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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <feed xml:lang="en-us" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title>CourtListener.com: All opinions for the District Court, District of Columbia</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/" rel="alternate"/><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/feed/court/dcd/" rel="self"/><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/</id><updated>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</updated><author><name>Free Law Project</name><email>feeds@courtlistener.com</email></author><rights>Created for the public domain by Free Law Project</rights><entry><title>Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund v. Avalanche Construction Group Inc.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282239/bricklayers-trowel-trades-international-pension-fund-v-avalanche/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282239/bricklayers-trowel-trades-international-pension-fund-v-avalanche/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BRICKLAYERS &amp; TROWEL TRADES INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND, Plaintiff, Case No. 23-cv-1784 (JMC) v. AVALANCHE CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC., Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Bricklayers &amp; Trowel Trades International Pension Fund (Bricklayers) moves for default judgment against Defendant Avalanche Construction Group, Inc. (Avalanche), seeking $77,001.80 for unpaid contributions due under a collective bargaining agreement, damages, and fees. For the reasons set out below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, ECF 9.1 I. BACKGROUND Bricklayers is an employee pension benefit plan organized under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) that provides retirement and related benefits to employees in the construction industry. ECF 1 ¶ 1; ECF 9-3 at 3–4 ¶ 3. Employers who sign collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers (the 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page. 1 Union) must pay contributions to the pension fund, which finances these benefits. ECF 9-1 at 6; ECF 9-3 at 3–4 ¶¶ 3, 7. Avalanche is one such employer. ECF 1 ¶¶ 6–7. Under its CBA, Avalanche was obligated to submit monthly remittance reports and pay monthly contributions to Bricklayers for each hour of covered work it performed. ECF 9-3 at 3–4 ¶¶ 7–8. From January 2022 through January 2023, Avalanche reported but failed to pay contributions to Bricklayers as required. Id. at 6–7 ¶¶ 10–11. From February 2023 through August 2024, Avalanche failed to report and pay all amounts owed to Bricklayers under the CBA. Id. at 7–8 ¶ 12. Pursuant to the CBA, once contributions are delinquent, Avalanche is required to pay— in addition to the delinquent contributions themselves—(1) interest on the unpaid contributions at a rate of 15 percent per year from the due date of each monthly payment; plus (2) liquidated damages, calculated at the rate of 20 percent of the delinquent contributions; plus (3) attorneys’ fees incurred recovering the delinquent amounts. Id. ¶¶ 11–15. Bricklayers is entitled to enforce the terms of the CBA pursuant to Sections 502(a) and 515 of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145. The docket reflects that Bricklayers properly served Avalanche on November 7, 2023. ECF 6.2 Avalanche did not respond. On July 3, 2024, Bricklayers filed a request for entry of default, ECF 7, and served a copy of that request on Avalanche, ECF 7-2. The Clerk of the Court entered default five days later. ECF 8. Despite being aware of this suit, see ECF 9-1 at 5, Avalanche did not move to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default or otherwise respond. 2 On October 5, 2023, Bricklayers filed a Motion for Service by Alternative Means. ECF 4. Despite Bricklayers’ diligent efforts, its process server … <a href="/opinion/10282239/bricklayers-trowel-trades-international-pension-fund-v-avalanche/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/bricklayers__trowel_trades_international_pension_fund_v._avalanche.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Washington v. Specialized Loan Servicing</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282294/washington-v-specialized-loan-servicing/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282294/washington-v-specialized-loan-servicing/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARCUS WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:23-cv-03447 SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Marcus Washington, a D.C. resident, sued Specialized Loan Servicing, a financial institution, under claims of fraud and racketeering. Before the Court is Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 27. Because Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 9(b), this Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.1 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The Court “must first tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state [a] claim to relief, and then determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded those elements with adequate factual support to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 1 Plaintiff initially sued Specialized Loan Servicing for violating various consumer protection laws. Dkt. 1. His Amended Complaint alleged similar violations of consumer protection laws. Dkt. 5. In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff dropped the consumer protection claims and brought only two claims: fraud and racketeering. Dkt. 21. His Second Amended Complaint named as Defendants not just Specialized Loan Servicing, but also an additional corporation, a limited liability company, and eighteen employees of the various companies sued. Id. Only Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 27. But because the reasons for dismissal apply equally to all Defendants, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 9(b). its face.” Blue v. District of Columbia, 811 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Mere conclusions are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 8(a) provides that a pleading “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim” showing that the court has jurisdiction and that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). This rule aims to give fair notice to defendants of the asserted claims so that they can file responsive pleadings and raise appropriate defenses. See Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Under Rule 9(b), a party alleging fraud “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting [the] fraud.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). This rule “normally [] means that the pleader must state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was obtained or given up as a consequence of the fraud.” United States v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (cleaned up). However, the particularity requirement under Rule 9(b) “does not abrogate Rule 8, and it should be harmonized with the general directives in subdivisions (a) and (e) of Rule 8 that the pleadings should contain a short and plain statement of the claim or defense and that each averment should be simple concise and direct.” Id. at 1386 (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint … <a href="/opinion/10282294/washington-v-specialized-loan-servicing/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/washington_v._specialized_loan_servicing.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Vhs Acquisition Subsidiary Number 7, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282312/vhs-acquisition-subsidiary-number-7-inc-v-national-labor-relations-board/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282312/vhs-acquisition-subsidiary-number-7-inc-v-national-labor-relations-board/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VHS ACQUISITION SUBSIDIARY NO. 7, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:24-cv-02577 (TNM) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, et al. Defendants. MEMORANDUM ORDER VHS Acquisition Subsidiary No. 7, doing business as Saint Vincent Hospital (“Saint Vincent”), brings this Emergency Motion. It is styled as one for a “Stay Pending Appeal.” Emergency Mot, ECF No. 30. The Motion comes on the heels of the Court’s denial of Saint Vincent’s Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, see Minute Order 09/10/2024, and its Motion for a Permanent Injunction, Mem. Order, ECF No. 28. Yet like the Lernaean Hydra, Saint Vincent regenerates its request for emergency relief once more. The Court denies the motion. Saint Vincent may not repackage its demand with a new label and expect a different result. The Court reiterates: It lacks authority to offer the requested relief. I. The relevant facts of this case are summarized in the Court’s previous denial of injunctive relief. VHS Acquisition Subsidiary, No. 7 v. Nat’l Lab. Relations Bd., 1:24-cv-02577 (TNM), 2024 WL 4817175, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2024). Essentially: Saint Vincent is a hospital that has been accused of various unfair labor practices by a nurses’ union. Id. at *1. That union filed a formal complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). Id. The NLRB then commenced an enforcement action against Saint Vincent, charging the hospital with violating various provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. But Saint Vincent is adamant about avoiding adjudication before the NLRB. It first sought a Temporary Restraining Order before this Court, only days before its administrative proceeding was to begin. Mot. TRO, ECF. No. 3. The Court denied that request. Minute Order 09/10/2024. It then sought a permanent injunction. Mot. Inj., ECF No. 12. The Court recently denied that request. It found that the Norris- LaGuardia Act (“Act”) precluded its jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. VHS Acquisition Subsidiary No. 7, 2024 WL 4817175, at *7. Specifically, that Saint Vincent’s challenge to the NLRB Administrative Law Judge’s removal restrictions “gr[ew] out of a labor dispute” as defined by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 101; VHS Acquisition Subsidiary No. 7, 2024 WL 4817175, at *5. And that Saint Vincent failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. VHS Acquisition Subsidiary No. 7, 2024 WL 4817175, at *6. Together, those conditions prevented the Court from issuing an injunction to stop the pending NLRB proceedings. Id. at *7. Saint Vincent promptly appealed to the D.C. Circuit. Not. Appeal, ECF No. 28. Now Saint Vincent appears again, asking the Court to grant a “stay” to “prevent[] the [NLRB] from proceeding against it while its appeal is pending” under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. Emergency Mot. 1. For the reasons below, that motion is denied. II. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 permits a party to move the district court for “a stay of the judgment or order of [the] district court pending appeal.” Fed. R. App. … <a href="/opinion/10282312/vhs-acquisition-subsidiary-number-7-inc-v-national-labor-relations-board/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/vhs_acquisition_subsidiary_number_7_inc._v._national_labor_relations_board.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Momocon, LLC v. Small Business Administration</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282410/momocon-llc-v-small-business-administration/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282410/momocon-llc-v-small-business-administration/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MOMOCON, LLC, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 21-2386 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 75 : SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, : et al., : : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff MomoCon, LLC (“MomoCon”) sued Defendants, the U.S. Small Business Administration and Administrator Isabella Casillas Guzman (collectively, “SBA”), claiming that SBA’s denial of MomoCon’s application for Shuttered Venue Operators Grant (“SVOG”) funds was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). On October 1, 2021, the Court granted SBA’s motion for voluntary remand. See Min. Order dated Oct. 1, 2021. On remand, SBA denied MomoCon’s application for the second time. MomoCon challenged this decision again, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The Court granted summary judgment for MomoCon and remanded the case to SBA “for supplementation of the administrative record as necessary regarding MomoCon’s competitors.” 2022 Summ. J. Order, ECF No. 30. On remand, SBA denied MomoCon’s application for the third time. After SBA’s third denial, MomoCon and SBA moved again for summary judgment. On this second motion for summary judgment, the Court denied MomoCon’s motion and granted SBA’s motion for summary judgment. See MomoCon, LLC v. Small Bus. Admin., No. 21-cv-2386, 2023 WL 8880335, at *11 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2023). MomoCon now moves for attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), arguing that it is entitled to fees as the prevailing party following the 2022 Summary Judgment Order. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies MomoCon’s motion. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Court’s earlier opinion described the background of this case in detail. See MomoCon, LLC, 2023 WL 8880335, at *1–4. The Court will therefore review only those details that are relevant at this stage in the proceedings or otherwise most central to the case. MomoCon is a festival organization that annually produces a 4-day anime-themed convention. See id. at *2. The convention features an exhibition hall, cosplay opportunities, meet and greets, gaming, and panel discussions in addition to live musical performances and theatrical productions. See id. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, MomoCon 2020 and MomoCon 2021 were both cancelled. See id. Seeking financial assistance for lost revenues, MomoCon applied for an SVOG grant of $1,044,330.08. See id.; see also Compl., ECF No. 1. SVOG is a funding program established by the Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Business, Nonprofits and Venue Act to provide financial relief to shuttered venue operators during COVID-19. MomoCon, LLC, 2023 WL 8880335, at *1. The statute lists out categories of businesses eligible for the grant, including “live venue operator[s] or promoter[s].” 15 U.S.C. § 9009a(a)(1)(A). More specifically, an operator or promoter is “an individual or entity . . . that, as a principal business activity, organizes, promotes, produces, manages, or hosts live concerts, comedy shows, theatrical productions, or other events by performing artists.” Id. § 9009a(a)(3)(A)(i)(I). To be eligible for this … <a href="/opinion/10282410/momocon-llc-v-small-business-administration/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/momocon_llc_v._small_business_administration.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Stagwell Technologies, Inc. v. Oh</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282453/stagwell-technologies-inc-v-oh/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282453/stagwell-technologies-inc-v-oh/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STAGWELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff, Case No. 22-cv-3495 (JMC) v. RICHARD OH, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Stagwell Technologies, Inc. (Stagwell) filed this suit against pro se Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Richard Oh in 2022. See ECF 1.1 Stagwell alleged that Oh “defrauded [Stagwell] into assuming a multimillion-dollar liability” by falsely inducing the company to pay rent on a lease that Oh was in fact liable for. See id. ¶¶ 5–30. Since then, Oh has filed several motions—including a motion to dismiss, ECF 24—which the Court denied on the record. See May 28, 2024 Minute Entry; Sept. 18, 2024 Minute Entry. Oh filed an answer and asserted three counterclaims against Stagwell: malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). ECF 35 at 6–10. Stagwell moves to dismiss Oh’s counterclaims. ECF 43-1. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Stagwell’s motion. The Court’s resolution of this motion has no bearing on the merits of Stagwell’s allegations against Oh or Oh’s defenses to those allegations. In resolving Stagwell’s motion to dismiss, the Court assumes that Oh’s factual allegations are true, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and construes his filings liberally in light 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page. 1 of his pro se status, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). First, Oh claims that Stagwell engaged in malicious prosecution by filing this civil suit against him. ECF 35 ¶¶ 46–47. “One of the prima facie elements of the claim under D.C. law, however, is that the underlying suit must have been first terminated in favor of the claimant.” U.S. ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2009); see Shulman v. Miskell, 626 F.2d 173, 174–75 (D.C. Cir. 1980).2 Here, the underlying suit (the allegedly malicious prosecution) is the instant civil suit filed by Stagwell. Because this lawsuit has not yet been resolved on the merits, Oh’s claim is premature. The Court will therefore dismiss Oh’s counterclaim for malicious prosecution. Oh is free to refile his suit at the appropriate time. Oh’s IIED claim turns on his malicious prosecution claim. He alleges that, “[a]s a direct consequence of Stagwell’s malicious prosecution of civil case by abusing the legal process, Defendant has incurred both economic and non-economic expenses in challenging the underlying action,” including “pain and suffering [and] emotional distress.” ECF 35 ¶¶ 52–53. The Court therefore dismisses Oh’s IIED counterclaim as premature because it is premised entirely on his malicious prosecution claim. Even if Oh’s IIED claim were properly before the Court, he has failed to state a claim. “To establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional … <a href="/opinion/10282453/stagwell-technologies-inc-v-oh/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/stagwell_technologies_inc._v._oh.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Begum v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282367/begum-v-bank-of-new-york-mellon-trust-company/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282367/begum-v-bank-of-new-york-mellon-trust-company/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NZINGA BEGUM, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02586 (UNA) ) BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON ) TRUST COMPANY, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on its initial review of the purported pro se notice of removal (“Not.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”), ECF No. 2, filed by Nzinga Begum, who also lists several pseudonyms, see Not. at 1–2, 4–6. For the reasons explained below, the Court hereby denies Begum’s IFP application and dismisses this matter. Both of Begum’s submissions are quite difficult to follow. In her IFP application, Begum merely asserts that she is exempt from federal taxation. See IFP App. at 1. Even assuming arguendo that statement is true, it does not exempt her from complying with the requirements to provide the Court with her relevant financial information in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), or to alternatively submit the filing fee attributable to civil actions in this District. As it stands, the Court is without any information regarding Plaintiff’s financial circumstances, and she has thus failed to establish that she qualifies for IFP status. Begum’s “notice” fares no better. She has supplied only a P.O. Box address, see Not. at 1, which is only allowed upon leave of court, see D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1); see also Mail Returned as Undeliverable to Begum, ECF No. 3. The charges that follow are nebulous, at best. As far as it can be discerned, Begum takes issue with (1) civil and criminal proceedings in the 21st Judicial Circuit of Missouri, located in St. Louis, and (2) bankruptcy proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. See Not. at 1–5. She seeks to remove those cases, in which she named as a defendant, to this District, see id., but she faces insurmountable hurdles. First, although Begum has presented this matter as a removal, there is absolutely no indication that the state matters were actually removed from the 21st Judicial Circuit of Missouri, or any other local court. In essence, Begum has attempted to open a civil matter without a complaint, which she may not do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1069 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3); see also Adair v. England, 193 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A party commences a civil action by filing a complaint . . . [and] [w]hen no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3). Second, a defendant is required to file for removal in the district court for the district and division within which such action is pending. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1455(a), 1446(a). None of these cited state actions were ever pending in a District of Columbia local court; therefore, they may not be removed to this federal … <a href="/opinion/10282367/begum-v-bank-of-new-york-mellon-trust-company/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/begum_v._bank_of_new_york_mellon_trust_company.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Cancel v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282366/cancel-v-us-department-of-health-and-human-services/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282366/cancel-v-us-department-of-health-and-human-services/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JOSE L. CANALES CANCEL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02384 (UNA) ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ) AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Currently before the court is plaintiff’s pro se complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The court grants the IFP application, and as explained below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff, a resident of Puerto Rico, sues the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and several of its officials, for $250,000 in damages. See Compl. at 1– 4. The complaint is far from a model of clarity. Plaintiff broadly alleges that HHS has abused its power, discriminated against him, disparaged him, engaged in misrepresentation, coercion, and “detraction,” and he accuses its staff of being “professional gaslighters.” See id. at 4. He then attaches screenshots of the purported salary of an HHS attorney, whom plaintiff contends earns too much. See id. at 6–8. Finally, plaintiff alleges that a medical group located in Puerto Rico, and its providers––none of whom are named as defendants––denied him services in violation of his civil rights, by “invalidating” his “total and permanent disability” benefits, due to the way it filled out his medical forms. See id. at 9. It appears that plaintiff may have reported this medical provider to HHS’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), and he is now dissatisfied with OCR’s response. See id. First, pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 … <a href="/opinion/10282366/cancel-v-us-department-of-health-and-human-services/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/cancel_v._u.s._department_of_health_and_human_services.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Mabrey v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282352/mabrey-v-washington-metropolitan-area-transit-authority/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282352/mabrey-v-washington-metropolitan-area-transit-authority/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) THOMAS A. MABREY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 23-cv-00569 (APM) ) WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA ) TRANSIT AUTHORITY, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION In this negligence action against Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), pro se Plaintiff Thomas Mabrey asserts a single claim of negligence arising from a fall on an escalator at a WMATA subway station in February 2020. Plaintiff alleges that WMATA was negligent for (1) “[f]ailing to properly maintain all areas of egress for passengers in a reasonable safe manner,” (2) “[f]ailing to monitor escalators and keep in safe working conditions,” and (3) “[f]ailing to employ adequate staff to assist with maintenance and control of working escalators.” Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, Pl.’s Compl. for Negligence and Personal Injury, ECF No. 1-3, ¶ 11. He also contends that WMATA “had a duty of care to give warning of the dangerous condition to the Plaintiff or other [sic.] similarly situated.” Id. ¶ 12. WMATA seeks entry of summary judgment. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 17 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.]. Although the court warned Plaintiff about the possible consequences of failing to respond to WMATA’s motion, see Order, ECF No. 19, he did not do so. Plaintiff therefore has not disputed any of WMATA’s factual assertions. The court therefore accepts WMATA’s facts as undisputed for purposes of the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Winston &amp; Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F.3d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Having considered the full factual record and WMATA’s arguments, the court grants the motion for the following reasons. First, Plaintiff has failed to identify any unsafe condition at an “area[] of egress” that gave rise to his claimed injuries. Def.’s Mot., Def.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 17-2 [hereinafter Def.’s Stmt.], ¶¶ 36–37. Second, Plaintiff has not identified any escalator malfunction or failure that caused his injuries. To the contrary, video evidence shows that Plaintiff “lost his balance and fell down the remaining [escalator] steps.” Id. ¶ 19; see also id. ¶ 26 (“Mr. Mabr[e]y reported to the EMTs that he ‘slipped and fell not paying attention.’”); ¶ 27 (noting that medical records indicate that Mabrey told providers that “he had fallen because he ‘missed a step’ and ‘caught his toe on the escalator’”). Third, Plaintiff has not offered any expert testimony as to the standard of care regarding appropriate staffing of a metro facility. See Burke v. Air Serv Int’l, Inc., 685 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[A] plaintiff must put on expert testimony to establish what the standard of care is if the subject in question is so distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layperson.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Finally, Plaintiff has not pointed to any hazardous condition about which WMATA was aware and failed to give proper warning and that caused his … <a href="/opinion/10282352/mabrey-v-washington-metropolitan-area-transit-authority/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/mabrey_v._washington_metropolitan_area_transit_authority.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Etzenhouser v. Vilsack</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282411/etzenhouser-v-vilsack/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282411/etzenhouser-v-vilsack/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MATTHEW ETZENHOUSER, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No. 23-cv-3539 (JMC) v. THOMAS J. VILSACK, Secretary of Agriculture, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiffs Matthew Etzenhouser and Taiga S. Rohrer, individually and as proposed putative class representatives, brought this action against Thomas J. Vilsack, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (in his individual and official capacities), and former Deputy Secretary Jewel Bronaugh (in her individual capacity only), asserting claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See ECF 1, 27. 1 In July 2024, Defendants filed motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF 32, 33. 2 To date—four months later— Plaintiffs, who are represented by counsel, have neither filed an opposition to Defendants’ motions nor requested an extension of time to do so. And they have not filed anything else on the docket or taken other steps to prosecute this case since Defendants moved to dismiss. Because Plaintiffs have 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page. 2 Defendants in their individual capacities move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. ECF 32. They also claim qualified immunity, but the Court need not address that argument given the posture and resolution of this case. Defendant Vilsack in his official capacity moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF 33. The Court resolves Defendant’s motion to dismiss and need not (and does not) consider his alternative motion for summary judgment. 1 failed to respond to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions as conceded and DISMISSES the case without prejudice. Local Civil Rule 7(b) requires an opposing party to file a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to a motion within 14 days of the service of the motion, or “the Court may treat the motion as conceded.” LCvr 7(b). Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint on July 22, 2024, making Plaintiffs’ response due on August 5, 2024. That deadline has come and gone with no word from Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court grants the Individual-Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as conceded. In response to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, Plaintiffs have the burden to establish that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Berman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 23-CV-01017, 2024 WL 3887373, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2024) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Having filed no response at all, Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden. With respect to … <a href="/opinion/10282411/etzenhouser-v-vilsack/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/etzenhouser_v._vilsack.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Matthews v. 1101 K St Restaurant LLC</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282443/matthews-v-1101-k-st-restaurant-llc/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282443/matthews-v-1101-k-st-restaurant-llc/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ALEXANDER MATTHEWS d/b/a WASHINGTON DC PERMIT EXPEDITORS, Case No. 22-cv-3440 (JMC) Plaintiff, v. 1101 K ST RESTAURANT LLC, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Alexander Matthews, proceeding pro se, sues the operators of two now-defunct restaurants—1101 K St Restaurant LLC and 2401 Restaurant Corporation (together, “Defendant Restaurants”)—for copyright infringement. ECF 1-2.1 Defendant Restaurants moved for summary judgment, ECF 19, and Matthews failed to respond, ECF 21. Because Defendant Restaurants have demonstrated that they are entitled to summary judgment, the Court will GRANT their motion. I. BACKGROUND Because Matthews has filed no opposition to Defendant Restaurants’ motion for summary judgment and submitted no evidence, the following facts are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett &amp; Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court is to deem as admitted the moving party’s facts that are uncontroverted by the nonmoving party[].”) (citing the predecessor to Loc. Civ. R. 7(h)). 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page. 1 In July 2021, RW Restaurant Group, LLC (RWRG) formed a contract with Matthews to help RWRG obtain permits for outdoor seating areas at two restaurants: Marcel’s, operated by Defendant 2401 Restaurant Corporation, and Brasserie Beck, operated by Defendant 1101 K St Restaurant LLC. ECF 19-1 ¶ 1. In September 2022—after “extensive delays” due to Matthews’s “failure to timely complete the permitting process”—RWRG abandoned its plans to open outdoor seating at the two restaurants. Id. ¶ 2. Neither restaurant ever opened outdoor seating or used the plans Matthews had worked on, and neither has any intention to do so in the future. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. In fact, both restaurants are now closed: Brasserie Beck went out of business in March 2024, and Marcel’s went out of business in May 2024. Id. ¶ 4. In late September 2022, Matthews filed this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. ECF 1-2. He brought claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against RWRG and four of its employees (Robert Wiedmaier, Joe Lively, Brian McBride, and Thomas Burke). Id. ¶¶ 10–18. He further alleged that RWRG, its four employees, and Defendant Restaurants committed copyright infringement because they “intend[ed] to utilize” his “unique and original copyrighted drawings” to “continue the permit process.” Id. ¶¶ 19–24. Defendant Restaurants removed the case to this Court in November 2022, ECF 1, and filed an answer, ECF 7. Matthews failed to properly serve RWRG, Wiedmaier, Lively, McBride, and Burke, and the Court therefore dismissed them from the case. Mar. 12, 2024 Minute Order. The only remaining Defendants are Defendant Restaurants. After Matthews failed to respond to multiple … <a href="/opinion/10282443/matthews-v-1101-k-st-restaurant-llc/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/matthews_v._1101_k_st_restaurant_llc.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Harrington v. United States</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281249/harrington-v-united-states/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281249/harrington-v-united-states/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VINCENT STERLING HARRINGTON Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 24-2403 (TJK) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. MEMORANDUM On August 21, 2024, the Court entered a minute order informing Plaintiff that he needed to serve Defendant within 90 days from this action’s removal under Federal Rule of Civil Proce- dure 4 and ordering him to either (1) cause process to be served and file proof of service or (2) move for an extension of time by November 18, 2024. Plaintiff did neither by October 22, so the Court entered another minute order directing Plaintiff to do so by November 18. That order ex- plained that Plaintiff had to comply with the Court’s order “to avoid dismissal of this action.” The November 18 deadline has passed, and Plaintiff has still not filed proof of service or any motion. Indeed, Plaintiff has filed nothing on the docket since this case was removed, and the only address the Court has for Plaintiff appears invalid. See ECF Nos. 6-8. Thus, pursuant to Local Rule 83.23 and the Court’s “inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or otherwise comply with a court order,” Peterson v. Archstone Communities LLC, 637 F.3d 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the Court will dismiss the case without prejudice. A separate order will issue. /s/ Timothy J. Kelly _____ TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: November 21, 2024 Civil Action No. 2024-2403 District Court, District of Columbia dcd D.D.C. Harrington v. United States Judge Timothy J. Kelly 21 November 2024 Published c4e73bdef4b0c44c87fdfbd8fa7b4fc32b553e0d <a href="/opinion/10281249/harrington-v-united-states/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/harrington_v._united_states.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Franklin v. Social Security Administration</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281250/franklin-v-social-security-administration/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281250/franklin-v-social-security-administration/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) CHANTAY D. FRANKLIN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 24-cv-1233 (APM) ) SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ ) ORDER In this action removed from the D.C. Superior Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, see Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Notice of Removal], Defendant Social Security Administration moves to dismiss Plaintiff Chantay Franklin’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, see Mot. to Dismiss &amp; Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 8 [hereinafter Mot. to Dismiss]. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and although the court gave her the required warnings for failing to respond, see Order, ECF No. 9, she has not done so. For the reasons set forth below, the court holds that dismissal without prejudice is warranted under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). 1 1 Removal may have been procedurally defective because Defendant failed to file for removal within 30 days of receiving “a copy of the initial pleading” through “service or otherwise,” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). See Notice of Removal at 1 (stating that “Defendant is in receipt of a Complaint” filed on March 4, 2024 in the D.C. Superior Court and removing this action on April 26, 2024). However, “a procedural defect in removal does not affect the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction and therefore may be waived.” Ficken v. Golden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2010) (alterations and citation omitted); accord Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It is well settled that § 1446(b)’s thirty-day time limit for removal is a procedural provision, not a jurisdictional one.”). Because Plaintiff has not filed for remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), she has waived any objections to this procedural defect. See Ballard v. District of Columbia, 813 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“It is settled law that an untimely removal constitutes a defect in the removal process, and that a remand based upon such a defect is encompassed by section 1447(c).”); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (dictating that motions to remand made on the basis of “any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction” must be filed within 30 days of removal). Accordingly, the court’s review of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is proper. First things first, Defendant is correct that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. Mot. to Dismiss at 3–5. For actions removed under § 1442, a federal court’s jurisdiction derives from the jurisdiction of the state court from which the action originated. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 n.17 (1981); Merkulov v. United States Park Police, 75 F. Supp. 3d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2014). Thus, if the D.C. Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s suit, so too would this court. Such is the case here. Plaintiff claims that her “application for Social Security disability was denied due process,” Compl., … <a href="/opinion/10281250/franklin-v-social-security-administration/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/franklin_v._social_security_administration.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Six Hundred One Thousand, Four Hundred Twenty-Six Dollars and Nineteen Cents ($601,426.19) of Funds Associated With Dynapex Energy Limited</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281588/united-states-v-six-hundred-one-thousand-four-hundred-twenty-six-dollars/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281588/united-states-v-six-hundred-one-thousand-four-hundred-twenty-six-dollars/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. $601,426.19 OF FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH DYNAPEX ENERGY LIMITED, $4,866,527.84 OF FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH DYNAPEX ENERGY LIMITED, $160,810.94 ASSOCIATED WITH BINRIN LIMITED, $1,078,587.67 ASSOCIATED WITH SIBSHUR LIMITED, Case No. 24-cv-542 (JMC) $999,980.00 ASSOCIATED WITH SIBSHUR LIMITED, $2,599,979.00 ASSOCIATED WITH DINRIN LIMITED $1,579,274.58 OF FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH PETROCHEM SOUTH EAST LIMITED, $110,232.63 OF FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH XINGHAI INTERNATIONAL SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED, Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION The United States brought this forfeiture action in rem against eight properties: (1) $601,426.19 of funds associated with Dynapex Energy Limited (“Defendant Funds 1”); (2) $4,866,527.84 of funds associated with Dynapex Energy Limited (“Defendant Funds 2”); (3) 1 $160,810.94 of funds associated with Binrin Limited (“Defendant Funds 3”); (4) $1,078,587.67 of funds associated with Sibshur Limited (“Defendant Funds 4”); (5) $999,980.00 of funds associated with Sibshur Limited (“Defendant Funds 5”); (6) $2,599,979.00 of funds associated with Dinrin Limited (“Defendant Funds 6”); (7) $1,579,274.58 of funds associated with Petrochem South East Limited (“Defendant Funds 7”); and (8) $110,232.63 of funds associated with Xinghai International Ship Management Limited (“Defendant Funds 8”) (collectively, “Defendant Funds”). ECF 1 ¶ 1. 1 The Government argues that the Defendant Funds are subject to seizure and forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i) as “foreign or domestic assets” of designated foreign terrorist organizations that have “engaged in planning and perpetrating” federal crimes of terrorism “against the United States, citizens or residents of the United States, or their property,” and as “assets, foreign or domestic, affording any person a source of influence over” those foreign terrorist organizations. ECF 6-1 at 11 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i)). 2 After receiving notice, potential claimants failed to appear or defend this action. The Clerk of Court entered default, and the Government now moves for an entry of default judgment. The Court finds that the Government has demonstrated its entitlement to such judgment and GRANTS the motion. 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page. 2 The Government proffers additional grounds for seizure and forfeiture of the Defendant Funds, but the Court finds that the Government’s claim under § 981(a)(1)(G)(i) is sufficient and so does not address the alternative grounds. See ECF 1 at 19–20 (Count Two, Forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)); id. at 20 (Count Three, Forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)). 2 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3 This case concerns the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and the complicated network of state-owned entities and front companies it uses to generate revenue and fund terrorism in Iran and abroad. As alleged, the IRGC is a branch of the Iranian military with the purpose of defending Iran’s political system. ECF 1 ¶ 10. According to the … <a href="/opinion/10281588/united-states-v-six-hundred-one-thousand-four-hundred-twenty-six-dollars/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/united_states_v._six_hundred_one_thousand_four_hundred_twenty-six_dollars.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>In the Matter of an Enforcement of a Restraining Order by the Ninth Federal Court, Fifth Judicial Subsection in Campinas, Sp, the Federative Republic of Brazil, to Restrain</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281545/in-the-matter-of-an-enforcement-of-a-restraining-order-by-the-ninth-federal/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281545/in-the-matter-of-an-enforcement-of-a-restraining-order-by-the-ninth-federal/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) In Re: ENFORCEMENT OF A RESTRAINING ) ORDER BY THE NINTH FEDERAL COURT, ) FIFTH JUDICIAL SUBSECTION IN CAMPINAS, ) SP, THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, ) TO RESTRAIN: ) ) Misc. Action No. 1:15-783-RBW ) AN APPROXIMATELY 836-POUND ) EMERALD KNOWN AS THE BAHIA ) EMERALD LOCATED IN LOS ANGELES, ) CALIFORNIA ) _________________________________________ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION This case concerns a large emerald known as the Bahia Emerald (the “Emerald”), that weighs approximately 836 pounds and is the subject of a final forfeiture judgment obtained by the Federative Republic of Brazil (the “Brazilian Forfeiture Judgment”) in a Brazilian court as part of the criminal prosecution of two individuals who were convicted of “smuggling, receiving stolen property[,] and fraudulent misrepresentation in violation of Brazilian law.” See United States’ Application to Enforce a Foreign Forfeiture Judgment Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2467(c)(1) and (d)(1) Against Bahia Emerald and for Entry of an Order of Forfeiture (“Gov’t Appl.” or “the application”) at 2, ECF No. 56. Currently pending before the Court is the United States’ application to register and enforce the Brazilian court’s Final Forfeiture Judgment. See id. at 1– 2. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, 1 the Court concludes for the following 1 In addition to the filings already identified, the Court also considered the following submissions in rendering its decision: (1) the Intervenors’ Opposition to [the] United States’ Application to Enforce a Foreign Forfeiture Judgment Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2467(c)(1) and (d)(1) Against [the] Bahia Emerald, (“Intervenors’ Opposition” or “Intervenors’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 57, and (2) the United States’ Reply to Intervenors’ Opposition, (“Government Reply” or “Gov’t Reply”), ECF No. 59. reasons that it must vacate the stay currently imposed in this case and grant the government’s application. I. BACKGROUND According to Brazilian authorities, “the Bahia Emerald is one of the largest emeralds—if not the largest emerald—ever to have been discovered.” Sixteenth Joint Status Report, Exhibit (“Ex.”) 1 (Letter to the Court from the Government of Brazil (“Letter to the Court”)) at 1, ECF No. 63-1. Undoubtedly, Brazilian authorities appreciate that “the Emerald [ ] has substantial monetary value, [but] its value to Brazil cannot be quantified: it is a ‘national treasure’ that forms a critical part of Brazil’s natural heritage and cultural patrimony.” Id., Ex. 1 (Letter to the Court) at 1 (footnote omitted). Understanding the significance of the Emerald, on April 4, 2022, the United States (the “government”) filed an application to enforce the Brazilian Forfeiture Judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2467, seeking to return the gem to Brazil. See Gov’t Appl. at 2. In late 2011, the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement “informed the Brazilian Ministry of Justice that the Bahia Emerald may have been illegally taken from Brazil[,]” which led the “Brazilian authorities to open a criminal investigation.” Id., Ex. 2 (Affidavit of Brazilian Prosecutor Fernando Filgueiras de Araujo (“de Araujo Aff.”)) 2 ¶ 15, ECF No. 56-2. Since then, … <a href="/opinion/10281545/in-the-matter-of-an-enforcement-of-a-restraining-order-by-the-ninth-federal/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/in_the_matter_of_an_enforcement_of_a_restraining_order_by_the_ninth_federal.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Halley v. Blinken</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281705/halley-v-blinken/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281705/halley-v-blinken/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ETHAN KESSLER HALLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 24-571 (RDM) ANTONY BLINKEN, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiffs are U.S. citizens, some of whom are domiciled in Israel, who are direct and indirect victims of the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel or attacks by “other terrorist factions” in the region. Dkt. 3 at 8–15 (Compl. ¶ 14–61). They allege that these attacks were supported by the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (“UNRWA”) and that Defendants—the United States Department of State, Secretary Antony Blinken, Deputy Secretary Richard Verma, and Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Tamara Wittes—“have permitted millions of dollars to flow to UNRWA [even though it is] publicly known that such funding is diverted to terrorism and [that] UNRWA employees are complicit in that terrorism.” Id. at 7 (Compl. ¶ 7). They seek a judicial order prohibiting Defendants “from providing any future funding to” UNRWA and “from providing any future funding to other relief, aid or humanitarian agencies or organizations that will indirectly transfer such funds to UNRWA or its officers or employees.” Id. at 5 (Compl. ¶ 1). Or, in the alternative, they seek an order halting “any and all funding to UNRWA until it produces irrefutable evidence that none of its employees directly or indirectly assist the Hamas terrorist organization and that none of its funding is being diverted to Hamas or other terrorist activities.” Id. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 10 at 1. For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT that motion. I. BACKGROUND The following background is taken from Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, which are taken as true for purposes of the pending motion, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and from public acts that are subject to judicial notice, see Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 909 F.3d 446, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2018). UNRWA is a United Nations agency, founded to provide humanitarian aid, assistance, and access to education for Palestinian refugees. Dkt. 12 at 8. The United States has historically been the “largest single-state donor to UNRWA,” contributing approximately $422 million to the organization in 2023 alone. Dkt. 3 at 15 (Compl. ¶¶ 62, 64). On January 26, 2024, however, the United States suspended its funding of UNRWA, id. at 6 (Compl. ¶ 4), and on March 23, 2024, Congress enacted legislation barring the use of any appropriated funds for any contribution, grant, or other payment to UNRWA, notwithstanding any prior appropriations or amounts provided in fiscal year 2025, until March 25, 2025. See Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, Div. G, tit. III § 301 (Mar. 23, 2024); Dkt. 10-1 at 9–10. Plaintiffs are U.S. citizens who reside in or visited Israel between October 7, 2023 and February 28, 2024 and … <a href="/opinion/10281705/halley-v-blinken/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/halley_v._blinken.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Johnson v. Bowser</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282192/johnson-v-bowser/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282192/johnson-v-bowser/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JAMES F. JOHNSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 24-3101 (UNA) ) MURIEL BOWSER, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION It appears that Plaintiff is the recipient of multiple photo enforcement tickets because a motor vehicle registered in his name was detected speeding and committing other traffic infractions. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 1), Ex. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4, 9, 22-23, 26) (page numbers designated by CM/ECF). It further appears that Plaintiff unsuccessfully contested certain tickets. See, e.g., id., Ex. (ECF No. 1-1 at 9-11, 25). Plaintiff estimates that his fines and penalties total approximately $8,000. See id. at 4. In this action, Plaintiff demands a hearing, see id., and a declaratory judgment, see, e.g., id. at 1, 2, deeming the tickets invalid and dismissing them, see id. at 4. Plaintiff has chosen the wrong forum for adjudication of his claims. A Hearing Examiner conducts a hearing for the adjudication of traffic infractions. See D.C. Code §§ 50-2302.06 (moving infractions), 50-2303.06 (parking, standing, stopping infractions); 18 D.C. Mun. Regs. §§ 1004, 1007, 1041. If the vehicle operator is found liable, he or she may request reconsideration, see D.C. Code § 50-2303.11(a), and if reconsideration is denied, he or she may appeal the Hearing Examiner’s decision to the Traffic Adjudication Appeals Board (“TAAB”) of the District of Columbia Department of Public Works, see D.C. 1 Code § 50-2304.02(a); 18 D.C. Mun. Regs. §§ 1042.2, 1044. An appeal of the TAAB’s decision goes before the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See D.C. Code § 50-2304.05. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), DISMISSES the complaint without prejudice, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) without prejudice as moot. An Order is issued separately. DATE: November 21, 2024 ANA C. REYES United States District Judge 2 Civil Action No. 2024-3101 District Court, District of Columbia dcd D.D.C. Johnson v. Bowser Judge Ana C. Reyes 21 November 2024 Published a72ab08014d1e8f8992a26bbf0c3c2cc67658e8f <a href="/opinion/10282192/johnson-v-bowser/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/johnson_v._bowser.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Rogers v. U.S. Bank National Associations</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282151/rogers-v-us-bank-national-associations/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282151/rogers-v-us-bank-national-associations/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BARBARA HANNAH ROGERS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 24-3193 (UNA) ) U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and her pro se Complaint (ECF No. 1).1 It appears that Plaintiff has an interest in real property in Effingham, South Carolina. She purports to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her rights under the United States Constitution. See Compl. at 3, 4. Her claims pertain to foreclosure proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas, State of South Carolina, County of Florence, culminating in a judgment of foreclosure in the mortgagee’s favor and an order for the sale of the property at public auction, see generally Compl., Ex. (ECF No. 1- 1), set for December 3, 2024, see id. at 4. Among other relief, Plaintiff demands “free and clear title” to the property. Id. at 5. In addition, Plaintiff appears to challenge the ruling of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, see id. at 4, dismissing Plaintiff’s prior challenge to the South Carolina proceedings, see id., Ex. (ECF No. 1-1 at 32-35). This Court lacks jurisdiction to provide Plaintiff’s requested relief. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal Courts are courts of limited 1 Only Barbara Hannah Rogers filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and only she is listed as a plaintiff in the Complaint. The Court proceeds as if she is the sole plaintiff. 1 jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”); NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and that courts may raise the issue sua sponte.”). As a general rule, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of other courts. See, e.g., Petrovic v. United States, No. 1:19-cv-00482, 2019 WL 1746301, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2019); United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923); see also Prentice v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 307 F. App’x 460, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[B]ecause a challenge to a state court action must proceed through that state’s system of appellate review rather than through a federal district court, the district court properly determined it lacked jurisdiction to review action taken by a . . . state court.” (citations omitted)). Here, if this Court were to entertain the Plaintiff’s claims, it would necessarily need to review and … <a href="/opinion/10282151/rogers-v-us-bank-national-associations/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/rogers_v._u.s._bank_national_associations.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Dollen v. Dyer</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282152/dollen-v-dyer/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282152/dollen-v-dyer/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BEVERLY DOLLEN, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 24-2552 (UNA) ) LORA DYER, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on consideration of Plaintiffs’ application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and pro se Complaint (ECF No. 1). The Court GRANTS the application and, for the reasons discussed below, DISMISSES the Complaint and this civil action without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Beverly Dolen’s three minor children have been removed from her custody, and it appears that Defendants, among whom are agents of Child Protective Services of West Virginia, the children’s guardian ad litem, the children’s biological father, and a judge, played some role in the children’s removal. Plaintiffs demand the children’s return. But the Court lacks jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (concluding “that the domestic relations exception . . . divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (explaining that domestic relationship exception divests federal court of jurisdiction over “grant[ing] a divorce, determin[ing] alimony or support obligations, or resolv[ing] parental conflicts over the custody of their children”). Nor does this Court have jurisdiction to review, revise, or overturn any ruling of a West Virginia court. See, e.g., United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot 1 exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)). Accordingly, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and dismisses the Complaint. An Order is issued separately. DATE: November 21, 2024 ANA C. REYES United States District Judge 2 Civil Action No. 2024-2552 District Court, District of Columbia dcd D.D.C. Dollen v. Dyer Judge Ana C. Reyes 21 November 2024 Published c3abdbf53f0ab101100e36828b642b4251d1b7f2 <a href="/opinion/10282152/dollen-v-dyer/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/dollen_v._dyer.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Rex v. Federal Bureau of Investigation</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281251/rex-v-federal-bureau-of-investigation/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281251/rex-v-federal-bureau-of-investigation/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BENJAMIN J. REX, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02605 v. ) ) FEDERAL BUREAU ) OF INVESTIGATION, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The Court grants the in forma pauperis application and, for the reasons discussed below, dismisses this case without prejudice. At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff only provided a partial address, see Compl. at 1, in contravention of D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1), see Mail Returned Undeliverable, ECF No. 4. The allegations themselves fare no better. “A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and Plaintiff’s Complaint falls squarely into this category. Here, Plaintiff sues the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), alleging that, for about three years, the agency has conspired against him by orchestrating a misinformation campaign, and by subjecting him extortion, menace, harassment, defamation, provocation, mental abuse, intentional tort, impersonation, negligence, coercion, false imprisonment, sexual abuse, misuse of excessive force, falsification of evidence, intimidation, infringement, brutality, undue pain and suffering, obstruction of justice, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, and physical, psychological, economic duress. See Compl. at 4–6. He contends the FBI’s alleged bad acts have manifested in myriad ways, including, but not limited to, “psycho technology,” loss of employment opportunities, attempted murder, abduction, and identity theft. See id. at 4–7. He demands millions in damages. See id. at 4–7. This Court cannot exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins”). As here, a court shall dismiss a complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). For these reasons, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s pending motion for CM/ECF access, ECF No, 3, is denied as moot. A … <a href="/opinion/10281251/rex-v-federal-bureau-of-investigation/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/rex_v._federal_bureau_of_investigation.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Dantzler v. Jorden</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278451/dantzler-v-jorden/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>District Court, District of Columbia</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278451/dantzler-v-jorden/</id><summary type="html"> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OSCAR C. DANTZLER, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:24-cv-00986 (ACR) WILLIAM W. JORDEN, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Oscar C. Dantzler, a resident of the Parish of Tangipahoa, Louisiana, sought to run for governor of Louisiana in 2023, but a state court disqualified him for filing a false certification on his notice of candidacy form. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sues all the parties involved in his disqualification for allegedly conspiring to prevent him from becoming governor of Louisiana. Defendants move to dismiss on multiple grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. See Dkts. 20, 22, 25. The Court agrees that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 28 U.S.C. § 1361 claims and that it lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims on these grounds, the Court need not address Defendants’ other arguments for dismissal. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Dkts. 20, 22, 25. And because it is not in the interest of justice to transfer this case, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Venue, Dkts. 21, 26. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Court takes the facts from Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Court must construe a pro se complaint together with all the plaintiff’s filings, see Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and must read all pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s claims stem from a Louisiana state court lawsuit that resulted in his disqualification from the 2023 Louisiana governor’s race. Dkt. 1 at 3. In August 2023, Defendant Anthony L. Jackson, Jr. filed a petition in the Louisiana Nineteenth Judicial District Court to disqualify Plaintiff from the gubernatorial race for filing a false certification on his notice of candidacy form. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that the judge presiding over the lawsuit, Defendant Judge William W. Jorden, allowed fraudulent and perjurious pleadings to be filed against Plaintiff, engaged in unethical behavior, and interfered with Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Dkt. 5 at 9–13. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants Mr. Jackson and Judge Jorden, as well as Douglas Welborn, Alvin Johnson, Cherie T. Henley, John B. Edwards, Yolanda Cezar, and the Nineteenth District Court of Louisiana, conspired to prevent him from becoming governor of the Pelican State.1 Id. On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against all Defendants except Ms. Cezar. Dkt. 1. A month later, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding Ms. Cezar to the list of Defendants. Dkt. 5. The claims in Plaintiff’s Complaints are long, repetitive, vague, and hard to parse. That said, the Court understands Plaintiff’s claims to be for general violations of his 1 Many a pelican call Louisiana home: the brown pelican is Louisiana’s state bird, and … <a href="/opinion/10278451/dantzler-v-jorden/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/dantzler_v._jorden.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry></feed>