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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <feed xml:lang="en-us" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title>CourtListener.com: All opinions for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/" rel="alternate"/><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/feed/court/ca6/" rel="self"/><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/</id><updated>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</updated><author><name>Free Law Project</name><email>feeds@courtlistener.com</email></author><rights>Created for the public domain by Free Law Project</rights><entry><title>Mich. Dep't of Env't, Great Lakes & Energy v. Gerald R. Ford Int'l Airport Auth.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282347/mich-dept-of-envt-great-lakes-energy-v-gerald-r-ford-intl-airport/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282347/mich-dept-of-envt-great-lakes-energy-v-gerald-r-ford-intl-airport/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0464n.06 Case No. 24-1085 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 22, 2024 MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ENVIRONMENT, GREAT LAKES, AND ) ENERGY, et al., ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF v. ) MICHIGAN ) GERALD R. FORD INTERNATIONAL ) OPINION AIRPORT AUTHORITY, ) ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Before: SILER, GRIFFIN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. SILER, Circuit Judge. This case arises from claims by the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (“EGLE”) and Attorney General Dana Nessel (collectively, “State Parties”) against the Gerald R. Ford International Airport Authority (“Airport Authority”) for alleged environmental contamination. The State Parties assert that the Airport Authority’s use of Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (“AFFF”), a firefighting agent containing per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”), led to contamination of the surrounding environment in violation of Michigan’s Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (“NREPA”). The Airport Authority removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that it acted “under” the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), which mandates the use of AFFF for certified airports. The district court granted the State Parties’ No. 24-1085, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, &amp; Energy v. Gerald R. Ford Int’l Airport Auth. motion to remand, finding that the Airport Authority’s compliance with FAA regulations did not meet the “acting under” requirement necessary for federal officer removal. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM the district court’s remand order. I. The Airport Authority, a Michigan corporation, owns and operates the Gerald R. Ford International Airport in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Formed under Michigan’s Regional Airport Authority Act, the Airport Authority manages the Airport’s operations, including compliance with federal, state, and local regulations. In September 2023, the State Parties filed a two-count complaint in the 17th Circuit Court for Kent County, Michigan. They alleged violations of Michigan’s NREPA (Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.101 et seq.), citing the Airport Authority’s use of AFFF containing PFAS during firefighting training, equipment testing, and emergency responses. The complaint asserts that the use of AFFF contaminated soil and groundwater at and near the Airport, impacting residential areas and exceeding EGLE’s cleanup criteria. Count I seeks relief under Part 201 of NREPA, holding the Airport Authority liable for the release of hazardous substances as the owner and operator of the site. Count II alleges violations under Part 31 of NREPA for stormwater discharges exceeding effluent limits, contributing to water pollution. In October 2023, the Airport Authority removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, asserting federal jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The Airport Authority argued that it was “acting under” a federal officer because, as a certified public airport under 14 C.F.R. Part 139, it must comply with FAA regulations mandating the use of AFFF that contains PFAS. 2 No. 24-1085, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, … <a href="/opinion/10282347/mich-dept-of-envt-great-lakes-energy-v-gerald-r-ford-intl-airport/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/mich._dept_of_envt_great_lakes__energy_v._gerald_r._ford_intl_airport.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Molly Irene McKinnon</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282345/united-states-v-molly-irene-mckinnon/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282345/united-states-v-molly-irene-mckinnon/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0465n.06 Case Nos. 23-5766/5773 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Nov 22, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF DOUGLAS WILLIAM VANCE (23-5766); ) KENTUCKY MOLLY IRENE MCKINNON (23-5773), ) Defendants-Appellants. ) OPINION ) Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; READLER and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. With the aid of millions from outside investors, Douglas Vance and Molly McKinnon ran a “clean coal” company in the heart of Kentucky coal country. Their business, Nex-Gen, purportedly heat-treated biomass and coal and sold the resulting high-energy product to other industrial concerns. In practice, that was not the case. Nex- Gen did little business. Worse yet, fraudulent business records provided to investors hid the company’s true financial health. Investors were likewise oblivious as to who had a stake in the enterprise. Nex-Gen’s management largely misappropriated and squandered the company’s funds. After one of Nex-Gen’s employees alerted an investor to the business’s troubles, a federal investigation ensued, ultimately leading to a jury finding Vance and McKinnon guilty of an array of fraud and money laundering crimes. On appeal, both attack their convictions and resulting sentences on many a front. We affirm. Case Nos. 23-5766/73, United States v. Vance / United States v. McKinnon I. Douglas Vance, a former coal miner, constructed a calciner, a machine that heats raw biomass or coal to produce biochar or calcinated coal. Such high-energy carbon products can then be sold to energy, industrial, or agricultural companies. From a small operation in Virginia, Vance hoped to expand to a site near Hazard, Kentucky. Enter Molly McKinnon. After meeting Vance in the spring of 2016, McKinnon began working with him, helping Vance with finances, while Vance focused on the business’s operations. Vance and McKinnon generally referred to their business as Nex-Gen. Vance and McKinnon found investors and lenders for Nex-Gen. One investor was Allan Deware. In August 2016, he agreed to provide a quarter million dollars in needed capital, creating a new corporate entity to oversee the operation. Around the same time, Vance and McKinnon convinced a charitable foundation called the Shumard Foundation to similarly invest in Nex-Gen. There were others that put money into Nex-Gen, as well, including Koch Industries and Vance’s long-time friend, Joan Faybik. But not all was what it seemed with Nex-Gen. While the company’s investors and lenders each operated on the understanding that they were the exclusive partners with Vance and McKinnon, the reality was that there were many fingers in the Nex-Gen pie. And Nex-Gen never seemed to ship large quantities of processed biomass or coal to any customers, despite continued assurances made to those with a financial stake in the company about pending sales. Indeed, many of the supposed sales and financial records that Nex-Gen’s investors and lenders relied on to lend money to Nex-Gen were misleading at best. … <a href="/opinion/10282345/united-states-v-molly-irene-mckinnon/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/united_states_v._molly_irene_mckinnon.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>In re Nissan N. Am., Inc. Litig.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282348/in-re-nissan-n-am-inc-litig/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282348/in-re-nissan-n-am-inc-litig/</id><summary type="html"> RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 24a0260p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ IN RE: NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. LITIGATION. │ ___________________________________________ │ ROBERT GARNEAU; NANCY HOUSELL; JEFFREY │ OLKOWSKI; VAUGHN KERKORIAN; DAVID TURNER; │ COURTNEY JOHNSON; SCOTT REEVES; LISA &gt; No. 23-5950 HENDRICKSON; RHONDA PERRY; JANE REEVES; │ MORELA JOVA; KIMBERLY WRIGHT; TODD BURROWS; │ HOSEA BARTLETT; AURELIA FOWLER; JOHN │ HARTWELL; KEITH HUDDLESTON; LAKEITA KEMP; │ MICHELLE BEREDA; ANGELENE HOEFFKEN; SCOTT │ NERI, │ Plaintiffs-Appellees, │ │ │ v. │ │ NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.; NISSAN MOTOR │ COMPANY, LTD., │ │ Defendants-Appellants. ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. Nos. 3:19-cv-00843; 3:19-cv-00854; 3:22-cv-00098; William Lynn Campbell, Jr., District Judge. Argued: October 31, 2024 Decided and Filed: November 22, 2024 Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; LARSEN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Aaron D. Van Oort, FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE &amp; REATH LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Appellants. John E. Tangren, DICELLO LEVITT LLC, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Aaron D. Van Oort, John L. Rockenbach, Anderson C. Tuggle, FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE &amp; REATH LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, E. Paul Cauley, Jr., No. 23-5950 In re Nissan N. Am., Inc. Litig. Page 2 S. Vance Wittie, FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE &amp; REATH LLP, Dallas, Texas, for Appellants. John E. Tangren, Adam J. Levitt, Daniel R. Ferri, Adam Prom, DICELLO LEVITT LLC, Chicago, Illinois, J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Michael C. Iadevaia, STRANCH, JENNINGS &amp; GARVEY, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, Benjamin L. Bailey, Jonathan D. Boggs, BAILEY &amp; GLASSER LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, W. Daniel “Dee” Miles, III, BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW, METHVIN, PORTIS &amp; MILES, P.C., Montgomery, Alabama, Joel D. Smith, SMITH KRIVOSHEY, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellees. Philip S. Goldberg, SHOOK, HARDY &amp; BACON L.L.P., Washington, D.C., John M. Thomas, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Kyle M. Asher, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC, Lansing, Michigan, Donald M. Falk, SCHAERR ǀ JAFFE LLP, San Francisco, California, Jeffrey R. White, AMERCAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae. _________________ OPINION _________________ SUTTON, Chief Judge. Many modern cars, indeed more and more each year, provide automatic alerts when they come too close to another car or an obstacle and will automatically brake to avoid a collision. Some models of Nissan cars, according to the complaint in this case, occasionally activate these alerts at the wrong time, say at a railroad crossing or in a parking garage. A group of car owners sued Nissan for various state-law claims. The district court certified ten statewide classes under Civil Rule 23(b)(3). Because the classes do not meet the material requirements for certification, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. I. In 2016, Nissan began equipping its cars with automatic electronic braking systems. Each system has three components: a radar, a control unit, and the brakes. The radar measures the distance to and speed of nearby obstacles and notifies the control unit, which interprets the data. If the data suggest a potential … <a href="/opinion/10282348/in-re-nissan-n-am-inc-litig/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/in_re_nissan_n._am._inc._litig..pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Gerald Lynn Campbell</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282346/united-states-v-gerald-lynn-campbell/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-22T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282346/united-states-v-gerald-lynn-campbell/</id><summary type="html"> RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 24a0259p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ &gt; No. 22-5567 │ v. │ │ GERALD LYNN CAMPBELL, │ Defendant-Appellant. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga. No. 1:21-cr-00005-1—Charles Edward Atchley, Jr., District Judge. Decided and Filed: November 22, 2024 Before: GIBBONS, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Dana C. Hansen Chavis, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. READER, J., delivered the amended opinion of the court in which GIBBONS and DAVIS, JJ., joined. DAVIS, J. (pp. 13–16), delivered a separate concurring opinion. _______________________ AMENDED OPINION _______________________ CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Gerald Lynn Campbell brandished a pistol and told a group of laborers that he had a bullet for each of them. Following an indictment, Campbell pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment, concluding that Campbell’s prior convictions for robbery No. 22-5567 United States v. Campbell Page 2 and drug offenses triggered the Armed Career Criminal Act’s mandatory minimum. Campbell appealed, challenging his sentence. We affirm. I. A group of construction workers were performing road repairs in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Gerald Lynn Campbell approached the group in his vehicle. When he arrived, he asked who had voted for Donald Trump in the recent presidential election. Seemingly unhappy with the responses he received, Campbell brandished a firearm. He told the laborers that he “had a bullet for each one of them.” Campbell then drove away, eventually parking his truck not far from the construction site. When responding officers found the vehicle, they also discovered Campbell sitting in his vehicle with a semi-automatic pistol in his lap. A grand jury indicted Campbell for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Campbell pleaded guilty. At the time of Campbell’s offense, being a felon in possession of a firearm typically carried a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2021). The Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, however, mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant with “three previous convictions” for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” each committed on “occasions different from another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). With respect to Campbell, the potential predicate offenses the district court considered were: (1) an August 1985 Tennessee robbery; (2) an April 1987 Tennessee aggravated assault; (3) an August 1992 Tennessee drug trafficking offense; (4) a December 1992 Virginia drug trafficking offense; and (5) a March 1993 Virginia drug trafficking offense. Campbell objected on multiple grounds. Among them, he argued that Tennessee robbery is not a predicate offense, that the drug offenses were not committed on different “occasions,” and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that the different-occasions … <a href="/opinion/10282346/united-states-v-gerald-lynn-campbell/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/22/united_states_v._gerald_lynn_campbell.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Lynn Evelyn Detillion v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281438/lynn-evelyn-detillion-v-ohio-dept-of-rehab-corr/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281438/lynn-evelyn-detillion-v-ohio-dept-of-rehab-corr/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0462n.06 Case No. 24-3347 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Nov 21, 2024 LYNN DETILLION, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO DEPARTMENT OF ) OHIO REHABILITATION &amp; CORRECTION; ) OHIO CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ) ASSOCATION, AFSCME LOCAL 11, ) OPINION Defendants-Appellees. ) Before: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and READLER, Circuit Judges. CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. During her tenure as a prison guard, Lynn Detillion held watch over an inmate who committed suicide. Believing that the suicide was tied to Detillion’s misconduct, her employer initially reassigned her and later terminated her employment. A second guard, Detillion’s partner, was also terminated. The officers’ union filed grievances for both. But it later withdrew Detillion’s while pursuing her partner’s, who was ultimately rehired. Detillion sued her employer and union, alleging she was mistreated before and during the grievance process. The district court granted summary judgment against her on all claims. We affirm. No. 24-3347, Detillion v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. &amp; Corr. I. Inmate Ronnie Jones hanged himself in a cell block staffed by Detillion and her partner, Angelo Brodie. The next day, a prison lieutenant collected statements from inmates who witnessed the tragedy. The lieutenant learned two important things. First, Detillion seemingly engaged in egregious misconduct. On the night of the incident, the lieutenant learned, Detillion locked Jones in a cell by himself and refused to let him speak with a mental health professional about a recent death in his family. When Jones threatened to kill himself, a friend asked to enter the cell to calm him down. Detillion called the friend a “f*g” who, she claimed, only wanted into the cell “so [they] could f*ck.” Detillion had the friend removed from the block. Jones inquired about his friend, at which point Detillion “announced” to the cell block “that Jones said he was going to kill himself if they didn’t move him to where his ‘boyfriend’ was” located. Detillion later found Jones with a noose and mocked him for not tying it correctly. She also joked that Jones did not “have the guts” to kill himself. Throughout the evening, Detillion “kept telling [Jones] to do it and calling him every name in the book.” Although Brodie was present for much of this, the inmates reported only two of his actions: early in the evening, he threatened to pepper spray Jones if he did not stop kicking his cell door, and later he refused one of Jones’s requests to see a mental health counselor by telling him to wait until Detillion returned to the cell block. No inmate accused Brodie of antagonizing Jones as Detillion was alleged to have done repeatedly throughout the evening. Second, multiple inmates then threatened Detillion, blaming her for the suicide. No inmate, however, made similar threats against Brodie. The lieutenant reported this information to his superiors in the Ohio Department … <a href="/opinion/10281438/lynn-evelyn-detillion-v-ohio-dept-of-rehab-corr/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/lynn_evelyn_detillion_v._ohio_dept_of_rehab.__corr..pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Jose Rodriguez</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281437/united-states-v-jose-rodriguez/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281437/united-states-v-jose-rodriguez/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0463n.06 No. 23-3912 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Nov 21, 2024 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF JOSE M. RODRIGUEZ, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION ) Before: KETHLEDGE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges. KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Jose Rodriguez pled guilty to two fentanyl-related charges, and the district court sentenced him to 140 months in prison. He now argues that the government violated his plea agreement and that the district court improperly applied a sentencing enhancement. We affirm. In early 2022, DEA agents intercepted three packages bound for Rodriguez and containing fentanyl. The agents later conducted two controlled buys of fentanyl pills from him. A grand jury thereafter indicted Rodriguez for conspiracy and attempted possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. He entered a plea agreement in which the parties jointly recommended a sentence based on an offense level of 29 under the sentencing guidelines—comprising 32 points for the offense minus three points for accepting responsibility. The agreement thus recommended a sentence between 121 and 151 months. The parties also agreed that no other sentencing enhancements should apply, but that the No. 23-3912, United States v. Rodriguez district court would ultimately calculate the guidelines range (with input from the probation office) and then impose a sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B). The probation office prepared a presentence report that recommended applying three sentencing enhancements. Together, those enhancements would have added eight points to Rodriguez’s offense level, resulting in a guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. At the sentencing hearing, the district court first acknowledged the parties’ agreed-upon guidelines range and then asked each party about the PSR’s proposed enhancements. The government prefaced each of its answers by asking the court to “abide by the plea agreement.” Twice, the government agreed that Rodriguez’s conduct qualified for the enhancements; yet both times the government reiterated its request that the court impose a sentence within the agreed-upon guidelines range. Eventually, the district court applied two of the three proposed enhancements and calculated a guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. After all that discussion, however, the district court chose to apply the guidelines range that the parties had agreed to in the first place, namely 121 to 151 months. The court then sentenced Rodriguez to 140 months. This appeal followed. Rodriguez argues that the government violated the plea agreement when it responded to the court’s questions by discussing the factual basis for the PSR’s proposed sentencing enhancements. Rodriguez did not object to those responses in the district court, so we review for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 138 (2009). A defendant can seek to set aside his sentence (or guilty plea) if the government violates the terms of a plea agreement. Santobello … <a href="/opinion/10281437/united-states-v-jose-rodriguez/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/united_states_v._jose_rodriguez.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Elizabeth Simon-Domingo v. Merrick B. Garland</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281439/elizabeth-simon-domingo-v-merrick-b-garland/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281439/elizabeth-simon-domingo-v-merrick-b-garland/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0461n.06 Case No. 23-3842 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 21, 2024 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ELIZABETH GRISELDA SIMON-DOMINGO; ) B. E. P. S. (a minor child), ) Petitioners, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW ) FROM THE UNITED STATES v. ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ) APPEALS MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, ) Respondent. ) OPINION Before: CLAY, WHITE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Elizabeth Griselda Simon-Domingo, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “the Board”) affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under Article III of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because the BIA’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence, we deny the petition for review. No. 23-3842, Simon-Domingo v. Garland I. A. Factual Background Elizabeth Simon-Domingo is a native and citizen of Guatemala. She and her daughter, B.E.P.S.,1 a minor whose application is a derivative rider to her mother’s,2 arrived in the United States on or about June 19, 2014. Mother and child were not admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. Within days of their arrival, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Simon-Domingo and B.E. by filing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), which charged them as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). At a subsequent hearing, Simon-Domingo admitted to the above facts about their arrival and conceded the charge of removability. Simon-Domingo later filed timely applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, based on her political opinion, imputed political opinion, and membership in two particular social groups (singular “PSG”). The two PSGs she proposed were “family members of high profile community leaders opposing hydro-electric dams in Barillas” and “indigenous female survivors of child sexual abuse.” (AR 96). Simon-Domingo is an indigenous Q’anjob’al woman from Santa Cruz Barillas in the state of Huehuetenango, Guatemala. Simon-Domingo’s sister Hermelinda is a leader in the indigenous movement there that opposed and protested the construction of hydroelectric dams in the region on the grounds that the projects would ruin local land and violate indigenous land and water rights. Hermelinda is a human-rights and environmental activist. She has spoken out both locally and 1 In accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, we refer to the minor child by her initials. See Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(5). 2 In view of the derivative nature of the minor child’s application for asylum, we refer to Petitioners collectively as “Simon-Domingo” when referencing the asylum claims. -2- No. 23-3842, Simon-Domingo v. Garland internationally to denounce the Guatemalan government’s human-rights abuses and retaliation against her and fellow protestors. In May 2012, former Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina responded to protests against the hydroelectric dams by declaring a “state of siege” in Santa Cruz Barillas, which included suspending constitutional rights and placing the army in control … <a href="/opinion/10281439/elizabeth-simon-domingo-v-merrick-b-garland/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/elizabeth_simon-domingo_v._merrick_b._garland.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Cynthia Brown v. David Yost</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281440/cynthia-brown-v-david-yost/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-21T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10281440/cynthia-brown-v-david-yost/</id><summary type="html"> RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 24a0258p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ CYNTHIA BROWN; CARLOS BUFORD; JENNY SUE │ ROWE, │ Plaintiffs-Appellants, &gt; No. 24-3354 │ v. │ │ DAVID YOST, in his official capacity as Ohio Attorney │ General, │ Defendant-Appellee. │ ┘ On Petition for Rehearing En Banc United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. No. 2:24-cv-01401—James L. Graham, District Judge. Argued En Banc: October 30, 2024 Decided and Filed: November 21, 2024 Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MOORE, CLAY, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, STRANCH, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN, NALBANDIAN, READLER, MURPHY, DAVIS, MATHIS, BLOOMEKATZ, and RITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED EN BANC: Kelsi Brown Corkran, INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. T. Elliot Gaiser, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON SUPPLMENTAL BRIEF: Kelsi Brown Corkran, Elizabeth R. Cruikshank, Alexandra Lichtenstein, William Powell, INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, Washington, D.C., Mark R. Brown, CAPITAL UNIVERSITY, Columbus, Ohio, Oliver Hall, CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE DEMOCRACY, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. T. Elliot Gaiser, Katie Rose Talley, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON AMICUS BRIEF: Tobias S. Loss-Eaton, Naomi Igra, Stephen Chang, Madison Ferraro, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae. The court delivered a PER CURIAM opinion. THAPAR, J. (pp. 8–23), delivered a separate concurring opinion. MOORE, J. (pp. 24–36), delivered a separate dissenting opinion, in which CLAY, STRANCH, and DAVIS, JJ., concurred, and KETHLEDGE and RITZ, JJ., No. 24-3354 Brown et al. v. Yost Page 2 concurred in Part II. KETHLEDGE, J. (pp. 37–38), also delivered a separate dissenting opinion, in which MOORE, CLAY, STRANCH, DAVIS, and RITZ, JJ., concurred. _________________ OPINION _________________ PER CURIAM. At issue in this case is whether a request for a preliminary injunction focused on the 2024 election—arising from a challenge to Ohio’s process for placing constitutional initiatives on the ballot—is moot. It is. The targeted election has come and gone, making this request for preliminary relief moot. Since 1912, Ohio has allowed its citizens to amend the Ohio Constitution through ballot initiatives. Ohio law requires proponents of initiatives to satisfy several requirements before their proposed constitutional amendment appears on the ballot. At the outset, the proponents must submit their proposed amendment, a summary of it, and 1,000 signatures to the Ohio Attorney General, who then must decide whether the summary is a “fair and truthful statement of the proposed law or constitutional amendment.” O.R.C. § 3519.01(A). If the Attorney General rejects the summary, the proponent may seek review in the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. § 3519.01(C). Once the proponent obtains approval of the summary, the Ballot Board must examine the initiative to ensure that it does not violate Ohio’s single-subject requirement. Id. § 3505.062(A). With the Board’s approval in hand, the proponent of the initiative may start the process of presenting the proposal and summary to Ohio citizens to obtain the roughly 400,000 signatures needed to … <a href="/opinion/10281440/cynthia-brown-v-david-yost/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/21/cynthia_brown_v._david_yost.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Andrei Fenner v. General Motors, LLC</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278449/andrei-fenner-v-general-motors-llc/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278449/andrei-fenner-v-general-motors-llc/</id><summary type="html"> RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 24a0257p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ ANDREI FENNER et al., │ Plaintiffs, │ │ PHILLIP BURNS, et al. (23-1648); NANCY ANDERTON, │ et al. (23-1696); MIKE BULAON, et al. (23-1697); &gt; Nos. 23-1648/1696/1697/1698 │ TAYLOR PANTEL, et al. (23-1698), │ Plaintiffs-Appellants, │ │ v. │ │ │ GENERAL MOTORS, LLC; ROBERT BOSCH GMBH; │ ROBERT BOSCH LLC, │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘ On Petition for Rehearing En Banc United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City. No. 1:17-cv-11661—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge. Decided and Filed: November 20, 2024 Before: MOORE, KETHLEDGE, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC: Jay P. Lefkowitz, KIRKLAND &amp; ELLIS LLP, New York, New York, Renee D. Smith, Jeffrey S. Bramson, Cole T. Carter, KIRKLAND &amp; ELLIS LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee General Motors. ON RESPONSE TO THE PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND TO THE MOTIONS TO FILE AMICI BRIEFS: Steve W. Berman, Garth D. Wojtanowicz, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP, Seattle, Washington, E. Powell Miller, Dennis A. Lienhardt, THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C., Rochester, Michigan, James E. Cecchi, Donald A. Ecklund, James A. O’Brien III, CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, BRODY &amp; AGNELLO, P.C., Roseland, New Jersey, Christopher A. Seeger, Jennifer R. Scullion, SEEGER WEISS LLP, Ridgefield Park, New Jersey, Shauna Itri, SEEGER WEISS Nos. 23-1648/1696/1697/1698 Fenner, et al. v. General Motors, LLC, et al. Page 2 LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellants Phillip Burns, et al. and joined by the Anderton, Bulaon, and Pantel Appellants. ON AMICI BRIEFS: Stephen A. D’Aunoy, KLEIN THOMAS LEE &amp; FRESARD, St. Louis, Missouri, Brandon L. Boxler, KLEIN THOMAS LEE &amp; FRESARD, Richmond, Virginia, Jonathan S. Martel, ARNOLD &amp; PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae. The court delivered an order denying the petition for rehearing en banc. MOORE, J. (pp. 3–5), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, in which CLAY, STRANCH, and BLOOMEKATZ, JJ., concurred. GRIFFIN, J. (pp. 6–7), delivered a separate opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, in which KETHLEDGE and BUSH, JJ., concurred. KETHLEDGE, J. (pp. 8–9), also delivered a separate opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, in which GRIFFIN and BUSH, JJ., concurred. _________________ ORDER _________________ The court received a petition for rehearing en banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision. The petition was then circulated to the full court.* Less than a majority of the judges voted in favor of rehearing en banc. Judge Kethledge would grant the petition for rehearing en banc for the reasons stated in his dissent to the court’s opinion of August 21, 2024, and in his dissent (pp. 8–9) to this order. Therefore, the petition is denied. * Judge Davis is recused from participation in this decision. Nos. … <a href="/opinion/10278449/andrei-fenner-v-general-motors-llc/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/andrei_fenner_v._general_motors_llc.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Jeremy Donte Hurdle</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278447/united-states-v-jeremy-donte-hurdle/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278447/united-states-v-jeremy-donte-hurdle/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0460n.06 No. 24-5067 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 20, 2024 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF JEREMY DONTE HURDLE, ) KENTUCKY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BUSH and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Jeremy Hurdle argues that the federal statute barring felons from possessing firearms facially violates the Second Amendment. Because we recently rejected an identical challenge, our precedent forecloses Hurdle’s claim. We thus affirm. In June 2022, police officers investigating stolen firearms traveled to Hurdle’s home in Boyle County, Kentucky, and spotted him leaving in a car driven by someone else. The police stopped the car. A consensual search uncovered a total of seven firearms either near Hurdle’s front passenger seat or in the trunk. Someone had stolen at least one of the guns. Hurdle had several prior convictions, including for aggravated robbery, assault, and child abuse. So he could not lawfully possess firearms. A federal grand jury indicted Hurdle for illegally possessing firearms as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hurdle moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the felon- No. 24-5067, United States v. Hurdle in-possession statute—§ 922(g)(1)—violated the Second Amendment on its face. The district court denied his motion. Hurdle entered a conditional plea agreement. He admitted that he had possessed four of the firearms found in the car and that he could not lawfully possess them. But he reserved the right to appeal his claim that § 922(g)(1) facially violated the Second Amendment. At the same time, he conceded that he had “waive[d] any argument on appeal” that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment “as applied to his particular circumstances[.]” Plea Agreement, R.29, PageID 250. The district court sentenced Hurdle to 78 months’ imprisonment. Hurdle now renews his argument that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment on its face. In support, he relies on the historically rooted test that the Supreme Court adopted to analyze Second Amendment claims in New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). But we recently rejected a similar facial challenge to this statute under Bruen’s test. See United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 648–57 (6th Cir. 2024). Our decision in Williams binds us here. See United States v. Dorsey, 2024 WL 4250319, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 2024); United States v. Partee, 2024 WL 4224982, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 18, 2024). And while Williams left open the possibility that defendants could raise as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), see 113 F.4th at 657, Hurdle did not preserve that type of challenge in his plea agreement. We affirm. 2 24-5067 Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ca6 6th Cir. United States v. Jeremy Donte Hurdle 20 November 2024 Unpublished cebde0460300cba63c936cb740ab001f01901bbd <a href="/opinion/10278447/united-states-v-jeremy-donte-hurdle/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/united_states_v._jeremy_donte_hurdle.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Michael Johnson v. Parker-Hannifin Corp.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278448/michael-johnson-v-parker-hannifin-corp/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-20T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278448/michael-johnson-v-parker-hannifin-corp/</id><summary type="html"> RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 24a0256p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ MICHAEL D. JOHNSON, MATTHEW COLLARO, JOHN M. BERG, │ MALLIKARJUN B. KANDULA, and TYLER L. SEAMONS, │ individually and as representatives of a class of participants │ and beneficiaries on behalf of Parker Retirement Savings Plan, │ Plaintiffs-Appellants, &gt; No. 24-3014 │ v. │ │ PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION, BOARD OF DIRECTORS FOR │ PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION, HUMAN RESOURCES AND │ THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS │ FOR PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION, and PARKER TOTAL │ REWARDS ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:21-cv-00256—Bridget Meehan Brennan, District Judge. Argued: July 24, 2024 Decided and Filed: November 20, 2024 Before: MOORE, MURPHY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Sean E. Soyars, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, for Appellants. Michael E. Kenneally, MORGAN, LEWIS &amp; BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Sean E. Soyars, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, for Appellants. Michael E. Kenneally, MORGAN, LEWIS &amp; BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., Christopher J. Boran, Kevin F. Gaffney, MORGAN, LEWIS &amp; BOCKIUS LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Keri L. Engelman, Joshua Adler, MORGAN, LEWIS &amp; BOCKIUS LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellees. MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BLOOMEKATZ, J., joined. MURPHY, J. (pp. 23–46), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. No. 24-3014 Johnson et al. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. et al. Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Five of the approximately 32,000 current and former Parker-Hannifin Corporation employees who participate in the Parker Retirement Savings Plan brought this action against the Parker-Hannifin Corporation and related boards, committees, and board members, alleging that Parker-Hannifin violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Parker-Hannifin breached its fiduciary duties by imprudently retaining the Northern Trust Focus Funds, imprudently providing participants with higher-cost shares, and failing to monitor its agents in their fiduciary duties. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims. For the following reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND1 A. Factual Background Plaintiffs-Appellants Michael D. Johnson, Matthew W. Collaro, John M. Berg, Mallikarjun B. Kandula, and Tyler L. Seamons (collectively, “Johnson” or “Plaintiffs”) are five of the approximately 32,000 current and former Parker-Hannifin Corporation employees who are participants in the Parker Retirement Savings Plan (“Plan”). R. 20 (Am. Compl. ¶ 14, 16–20) (Page ID #538–40). They bring their claims individually and as representatives of a class of Plan participants and beneficiaries. Id. ¶ 1 (Page ID #534). The Plan is a defined contribution employee pension benefit plan, id. ¶ 11 (Page ID #538), governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002. Defendant-Appellees (collectively, “Parker-Hannifin”) are the Plan’s fiduciaries and are collectively responsible for the administration of the Plan. R. 20 (Am. Compl. ¶ 21–30) (Page ID #540–43). 1 We present the facts by accepting … <a href="/opinion/10278448/michael-johnson-v-parker-hannifin-corp/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/20/michael_johnson_v._parker-hannifin_corp..pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Jeremy Noel</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10277393/united-states-v-jeremy-noel/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-19T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10277393/united-states-v-jeremy-noel/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0459n.06 Case No. 24-5599 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Nov 19, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF JEREMY NOEL, ) TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MURPHY and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. SUTTON, Chief Judge. Police stopped Jeremy Noel for driving without wearing a seatbelt. Noel challenged his stop on Fourth Amendment grounds, objecting to the district court’s finding that the officers saw him unbuckled. Because that finding was not clearly erroneous, we affirm. On October 8, 2020, Officer Dustin Beard and his partner were driving down a street in Memphis, responding to a dispatch about a suspect in a white sedan. They spotted a white sedan drive toward them and turn right onto a residential street. Officer Beard saw that the driver, Jeremy Noel, was not wearing a seatbelt. The officers turned left to follow him, flashed their police lights, and pulled him over. The officers approached Noel’s car. Noel was unbuckled in the driver’s seat. Beard leaned inside the car, where he smelled marijuana and saw loose pills in a baggie. The officers directed Noel out of the car and asked him if he had a weapon. Noel told them that he had a firearm in his waistband. They seized his gun, frisked him, and secured him in the back of the patrol car. No. 24-5599, United States v. Noel Two more officers arrived on the scene. They soon discovered that Noel was a felon. The officers arrested Noel and transported him to jail. A federal grand jury charged Noel with knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Noel moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by pulling him over. The district court rejected his argument. The magistrate judge credited Officer Beard’s testimony that he witnessed Noel driving without wearing his seatbelt, a misdemeanor under Tennessee law, and the district court adopted that finding. Noel pleaded guilty and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The district court imposed a 100-month sentence. Noel appeals. At issue is whether the officers’ “seizure” was “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Three cases orient this appeal. In the first, Whren v. United States, police witnessed a truck turn without signaling and drive unreasonably fast, both in violation of D.C. law. 517 U.S. 806, 808–10 (1996). After stopping the truck, one of the officers saw large plastic bags of crack cocaine through the driver’s window. Id. at 808–09. The officers arrested the driver and a passenger. Id. at 809. The Supreme Court rejected the occupants’ invitation to consider the officers’ subjective motivations for pulling them over. Id. at 810–13. It instead applied an objective test, examining only whether the police had “probable cause to believe that a traffic … <a href="/opinion/10277393/united-states-v-jeremy-noel/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/19/united_states_v._jeremy_noel.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Jason Cunningham v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10277394/jason-cunningham-v-shelby-cnty-tenn/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-19T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10277394/jason-cunningham-v-shelby-cnty-tenn/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0458n.06 Case No. 24-5241 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 19, 2024 ) JASON CUNNINGHAM, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ) TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellee. ) ) OPINION BEFORE: SUTTON, Chief Judge; NORRIS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. After Nancy Lewellyn aimed a gun at Shelby County deputy sheriffs, they shot and killed her. Her son filed a § 1983 action against the County on the ground that the officers used excessive force. Because he failed to tie her death to any ascertainable County policy, the district court granted summary judgment for the County. We affirm. I. This tragedy unfolded on March 17, 2017. Nancy Lewellyn called 911 and told the dispatcher that she was depressed, suicidal, and armed with a gun. Three Shelby County, Tennessee, deputy sheriffs arrived at her residence soon after. Video cameras on their vehicles captured what happened next. When the deputies arrived, Lewellyn emerged from the front door, holding what looked like a handgun (but in fact was a BB gun). As she entered the driveway, she raised the gun and No. 24-5241, Cunningham v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn. pointed it in the direction of the deputies. In response, one of the deputies fired several shots at Lewellyn, who continued to move toward a parked car in the driveway. Once she reached the car, she leaned on it and apparently laid the gun on the hood. The deputies maintain they did not see her lay down the gun. A second deputy fired at Lewellyn as well. In total, the two deputies fired ten shots, eight of which hit Lewellyn. The deputies administered aid while waiting for an ambulance. Lewellyn died at a local hospital. After Lewellyn’s death, her son and estate representative, Jason Cunningham, sued the Sheriff, the two deputies, and Shelby County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the use of excessive force violated Lewellyn’s Fourth (and Fourteenth) Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the sheriff from the lawsuit, and we granted qualified immunity to the deputies. Cunningham v. Shelby County, 994 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2021). In February 2024, the district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Shelby County on Cunningham’s unconstitutional custom and ratification claims. II. At summary judgment, we, like the district court, ask whether Cunningham has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for him. Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017). In doing so, we draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. To prevail on his § 1983 claims against the County, Cunningham must show that (1) Lewellyn suffered a constitutional violation and (2) either a custom of toleration for illegal practices or the ratification of a violation by an official with final decision-making authority directly caused her death. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. … <a href="/opinion/10277394/jason-cunningham-v-shelby-cnty-tenn/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/19/jason_cunningham_v._shelby_cnty._tenn..pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Kimberly Potter v. Debra Gorrell Wehrle</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10276069/kimberly-potter-v-debra-gorrell-wehrle/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-18T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10276069/kimberly-potter-v-debra-gorrell-wehrle/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0455n.06 Case No. 24-3097 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 18, 2024 ) KIMBERLY POTTER, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DEBRA GORRELL WEHRLE; AUBREY ) DISTRICT OF OHIO COOK; OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ) OFFICE, ) Defendants-Appellees. ) OPINION ) BEFORE: COLE, MATHIS, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. COLE, Circuit Judge. After a state trial court dismissed criminal charges against Kimberly Potter, she filed a complaint in federal court against the Ohio Attorney General, Debra Wehrle, and other state actors alleging malicious prosecution. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court denied the motion and granted leave for Potter to amend her complaint. Following the filing of the amended complaint, defendants again moved to dismiss the case. Potter thereupon sought leave to file a second amended complaint. The district court denied the request for leave to amend the complaint and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Potter appeals the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss. We affirm. No. 24-3097, Potter v. Wehrle, et al. I. Potter was a certified nurse practitioner who provided nursing care for patients at the Whetstone Gardens and Care Center, a long-term care facility in central Ohio. In 2017, the Ohio Attorney General began investigating allegedly inadequate treatment of patients at Whetstone. The Ohio Attorney General claimed that staff had falsified medical treatment documentation and forged signatures of nursing staff, and that neglect by several employees—including Potter— resulted in the death of one patient. As a result of the investigation, a grand jury indicted Potter on three charges: involuntary manslaughter, gross patient neglect, and patient neglect. After the trial court dismissed some counts against Potter, the indictment was superseded twice, and the case proceeded to trial. After the state’s case in chief, the trial court granted Potter’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Potter thereafter filed a malicious prosecution claim against the Ohio Attorney General and two of his employees—special agent Aubrey Cook and prosecutor Debra Gorrell Wehrle. Potter alleged that the state’s investigation of her was flawed and maliciously motivated for several reasons. Potter’s suit centers on Wehrle’s role, as the assistant prosecutor assigned to Potter’s criminal case, during the investigatory stage of Potter’s prosecution. Potter alleges that Wehrle “inappropriately”: (i) inserted herself into the investigation, (ii) met with witnesses, and (iii) directed the interview and investigation process. According to Potter, the Attorney General and Cook developed a timeline from staffing logs which the Attorney General knew to be falsified and inaccurate. And from this timeline, Wehrle allegedly coached several Whetstone staff witnesses about the sequence of events and encouraged them to testify consistent with the false timeline. The Attorney General and Cook also allegedly misrepresented witness statements in their -2- No. 24-3097, Potter v. Wehrle, et al. investigative reports. Then, Wehrle and the Attorney General apparently encouraged their medical expert to rely … <a href="/opinion/10276069/kimberly-potter-v-debra-gorrell-wehrle/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/18/kimberly_potter_v._debra_gorrell_wehrle.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Lynn Kizer v. St. Jude Children's Research Hosp.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10276068/lynn-kizer-v-st-jude-childrens-research-hosp/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-18T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10276068/lynn-kizer-v-st-jude-childrens-research-hosp/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0456n.06 No. 24-5207 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 18, 2024 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) LYNN KIZER, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ST. JUDE CHILDREN’S RESEARCH ) HOSPITAL, ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION ) ) Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges. KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Lynn Kizer appeals from the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of her employer, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, on Kizer’s claims that, in violation of Title VII, St. Jude failed to provide her with a religious accommodation. Because we hold that St. Jude presented evidence showing that accommodating Kizer would have caused an undue hardship for St. Jude, and because Kizer’s evidence to the contrary cannot support a jury verdict in her favor, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of St. Jude. I. BACKGROUND In 2021, Lynn Kizer was employed by St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital as an Electronic Health Record (“EHR”) Applications Analyst assisting with preparations for the hospital’s two-year-long transition to a complex new EHR system known as “Epic.” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 4) (Page ID #1–2). That same year, a vaccine for COVID-19 became available. Because St. Jude No. 24-5207, Kizer v. St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital primarily treats vulnerable pediatric patients, the hospital implemented a mandatory COVID vaccine policy for its employees and established a process for considering requests for religious and medical accommodations. R. 31-5 (Bottenfield Decl. ¶¶ 22–25) (Page ID #178–79). Kizer submitted one such request, stating that her sincerely held religious beliefs prevented her from receiving the vaccine and asking for permission to work remotely. R. 31-14 (Accommodation Req. at 5–6) (Page ID #343–44). St. Jude gathered information about Kizer’s position, including about the upcoming launch (or “go live”) of the new Epic system and determined that it could not reasonably accommodate Kizer because her job required her to work in person in clinical areas and in contact with clinical people. R. 31-5 (Bottenfield Decl. ¶¶ 36–43) (Page ID #182–83). St. Jude ultimately terminated Kizer for failing to become vaccinated. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 6) (Page ID #2). Kizer brought suit for religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII, id. ¶¶ 46–64 (Page ID #10–13), and now appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of St. Jude. II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2007). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “[B]oth the movant and the opponent must support their factual positions either by directing the court’s attention to materials in the record or … <a href="/opinion/10276068/lynn-kizer-v-st-jude-childrens-research-hosp/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/18/lynn_kizer_v._st._jude_childrens_research_hosp..pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Vincent Richardson</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10276067/united-states-v-vincent-richardson/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-18T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10276067/united-states-v-vincent-richardson/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0457n.06 Case No. 22-3810 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Nov 18, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF VINCENT RICHARDSON, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION Before: SILER, GRIFFIN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. SILER, Circuit Judge. Vincent Richardson appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to multiple federal drug trafficking charges. He argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for drug trafficking under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12), imposed an improper two-level role enhancement for his role as an organizer or leader under USSG § 3B1.1(c), failed to adequately account for the sentencing disparity between him and his co-defendants, and erred in running all but 55 months of his sentence consecutive to his undischarged state sentence. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. I. In September 2020, a federal grand jury indicted Richardson and ten co-defendants for their involvement in a drug trafficking organization known as the “Money Team,” which operated in Warren, Ohio. Richardson was charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, multiple counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, use No. 22-3810, United States v. Richardson of communication facilities in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Law enforcement began investigating Richardson in 2015 when it received reports of drug trafficking at 1367 Hamilton Street SW, a residence associated with Richardson. Officers observed high volumes of traffic consistent with drug sales and received reports of overdoses linked to drugs sold from that location. In May 2018, Richardson was arrested after arranging a controlled drug transaction at the same residence. A search of the property uncovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and items bearing the “Money Team” moniker. Richardson was subsequently convicted in state court and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment in March 2020. Despite his incarceration, Richardson continued his involvement in drug trafficking. Between March 2019 and February 2020, investigators conducted controlled purchases of drugs from Richardson and his associates. Richardson either conducted the transactions himself or directed others to do so on his behalf. During this period, law enforcement executed multiple search warrants at properties associated with Richardson, uncovering significant quantities of drugs, paraphernalia, and firearms. In 2022, Richardson pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. The Presentence Report (“PSR”) calculated Richardson’s base offense level at 30 under USSG § 2D1.1(c)(5). It recommended a two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for drug trafficking and another two-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) for his role as an organizer or leader. After a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his total offense level was 31. With a criminal history category of VI, his advisory Guidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment, plus a mandatory consecutive 60 months for the firearm … <a href="/opinion/10276067/united-states-v-vincent-richardson/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/18/united_states_v._vincent_richardson.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Horace Crump v. Jane Blue</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10274901/horace-crump-v-jane-blue/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-15T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10274901/horace-crump-v-jane-blue/</id><summary type="html"> RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 24a0255p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ HORACE W. CRUMP, JR., │ Plaintiff-Appellant, │ │ v. &gt; No. 24-1126 │ │ JANE BLUE, LCF Nurse, NATHAN MIKEL, LCF Health │ Unit Manager (HUM), TIMOTHY SHAW, LCF Resident │ Unit Manager (RUM), and SUZANNE E. GROFF, LCF │ Nurse Practitioner (NP), in their personal capacities, │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. No. 1:23-cv-01353—Sally Berens, Magistrate Judge. Argued: October 29, 2024 Decided and Filed: November 15, 2024 Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; READLER and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Logan L. Page, WILKINSON STEKLOFF LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. ON BRIEF: Logan L. Page, Dhruti Patel, WILKINSON STEKLOFF LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. SUTTON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which READLER and BLOOMEKATZ, JJ., joined. READLER, J. (pp. 10–12), delivered a separate concurring opinion. No. 24-1126 Crump v. Blue, et al. Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ SUTTON, Chief Judge. While incarcerated at the Lakeland Correctional Facility in Michigan, Horace Crump filed this § 1983 action against several prison employees, alleging that they withheld treatment for his multiple sclerosis. At stake at this stage in the case is not whether the prison employees withheld this medical treatment; it is whether Crump’s lawsuit may go forward before he pays the required filing fee. The district court held that it could not. We vacate and remand. I. Anyone who files a lawsuit in federal court presumptively must pay a filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). And anyone who cannot pay the fee may ask to proceed “in forma pauperis,” a status that allows the litigant to pay the fee over time or sometimes not at all. See id. § 1915(a)–(b). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners may lose this privilege. They must pay the fee upfront if courts have dismissed three or more of their prior “action[s] or appeal[s]” as “frivolous, malicious, or [for] fail[ing] to state a claim.” Id. § 1915(g). Prisoners “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” are exempt from this three-strikes rule. Id. When Crump filed his lawsuit, he did not pay his filing fee and instead sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court held that the Act’s three-strikes rule disqualified him from obtaining relief under this exception and dismissed his complaint. Crump appeals, disputing two of the three strikes. II. To bring the issue into view, it helps to describe Crump’s prior cases at the outset. In one of them, the district court dismissed Crump’s federal claims for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. Crump v. Patrick et al., No. 1:11-cv-15 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2011). In the other case, the court dismissed Crump’s claims against some defendants for failure to state a claim and declined to review the claims No. 24-1126 Crump v. … <a href="/opinion/10274901/horace-crump-v-jane-blue/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/15/horace_crump_v._jane_blue.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Gregory Cassels v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc.</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10274902/gregory-cassels-v-schneider-natl-carriers-inc/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-15T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10274902/gregory-cassels-v-schneider-natl-carriers-inc/</id><summary type="html"> NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0454n.06 Case Nos. 24-3106/3107 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT GREGORY P. CASSELS, OLGA CASSELS, ) FILED ) Nov 15, 2024 Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) v. ) SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.; ) ) RODNEY KARL, ) Defendants-Appellees ) ) _____________________________________ ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, ) OHIO Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) OPINION v. ) ) SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.; ) RODNEY KARL, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. ) ) Before: SILER, GRIFFIN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. SILER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants Gregory Cassels, his wife Olga, (hereinafter “Cassels”) and their insurer, Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan, appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Rodney Karl and his employer, Schneider National Carriers, Inc. The district court held that Ohio’s Good Samaritan Statute immunized Karl and Schneider from liability for Karl’s alleged negligence while No. 24-3106, Cassels, et al., v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., et al. No. 24-3107, Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., et al. helping Cassels remove an object blocking a roadway. Because Cassels’ and Farm Bureau’s arguments are procedurally defective, we affirm. I. Gregory Cassels was driving in the southbound lane of Ohio State Route 309, a two-lane highway, when he saw a large roll of carpet padding fall from a pickup truck’s trailer and block the northbound lane. The pickup truck’s driver did not stop and has never been identified. Cassels pulled over and parked on the southbound lane’s shoulder. Meanwhile, Rodney Karl was driving a semitruck in the northbound lane. When he saw the carpet padding, he braked and came to a complete stop in the road about a car length from it. By the time he stopped, Karl saw Cassels already in the road struggling to move the carpet padding alone. Worried that Cassels would be hit by a passing southbound car, Karl exited his semitruck to assist Cassels. Karl did not place cones, safety triangles, or flares to indicate that his semitruck was parked. Together, Karl and Cassels moved the carpet padding off the east side of the northbound lane. Glen Koons, also driving north on State Route 309, could not stop his pickup truck, so he swerved onto the shoulder of the northbound lane to avoid hitting Karl’s semitruck. Koons hit Cassels, severely injuring him. Two federal lawsuits arose from this accident. Farm Bureau sued Koons, Karl, and Schneider in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to recover insurance payments it made to Cassels. In a separate action, Cassels sued Koons,1 Karl, and Schneider in 1 Cassels and Farm Bureau have settled their claims against Koons, who is not a party to this appeal. 2 No. 24-3106, Cassels, et al., v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., et al. No. 24-3107, Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, … <a href="/opinion/10274902/gregory-cassels-v-schneider-natl-carriers-inc/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/15/gregory_cassels_v._schneider_natl_carriers_inc..pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Non-Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Nathaniel Taylor</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10274900/united-states-v-nathaniel-taylor/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-15T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10274900/united-states-v-nathaniel-taylor/</id><summary type="html"> RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 24a0254p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ &gt; No. 23-5344 │ v. │ │ NATHANIEL T. TAYLOR, │ Defendant-Appellant. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville. No. 3:20-cr-00020-1—Katherine A. Crytzer, District Judge. Decided and Filed: November 15, 2024 Before: COLE, MATHIS, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Jarrod J. Beck, LAW OFFICE OF JARROD J. BECK, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ MATHIS, Circuit Judge. A police officer stopped Nathaniel Taylor for speeding on an interstate in Knoxville, Tennessee. Based on Taylor’s supposed suspicious activities during the traffic stop, the officer requested a K-9 unit to conduct a dog sniff. The dog sniff suggested the presence of drugs in Taylor’s vehicle. This gave law enforcement probable cause to search Taylor’s vehicle. The search did not uncover drugs. But it did lead to the discovery of a firearm, No. 23-5344 United States v. Taylor Page 2 which presented a problem for Taylor because, as a felon, he could not lawfully possess a firearm. After a grand jury indicted Taylor for being a felon in possession of a firearm, he moved to suppress evidence from the search that led to the discovery of the firearm, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond the time necessary to issue him a traffic citation. The district court denied Taylor’s motion to suppress. Taylor appeals the denial. Because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop, we reverse the district court’s denial of Taylor’s motion to suppress. I. At all pertinent times, Officer Kristen Cox worked in the traffic services unit of the Knoxville Police Department’s drug interdiction team. In that role, Officer Cox spent most of her time patrolling the interstate in the Knoxville, Tennessee, area “stopping cars all day long . . . looking for any narcotics or criminal activity.” R. 25, PageID 185. On January 21, 2019, Officer Cox stopped Taylor for speeding on Interstate 275. Officer Cox’s dashcam video captured the salient points of the stop. It began as a routine traffic stop. Officer Cox walked to the passenger side of Taylor’s vehicle and told Taylor that she stopped him because he was driving 69 miles per hour, 14 miles per hour above the speed limit. Taylor volunteered information that he was coming from a job interview at a nearby Culver’s restaurant. Officer Cox did not ask Taylor where he was headed, and he did not offer that detail. She asked for his license and proof of insurance. Taylor handed his license to Officer Cox, but he struggled to locate his insurance information. Taylor initially reached into his glove box to find his insurance paperwork and then quickly checked his center console. Before Officer Cox returned … <a href="/opinion/10274900/united-states-v-nathaniel-taylor/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/15/united_states_v._nathaniel_taylor.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>United States v. Joseph Gray</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10274124/united-states-v-joseph-gray/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-11-14T00:00:00-08:00</published><author><name>Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10274124/united-states-v-joseph-gray/</id><summary type="html"> RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 24a0253p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ &gt; No. 22-1828 │ v. │ │ JOSEPH SCOTT GRAY, │ Defendant-Appellant. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. No. 1:20-cr-00099-1—Robert J. Jonker, District Judge. Argued: October 30, 2024 Decided and Filed: November 14, 2024 Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; READLER and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Cade McGavinn Brown, KERRICK BACHERT, PSC, Bowling Green, Kentucky, for Appellant. Kathryn M. Dalzell, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cade McGavinn Brown, KERRICK BACHERT, PSC, Bowling Green, Kentucky, for Appellant. Davin M. Reust, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ SUTTON, Chief Judge. Joseph Scott Gray honored his country as a soldier but not as a civilian. For more than a decade, he served in the military, earning a range of medals for his service in the Gulf War. But after leaving the service, he lied about his health to the Department No. 22-1828 United States v. Gray Page 2 of Veterans Affairs to obtain benefits to which he was not entitled. A jury convicted Gray of several fraud-related offenses. And the district court sentenced him to five years in prison and imposed $264,631 in restitution. We affirm the conviction and term of imprisonment but not the restitution order. Because the indictment alleged that Gray’s criminal scheme began in 2015 and because the restitution order covered benefits a decade earlier, we vacate the restitution order. I. In 1987, Joseph Gray followed in his father’s and brother’s footsteps and enlisted in the U.S. Army as a paratrooper. To say his service was decorated understates matters. Gray received a slew of awards for valor, including the Army Achievement Medal and Army Commendation Medal, as well as two Bronze Service Stars for his tour of duty in the Gulf War. But this service came at a cost. When Gray left the Army in 2003, he brought with him several injuries sustained over the course of his tenure. He had injured his knees and his back in a skydiving accident. He had been electrocuted, twice. And he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and other health conditions as a result of his service in Operation Desert Storm. The Department of Veterans Affairs pays veterans based in part on the severity of their disabilities. In 2004, the Department assessed Gray and deemed him 90% disabled. That entitled him initially to about $1,700 per month. Gray sought more and lied in doing so. His first gambit was to seek “individual unemployability” benefits—roughly an additional $1,000 monthly payment reserved, as the name implies, for veterans unable to work because of their disabilities. Between 2004 and 2005, he told Veterans Affairs that he faced “unbearable” pain every day, that he “use[d] a cane around the house” and “a motorized cart” otherwise, … <a href="/opinion/10274124/united-states-v-joseph-gray/">Original document</a> </summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/11/14/united_states_v._joseph_gray.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry></feed>