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In particular, I shall argue that Kant’s espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason’s relation to the will is" /> <meta name="twitter:image" content="https://0.academia-photos.com/225316/50458/64318148/s200_triantafyllos.gkouvas.jpg" /> <meta property="fb:app_id" content="2369844204" /> <meta property="og:type" content="article" /> <meta property="og:url" content="https://www.academia.edu/299351/The_Practicality_of_Pure_Reason_Kants_Theory_of_Moral_Motivation" /> <meta property="og:title" content="The Practicality of Pure Reason: Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation" /> <meta property="og:image" content="http://a.academia-assets.com/images/open-graph-icons/fb-paper.gif" /> <meta property="og:description" content="The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant’s espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason’s relation to the will is" /> <meta property="article:author" content="https://uc3m.academia.edu/TriantafyllosGkouvas" /> <meta name="description" content="The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant’s espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason’s relation to the will is" /> <title>(PDF) The Practicality of Pure Reason: Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation | Triantafyllos Gkouvas - Academia.edu</title> <link rel="canonical" href="https://www.academia.edu/299351/The_Practicality_of_Pure_Reason_Kants_Theory_of_Moral_Motivation" /> <script async src="https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js?id=G-5VKX33P2DS"></script> <script> window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; function gtag(){dataLayer.push(arguments);} gtag('js', new Date()); gtag('config', 'G-5VKX33P2DS', { cookie_domain: 'academia.edu', send_page_view: false, }); gtag('event', 'page_view', { 'controller': "single_work", 'action': "show", 'controller_action': 'single_work#show', 'logged_in': 'false', 'edge': 'unknown', // Send nil if there is no A/B test bucket, in case some records get logged // with missing data - that way we can distinguish between the two cases. // ab_test_bucket should be of the form <ab_test_name>:<bucket> 'ab_test_bucket': null, }) </script> <script> var $controller_name = 'single_work'; var $action_name = "show"; var $rails_env = 'production'; var $app_rev = '9387f500ddcbb8d05c67bef28a2fe0334f1aafb8'; var $domain = 'academia.edu'; var $app_host = "academia.edu"; var $asset_host = "academia-assets.com"; var $start_time = new Date().getTime(); var $recaptcha_key = "6LdxlRMTAAAAADnu_zyLhLg0YF9uACwz78shpjJB"; var $recaptcha_invisible_key = "6Lf3KHUUAAAAACggoMpmGJdQDtiyrjVlvGJ6BbAj"; var $disableClientRecordHit = false; </script> <script> window.require = { config: function() { return function() {} } } </script> <script> window.Aedu = window.Aedu || {}; window.Aedu.hit_data = null; window.Aedu.serverRenderTime = new Date(1733044439000); window.Aedu.timeDifference = new Date().getTime() - 1733044439000; </script> <script type="application/ld+json">{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"ScholarlyArticle","abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant’s espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason’s relation to the will is premised on a practical synthetic a priori proposition. What I aim to demonstrate is that Kant treated practical syntheticity as a pivotal concept for his account of what it means to be motivated by principles of pure reason. On my construal of Kant’s motivational theory, the relation between universalizable maxims and the moral interest to act upon them is necessary but non-tautological, since violations of duty are logically possible despite our having a moral reason to act. What prevents the latter argument from collapsing into a quasiexternalist account of moral motivation is that the motivational impact of law-like maxims is ultimately premised on a normative conception of ourselves as free agents.","author":[{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"Person","name":"Triantafyllos Gkouvas"}],"contributor":[],"dateCreated":"2010-08-17","dateModified":"2014-05-24","datePublished":null,"headline":"The Practicality of Pure Reason: Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation","inLanguage":"en","keywords":["Kant","Moral Psychology","Personal and Moral Autonomy","Reasons internalism"],"locationCreated":null,"publication":null,"publisher":{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"Organization","name":null},"image":null,"thumbnailUrl":null,"url":"https://www.academia.edu/299351/The_Practicality_of_Pure_Reason_Kants_Theory_of_Moral_Motivation","sourceOrganization":[{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"EducationalOrganization","name":"uc3m"}]}</script><link 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"https://www.academia.edu/login?post_login_redirect_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F299351%2FThe_Practicality_of_Pure_Reason_Kants_Theory_of_Moral_Motivation%3Fauto%3Ddownload"; window.loswp.translateUrl = "https://www.academia.edu/login?post_login_redirect_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F299351%2FThe_Practicality_of_Pure_Reason_Kants_Theory_of_Moral_Motivation%3Fshow_translation%3Dtrue"; window.loswp.previewableAttachments = [{"id":1422116,"identifier":"Attachment_1422116","shouldShowBulkDownload":false}]; window.loswp.shouldDetectTimezone = true; window.loswp.shouldShowBulkDownload = true; window.loswp.showSignupCaptcha = false window.loswp.willEdgeCache = false; window.loswp.work = {"work":{"id":299351,"created_at":"2010-08-17T03:17:08.955-07:00","from_world_paper_id":null,"updated_at":"2021-01-16T14:36:52.283-08:00","_data":{"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant’s espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason’s relation to the will is premised on a practical synthetic a priori proposition. What I aim to demonstrate is that Kant treated practical syntheticity as a pivotal concept for his account of what it means to be motivated by principles of pure reason. On my construal of Kant’s motivational theory, the relation between universalizable maxims and the moral interest to act upon them is necessary but non-tautological, since violations of duty are logically possible despite our having a moral reason to act. What prevents the latter argument from collapsing into a quasiexternalist account of moral motivation is that the motivational impact of law-like maxims is ultimately premised on a normative conception of ourselves as free agents.","more_info":"published in EIDOS, Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte No14 (Jan-June 2011) pp 152-91"},"document_type":"paper","pre_hit_view_count_baseline":176,"quality":"high","language":"en","title":"The Practicality of Pure Reason: Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation","broadcastable":true,"draft":null,"has_indexable_attachment":true,"indexable":true}}["work"]; window.loswp.workCoauthors = [225316]; window.loswp.locale = "en"; window.loswp.countryCode = "SG"; window.loswp.cwvAbTestBucket = ""; window.loswp.designVariant = "ds_vanilla"; window.loswp.fullPageMobileSutdModalVariant = "full_page_mobile_sutd_modal"; window.loswp.useOptimizedScribd4genScript = false; window.loswp.appleClientId = 'edu.academia.applesignon';</script><script defer="" src="https://accounts.google.com/gsi/client"></script><div class="ds-loswp-container"><div class="ds-work-card--grid-container"><div class="ds-work-card--container js-loswp-work-card"><div class="ds-work-card--cover"><div class="ds-work-cover--wrapper"><div class="ds-work-cover--container"><button class="ds-work-cover--clickable js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"swp-splash-paper-cover","attachmentId":1422116,"attachmentType":"pdf"}"><img alt="First page of “The Practicality of Pure Reason: Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation”" class="ds-work-cover--cover-thumbnail" src="https://0.academia-photos.com/attachment_thumbnails/1422116/mini_magick20190427-14475-w4k2ps.png?1556391397" /><img alt="PDF Icon" class="ds-work-cover--file-icon" src="//a.academia-assets.com/assets/single_work_splash/adobe.icon-574afd46eb6b03a77a153a647fb47e30546f9215c0ee6a25df597a779717f9ef.svg" /><div class="ds-work-cover--hover-container"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 20px" translate="no">download</span><p>Download Free PDF</p></div><div class="ds-work-cover--ribbon-container">Download Free PDF</div><div class="ds-work-cover--ribbon-triangle"></div></button></div></div></div><div class="ds-work-card--work-information"><h1 class="ds-work-card--work-title">The Practicality of Pure Reason: Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation</h1><div class="ds-work-card--work-authors ds-work-card--detail"><a class="ds-work-card--author js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="225316" href="https://uc3m.academia.edu/TriantafyllosGkouvas"><img alt="Profile image of Triantafyllos Gkouvas" class="ds-work-card--author-avatar" src="https://0.academia-photos.com/225316/50458/64318148/s65_triantafyllos.gkouvas.jpg" />Triantafyllos Gkouvas</a></div><div class="ds-work-card--detail"></div><p class="ds-work-card--work-abstract ds-work-card--detail ds2-5-body-md">The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant’s espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason’s relation to the will is premised on a practical synthetic a priori proposition. What I aim to demonstrate is that Kant treated practical syntheticity as a pivotal concept for his account of what it means to be motivated by principles of pure reason. On my construal of Kant’s motivational theory, the relation between universalizable maxims and the moral interest to act upon them is necessary but non-tautological, since violations of duty are logically possible despite our having a moral reason to act. What prevents the latter argument from collapsing into a quasiexternalist account of moral motivation is that the motivational impact of law-like maxims is ultimately premised on a normative conception of ourselves as free agents.</p><div class="ds-work-card--button-container"><button class="ds2-5-button js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"continue-reading-button--work-card","attachmentId":1422116,"attachmentType":"pdf","workUrl":"https://www.academia.edu/299351/The_Practicality_of_Pure_Reason_Kants_Theory_of_Moral_Motivation"}">See full PDF</button><button class="ds2-5-button ds2-5-button--secondary js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"download-pdf-button--work-card","attachmentId":1422116,"attachmentType":"pdf","workUrl":"https://www.academia.edu/299351/The_Practicality_of_Pure_Reason_Kants_Theory_of_Moral_Motivation"}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 20px" translate="no">download</span>Download 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Kant ' s theory of moral motivation</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="225316" href="https://uc3m.academia.edu/TriantafyllosGkouvas">Triantafyllos Gkouvas</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">Eidos Revista De Filosofia De La Universidad Del Norte, 2011</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"The practicality of pure reason.: A normative defence of Kant ' s theory of moral motivation","attachmentId":66548724,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/47474979/The_practicality_of_pure_reason_A_normative_defence_of_Kant_s_theory_of_moral_motivation","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/47474979/The_practicality_of_pure_reason_A_normative_defence_of_Kant_s_theory_of_moral_motivation"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">chevron_right</span></a></div></div><div class="ds-related-work--container js-wsj-grid-card" data-collection-position="1" data-entity-id="94828937" data-sort-order="default"><a class="ds-related-work--title js-wsj-grid-card-title ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" href="https://www.academia.edu/94828937/KantsCritique_of_Practical_Reason">Kant'sCritique of Practical Reason</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="72758743" href="https://st-andrews.academia.edu/JensTimmermann">Jens Timmermann</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">2009</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"Kant'sCritique of Practical Reason","attachmentId":97179703,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/94828937/KantsCritique_of_Practical_Reason","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/94828937/KantsCritique_of_Practical_Reason"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">chevron_right</span></a></div></div><div class="ds-related-work--container js-wsj-grid-card" data-collection-position="2" data-entity-id="44299044" data-sort-order="default"><a class="ds-related-work--title js-wsj-grid-card-title ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" href="https://www.academia.edu/44299044/_Rational_Will_or_Willing_Reason_A_Defense_of_the_Kantian_Account_of_Practical_Reason">"Rational Will or Willing Reason?": A Defense of the Kantian Account of Practical Reason</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="69031291" href="https://sbc-sg.academia.edu/YongfuMeiling">Leonard Sidharta 戴永富</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--abstract ds2-5-body-sm">This paper shows that although Kant's moral philosophy belongs to moral rationalism, Kant in fact accommodates the strategic strength of moral sentimentalism and thus overcomes the shortcoming of traditional moral rationalism. Kant's theory of practical reason is a via media between sentimentalism and rationalism. Hence, different from moral rationalists, Kant accommodates the Humean emphasis on passion by reconceptualizing it as the primacy of practical reason. Yet, different from Hume, for Kant, practical reason can only be based on non-empirical moral realism. But the problem is: what is this practical reason? Is it volitional reason or rational volition?</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"\"Rational Will or Willing Reason?\": A Defense of the Kantian Account of Practical Reason","attachmentId":64683048,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/44299044/_Rational_Will_or_Willing_Reason_A_Defense_of_the_Kantian_Account_of_Practical_Reason","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/44299044/_Rational_Will_or_Willing_Reason_A_Defense_of_the_Kantian_Account_of_Practical_Reason"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">chevron_right</span></a></div></div><div class="ds-related-work--container js-wsj-grid-card" data-collection-position="3" data-entity-id="65117327" data-sort-order="default"><a class="ds-related-work--title js-wsj-grid-card-title ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" href="https://www.academia.edu/65117327/Moral_Motivation_in_Kant">Moral Motivation in Kant</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="76137579" href="https://aristoteleio.academia.edu/KonstantinosSargentis">Konstantinos Sargentis</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">Kant Studies Online, 2012, 93-121 , 2012</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"Moral Motivation in Kant","attachmentId":80418149,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/65117327/Moral_Motivation_in_Kant","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/65117327/Moral_Motivation_in_Kant"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">chevron_right</span></a></div></div><div class="ds-related-work--container js-wsj-grid-card" data-collection-position="4" data-entity-id="7618669" data-sort-order="default"><a class="ds-related-work--title js-wsj-grid-card-title ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" href="https://www.academia.edu/7618669/Torralba_J_M_The_Two_Objects_of_Practical_Reason_Moral_autonomy_human_causality_and_inner_disposition_Gesinnung_in_Bacin_S_Ferrarin_A_La_Rocca_C_Ruffing_M_Hg_Kant_und_die_Philosophie_in_weltb%C3%BCrgerlicher_Absicht_Walter_de_Gruyter_Berlin_New_York_2013_pp_693_705">Torralba, J. M., “The Two Objects of Practical Reason. Moral autonomy, human causality, and inner disposition (Gesinnung)”, in Bacin, S. – Ferrarin, A. – La Rocca, C. – Ruffing, M. (Hg.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 2013, pp. 693-705.</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="13758113" href="https://unav.academia.edu/JoseMTorralba">José M. Torralba</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--abstract ds2-5-body-sm">The concept of the object of practical reason is key to the framework of Kant’s second Critique. Moral autonomy may only be justified if reason is capable of constituting of itself and a priori an object adequate to a morally determined will. Such an object is referred to as the good (das Gute). This paper comprises an argument in favour of the following two theses: (1) that there are two objects of practical reason (rather than only one), which defer to a dual order of subjective practical principles or maxims (Maxime and Gesinnung), and which depend on the two-fold level of the faculty of desire (choice and will), as well as the two senses in which Kant uses the term “practical freedom”; and (2) that the concept of the object of practical reason may only be coherently understood in relation to Kant’s thought regarding the categories of freedom and the typic of the pure practical faculty of judgment.</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/7618669/Torralba_J_M_The_Two_Objects_of_Practical_Reason_Moral_autonomy_human_causality_and_inner_disposition_Gesinnung_in_Bacin_S_Ferrarin_A_La_Rocca_C_Ruffing_M_Hg_Kant_und_die_Philosophie_in_weltb%C3%BCrgerlicher_Absicht_Walter_de_Gruyter_Berlin_New_York_2013_pp_693_705"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">chevron_right</span></a></div></div><div class="ds-related-work--container js-wsj-grid-card" data-collection-position="5" data-entity-id="26024932" data-sort-order="default"><a class="ds-related-work--title js-wsj-grid-card-title ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" href="https://www.academia.edu/26024932/Kant_on_the_Justification_of_Moral_Principles">Kant on the Justification of Moral Principles</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="3042709" href="https://illinois.academia.edu/JochenBojanowski">Jochen Bojanowski</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">Kant-Studien, 2017</p><p class="ds-related-work--abstract ds2-5-body-sm">In Groundwork III, Kant attempts to give a deduction of the categorical imperative. There is widespread disagreement as to how Kant’s argument is supposed to proceed. Many com-mentators believe that Kant’s deduction fails because some of its argumentative moves are unjustified. In particular, Kant makes a mistaken inference from theoretical freedom to prac-tical freedom, and his axiological ‘superiority claim’ regarding the noumenal world’s priority over the sensible world is unjustified. According to the standard incompatibilist story, Kant came to see that his deduction was flawed by the time he wrote the Critique of Practical Reason, at which point he claimed that the truth of the moral law does not require a deduc-tion since it is a “fact of pure reason”. The moral law is no longer the conclusion of his argu-ment; instead, it functions as the premise of an argument that establishes our freedom. Other commentators endorse a compatibilist reading, according to which the justification of the moral law in Groundwork III and the second Critique are compatible because Kant never attempted to give the strong kind of deduction that he rightly rejects in the second Critique. On the view I develop here, the particular argumentative moves that the standard incompat-ibilist takes issue with are not flawed and incompatible with Kant’s second Critique. I argue for a compatibilist reading of these moves. I think the compatibilist is right to claim that the deduction Kant considered impossible in both the Groundwork and the second Critique is what I call a strong deduction. I also agree with compatibilists that the deduction he actually delivers in Groundwork III is only a weak deduction that makes use of a merely problematic conception of transcendental freedom. However, I do think that Kant’s argument in Groundwork III remains question begging in the final analysis. The facticity claim in the se-cond Critique, by contrast, can provide a non-question-begging account of moral obligation. Here, I agree with the optimistic incompatibilist, who views the argument in the second Cri-tique as an improvement on his argument in the Groundwork. However, in my novel account of Kant’s argument, I endorse what I call ‘radical incompatibilism’ because it concerns the roots of Kant’s approach to the justification of the moral law. What is novel about my ac-count is the claim that the deduction in Groundwork III rests on the false assumption that practical cognition, like theoretical cognition, requires a critique of pure reason. In the se-cond Critique, Kant revised his argument because he realized that, in contrast to synthetic a priori judgments of theoretical cognition, the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments of practical cognition can be derived from the actuality of a “deed”. With respect to pure prac-tical reason, the second Critique proceeds metaphysically—i.e. dogmatically—rather than critically. Hence Kant came to view a deduction of the categorical imperative as unnecessary and abandoned the project of a critique of pure practical reason. We should, for this reason, resist the generality of Kant’s claim in the first Critique to the effect that, for all synthetic judgments a priori, “if not a proof then at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion must unfailingly be supplied” (CPR, B 286).</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"Kant on the Justification of Moral Principles","attachmentId":53444686,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/26024932/Kant_on_the_Justification_of_Moral_Principles","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/26024932/Kant_on_the_Justification_of_Moral_Principles"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">chevron_right</span></a></div></div><div class="ds-related-work--container js-wsj-grid-card" data-collection-position="6" data-entity-id="38462880" data-sort-order="default"><a class="ds-related-work--title js-wsj-grid-card-title ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" href="https://www.academia.edu/38462880/Moral_Duty_and_the_Highest_Good_in_the_Critique_of_Practical_Reason">Moral Duty and the Highest Good in the Critique of Practical Reason</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="12597305" href="https://hkbu.academia.edu/BrandonLove">Brandon Love</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (eds.) Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing, and David Wagner (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2018), 1903-1910. </p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"Moral Duty and the Highest Good in the Critique of Practical Reason","attachmentId":58527071,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/38462880/Moral_Duty_and_the_Highest_Good_in_the_Critique_of_Practical_Reason","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/38462880/Moral_Duty_and_the_Highest_Good_in_the_Critique_of_Practical_Reason"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">chevron_right</span></a></div></div><div class="ds-related-work--container js-wsj-grid-card" data-collection-position="7" data-entity-id="96290641" data-sort-order="default"><a class="ds-related-work--title js-wsj-grid-card-title ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" href="https://www.academia.edu/96290641/Kant_on_Moral_Sensibility_and_Moral_Motivation">Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="224080355" href="https://utoronto.academia.edu/OwenWare">Owen Ware</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2014</p><p class="ds-related-work--abstract ds2-5-body-sm">Despite Kant’s lasting influence on philosophical accounts of moral motivation, many details of his own position remain elusive. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant argues that our recognition of the moral law’s authority must elicit both painful and pleasurable feelings in us. On reflection, however, it is unclear how these effects could motivate us to act from duty. As a result, Kant’s theory of moral sensibility comes under a skeptical threat: the possibility of a morally motivating feeling seems incoherent. My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Kant’s theory in a way that overcomes this threat. By way of conclusion, I show how my reconstruction brings a new perspective to a long-standing dispute over intellectualist and affectivist views of moral motivation.</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation","attachmentId":98230709,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/96290641/Kant_on_Moral_Sensibility_and_Moral_Motivation","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/96290641/Kant_on_Moral_Sensibility_and_Moral_Motivation"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span 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Motivation","attachmentId":47128971,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/26859206/Kant_and_the_Possibility_of_Moral_Motivation","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" href="https://www.academia.edu/26859206/Kant_and_the_Possibility_of_Moral_Motivation"><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">View PDF</span><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">chevron_right</span></a></div></div><div class="ds-related-work--container js-wsj-grid-card" data-collection-position="9" data-entity-id="48872427" data-sort-order="default"><a class="ds-related-work--title js-wsj-grid-card-title ds2-5-body-md ds2-5-body-link" href="https://www.academia.edu/48872427/Practical_Reason_the_Moral_Law_and_Choice">Practical Reason, the Moral Law, and Choice</a><div class="ds-related-work--metadata"><a class="js-wsj-grid-card-author ds2-5-body-sm ds2-5-body-link" data-author-id="475330" href="https://unc.academia.edu/ThomasHill">Thomas Hill</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">Analytic Philosophy</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"Practical Reason, the Moral Law, and Choice","attachmentId":67283339,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/48872427/Practical_Reason_the_Moral_Law_and_Choice","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-wsj-grid-card-view-pdf" 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data-author-id="3499862" href="https://sandiego.academia.edu/LawrenceHinman">Lawrence Hinman</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">The Monist, Vol. 66, No. 2 (April, 1983), 251-67.</p><div class="ds-related-work--ctas"><button class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-swp-download-button" data-signup-modal="{"location":"wsj-grid-card-download-pdf-modal","work_title":"On the Purity of Our Moral Motives: A Critique of Kant’s Account of the Emotions and Acting for the Sake of Duty","attachmentId":31315063,"attachmentType":"pdf","work_url":"https://www.academia.edu/3622634/On_the_Purity_of_Our_Moral_Motives_A_Critique_of_Kant_s_Account_of_the_Emotions_and_Acting_for_the_Sake_of_Duty","alternativeTracking":true}"><span class="material-symbols-outlined" style="font-size: 18px" translate="no">download</span><span class="ds2-5-text-link__content">Download free PDF</span></button><a class="ds2-5-text-link ds2-5-text-link--inline js-related-work-grid-card-view-pdf" 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Sargentis</a></div><p class="ds-related-work--metadata ds2-5-body-xs">I. Patellis, K. Goudeli, P. Kontos (eds.), Kant: Making Reason Intuitive. 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