style="font-family: "open sans" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 358px; overflow: hidden; width: 422px;"><img height="374" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/pFgWkhGPqrmpIvGAeZPwo5rkWXcBK_Me5eOYrSaB_SyPNY1zDjqGrrwoE5iGdf4wZtRedQG8GHQlTaeXIzHe54GszxKStFShPKkn3-Hb0cuXfADgRfiXkkHoUNiSOekm6-7540re" style="margin-left: -19.939862542955325px; margin-top: 0px;" width="461.8797250859106" /></span></span></span><br /> <i>The new security indicator and connection security information that will be shown to users who visit a site using TLS 1.0 or 1.1 starting in January 2020.</i></div> <div> When a site uses TLS 1.0 or 1.1, Chrome will downgrade the security indicator and show a more detailed warning message inside Page Info. This change will not block users from visiting or using the page, but will alert them to the downgraded security of the connection.<br /> <br /> Note that Chrome already shows warnings in DevTools to alert site owners that they are using a deprecated version of TLS.<br /> <div> <span id="docs-internal-guid-8613e32f-7fff-ba12-c01e-43eaa888652c"></span><br /> <div> <span id="docs-internal-guid-8613e32f-7fff-ba12-c01e-43eaa888652c"><span style="font-family: "open sans" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></span></div> <span id="docs-internal-guid-8613e32f-7fff-ba12-c01e-43eaa888652c"> </span> <div> <br /> <h3> Removal UI</h3> <br /> In Chrome 81, which will be released to the Stable channel in March 2020, we will begin blocking connections to sites using TLS 1.0 or 1.1, showing a full page interstitial warning:<br /> <br /> <br /> <span id="docs-internal-guid-c87c0364-7fff-012a-5e60-2566ebc77fd9"><span style="font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: 1pt solid #d9d9d9; display: inline-block; height: 334px; overflow: hidden; width: 485px;"><img height="413.9870550161812" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/9i5Gr4_Wo7iuIEphWB-zX5YdzpQMbjBp0vEMguwFtJ4luJdd9Lw89_itemCmh4--RXRszSN7WD4NElVOnfgF1pt9ZTHU_Z-bSXPRekOr6LzdHYFXIrKMLN8MYfZqJ8Ka-plcplyD" style="margin-left: -20.8025px; margin-top: -18.3754px;" width="528.7531458370364" /></span></span></span><br /> <br /> <i>The full screen interstitial warning that will be shown to users who visit a site using TLS 1.0 or 1.1 starting in Chrome 81. Final warning subject to change.</i><br /> <br /> Site administrators should immediately enable TLS 1.2 or later. Depending on server software (such as Apache or nginx), this may be a configuration change or a software update. Additionally, we encourage all sites to revisit their TLS configuration. In <a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/modernizing-transport-security.html" target="_blank">our original announcement</a>, we outlined our current criteria for modern TLS.<br /> <br /> Enterprise deployments can preview the final removal of TLS 1.0 and 1.1 by setting the SSLVersionMin policy to “tls1.2”. This will prevent clients from connecting over these protocol versions. For enterprise deployments that need more time, this same policy can be used to re-enable TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 and disable the warning UIs until January 2021.</div> <div> <br /></div> <div> Posted by Chris Thompson, Chrome security team<br /> <div> <br /></div> </div> </div> </div> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </script> <noscript> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"> </div> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Update (April 6, 2020): The removal of legacy TLS versions was originally scheduled for Chrome 81, but is being delayed until at least Chrome 84. Chrome will continue to show the “Not Secure” indicator for sites using TLS 1.0 or 1.1, and Chrome 81 Beta will show the full page interstitial warning for affected sites. Our hope is that this will help alert affected site owners ahead of the delayed removal. Check the <a href="https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5759116003770368" target="_blank">Chrome Platform Status entry</a> for the latest information about the removal of TLS 1.0 and 1.1 support.</i></span><br /> <div> <br /></div> <br /> Last October <a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/modernizing-transport-security.html" target="_blank">we announced</a> our plans to remove support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1 in Chrome 81. In this post we’re announcing a pre-removal phase in which we’ll introduce a gentler warning UI, and previewing the UI that we’ll use to block TLS 1.0 and 1.1 in Chrome 81. Site administrators should immediately enable TLS 1.2 or later to avoid these UI treatments.<br /> <br /> While legacy TLS usage has decreased, we still see <a href="https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2634" target="_blank">over 0.5% of page loads</a> using these deprecated versions. To ease the transition to the final removal of support and to reduce user surprise when outdated configurations stop working, Chrome will discontinue support in two steps: first, showing new security indicators for sites using these deprecated versions; and second, blocking connections to these sites with a full page warning.<br /> <br /> <br /> <h3> Pre-removal warning</h3> Starting January 13, 2020, for Chrome 79 and higher, we will show a “Not Secure” indicator for sites using TLS 1.0 or 1.1 to alert users to the outdated configuration:<br /> <div> <br /></div> <div> <span id="docs-internal-guid-57e812bb-7fff-1353-3b3e-f50df777295d"><span style="font-family: "open sans" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: none; display: inline-block; height: 358px; overflow: hidden; width: 422px;"><img height="374" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/pFgWkhGPqrmpIvGAeZPwo5rkWXcBK_Me5eOYrSaB_SyPNY1zDjqGrrwoE5iGdf4wZtRedQG8GHQlTaeXIzHe54GszxKStFShPKkn3-Hb0cuXfADgRfiXkkHoUNiSOekm6-7540re" style="margin-left: -19.939862542955325px; margin-top: 0px;" width="461.8797250859106" /></span></span></span><br /> <i>The new security indicator and connection security information that will be shown to users who visit a site using TLS 1.0 or 1.1 starting in January 2020.</i></div> <div> When a site uses TLS 1.0 or 1.1, Chrome will downgrade the security indicator and show a more detailed warning message inside Page Info. This change will not block users from visiting or using the page, but will alert them to the downgraded security of the connection.<br /> <br /> Note that Chrome already shows warnings in DevTools to alert site owners that they are using a deprecated version of TLS.<br /> <div> <span id="docs-internal-guid-8613e32f-7fff-ba12-c01e-43eaa888652c"></span><br /> <div> <span id="docs-internal-guid-8613e32f-7fff-ba12-c01e-43eaa888652c"><span style="font-family: "open sans" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></span></div> <span id="docs-internal-guid-8613e32f-7fff-ba12-c01e-43eaa888652c"> </span> <div> <br /> <h3> Removal UI</h3> <br /> In Chrome 81, which will be released to the Stable channel in March 2020, we will begin blocking connections to sites using TLS 1.0 or 1.1, showing a full page interstitial warning:<br /> <br /> <br /> <span id="docs-internal-guid-c87c0364-7fff-012a-5e60-2566ebc77fd9"><span style="font-family: "arial"; font-size: 11pt; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="border: 1pt solid #d9d9d9; display: inline-block; height: 334px; overflow: hidden; width: 485px;"><img height="413.9870550161812" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/9i5Gr4_Wo7iuIEphWB-zX5YdzpQMbjBp0vEMguwFtJ4luJdd9Lw89_itemCmh4--RXRszSN7WD4NElVOnfgF1pt9ZTHU_Z-bSXPRekOr6LzdHYFXIrKMLN8MYfZqJ8Ka-plcplyD" style="margin-left: -20.8025px; margin-top: -18.3754px;" width="528.7531458370364" /></span></span></span><br /> <br /> <i>The full screen interstitial warning that will be shown to users who visit a site using TLS 1.0 or 1.1 starting in Chrome 81. Final warning subject to change.</i><br /> <br /> Site administrators should immediately enable TLS 1.2 or later. Depending on server software (such as Apache or nginx), this may be a configuration change or a software update. Additionally, we encourage all sites to revisit their TLS configuration. In <a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/modernizing-transport-security.html" target="_blank">our original announcement</a>, we outlined our current criteria for modern TLS.<br /> <br /> Enterprise deployments can preview the final removal of TLS 1.0 and 1.1 by setting the SSLVersionMin policy to “tls1.2”. This will prevent clients from connecting over these protocol versions. For enterprise deployments that need more time, this same policy can be used to re-enable TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 and disable the warning UIs until January 2021.</div> <div> <br /></div> <div> Posted by Chris Thompson, Chrome security team<br /> <div> <br /></div> </div> </div> </div> <span itemprop='author' itemscope='itemscope' itemtype='http://schema.org/Person'> <meta content='https://plus.google.com/116899029375914044550' itemprop='url'/> </span> </noscript> </div> </div> <div class='share'> <span class='twitter-custom social-wrapper' data-href='http://twitter.com/share?text=Chromium Blog:Chrome UI for Deprecating Legacy TLS Versions&url=https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/chrome-ui-for-deprecating-legacy-tls.html&via=ChromiumDev'> <img alt='Share on Twitter' height='24' src='https://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/material/system/2x/post_twitter_black_24dp.png' width='24'/> </span> <span class='fb-custom social-wrapper' 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</li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/Lite%20pages'> Lite pages </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/loading%20interventions'> loading interventions </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/loading%20optimizations'> loading optimizations </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/lock%20icon'> lock icon </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/long-tail'> long-tail </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/mac'> mac </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/manifest%20v3'> manifest v3 </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/metrics'> metrics </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/microsoft%20edge'> microsoft edge </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/mixed%20forms'> mixed forms </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/mobile'> mobile </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/na'> na </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/native%20client'> native client </a> <span dir='ltr'> 8 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/native%20file%20system'> native file system </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/New%20Features'> New Features </a> <span dir='ltr'> 5 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/notifications'> notifications </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/octane'> octane </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/open%20web'> open web </a> <span dir='ltr'> 4 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/origin%20trials'> origin trials </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/pagespeed%20insights'> pagespeed insights </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/pagespeedinsights'> pagespeedinsights </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/passwords'> passwords </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/payment%20handler'> payment handler </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/payment%20request'> payment request </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/payments'> payments </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/performance'> performance </a> <span dir='ltr'> 20 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/performance%20tools'> performance tools </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/permission%20UI'> permission UI </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/permissions'> permissions </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/play%20store'> play store </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/portals'> portals </a> <span dir='ltr'> 3 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/prefetching'> prefetching </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/privacy'> privacy </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/privacy%20sandbox'> privacy sandbox </a> <span dir='ltr'> 4 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/private%20prefetch%20proxy'> private prefetch proxy </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/profile%20guided%20optimization'> profile guided optimization </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/progressive%20web%20apps'> progressive web apps </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/Project%20Strobe'> Project Strobe </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/protection'> protection </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/pwa'> pwa </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/QUIC'> QUIC </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/quieter%20permissions'> quieter permissions </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/releases'> releases </a> <span dir='ltr'> 3 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/removals'> removals </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/rlz'> rlz </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/root%20program'> root program </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/safe%20browsing'> safe browsing </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/Secure%20DNS'> Secure DNS </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/security'> security </a> <span dir='ltr'> 36 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/site%20isolation'> site isolation </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/slow%20loading'> slow loading </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/sms%20receiver'> sms receiver </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/spam%20policy'> spam policy </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/spdy'> spdy </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/spectre'> spectre </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/speed'> speed </a> <span dir='ltr'> 4 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/ssl'> ssl </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/store%20listing'> store listing </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/strobe'> strobe </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/subscription%20pages'> subscription pages </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/suspicious%20site%20reporter%20extension'> suspicious site reporter extension </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/TCP'> TCP </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/the%20fast%20and%20the%20curious'> the fast and the curious </a> <span dir='ltr'> 23 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/TLS'> TLS </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/tools'> tools </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/tracing'> tracing </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/transparency'> transparency </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/trusted%20web%20activities'> trusted web activities </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/twa'> twa </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/user%20agent%20string'> user agent string </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/user%20data%20policy'> user data policy </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/v8'> v8 </a> <span dir='ltr'> 6 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/video'> video </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/wasm'> wasm </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web'> web </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20apps'> web apps </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20assembly'> web assembly </a> <span dir='ltr'> 2 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20developers'> web developers </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20intents'> web intents </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20packaging'> web packaging </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20payments'> web payments </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20platform'> web platform </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20request%20api'> web request api </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web%20vitals'> web vitals </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web.dev'> web.dev </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/web.dev%20live'> web.dev live </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webapi'> webapi </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webassembly'> webassembly </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webaudio'> webaudio </a> <span dir='ltr'> 3 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webgl'> webgl </a> <span dir='ltr'> 7 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webkit'> webkit </a> <span dir='ltr'> 5 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/WebM'> WebM </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webmaster'> webmaster </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webp'> webp </a> <span dir='ltr'> 5 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webrtc'> webrtc </a> <span dir='ltr'> 6 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/websockets'> websockets </a> <span dir='ltr'> 5 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/webtiming'> webtiming </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/writable-files'> writable-files </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> <li> <a dir='ltr' href='https://blog.chromium.org/search/label/yerba%20beuna%20center%20for%20the%20arts'> yerba beuna center for the arts </a> <span dir='ltr'> 1 </span> </li> </ul> <div class='clear'></div> </div> </div><div class='widget BlogArchive' 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class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2023/06/'> Jun </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2023/05/'> May </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2023/04/'> Apr </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2023/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/'> 2022 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/12/'> Dec </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/09/'> Sep </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/08/'> Aug </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/06/'> Jun </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/05/'> May </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/04/'> Apr </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/03/'> Mar </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2022/01/'> Jan </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/'> 2021 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/12/'> Dec </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/11/'> Nov </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/10/'> Oct </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/09/'> Sep </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/08/'> Aug </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/07/'> Jul </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/06/'> Jun </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2021/05/'> May </a> 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class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/'> 2020 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/12/'> Dec </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/11/'> Nov </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/10/'> Oct </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/09/'> Sep </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/08/'> Aug </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/07/'> Jul </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/06/'> Jun </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/05/'> May </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/04/'> Apr </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/03/'> Mar </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2020/01/'> Jan </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate expanded'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy toggle-open'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/'> 2019 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/12/'> Dec </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/11/'> Nov </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate expanded'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/10/'> Oct </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/09/'> Sep </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/08/'> Aug </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/07/'> Jul </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/06/'> Jun </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/05/'> May </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/04/'> Apr </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/03/'> Mar </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2019/01/'> Jan </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2018/'> 2018 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> 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class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2018/07/'> Jul </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2018/06/'> Jun </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2018/05/'> May </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2018/04/'> Apr </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2018/03/'> Mar </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2018/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2018/01/'> Jan </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2017/'> 2017 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2017/12/'> Dec </a> </div> <div class='items'> 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</li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2017/06/'> Jun </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2017/05/'> May </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2017/04/'> Apr </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2017/03/'> Mar </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2017/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2017/01/'> Jan </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2016/'> 2016 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2016/12/'> Dec </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2016/11/'> Nov </a> 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<div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2016/04/'> Apr </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2016/03/'> Mar </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2016/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2016/01/'> Jan </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/'> 2015 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/12/'> Dec </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/11/'> Nov </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/10/'> Oct </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/09/'> Sep </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/08/'> Aug </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/07/'> Jul </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/06/'> Jun </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/05/'> May </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/04/'> Apr </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/03/'> Mar </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2015/01/'> Jan </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i 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class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2013/02/'> Feb </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2013/01/'> Jan </a> </div> <div class='items'> </div> </li> </ul> </div> </li> </ul> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class='intervalToggle'> <span class='new-toggle' href='javascript:void(0)'> <i class='material-icons arrow'>  </i> </span> <a class='toggle' href='javascript:void(0)' style='display: none'> <span class='zippy'> <i class='material-icons'>  </i>   </span> </a> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2012/'> 2012 </a> </div> <div class='items'> <ul class='hierarchy'> <li class='archivedate collapsed'> <div class=''> <a class='post-count-link' href='https://blog.chromium.org/2012/12/'> Dec </a> </div> <div class='items'> 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