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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <feed xml:lang="en-us" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title>CourtListener.com: All opinions for the Court of Appeals of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/" rel="alternate"/><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/feed/court/arkctapp/" rel="self"/><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/</id><updated>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</updated><author><name>Free Law Project</name><email>feeds@courtlistener.com</email></author><rights>Created for the public domain by Free Law Project</rights><entry><title>(In the Matter of the Adoption of Mc, a Minor ) James David Garner v. Rhonda Michelle Bunn and Paul Bunn</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278218/in-the-matter-of-the-adoption-of-mc-a-minor-james-david-garner-v/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278218/in-the-matter-of-the-adoption-of-mc-a-minor-james-david-garner-v/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 579 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-23-637 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 OF MC, A MINOR APPEAL FROM THE WHITE JAMES DAVID GARNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 73PR-22-165] APPELLANT HONORABLE ELLEN B. BRANTLEY, V. JUDGE RHONDA MICHELLE BUNN AND PAUL BUNN APPELLEES AFFIRMED STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge Appellant, James David Garner (David), appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of White County terminating his parental rights to his daughter, MC, and granting a stepparent adoption to appellee, Paul Bunn, with the consent of the mother, Rhonda Michelle Bunn (Michelle). David brings two points on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that his daughter could be adopted without his consent, and (2) the circuit court erred in finding it was in the best interest of the child to be adopted. We affirm. On May 17, 2022, Paul Bunn, MC’s stepfather, and Michelle jointly filed a “Petition for Adoption” of MC by Paul. MC is the nine-year-old child of Michelle and David, who were never married nor lived together. Their relationship ended prior to the birth of MC on November 14, 2014, in Searcy, Arkansas. David made a brief appearance at the hospital when MC was born. Despite Michelle’s request, he failed to return to the hospital to have his name put on MC’s birth certificate. David did not register with the Arkansas Putative Father Registry stating he is the father of MC. Michelle was a family-law attorney for over twenty years in White County and met Paul in April 2020 when he hired her to represent him in his divorce from Holly Hickman. Michelle was Paul’s divorce attorney for around six months until he discharged her as his attorney. They were married a year later in September. At the time of the adoption hearing, they had been married for almost two years. Paul had been consistently in MC’s life for nearly two and a half years at the time of the hearing for adoption. The pleadings show he is a highly decorated combat veteran of Iraqi Freedom, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and many other missions. Paul now operates a veterans outreach program. Michelle practices veterans law, assisting Paul. Michelle testified that David had seen MC on the day she was born and less than five times over the next nine years. Michelle testified she sent David photos of MC through emails and texts for about two years after MC’s birth, but she eventually stopped because he would respond only occasionally by saying “nice” or “cute.” David also admitted Michelle told him there was an open-door policy to see MC. The next time he saw MC was the first Christmas, which was the next month after her birth. He and one of his family members came by Michelle’s home, and they visited for an hour or less. Michelle testified to another occasion where David came to her office to obtain power of attorney for his wife. MC … <a href="/opinion/10278218/in-the-matter-of-the-adoption-of-mc-a-minor-james-david-garner-v/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/in_the_matter_of_the_adoption_of_mc_a_minor__james_david_garner_v..pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Phillip Carter And, Antoinette Carter-Harris,, as Legal Guardians Of, Antoin Harris, An, Incapacitated Person v. Entergy Arkansas, Inc.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278206/phillip-carter-and-antoinette-carter-harris-as-legal-guardians-of/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278206/phillip-carter-and-antoinette-carter-harris-as-legal-guardians-of/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 573 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISIONS I, III &amp; IV No. CV-23-100 Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 PHILLIP CARTER AND APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON ANTOINETTE CARTER-HARRIS, COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT AS LEGAL GUARDIANS OF [NO. 35CV-18-683] ANTOIN HARRIS, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON HONORABLE ROBERT H. WYATT, APPELLANTS JR., JUDGE V. ENTERGY ARKANSAS, INC. APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED BART F. VIRDEN, Judge Phillip Carter and Antoinette Carter-Harris, as legal guardians of Antoin Harris, appeal the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment to Entergy Arkansas, Inc., in their negligence suit against the utility company. We reverse and remand. I. Background Entergy Arkansas, Inc. (“Entergy”), owns a utility pole with attached supporting guy wires that is located on the premises of Pine Bluff High School. This equipment is in a grassy strip between a campus parking lot and a campus street.1 On December 9, 2015, Antoin 1 There was a disagreement whether the grassy strip of land was subject to a utility easement as discussed below. In light of our holding, whether the grassy strip was subject to an easement is not relevant. 1 Harris (“Antoin”) and other students were in the relevant parking area performing ROTC drills after school. Upon dismissal from drill with instruction to go to the ROTC building, Antoin and a classmate ran from the parking area toward the ROTC building located on the other side of the grassy strip and campus street. While running across the grassy strip, Antoin struck the guy wire with his body. As a result of the force of impact, Antoin fell backwards and hit his head on the ground. This incident resulted in hospitalization and physical injury including brain damage. Antoin’s parents, Phillip Carter and Antoinette Carter-Harris (“the Carter/Harris family”), were granted legal guardianship of him after this incident. On June 18, 2018, the Carter/Harris family sued Entergy, alleging negligence in Entergy’s failure to ensure the guy wire had the industry-required conspicuous marker, failure to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises in safe condition, and other allegations. After exchanging pleadings and undergoing unsuccessful mediation, on August 19, 2022, Entergy moved for summary judgment. The motion stated that Antoin was a licensee on Entergy’s utility easement; that no duty of care was breached; that regardless of Antoin’s status, there was no duty to warn of obvious dangers; and that Antoin knew the guy wire was there and had years of experience safely navigating it. The Carter/Harris family responded on September 9, 2022, claiming that Entergy owed a duty of care on the basis of the city ordinance allowing for placement of utility equipment on city property; that Entergy did not have an easement; that Antoin was an invitee of the school; that the duty of care was breached because of the guard marker placement was not in compliance with the National Electrical Safety Code (“NESC”) guidelines; and that factual questions still existed as to 2 whether Antoin’s prior knowledge about the guy wire was sufficient to establish the “open and … <a href="/opinion/10278206/phillip-carter-and-antoinette-carter-harris-as-legal-guardians-of/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/phillip_carter_and_antoinette_carter-harris_as_legal_guardians_of.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Donald J. Merrill v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278211/donald-j-merrill-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278211/donald-j-merrill-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 575 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-23-781 DONALD J. MERRILL Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 45CR-20-108] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JOHN R. PUTMAN, APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge This appeal comes from the Marion County Circuit Court’s denial of appellant Donald Merrill’s (“Merrill’s”) motion for a new trial following his convictions for two counts of rape and resulting sentence of forty years in the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”) on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Merrill argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motions for directed verdict as to the two counts of rape because the evidence was legally insufficient. Merrill also contends that (1) the circuit court erred in denying his four motions for a mistrial; (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor’s conflict of interest; and (3) the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis of the State’s failure to disclose certain evidence. We affirm. I. Background Facts On November 4, 2020, Merrill was charged with two counts of rape and three counts of second-degree sexual assault. The criminal information alleged that on or before July 29, 2020, Merrill engaged in deviate sexual activity with (1) a seven-year-old female; (2) a ten-year-old- female; and (3) a thirteen-year-old female in Marion County, Arkansas. The first victim (“MC1”), who was thirty-one years old at the time of the trial, alleged that Merrill had sexually assaulted her approximately twenty years ago, when she was seven to nine years old and Merrill was married to her mother. Minor child (“MC2”)—who was sixteen years old at the time of the trial—alleged that around the time she was seven years old, Merrill touched her vagina with his hand, put his penis inside her vagina, and “touched her boobs and her buttocks”. Minor child (“MC3”)—who was thirteen years old at the time of the trial—alleged that Merrill would make her lie in the bed with him and would rub her vagina with his hands and forced her to touch his penis. In March 2020—before criminal charges were filed against Merrill—MC3 and her brothers moved to Florida to live with their maternal aunt, MC1. Two months later, MC3’s mother informed MC1 that she had acquired a suitable residence and that MC3 and her brothers would be moving back to Arkansas. MC1 alleged that MC3 became “very emotionally upset” upon hearing she would be returning home to Arkansas and that MC3 disclosed to her that Merrill, her mother’s live-in boyfriend, had been sexually abusing her. Accordingly, MC1 filed an emergency petition for guardianship of MC3 and her brothers. The emergency petition alleged that on at least one occasion, MC3’s mother had performed oral sex on Merrill while he was molesting MC3. In November 2020, the guardianship petition was granted. In addition to … <a href="/opinion/10278211/donald-j-merrill-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/donald_j._merrill_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Brandon Adams</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278205/privilege-underwriters-reciprocal-exchange-v-brandon-adams/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278205/privilege-underwriters-reciprocal-exchange-v-brandon-adams/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 571 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-23-474 PRIVILEGE UNDERWRITERS Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 72CV-21-781] V. HONORABLE JOHN C. THREET, BRANDON ADAMS JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge This interlocutory appeal arises out of the circuit court’s February 3, 2023 “Order on Motions” (the “Subject Order”) in which the circuit court (1) granted appellee Brandon Adams’s motion to enforce court order and motion for sanctions, imposed a “sanction fee in the amount of $5,000” against appellant Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange (“Privilege”), and awarded Adams $2,500 in attorneys’ fees and costs under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 37; (2) denied Privilege’s motion for summary judgment; and (3) denied Privilege’s motion for protective order, which sought to bar Adams from taking any depositions. Adams argues that the only immediately appealable portion of the Subject Order is the imposition of a “sanction fee in the amount of $5,000” against Privilege. We agree with Adams that the denial of Privilege’s motion for summary judgment and the denial of Privilege’s motion for protective order should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, as discussed hereafter, we will also address the merits of the court’s award of attorneys’ fees. We affirm the circuit court’s contempt finding, including both the sanction fee of $5,000 and the $2,500 in attorneys’ fees and costs under Rule 37. This is an insurance-coverage action in which Adams sued Privilege, his insurer, for failing to provide him a defense in a lawsuit filed against Adams and several other individuals and entities in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Arkansas, Case No. 35CV-18-1077. Privilege answered Adams’s coverage complaint on June 3, 2021, denying that it owed Adams a duty to defend the Jefferson County lawsuit and asserting a number of the subject policies’ exclusions as affirmative defenses to coverage. On August 20, 2021, Adams served written discovery on Privilege. After two extensions of time, on October 26, 2021, Privilege finally served objections and responses to Adams’s discovery requests. As to many of these requests, Privilege refused to provide any substantive response or documents and, instead, objected to Adams’s discovery. On December 14, 2021, Adams moved to compel Privilege to respond and produce documents. Privilege responded to that motion, and Adams filed a reply. On February 9, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on Adams’s motion to compel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court stated that it would grant that motion. The order granting Adams’s motion to compel was entered on February 22, 2022. The circuit court specifically ordered Privilege, within twenty-one days, to provide full and complete 2 responses to Adams’s interrogatories, to provide a supplemental privilege log containing specified information, and to produce all nonprivileged, responsive documents that Adams had sought in his requests for production. Privilege was also ordered to pay Adams’s attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $2,000. Privilege produced its supplemental interrogatory answers and … <a href="/opinion/10278205/privilege-underwriters-reciprocal-exchange-v-brandon-adams/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/privilege_underwriters_reciprocal_exchange_v._brandon_adams.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Kevis Williams v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278207/kevis-williams-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278207/kevis-williams-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 570 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-24-215 KEVIS WILLIAMS Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE DREW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 22CR-20-195] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON APPELLEE III, JUDGE AFFIRMED BRANDON J. HARRISON, Chief Judge Kevis Williams appeals the Drew County Circuit Court’s findings that he violated conditions of his suspended sentence by constructively possessing a firearm and controlled substances on 5 September 2023, when Drug Task Force agents executed a search warrant in Dumas at a camper on Lincoln Street. Agent Ben Michel, who took part in the search, testified at the revocation hearing that police had been investigating reports of narcotics sales there. They found Williams and an unnamed woman inside. According to Agent Michel, Williams told another officer (Agent Slaughter) there was a gun in a bag near the door. It was missing a firing pin, he said.1 The gun—a loaded revolver—was not all the bag contained: agents found four bags of suspected methamphetamine inside, totaling about 1 Williams did not dispute the gun was a “firearm” as defined by statute. Compare, e.g., S.T. v. State, 318 Ark. 499, 885 S.W.2d 885 (1994). The record does not disclose whether it was missing a firing pin. fourteen grams. A jar nearby contained sixteen grams of marijuana in fifteen separate bags. When Agent Slaughter found the gun, he asked Williams, “What about the rest of them?” Agent Michel saw Williams nod his head. The conditions of Williams’s suspended sentences included requirements not to “purchase, own, possess, or control any deadly weapons or firearms” or to “possess, buy, consume, sell or distribute any . . . controlled substances” or “enter places where . . . controlled substances are used, sold, or permitted.” Williams is a convicted felon, so possessing a firearm would also violate another condition: do not “commit any felony misdemeanor or other criminal offense punishable by confinement in jail or prison.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-103(a)(1) (Supp. 2023). The circuit court found “very easily” that he had violated all three conditions. Constructive possession of contraband “means knowledge of its presence and control over it.” Lambert v. State, 2017 Ark. 31, at 3, 509 S.W.3d 637, 640. Williams argues there was insufficient proof he constructively possessed the gun or the drugs because the State did not prove he owned (or even lived in) the camper, and proving that he knew there was contraband inside didn’t also establish that he exercised “control, care, or management” of it. He argues the record is clouded on that point because the other occupant had a personal- use amount of methamphetamine on her person when she was processed at the Dumas jail, and methamphetamine was found with the gun. We limit our discussion to the firearm violation because the point is clearer, and even one violation will sustain the decision to revoke. 2 In the revocation setting, we will affirm a constructive-possession finding on weaker proof than we would require to … <a href="/opinion/10278207/kevis-williams-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/kevis_williams_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Donald Freeman v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278212/donald-freeman-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278212/donald-freeman-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 584 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-24-121 DONALD FREEMAN APPELLANT Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 V. APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 18CR-22-546] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DAN RITCHEY, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED MIKE MURPHY, Judge The Crittenden County Circuit Court revoked appellant Donald Freeman’s suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment followed by five years’ SIS. On appeal, Freeman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation. We affirm. On June 5, 2023, Freeman pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of methamphetamine or cocaine weighing under two grams in case number 18CR-22-546. He was placed on sixty months’ SIS. As part of his plea, Freeman agreed to certain terms and conditions, which included paying fines, costs, restitution, and fees; living a law-abiding life; and possessing no firearms. On September 19, the State petitioned to revoke Freeman’s SIS, alleging that he failed to pay fines, costs, restitution, and fees as directed; failed to live a law-abiding life; and committed the new offense of possession of a firearm by a certain person and possession of drug paraphernalia. A revocation hearing was conducted on December 4. At the hearing, Officer Blaine Cagle with the West Memphis Police Department testified that while he was running surveillance on Freeman’s home, Freeman was involved in a traffic stop at another location and was brought back to his house. Cagle testified that he and other officers conducted a probation search of the home. During the search, Cagle found drug paraphernalia throughout the home, a loaded rifle hidden in a floor vent, and ammunition that matched the rifle in a nightstand and a dresser. Cagle testified that Freeman later described in an interview that his bedroom was the one where the ammunition was found. Cagle also testified that Freeman denied ownership of the firearm. Officer Jamie Counce with the West Memphis Police Department also testified. Counce’s testimony matched Cagle’s, and he added that before the search, Freeman told him that there was likely a methamphetamine pipe in the home due to people “coming and going.” Counce said that Freeman told him he was the only person living in the home at the time. Patricia Joplin, record keeper for the Crittenden County Sheriff’s Department, testified that Freeman’s statement amount is $915 and that he was ordered to pay $35 a month beginning July 5, 2023. She testified that Freeman made a $100 payment on October 13 but that due to the computer system, the payment was automatically applied to one of 2 Freeman’s older cases. She said he has a total of five cases that require payment on fines and that he has made only seven payments since 2012 on those cases. Beth Turner testified for the defense and stated that several people lived in Freeman’s home and that people come and go. She said that she was living at Freeman’s home the day of the probation search. She testified that the firearm … <a href="/opinion/10278212/donald-freeman-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/donald_freeman_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>In Re Estate of Lindsey</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278210/in-re-estate-of-lindsey/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278210/in-re-estate-of-lindsey/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 581 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-23-335 Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF IMA JEAN LINDSEY, DECEASED APPEAL FROM THE WOODRUFF COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT RALPH MYERS III, EXECUTOR OF [NO. 74PR-21-35] THE ESTATE OF IMA JEAN LINDSEY, DECEASED HONORABLE CHALK S. MITCHELL, APPELLANT JUDGE V. JOHNNY LINDSEY AND MERCHANTS &amp; PLANTERS BANK APPELLEES AFFIRMED WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge Ralph Myers III, the executor of the estate of Ima Jean Lindsey, appeals the Woodruff County Circuit Court’s order dismissing his claims against Johnny Lindsey and Merchants &amp; Planters Bank (the Bank). On appeal, Myers contends that the circuit court erred in finding that (1) Ima Jean’s checking and savings accounts and certificates of deposit (CDs) are not property of the estate; (2) Myers has no standing to contest Johnny’s actions as power of attorney (POA) for Ima Jean; and (3) as POA, Johnny did not breach his fiduciary duty, commit conversion, or unjustly enrich himself. Myers also claims that the circuit court erred in approving the amended “Family Settlement Agreement” (FSA) and that the court erred in denying his injunction and his claim for money damages against the Bank. We affirm. Ima Jean died at the age of ninety on August 14, 2021. Myers had drafted her will, which Ima Jean executed on October 30, 2013. In the will, Ima Jean designated Myers as the executor of her estate, directed that he serve as estate attorney, and requested that he “be paid a full attorney fee, pursuant to the Probate Code, plus expenses.” At the time Ima Jean executed the will, she was a widow with four children: Vicki Lindsey, Ann Lindsey, William Lindsey,1 and Johnny. Ima Jean bequeathed certain real estate to William, Johnny, and Lance and her residence to Vicki. She also directed that certain real estate be sold and the proceeds used to pay taxes and expenses with the remaining proceeds to go to William and Johnny. Finally, she bequeathed the “rest, residue and remainder” of the estate to Vicki and Ann equally. The will did not specifically refer to or address any bank accounts or CDs. On September 19, 2019, several years before she died, Ima Jean executed a durable POA designating Johnny to serve as her attorney-in-fact. The POA authorized Johnny to take any action he deemed appropriate, providing in relevant part as follows: I hereby grant unto my attorney in fact full power and authority to perform any act whatsoever requisite, necessary or appropriate to be done as determined by my attorney’s sole and unrestricted judgment and discretion with respect to any and all of my property as fully as I might or could do personally present with full power of substitution and revocation. I hereby ratify and confirm all that my attorney in fact may have heretofore done in my name and behalf and all that my attorney may hereafter do pursuant to the power of attorney hereby granted. On December … <a href="/opinion/10278210/in-re-estate-of-lindsey/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/in_re_estate_of_lindsey.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Daniel Harris v. Director, Division of Workforce Services</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278213/daniel-harris-v-director-division-of-workforce-services/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278213/daniel-harris-v-director-division-of-workforce-services/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 582 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. E-23-319 DANIEL HARRIS Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW V. [NO. 2023-BR-00639] DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES APPELLEE AFFIRMED WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge Daniel Harris appeals the decision of the Board of Review (Board) dismissing his unemployment-benefits appeal on the basis that his untimely appeal to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) was not due to circumstances beyond his control. Harris argues that the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. The Division of Workforce Services (DWS) issued a notice of nonfraud overpayment determination informing Harris that he was liable to repay an overpayment of $5175 for the weeks beginning on October 15, 2011, and continuing through April 14, 2012. The notice stated that the mailing date was June 1, 2012. Harris did not file an appeal to the Tribunal until February 2023 when he received a January 2023 benefit-overpayment statement. A hearing was held pursuant to Paulino v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 676, 559 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. App. 1980), to determine if the untimely filing of the appeal was due to circumstances beyond Harris’s control. The hearing officer asked Harris if he had received the June 1, 2012 notice of nonfraud overpayment determination, and Harris replied no. Harris confirmed that 96 Village Terrace in Mabelvale, which was the address listed on the notice, was his address when the notice was mailed and that he did not have any issues receiving mail at that address. Harris’s wife also confirmed that they had no issues receiving mail at that address. The hearing officer asked Harris if he was aware he had an overpayment from DWS prior to receiving the benefit-overpayment statement in 2023, and Harris responded: In 2010 -- when it was originally sent out in 2010, that was the one and only statement, or letter, regarding the overpayment that I’ve ever received -- was in 2010 that I responded to. I called to dispute it, was told there was nothing I could do about [it], I’d have to repay it. The hearing officer questioned if the notice Harris received in 2010 was for a previous overpayment, and Harris said, “[N]o it’s for this one.” Harris said he was overpaid in 2010, and his wife agreed that he received only one overpayment notice, which was in 2010. Harris said he had not received anything since then. Harris testified about other mail that he received at his address, including a notice to vacate the property, which was included in the record. The Tribunal determined that Harris failed to show that his late filing was due to circumstances beyond his control and dismissed his appeal. Without conducting a hearing, the Board affirmed the decision of the Tribunal. The Board’s decision stated that the “record reflects a reasonable opportunity, at the hearing before the Tribunal, for the presentation of evidence on the issues controlling the substantial rights of the parties in this matter.” Specifically, … <a href="/opinion/10278213/daniel-harris-v-director-division-of-workforce-services/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/daniel_harris_v._director_division_of_workforce_services.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Teresa Bloodman v. Bill Fitts Auto Sales, Inc.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278202/teresa-bloodman-v-bill-fitts-auto-sales-inc/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278202/teresa-bloodman-v-bill-fitts-auto-sales-inc/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 585 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-23-132 TERESA BLOODMAN Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SALINE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 63CV-22-1190] BILL FITTS AUTO SALES, INC. HONORABLE JOSH FARMER, JUDGE APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED MIKE MURPHY, Judge This is a one-brief appeal. Appellant Teresa Bloodman (“Bloodman”) appeals the orders of the Saline County Circuit Court dismissing her appeal from district court and denying her motion to vacate certain writs of garnishment obtained by appellee Bill Fitts Auto Sales, Inc. (Bill Fitts Auto), against her. Bloodman makes several arguments on appeal, but because we agree with her point that she was not served with the summons and complaint from district court under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4, we reverse and remand the circuit court’s orders. On September 12, 2015, Bloodman purchased a car from Bill Fitts Auto. At some point, according to the complaint, Bloodman stopped making payments on the car loan. Bill Fitts Auto filed its complaint in district court on July 5, 2016, meaning the alleged missed payments were before that date. The record from district court is sparse. Most notably, it does not show that Bill Fitts Auto ever filed a proof of service. The certified docket sheet shows that on October 27, 2017, a document titled “Fourth Order Requesting an Extension” was filed, but there are no earlier docket entries in the record showing that Bill Fitts Auto requested an extension for serving Bloodman, and the document matching that description does not appear in the record. There is also no evidence in the record that Bill Fitts Auto requested or received any extensions of time to serve Bloodman before October 27, 2017. On April 5, 2018, Bill Fitts Auto filed an amended complaint stating that the vehicle subject to the loan had been repossessed and sold. Bill Fitts Auto alleged there was a $14,891.82 shortfall in the sale and that it was owed $5,200 in attorneys’ fees. Bloodman never answered either complaint. On July 16, Bill Fitts Auto filed an affidavit stating that it had published a warning order and mailed the warning order and complaint to Bloodman more than forty-five days before filing its affidavit. The record does not contain any information showing what efforts, if any, Bill Fitts Auto made to effectuate personal service on Bloodman. On September 5, the district court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Bill Fitts Auto and awarded $14,891.82 for the alleged unpaid car loan plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. To this point, Bloodman had never responded to any motion for summary judgment or filed any pleading or document in the district court. 2 Bill Fitts Auto served a writ of garnishment on Consilio Services, LLC, on April 25, 2022, and served another writ of garnishment on Bank of America on July 21. Bloodman made her first filings in this case on August 10. On that day, she filed four separate … <a href="/opinion/10278202/teresa-bloodman-v-bill-fitts-auto-sales-inc/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/teresa_bloodman_v._bill_fitts_auto_sales_inc..pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Charles Jaleel White v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278216/charles-jaleel-white-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278216/charles-jaleel-white-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 572 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-71 CHARLES JALEEL WHITE Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT V. SMITH DISTRICT [NO. 66FCR-22-607] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE STEPHEN TABOR, JUDGE AFFIRMED BART F. VIRDEN, Judge Charles Jaleel White appeals his conviction by a Sebastian County Circuit Court jury of trafficking methamphetamine. He argues that the evidence supporting his conviction was obtained from an illegal traffic stop and should have been suppressed. We affirm. I. Relevant Facts On Apil 3, 2023, White was charged by criminal information with trafficking methamphetamine (Class Y felony). On November 27, 2023, White moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to the stop. He alleged that the traffic stop was made without probable cause; thus, the evidence seized in the subsequent search was erroneously admitted into evidence. In his motion, White alleged that Fort Smith Police Department Officer Lauren Hendrix initiated a traffic stop based solely on the dispatch report that the insurance for the vehicle he was driving was unverifiable, which is insufficient probable cause to initiate a stop. White contended that the results from the insurance- verification-system search showed only that proof of insurance was “inconclusive,” and there was conflicting evidence regarding whether Hedricks conducted the search of the database before or after she initiated the stop. Specifically, White argued that Hendricks could not have run his tags through the database with another car directly behind him and in front of the police officer’s car. White characterized this as Hendricks’s having made a “conflicting statement” regarding “when she ran the tags, whether it was before she was pulling out.” Also, White argued that Hendricks told him “that she [was] going back to her unit to actually run the insurance at that time. This was after the stop had already occurred while she was on the scene. As the evidence shows that the State’s presented, the tags were only r[u]n once.” Moreover, he argued, on Officer Hendrix’s body-cam footage, she can be heard stating that the stop was a “cold” or “cool” stop for the sole purpose of making a drug arrest. A hearing was held on the motion, and the following testimony and evidence was adduced. On the afternoon of May 25, 2020, Officer Hendrix was parked in a lot near O and 38th Streets in Fort Smith. Charles White drove past Officer Hendrix in a white Mercedes that he had borrowed from a friend. Hendrix recognized the vehicle as belonging to a known drug dealer named Christopher Clem, who had been the subject of a prior narcotics investigation. At 3:39:02 p.m., Hendrix called the police dispatch and asked the communication advisor to run the license plate through the ACIC database. Hendrix learned from the subsequent report that the car’s registration had expired, and the insurance 2 information was unverifiable. Hendrix, who had pulled into traffic to follow the Mercedes, turned on the vehicle’s blue lights to … <a href="/opinion/10278216/charles-jaleel-white-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/charles_jaleel_white_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Richard Newton v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278204/richard-newton-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278204/richard-newton-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 580 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-23-813 RICHARD NEWTON Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FRANKLIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT V. [NO. 24CCR-22-2] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JAMES DUNHAM, APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge Appellant Richard Newton was convicted by a Franklin County jury of one count of residential burglary, a Class B felony, and one count of misdemeanor theft of property with a value of less than $1000; he was sentenced to ten years in the Arkansas Division of Correction. On appeal, he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction; instead, he argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow him to testify about a conversation he purportedly had with the Franklin County Sheriff. We find no error and affirm. Newton and his ex-wife, Amber, married in 2011 and purchased a house together. When they divorced in 2016, Amber was awarded the house. As a result, she refinanced the house in her name only and obtained a new deed without Newton’s name. Although divorced, Newton and Amber maintained an “off and on” romantic relationship until October 22, 2021. On October 23, they were involved in an altercation that led to Newton’s arrest1 and the issuance of a no-contact order that forbade him from communicating with or being around Amber or her family members. After the October 23 incident, Amber placed padlocks on every entrance to her property to prevent his entry. On December 21, Amber and her daughters left for an out-of-state vacation. When they returned home on December 27, Amber could tell that someone had been in her house: the door was unlocked, a laundry bag had been left in her laundry room, and someone had made coffee and hot chocolate. Amber checked her security-system footage and saw Newton’s truck arriving and departing her house on December 25 and 26. Other video footage showed Newton inside the house. Amber found that numerous items were missing from the house when she returned from vacation, including keys to the padlocks that she had placed around the house after Newton was arrested. At trial, Amber introduced a list of the missing property along with her estimates of its value. After the State rested, Newton testified on his own behalf. After describing his version of the events of October 23, he acknowledged the no-contact order. He explained that he drove past Amber’s house because he was working on a house down the road and because he had a horse at her place that he wanted to check on. He said that some of the things that 1 Newton was charged with misdemeanor assault in a separate criminal case that was tried at the same time as the residential-burglary and theft charges. He was convicted on that count and sentenced to thirty days in the county jail; however, he did not appeal from that conviction. 2 were taken out of the pasture behind the … <a href="/opinion/10278204/richard-newton-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/richard_newton_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Angela Styles v. James Styles</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278217/angela-styles-v-james-styles/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278217/angela-styles-v-james-styles/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 583 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-24-28 Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 ANGELA STYLES APPEAL FROM THE POPE COUNTY APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 58DR-18-53] V. HONORABLE GORDON W. “MACK” MCCAIN, JR., JUDGE JAMES STYLES APPELLEE AFFIRMED KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge In this postdivorce dispute between appellant Angela Styles and appellee James (Jamey) Styles, Angela appeals from a default judgment entered by the trial court that ordered her to pay the boarding-school expenses for one of the parties’ minor children, MC3. Angela also appeals from a subsequent order that awarded Jamey $1650 in attorney’s fees. On appeal, Angela argues that because of technical issues with her law firm’s internet provider that prevented her from receiving notice of Jamey’s petition for relief, the trial court erred in granting the default judgment. Angela also argues that because the trial court erred in granting the default judgment, the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm the default judgment and the order awarding attorney’s fees. I. Facts and Procedural History Angela and Jamey were divorced on February 10, 2020, and a final order was entered in the divorce proceeding on July 27, 2021, that granted Jamey custody of the parties’ four minor children subject to Angela’s standard visitation. The final order also provided that Jamey “is in charge of all aspects of the children’s lives,” including the “children’s education.” Angela appealed from the final order in the divorce case, raising numerous arguments on appeal, including that the trial court erred in awarding custody of the children to Jamey. In Styles v. Styles, 2024 Ark. App. 435, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Styles I), among other dispositions of the case not pertinent to this appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s decision to award Jamey custody of the children, and our decision did not disturb the trial court’s finding that Jamey is in charge of all aspects of the children’s lives, including the children’s education. The postdivorce litigation herein began on April 15, 2022, when Jamey filed a petition for modification of visitation regarding the parties’ daughter, MC3, who was then fourteen years old. Jamey’s petition alleged that MC3 was enrolled in Clarksville Junior High School and exhibited a negative attitude, defiance, and lack of effort. As a result, Jamey asserted that MC3 was in need of boarding school and petitioned to have her placed in Teen Challenge, a boarding school in Disney, Oklahoma. In his petition, Jamey stated that the initial payment for the boarding school was $10,600 and that the monthly tuition was $3750. Jamey stated that he was willing to pay the fees but requested that the trial court order Angela to also participate in the fee payments. On April 29, 2022, Angela responded to Jamey’s petition, asking that it be denied. 2 On May 3, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Jamey’s petition for modification of visitation. At the hearing, the trial court noted that it had put Jamey in charge of the children’s … <a href="/opinion/10278217/angela-styles-v-james-styles/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/angela_styles_v._james_styles.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Christopher F. Bailey v. Lindsey Bailey</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278215/christopher-f-bailey-v-lindsey-bailey/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278215/christopher-f-bailey-v-lindsey-bailey/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 587 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-23-613 CHRISTOPHER F. BAILEY Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 30DR-22-183] LINDSEY BAILEY HONORABLE CHRIS E WILLIAMS, APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge Appellant Christopher Bailey and appellee Lindsey Bailey were divorced by a decree entered on May 23, 2023. Appellant brings this appeal contending that the circuit court’s actions during the divorce hearing intimidated appellant into entering into a settlement agreement. The parties were married on February 7, 2021, and separated around August 5, 2022. There were no children born of the marriage. During the time that they were together, the parties commingled property that would have otherwise been considered nonmarital. The divorce hearing took place on May 1, and there was some disagreement about how the property in question would be divided. The circuit court subsequently stated the following: You know, folks, I’m going to tell you that there’s a lot about this case that -- you know, I’ve read through all your stuff and I explained it to you. But I’m going to tell you, if y’all can’t reach an agreement that stuff that I find to be marital is going to be sold at an auction. And here’s the problem. If y’all can reach an agreement between yourselves that’s fine. Obviously you can’t. You’re here. But here’s the situation. If it’s been co-mingled during the marital relationship, during the period of time they were married and they changed titles on it, it’s marital. Isn’t anything I can do about it under Arkansas law. I’ll let you trace back to it if you traded something in. But you’re going to be stuck with the ruling not from me, from the Court of Appeals. They’re very clear on this issue. They believe that anything that’s been co-mingled, it’s been transmuted and it becomes part of the marital estate. So, you know, I’m just telling y’all that because you seem to be trying to bounce around trying to keep what, cherry pick what you want. But I’m stuck. Legally I’m stuck to make sure if it’s been transmuted or commuted together then it becomes marital property. And if you can’t reach an agreement I’m going to sell it. I can’t help that. So I don’t mind you making your argument. I just want everybody to know they’re on the page that I’m having to deal with. I’ve got to follow the law that the Court of Appeals has laid down in numerous cases in this state. You may proceed. The circuit court then made it clear that it was not trying to force a settlement on the parties but that it intended to follow the law if it was left up to court. After the circuit court’s statements, both attorneys asked for a brief recess. When they returned, an agreement had been reached, and it was subsequently read into the record. Appellant was granted a … <a href="/opinion/10278215/christopher-f-bailey-v-lindsey-bailey/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/christopher_f._bailey_v._lindsey_bailey.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Kerry Baker, as the Administrator of the Estate of James Luke Baker; And Kerry Baker, Individually v. Bryan Adams; Skylar Wilson; Travis Jones; Carson Cook; Karla Cook; Prairie Wings South, LLC; Austin Tate; John Tate; Prairie Wings Lodge, LLC; Christie Adams; Mary Tate; Reliance Health Care, Inc.; Brandon Adams; And Todd Ross</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278208/kerry-baker-as-the-administrator-of-the-estate-of-james-luke-baker-and/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278208/kerry-baker-as-the-administrator-of-the-estate-of-james-luke-baker-and/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 577 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CV-22-102 KERRY BAKER, AS THE Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON OF JAMES LUKE BAKER; AND KERRY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT BAKER, INDIVIDUALLY [NO. 35CV-18-1077] APPELLANTS HONORABLE ALEX V. GUYNN, V. JUDGE BRYAN ADAMS; SKYLAR WILSON; TRAVIS JONES; CARSON COOK; KARLA COOK; PRAIRIE WINGS SOUTH, LLC; AUSTIN TATE; JOHN TATE; PRAIRIE WINGS LODGE, LLC; CHRISTIE ADAMS; MARY TATE; RELIANCE HEALTH CARE, INC.; BRANDON ADAMS; AND TODD ROSS APPELLEES REVERSED AND REMANDED N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge Although this case is based on a tragic factual situation, the issue before the court is procedural—whether a plaintiff’s right to dismiss a case pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) is absolute. We find that it is and reverse and remand. I. Background A. Facts and Early Filings On October 24, 2015, Luke Baker died by a gunshot wound to his head at the Prairie Wings Duck Club. He was twenty years old. Luke was survived by his father, Kerry Baker; his mother, Gena Downey Baker; and his sister, Savannah Baker Case. Luke’s friend, Skylar Wilson, was present in the room at the time of the gunshot, and two other friends, Carson Cook and Austin Tate, were staying at Prairie Wings when it happened. The death certificate issued the day of Luke’s death listed the cause as a self-inflicted “GSW [gunshot wound] head.” The Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office conducted an investigation regarding Luke’s death, but it was closed without any finding of criminal activity. Three years later, on October 23, 2018, Luke’s surviving immediate family members and his estate (the Estate) brought a wrongful-death lawsuit against all of the men present on the night of Luke’s death, those men’s parents, Prairie Wings, the owners of Prairie Wings, Travis Jones, and Reliance Health Care, Inc. The complaint alleged claims for wrongful death, premises liability, host liability, liability under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16- 118-107 (Repl. 2016) against any person who committed certain felonies, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. On January 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that set out more specific allegations against each of the defendants. The amended complaint alleged claims of wrongful death against Skylar Wilson, negligence against all defendants, premises liability against Prairie Wings and its owners, civil liability for acts committed in the course of a felony against all defendants, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants. 2 Throughout the case, the plaintiffs1 were represented by different attorneys. At the beginning of the lawsuit, Kerry and the Estate were represented by Greg Stephens, and Gena and Savannah were represented by Marion Humphrey. A few months later, on December 11, 2018, Luther Sutter entered an appearance for Gena, and Sutter’s partner, Lucien Gillham, also represented Gena. On June 10, 2019, Eric Buchanan entered an appearance for Kerry and the Estate, and Stephens withdrew from representing those parties on July 26, 2019. Finally, on February 6, … <a href="/opinion/10278208/kerry-baker-as-the-administrator-of-the-estate-of-james-luke-baker-and/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/kerry_baker_as_the_administrator_of_the_estate_of_james_luke_baker_and.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Julius Ray Williams v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278209/julius-ray-williams-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278209/julius-ray-williams-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 578 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-23-812 JULIUS RAY WILLIAMS Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE HEMPSTEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 29CR-22-64] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JOE C. SHORT, JUDGE APPELLEE REMANDED TO SETTLE THE RECORD STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge Appellant Julius Ray Wiliams was originally charged in the Hempstead County Circuit Court with the offense of residential burglary, a Class B felony, with an allegation in the information that he should receive an extended term of imprisonment as a violent offender with two or more previous convictions of felonies involving violence. In a hearing on February 21, 2023, Williams entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the residential-burglary charge. On March 8, the State filed an amended information, removing the violent-offender enhancement and replacing it with the allegation that Williams should receive an extended term of imprisonment as a habitual offender having four or more felony convictions. Later that day, a sentencing order was entered sentencing Williams as a habitual offender with four or more felony convictions to fifteen years in the Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC), with an additional five-year suspended imposition of sentence. On October 6, Williams filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016). In it, he alleged the State erred when it failed to explain to him that he would have to serve the entire fifteen-year sentence, that he had agreed to one-half, or seven and a half years; that his Fifth Amendment due- process rights were violated; and that his Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. In its order denying and dismissing Williams’s petition to correct an illegal sentence filed on October 12, the circuit court found that Williams had entered a plea of guilty to one count of residential burglary set forth in the information, which had been amended to remove the violent-offender-status allegation and replaced with a large-habitual-offender- status allegation; that the range of punishment for large-habitual status for a Class B felony is not less than five years nor more than forty years in the ADC; that Williams had been sentenced to twenty years in the ADC with five years suspended; and that the sentence imposed was not beyond the court’s authority to impose and was therefore not an illegal sentence. The circuit court, however, did not address the allegation that the sentence was illegally imposed, whether Williams had been informed of the future amendment to the charges, or whether the amended enhancement was part of the plea agreement. On December 14, Williams filed a pro se motion for belated appeal with this court, which was granted on February 2, 2024. On appeal, Williams argues that the circuit court erred in denying his petition, claiming that (1) his sentence is illegal because his counsel was ineffective for failing to correctly advise him as to parole eligibility; (2) his due-process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when he was … <a href="/opinion/10278209/julius-ray-williams-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/julius_ray_williams_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Robbie C. Harvey v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278203/robbie-c-harvey-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278203/robbie-c-harvey-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 576 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-24-19 ROBBIE C. HARVEY Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. SEVENTH DIVISION [NO. 60CR-20-2456] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE KAREN D. WHATLEY, JUDGE AFFIRMED ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge Appellant Robbie Harvey (“Harvey”) appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s conviction for second-degree sexual assault and resulting sentence of five years’ probation. On appeal, Harvey argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on his allegation that the State failed to set forth sufficient evidence at trial that he was in a position of trust or authority over the victim, a minor child (“MC”). We affirm. I. Background Facts On April 8, 2020, Harvey picked up sixteen-year-old MC from her home in Cabot, Arkansas. MC was planning to spend the weekend with Harvey and his wife in Jacksonville. MC testified that Harvey was a family friend, and they were “extremely close” because she spent a lot of time with him “growing up.” She explained that Harvey was like a father figure, and she referred to him as “papa.” Brenda Winstead (“Brenda”), MC’s mother, testified that she knew Harvey and his wife because her family moved across the street from them when she was approximately fourteen years old. Brenda stated that she became friends with Harvey’s daughter, and she considered Harvey and his wife “parental figures.” After picking MC up at her home, Harvey began making sexually inappropriate comments toward MC. MC testified that Harvey told her she needed to stop wearing tight clothes because it was “turning him on,” asked her if she was a virgin, and asked whether she “[thought] about him the way [he] thinks about [her].” Harvey then placed his hand on MC’s thigh and started rubbing it and asked MC “if eight inches was enough to fill [her] up.” MC stated that Harvey also lifted his leg, pulled up his shorts, and attempted to pull out his penis. MC testified that she pushed Harvey’s hand away but that he continued, and then he grabbed her vagina. At this point, MC sent her brother a text and asked him to come pick her up. However, he originally told MC that he could not do so because he was at work. MC testified that she needed her brother to understand that it was an “emergency,” so she started recording what was happening on her phone and sent the video to her brother. The video, which was played in court, showed Harvey’s hand on MC’s thigh and MC’s hand pushing Harvey’s away. The following exchange between MC and Harvey was captured on video: MC: Stop—Papa, it’s weird. Stop. HARVEY: Nah, it ain’t. MC: It is. Stop, papa. It’s weird. 2 Subsequently, MC asked Harvey to stop at McDonald’s so that she could use the restroom. However, because the McDonald’s was closed due to COVID, Harvey drove MC across the street to a Walgreens. MC stayed … <a href="/opinion/10278203/robbie-c-harvey-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/robbie_c._harvey_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Crista Ann Steadmon v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278214/crista-ann-steadmon-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278214/crista-ann-steadmon-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 586 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-24-207 Opinion Delivered November 20, 2024 CRISTA ANN STEADMON APPEAL FROM THE ASHLEY COUNTY APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 02CR-23-109] V. HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON III, STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge An Ashley County Circuit Court jury found appellant Crista Steadmon guilty of possession of a firearm by certain persons—prior violent crime, a Class B felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103(c)(1).1 In an order filed on February 1, 2024, Steadmon was sentenced as a habitual offender to a term of eight years’ incarceration in the Arkansas Division of Correction and ordered to pay a $7,000 fine. On appeal, Steadmon argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that she possessed a firearm. We affirm. On May 11, 2023, at the request of Steadmon’s mother, Ashley County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to 622 Ashley 35, Wilmot, Arkansas, to conduct a welfare check. Robert O’Neal, the homeowner, denied officers permission to search the residence. However, because Steadmon signed a probation search waiver for that address and the address was listed on Steadmon’s driver’s license 1 (Supp. 2023). as her home address, officers performed a search of the house. During the welfare check and search, officers located Steadmon in a room attached to the carport; firearms were also discovered in the residence. Steadmon, who had an active warrant for her arrest, was taken into custody and subsequently charged with possession of a firearm by certain persons. At the January 31, 2024, jury trial, the parties stipulated that Steadmon is a convicted felon. Chief Christopher Riordan testified that on May 11, 2023, he was dispatched to a Wilmot residence in reference to a welfare concern. Ann Standridge, Steadmon’s mother, requested a welfare check on Steadmon because she had been unable to contact her and knew that she had been in an altercation with her boyfriend, O’Neal, earlier in the day. Chief Riordan testified that when he first arrived at the house, it appeared that no one was home, and no one answered his knock at the door. Shortly after exiting the driveway, Chief Riordan saw a black Chevy Silverado truck pull into the driveway of the residence. He stated that he recognized the truck as belonging to Robert O’Neal. Chief Riordan pulled back into the driveway behind O’Neal. When asked about Steadmon, O’Neal said that she had left and gone to Stuttgart the previous night; he stated that she was not at the home and refused permission to search the residence. Chief Riordan testified that while still at the residence, law enforcement “pinged” Steadmon’s cellular phone to get an idea of its general location; it pinged in the Wilmot area. He testified that he then learned that Steadmon’s driver’s license listed the Wilmot address as her residence. Chief Riordan was further informed that Steadmon was on probation, had a warrant for her arrest, and her 2 signed search waiver2 was registered for the same … <a href="/opinion/10278214/crista-ann-steadmon-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/crista_ann_steadmon_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Timothy Finley v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10273013/timothy-finley-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-13T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10273013/timothy-finley-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 567 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I NO. CR-23-481 Opinion Delivered November 13, 2024 TIMOTHY FINLEY APPEAL FROM THE UNION APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NOS. 70CR-95-208 &amp; 70CR-95-317] V. HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON, STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge Appellant Timothy Finley appeals from two orders denying his petitions to seal his felony convictions in Union County Circuit Court case numbers 70CR-95-208 (case 208) and 70CR-95-317 (case 317).1 On appeal, Finley argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying Finley’s motion to strike the prosecutor’s written objections to the petitions because the prosecutor’s objections were filed outside the statutory thirty-day response time; (2) the trial court erred in finding that Finley failed to meet his burden of proof in showing that the sealing of his records would further the interests of justice; and (3) the trial court erred in 1 There were two separate appeals filed from these orders but because both appeals concern the same issues applicable to both cases, we granted Finley’s motion to consolidate the cases. finding that because Finley had more than one prior felony conviction, none of his convictions could be sealed. For the reasons explained herein, we reverse and remand. I. Background and Relevant Facts On October 2, 1995, Finley executed separate written plea agreements in case 208 and case 317 pleading guilty to multiple felony drug offenses. In case 208, Finley pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia—both Class C felonies. In case 317, Finley pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia, and he also pleaded guilty to operating a drug premises—a Class D felony. The plea agreement in case 208 provided that the prosecutor would recommend five years in prison followed by a five-year suspended imposition of sentence, as well as costs and fees to be paid in full on the date the plea was entered. The plea agreement in case 317 provided that the prosecutor would recommend five years in prison followed by a five-year suspended imposition of sentence, as well as court costs. On October 11, 1995, a judgment and commitment order was entered for all five convictions. The judgment reflected that the two drug offenses in case 208 were committed on March 17, 1995, and that three drug offenses in case 317 were committed on April 27, 1995. For each of the five offenses, the trial court sentenced Finley to five years in prison followed by a five-year suspended imposition of sentence, with all the sentences to run concurrently. The judgment did not order Finley to pay any fines, and in the space for court costs is the handwritten notation, “WAIVED/INDIGENT.” 2 Finley was also furnished with the written conditions of his suspended sentences in case 208 and case 317. Neither of these written conditions required Finley to pay any fines or court costs. On January 11, 2023, Finley filed separate … <a href="/opinion/10273013/timothy-finley-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/13/timothy_finley_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Wanda Brown and Donald Brown v. Greg Masanelli, M.D.; And South Arkansas Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine Center, P.L.L.C.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10273012/wanda-brown-and-donald-brown-v-greg-masanelli-md-and-south-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-13T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10273012/wanda-brown-and-donald-brown-v-greg-masanelli-md-and-south-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 569 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-23-437 WANDA BROWN AND DONALD Opinion Delivered November 13, 2024 BROWN APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 52CV-20-248] V. HONORABLE SPENCER G. GREG MASSANELLI, M.D.; AND SINGLETON, JUDGE SOUTH ARKANSAS ORTHOPAEDICS &amp; SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER, P.L.L.C. APPELLEES AFFIRMED WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge Appellants Wanda and Donald Brown1 appeal from March 14, 2023 order of the Ouachita County Circuit Court granting appellees’ motion to exclude the testimony of appellants’ expert, Dr. Omar Hussamy, based on his failure to use a local standard of care and appellees’ motion for summary judgment because appellants no longer had an expert to testify. Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in excluding Dr. Hussamy’s testimony pursuant to the locality rule and that the court’s grant of summary judgment was also in error. We affirm. 1 Donald is Wanda’s husband, and he sought damages for loss of consortium. Wanda’s general physician referred her to Dr. Massanelli due to complaints of left hip pain and weakness. Dr. Massanelli diagnosed Wanda with end stage primary osteoarthritis of the left hip on January 10, 2017, and recommended a left-hip-replacement surgery. Wanda underwent the surgery on January 25 and woke up experiencing extreme pain, weakness, and numbness. Wanda was not discharged from the hospital until January 29. Wanda was subsequently diagnosed by Dr. Eric Brickell of Shreveport, Louisiana, with a stretched sciatic nerve and foot drop. Dr. John Knowles also diagnosed Wanda with a severe stretch injury to her left sciatic nerve. Wanda filed her second complaint2 against appellees on December 23, 2020, alleging medical negligence and seeking damages. Appellees filed an answer on April 23, 2021, denying the material allegations of Wanda’s complaint and asking to have the action dismissed. Based on a notice filed on April 1, 2022, a jury trial was set for April 24–28, 2023. The circuit court also entered a scheduling order at that time. Appellants informed appellees that they intended to have Dr. Hussamy testify as their expert in this matter. Appellees had to seek the circuit court’s intervention because Dr. Hussamy was attempting to charge $2500 an hour to sit down for a deposition with a required prepayment amount of $20,000. The circuit court entered an order on October 25, finding that the amount Dr. Hussamy was charging was unreasonable and setting his hourly rate at $900 with only a two-hour prepayment. 2 An earlier complaint had been dismissed without prejudice. 2 The parties subsequently agreed to an amended scheduling order to allow the parties more time to complete expert discovery. The amended order was filed on October 27, and it changed the time in which the parties were to name their experts and make them available for deposition. According to the new schedule, appellants were to provide the names of their expert witnesses on or before November 15, 2022, and make the witnesses available for deposition by December 15. Appellees were to provide the names of … <a href="/opinion/10273012/wanda-brown-and-donald-brown-v-greg-masanelli-md-and-south-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/13/wanda_brown_and_donald_brown_v._greg_masanelli_m.d._and_south_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Jason Harding v. State of Arkansas</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10273017/jason-harding-v-state-of-arkansas/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-13T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals of Arkansas</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10273017/jason-harding-v-state-of-arkansas/</id><summary type="html"> Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 560 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-77 JASON HARDING Opinion Delivered November 13, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, THIRD V. DIVISION [NO. 60CR-21-3082] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE CATHLEEN V. COMPTON, JUDGE AFFIRMED BART F. VIRDEN, Judge The Pulaski County Circuit Court convicted appellant Jason Harding of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced him as a habitual offender to five years’ imprisonment. Harding argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and his motion to suppress. We affirm. I. Background Shortly before Harding’s bench trial began, defense counsel orally moved to suppress the firearm at issue. Although a parole search waiver was involved and an underlying statute provides that no reasonable grounds are needed to search for those on probation and parole, defense counsel claimed that our supreme court has since ruled that reasonable suspicion and reasonable grounds to search are, in fact, required. The trial court held its ruling in abeyance until after the trial testimony. The State called Agent Violet White, who testified that she is currently an assistant area manager with the Arkansas Department of Community Correction (DCC). Agent White, who referred to Harding as a parolee,1 testified that she had Harding’s signed warrantless-search waiver, dated July 25, 2017, on file, which reads as follows: As a condition of my supervised parole or probation, I agree to allow any [DCC] officer, or any certified law enforcement officer, to conduct a warrantless search of my person, place of residence, or motor vehicle at any time, day or night, whenever requested by the [DCC] officer, or certified law enforcement officer. I understand that a warrantless search based on this waiver must be conducted in a reasonable manner but does not need to be based on a clearly expressed suspicion that I am committing or I have committed a criminal offense. Agent White testified that on June 10, 2021, the DCC received a report that early that morning, Harding had driven by and fired a round through a residence. She said that she and other officers went to investigate the report and learned that Harding was living with his parents. Agent White further testified that Harding’s mother let her and the other officers into the parents’ home. She said that Harding, who had warrants, was cooperative and that officers found a Toyota key fob in his pocket. She testified that Harding’s mother said that she owned the Toyota Corolla parked in the driveway but that Harding was “the primary and only” driver of the car. Agent White testified that officers searched the car and found a loaded 30-30 lever-action rifle on the backseat floorboard. Agent White was asked 1 Harding was a probationer, not a parolee. 2 how a search could be conducted in a “reasonable manner,” and she said, “[W]e try to do as little damage as possible, try to take care of people’s property and be as respectful as … <a href="/opinion/10273017/jason-harding-v-state-of-arkansas/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/13/jason_harding_v._state_of_arkansas.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry></feed>