Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Sub-technique T1547.001 - Enterprise

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href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1590/005/"> IP Addresses </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1590-T1590.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1590/006/"> Network Security Appliances </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0043-T1591"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1591/"> Gather Victim Org Information </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1591-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0043-T1591-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0043-T1591-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1591-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0043-T1591-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1591-T1591.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1591/001/"> Determine Physical Locations </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1591-T1591.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1591/002/"> Business Relationships </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1591-T1591.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1591/003/"> Identify Business Tempo </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1591-T1591.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1591/004/"> Identify Roles </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0043-T1598"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1598/"> Phishing for Information </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1598-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0043-T1598-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0043-T1598-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1598-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0043-T1598-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1598-T1598.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1598/001/"> Spearphishing Service </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1598-T1598.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1598/002/"> Spearphishing Attachment </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1598-T1598.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1598/003/"> Spearphishing Link </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0043-T1597"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1597/"> Search Closed Sources </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1597-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0043-T1597-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0043-T1597-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1597-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0043-T1597-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1597-T1597.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1597/001/"> Threat Intel Vendors </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1597-T1597.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1597/002/"> Purchase Technical Data </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0043-T1596"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1596/"> Search Open Technical Databases </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1596-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0043-T1596-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0043-T1596-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1596-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0043-T1596-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1596-T1596.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1596/001/"> DNS/Passive DNS </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1596-T1596.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1596/002/"> WHOIS </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1596-T1596.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1596/003/"> Digital Certificates </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1596-T1596.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1596/004/"> CDNs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1596-T1596.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1596/005/"> Scan Databases </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0043-T1593"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1593/"> Search Open Websites/Domains </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1593-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0043-T1593-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0043-T1593-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1593-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0043-T1593-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1593-T1593.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1593/001/"> Social Media </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1593-T1593.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1593/002/"> Search Engines </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0043-T1594"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1594/"> Search Victim-Owned Websites </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0042"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0042"> Resource Development </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0042-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0042-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0042-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0042-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0042-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1583/"> Acquire Infrastructure </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0042-T1583-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0042-T1583-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-T1583.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1583/001/"> Domains </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-T1583.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1583/002/"> DNS Server </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-T1583.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1583/003/"> Virtual Private Server </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-T1583.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1583/004/"> Server </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-T1583.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1583/005/"> Botnet </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1583-T1583.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1583/006/"> Web Services </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0042-T1586"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1586/"> Compromise Accounts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1586-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0042-T1586-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0042-T1586-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1586-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0042-T1586-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1586-T1586.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1586/001/"> Social Media Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1586-T1586.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1586/002/"> Email Accounts </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1584/"> Compromise Infrastructure </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0042-T1584-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0042-T1584-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-T1584.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1584/001/"> Domains </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-T1584.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1584/002/"> DNS Server </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-T1584.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1584/003/"> Virtual Private Server </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-T1584.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1584/004/"> Server </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-T1584.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1584/005/"> Botnet </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1584-T1584.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1584/006/"> Web Services </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0042-T1587"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1587/"> Develop Capabilities </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1587-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0042-T1587-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0042-T1587-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1587-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0042-T1587-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1587-T1587.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1587/001/"> Malware </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1587-T1587.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1587/002/"> Code Signing Certificates </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1587-T1587.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1587/003/"> Digital Certificates </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1587-T1587.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1587/004/"> Exploits </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0042-T1585"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1585/"> Establish Accounts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1585-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0042-T1585-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0042-T1585-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1585-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0042-T1585-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1585-T1585.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1585/001/"> Social Media Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1585-T1585.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1585/002/"> Email Accounts </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1588/"> Obtain Capabilities </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0042-T1588-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0042-T1588-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-T1588.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1588/001/"> Malware </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-T1588.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1588/002/"> Tool </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-T1588.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1588/003/"> Code Signing Certificates </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-T1588.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1588/004/"> Digital Certificates </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-T1588.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1588/005/"> Exploits </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1588-T1588.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1588/006/"> Vulnerabilities </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0042-T1608"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1608/"> Stage Capabilities </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1608-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0042-T1608-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0042-T1608-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1608-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0042-T1608-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1608-T1608.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1608/001/"> Upload Malware </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1608-T1608.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1608/002/"> Upload Tool </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1608-T1608.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1608/003/"> Install Digital Certificate </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1608-T1608.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1608/004/"> Drive-by Target </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0042-T1608-T1608.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1608/005/"> Link Target </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0001"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0001"> Initial Access </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0001-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0001-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0001-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0001-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0001-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1189"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1189/"> Drive-by Compromise </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1190"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1190/"> Exploit Public-Facing Application </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1133"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1133/"> External Remote Services </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1200"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1200/"> Hardware Additions </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0001-T1566"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1566/"> Phishing </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1566-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0001-T1566-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0001-T1566-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1566-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0001-T1566-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1566-T1566.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1566/001/"> Spearphishing Attachment </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1566-T1566.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1566/002/"> Spearphishing Link </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1566-T1566.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1566/003/"> Spearphishing via Service </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1091"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1091/"> Replication Through Removable Media </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0001-T1195"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1195/"> Supply Chain Compromise </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1195-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0001-T1195-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0001-T1195-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1195-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0001-T1195-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1195-T1195.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1195/001/"> Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1195-T1195.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1195/002/"> Compromise Software Supply Chain </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1195-T1195.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1195/003/"> Compromise Hardware Supply Chain </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1199"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1199/"> Trusted Relationship </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0001-T1078"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/"> Valid Accounts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1078-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0001-T1078-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0001-T1078-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1078-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0001-T1078-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1078-T1078.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/001/"> Default Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1078-T1078.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/002/"> Domain Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1078-T1078.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/003/"> Local Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0001-T1078-T1078.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/004/"> Cloud Accounts </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0002"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0002"> Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0002-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0002-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0002-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0002-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0002-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/"> Command and Scripting Interpreter </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0002-T1059-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0002-T1059-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-T1059.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/001/"> PowerShell </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-T1059.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/002/"> AppleScript </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-T1059.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/003/"> Windows Command Shell </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-T1059.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/004/"> Unix Shell </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-T1059.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/005/"> Visual Basic </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-T1059.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/006/"> Python </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-T1059.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/007/"> JavaScript </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1059-T1059.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/008/"> Network Device CLI </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1609"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1609/"> Container Administration Command </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1610"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1610/"> Deploy Container </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1203"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1203/"> Exploitation for Client Execution </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0002-T1559"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1559/"> Inter-Process Communication </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1559-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0002-T1559-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0002-T1559-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1559-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0002-T1559-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1559-T1559.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1559/001/"> Component Object Model </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1559-T1559.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1559/002/"> Dynamic Data Exchange </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1106"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1106/"> Native API </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/"> Scheduled Task/Job </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0002-T1053-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0002-T1053-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-T1053.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/001/"> At (Linux) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-T1053.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/002/"> At (Windows) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-T1053.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/003/"> Cron </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-T1053.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/004/"> Launchd </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-T1053.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/005/"> Scheduled Task </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-T1053.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/006/"> Systemd Timers </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1053-T1053.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/007/"> Container Orchestration Job </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1129"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1129/"> Shared Modules </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1072"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1072/"> Software Deployment Tools </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0002-T1569"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1569/"> System Services </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1569-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0002-T1569-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0002-T1569-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1569-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0002-T1569-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1569-T1569.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1569/001/"> Launchctl </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1569-T1569.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1569/002/"> Service Execution </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0002-T1204"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1204/"> User Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1204-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0002-T1204-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0002-T1204-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1204-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0002-T1204-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1204-T1204.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1204/001/"> Malicious Link </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1204-T1204.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1204/002/"> Malicious File </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1204-T1204.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1204/003/"> Malicious Image </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0002-T1047"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1047/"> Windows Management Instrumentation </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0003"> Persistence </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1098"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1098/"> Account Manipulation </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1098-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1098-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1098-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1098-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1098-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1098-T1098.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1098/001/"> Additional Cloud Credentials </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1098-T1098.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1098/002/"> Exchange Email Delegate Permissions </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1098-T1098.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1098/003/"> Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1098-T1098.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1098/004/"> SSH Authorized Keys </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1197"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1197/"> BITS Jobs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/"> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1547-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1547-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head active" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/001/"> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/002/"> Authentication Package </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/003/"> Time Providers </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/004/"> Winlogon Helper DLL </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/005/"> Security Support Provider </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/006/"> Kernel Modules and Extensions </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/007/"> Re-opened Applications </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/008/"> LSASS Driver </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/009/"> Shortcut Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/010/"> Port Monitors </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/011/"> Plist Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/012/"> Print Processors </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.013"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/013/"> XDG Autostart Entries </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1547-T1547.014"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/014/"> Active Setup </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1037"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/"> Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1037-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1037-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1037-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1037-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1037-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1037-T1037.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/001/"> Logon Script (Windows) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1037-T1037.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/002/"> Logon Script (Mac) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1037-T1037.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/003/"> Network Logon Script </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1037-T1037.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/004/"> RC Scripts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1037-T1037.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/005/"> Startup Items </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1176"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1176/"> Browser Extensions </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1554"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1554/"> Compromise Client Software Binary </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1136"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1136/"> Create Account </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1136-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1136-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1136-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1136-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1136-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1136-T1136.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1136/001/"> Local Account </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1136-T1136.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1136/002/"> Domain Account </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1136-T1136.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1136/003/"> Cloud Account </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1543"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/"> Create or Modify System Process </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1543-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1543-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1543-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1543-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1543-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1543-T1543.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/001/"> Launch Agent </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1543-T1543.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/002/"> Systemd Service </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1543-T1543.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/003/"> Windows Service </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1543-T1543.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/004/"> Launch Daemon </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/"> Event Triggered Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1546-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1546-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/001/"> Change Default File Association </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/002/"> Screensaver </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/003/"> Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/004/"> Unix Shell Configuration Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/005/"> Trap </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/006/"> LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/007/"> Netsh Helper DLL </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/008/"> Accessibility Features </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/009/"> AppCert DLLs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/010/"> AppInit DLLs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/011/"> Application Shimming </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/012/"> Image File Execution Options Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.013"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/013/"> PowerShell Profile </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.014"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/014/"> Emond </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1546-T1546.015"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/015/"> Component Object Model Hijacking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1133"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1133/"> External Remote Services </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/"> Hijack Execution Flow </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1574-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1574-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/001/"> DLL Search Order Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/002/"> DLL Side-Loading </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/004/"> Dylib Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/005/"> Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/006/"> Dynamic Linker Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/007/"> Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/008/"> Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/009/"> Path Interception by Unquoted Path </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/010/"> Services File Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/011/"> Services Registry Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1574-T1574.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/012/"> COR_PROFILER </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1525"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1525/"> Implant Internal Image </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1556"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/"> Modify Authentication Process </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1556-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1556-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1556-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1556-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1556-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1556-T1556.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/001/"> Domain Controller Authentication </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1556-T1556.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/002/"> Password Filter DLL </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1556-T1556.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/003/"> Pluggable Authentication Modules </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1556-T1556.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/004/"> Network Device Authentication </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1137/"> Office Application Startup </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1137-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1137-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-T1137.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1137/001/"> Office Template Macros </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-T1137.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1137/002/"> Office Test </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-T1137.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1137/003/"> Outlook Forms </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-T1137.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1137/004/"> Outlook Home Page </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-T1137.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1137/005/"> Outlook Rules </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1137-T1137.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1137/006/"> Add-ins </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1542"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/"> Pre-OS Boot </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1542-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1542-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1542-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1542-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1542-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1542-T1542.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/001/"> System Firmware </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1542-T1542.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/002/"> Component Firmware </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1542-T1542.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/003/"> Bootkit </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1542-T1542.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/004/"> ROMMONkit </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1542-T1542.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/005/"> TFTP Boot </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/"> Scheduled Task/Job </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1053-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1053-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-T1053.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/001/"> At (Linux) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-T1053.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/002/"> At (Windows) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-T1053.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/003/"> Cron </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-T1053.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/004/"> Launchd </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-T1053.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/005/"> Scheduled Task </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-T1053.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/006/"> Systemd Timers </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1053-T1053.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/007/"> Container Orchestration Job </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1505"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1505/"> Server Software Component </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1505-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1505-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1505-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1505-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1505-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1505-T1505.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1505/001/"> SQL Stored Procedures </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1505-T1505.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1505/002/"> Transport Agent </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1505-T1505.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1505/003/"> Web Shell </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1205"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/"> Traffic Signaling </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1205-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1205-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1205-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1205-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1205-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1205-T1205.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/001/"> Port Knocking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0003-T1078"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/"> Valid Accounts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1078-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0003-T1078-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0003-T1078-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1078-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0003-T1078-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1078-T1078.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/001/"> Default Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1078-T1078.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/002/"> Domain Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1078-T1078.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/003/"> Local Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0003-T1078-T1078.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/004/"> Cloud Accounts </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0004"> Privilege Escalation </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1548"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/"> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1548-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1548-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1548-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1548-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1548-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1548-T1548.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/001/"> Setuid and Setgid </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1548-T1548.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/002/"> Bypass User Account Control </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1548-T1548.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/003/"> Sudo and Sudo Caching </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1548-T1548.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/004/"> Elevated Execution with Prompt </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1134"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/"> Access Token Manipulation </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1134-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1134-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1134-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1134-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1134-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1134-T1134.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/001/"> Token Impersonation/Theft </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1134-T1134.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/002/"> Create Process with Token </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1134-T1134.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/003/"> Make and Impersonate Token </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1134-T1134.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/004/"> Parent PID Spoofing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1134-T1134.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/005/"> SID-History Injection </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/"> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1547-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1547-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head active" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/001/"> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/002/"> Authentication Package </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/003/"> Time Providers </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/004/"> Winlogon Helper DLL </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/005/"> Security Support Provider </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/006/"> Kernel Modules and Extensions </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/007/"> Re-opened Applications </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/008/"> LSASS Driver </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/009/"> Shortcut Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/010/"> Port Monitors </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/011/"> Plist Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/012/"> Print Processors </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.013"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/013/"> XDG Autostart Entries </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1547-T1547.014"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/014/"> Active Setup </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1037"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/"> Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1037-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1037-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1037-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1037-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1037-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1037-T1037.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/001/"> Logon Script (Windows) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1037-T1037.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/002/"> Logon Script (Mac) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1037-T1037.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/003/"> Network Logon Script </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1037-T1037.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/004/"> RC Scripts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1037-T1037.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1037/005/"> Startup Items </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1543"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/"> Create or Modify System Process </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1543-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1543-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1543-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1543-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1543-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1543-T1543.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/001/"> Launch Agent </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1543-T1543.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/002/"> Systemd Service </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1543-T1543.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/003/"> Windows Service </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1543-T1543.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/004/"> Launch Daemon </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1484"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1484/"> Domain Policy Modification </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1484-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1484-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1484-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1484-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1484-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1484-T1484.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1484/001/"> Group Policy Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1484-T1484.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1484/002/"> Domain Trust Modification </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1611"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1611/"> Escape to Host </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/"> Event Triggered Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1546-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1546-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/001/"> Change Default File Association </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/002/"> Screensaver </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/003/"> Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/004/"> Unix Shell Configuration Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/005/"> Trap </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/006/"> LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/007/"> Netsh Helper DLL </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/008/"> Accessibility Features </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/009/"> AppCert DLLs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/010/"> AppInit DLLs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/011/"> Application Shimming </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/012/"> Image File Execution Options Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.013"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/013/"> PowerShell Profile </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.014"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/014/"> Emond </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1546-T1546.015"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1546/015/"> Component Object Model Hijacking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1068"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1068/"> Exploitation for Privilege Escalation </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/"> Hijack Execution Flow </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1574-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1574-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/001/"> DLL Search Order Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/002/"> DLL Side-Loading </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/004/"> Dylib Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/005/"> Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/006/"> Dynamic Linker Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/007/"> Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/008/"> Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/009/"> Path Interception by Unquoted Path </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/010/"> Services File Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/011/"> Services Registry Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1574-T1574.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/012/"> COR_PROFILER </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/"> Process Injection </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1055-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1055-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/001/"> Dynamic-link Library Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/002/"> Portable Executable Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/003/"> Thread Execution Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/004/"> Asynchronous Procedure Call </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/005/"> Thread Local Storage </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/008/"> Ptrace System Calls </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/009/"> Proc Memory </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/011/"> Extra Window Memory Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/012/"> Process Hollowing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.013"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/013/"> Process Doppelgänging </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1055-T1055.014"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/014/"> VDSO Hijacking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/"> Scheduled Task/Job </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1053-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1053-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-T1053.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/001/"> At (Linux) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-T1053.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/002/"> At (Windows) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-T1053.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/003/"> Cron </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-T1053.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/004/"> Launchd </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-T1053.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/005/"> Scheduled Task </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-T1053.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/006/"> Systemd Timers </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1053-T1053.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/007/"> Container Orchestration Job </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0004-T1078"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/"> Valid Accounts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1078-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0004-T1078-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0004-T1078-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1078-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0004-T1078-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1078-T1078.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/001/"> Default Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1078-T1078.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/002/"> Domain Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1078-T1078.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/003/"> Local Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0004-T1078-T1078.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/004/"> Cloud Accounts </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0005"> Defense Evasion </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1548"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/"> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1548-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1548-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1548-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1548-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1548-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1548-T1548.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/001/"> Setuid and Setgid </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1548-T1548.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/002/"> Bypass User Account Control </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1548-T1548.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/003/"> Sudo and Sudo Caching </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1548-T1548.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1548/004/"> Elevated Execution with Prompt </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1134"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/"> Access Token Manipulation </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1134-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1134-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1134-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1134-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1134-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1134-T1134.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/001/"> Token Impersonation/Theft </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1134-T1134.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/002/"> Create Process with Token </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1134-T1134.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/003/"> Make and Impersonate Token </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1134-T1134.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/004/"> Parent PID Spoofing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1134-T1134.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1134/005/"> SID-History Injection </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1197"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1197/"> BITS Jobs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1612"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1612/"> Build Image on Host </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1140"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1140/"> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1610"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1610/"> Deploy Container </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1006/"> Direct Volume Access </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1484"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1484/"> Domain Policy Modification </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1484-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1484-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1484-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1484-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1484-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1484-T1484.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1484/001/"> Group Policy Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1484-T1484.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1484/002/"> Domain Trust Modification </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1480"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1480/"> Execution Guardrails </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1480-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1480-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1480-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1480-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1480-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1480-T1480.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1480/001/"> Environmental Keying </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1211"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1211/"> Exploitation for Defense Evasion </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1222"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1222/"> File and Directory Permissions Modification </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1222-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1222-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1222-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1222-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1222-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1222-T1222.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1222/001/"> Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1222-T1222.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1222/002/"> Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1564/"> Hide Artifacts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1564-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1564-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-T1564.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1564/001/"> Hidden Files and Directories </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-T1564.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1564/002/"> Hidden Users </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-T1564.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1564/003/"> Hidden Window </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-T1564.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1564/004/"> NTFS File Attributes </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-T1564.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1564/005/"> Hidden File System </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-T1564.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1564/006/"> Run Virtual Instance </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1564-T1564.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1564/007/"> VBA Stomping </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/"> Hijack Execution Flow </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1574-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1574-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/001/"> DLL Search Order Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/002/"> DLL Side-Loading </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/004/"> Dylib Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/005/"> Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/006/"> Dynamic Linker Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/007/"> Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/008/"> Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/009/"> Path Interception by Unquoted Path </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/010/"> Services File Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/011/"> Services Registry Permissions Weakness </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1574-T1574.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/012/"> COR_PROFILER </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1562/"> Impair Defenses </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1562-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1562-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-T1562.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1562/001/"> Disable or Modify Tools </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-T1562.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1562/002/"> Disable Windows Event Logging </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-T1562.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1562/003/"> Impair Command History Logging </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-T1562.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1562/004/"> Disable or Modify System Firewall </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-T1562.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1562/006/"> Indicator Blocking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-T1562.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1562/007/"> Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1562-T1562.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1562/008/"> Disable Cloud Logs </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1070/"> Indicator Removal on Host </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1070-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1070-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-T1070.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1070/001/"> Clear Windows Event Logs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-T1070.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1070/002/"> Clear Linux or Mac System Logs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-T1070.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1070/003/"> Clear Command History </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-T1070.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1070/004/"> File Deletion </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-T1070.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1070/005/"> Network Share Connection Removal </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1070-T1070.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1070/006/"> Timestomp </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1202"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1202/"> Indirect Command Execution </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1036/"> Masquerading </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1036-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1036-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-T1036.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1036/001/"> Invalid Code Signature </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-T1036.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1036/002/"> Right-to-Left Override </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-T1036.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1036/003/"> Rename System Utilities </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-T1036.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1036/004/"> Masquerade Task or Service </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-T1036.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1036/005/"> Match Legitimate Name or Location </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1036-T1036.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1036/006/"> Space after Filename </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1556"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/"> Modify Authentication Process </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1556-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1556-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1556-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1556-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1556-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1556-T1556.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/001/"> Domain Controller Authentication </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1556-T1556.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/002/"> Password Filter DLL </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1556-T1556.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/003/"> Pluggable Authentication Modules </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1556-T1556.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/004/"> Network Device Authentication </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1578"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1578/"> Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1578-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1578-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1578-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1578-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1578-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1578-T1578.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1578/001/"> Create Snapshot </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1578-T1578.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1578/002/"> Create Cloud Instance </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1578-T1578.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1578/003/"> Delete Cloud Instance </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1578-T1578.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1578/004/"> Revert Cloud Instance </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1112"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1112/"> Modify Registry </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1601"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1601/"> Modify System Image </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1601-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1601-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1601-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1601-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1601-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1601-T1601.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1601/001/"> Patch System Image </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1601-T1601.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1601/002/"> Downgrade System Image </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1599"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1599/"> Network Boundary Bridging </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1599-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1599-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1599-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1599-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1599-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1599-T1599.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1599/001/"> Network Address Translation Traversal </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1027"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1027/"> Obfuscated Files or Information </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1027-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1027-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1027-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1027-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1027-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1027-T1027.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1027/001/"> Binary Padding </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1027-T1027.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1027/002/"> Software Packing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1027-T1027.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1027/003/"> Steganography </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1027-T1027.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1027/004/"> Compile After Delivery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1027-T1027.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1027/005/"> Indicator Removal from Tools </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1542"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/"> Pre-OS Boot </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1542-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1542-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1542-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1542-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1542-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1542-T1542.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/001/"> System Firmware </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1542-T1542.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/002/"> Component Firmware </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1542-T1542.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/003/"> Bootkit </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1542-T1542.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/004/"> ROMMONkit </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1542-T1542.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1542/005/"> TFTP Boot </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/"> Process Injection </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1055-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1055-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/001/"> Dynamic-link Library Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/002/"> Portable Executable Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/003/"> Thread Execution Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/004/"> Asynchronous Procedure Call </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/005/"> Thread Local Storage </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/008/"> Ptrace System Calls </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/009/"> Proc Memory </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/011/"> Extra Window Memory Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/012/"> Process Hollowing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.013"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/013/"> Process Doppelgänging </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1055-T1055.014"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/014/"> VDSO Hijacking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1207"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1207/"> Rogue Domain Controller </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1014"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1014/"> Rootkit </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/"> Signed Binary Proxy Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1218-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1218-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/001/"> Compiled HTML File </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/002/"> Control Panel </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/003/"> CMSTP </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/004/"> InstallUtil </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/005/"> Mshta </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/007/"> Msiexec </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/008/"> Odbcconf </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.009"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/009/"> Regsvcs/Regasm </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/010/"> Regsvr32 </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/011/"> Rundll32 </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1218-T1218.012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/012/"> Verclsid </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1216"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1216/"> Signed Script Proxy Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1216-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1216-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1216-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1216-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1216-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1216-T1216.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1216/001/"> PubPrn </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1553/"> Subvert Trust Controls </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1553-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1553-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-T1553.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1553/001/"> Gatekeeper Bypass </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-T1553.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1553/002/"> Code Signing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-T1553.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1553/003/"> SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-T1553.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1553/004/"> Install Root Certificate </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-T1553.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1553/005/"> Mark-of-the-Web Bypass </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1553-T1553.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1553/006/"> Code Signing Policy Modification </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1221"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1221/"> Template Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1205"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/"> Traffic Signaling </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1205-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1205-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1205-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1205-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1205-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1205-T1205.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/001/"> Port Knocking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1127"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1127/"> Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1127-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1127-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1127-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1127-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1127-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1127-T1127.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1127/001/"> MSBuild </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1535"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1535/"> Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1550"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/"> Use Alternate Authentication Material </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1550-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1550-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1550-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1550-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1550-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1550-T1550.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/001/"> Application Access Token </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1550-T1550.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/002/"> Pass the Hash </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1550-T1550.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/003/"> Pass the Ticket </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1550-T1550.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/004/"> Web Session Cookie </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1078"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/"> Valid Accounts </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1078-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1078-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1078-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1078-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1078-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1078-T1078.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/001/"> Default Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1078-T1078.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/002/"> Domain Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1078-T1078.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/003/"> Local Accounts </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1078-T1078.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/004/"> Cloud Accounts </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1497"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1497/"> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1497-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1497-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1497-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1497-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1497-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1497-T1497.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1497/001/"> System Checks </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1497-T1497.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1497/002/"> User Activity Based Checks </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1497-T1497.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1497/003/"> Time Based Evasion </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0005-T1600"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1600/"> Weaken Encryption </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1600-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0005-T1600-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0005-T1600-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1600-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0005-T1600-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1600-T1600.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1600/001/"> Reduce Key Space </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1600-T1600.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1600/002/"> Disable Crypto Hardware </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0005-T1220"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1220/"> XSL Script Processing </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0006"> Credential Access </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1110"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1110/"> Brute Force </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1110-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1110-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1110-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1110-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1110-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1110-T1110.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1110/001/"> Password Guessing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1110-T1110.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1110/002/"> Password Cracking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1110-T1110.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1110/003/"> Password Spraying </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1110-T1110.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1110/004/"> Credential Stuffing </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1555"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1555/"> Credentials from Password Stores </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1555-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1555-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1555-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1555-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1555-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1555-T1555.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1555/001/"> Keychain </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1555-T1555.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1555/002/"> Securityd Memory </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1555-T1555.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1555/003/"> Credentials from Web Browsers </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1555-T1555.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1555/004/"> Windows Credential Manager </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1555-T1555.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1555/005/"> Password Managers </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1212"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1212/"> Exploitation for Credential Access </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1187"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1187/"> Forced Authentication </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1606"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1606/"> Forge Web Credentials </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1606-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1606-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1606-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1606-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1606-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1606-T1606.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1606/001/"> Web Cookies </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1606-T1606.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1606/002/"> SAML Tokens </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1056"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/"> Input Capture </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1056-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1056-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1056-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1056-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1056-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1056-T1056.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/001/"> Keylogging </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1056-T1056.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/002/"> GUI Input Capture </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1056-T1056.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/003/"> Web Portal Capture </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1056-T1056.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/004/"> Credential API Hooking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1557"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1557/"> Man-in-the-Middle </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1557-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1557-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1557-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1557-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1557-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1557-T1557.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1557/001/"> LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1557-T1557.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1557/002/"> ARP Cache Poisoning </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1556"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/"> Modify Authentication Process </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1556-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1556-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1556-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1556-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1556-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1556-T1556.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/001/"> Domain Controller Authentication </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1556-T1556.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/002/"> Password Filter DLL </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1556-T1556.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/003/"> Pluggable Authentication Modules </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1556-T1556.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/004/"> Network Device Authentication </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1040"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1040/"> Network Sniffing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/"> OS Credential Dumping </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1003-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1003-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-T1003.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/001/"> LSASS Memory </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-T1003.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/002/"> Security Account Manager </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-T1003.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/003/"> NTDS </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-T1003.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/004/"> LSA Secrets </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-T1003.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/005/"> Cached Domain Credentials </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-T1003.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/006/"> DCSync </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-T1003.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/007/"> Proc Filesystem </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1003-T1003.008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/008/"> /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1528"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1528/"> Steal Application Access Token </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1558"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1558/"> Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1558-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1558-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1558-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1558-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1558-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1558-T1558.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1558/001/"> Golden Ticket </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1558-T1558.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1558/002/"> Silver Ticket </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1558-T1558.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1558/003/"> Kerberoasting </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1558-T1558.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1558/004/"> AS-REP Roasting </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1539"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1539/"> Steal Web Session Cookie </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1111"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1111/"> Two-Factor Authentication Interception </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1552/"> Unsecured Credentials </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0006-T1552-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0006-T1552-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-T1552.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1552/001/"> Credentials In Files </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-T1552.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1552/002/"> Credentials in Registry </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-T1552.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1552/003/"> Bash History </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-T1552.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1552/004/"> Private Keys </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-T1552.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1552/005/"> Cloud Instance Metadata API </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-T1552.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1552/006/"> Group Policy Preferences </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0006-T1552-T1552.007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1552/007/"> Container API </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0007"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0007"> Discovery </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0007-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0007-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0007-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0007-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0007-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0007-T1087"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1087/"> Account Discovery </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1087-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0007-T1087-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0007-T1087-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1087-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0007-T1087-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1087-T1087.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1087/001/"> Local Account </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1087-T1087.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1087/002/"> Domain Account </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1087-T1087.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1087/003/"> Email Account </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1087-T1087.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1087/004/"> Cloud Account </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1010"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1010/"> Application Window Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1217"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1217/"> Browser Bookmark Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1580"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1580/"> Cloud Infrastructure Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1538"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1538/"> Cloud Service Dashboard </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1526"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1526/"> Cloud Service Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1613"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1613/"> Container and Resource Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1482"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1482/"> Domain Trust Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1083"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1083/"> File and Directory Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1046"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1046/"> Network Service Scanning </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1135"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1135/"> Network Share Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1040"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1040/"> Network Sniffing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1201"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1201/"> Password Policy Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1120"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1120/"> Peripheral Device Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0007-T1069"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1069/"> Permission Groups Discovery </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1069-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0007-T1069-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0007-T1069-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1069-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0007-T1069-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1069-T1069.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1069/001/"> Local Groups </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1069-T1069.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1069/002/"> Domain Groups </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1069-T1069.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1069/003/"> Cloud Groups </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1057"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1057/"> Process Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1012"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1012/"> Query Registry </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1018"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1018/"> Remote System Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0007-T1518"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1518/"> Software Discovery </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1518-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0007-T1518-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0007-T1518-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1518-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0007-T1518-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1518-T1518.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1518/001/"> Security Software Discovery </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1082"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1082/"> System Information Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1614"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1614/"> System Location Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0007-T1016"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1016/"> System Network Configuration Discovery </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1016-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0007-T1016-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0007-T1016-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1016-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0007-T1016-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1016-T1016.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1016/001/"> Internet Connection Discovery </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1049"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1049/"> System Network Connections Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1033"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1033/"> System Owner/User Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1007"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1007/"> System Service Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1124"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1124/"> System Time Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0007-T1497"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1497/"> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1497-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0007-T1497-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0007-T1497-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1497-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0007-T1497-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1497-T1497.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1497/001/"> System Checks </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1497-T1497.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1497/002/"> User Activity Based Checks </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0007-T1497-T1497.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1497/003/"> Time Based Evasion </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0008"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0008"> Lateral Movement </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0008-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0008-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0008-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0008-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0008-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1210"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1210/"> Exploitation of Remote Services </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1534"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1534/"> Internal Spearphishing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1570"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1570/"> Lateral Tool Transfer </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0008-T1563"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1563/"> Remote Service Session Hijacking </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1563-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0008-T1563-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0008-T1563-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1563-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0008-T1563-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1563-T1563.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1563/001/"> SSH Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1563-T1563.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1563/002/"> RDP Hijacking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1021/"> Remote Services </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0008-T1021-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0008-T1021-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-T1021.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1021/001/"> Remote Desktop Protocol </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-T1021.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1021/002/"> SMB/Windows Admin Shares </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-T1021.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1021/003/"> Distributed Component Object Model </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-T1021.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1021/004/"> SSH </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-T1021.005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1021/005/"> VNC </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1021-T1021.006"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1021/006/"> Windows Remote Management </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1091"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1091/"> Replication Through Removable Media </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1072"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1072/"> Software Deployment Tools </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1080"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1080/"> Taint Shared Content </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0008-T1550"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/"> Use Alternate Authentication Material </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1550-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0008-T1550-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0008-T1550-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1550-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0008-T1550-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1550-T1550.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/001/"> Application Access Token </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1550-T1550.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/002/"> Pass the Hash </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1550-T1550.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/003/"> Pass the Ticket </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0008-T1550-T1550.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1550/004/"> Web Session Cookie </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0009"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0009"> Collection </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0009-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0009-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0009-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0009-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0009-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0009-T1560"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1560/"> Archive Collected Data </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1560-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0009-T1560-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0009-T1560-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1560-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0009-T1560-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1560-T1560.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1560/001/"> Archive via Utility </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1560-T1560.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1560/002/"> Archive via Library </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1560-T1560.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1560/003/"> Archive via Custom Method </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1123"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1123/"> Audio Capture </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1119"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1119/"> Automated Collection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1115"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1115/"> Clipboard Data </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1530"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1530/"> Data from Cloud Storage Object </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0009-T1602"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1602/"> Data from Configuration Repository </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1602-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0009-T1602-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0009-T1602-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1602-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0009-T1602-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1602-T1602.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1602/001/"> SNMP (MIB Dump) </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1602-T1602.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1602/002/"> Network Device Configuration Dump </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0009-T1213"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1213/"> Data from Information Repositories </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1213-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0009-T1213-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0009-T1213-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1213-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0009-T1213-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1213-T1213.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1213/001/"> Confluence </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1213-T1213.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1213/002/"> Sharepoint </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1005"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1005/"> Data from Local System </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1039"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1039/"> Data from Network Shared Drive </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1025"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1025/"> Data from Removable Media </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0009-T1074"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1074/"> Data Staged </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1074-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0009-T1074-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0009-T1074-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1074-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0009-T1074-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1074-T1074.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1074/001/"> Local Data Staging </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1074-T1074.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1074/002/"> Remote Data Staging </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0009-T1114"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1114/"> Email Collection </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1114-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0009-T1114-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0009-T1114-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1114-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0009-T1114-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1114-T1114.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1114/001/"> Local Email Collection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1114-T1114.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1114/002/"> Remote Email Collection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1114-T1114.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1114/003/"> Email Forwarding Rule </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0009-T1056"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/"> Input Capture </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1056-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0009-T1056-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0009-T1056-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1056-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0009-T1056-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1056-T1056.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/001/"> Keylogging </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1056-T1056.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/002/"> GUI Input Capture </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1056-T1056.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/003/"> Web Portal Capture </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1056-T1056.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1056/004/"> Credential API Hooking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1185"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1185/"> Man in the Browser </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0009-T1557"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1557/"> Man-in-the-Middle </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1557-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0009-T1557-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0009-T1557-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1557-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0009-T1557-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1557-T1557.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1557/001/"> LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1557-T1557.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1557/002/"> ARP Cache Poisoning </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1113"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1113/"> Screen Capture </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0009-T1125"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1125/"> Video Capture </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0011"> Command and Control </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011-T1071"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/"> Application Layer Protocol </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1071-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-T1071-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-T1071-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1071-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-T1071-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1071-T1071.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/001/"> Web Protocols </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1071-T1071.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/002/"> File Transfer Protocols </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1071-T1071.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/003/"> Mail Protocols </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1071-T1071.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1071/004/"> DNS </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1092"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1092/"> Communication Through Removable Media </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011-T1132"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132/"> Data Encoding </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1132-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-T1132-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-T1132-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1132-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-T1132-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1132-T1132.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132/001/"> Standard Encoding </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1132-T1132.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1132/002/"> Non-Standard Encoding </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011-T1001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/"> Data Obfuscation </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1001-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-T1001-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-T1001-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1001-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-T1001-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1001-T1001.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/001/"> Junk Data </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1001-T1001.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/002/"> Steganography </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1001-T1001.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1001/003/"> Protocol Impersonation </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011-T1568"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/"> Dynamic Resolution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1568-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-T1568-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-T1568-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1568-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-T1568-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1568-T1568.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/001/"> Fast Flux DNS </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1568-T1568.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/002/"> Domain Generation Algorithms </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1568-T1568.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1568/003/"> DNS Calculation </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011-T1573"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573/"> Encrypted Channel </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1573-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-T1573-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-T1573-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1573-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-T1573-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1573-T1573.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573/001/"> Symmetric Cryptography </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1573-T1573.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1573/002/"> Asymmetric Cryptography </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1008"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1008/"> Fallback Channels </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1105"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1105/"> Ingress Tool Transfer </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1104"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1104/"> Multi-Stage Channels </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1095"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1095/"> Non-Application Layer Protocol </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1571"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1571/"> Non-Standard Port </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1572"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1572/"> Protocol Tunneling </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011-T1090"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/"> Proxy </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1090-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-T1090-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-T1090-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1090-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-T1090-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1090-T1090.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/001/"> Internal Proxy </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1090-T1090.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/002/"> External Proxy </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1090-T1090.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/003/"> Multi-hop Proxy </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1090-T1090.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/004/"> Domain Fronting </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1219"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1219/"> Remote Access Software </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011-T1205"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/"> Traffic Signaling </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1205-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-T1205-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-T1205-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1205-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-T1205-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1205-T1205.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1205/001/"> Port Knocking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0011-T1102"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/"> Web Service </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1102-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0011-T1102-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0011-T1102-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1102-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0011-T1102-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1102-T1102.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/001/"> Dead Drop Resolver </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1102-T1102.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/002/"> Bidirectional Communication </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0011-T1102-T1102.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1102/003/"> One-Way Communication </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0010"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0010"> Exfiltration </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0010-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0010-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0010-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0010-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0010-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0010-T1020"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1020/"> Automated Exfiltration </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1020-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0010-T1020-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0010-T1020-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1020-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0010-T1020-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1020-T1020.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1020/001/"> Traffic Duplication </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1030"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1030/"> Data Transfer Size Limits </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0010-T1048"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1048/"> Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1048-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0010-T1048-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0010-T1048-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1048-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0010-T1048-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1048-T1048.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1048/001/"> Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1048-T1048.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1048/002/"> Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1048-T1048.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1048/003/"> Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1041"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1041/"> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0010-T1011"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1011/"> Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1011-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0010-T1011-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0010-T1011-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1011-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0010-T1011-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1011-T1011.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1011/001/"> Exfiltration Over Bluetooth </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0010-T1052"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1052/"> Exfiltration Over Physical Medium </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1052-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0010-T1052-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0010-T1052-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1052-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0010-T1052-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1052-T1052.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1052/001/"> Exfiltration over USB </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0010-T1567"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1567/"> Exfiltration Over Web Service </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1567-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0010-T1567-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0010-T1567-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1567-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0010-T1567-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1567-T1567.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1567/001/"> Exfiltration to Code Repository </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1567-T1567.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1567/002/"> Exfiltration to Cloud Storage </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1029"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1029/"> Scheduled Transfer </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0010-T1537"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1537/"> Transfer Data to Cloud Account </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0040"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0040"> Impact </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0040-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0040-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0040-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0040-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0040-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1531"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1531/"> Account Access Removal </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1485"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1485/"> Data Destruction </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1486"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1486/"> Data Encrypted for Impact </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0040-T1565"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1565/"> Data Manipulation </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1565-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0040-T1565-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0040-T1565-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1565-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0040-T1565-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1565-T1565.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1565/001/"> Stored Data Manipulation </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1565-T1565.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1565/002/"> Transmitted Data Manipulation </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1565-T1565.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1565/003/"> Runtime Data Manipulation </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0040-T1491"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1491/"> Defacement </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1491-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0040-T1491-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0040-T1491-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1491-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0040-T1491-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1491-T1491.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1491/001/"> Internal Defacement </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1491-T1491.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1491/002/"> External Defacement </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0040-T1561"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1561/"> Disk Wipe </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1561-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0040-T1561-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0040-T1561-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1561-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0040-T1561-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1561-T1561.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1561/001/"> Disk Content Wipe </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1561-T1561.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1561/002/"> Disk Structure Wipe </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0040-T1499"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1499/"> Endpoint Denial of Service </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1499-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0040-T1499-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0040-T1499-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1499-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0040-T1499-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1499-T1499.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1499/001/"> OS Exhaustion Flood </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1499-T1499.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1499/002/"> Service Exhaustion Flood </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1499-T1499.003"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1499/003/"> Application Exhaustion Flood </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1499-T1499.004"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1499/004/"> Application or System Exploitation </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1495"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1495/"> Firmware Corruption </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1490"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1490/"> Inhibit System Recovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="enterprise-TA0040-T1498"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1498/"> Network Denial of Service </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1498-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#enterprise-TA0040-T1498-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#enterprise-TA0040-T1498-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1498-body" aria-labelledby="enterprise-TA0040-T1498-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1498-T1498.001"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1498/001/"> Direct Network Flood </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1498-T1498.002"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1498/002/"> Reflection Amplification </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1496"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1496/"> Resource Hijacking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1489"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1489/"> Service Stop </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="enterprise-TA0040-T1529"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1529/"> System Shutdown/Reboot </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/mobile/"> Mobile </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0027"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0027"> Initial Access </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0027-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0027-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0027-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0027-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0027-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1475"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1475/"> Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1476"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1476/"> Deliver Malicious App via Other Means </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1456"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1456/"> Drive-by Compromise </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1458"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1458/"> Exploit via Charging Station or PC </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1477"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1477/"> Exploit via Radio Interfaces </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1478"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1478/"> Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1461"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1461/"> Lockscreen Bypass </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1444"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1444/"> Masquerade as Legitimate Application </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0027-T1474"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1474/"> Supply Chain Compromise </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0041"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0041"> Execution </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0041-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0041-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0041-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0041-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0041-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0041-T1402"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1402/"> Broadcast Receivers </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0041-T1605"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1605/"> Command-Line Interface </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0041-T1575"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1575/"> Native Code </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0041-T1603"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1603/"> Scheduled Task/Job </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0028"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0028"> Persistence </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0028-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0028-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0028-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0028-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0028-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1402"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1402/"> Broadcast Receivers </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1540"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1540/"> Code Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1577"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1577/"> Compromise Application Executable </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1541"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1541/"> Foreground Persistence </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1403"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1403/"> Modify Cached Executable Code </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1398"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1398/"> Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1400"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1400/"> Modify System Partition </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1399"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1399/"> Modify Trusted Execution Environment </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0028-T1603"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1603/"> Scheduled Task/Job </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0029"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0029"> Privilege Escalation </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0029-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0029-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0029-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0029-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0029-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0029-T1540"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1540/"> Code Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0029-T1401"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1401/"> Device Administrator Permissions </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0029-T1404"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1404/"> Exploit OS Vulnerability </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0029-T1405"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1405/"> Exploit TEE Vulnerability </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0030"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0030"> Defense Evasion </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0030-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0030-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0030-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0030-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0030-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1418"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1418/"> Application Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1540"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1540/"> Code Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1447"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1447/"> Delete Device Data </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1446"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1446/"> Device Lockout </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1408"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1408/"> Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1407"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1407/"> Download New Code at Runtime </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1523"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1523/"> Evade Analysis Environment </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1581"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1581/"> Geofencing </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1516"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1516/"> Input Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1478"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1478/"> Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1444"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1444/"> Masquerade as Legitimate Application </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1398"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1398/"> Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1400"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1400/"> Modify System Partition </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1399"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1399/"> Modify Trusted Execution Environment </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1575"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1575/"> Native Code </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1406"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1406/"> Obfuscated Files or Information </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1604"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1604/"> Proxy Through Victim </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1508"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1508/"> Suppress Application Icon </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0030-T1576"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1576/"> Uninstall Malicious Application </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0031"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0031"> Credential Access </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0031-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0031-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0031-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0031-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0031-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1517"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1517/"> Access Notifications </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1413"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1413/"> Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1409"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1409/"> Access Stored Application Data </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1414"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1414/"> Capture Clipboard Data </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1412"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1412/"> Capture SMS Messages </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1405"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1405/"> Exploit TEE Vulnerability </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1417"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1417/"> Input Capture </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1411"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1411/"> Input Prompt </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1579"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1579/"> Keychain </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1410"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1410/"> Network Traffic Capture or Redirection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0031-T1416"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1416/"> URI Hijacking </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0032"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0032"> Discovery </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0032-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0032-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0032-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0032-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0032-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1418"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1418/"> Application Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1523"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1523/"> Evade Analysis Environment </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1420"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1420/"> File and Directory Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1430"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1430/"> Location Tracking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1423"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1423/"> Network Service Scanning </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1424"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1424/"> Process Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1426"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1426/"> System Information Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1422"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1422/"> System Network Configuration Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0032-T1421"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1421/"> System Network Connections Discovery </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0033"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0033"> Lateral Movement </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0033-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0033-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0033-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0033-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0033-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0033-T1427"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1427/"> Attack PC via USB Connection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0033-T1428"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1428/"> Exploit Enterprise Resources </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0035"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0035"> Collection </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0035-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0035-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0035-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0035-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0035-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1435"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1435/"> Access Calendar Entries </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1433"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1433/"> Access Call Log </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1432"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1432/"> Access Contact List </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1517"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1517/"> Access Notifications </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1413"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1413/"> Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1409"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1409/"> Access Stored Application Data </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1429"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1429/"> Capture Audio </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1512"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1512/"> Capture Camera </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1414"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1414/"> Capture Clipboard Data </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1412"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1412/"> Capture SMS Messages </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1533"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1533/"> Data from Local System </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1541"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1541/"> Foreground Persistence </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1417"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1417/"> Input Capture </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1430"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1430/"> Location Tracking </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1507"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1507/"> Network Information Discovery </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1410"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1410/"> Network Traffic Capture or Redirection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0035-T1513"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1513/"> Screen Capture </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0037"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0037"> Command and Control </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0037-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0037-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0037-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0037-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0037-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0037-T1438"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1438/"> Alternate Network Mediums </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0037-T1436"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1436/"> Commonly Used Port </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0037-T1520"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1520/"> Domain Generation Algorithms </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0037-T1544"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1544/"> Remote File Copy </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0037-T1437"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1437/"> Standard Application Layer Protocol </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0037-T1521"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1521/"> Standard Cryptographic Protocol </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0037-T1509"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1509/"> Uncommonly Used Port </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0037-T1481"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1481/"> Web Service </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0036"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0036"> Exfiltration </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0036-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0036-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0036-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0036-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0036-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0036-T1438"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1438/"> Alternate Network Mediums </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0036-T1436"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1436/"> Commonly Used Port </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0036-T1532"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1532/"> Data Encrypted </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0036-T1437"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1437/"> Standard Application Layer Protocol </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0034"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0034"> Impact </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0034-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0034-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0034-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0034-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0034-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1448"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1448/"> Carrier Billing Fraud </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1510"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1510/"> Clipboard Modification </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1471"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1471/"> Data Encrypted for Impact </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1447"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1447/"> Delete Device Data </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1446"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1446/"> Device Lockout </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1472"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1472/"> Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1516"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1516/"> Input Injection </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1452"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1452/"> Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1400"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1400/"> Modify System Partition </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0034-T1582"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1582/"> SMS Control </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0038"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0038"> Network Effects </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0038-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0038-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0038-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0038-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0038-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1466"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1466/"> Downgrade to Insecure Protocols </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1439"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1439/"> Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1449"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1449/"> Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1450"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1450/"> Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1464"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1464/"> Jamming or Denial of Service </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1463"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1463/"> Manipulate Device Communication </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1467"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1467/"> Rogue Cellular Base Station </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1465"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1465/"> Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0038-T1451"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1451/"> SIM Card Swap </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head " id="mobile-TA0039"> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0039"> Remote Service Effects </a> <div class="expand-button collapsed" id="mobile-TA0039-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#mobile-TA0039-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="#mobile-TA0039-body"></div> </div> <div class="sidenav-body collapse" id="mobile-TA0039-body" aria-labelledby="mobile-TA0039-header"> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0039-T1470"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1470/"> Obtain Device Cloud Backups </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0039-T1468"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1468/"> Remotely Track Device Without Authorization </a> </div> </div> <div class="sidenav"> <div class="sidenav-head" id="mobile-TA0039-T1469"> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1469/"> Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div>  </div> <div class="tab-content col-xl-10 col-lg-9 col-md-9 pt-4" id="v-tabContent"> <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="v-attckmatrix" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="v-attckmatrix-tab"> <ol class="breadcrumb"> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/versions/v9/">Home</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/versions/v9/techniques/enterprise">Techniques</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/versions/v9/techniques/enterprise">Enterprise</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547">Boot or Logon Autostart Execution</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item">Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder</li> </ol> <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="v-" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="v--tab"></div> <div class="row"> <div class="col-xl-12"> <div class="jumbotron jumbotron-fluid"> <div class="container-fluid"> <h1 id=""> <span id="subtechnique-parent-name">Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:</span> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder </h1> <div class="row"> <div class="col-md-8">  <div class="card-block pb-2"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-header collapsed" id="subtechniques-card-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#subtechniques-card-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="subtechniques-card-body"> <h5 class="mb-0" id ="sub-techniques">Other sub-techniques of Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)</h5> </div> <div id="subtechniques-card-body" class="card-body p-0 collapse" aria-labelledby="subtechniques-card-header"> <table class="table table-bordered"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Name</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td class="active"> T1547.001 </td> <td class="active"> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/002/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.002"> T1547.002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/002/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.002"> Authentication Package </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/003/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.003"> T1547.003 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/003/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.003"> Time Providers </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/004/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.004"> T1547.004 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/004/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.004"> Winlogon Helper DLL </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/005/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.005"> T1547.005 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/005/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.005"> Security Support Provider </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/006/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.006"> T1547.006 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/006/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.006"> Kernel Modules and Extensions </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/007/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.007"> T1547.007 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/007/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.007"> Re-opened Applications </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/008/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.008"> T1547.008 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/008/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.008"> LSASS Driver </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/009/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.009"> T1547.009 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/009/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.009"> Shortcut Modification </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/010/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.010"> T1547.010 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/010/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.010"> Port Monitors </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/011/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.011"> T1547.011 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/011/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.011"> Plist Modification </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/012/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.012"> T1547.012 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/012/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.012"> Print Processors </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/013/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.013"> T1547.013 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/013/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.013"> XDG Autostart Entries </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/014/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.014"> T1547.014 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/014/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1547.014"> Active Setup </a> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> </div> </div>  <div class="description-body"> <p>Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-1') id="scite-ref-1-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Microsoft Run Key"><sup><a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="0" aria-describedby="qtip-0">[1]</a></sup></span> These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.</p><p>Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>.</p><p>The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:</p><ul><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code></li></ul><p>Run keys may exist under multiple hives.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-2') id="scite-ref-2-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018"><sup><a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="1" aria-describedby="qtip-1">[2]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-3') id="scite-ref-3-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016"><sup><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="2" aria-describedby="qtip-2">[3]</a></sup></span> The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-4') id="scite-ref-4-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018"><sup><a href="https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="3" aria-describedby="qtip-3">[4]</a></sup></span> For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-5') id="scite-ref-5-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018"><sup><a href="https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="4" aria-describedby="qtip-4">[5]</a></sup></span></p><p>The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:</p><ul><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code></li></ul><p>The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:</p><ul><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code></li><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code></li></ul><p>Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:</p><ul><li><code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code></li><li><code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code></li></ul><p>The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</code> subkeys can automatically launch programs.</p><p>Programs listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run when any user logs on.</p><p>By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.</p><p>Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1036">Masquerading</a> to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.</p> </div> </div> <div class="col-md-4"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"> <div class="row card-data" id="card-id"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">ID: </span>T1547.001 </div> </div>  <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Sub-technique of: </span> <a href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547">T1547</a> </div> </div>  <div id="card-tactics" class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The tactic objectives that the (sub-)technique can be used to accomplish">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Tactics:</span> <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0003">Persistence</a>, <a href="/versions/v9/tactics/TA0004">Privilege Escalation</a> </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The system an adversary is operating within; could be an operating system or application">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Platforms: </span>Windows </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The lowest level of permissions the adversary is required to be operating within to perform the (sub-)technique on a system">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Permissions Required: </span>Administrator, User </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="Source of information collected by a sensor or logging system that may be used to collect information relevant to identifying the action being performed, sequence of actions, or the results of those actions by an adversary">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Data Sources: </span><a target='_blank' href='https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources/blob/main/contribution/command.yml'>Command</a>: Command Execution, <a target='_blank' href='https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources/blob/main/contribution/file.yml'>File</a>: File Modification, <a target='_blank' href='https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources/blob/main/contribution/process.yml'>Process</a>: Process Creation, <a target='_blank' href='https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources/blob/main/contribution/windows_registry.yml'>Windows Registry</a>: Windows Registry Key Creation, <a target='_blank' href='https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources/blob/main/contribution/windows_registry.yml'>Windows Registry</a>: Windows Registry Key Modification </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="CAPEC IDs associated with the (sub-)technique">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">CAPEC ID:</span> <a href="https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html" target="_blank">CAPEC-270</a> </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Contributors: </span>Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Version: </span>1.1 </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Created: </span>23 January 2020 </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Last Modified: </span>06 January 2021 </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="text-center pt-2 version-button permalink"> <div class="live"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Permalink to this version of T1547.001" href="/versions/v9/techniques/T1547/001/" data-test-ignore="true">Version Permalink</a> </div> <div class="permalink"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Go to the live version of T1547.001" href="/techniques/T1547/001/" data-test-ignore="true">Live Version</a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="examples">Procedure Examples</h2> <table class="table table-bordered table-alternate mt-2"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Name</th> <th scope="col">Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0045"> S0045 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0045"> ADVSTORESHELL </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0045">ADVSTORESHELL</a> achieves persistence by adding itself to the <code>HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> Registry key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-6') id="scite-ref-6-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Kaspersky Sofacy"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="5" aria-describedby="qtip-5">[6]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-7') id="scite-ref-7-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Sednit Part 2"><sup><a href="http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="6" aria-describedby="qtip-6">[7]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-8') id="scite-ref-8-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Bitdefender APT28 Dec 2015"><sup><a href="https://download.bitdefender.com/resources/media/materials/white-papers/en/Bitdefender_In-depth_analysis_of_APT28%E2%80%93The_Political_Cyber-Espionage.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="7" aria-describedby="qtip-7">[8]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0331"> S0331 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0331"> Agent Tesla </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0331">Agent Tesla</a> can add itself to the Registry as a startup program to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-9') id="scite-ref-9-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="8" aria-describedby="qtip-8">[9]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-10') id="scite-ref-10-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="SentinelLabs Agent Tesla Aug 2020"><sup><a href="https://labs.sentinelone.com/agent-tesla-old-rat-uses-new-tricks-to-stay-on-top/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="9" aria-describedby="qtip-9">[10]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0026"> G0026 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0026"> APT18 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0026">APT18</a> establishes persistence via the <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-11') id="scite-ref-11-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Anomali Evasive Maneuvers July 2015"><sup><a href="https://www.anomali.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="10" aria-describedby="qtip-10">[11]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-12') id="scite-ref-12-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="PaloAlto DNS Requests May 2016"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="11" aria-describedby="qtip-11">[12]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0073"> G0073 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0073"> APT19 </a> </td> <td> <p>An <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0073">APT19</a> HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-13') id="scite-ref-13-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/new-attacks-linked-to-c0d0s0-group/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="12" aria-describedby="qtip-12">[13]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0007"> G0007 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0007"> APT28 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0007">APT28</a> has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-14') id="scite-ref-14-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="13" aria-describedby="qtip-13">[14]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0016"> G0016 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0016"> APT29 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0016">APT29</a> added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-15') id="scite-ref-15-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Mandiant No Easy Breach"><sup><a href="http://www.slideshare.net/MatthewDunwoody1/no-easy-breach-derby-con-2016" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="14" aria-describedby="qtip-14">[15]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0022"> G0022 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0022"> APT3 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0022">APT3</a> places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-16') id="scite-ref-16-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye Operation Double Tap"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="15" aria-describedby="qtip-15">[16]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0050"> G0050 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0050"> APT32 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0050">APT32</a> established persistence using Registry Run keys, both to execute PowerShell and VBS scripts as well as to execute their backdoor directly.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-17') id="scite-ref-17-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-cobalt-kitty-apt" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="16" aria-describedby="qtip-16">[17]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-18') id="scite-ref-18-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017"><sup><a href="https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="17" aria-describedby="qtip-17">[18]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-19') id="scite-ref-19-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/20/fake-or-fake-keeping-up-with-oceanlotus-decoys/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="18" aria-describedby="qtip-18">[19]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0064"> G0064 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0064"> APT33 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0064">APT33</a> has deployed a tool known as <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0334">DarkComet</a> to the Startup folder of a victim, and used Registry run keys to gain persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-20') id="scite-ref-20-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Symantec Elfin Mar 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="19" aria-describedby="qtip-19">[20]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-21') id="scite-ref-21-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Microsoft Holmium June 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="20" aria-describedby="qtip-20">[21]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0067"> G0067 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0067"> APT37 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0067">APT37</a>'s has added persistence via the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-22') id="scite-ref-22-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT37 Feb 2018"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="21" aria-describedby="qtip-21">[22]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-23') id="scite-ref-23-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos Group123"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="22" aria-describedby="qtip-22">[23]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0087"> G0087 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0087"> APT39 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0087">APT39</a> has maintained persistence using the startup folder. <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-24') id="scite-ref-24-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT39 Jan 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="23" aria-describedby="qtip-23">[24]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0096"> G0096 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0096"> APT41 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0096">APT41</a> created and modified startup files for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-25') id="scite-ref-25-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT41 Aug 2019"><sup><a href="https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="24" aria-describedby="qtip-24">[25]</a></sup></span> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0096">APT41</a> added a registry key in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost</code> to establish persistence for Cobalt Strike.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-26') id="scite-ref-26-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT41 March 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="25" aria-describedby="qtip-25">[26]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0456"> S0456 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0456"> Aria-body </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0456">Aria-body</a> has established persistence via the Startup folder or Run Registry key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-27') id="scite-ref-27-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CheckPoint Naikon May 2020"><sup><a href="https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/naikon-apt-cyber-espionage-reloaded/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="26" aria-describedby="qtip-26">[27]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0373"> S0373 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0373"> Astaroth </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0373">Astaroth</a> creates a startup item for persistence. <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-28') id="scite-ref-28-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018"><sup><a href="https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="27" aria-describedby="qtip-27">[28]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0414"> S0414 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0414"> BabyShark </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0414">BabyShark</a> has added a Registry key to ensure all future macros are enabled for Microsoft Word and Excel as well as for additional persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-29') id="scite-ref-29-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019"><sup><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="28" aria-describedby="qtip-28">[29]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-30') id="scite-ref-30-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky"><sup><a href="https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="29" aria-describedby="qtip-29">[30]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0093"> S0093 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0093"> Backdoor.Oldrea </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0093">Backdoor.Oldrea</a> adds Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-31') id="scite-ref-31-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Symantec Dragonfly"><sup><a href="http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="30" aria-describedby="qtip-30">[31]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0031"> S0031 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0031"> BACKSPACE </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0031">BACKSPACE</a> achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-32') id="scite-ref-32-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT30"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="31" aria-describedby="qtip-31">[32]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0128"> S0128 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0128"> BADNEWS </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0128">BADNEWS</a> installs a registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-33') id="scite-ref-33-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Forcepoint Monsoon"><sup><a href="https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="32" aria-describedby="qtip-32">[33]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0337"> S0337 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0337"> BadPatch </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0337">BadPatch</a> establishes a foothold by adding a link to the malware executable in the startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-34') id="scite-ref-34-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 BadPatch Oct 2017"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-badpatch/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="33" aria-describedby="qtip-33">[34]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0534"> S0534 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0534"> Bazar </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0534">Bazar</a> can create or add files to Registry Run Keys to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-35') id="scite-ref-35-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cybereason Bazar July 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.cybereason.com/blog/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="34" aria-describedby="qtip-34">[35]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-36') id="scite-ref-36-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="NCC Group Team9 June 2020"><sup><a href="https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="35" aria-describedby="qtip-35">[36]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0127"> S0127 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0127"> BBSRAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0127">BBSRAT</a> has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe</code>.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0268"> S0268 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0268"> Bisonal </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0268">Bisonal</a> adds itself to the Registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\</code> for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-37') id="scite-ref-37-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-bisonal-malware-used-attacks-russia-south-korea/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="36" aria-describedby="qtip-36">[37]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0570"> S0570 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0570"> BitPaymer </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0570">BitPaymer</a> has set the run key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-38') id="scite-ref-38-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="37" aria-describedby="qtip-37">[38]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0089"> S0089 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0089"> BlackEnergy </a> </td> <td> <p>The <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0089">BlackEnergy</a> 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-39') id="scite-ref-39-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014"><sup><a href="https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="38" aria-describedby="qtip-38">[39]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0204"> S0204 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0204"> Briba </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0204">Briba</a> creates run key Registry entries pointing to malicious DLLs dropped to disk.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-40') id="scite-ref-40-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Symantec Briba May 2012"><sup><a href="https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-2843-99" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="39" aria-describedby="qtip-39">[40]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0060"> G0060 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0060"> BRONZE BUTLER </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0060">BRONZE BUTLER</a> has used a batch script that adds a Registry Run key to establish malware persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-41') id="scite-ref-41-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="40" aria-describedby="qtip-40">[41]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0471"> S0471 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0471"> build_downer </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0471">build_downer</a> has the ability to add itself to the Registry Run key for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-42') id="scite-ref-42-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Trend Micro Tick November 2019"><sup><a href="https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/Operation-ENDTRADE-TICK-s-Multi-Stage-Backdoors-for-Attacking-Industries-and-Stealing-Classified-Data.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="41" aria-describedby="qtip-41">[42]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0030"> S0030 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0030"> Carbanak </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0030">Carbanak</a> stores a configuration files in the startup directory to automatically execute commands in order to persist across reboots.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-43') id="scite-ref-43-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye CARBANAK June 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="42" aria-describedby="qtip-42">[43]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0484"> S0484 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0484"> Carberp </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0484">Carberp</a> has maintained persistence by placing itself inside the current user's startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-44') id="scite-ref-44-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Prevx Carberp March 2011"><sup><a href="http://pxnow.prevx.com/content/blog/carberp-a_modular_information_stealing_trojan.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="43" aria-describedby="qtip-43">[44]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0348"> S0348 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0348"> Cardinal RAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0348">Cardinal RAT</a> establishes Persistence by setting the <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load</code> Registry key to point to its executable.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-45') id="scite-ref-45-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="PaloAlto CardinalRat Apr 2017"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-cardinal-rat-active-two-years/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="44" aria-describedby="qtip-44">[45]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0144"> S0144 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0144"> ChChes </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0144">ChChes</a> establishes persistence by adding a Registry Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-46') id="scite-ref-46-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="45" aria-describedby="qtip-45">[46]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0080"> G0080 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0080"> Cobalt Group </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0080">Cobalt Group</a> has used Registry Run keys for persistence. The group has also set a Startup path to launch the PowerShell shell command and download Cobalt Strike.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-47') id="scite-ref-47-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="46" aria-describedby="qtip-46">[47]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0338"> S0338 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0338"> Cobian RAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0338">Cobian RAT</a> creates an autostart Registry key to ensure persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-48') id="scite-ref-48-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Zscaler Cobian Aug 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/cobian-rat-backdoored-rat" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="47" aria-describedby="qtip-47">[48]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0244"> S0244 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0244"> Comnie </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0244">Comnie</a> achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-49') id="scite-ref-49-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Palo Alto Comnie"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-comnie-continues-target-organizations-east-asia/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="48" aria-describedby="qtip-48">[49]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0137"> S0137 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0137"> CORESHELL </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0137">CORESHELL</a> has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-50') id="scite-ref-50-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Microsoft SIR Vol 19"><sup><a href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_English.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="49" aria-describedby="qtip-49">[50]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0046"> S0046 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0046"> CozyCar </a> </td> <td> <p>One persistence mechanism used by <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0046">CozyCar</a> is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys: <br><code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\</code> <br><code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\</code> <br><code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code> <br><code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-51') id="scite-ref-51-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="F-Secure CozyDuke"><sup><a href="https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="50" aria-describedby="qtip-50">[51]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0235"> S0235 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0235"> CrossRAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0235">CrossRAT</a> uses run keys for persistence on Windows</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0070"> G0070 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0070"> Dark Caracal </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0070">Dark Caracal</a>'s version of <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0234">Bandook</a> adds a registry key to <code>HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-52') id="scite-ref-52-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018"><sup><a href="https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="51" aria-describedby="qtip-51">[52]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0334"> S0334 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0334"> DarkComet </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0334">DarkComet</a> adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-53') id="scite-ref-53-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014"><sup><a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/DARKCOMET" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="52" aria-describedby="qtip-52">[53]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-54') id="scite-ref-54-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018"><sup><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2012/06/you-dirty-rat-part-1-darkcomet/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="53" aria-describedby="qtip-53">[54]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0012"> G0012 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0012"> Darkhotel </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0012">Darkhotel</a> has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-55') id="scite-ref-55-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Kaspersky Darkhotel"><sup><a href="https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08070903/darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="54" aria-describedby="qtip-54">[55]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0186"> S0186 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0186"> DownPaper </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0186">DownPaper</a> uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-56') id="scite-ref-56-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017"><sup><a href="http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="55" aria-describedby="qtip-55">[56]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0074"> G0074 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0074"> Dragonfly 2.0 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0074">Dragonfly 2.0</a> added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-57') id="scite-ref-57-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="US-CERT TA18-074A"><sup><a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="56" aria-describedby="qtip-56">[57]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0062"> S0062 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0062"> DustySky </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0062">DustySky</a> achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in <code>HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-58') id="scite-ref-58-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="DustySky"><sup><a href="https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="57" aria-describedby="qtip-57">[58]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0081"> S0081 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0081"> Elise </a> </td> <td> <p>If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0081">Elise</a> establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.exe</code>. Other variants have set the following Registry keys for persistence: <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\imejp : [self]</code> and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAStorD</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-59') id="scite-ref-59-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Lotus Blossom Jun 2015"><sup><a href="https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="58" aria-describedby="qtip-58">[59]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-60') id="scite-ref-60-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.accenture.com/t20180127T003755Z_w_/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-46/Accenture-Security-Dragonfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="59" aria-describedby="qtip-59">[60]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0082"> S0082 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0082"> Emissary </a> </td> <td> <p>Variants of <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0082">Emissary</a> have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-61') id="scite-ref-61-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Emissary Trojan Feb 2016"><sup><a href="http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/emissary-trojan-changelog-did-operation-lotus-blossom-cause-it-to-evolve/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="60" aria-describedby="qtip-60">[61]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0367"> S0367 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0367"> Emotet </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0367">Emotet</a> has been observed adding the downloaded payload to the <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> key to maintain persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-62') id="scite-ref-62-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Symantec Emotet Jul 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/evolution-emotet-trojan-distributor" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="61" aria-describedby="qtip-61">[62]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-63') id="scite-ref-63-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="62" aria-describedby="qtip-62">[63]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-64') id="scite-ref-64-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Picus Emotet Dec 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/the-christmas-card-you-never-wanted-a-new-wave-of-emotet-is-back-to-wreak-havoc.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="63" aria-describedby="qtip-63">[64]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0363"> S0363 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0363"> Empire </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0363">Empire</a> can modify the registry run keys <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-65') id="scite-ref-65-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Github PowerShell Empire"><sup><a href="https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="64" aria-describedby="qtip-64">[65]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0396"> S0396 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0396"> EvilBunny </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0396">EvilBunny</a> has created Registry keys for persistence in <code>[HKLM|HKCU]\…\CurrentVersion\Run</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-66') id="scite-ref-66-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cyphort EvilBunny Dec 2014"><sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20150311013500/http://www.cyphort.com/evilbunny-malware-instrumented-lua/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="65" aria-describedby="qtip-65">[66]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0152"> S0152 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0152"> EvilGrab </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0152">EvilGrab</a> adds a Registry Run key for ctfmon.exe to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-46') id="scite-ref-46-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="45" aria-describedby="qtip-45">[46]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0568"> S0568 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0568"> EVILNUM </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0568">EVILNUM</a> can achieve persistence through the Registry Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-67') id="scite-ref-67-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET EvilNum July 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/09/more-evil-deep-look-evilnum-toolset/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="66" aria-describedby="qtip-66">[67]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-68') id="scite-ref-68-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Prevailion EvilNum May 2020"><sup><a href="https://blog.prevailion.com/2020/05/phantom-in-command-shell5.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="67" aria-describedby="qtip-67">[68]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0512"> S0512 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0512"> FatDuke </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0512">FatDuke</a> has used <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run</code> to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-69') id="scite-ref-69-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Dukes October 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="68" aria-describedby="qtip-68">[69]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0267"> S0267 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0267"> FELIXROOT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0267">FELIXROOT</a> adds a shortcut file to the startup folder for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-70') id="scite-ref-70-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET GreyEnergy Oct 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ESET_GreyEnergy.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="69" aria-describedby="qtip-69">[70]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0051"> G0051 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0051"> FIN10 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0051">FIN10</a> has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-71') id="scite-ref-71-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye FIN10 June 2017"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="70" aria-describedby="qtip-70">[71]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-65') id="scite-ref-65-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Github PowerShell Empire"><sup><a href="https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="64" aria-describedby="qtip-64">[65]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0037"> G0037 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0037"> FIN6 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0037">FIN6</a> has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-72') id="scite-ref-72-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye FIN6 April 2016"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="71" aria-describedby="qtip-71">[72]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0046"> G0046 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0046"> FIN7 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0046">FIN7</a> malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-73') id="scite-ref-73-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye FIN7 April 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="72" aria-describedby="qtip-72">[73]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-74') id="scite-ref-74-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="73" aria-describedby="qtip-73">[74]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0355"> S0355 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0355"> Final1stspy </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0355">Final1stspy</a> creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-75') id="scite-ref-75-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/10/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="74" aria-describedby="qtip-74">[75]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0182"> S0182 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0182"> FinFisher </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0182">FinFisher</a> establishes persistence by creating the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-76') id="scite-ref-76-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FinFisher Citation"><sup><a href="http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="75" aria-describedby="qtip-75">[76]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-77') id="scite-ref-77-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Microsoft FinFisher March 2018"><sup><a href="https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="76" aria-describedby="qtip-76">[77]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0036"> S0036 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0036"> FLASHFLOOD </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0036">FLASHFLOOD</a> achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-32') id="scite-ref-32-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT30"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="31" aria-describedby="qtip-31">[32]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0047"> G0047 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0047"> Gamaredon Group </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0047">Gamaredon Group</a> tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-78') id="scite-ref-78-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020"><sup><a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/gamaredon-apt-group-use-covid-19-lure-in-campaigns/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="77" aria-describedby="qtip-77">[78]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-79') id="scite-ref-79-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Gamaredon June 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="78" aria-describedby="qtip-78">[79]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0168"> S0168 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0168"> Gazer </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0168">Gazer</a> can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-80') id="scite-ref-80-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Gazer Aug 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="79" aria-describedby="qtip-79">[80]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-81') id="scite-ref-81-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="80" aria-describedby="qtip-80">[81]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0032"> S0032 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0032"> gh0st RAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0032">gh0st RAT</a> has added a Registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-82') id="scite-ref-82-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018"><sup><a href="https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/04/17/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="81" aria-describedby="qtip-81">[82]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-83') id="scite-ref-83-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Gh0stRAT ATT March 2019"><sup><a href="https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/the-odd-case-of-a-gh0strat-variant" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="82" aria-describedby="qtip-82">[83]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0249"> S0249 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0249"> Gold Dragon </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0249">Gold Dragon</a> establishes persistence in the Startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-84') id="scite-ref-84-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="McAfee Gold Dragon"><sup><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="83" aria-describedby="qtip-83">[84]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0078"> G0078 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0078"> Gorgon Group </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0078">Gorgon Group</a> malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-85') id="scite-ref-85-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/08/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="84" aria-describedby="qtip-84">[85]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0531"> S0531 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0531"> Grandoreiro </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0531">Grandoreiro</a> can use run keys and create link files in the startup folder for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-86') id="scite-ref-86-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="IBM Grandoreiro April 2020"><sup><a href="https://securityintelligence.com/posts/grandoreiro-malware-now-targeting-banks-in-spain/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="85" aria-describedby="qtip-85">[86]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-87') id="scite-ref-87-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Grandoreiro April 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="86" aria-describedby="qtip-86">[87]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0417"> S0417 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0417"> GRIFFON </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0417">GRIFFON</a> has used a persistence module that stores the implant inside the Registry, which executes at logon.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-88') id="scite-ref-88-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="SecureList Griffon May 2019"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/fin7-5-the-infamous-cybercrime-rig-fin7-continues-its-activities/90703/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="87" aria-describedby="qtip-87">[88]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0561"> S0561 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0561"> GuLoader </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0561">GuLoader</a> can establish persistence via the Registry under <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-89') id="scite-ref-89-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020"><sup><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="88" aria-describedby="qtip-88">[89]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0499"> S0499 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0499"> Hancitor </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0499">Hancitor</a> has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-90') id="scite-ref-90-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye Hancitor"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/09/hancitor_aka_chanit.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="89" aria-describedby="qtip-89">[90]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0170"> S0170 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0170"> Helminth </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0170">Helminth</a> establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-91') id="scite-ref-91-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Palo Alto OilRig May 2016"><sup><a href="http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="90" aria-describedby="qtip-90">[91]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0087"> S0087 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0087"> Hi-Zor </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0087">Hi-Zor</a> creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-92') id="scite-ref-92-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Fidelis INOCNATION"><sup><a href="https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1020_Fidelis_Inocnation_FINAL_0.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="91" aria-describedby="qtip-91">[92]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0126"> G0126 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0126"> Higaisa </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0126">Higaisa</a> added a spoofed binary to the start-up folder for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-93') id="scite-ref-93-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020"><sup><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/06/higaisa/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="92" aria-describedby="qtip-92">[93]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-94') id="scite-ref-94-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Zscaler Higaisa 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/return-higaisa-apt" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="93" aria-describedby="qtip-93">[94]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0072"> G0072 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0072"> Honeybee </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0072">Honeybee</a> uses a batch file that configures the ComSysApp service to autostart in order to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-95') id="scite-ref-95-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="McAfee Honeybee"><sup><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-uncovers-operation-honeybee-malicious-document-campaign-targeting-humanitarian-aid-groups/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="94" aria-describedby="qtip-94">[95]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0070"> S0070 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0070"> HTTPBrowser </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0070">HTTPBrowser</a> has established persistence by setting the <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> key value for <code>wdm</code> to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry <code>HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn "%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe"</code> to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-96') id="scite-ref-96-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ZScaler Hacking Team"><sup><a href="http://research.zscaler.com/2015/08/chinese-cyber-espionage-apt-group.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="95" aria-describedby="qtip-95">[96]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-97') id="scite-ref-97-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ThreatStream Evasion Analysis"><sup><a href="https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="96" aria-describedby="qtip-96">[97]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0483"> S0483 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0483"> IcedID </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0483">IcedID</a> has established persistence by creating a Registry run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-98') id="scite-ref-98-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="IBM IcedID November 2017"><sup><a href="https://securityintelligence.com/new-banking-trojan-icedid-discovered-by-ibm-x-force-research/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="97" aria-describedby="qtip-97">[98]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0100"> G0100 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0100"> Inception </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0100">Inception</a> has maintained persistence by modifying Registry run key value <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-99') id="scite-ref-99-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/cloud-atlas-redoctober-apt-is-back-in-style/68083/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="98" aria-describedby="qtip-98">[99]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0259"> S0259 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0259"> InnaputRAT </a> </td> <td> <p>Some <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0259">InnaputRAT</a> variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key <code>HKU\<SID>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-100') id="scite-ref-100-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018"><sup><a href="https://asert.arbornetworks.com/innaput-actors-utilize-remote-access-trojan-since-2016-presumably-targeting-victim-files/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="99" aria-describedby="qtip-99">[100]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0260"> S0260 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0260"> InvisiMole </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0260">InvisiMole</a> can place a lnk file in the Startup Folder to achieve persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-101') id="scite-ref-101-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET InvisiMole June 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="100" aria-describedby="qtip-100">[101]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0015"> S0015 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0015"> Ixeshe </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0015">Ixeshe</a> can achieve persistence by adding itself to the <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> Registry key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-102') id="scite-ref-102-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Trend Micro IXESHE 2012"><sup><a href="https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="101" aria-describedby="qtip-101">[102]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0389"> S0389 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0389"> JCry </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0389">JCry</a> has created payloads in the Startup directory to maintain persistence. <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-103') id="scite-ref-103-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Carbon Black JCry May 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/05/14/cb-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-jcry-ransomware-pretends-to-be-adobe-flash-player-update-installer/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="102" aria-describedby="qtip-102">[103]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0044"> S0044 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0044"> JHUHUGIT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0044">JHUHUGIT</a> has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-104') id="scite-ref-104-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Sednit Part 1"><sup><a href="http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part1.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="103" aria-describedby="qtip-103">[104]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0088"> S0088 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0088"> Kasidet </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0088">Kasidet</a> creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-105') id="scite-ref-105-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Zscaler Kasidet"><sup><a href="http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="104" aria-describedby="qtip-104">[105]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-106') id="scite-ref-106-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Microsoft Kasidet"><sup><a href="http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2FKasidet" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="105" aria-describedby="qtip-105">[106]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0265"> S0265 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0265"> Kazuar </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0265">Kazuar</a> adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-107') id="scite-ref-107-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/05/unit42-kazuar-multiplatform-espionage-backdoor-api-access/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="106" aria-describedby="qtip-106">[107]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0004"> G0004 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0004"> Ke3chang </a> </td> <td> <p>Several <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0004">Ke3chang</a> backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-108') id="scite-ref-108-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong"><sup><a href="https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="107" aria-describedby="qtip-107">[108]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0094"> G0094 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0094"> Kimsuky </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0094">Kimsuky</a> has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-109') id="scite-ref-109-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="108" aria-describedby="qtip-108">[109]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-30') id="scite-ref-30-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky"><sup><a href="https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="29" aria-describedby="qtip-29">[30]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-110') id="scite-ref-110-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020"><sup><a href="https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="109" aria-describedby="qtip-109">[110]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0356"> S0356 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0356"> KONNI </a> </td> <td> <p>A version of <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0356">KONNI</a> drops a Windows shortcut into the Startup folder to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-111') id="scite-ref-111-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos Konni May 2017"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="110" aria-describedby="qtip-110">[111]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0032"> G0032 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0032"> Lazarus Group </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0032">Lazarus Group</a> malware attempts to maintain persistence by saving itself in the Start menu folder or by adding a Registry Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-112') id="scite-ref-112-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Novetta Blockbuster"><sup><a href="https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="111" aria-describedby="qtip-111">[112]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-113') id="scite-ref-113-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Novetta Blockbuster RATs"><sup><a href="https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-RAT-and-Staging-Report.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="112" aria-describedby="qtip-112">[113]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-114') id="scite-ref-114-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/lazarus-resurfaces-targets-global-banks-bitcoin-users/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="113" aria-describedby="qtip-113">[114]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0065"> G0065 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0065"> Leviathan </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0065">Leviathan</a> has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-115') id="scite-ref-115-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="114" aria-describedby="qtip-114">[115]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-116') id="scite-ref-116-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye Periscope March 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="115" aria-describedby="qtip-115">[116]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0397"> S0397 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0397"> LoJax </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0397">LoJax</a> has modified the Registry key <code>‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’</code> from <code>‘autocheck autochk <em>’</code> to <code>‘autocheck autoche </em>’</code> in order to execute its payload during Windows startup.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-117') id="scite-ref-117-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET LoJax Sept 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="116" aria-describedby="qtip-116">[117]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0582"> S0582 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0582"> LookBack </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0582">LookBack</a> sets up a Registry Run key to establish a persistence mechanism.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-118') id="scite-ref-118-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Proofpoint LookBack Malware Aug 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/lookback-malware-targets-united-states-utilities-sector-phishing-attacks" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="117" aria-describedby="qtip-117">[118]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0532"> S0532 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0532"> Lucifer </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0532">Lucifer</a> can persist by setting Registry key values <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic</code> and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-119') id="scite-ref-119-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020"><sup><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/lucifer-new-cryptojacking-and-ddos-hybrid-malware/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="118" aria-describedby="qtip-118">[119]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0409"> S0409 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0409"> Machete </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0409">Machete</a> used the startup folder for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-120') id="scite-ref-120-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Securelist Machete Aug 2014"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="119" aria-describedby="qtip-119">[120]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-121') id="scite-ref-121-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cylance Machete Mar 2017"><sup><a href="https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="120" aria-describedby="qtip-120">[121]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0059"> G0059 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0059"> Magic Hound </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0059">Magic Hound</a> malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-122') id="scite-ref-122-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="121" aria-describedby="qtip-121">[122]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0167"> S0167 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0167"> Matryoshka </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0167">Matryoshka</a> can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-123') id="scite-ref-123-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017"><sup><a href="http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation_Wilted_Tulip.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="122" aria-describedby="qtip-122">[123]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-124') id="scite-ref-124-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CopyKittens Nov 2015"><sup><a href="https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="123" aria-describedby="qtip-123">[124]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0449"> S0449 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0449"> Maze </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0449">Maze</a> has created a file named "startup_vrun.bat" in the Startup folder of a virtual machine to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-125') id="scite-ref-125-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Sophos Maze VM September 2020"><sup><a href="https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/09/17/maze-attackers-adopt-ragnar-locker-virtual-machine-technique/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="124" aria-describedby="qtip-124">[125]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0500"> S0500 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0500"> MCMD </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0500">MCMD</a> can use Registry Run Keys for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-126') id="scite-ref-126-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Secureworks MCMD July 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="125" aria-describedby="qtip-125">[126]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0455"> S0455 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0455"> Metamorfo </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0455">Metamorfo</a> has written its executable path to a Registry Run key and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-127') id="scite-ref-127-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020"><sup><a href="https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="126" aria-describedby="qtip-126">[127]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-128') id="scite-ref-128-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/04/metamorfo-campaign-targeting-brazilian-users.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="127" aria-describedby="qtip-127">[128]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-129') id="scite-ref-129-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/another-metamorfo-variant-targeting-customers-of-financial-institutions" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="128" aria-describedby="qtip-128">[129]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0080"> S0080 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0080"> Mivast </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0080">Mivast</a> creates the following Registry entry: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Micromedia</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-130') id="scite-ref-130-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Symantec Backdoor.Mivast"><sup><a href="http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-020623-0740-99&tabid=2" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="129" aria-describedby="qtip-129">[130]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0553"> S0553 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0553"> MoleNet </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0553">MoleNet</a> can achieve persitence on the infected machine by setting the Registry run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-131') id="scite-ref-131-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/Molerats-in-the-Cloud-New-Malware-Arsenal-Abuses-Cloud-Platforms-in-Middle-East-Espionage-Campaign.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="130" aria-describedby="qtip-130">[131]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0021"> G0021 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0021"> Molerats </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0021">Molerats</a> saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-132') id="scite-ref-132-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/gaza-cybergang-group1-operation-sneakypastes/90068/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="131" aria-describedby="qtip-131">[132]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0256"> S0256 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0256"> Mosquito </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0256">Mosquito</a> establishes persistence under the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Run auto_update</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-133') id="scite-ref-133-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="132" aria-describedby="qtip-132">[133]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0069"> G0069 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0069"> MuddyWater </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0069">MuddyWater</a> has added Registry Run key <code>KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding</code> to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-134') id="scite-ref-134-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="133" aria-describedby="qtip-133">[134]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-135') id="scite-ref-135-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/muddywater/88059/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="134" aria-describedby="qtip-134">[135]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-136') id="scite-ref-136-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos MuddyWater May 2019"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/05/recent-muddywater-associated-blackwater.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="135" aria-describedby="qtip-135">[136]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-137') id="scite-ref-137-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017"><sup><a href="https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="136" aria-describedby="qtip-136">[137]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-138') id="scite-ref-138-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021"><sup><a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/c/earth-vetala---muddywater-continues-to-target-organizations-in-t.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="137" aria-describedby="qtip-137">[138]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0129"> G0129 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0129"> Mustang Panda </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0129">Mustang Panda</a> has created the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobelmdyU</code> to maintain persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-139') id="scite-ref-139-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Proofpoint TA416 November 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta416-goes-ground-and-returns-golang-plugx-malware-loader" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="138" aria-describedby="qtip-138">[139]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0228"> S0228 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0228"> NanHaiShu </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0228">NanHaiShu</a> modifies the %regrun% Registry to point itself to an autostart mechanism.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-140') id="scite-ref-140-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="fsecure NanHaiShu July 2016"><sup><a href="https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="139" aria-describedby="qtip-139">[140]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0336"> S0336 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0336"> NanoCore </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0336">NanoCore</a> creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-141') id="scite-ref-141-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018"><sup><a href="https://cofense.com/nanocore-rat-resurfaced-sewers/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="140" aria-describedby="qtip-140">[141]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0247"> S0247 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0247"> NavRAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0247">NavRAT</a> creates a Registry key to ensure a file gets executed upon reboot in order to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-142') id="scite-ref-142-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos NavRAT May 2018"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/navrat.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="141" aria-describedby="qtip-141">[142]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0034"> S0034 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0034"> NETEAGLE </a> </td> <td> <p>The "SCOUT" variant of <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0034">NETEAGLE</a> achieves persistence by adding itself to the <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> Registry key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-32') id="scite-ref-32-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT30"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="31" aria-describedby="qtip-31">[32]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0198"> S0198 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0198"> NETWIRE </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0198">NETWIRE</a> creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-143') id="scite-ref-143-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="McAfee Netwire Mar 2015"><sup><a href="https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/netwire-rat-behind-recent-targeted-attacks/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="142" aria-describedby="qtip-142">[143]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-144') id="scite-ref-144-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020"><sup><a href="https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="143" aria-describedby="qtip-143">[144]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-89') id="scite-ref-89-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020"><sup><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="88" aria-describedby="qtip-88">[89]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-145') id="scite-ref-145-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Proofpoint NETWIRE December 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/geofenced-netwire-campaigns" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="144" aria-describedby="qtip-144">[145]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0385"> S0385 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0385"> njRAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0385">njRAT</a> has added persistence via the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\</code> and dropped a shortcut in <code>%STARTUP%</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-146') id="scite-ref-146-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Fidelis njRAT June 2013"><sup><a href="https://www.threatminer.org/_reports/2013/fta-1009---njrat-uncovered-1.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="145" aria-describedby="qtip-145">[146]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-147') id="scite-ref-147-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Trend Micro njRAT 2018"><sup><a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/autoit-compiled-worm-affecting-removable-media-delivers-fileless-version-of-bladabindi-njrat-backdoor/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="146" aria-describedby="qtip-146">[147]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0353"> S0353 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0353"> NOKKI </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0353">NOKKI</a> has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-148') id="scite-ref-148-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-new-konni-malware-attacking-eurasia-southeast-asia/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="147" aria-describedby="qtip-147">[148]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0439"> S0439 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0439"> Okrum </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0439">Okrum</a> establishes persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-149') id="scite-ref-149-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Okrum July 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ESET_Okrum_and_Ketrican.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="148" aria-describedby="qtip-148">[149]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0040"> G0040 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0040"> Patchwork </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0040">Patchwork</a> has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-150') id="scite-ref-150-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cymmetria Patchwork"><sup><a href="https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling_Patchwork.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="149" aria-describedby="qtip-149">[150]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-151') id="scite-ref-151-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017"><sup><a href="https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="150" aria-describedby="qtip-150">[151]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0124"> S0124 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0124"> Pisloader </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0124">Pisloader</a> establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-152') id="scite-ref-152-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Palo Alto DNS Requests"><sup><a href="http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="151" aria-describedby="qtip-151">[152]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0254"> S0254 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0254"> PLAINTEE </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0254">PLAINTEE</a> gains persistence by adding the Registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-153') id="scite-ref-153-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Rancor Unit42 June 2018"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="152" aria-describedby="qtip-152">[153]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0013"> S0013 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0013"> PlugX </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0013">PlugX</a> adds Run key entries in the Registry to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-154') id="scite-ref-154-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Lastline PlugX Analysis"><sup><a href="http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="153" aria-describedby="qtip-153">[154]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-46') id="scite-ref-46-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="45" aria-describedby="qtip-45">[46]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-155') id="scite-ref-155-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CIRCL PlugX March 2013"><sup><a href="http://circl.lu/assets/files/tr-12/tr-12-circl-plugx-analysis-v1.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="154" aria-describedby="qtip-154">[155]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0428"> S0428 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0428"> PoetRAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0428">PoetRAT</a> has added a registry key in the <RUN> hive for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-156') id="scite-ref-156-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos PoetRAT April 2020"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="155" aria-describedby="qtip-155">[156]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0012"> S0012 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0012"> PoisonIvy </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0012">PoisonIvy</a> creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-157') id="scite-ref-157-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005"><sup><a href="https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="156" aria-describedby="qtip-156">[157]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0139"> S0139 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0139"> PowerDuke </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0139">PowerDuke</a> achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-158') id="scite-ref-158-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Volexity PowerDuke November 2016"><sup><a href="https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="157" aria-describedby="qtip-157">[158]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0441"> S0441 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0441"> PowerShower </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0441">PowerShower</a> sets up persistence with a Registry run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-159') id="scite-ref-159-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 Inception November 2018"><sup><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-inception-attackers-target-europe-year-old-office-vulnerability/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="158" aria-describedby="qtip-158">[159]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0145"> S0145 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0145"> POWERSOURCE </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0145">POWERSOURCE</a> achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-160') id="scite-ref-160-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017"><sup><a href="http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="159" aria-describedby="qtip-159">[160]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0194"> S0194 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0194"> PowerSploit </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0194">PowerSploit</a>'s <code>New-UserPersistenceOption</code> Persistence argument can be used to establish via the <code>HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> Registry key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-161') id="scite-ref-161-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="GitHub PowerSploit May 2012"><sup><a href="https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="160" aria-describedby="qtip-160">[161]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-162') id="scite-ref-162-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="PowerSploit Documentation"><sup><a href="http://powersploit.readthedocs.io" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="161" aria-describedby="qtip-161">[162]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0371"> S0371 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0371"> POWERTON </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0371">POWERTON</a> can install a Registry Run key for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-163') id="scite-ref-163-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT33 Guardrail"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="162" aria-describedby="qtip-162">[163]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0113"> S0113 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0113"> Prikormka </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0113">Prikormka</a> adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-164') id="scite-ref-164-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Operation Groundbait"><sup><a href="http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="163" aria-describedby="qtip-163">[164]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0056"> G0056 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0056"> PROMETHIUM </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0056">PROMETHIUM</a> has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-165') id="scite-ref-165-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos Promethium June 2020"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="164" aria-describedby="qtip-164">[165]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0147"> S0147 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0147"> Pteranodon </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0147">Pteranodon</a> copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-166') id="scite-ref-166-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="165" aria-describedby="qtip-165">[166]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0196"> S0196 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0196"> PUNCHBUGGY </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0196">PUNCHBUGGY</a> has been observed using a Registry Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-167') id="scite-ref-167-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="166" aria-describedby="qtip-166">[167]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-168') id="scite-ref-168-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Morphisec ShellTea June 2019"><sup><a href="http://blog.morphisec.com/security-alert-fin8-is-back" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="167" aria-describedby="qtip-167">[168]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0192"> S0192 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0192"> Pupy </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0192">Pupy</a> adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key <code>SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-169') id="scite-ref-169-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="GitHub Pupy"><sup><a href="https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="168" aria-describedby="qtip-168">[169]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0024"> G0024 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0024"> Putter Panda </a> </td> <td> <p>A dropper used by <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0024">Putter Panda</a> installs itself into the ASEP Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> with a value named McUpdate.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-170') id="scite-ref-170-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CrowdStrike Putter Panda"><sup><a href="http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="169" aria-describedby="qtip-169">[170]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0458"> S0458 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0458"> Ramsay </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0458">Ramsay</a> has created Registry Run keys to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-171') id="scite-ref-171-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.programmersought.com/article/62493896999/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="170" aria-describedby="qtip-170">[171]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0172"> S0172 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0172"> Reaver </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0172">Reaver</a> creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-172') id="scite-ref-172-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="171" aria-describedby="qtip-171">[172]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0153"> S0153 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0153"> RedLeaves </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0153">RedLeaves</a> attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-46') id="scite-ref-46-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="45" aria-describedby="qtip-45">[46]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-173') id="scite-ref-173-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Accenture Hogfish April 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="172" aria-describedby="qtip-172">[173]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0332"> S0332 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0332"> Remcos </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0332">Remcos</a> can add itself to the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-174') id="scite-ref-174-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/remcos-a-new-rat-in-the-wild-2.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="173" aria-describedby="qtip-173">[174]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0375"> S0375 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0375"> Remexi </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0375">Remexi</a> utilizes Run Registry keys in the HKLM hive as a persistence mechanism.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-175') id="scite-ref-175-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Securelist Remexi Jan 2019"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="174" aria-describedby="qtip-174">[175]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0379"> S0379 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0379"> Revenge RAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0379">Revenge RAT</a> creates a Registry key at <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</code> to survive a system reboot.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-176') id="scite-ref-176-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/WhiteCompanyOperationShaheenReport.pdf?_ga=2.161661948.1943296560.1555683782-1066572390.1555511517" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="175" aria-describedby="qtip-175">[176]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0433"> S0433 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0433"> Rifdoor </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0433">Rifdoor</a> has created a new registry entry at <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Graphics</code> with a value of <code>C:\ProgramData\Initech\Initech.exe /run</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-177') id="scite-ref-177-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.carbonblack.com/2020/04/16/vmware-carbon-black-tau-threat-analysis-the-evolution-of-lazarus/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="176" aria-describedby="qtip-176">[177]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0106"> G0106 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0106"> Rocke </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0106">Rocke</a>'s miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-178') id="scite-ref-178-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos Rocke August 2018"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/08/rocke-champion-of-monero-miners.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="177" aria-describedby="qtip-177">[178]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0270"> S0270 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0270"> RogueRobin </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0270">RogueRobin</a> created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-179') id="scite-ref-179-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="178" aria-describedby="qtip-178">[179]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0090"> S0090 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0090"> Rover </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0090">Rover</a> persists by creating a Registry entry in <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-180') id="scite-ref-180-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Palo Alto Rover"><sup><a href="http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="179" aria-describedby="qtip-179">[180]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0148"> S0148 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0148"> RTM </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0148">RTM</a> tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-181') id="scite-ref-181-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET RTM Feb 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="180" aria-describedby="qtip-180">[181]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0048"> G0048 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0048"> RTM </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0048">RTM</a> has used Registry run keys to establish persistence for the <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0148">RTM</a> Trojan and other tools, such as a modified version of TeamViewer remote desktop software.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-181') id="scite-ref-181-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET RTM Feb 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="180" aria-describedby="qtip-180">[181]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-182') id="scite-ref-182-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Group IB RTM August 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.group-ib.com/blog/rtm" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="181" aria-describedby="qtip-181">[182]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0253"> S0253 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0253"> RunningRAT </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0253">RunningRAT</a> adds itself to the Registry key <code>Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> to establish persistence upon reboot.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-84') id="scite-ref-84-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="McAfee Gold Dragon"><sup><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="83" aria-describedby="qtip-83">[84]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0446"> S0446 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0446"> Ryuk </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0446">Ryuk</a> has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-183') id="scite-ref-183-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="182" aria-describedby="qtip-182">[183]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0085"> S0085 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0085"> S-Type </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0085">S-Type</a> may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key <code>HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{{3 characters of Unique Identifier}}</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-184') id="scite-ref-184-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cylance Dust Storm"><sup><a href="https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="183" aria-describedby="qtip-183">[184]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0074"> S0074 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0074"> Sakula </a> </td> <td> <p>Most <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0074">Sakula</a> samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key <code>SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\</code> in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-185') id="scite-ref-185-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Dell Sakula"><sup><a href="http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="184" aria-describedby="qtip-184">[185]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0461"> S0461 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0461"> SDBbot </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0461">SDBbot</a> has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-186') id="scite-ref-186-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Proofpoint TA505 October 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ta505-distributes-new-sdbbot-remote-access-trojan-get2-downloader" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="185" aria-describedby="qtip-185">[186]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-187') id="scite-ref-187-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="IBM TA505 April 2020"><sup><a href="https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ta505-continues-to-infect-networks-with-sdbbot-rat/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="186" aria-describedby="qtip-186">[187]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0053"> S0053 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0053"> SeaDuke </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0053">SeaDuke</a> is capable of persisting via the Registry Run key or a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-188') id="scite-ref-188-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit 42 SeaDuke 2015"><sup><a href="http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="187" aria-describedby="qtip-187">[188]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0345"> S0345 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0345"> Seasalt </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0345">Seasalt</a> creates a Registry entry to ensure infection after reboot under <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\currentVersion\Run</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-189') id="scite-ref-189-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="McAfee Oceansalt Oct 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-operation-oceansalt.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="188" aria-describedby="qtip-188">[189]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0382"> S0382 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0382"> ServHelper </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0382">ServHelper</a> may attempt to establish persistence via the <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\</code> run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-190') id="scite-ref-190-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Deep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.deepinstinct.com/2019/04/02/new-servhelper-variant-employs-excel-4-0-macro-to-drop-signed-payload/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="189" aria-describedby="qtip-189">[190]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0104"> G0104 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0104"> Sharpshooter </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0104">Sharpshooter</a>'s first-stage downloader installed <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0448">Rising Sun</a> to the startup folder <code>%Startup%\mssync.exe</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-191') id="scite-ref-191-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-operation-sharpshooter.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="190" aria-describedby="qtip-190">[191]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0546"> S0546 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0546"> SharpStage </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0546">SharpStage</a> has the ability to create persistence for the malware using the Registry autorun key and startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-131') id="scite-ref-131-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/Molerats-in-the-Cloud-New-Malware-Arsenal-Abuses-Cloud-Platforms-in-Middle-East-Espionage-Campaign.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="130" aria-describedby="qtip-130">[131]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0444"> S0444 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0444"> ShimRat </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0444">ShimRat</a> has installed a registry based start-up key <code>HKCU\Software\microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> to maintain persistence should other methods fail.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-192') id="scite-ref-192-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang"><sup><a href="https://foxitsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/fox-it_mofang_threatreport_tlp-white.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="191" aria-describedby="qtip-191">[192]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0028"> S0028 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0028"> SHIPSHAPE </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0028">SHIPSHAPE</a> achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-32') id="scite-ref-32-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT30"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="31" aria-describedby="qtip-31">[32]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0121"> G0121 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0121"> Sidewinder </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0121">Sidewinder</a> has added paths to executables in the Registry to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-193') id="scite-ref-193-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.rewterz.com/threats/sidewinder-apt-group-campaign-analysis" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="192" aria-describedby="qtip-192">[193]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-194') id="scite-ref-194-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.rewterz.com/articles/analysis-on-sidewinder-apt-group-covid-19" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="193" aria-describedby="qtip-193">[194]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-195') id="scite-ref-195-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cyble Sidewinder September 2020"><sup><a href="https://cybleinc.com/2020/09/26/sidewinder-apt-targets-with-futuristic-tactics-and-techniques/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="194" aria-describedby="qtip-194">[195]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0091"> G0091 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0091"> Silence </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0091">Silence</a> has used <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>, <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>, and the Startup folder to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-196') id="scite-ref-196-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Group IB Silence Sept 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_moving-into-the-darkside.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="195" aria-describedby="qtip-195">[196]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0226"> S0226 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0226"> Smoke Loader </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0226">Smoke Loader</a> adds a Registry Run key for persistence and adds a script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-197') id="scite-ref-197-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016"><sup><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/smoke-loader-downloader-with-a-smokescreen-still-alive/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="196" aria-describedby="qtip-196">[197]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0159"> S0159 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0159"> SNUGRIDE </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0159">SNUGRIDE</a> establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-198') id="scite-ref-198-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT10 April 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="197" aria-describedby="qtip-197">[198]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0035"> S0035 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0035"> SPACESHIP </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0035">SPACESHIP</a> achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-32') id="scite-ref-32-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye APT30"><sup><a href="https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="31" aria-describedby="qtip-31">[32]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0058"> S0058 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0058"> SslMM </a> </td> <td> <p>To establish persistence, <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0058">SslMM</a> identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-199') id="scite-ref-199-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Baumgartner Naikon 2015"><sup><a href="https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="198" aria-describedby="qtip-198">[199]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0491"> S0491 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0491"> StrongPity </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0491">StrongPity</a> can use the <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> Registry key for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-165') id="scite-ref-165-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos Promethium June 2020"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="164" aria-describedby="qtip-164">[165]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0018"> S0018 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0018"> Sykipot </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0018">Sykipot</a> has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-200') id="scite-ref-200-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Blasco 2013"><sup><a href="http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="199" aria-describedby="qtip-199">[200]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0586"> S0586 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0586"> TAINTEDSCRIBE </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0586">TAINTEDSCRIBE</a> can copy itself into the current user’s Startup folder as "Narrator.exe" for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-201') id="scite-ref-201-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020"><sup><a href="https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133b" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="200" aria-describedby="qtip-200">[201]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0027"> G0027 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0027"> Threat Group-3390 </a> </td> <td> <p>A <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0027">Threat Group-3390</a> tool can add the binary’s path to the Registry key <code>Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> to add persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-202') id="scite-ref-202-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018"><sup><a href="https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="201" aria-describedby="qtip-201">[202]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0131"> S0131 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0131"> TINYTYPHON </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0131">TINYTYPHON</a> installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-33') id="scite-ref-33-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Forcepoint Monsoon"><sup><a href="https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="32" aria-describedby="qtip-32">[33]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0004"> S0004 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0004"> TinyZBot </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0004">TinyZBot</a> can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-203') id="scite-ref-203-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Cylance Cleaver"><sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="202" aria-describedby="qtip-202">[203]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0266"> S0266 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0266"> TrickBot </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0266">TrickBot</a> establishes persistence in the Startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-204') id="scite-ref-204-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Trickbot Oct 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/10/12/eset-takes-part-global-operation-disrupt-trickbot/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="203" aria-describedby="qtip-203">[204]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0094"> S0094 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0094"> Trojan.Karagany </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0094">Trojan.Karagany</a> can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-31') id="scite-ref-31-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Symantec Dragonfly"><sup><a href="http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="30" aria-describedby="qtip-30">[31]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-205') id="scite-ref-205-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Secureworks Karagany July 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="204" aria-describedby="qtip-204">[205]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0081"> G0081 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0081"> Tropic Trooper </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0081">Tropic Trooper</a> has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-206') id="scite-ref-206-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.anomali.com/blog/anomali-suspects-that-china-backed-apt-pirate-panda-may-be-seeking-access-to-vietnam-government-data-center#When:15:00:00Z" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="205" aria-describedby="qtip-205">[206]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-207') id="scite-ref-207-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020"><sup><a href="https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/Tech-Brief-Tropic-Trooper-s-Back-USBferry-Attack-Targets-Air-gapped-Environments.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="206" aria-describedby="qtip-206">[207]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0178"> S0178 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0178"> Truvasys </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0178">Truvasys</a> adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-208') id="scite-ref-208-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="207" aria-describedby="qtip-207">[208]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0010"> G0010 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0010"> Turla </a> </td> <td> <p>A <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0010">Turla</a> Javascript backdoor added a local_update_check value under the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> to establish persistence. Additionally, a <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0010">Turla</a> custom executable containing Metasploit shellcode is saved to the Startup folder to gain persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-133') id="scite-ref-133-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="132" aria-describedby="qtip-132">[133]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-209') id="scite-ref-209-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Turla Mosquito May 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/05/22/turla-mosquito-shift-towards-generic-tools/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="208" aria-describedby="qtip-208">[209]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0199"> S0199 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0199"> TURNEDUP </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0199">TURNEDUP</a> is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-210') id="scite-ref-210-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="209" aria-describedby="qtip-209">[210]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0386"> S0386 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0386"> Ursnif </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0386">Ursnif</a> has used Registry Run keys to establish automatic execution at system startup.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-211') id="scite-ref-211-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="TrendMicro PE_URSNIF.A2"><sup><a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/PE_URSNIF.A2?_ga=2.131425807.1462021705.1559742358-1202584019.1549394279" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="210" aria-describedby="qtip-210">[211]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-212') id="scite-ref-212-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="TrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM"><sup><a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/BKDR_URSNIF.SM?_ga=2.129468940.1462021705.1559742358-1202584019.1549394279" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="211" aria-describedby="qtip-211">[212]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0136"> S0136 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0136"> USBStealer </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0136">USBStealer</a> registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-213') id="scite-ref-213-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014"><sup><a href="http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="212" aria-describedby="qtip-212">[213]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0207"> S0207 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0207"> Vasport </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0207">Vasport</a> copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-214') id="scite-ref-214-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Symantec Vasport May 2012"><sup><a href="https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-5938-99" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="213" aria-describedby="qtip-213">[214]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0442"> S0442 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0442"> VBShower </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0442">VBShower</a> used <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\[a-f0-9A-F]{{8}}</code> to maintain persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-215') id="scite-ref-215-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019"><sup><a href="https://securelist.com/recent-cloud-atlas-activity/92016/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="214" aria-describedby="qtip-214">[215]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0112"> G0112 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0112"> Windshift </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0112">Windshift</a> has created LNK files in the Startup folder to establish persistence.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-216') id="scite-ref-216-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Blackberry Bahamut"><sup><a href="https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/pdfviewer?file=/content/dam/blackberry-com/asset/enterprise/pdf/direct/report-spark-bahamut.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="215" aria-describedby="qtip-215">[216]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0102"> G0102 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0102"> Wizard Spider </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0102">Wizard Spider</a> has established persistence via the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and a shortcut within the startup folder.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-217') id="scite-ref-217-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020"><sup><a href="https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="216" aria-describedby="qtip-216">[217]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-218') id="scite-ref-218-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="217" aria-describedby="qtip-217">[218]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0341"> S0341 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0341"> Xbash </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0341">Xbash</a> can create a Startup item for persistence if it determines it is on a Windows system.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-219') id="scite-ref-219-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018"><sup><a href="https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="218" aria-describedby="qtip-218">[219]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0251"> S0251 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0251"> Zebrocy </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0251">Zebrocy</a> creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-220') id="scite-ref-220-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/20/sednit-whats-going-zebrocy/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="219" aria-describedby="qtip-219">[220]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-221') id="scite-ref-221-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="ESET Zebrocy May 2019"><sup><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="220" aria-describedby="qtip-220">[221]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-222') id="scite-ref-222-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018"><sup><a href="https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="221" aria-describedby="qtip-221">[222]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0330"> S0330 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/software/S0330"> Zeus Panda </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/software/S0330">Zeus Panda</a> adds persistence by creating Registry Run keys.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-223') id="scite-ref-223-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Talos Zeus Panda Nov 2017"><sup><a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/zeus-panda-campaign.html#More" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="222" aria-describedby="qtip-222">[223]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-224') id="scite-ref-224-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="GDATA Zeus Panda June 2017"><sup><a href="https://cyberwtf.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/panda-whitepaper.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="223" aria-describedby="qtip-223">[224]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0128"> G0128 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0128"> ZIRCONIUM </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/versions/v9/groups/G0128">ZIRCONIUM</a> has created a Registry Run key named <code>Dropbox Update Setup</code> to establish persistence for a malicious Python binary.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-225') id="scite-ref-225-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020"><sup><a href="https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-31-leverages-covid-19-vaccine-theme-and-abuses-legitimate-online" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="224" aria-describedby="qtip-224">[225]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="mitigations">Mitigations</h2> <p> This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features. </p> <h2 class="pt-3" id="detection">Detection</h2> <div> <p>Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-226') id="scite-ref-226-a" class="scite-citeref-number" data-reference="TechNet Autoruns"><sup><a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="225" aria-describedby="qtip-225">[226]</a></sup></span> Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.</p><p>Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.</p> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id="references">References</h2> <div class="row"> <div class="col"> <ol> <li> <span id="scite-1" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-1" href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977" target="_blank"> Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. 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