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Qualia - Wikipedia

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class="vector-toc-numb">2</span> <span>Arguments regarding the existence of qualia</span> </div> </a> <button aria-controls="toc-Arguments_regarding_the_existence_of_qualia-sublist" class="cdx-button cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--icon-only vector-toc-toggle"> <span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-expand"></span> <span>Toggle Arguments regarding the existence of qualia subsection</span> </button> <ul id="toc-Arguments_regarding_the_existence_of_qualia-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Modern_philosophy" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Modern_philosophy"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">2.1</span> <span>Modern philosophy</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Modern_philosophy-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Inverted_spectrum_argument" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Inverted_spectrum_argument"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">2.1.1</span> <span>Inverted spectrum argument</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Inverted_spectrum_argument-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Analytic_philosophy" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Analytic_philosophy"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">2.2</span> <span>Analytic philosophy</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Analytic_philosophy-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-&quot;What&#039;s_it_like_to_be?&quot;_argument" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#&quot;What&#039;s_it_like_to_be?&quot;_argument"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">2.2.1</span> <span>"What's it like to be?" argument</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-&quot;What&#039;s_it_like_to_be?&quot;_argument-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Zombie_argument" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Zombie_argument"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">2.2.2</span> <span>Zombie argument</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Zombie_argument-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Explanatory_gap_argument" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Explanatory_gap_argument"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">2.2.3</span> <span>Explanatory gap argument</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Explanatory_gap_argument-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Knowledge_argument" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Knowledge_argument"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">2.2.4</span> <span>Knowledge argument</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Knowledge_argument-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Proponents_of_qualia" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Proponents_of_qualia"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3</span> <span>Proponents of qualia</span> </div> </a> <button aria-controls="toc-Proponents_of_qualia-sublist" class="cdx-button cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--icon-only vector-toc-toggle"> <span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-expand"></span> <span>Toggle Proponents of qualia subsection</span> </button> <ul id="toc-Proponents_of_qualia-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Analytic_philosophy_2" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Analytic_philosophy_2"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.1</span> <span>Analytic philosophy</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Analytic_philosophy_2-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-David_Chalmers" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#David_Chalmers"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.1.1</span> <span>David Chalmers</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-David_Chalmers-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-E._J._Lowe" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#E._J._Lowe"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.1.2</span> <span>E. J. Lowe</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-E._J._Lowe-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-J._B._Maund" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#J._B._Maund"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.1.3</span> <span>J. B. Maund</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-J._B._Maund-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Moreland_Perkins" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Moreland_Perkins"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.1.4</span> <span>Moreland Perkins</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Moreland_Perkins-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Howard_Robinson_and_William_Robinson" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Howard_Robinson_and_William_Robinson"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.1.5</span> <span>Howard Robinson and William Robinson</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Howard_Robinson_and_William_Robinson-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Neuroscience" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Neuroscience"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.2</span> <span>Neuroscience</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Neuroscience-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Gerald_Edelman" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Gerald_Edelman"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.2.1</span> <span>Gerald Edelman</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Gerald_Edelman-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Antonio_Damasio" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Antonio_Damasio"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.2.2</span> <span>Antonio Damasio</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Antonio_Damasio-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Rodolfo_Llinás" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Rodolfo_Llinás"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.2.3</span> <span>Rodolfo Llinás</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Rodolfo_Llinás-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Vilayanur_Ramachandran" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-3"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Vilayanur_Ramachandran"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">3.2.4</span> <span>Vilayanur Ramachandran</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Vilayanur_Ramachandran-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Critics_of_qualia" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Critics_of_qualia"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4</span> <span>Critics of qualia</span> </div> </a> <button aria-controls="toc-Critics_of_qualia-sublist" class="cdx-button cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--icon-only vector-toc-toggle"> <span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-expand"></span> <span>Toggle Critics of qualia subsection</span> </button> <ul id="toc-Critics_of_qualia-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Daniel_Dennett" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Daniel_Dennett"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.1</span> <span>Daniel Dennett</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Daniel_Dennett-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Paul_Churchland" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Paul_Churchland"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.2</span> <span>Paul Churchland</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Paul_Churchland-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Gary_Drescher" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Gary_Drescher"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.3</span> <span>Gary Drescher</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Gary_Drescher-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-David_Lewis" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#David_Lewis"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.4</span> <span>David Lewis</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-David_Lewis-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Marvin_Minsky" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Marvin_Minsky"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.5</span> <span>Marvin Minsky</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Marvin_Minsky-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Michael_Tye" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Michael_Tye"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.6</span> <span>Michael Tye</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Michael_Tye-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Roger_Scruton" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Roger_Scruton"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">4.7</span> <span>Roger Scruton</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Roger_Scruton-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-History" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#History"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">5</span> <span>History</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-History-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-See_also" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#See_also"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">6</span> <span>See also</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-See_also-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Explanatory_notes" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Explanatory_notes"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">7</span> <span>Explanatory notes</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Explanatory_notes-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-References" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#References"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">8</span> <span>References</span> </div> </a> <button aria-controls="toc-References-sublist" class="cdx-button cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--icon-only vector-toc-toggle"> <span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-expand"></span> <span>Toggle References subsection</span> </button> <ul id="toc-References-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> <li id="toc-Citations" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Citations"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">8.1</span> <span>Citations</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Citations-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Other_references" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-2"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Other_references"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">8.2</span> <span>Other references</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Other_references-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-Further_reading" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#Further_reading"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">9</span> <span>Further reading</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-Further_reading-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> <li id="toc-External_links" class="vector-toc-list-item vector-toc-level-1"> <a class="vector-toc-link" href="#External_links"> <div class="vector-toc-text"> <span class="vector-toc-numb">10</span> <span>External links</span> </div> </a> <ul id="toc-External_links-sublist" class="vector-toc-list"> </ul> </li> </ul> </div> </div> </nav> </div> </div> <div class="mw-content-container"> <main id="content" class="mw-body"> <header class="mw-body-header vector-page-titlebar"> <nav aria-label="Contents" class="vector-toc-landmark"> <div id="vector-page-titlebar-toc" class="vector-dropdown vector-page-titlebar-toc vector-button-flush-left" title="Table of Contents" > <input type="checkbox" id="vector-page-titlebar-toc-checkbox" role="button" aria-haspopup="true" data-event-name="ui.dropdown-vector-page-titlebar-toc" class="vector-dropdown-checkbox " aria-label="Toggle the table of contents" > <label id="vector-page-titlebar-toc-label" for="vector-page-titlebar-toc-checkbox" class="vector-dropdown-label cdx-button cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--icon-only " aria-hidden="true" ><span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-listBullet mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-listBullet"></span> <span class="vector-dropdown-label-text">Toggle the table of contents</span> </label> <div class="vector-dropdown-content"> <div id="vector-page-titlebar-toc-unpinned-container" class="vector-unpinned-container"> </div> </div> </div> </nav> <h1 id="firstHeading" class="firstHeading mw-first-heading"><span class="mw-page-title-main">Qualia</span></h1> <div id="p-lang-btn" class="vector-dropdown mw-portlet mw-portlet-lang" > <input type="checkbox" id="p-lang-btn-checkbox" role="button" aria-haspopup="true" data-event-name="ui.dropdown-p-lang-btn" class="vector-dropdown-checkbox mw-interlanguage-selector" aria-label="Go to an article in another language. Available in 38 languages" > <label id="p-lang-btn-label" for="p-lang-btn-checkbox" class="vector-dropdown-label cdx-button cdx-button--fake-button cdx-button--fake-button--enabled cdx-button--weight-quiet cdx-button--action-progressive mw-portlet-lang-heading-38" aria-hidden="true" ><span class="vector-icon mw-ui-icon-language-progressive mw-ui-icon-wikimedia-language-progressive"></span> <span class="vector-dropdown-label-text">38 languages</span> </label> <div class="vector-dropdown-content"> <div class="vector-menu-content"> <ul class="vector-menu-content-list"> <li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-af mw-list-item"><a href="https://af.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kwalia" title="Kwalia – Afrikaans" lang="af" hreflang="af" data-title="Kwalia" data-language-autonym="Afrikaans" data-language-local-name="Afrikaans" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Afrikaans</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ar mw-list-item"><a href="https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A9" title="كيفيات محسوسة – Arabic" lang="ar" hreflang="ar" data-title="كيفيات محسوسة" data-language-autonym="العربية" data-language-local-name="Arabic" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>العربية</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ca mw-list-item"><a href="https://ca.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qu%C3%A0lia" title="Quàlia – Catalan" lang="ca" hreflang="ca" data-title="Quàlia" data-language-autonym="Català" data-language-local-name="Catalan" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Català</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-cs mw-list-item"><a href="https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Czech" lang="cs" hreflang="cs" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Čeština" data-language-local-name="Czech" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Čeština</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-da mw-list-item"><a href="https://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Danish" lang="da" hreflang="da" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Dansk" data-language-local-name="Danish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Dansk</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-de badge-Q17437796 badge-featuredarticle mw-list-item" title="featured article badge"><a href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – German" lang="de" hreflang="de" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Deutsch" data-language-local-name="German" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Deutsch</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-et mw-list-item"><a href="https://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kvaalid" title="Kvaalid – Estonian" lang="et" hreflang="et" data-title="Kvaalid" data-language-autonym="Eesti" data-language-local-name="Estonian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Eesti</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-es mw-list-item"><a href="https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Spanish" lang="es" hreflang="es" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Español" data-language-local-name="Spanish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Español</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fa mw-list-item"><a href="https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%81%DB%8C%D8%AA_%D8%B0%D9%87%D9%86%DB%8C" title="کیفیت ذهنی – Persian" lang="fa" hreflang="fa" data-title="کیفیت ذهنی" data-language-autonym="فارسی" data-language-local-name="Persian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>فارسی</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fr mw-list-item"><a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – French" lang="fr" hreflang="fr" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Français" data-language-local-name="French" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Français</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ki mw-list-item"><a href="https://ki.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwagor%C5%A9ga" title="Rwagorũga – Kikuyu" lang="ki" hreflang="ki" data-title="Rwagorũga" data-language-autonym="Gĩkũyũ" data-language-local-name="Kikuyu" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Gĩkũyũ</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ko mw-list-item"><a href="https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EA%B0%90%EA%B0%81%EC%A7%88" title="감각질 – Korean" lang="ko" hreflang="ko" data-title="감각질" data-language-autonym="한국어" data-language-local-name="Korean" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>한국어</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-id mw-list-item"><a href="https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Indonesian" lang="id" hreflang="id" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Bahasa Indonesia" data-language-local-name="Indonesian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Bahasa Indonesia</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-it mw-list-item"><a href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Italian" lang="it" hreflang="it" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Italiano" data-language-local-name="Italian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Italiano</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-he mw-list-item"><a href="https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%94" title="קווליה – Hebrew" lang="he" hreflang="he" data-title="קווליה" data-language-autonym="עברית" data-language-local-name="Hebrew" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>עברית</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-kk mw-list-item"><a href="https://kk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B0" title="Квалиа – Kazakh" lang="kk" hreflang="kk" data-title="Квалиа" data-language-autonym="Қазақша" data-language-local-name="Kazakh" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Қазақша</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-la mw-list-item"><a href="https://la.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Latin" lang="la" hreflang="la" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Latina" data-language-local-name="Latin" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Latina</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-hu mw-list-item"><a href="https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kv%C3%A1l%C3%A9" title="Kválé – Hungarian" lang="hu" hreflang="hu" data-title="Kválé" data-language-autonym="Magyar" data-language-local-name="Hungarian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Magyar</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ms mw-list-item"><a href="https://ms.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kualia" title="Kualia – Malay" lang="ms" hreflang="ms" data-title="Kualia" data-language-autonym="Bahasa Melayu" data-language-local-name="Malay" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Bahasa Melayu</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-nl mw-list-item"><a href="https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Dutch" lang="nl" hreflang="nl" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Nederlands" data-language-local-name="Dutch" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Nederlands</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ja mw-list-item"><a href="https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%82%AF%E3%82%AA%E3%83%AA%E3%82%A2" title="クオリア – Japanese" lang="ja" hreflang="ja" data-title="クオリア" data-language-autonym="日本語" data-language-local-name="Japanese" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>日本語</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-no mw-list-item"><a href="https://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Norwegian Bokmål" lang="nb" hreflang="nb" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Norsk bokmål" data-language-local-name="Norwegian Bokmål" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Norsk bokmål</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-oc mw-list-item"><a href="https://oc.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Occitan" lang="oc" hreflang="oc" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Occitan" data-language-local-name="Occitan" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Occitan</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pap mw-list-item"><a href="https://pap.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Papiamento" lang="pap" hreflang="pap" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Papiamentu" data-language-local-name="Papiamento" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Papiamentu</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pl mw-list-item"><a href="https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Polish" lang="pl" hreflang="pl" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Polski" data-language-local-name="Polish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Polski</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pt mw-list-item"><a href="https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Portuguese" lang="pt" hreflang="pt" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Português" data-language-local-name="Portuguese" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Português</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ru mw-list-item"><a href="https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B0" title="Квалиа – Russian" lang="ru" hreflang="ru" data-title="Квалиа" data-language-autonym="Русский" data-language-local-name="Russian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Русский</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-simple mw-list-item"><a href="https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Simple English" lang="en-simple" hreflang="en-simple" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Simple English" data-language-local-name="Simple English" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Simple English</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ckb mw-list-item"><a href="https://ckb.wikipedia.org/wiki/%DA%86%D9%84%DB%86%D9%86%DB%8C_(%D9%81%DB%95%D9%84%D8%B3%DB%95%D9%81%DB%95%DB%8C_%D8%B2%DB%95%DB%8C%D9%86)" title="چلۆنی (فەلسەفەی زەین) – Central Kurdish" lang="ckb" hreflang="ckb" data-title="چلۆنی (فەلسەفەی زەین)" 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data-language-local-name="Swedish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Svenska</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ta mw-list-item"><a href="https://ta.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%AE%A4%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%88%E0%AE%AF%E0%AE%99%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%B3%E0%AF%8D" title="தன்மையங்கள் – Tamil" lang="ta" hreflang="ta" data-title="தன்மையங்கள்" data-language-autonym="தமிழ்" data-language-local-name="Tamil" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>தமிழ்</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-th mw-list-item"><a href="https://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%B8%84%E0%B8%A7%E0%B8%AD%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%B5%E0%B8%A2" title="ควอเลีย – Thai" lang="th" hreflang="th" data-title="ควอเลีย" data-language-autonym="ไทย" data-language-local-name="Thai" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>ไทย</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-tr mw-list-item"><a href="https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" title="Qualia – Turkish" lang="tr" hreflang="tr" data-title="Qualia" data-language-autonym="Türkçe" data-language-local-name="Turkish" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Türkçe</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-uk mw-list-item"><a href="https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B0" title="Кваліа – Ukrainian" lang="uk" hreflang="uk" data-title="Кваліа" data-language-autonym="Українська" data-language-local-name="Ukrainian" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>Українська</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-zh-yue mw-list-item"><a href="https://zh-yue.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%84%9F%E8%B3%AA" title="感質 – Cantonese" lang="yue" hreflang="yue" data-title="感質" data-language-autonym="粵語" data-language-local-name="Cantonese" class="interlanguage-link-target"><span>粵語</span></a></li><li class="interlanguage-link interwiki-zh mw-list-item"><a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%84%9F%E8%B4%A8" title="感质 – Chinese" lang="zh" hreflang="zh" data-title="感质" 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class="mw-content-ltr mw-parser-output" lang="en" dir="ltr"><div class="shortdescription nomobile noexcerpt noprint searchaux" style="display:none">Instances of subjective experience</div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1236090951">.mw-parser-output .hatnote{font-style:italic}.mw-parser-output div.hatnote{padding-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.5em}.mw-parser-output .hatnote i{font-style:normal}.mw-parser-output .hatnote+link+.hatnote{margin-top:-0.5em}@media print{body.ns-0 .mw-parser-output .hatnote{display:none!important}}</style><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">This article is about the philosophical concept. For other uses, see <a href="/wiki/Qualia_(disambiguation)" class="mw-disambig" title="Qualia (disambiguation)">Qualia (disambiguation)</a>.</div> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Solid_red.svg" class="mw-file-description"><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/62/Solid_red.svg/140px-Solid_red.svg.png" decoding="async" width="140" height="140" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/62/Solid_red.svg/210px-Solid_red.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/62/Solid_red.svg/280px-Solid_red.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="512" data-file-height="512" /></a><figcaption>The "redness" of red is a commonly used example of a quale.</figcaption></figure> <p>In <a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">philosophy of mind</a>, <b>qualia</b> (<span class="rt-commentedText nowrap"><span class="IPA nopopups noexcerpt" lang="en-fonipa"><a href="/wiki/Help:IPA/English" title="Help:IPA/English">/<span style="border-bottom:1px dotted"><span title="/ˈ/: primary stress follows">ˈ</span><span title="&#39;k&#39; in &#39;kind&#39;">k</span><span title="&#39;w&#39; in &#39;wind&#39;">w</span><span title="/ɑː/: &#39;a&#39; in &#39;father&#39;">ɑː</span><span title="&#39;l&#39; in &#39;lie&#39;">l</span><span title="/i/: &#39;y&#39; in &#39;happy&#39;">i</span><span title="/ə/: &#39;a&#39; in &#39;about&#39;">ə</span></span>,<span class="wrap"> </span><span style="border-bottom:1px dotted"><span title="/ˈ/: primary stress follows">ˈ</span><span title="&#39;k&#39; in &#39;kind&#39;">k</span><span title="&#39;w&#39; in &#39;wind&#39;">w</span><span title="/eɪ/: &#39;a&#39; in &#39;face&#39;">eɪ</span></span>-/</a></span></span>; singular: <b>quale</b> <span class="rt-commentedText nowrap"><span class="IPA nopopups noexcerpt" lang="en-fonipa"><a href="/wiki/Help:IPA/English" title="Help:IPA/English">/-<span style="border-bottom:1px dotted"><span title="&#39;l&#39; in &#39;lie&#39;">l</span><span title="/i/: &#39;y&#39; in &#39;happy&#39;">i</span></span>,<span class="wrap"> </span>-<span style="border-bottom:1px dotted"><span title="&#39;l&#39; in &#39;lie&#39;">l</span><span title="/eɪ/: &#39;a&#39; in &#39;face&#39;">eɪ</span></span>/</a></span></span>) are defined as instances of <a href="/wiki/Subjectivity" class="mw-redirect" title="Subjectivity">subjective</a>, <a href="/wiki/Consciousness" title="Consciousness">conscious experience</a>. The term <i>qualia</i> derives from the <a href="/wiki/Latin" title="Latin">Latin</a> neuter plural form (<i>qualia</i>) of the Latin adjective <i><a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/qualis" class="extiw" title="wikt:qualis">quālis</a></i> (<style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1177148991">.mw-parser-output .IPA-label-small{font-size:85%}.mw-parser-output .references .IPA-label-small,.mw-parser-output .infobox .IPA-label-small,.mw-parser-output .navbox .IPA-label-small{font-size:100%}</style><span class="IPA-label IPA-label-small">Latin pronunciation:</span> <span class="IPA nowrap" lang="la-Latn-fonipa"><a href="/wiki/Help:IPA/Latin" title="Help:IPA/Latin">&#91;ˈkʷaːlɪs&#93;</a></span>) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in relation to a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific <span class="nowrap">apple&#8202;—</span>&#8202;this particular apple now". </p><p>Examples of qualia include the perceived sensation of <i>pain</i> of a headache, the <i>taste</i> of wine, and the <i>redness</i> of an evening sky. As qualitative characteristics of sensations, qualia stand in contrast to <a href="/wiki/Propositional_attitude" title="Propositional attitude">propositional attitudes</a>,<sup id="cite_ref-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-1"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>1<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> where the focus is on beliefs about experience rather than what it is directly like to be experiencing. </p><p>American philosopher <a href="/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce" title="Charles Sanders Peirce">Charles Sanders Peirce</a> introduced the term <i>quale</i> in philosophy in 1866, and in 1929 <a href="/wiki/Clarence_Irving_Lewis" class="mw-redirect" title="Clarence Irving Lewis">C. I. Lewis</a> was the first to use the term "qualia" in its generally agreed upon modern sense. <a href="/wiki/Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">Frank Jackson</a> later defined qualia as "...certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes". <a href="/wiki/Philosopher" class="mw-redirect" title="Philosopher">Philosopher</a> and <a href="/wiki/Cognitive_scientist" class="mw-redirect" title="Cognitive scientist">cognitive scientist</a> <a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a> suggested that <i>qualia</i> was "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us". </p><p>The nature and existence of qualia under various definitions remain controversial. Much of the debate over the importance of qualia hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Some philosophers of mind, like <a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a>, argue that qualia do not exist. Other philosophers, as well as neuroscientists and neurologists, believe qualia exist and that the desire by some philosophers to disregard qualia is based on an erroneous interpretation of what constitutes science.<sup id="cite_ref-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-2"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> Within the framework of <a href="/wiki/Mind" title="Mind">mind</a>, or <a href="/wiki/Nondualism" title="Nondualism">nondualism</a>, qualia may be considered comparable and <a href="/wiki/Analogous" class="mw-redirect" title="Analogous">analogous</a> to the concepts of <a href="/wiki/J%C3%B1%C4%81na" title="Jñāna">jñāna</a> found in <a href="/wiki/Eastern_philosophy" title="Eastern philosophy">Eastern philosophy</a> and <a href="/wiki/Eastern_traditions" class="mw-redirect" title="Eastern traditions">traditions</a>. </p> <meta property="mw:PageProp/toc" /> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Definitions">Definitions</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=1" title="Edit section: Definitions"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>Many definitions of qualia have been proposed. One of the simpler, broader definitions is: "The 'what it is like' character of mental states. The way it feels to have mental states such as pain, seeing red, smelling a rose, etc."<sup id="cite_ref-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-3"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>3<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p><a href="/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce" title="Charles Sanders Peirce">C.S. Peirce</a> introduced the term <i>quale</i> in philosophy in 1866,<sup id="cite_ref-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-4"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>4<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-Lewis-1929_5-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Lewis-1929-5"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> and in 1929 <a href="/wiki/Clarence_Irving_Lewis" class="mw-redirect" title="Clarence Irving Lewis">C.I. Lewis</a> was the first to use the term "qualia" in its generally agreed upon modern sense.<sup id="cite_ref-Lewis-1929_5-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Lewis-1929-5"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1244412712">.mw-parser-output .templatequote{overflow:hidden;margin:1em 0;padding:0 32px}.mw-parser-output .templatequotecite{line-height:1.5em;text-align:left;margin-top:0}@media(min-width:500px){.mw-parser-output .templatequotecite{padding-left:1.6em}}</style><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these "qualia." But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories. The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective.<sup id="cite_ref-Lewis-1929_5-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Lewis-1929-5"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 121">&#58;&#8202;121&#8202;</span></sup></p></blockquote> <p><a href="/wiki/Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">Frank Jackson</a> later defined qualia as "...<span class="nowrap">&#160;</span>certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes".<sup id="cite_ref-Jackson_6-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Jackson-6"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 273">&#58;&#8202;273&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p><a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a> suggested that <i>qualia</i> was "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us".<sup id="cite_ref-auto_7-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-auto-7"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>7<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> He identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-auto_7-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-auto-7"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>7<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> According to these, <i>qualia</i> are: </p> <ol><li><i><a href="/wiki/Ineffability" title="Ineffability">ineffable</a></i>&#160;– they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any means other than direct experience.</li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Intrinsic" class="mw-redirect" title="Intrinsic">intrinsic</a></i>&#160;– they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.</li> <li><i><a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Private" class="extiw" title="wikt:Private">private</a></i>&#160;– all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.</li> <li><i>directly or immediately <a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/apprehend" class="extiw" title="wikt:apprehend">apprehensible</a> by <a href="/wiki/Consciousness" title="Consciousness">consciousness</a></i>&#160;– to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale.</li></ol> <p>If qualia of this sort exist, then a normally sighted person who sees red would be unable to describe the experience of this <a href="/wiki/Perception" title="Perception">perception</a> in such a way that a listener who has never experienced color will be able to know everything there is to know about that experience. Though it is possible to make an <a href="/wiki/Analogy" title="Analogy">analogy</a>, such as "red looks hot", or to provide a description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such as "it's the color you see when light of 700-<a href="/wiki/Nanometer" class="mw-redirect" title="Nanometer">nm</a> wavelength is directed at you", supporters of this definition of qualia contend that such descriptions cannot provide a complete description of the experience.<sup id="cite_ref-Schrodinger-1958_8-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Schrodinger-1958-8"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>8<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 154">&#58;&#8202;154&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>Another way of defining qualia is as "raw feels". A <i>raw feel</i> is a perception in and of itself, considered entirely in isolation from any effect it might have on behavior and behavioral disposition.<sup id="cite_ref-9" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-9"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>9<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> In contrast, a <i>cooked feel</i> is that perception seen in terms of its effects. For example, the perception of the taste of wine is an ineffable, raw feel, while the behavioral reaction one has to the warmth or bitterness caused by that taste of wine would be a cooked feel. Cooked feels are not qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-10" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-10"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>10<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>Arguably, the idea of <a href="/wiki/Hedonistic_utilitarianism" class="mw-redirect" title="Hedonistic utilitarianism">hedonistic utilitarianism</a>, where the ethical value of things is determined from the amount of subjective pleasure or pain they cause, is dependent on the existence of qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-11" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-11"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>11<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-12" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-12"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>12<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="noprint Inline-Template" style="white-space:nowrap;">&#91;<i><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:No_original_research#Synthesis_of_published_material" title="Wikipedia:No original research"><span title="The material near this tag may be based upon an improper synthesis of sources. (July 2023)">improper synthesis?</span></a></i>&#93;</sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Arguments_regarding_the_existence_of_qualia">Arguments regarding the existence of qualia</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=2" title="Edit section: Arguments regarding the existence of qualia"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>Since, by definition, qualia cannot be fully conveyed verbally, they also cannot be demonstrated directly in an argument&#160;– a more nuanced approach is needed. Arguments for qualia generally come in the form of <a href="/wiki/Thought_experiment" title="Thought experiment">thought experiments</a> designed to lead one to the conclusion that qualia exist.<sup id="cite_ref-13" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-13"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>13<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Modern_philosophy">Modern philosophy</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=3" title="Edit section: Modern philosophy"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Inverted_spectrum_argument">Inverted spectrum argument</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=4" title="Edit section: Inverted spectrum argument"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951" /><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Inverted_spectrum" title="Inverted spectrum">Inverted spectrum</a></div> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg" class="mw-file-description"><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg/220px-Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg" decoding="async" width="220" height="126" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg/330px-Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg/440px-Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg 2x" data-file-width="1070" data-file-height="614" /></a><figcaption>Inverted qualia</figcaption></figure> <p>The inverted spectrum thought experiment, originally developed by <a href="/wiki/John_Locke" title="John Locke">John Locke</a>,<sup id="cite_ref-14" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-14"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>14<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> invites us to imagine two individuals who perceive colors differently: where one person sees red, the other sees green, and vice versa. Despite this difference in their subjective experiences, they behave and communicate as if their perceptions are the same, and no physical or behavioral test can reveal the inversion. Critics of <a href="/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">functionalism</a>, and of <a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalism</a> more broadly, argue that if we can imagine this happening without contradiction, it follows that we are imagining a change in a property that determines the way things look to us, but that has no physical basis.<sup id="cite_ref-15" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-15"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>15<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-Byrne-2020_16-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Byrne-2020-16"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>16<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> In more detail:<sup class="noprint Inline-Template Template-Fact" style="white-space:nowrap;">&#91;<i><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed" title="Wikipedia:Citation needed"><span title="This claim needs references to reliable sources. (July 2023)">citation needed</span></a></i>&#93;</sup> </p> <ol><li>Metaphysical identity requires necessity.<sup id="cite_ref-17" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-17"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>note 1<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></li> <li>By definition, if something is possibly false, it is not necessary.</li> <li>It is conceivable that different qualia could be produced by the same physical brain-state.<sup id="cite_ref-18" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-18"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>note 2<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></li> <li>If it is conceivable, then it is possible.<sup id="cite_ref-21" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-21"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>note 3<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></li> <li>Since it is possible that different qualia could be produced by the same physical brain-state, they cannot be identical to physical brain states (per 1).</li> <li>Therefore, qualia are non-physical.</li></ol> <p>The argument thus claims that if we find the inverted spectrum plausible, we must admit that qualia exist (and are non-physical). Some philosophers<sup class="noprint Inline-Template" style="white-space:nowrap;">&#91;<i><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Words_to_watch#Unsupported_attributions" title="Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Words to watch"><span title="The material near this tag possibly uses too-vague attribution or weasel words. (September 2024)">who?</span></a></i>&#93;</sup> find it absurd that <a href="/wiki/Armchair_theorizing" title="Armchair theorizing">armchair theorizing</a> can prove something to exist, and the detailed argument does involve a lot of assumptions about conceivability and possibility, which are open to criticism.<sup class="noprint Inline-Template Template-Fact" style="white-space:nowrap;">&#91;<i><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed" title="Wikipedia:Citation needed"><span title="This claim needs references to reliable sources. (July 2023)">citation needed</span></a></i>&#93;</sup> </p><p>The idea that an inverted spectrum would be undetectable in practice is also open to criticism on more scientific grounds, by C. L. Hardin, among others.<sup id="cite_ref-Byrne-2020_16-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Byrne-2020-16"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>16<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-HardinPandPR_22-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-HardinPandPR-22"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>19<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> As Alex Byrne puts it: </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712" /><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>...there are more perceptually distinguishable shades between red and blue than there are between green and yellow, which would make red-green inversion behaviorally detectable. And there are yet further asymmetries. Dark yellow is brown (qualitatively different from yellow), whereas dark blue is blue[...] Similarly, desaturated bluish-red is pink (qualitatively different from saturated bluish-red), whereas desaturated greenish-yellow is similar to saturated greenish-yellow. Again, red is a "warm" color, whereas blue is "cool"—and perhaps this is not a matter of learned associations with temperature.<sup id="cite_ref-Byrne-2020_16-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Byrne-2020-16"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>16<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></p></blockquote> <p>According to <a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a>, all "functionally <a href="/wiki/Isomorphic" class="mw-redirect" title="Isomorphic">isomorphic</a>" systems (those with the same "fine-grained functional organization", i.e., the same information processing) will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. He calls this the principle of <i>organizational invariance</i>. For example, it implies that a <a href="/wiki/Silicon_chip" class="mw-redirect" title="Silicon chip">silicon chip</a> that is functionally isomorphic to a brain will have the same perception of the color red, given the same sensory inputs. He proposed the thought experiment of the "dancing qualia" to demonstrate it. It is a <i><a href="/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum" title="Reductio ad absurdum">reductio ad absurdum</a></i> argument that starts by supposing that two such systems can have different qualia in the same situation. It involves a switch that enables to connect the main part of the brain with any of these two subsystems. For example, one subsystem can be a chunk of brain that causes to see an object as red, and the other one a silicon chip that causes to see an object as blue. Since both perform the same function within the brain, the subject would be unable to notice any change during the switch. Chalmers argues that this would be highly implausible if the qualia were truly switching between red and blue, hence the contradiction. Therefore, he concludes that the dancing qualia is impossible in practice, and the functionally isomorphic digital system would not only experience qualia, but it would have conscious experiences that are qualitatively identical to those of the biological system (e.g., seeing the same color). He also proposed a similar thought experiment, named the fading qualia, that argues that it is not possible for the qualia to fade when each biological neuron is replaced by a functional equivalent.<sup id="cite_ref-:6_23-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:6-23"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>20<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-:7_24-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:7-24"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>21<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>There is an actual experiment&#160;– albeit somewhat obscure&#160;– that parallels the inverted spectrum argument. <a href="/wiki/George_M._Stratton" title="George M. Stratton">George M. Stratton</a>, professor of <a href="/wiki/Psychology" title="Psychology">psychology</a> at the University of California, Berkeley, performed an experiment in which he wore special prism glasses that caused the external world to appear upside down. After a few days of continually wearing the glasses, he adapted and the external world appeared upright to him. When he removed the glasses, his perception of the external world again returned to the "normal" perceptual state.<sup id="cite_ref-25" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-25"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>22<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> If this argument provides evidence that qualia exist, it does not necessarily follow that they must be non-physical, because that distinction should be considered a separate <a href="/wiki/Epistemological" class="mw-redirect" title="Epistemological">epistemological</a> issue. <sup class="noprint Inline-Template" style="white-space:nowrap;">&#91;<i><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability" title="Wikipedia:Verifiability"><span title="Source is about vision, not philosophy. (July 2023)">failed verification</span></a></i>&#93;</sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Analytic_philosophy">Analytic philosophy</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=5" title="Edit section: Analytic philosophy"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="&quot;What's_it_like_to_be?&quot;_argument"><span id=".22What.27s_it_like_to_be.3F.22_argument"></span>"What's it like to be?" argument</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=6" title="Edit section: &quot;What&#39;s it like to be?&quot; argument"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951" /><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Subjective_character_of_experience" title="Subjective character of experience">Subjective character of experience</a></div> <figure class="mw-default-size mw-halign-right" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Big-eared-townsend-fledermaus.jpg" class="mw-file-description"><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/77/Big-eared-townsend-fledermaus.jpg/250px-Big-eared-townsend-fledermaus.jpg" decoding="async" width="220" height="134" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/77/Big-eared-townsend-fledermaus.jpg/330px-Big-eared-townsend-fledermaus.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/77/Big-eared-townsend-fledermaus.jpg/500px-Big-eared-townsend-fledermaus.jpg 2x" data-file-width="617" data-file-height="375" /></a><figcaption><a href="/wiki/Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Thomas Nagel</a> argues that while a human might be able to imagine what it is like to be a <a href="/wiki/Bat" title="Bat">bat</a> by taking "the bat's point of view", it would still be impossible "to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat." (<i><a href="/wiki/Townsend%27s_big-eared_bat" title="Townsend&#39;s big-eared bat">Townsend's big-eared bat</a> pictured</i>).</figcaption></figure> <p>American philosopher <a href="/wiki/Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Thomas Nagel's</a> paper <i><a href="/wiki/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F" class="mw-redirect" title="What Is it Like to Be a Bat?">What Is it Like to Be a Bat?</a></i><sup id="cite_ref-jstor2183914_26-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-jstor2183914-26"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>23<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> is often cited in debates about qualia, though it does not use the word "qualia". Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective character, a what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to <i>be</i> that organism&#160;– something it is like <i>for</i> the organism."<sup id="cite_ref-jstor2183914_26-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-jstor2183914-26"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>23<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> Nagel suggests that this subjective aspect may never be sufficiently accounted for by the <a href="/wiki/Objectivity_(science)" title="Objectivity (science)">objective</a> methods of <a href="/wiki/Reductionism" title="Reductionism">reductionistic</a> science. He claims that "if we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue about how this could be done."<sup id="cite_ref-Tye-2000_27-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Tye-2000-27"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page: 450">&#58;&#8202;450&#8202;</span></sup> Furthermore, "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective."<sup id="cite_ref-Tye-2000_27-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Tye-2000-27"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page: 450">&#58;&#8202;450&#8202;</span></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Zombie_argument">Zombie argument</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=7" title="Edit section: Zombie argument"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951" /><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Philosophical_zombie" title="Philosophical zombie">Philosophical zombie</a></div> <p><a href="/wiki/Saul_Kripke" title="Saul Kripke">Saul Kripke</a> argues that one key consequence of the claim that such things as raw feels, or qualia, can be meaningfully discussed is that it leads to the logical possibility of two entities exhibiting identical behavior in all ways despite one of them entirely lacking qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-28" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-28"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>25<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> While few claim that such an entity, called a <a href="/wiki/Philosophical_zombie" title="Philosophical zombie">philosophical zombie</a>, actually exists, the possibility is raised as a refutation of <a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalism</a>,<sup id="cite_ref-29" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-29"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>26<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> and in defense of the <a href="/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">hard problem of consciousness</a> (the problem of accounting for, in physical terms, subjective, intrinsic, first-person experiences).<sup id="cite_ref-Kirk-2009_30-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Kirk-2009-30"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>27<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>The argument holds that it is conceivable for a person to have a duplicate, identical in every physical way, but lacking consciousness, called a "philosophical zombie." It would appear exactly the same as the original person, in both behavior and speech, just without subjective <a href="/wiki/Phenomenology_(psychology)" title="Phenomenology (psychology)">phenomenology</a>. For these zombies to exist, qualia must not arise from any specific part or parts of the brain, for if it did there would be no difference between "normal humans" and philosophical zombies: The zombie/normal-human distinction can only be valid if subjective consciousness is separate from the physical brain.<sup id="cite_ref-Kirk-2009_30-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Kirk-2009-30"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>27<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>According to Chalmers, the simplest form of the argument goes as follows: </p> <ol><li>It is conceivable that there be zombies</li> <li>If it is conceivable that there be zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies.</li> <li>If it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies, then consciousness is non-physical.</li> <li>Consciousness is nonphysical.<sup id="cite_ref-Chalmers-2003_20-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Chalmers-2003-20"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>18<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 106">&#58;&#8202;106&#8202;</span></sup></li></ol> <p>Former AI researcher <a href="/wiki/Marvin_Minsky" title="Marvin Minsky">Marvin Minsky</a> sees the argument as <a href="/wiki/Circular_reasoning" title="Circular reasoning">circular</a>. He says the proposition of something physically identical to a human but without <a href="/wiki/Subjective_experience" class="mw-redirect" title="Subjective experience">subjective experience</a> assumes that the physical characteristics of humans cannot produce consciousness, which is exactly what the argument claims to prove. In other words, it tries to prove consciousness is nonphysical by assuming consciousness is nonphysical.<sup id="cite_ref-Minsky_31-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Minsky-31"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>28<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 2">&#58;&#8202;2&#8202;</span></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Explanatory_gap_argument">Explanatory gap argument</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=8" title="Edit section: Explanatory gap argument"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951" /><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Explanatory_gap" title="Explanatory gap">Explanatory gap</a></div> <p><a href="/wiki/Joseph_Levine_(philosopher)" title="Joseph Levine (philosopher)">Joseph Levine's</a> paper <i>Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap</i> takes up where the criticisms of conceivability arguments (such as the inverted spectrum argument and the zombie argument) leave off. Levine agrees that conceivability is a flawed means of establishing metaphysical realities, but points out that even if we come to the <i>metaphysical</i> conclusion that qualia are physical, there is still an <i>explanatory</i> problem. </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712" /><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>While I think this materialist response is right in the end, it does not suffice to put the <a href="/wiki/Mind-body_problem" class="mw-redirect" title="Mind-body problem">mind-body problem</a> to rest. Even if conceivability considerations do not establish that the mind is in fact distinct from the body, or that mental properties are metaphysically irreducible to physical properties, still they do demonstrate that we lack an explanation of the mental in terms of the physical.<sup id="cite_ref-Levine-1999_19-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Levine-1999-19"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>17<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></p></blockquote> <p>However, such an <a href="/wiki/Epistemological" class="mw-redirect" title="Epistemological">epistemological</a> or explanatory problem might indicate an underlying metaphysical issue, as even if not proven by conceivability arguments, the non-physicality of qualia is far from ruled out. </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712" /><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>In the end, we are right back where we started. The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature. But so long as we have countervailing reasons for doubting the latter, we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the former.<sup id="cite_ref-Levine-1999_19-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Levine-1999-19"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>17<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></p></blockquote> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Knowledge_argument">Knowledge argument</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=9" title="Edit section: Knowledge argument"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951" /><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Knowledge_argument" title="Knowledge argument">Knowledge argument</a></div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1273380762/mw-parser-output/.tmulti">.mw-parser-output .tmulti .multiimageinner{display:flex;flex-direction:column}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .trow{display:flex;flex-direction:row;clear:left;flex-wrap:wrap;width:100%;box-sizing:border-box}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .tsingle{margin:1px;float:left}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .theader{clear:both;font-weight:bold;text-align:center;align-self:center;background-color:transparent;width:100%}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .thumbcaption{background-color:transparent}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .text-align-left{text-align:left}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .text-align-right{text-align:right}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .text-align-center{text-align:center}@media all and (max-width:720px){.mw-parser-output .tmulti .thumbinner{width:100%!important;box-sizing:border-box;max-width:none!important;align-items:center}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .trow{justify-content:center}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .tsingle{float:none!important;max-width:100%!important;box-sizing:border-box;text-align:center}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .tsingle .thumbcaption{text-align:left}.mw-parser-output .tmulti .trow>.thumbcaption{text-align:center}}@media screen{html.skin-theme-clientpref-night .mw-parser-output .tmulti .multiimageinner span:not(.skin-invert-image):not(.skin-invert):not(.bg-transparent) img{background-color:white}}@media screen and (prefers-color-scheme:dark){html.skin-theme-clientpref-os .mw-parser-output .tmulti .multiimageinner span:not(.skin-invert-image):not(.skin-invert):not(.bg-transparent) img{background-color:white}}</style><div class="thumb tmulti tright"><div class="thumbinner multiimageinner" style="width:442px;max-width:442px"><div class="trow"><div class="tsingle" style="width:220px;max-width:220px"><div class="thumbimage" style="height:269px;overflow:hidden"><span typeof="mw:File"><a href="/wiki/File:087.King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.jpg" class="mw-file-description"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/39/087.King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.jpg/218px-087.King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.jpg" decoding="async" width="218" height="269" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/39/087.King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.jpg/327px-087.King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/39/087.King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.jpg/436px-087.King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.jpg 2x" data-file-width="2367" data-file-height="2921" /></a></span></div><div class="thumbcaption text-align-left">Did Mary learn something new?</div></div><div class="tsingle" style="width:218px;max-width:218px"><div class="thumbimage" style="height:269px;overflow:hidden"><span typeof="mw:File"><a href="/wiki/File:Colorized_King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.png" class="mw-file-description"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7f/Colorized_King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.png/250px-Colorized_King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.png" decoding="async" width="216" height="270" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7f/Colorized_King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.png/330px-Colorized_King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7f/Colorized_King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.png/500px-Colorized_King_Solomon_in_Old_Age.png 2x" data-file-width="2330" data-file-height="2913" /></a></span></div></div></div></div></div> <p>In 1982, <a href="/wiki/Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">F. C. Jackson</a> offered what he calls the "knowledge argument" for qualia. It goes as follows: </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712" /><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes or the sky and use terms like "red", "blue", and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence "The sky is blue." What happens when Mary is released from her black-and-white room or is given a color television monitor? Does she learn anything new or not?</p></blockquote> <p>Jackson claimed that she does.<sup id="cite_ref-Jackson_6-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Jackson-6"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 130">&#58;&#8202;130&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>This <a href="/wiki/Thought_experiment" title="Thought experiment">thought experiment</a> has two purposes. First, it is intended to show that qualia exist. If we accept the thought experiment, we believe that upon leaving the room Mary gains something: the knowledge of a particular thing that she did not possess before. That knowledge, Jackson argues, is knowledge of the quale that corresponds to the experience of seeing red, and it must thus be conceded that qualia are real properties, since there is a difference between a person who has access to a particular quale and one who does not.<sup id="cite_ref-Jackson_6-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Jackson-6"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page: 130">&#58;&#8202;130&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>The second purpose of this argument is to refute the physicalist account of the mind. Specifically, the knowledge argument is an attack on the physicalist claim about the completeness of physical truths. The challenge posed to <a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">physicalism</a> by the knowledge argument runs as follows: </p> <ol><li>While in the room, Mary has acquired all the physical facts there are about color sensations, including the sensation of seeing red.</li> <li>When Mary exits the room and sees a ripe red tomato, she learns a new fact about the sensation of seeing red, namely its subjective character.</li> <li>Therefore, there are non-physical facts about color sensations. [From 1, 2]</li> <li>If there are non-physical facts about color sensations, then color sensations are non-physical events.</li> <li>Therefore, color sensations are non-physical events. [From 3, 4]</li> <li>If color sensations are non-physical events, then physicalism is false.</li> <li>Therefore, physicalism is false. [From 5, 6]<sup id="cite_ref-32" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-32"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>29<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></li></ol> <p>Some critics argue that Mary's confinement to a monochromatic environment wouldn't prevent her from forming color experiences or that she might deduce what colors look like from her complete physical knowledge. Others suggest that the thought experiment's conceivability might conflict with current or future scientific understanding of vision, but defenders maintain that its purpose is to challenge materialism conceptually, not scientifically.<sup id="cite_ref-33" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-33"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>30<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>Early in his career Jackson argued that qualia are <a href="/wiki/Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">epiphenomenal</a>, meaning they have no causal influence on the physical world.<sup id="cite_ref-Jackson_6-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Jackson-6"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> The issue with this view is that if qualia are non-physical, it becomes unclear how they can have any effect on the brain or behavior. Jackson later rejected epiphenomenalism, arguing that knowledge about qualia is impossible if they are epiphenomenal. He concluded that there must be an issue with the knowledge argument, eventually embracing a <a href="/wiki/Representationalist" class="mw-redirect" title="Representationalist">representationalist</a> account, arguing that sensory experiences can be understood in physical terms.<sup id="cite_ref-34" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-34"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>31<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Proponents_of_qualia">Proponents of qualia</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=10" title="Edit section: Proponents of qualia"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Analytic_philosophy_2">Analytic philosophy</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=11" title="Edit section: Analytic philosophy"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="David_Chalmers">David Chalmers</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=12" title="Edit section: David Chalmers"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a> formulated the <i><a href="/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">hard problem of consciousness</a></i>, which raised the issue of qualia to a new level of importance and acceptance in the field of the <a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">philosophy of mind</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-amy_kind_35-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-amy_kind-35"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>32<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> In 1995 Chalmers argued for what he called "the principle of organizational invariance": if a system such as one of appropriately configured computer hardware reproduces the functional organization of the brain, it will also reproduce the qualia associated with the brain.<sup id="cite_ref-Chalmers-1995_36-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Chalmers-1995-36"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>33<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="E._J._Lowe">E. J. Lowe</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=13" title="Edit section: E. J. Lowe"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><a href="/wiki/E._J._Lowe_(philosopher)" title="E. J. Lowe (philosopher)">E.&#160;J. Lowe</a> denies that indirect realism, wherein which we have access only to sensory features internal to the brain, necessarily implies a <a href="/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism" title="Mind–body dualism">Cartesian dualism</a>. He agrees with <a href="/wiki/Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a> that the way images are received by our retinas, our "retinal images", are connected to "patterns of neural activity in the cortex".<sup id="cite_ref-Lowe-1996_37-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Lowe-1996-37"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>34<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> He defends a version of the <i>causal theory of perception</i> in which a causal path can be traced between the external object and the perception of it. He is careful to deny that we do any inferring from the <a href="/wiki/Sensory_field" class="mw-redirect" title="Sensory field">sensory field</a>; he believes this allows us to build an access to knowledge on that causal connection. In a later work he moves closer to <a href="#The_non-epistemic_argument">the non-epistemic argument</a> in that he postulates "a wholly non-conceptual component of perceptual experience".<sup id="cite_ref-Lowe-1996_37-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Lowe-1996-37"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>34<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="J._B._Maund">J. B. Maund</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=14" title="Edit section: J. B. Maund"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>John Barry Maund, an Australian philosopher of perception, argues that qualia can be described on two levels, a fact that he refers to as "dual coding".<sup id="cite_ref-38" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-38"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>35<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>Maund extended his argument with reference to color.<sup id="cite_ref-Maund-1995-2003_39-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Maund-1995-2003-39"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>36<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> Color he sees as a dispositional property, not an objective one. Colors are "virtual properties", which means they are <i>as if</i> things possessed them. Although the naïve view attributes them to objects, they are intrinsic, non-relational, inner experiences. This allows for the different perceptions between person and person, and also leaves aside the claim that external objects are colored. </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Moreland_Perkins">Moreland Perkins</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=15" title="Edit section: Moreland Perkins"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>In his book <i>Sensing the World,</i><sup id="cite_ref-40" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-40"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>37<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> Moreland Perkins argues that qualia need not be identified as their objective sources: a smell, for instance, bears no direct resemblance to the molecular shape that gives rise to it, nor is a toothache actually in the tooth. Like <a href="/wiki/Hobbes" class="mw-redirect" title="Hobbes">Hobbes</a> he views the process of sensing as complete in itself; as he puts it, it is not like "kicking a football" where an external object is required&#160;– it is more like "kicking a kick". This explanation evades the <i><a href="/wiki/Homunculus_argument" title="Homunculus argument">Homunculus Objection</a>,</i> as adhered to by <a href="/wiki/Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Gilbert Ryle</a>, among others. Ryle was unable to entertain this possibility, protesting that "in effect it explained the having of sensations as the not having of sensations".<sup id="cite_ref-41" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-41"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>38<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> However, <a href="/wiki/A._J._Ayer" title="A. J. Ayer">A. J. Ayer</a> called this objection "very weak" as it betrayed an inability to detach the notion of eyes, or indeed any sensory organ, from the neural sensory experience.<sup id="cite_ref-42" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-42"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>39<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Howard_Robinson_and_William_Robinson">Howard Robinson and William Robinson</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=16" title="Edit section: Howard Robinson and William Robinson"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>Philosopher <a href="/wiki/Howard_Robinson" title="Howard Robinson">Howard Robinson</a> argued against reducing sensory experiences to physical explanations. He defended the theory of <a href="/wiki/Sense_data" title="Sense data">sense data</a>, maintaining that sensory experiences involve qualia. As a dualist, Robinson held that mind and matter have distinct metaphysical natures. He maintained that the knowledge argument shows that physicalism fails to account for the qualitative nature of qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-43" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-43"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>40<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>Similarly, William Robinson, in <i>Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness</i>,<sup id="cite_ref-44" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-44"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>41<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> advocates for dualism and rejects the idea of reducing phenomenal experience to neural processes. His theory of Qualitative Event Realism proposes that phenomenal consciousness consists of immaterial events caused by brain activity but not reducible to it. He seeks to conciliate dualism with scientific methodology, aiming for a future unified theory that respects both phenomenal qualities and scientific explanations.<sup id="cite_ref-45" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-45"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>42<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Neuroscience">Neuroscience</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=17" title="Edit section: Neuroscience"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Gerald_Edelman">Gerald Edelman</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=18" title="Edit section: Gerald Edelman"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>In his book <i>Bright Air, Brilliant Fire</i>, neuroscientist and Nobel laureate in Physiology / Medicine <a href="/wiki/Gerald_Edelman" title="Gerald Edelman">Gerald Edelman</a> says "that [it] definitely does not seem feasible [...] to ignore completely the reality of qualia". As he sees it, it is impossible to explain color, sensations, and similar experiences "to a 'qualia-free' observer" by description alone. Edelman argues that proposing such a theory of consciousness is proposing "a theory based on a kind of God's-eye view of consciousness" and that any scientific theory requires the assumption "that observers have sensation as well as perception." He concludes by stating that assuming a theory that requires neither could exist "is to indulge the errors of theories that attempt syntactical formulations mapped onto objectivist interpretations&#160;– theories that ignore embodiment as a source of meaning. There is no qualia-free scientific observer."<sup id="cite_ref-46" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-46"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>43<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 115">&#58;&#8202;115&#8202;</span></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Antonio_Damasio">Antonio Damasio</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=19" title="Edit section: Antonio Damasio"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>Neurologist <a href="/wiki/Antonio_Damasio" title="Antonio Damasio">Antonio Damasio</a>, in his book <i>The Feeling Of What Happens</i>, defines qualia as "the simple sensory qualities to be found in the blueness of the sky or the tone of sound produced by a cello, and the fundamental components of the images in the movie metaphor are thus made of qualia."<sup id="cite_ref-Damasio_47-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Damasio-47"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>44<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 309">&#58;&#8202;309&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>Damasio points out that "in all likelihood, I will never know your thoughts unless you tell me, and you will never know mine until I tell you." The reason he gives for this is that "the mind and its consciousness are first and foremost private phenomena" that are personal, private experiences that should be investigated as such. While he believes that trying to study these experiences "by the study of their behavioral correlates is wrong," he does think they can be studied as "the idea that subjective experiences are not scientifically accessible is nonsense." In his view the way to do this is for "enough observers [to] undertake rigorous observations according to the same experimental design; and [...] that those observations be checked for consistency across observers and that they yield some form of measurement." He also thinks that "subjective observations [...] can inspire objective experiments" and "be explained in terms of the available scientific knowledge".<sup id="cite_ref-Damasio_47-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Damasio-47"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>44<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Pages: 307–309">&#58;&#8202;307–309&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>In his mind: </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712" /><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>The resistance found in some scientific quarters to the use of subjective observations is a revisitation of an old argument between <a href="/wiki/Behaviorist_theories_of_learning" class="mw-redirect" title="Behaviorist theories of learning">behaviorists</a>, who believed that only behaviors, not mental experiences, could be studied objectively, and <a href="/wiki/Cognitivism_(psychology)" title="Cognitivism (psychology)">cognitivists</a>, who believed that studying only behavior did not do justice to human complexity.<sup id="cite_ref-Damasio_47-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Damasio-47"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>44<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Pages: 308">&#58;&#8202;308&#8202;</span></sup></p></blockquote> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Rodolfo_Llinás"><span id="Rodolfo_Llin.C3.A1s"></span>Rodolfo Llinás</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=20" title="Edit section: Rodolfo Llinás"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>Neurologist <a href="/wiki/Rodolfo_Llin%C3%A1s" title="Rodolfo Llinás">Rodolfo Llinás</a> states in his book <i><a href="/wiki/I_of_the_Vortex" title="I of the Vortex">I of the Vortex</a></i> that qualia, from a neurological perspective, are essential for an organism's survival and played a key role in the evolution of <a href="/wiki/Nervous_system" title="Nervous system">nervous systems</a>, including in simple creatures like ants or cockroaches.<sup id="cite_ref-Llinás_48-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Llinás-48"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>45<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 201–221">&#58;&#8202;201–221&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>Llinás contends that qualia are a product of <a href="/wiki/Neural_oscillation" title="Neural oscillation">neuronal oscillation</a> and cites <a href="/wiki/Anesthesia" title="Anesthesia">anesthesia</a> experiments, showing that qualia can be "turned off" by altering brain oscillations while other connections remain intact.<sup id="cite_ref-Llinás_48-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Llinás-48"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>45<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Pages: 202–207">&#58;&#8202;202–207&#8202;</span></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading4"><h4 id="Vilayanur_Ramachandran">Vilayanur Ramachandran</h4><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=21" title="Edit section: Vilayanur Ramachandran"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG" class="mw-file-description"><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a5/Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG/250px-Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG" decoding="async" width="170" height="243" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a5/Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG/330px-Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a5/Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG/500px-Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG 2x" data-file-width="2736" data-file-height="3906" /></a><figcaption>Vilayanur S. Ramachandran</figcaption></figure> <p><a href="/wiki/Vilayanur_S._Ramachandran" class="mw-redirect" title="Vilayanur S. Ramachandran">Vilayanur S. Ramachandran</a> and <a href="/wiki/William_Hirstein" title="William Hirstein">William Hirstein</a><sup id="cite_ref-Three_laws_49-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Three_laws-49"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>46<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> proposed three laws of qualia (with a fourth later added), which are "functional criteria that need to be fulfilled in order for certain neural events to be associated with qualia" by philosophers of the mind: </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712" /><blockquote class="templatequote"> <ol><li>Qualia are irrevocable and indubitable. You don't say 'maybe it is red but I can visualize it as green if I want to'. An explicit neural representation of red is created that invariably and automatically 'reports' this to higher brain centres.</li> <li>Once the representation is created, what can be done with it is open-ended. You have the luxury of choice, e.g., if you have the percept of an apple you can use it to tempt Adam, to keep the doctor away, bake a pie, or just to eat. Even though the representation at the input level is immutable and automatic, the output is potentially infinite. This isn't true for, say, a spinal reflex arc where the output is also inevitable and automatic. Indeed, a paraplegic can even have an erection and ejaculate without an orgasm.</li> <li>Short-term memory. The input invariably creates a representation that persists in short-term memory&#160;– long enough to allow time for choice of output. Without this component, again, you get just a reflex arc.</li> <li>Attention. Qualia and attention are closely linked. You need attention to fulfill criterion number two; to choose. A study of circuits involved in attention, therefore, will shed much light on the riddle of qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-50" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-50"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>47<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></li></ol></blockquote> <p>These authors approach qualia from an empirical perspective and not as a logical or philosophical problem. They wonder how qualia evolved, and in doing so consider a skeptical point of view in which, since the objective scientific description of the world is complete without qualia, it is nonsense to ask why they evolved or what they are for. However they decide against this skeptical view. </p><p>Based on the parsimony principle of <a href="/wiki/Occam%27s_razor" title="Occam&#39;s razor">Occam's razor</a>, one could accept <a href="/wiki/Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">epiphenomenalism</a> and deny qualia, since they are not necessary for a description of the functioning of the brain. However, they argue that Occam's razor is not useful for scientific discovery.<sup id="cite_ref-Three_laws_49-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Three_laws-49"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>46<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> For example, the discovery of relativity in physics was not the product of accepting Occam's razor but rather of rejecting it and asking the question of whether a deeper generalization, not required by the currently available data, was true and would allow for unexpected predictions. Most scientific discoveries arise, these authors argue, from ontologically promiscuous conjectures<sup class="noprint Inline-Template" style="margin-left:0.1em; white-space:nowrap;">&#91;<i><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Please_clarify" title="Wikipedia:Please clarify"><span title="The text near this tag may need clarification or removal of jargon. (July 2023)">clarification needed</span></a></i>&#93;</sup> that do not come from current data. </p><p>The authors then point out that skepticism might be justified in the philosophical field, but that science is the wrong place for skepticism, such as asking if "your red is not my green" or if we can be logically certain that we are not dreaming. Science, these authors assert, deals with what is probably true, beyond reasonable doubt, not with what can be known with complete and absolute certainty. The authors say that most neuroscientists and even most psychologists dispute the very existence of the problem of qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-Three_laws_49-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Three_laws-49"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>46<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Critics_of_qualia">Critics of qualia</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=22" title="Edit section: Critics of qualia"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Daniel_Dennett">Daniel Dennett</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=23" title="Edit section: Daniel Dennett"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Daniel_dennett_Oct2008_(portrait).JPG" class="mw-file-description"><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b6/Daniel_dennett_Oct2008_%28portrait%29.JPG/170px-Daniel_dennett_Oct2008_%28portrait%29.JPG" decoding="async" width="170" height="213" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b6/Daniel_dennett_Oct2008_%28portrait%29.JPG/255px-Daniel_dennett_Oct2008_%28portrait%29.JPG 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b6/Daniel_dennett_Oct2008_%28portrait%29.JPG/340px-Daniel_dennett_Oct2008_%28portrait%29.JPG 2x" data-file-width="1728" data-file-height="2160" /></a><figcaption>Daniel Dennett</figcaption></figure> <p>In <i><a href="/wiki/Consciousness_Explained" title="Consciousness Explained">Consciousness Explained</a></i><sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-1991_51-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-1991-51"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>48<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> and <i>Quining Qualia,</i><sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-1988-52"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>49<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> <a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a> argues against qualia by claiming that the "knowledge argument" breaks down if one tries to apply it practically. In a series of thought experiments, which he calls <i><a href="/wiki/Intuition_pump" title="Intuition pump">intuition pumps</a>,</i> he brings qualia into the world of <a href="/wiki/Neurosurgery" title="Neurosurgery">neurosurgery</a>, <a href="/wiki/Clinical_psychology" title="Clinical psychology">clinical psychology</a>, and <a href="/wiki/Experimental_psychology" title="Experimental psychology">psychological experimentation</a>. He argues that, once the concept of qualia is so imported, we can either make no use of it, or the questions introduced by it are unanswerable precisely because of the special properties defining qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-1991_51-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-1991-51"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>48<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 398–406">&#58;&#8202;398–406&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>In Dennett's updated version of the <a href="/wiki/Inverted_spectrum" title="Inverted spectrum">inverted spectrum</a> thought experiment, which he calls <i>alternative neurosurgery</i>, you again awake to find that your qualia have been inverted&#160;– grass appears red, the sky appears orange, etc. According to the original account, you should be immediately aware that something has gone horribly wrong. Dennett argues, however, that it is impossible to know whether the diabolical neurosurgeons have indeed inverted your qualia (e.g. by tampering with your optic nerve), or have simply inverted your connection to memories of past qualia. Since both operations would produce the same result, you would have no means on your own to tell which operation has actually been conducted, and you are thus in the odd position of not knowing whether there has been a change in your "immediately apprehensible" qualia.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-1988-52"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>49<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>Dennett argues that for qualia to be taken seriously as a component of experience&#160;– for them to make sense as a discrete concept&#160;– it must be possible to show that: </p> <div><ol type="a"><li>it is possible to know that a change in qualia has occurred, as opposed to a change in something else;<br /> &#160;&#160;&#160;&#160; or that</li><li>there is a difference between having a change in qualia and not having one.</li></ol></div> <p>Dennett attempts to show that we cannot satisfy (a) either through introspection or through observation, and that qualia's very definition undermines its chances of satisfying (b).<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-1988-52"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>49<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>Supporters of qualia point out that in order for you to notice a change in qualia, you must compare your current qualia with your memories of past qualia. Arguably, such a comparison would involve immediate assessment of your current qualia and your memories of past qualia, but not of the past qualia themselves. Furthermore, modern <a href="/wiki/Functional_magnetic_resonance_imaging" title="Functional magnetic resonance imaging">functional brain imaging</a> has increasingly suggested that the memory of an experience is processed in similar ways, and in similar zones of the brain, as the original perception.<sup id="cite_ref-53" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-53"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>50<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>This may mean that there would be asymmetric outcomes between altering the mechanism of perception of qualia and altering the memory of that qualia. If the diabolical neurosurgery altered the immediate perception of qualia, the inversion might not be noticed directly, since the brain zones which re-process the memories would invert the remembered qualia. On the other hand, alteration of the qualia memories themselves would be processed without inversion, and thus you would perceive them as an inversion. Thus, you might know immediately if memory of your qualia had been altered, but might not know if immediate qualia were inverted or whether the diabolical neurosurgeons had done a sham procedure.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-1988-52"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>49<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>Dennett responds to the <i><a href="/wiki/Mary%27s_room" class="mw-redirect" title="Mary&#39;s room">Mary the color scientist</a></i> thought experiment by arguing that Mary would not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of her black and white room to see the color red. Dennett asserts that if she already truly knew "everything about color", that knowledge would include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense the quale of color. Mary would therefore already know exactly what to expect upon seeing red, before ever leaving the room.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-2006-54"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>51<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 15">&#58;&#8202;15&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>Dennett argues that the misleading aspect of the story is that Mary is supposed to not merely be knowledgeable about color but to actually know <i>all</i> the physical facts about it, which would be a knowledge so deep that it exceeds what can be imagined, and twists our intuitions. If Mary really does know everything physical there is to know about the experience of color, then this effectively grants her almost omniscient powers of knowledge. Using this, she will be able to deduce her own reaction, and figure out exactly what the experience of seeing red will feel like.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-2006-54"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>51<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 15–16">&#58;&#8202;15–16&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>Dennett finds that many people find it difficult to see this, so he uses the case of RoboMary to further illustrate what it would be like for Mary to possess such a vast knowledge of the physical workings of the human brain and color vision. RoboMary is an intelligent robot who, instead of having color cameras as eyes, has a software lock such that they are only able to perceive black and white and shades in-between.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-2006-54"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>51<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 27–28">&#58;&#8202;27–28&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>RoboMary can examine the computer brain of similar non-color-locked robots when they see red, and see exactly how they react and what kinds of impulses occur. RoboMary can also construct a simulation of her own brain, unlock the simulation's color-lock and, with reference to the other robots, simulate exactly how this simulation of herself reacts to seeing red. RoboMary naturally has control over all of her internal states except for the color-lock. With the knowledge of her simulation's internal states upon seeing red, RoboMary can put her own internal states directly into the states they would be in upon seeing red. In this way, without ever actually seeing red through her cameras, she will know exactly what it is like to see red.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-2006-54"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>51<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 28">&#58;&#8202;28&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>Dennett uses this example as an attempt to show us that Mary's all-encompassing physical knowledge makes her own internal states as transparent as those of a robot or computer, and it is as straightforward for her to figure out exactly how it feels to see red.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-2006-54"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>51<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 16–17">&#58;&#8202;16–17&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>Perhaps Mary's failure to learn exactly what seeing red feels like is simply a failure of language, or a failure of our ability to describe experiences. An alien race with a different method of communication or description might be perfectly able to teach their version of Mary exactly how seeing the color red would feel. Perhaps it is simply a uniquely human failing to communicate first-person experiences from a third-person perspective. Dennett suggests that the description might even be possible using English. He uses a simpler version of the Mary thought experiment to show how this might work. What if Mary was in a room without triangles and was prevented from seeing or making any triangles? An English-language description of just a few words would be sufficient for her to imagine what it is like to see a triangle&#160;– she can simply and directly visualize a triangle in her mind. Similarly, Dennett proposes, it is perfectly, logically, possible that the quale of what it is like to see red could eventually be described in an English-language description of millions or billions of words.<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-1988-52"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>49<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p><p>In <i>Are we explaining consciousness yet?,</i><sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-2001_55-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-2001-55"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>52<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> Dennett approves of an account of qualia defined as the deep, rich collection of individual neural responses that are too fine-grained for language to capture. For instance, a person might have an alarming reaction to yellow because of a yellow car that hit her previously, and someone else might have a nostalgic reaction to a comfort food. These effects are too individual-specific to be captured by English words. "If one dubs this inevitable residue <i>qualia</i>, then qualia are guaranteed to exist, but they are just more of the same, dispositional properties that have not yet been entered in the catalog".<sup id="cite_ref-Dennett-2001_55-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Dennett-2001-55"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>52<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Paul_Churchland">Paul Churchland</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=24" title="Edit section: Paul Churchland"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>According to <a href="/wiki/Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland">Paul Churchland</a>, Mary might be considered akin to a <a href="/wiki/Feral_child" title="Feral child">feral child</a> who suffered extreme isolation during childhood. Technically when Mary leaves the room, she would not have the ability to see or know what the color red is, as a brain has to learn and develop how to see colors. Patterns need to form in the V4 section of the <a href="/wiki/Visual_cortex" title="Visual cortex">visual cortex</a>, which occurs via exposure to wavelengths of light. This exposure needs to occur during the early stages of <a href="/wiki/Brain" title="Brain">brain</a> development. In Mary's case, the identifications and categorizations of <a href="/wiki/Color" title="Color">color</a> will only be in respect to representations of black and white.<sup id="cite_ref-56" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-56"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>53<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Gary_Drescher">Gary Drescher</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=25" title="Edit section: Gary Drescher"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p>In his book <i>Good and Real,</i><sup id="cite_ref-Drescher-2006_57-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Drescher-2006-57"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>54<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> <a href="/wiki/Gary_Drescher" title="Gary Drescher">Gary Drescher</a> compares qualia with "<a href="/wiki/Hygienic_macro" title="Hygienic macro">gensyms</a>" (generated symbols) in <a href="/wiki/Common_Lisp" title="Common Lisp">Common Lisp</a>. These are objects that Lisp treats as having no properties or components, which can only be identified as equal or not equal to other objects. Drescher explains, "we have no introspective access to whatever internal properties make the <i>red</i> gensym recognizably distinct from the <i>green</i> [...] even though we know the sensation when we experience it."<sup id="cite_ref-Drescher-2006_57-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Drescher-2006-57"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>54<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> Under this interpretation of qualia, Drescher responds to the Mary thought experiment by noting that "knowing about red-related cognitive structures and the dispositions they <a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/engender" class="extiw" title="wikt:engender">engender</a>&#160;– even if that knowledge were implausibly detailed and exhaustive&#160;– would not necessarily give someone who lacks prior color-experience the slightest clue whether the card now being shown is of the color called red." However, this does not imply that our experience of red is non-mechanical, as "gensyms are a routine feature of computer-programming languages".<sup id="cite_ref-Tye-2000_27-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Tye-2000-27"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page: 82">&#58;&#8202;82&#8202;</span></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="David_Lewis">David Lewis</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=26" title="Edit section: David Lewis"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><a href="/wiki/David_Kellogg_Lewis" class="mw-redirect" title="David Kellogg Lewis">David K. Lewis</a> introduced a hypothesis about types of knowledge and their transmission in qualia cases. Lewis agrees that Mary cannot learn what red looks like through her monochrome physicalist studies, but he proposes that this does not matter. Learning transmits information, but experiencing qualia does not transmit information: it communicates abilities. When Mary sees red, she does not acquire any new information; she instead gains new abilities. Now she can remember what red looks like, imagine what other red things might look like and recognize further instances of redness. </p><p>Lewis states that Jackson's thought experiment uses the <i>phenomenal information hypothesis</i>&#160;– that is, that the new knowledge that Mary gains upon seeing red is <a href="/wiki/Phenomenalism" title="Phenomenalism">phenomenal</a> information. Lewis then proposes a different <i>ability hypothesis</i> that differentiates between two types of knowledge: knowledge "that" (<i>information</i>) and knowledge "how" (<i>abilities</i>). Normally the two are entangled; ordinary learning is also an experience of the subject concerned, and people learn both information (for instance, that Freud was a psychologist) and gain ability (to recognize images of Freud). However, in the thought experiment, Mary can use ordinary learning only to gain "that" knowledge. She is prevented from using experience to gain the "how" knowledge that would allow her to remember, imagine and recognize the color red. </p><p>We have the intuition that Mary has been deprived of some vital data to do with the experience of redness. It is also uncontroversial that some things cannot be learned inside the room; for example, Mary cannot learn how to ski within the room. Lewis has articulated that information and ability are potentially different things. In this way, <i>physicalism</i> is still compatible with the conclusion that Mary gains new knowledge. It is also useful for considering other instances of qualia&#160;– "being a bat" is an ability, so it is "how" knowledge.<sup id="cite_ref-58" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-58"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>55<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Marvin_Minsky">Marvin Minsky</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=27" title="Edit section: Marvin Minsky"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg" class="mw-file-description"><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg/250px-Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg" decoding="async" width="170" height="170" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg/330px-Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg/500px-Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg 2x" data-file-width="1024" data-file-height="1025" /></a><figcaption>Marvin Minsky</figcaption></figure> <p><a href="/wiki/Artificial_intelligence" title="Artificial intelligence">Artificial intelligence</a> researcher <a href="/wiki/Marvin_Minsky" title="Marvin Minsky">Marvin Minsky</a> thinks the problems posed by qualia are essentially issues of complexity, or rather of mistaking complexity for simplicity. </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712" /><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>Now, a philosophical dualist might then complain: <i>"You've described how hurting affects your mind&#160;– but you still can't express how hurting feels."</i> This, I maintain, is a huge mistake&#160;– that attempt to reify <i>"feeling"</i> as an independent entity, with an essence that's indescribable. As I see it, feelings are not strange alien things. It is precisely those cognitive changes themselves that constitute what <i>"hurting"</i> is&#160;– and this also includes all those clumsy attempts to represent and summarize those changes. The big mistake comes from looking for some single, simple, <i>"essence"</i> of hurting, rather than recognizing that this is the word we use for complex rearrangement of our disposition of resources.<sup id="cite_ref-59" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-59"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>56<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></p></blockquote> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Michael_Tye">Michael Tye</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=28" title="Edit section: Michael Tye"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <figure class="mw-default-size" typeof="mw:File/Thumb"><a href="/wiki/File:Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG" class="mw-file-description"><img src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1d/Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG/170px-Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG" decoding="async" width="170" height="182" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1d/Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG/255px-Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1d/Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG/340px-Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG 2x" data-file-width="357" data-file-height="382" /></a><figcaption>Michael Tye</figcaption></figure> <p><a href="/wiki/Michael_Tye_(philosopher)" title="Michael Tye (philosopher)">Michael Tye</a> believes there are no qualia, no "veils of perception" between us and the referents of our thought. He describes our experience of an object in the world as "transparent", meaning that no matter what private understandings and/or misunderstandings we may have of something, it is still there before us in reality. The idea that qualia intervene between ourselves and their origins he regards as a "massive error. That is just not credible. It seems totally implausible [...] that visual experience is systematically misleading in this way." He continues: "the only objects of which you are aware are the external ones making up the scene before your eyes."<sup id="cite_ref-Tye-2000_27-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Tye-2000-27"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page: 46-47">&#58;&#8202;46-47&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>From this he concludes "that there are no such qualities of experiences. They are qualities of external surfaces (and volumes and films), if they are qualities of anything." Thus he believes we can take our experiences at face value since there is no fear of losing contact with the realness of physical objects.<sup id="cite_ref-Tye-2000_27-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Tye-2000-27"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page: 49">&#58;&#8202;49&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>In Tye's thought there is no question of qualia without information being contained within them; it is always "an awareness that" and always "representational". He characterizes the perception of children as a misperception of referents that are undoubtedly as present for them as they are for grown-ups. As he puts it, they may not know that "the house is dilapidated", but there is no doubt about their seeing the house. After-images are dismissed as presenting no problem for the <i>transparency theory</i> because, as he puts it, after-images being illusory, there is nothing that one sees.<sup id="cite_ref-Tye-2000_27-5" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Tye-2000-27"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 58–59">&#58;&#8202;58–59&#8202;</span></sup> </p><p>Tye proposes that phenomenal experience has five basic elements, for which he has coined the acronym PANIC&#160;– Poised, Abstract, Nonconceptual, Intentional Content.<sup id="cite_ref-Tye-2000_27-6" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Tye-2000-27"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page: 63">&#58;&#8202;63&#8202;</span></sup> </p> <ul><li><i>"Poised"</i> - the phenomenal experience is always present to the understanding, whether or not the agent is able to apply a concept to it.</li> <li><i>"Abstract"</i> - it is unclear whether you are in touch with a concrete object (for example, someone may feel a pain in an amputated <a href="/wiki/Phantom_limb" title="Phantom limb">limb</a>).</li> <li><i>"Nonconceptual"</i> - phenomenon can exist although one does not have the concept by which to recognize it.</li> <li><i>"Intentional (Content)"</i> - it represents something, whether or not the observer is taking advantage of that fact.</li></ul> <p>Tye adds that the experience is like a map in that, in most cases, it goes beyond the shapes, edges, volumes, etc. in the world&#160;– you may not be reading the a map but, as with an actual map there is a reliable match with what it is mapping. This is why Tye calls his theory <i>representationalism,</i> makes it plain that Tye believes that he has retained a direct contact with what produces the phenomena and is therefore not hampered by any trace of a "veil of perception".<sup id="cite_ref-Tye-1991-1995_60-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Tye-1991-1995-60"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>57<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Roger_Scruton">Roger Scruton</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=29" title="Edit section: Roger Scruton"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <p><a href="/wiki/Roger_Scruton" title="Roger Scruton">Roger Scruton</a>, while skeptical that <a href="/wiki/Neuroscience" title="Neuroscience">neurobiology</a> can tell us much about consciousness, believes qualia is an incoherent concept, and that <a href="/wiki/Wittgenstein" class="mw-redirect" title="Wittgenstein">Wittgenstein</a>'s <a href="/wiki/Private_language_argument" title="Private language argument">private language argument</a> effectively disproves it. Scruton writes, </p> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1244412712" /><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>The belief that these essentially private features of mental states exist, and that they form the introspectible essence of whatever possesses them, is grounded in a confusion, one that Wittgenstein tried to sweep away in his arguments against the possibility of a private language. When you judge that I am in pain, it is on the basis of my circumstances and behavior, and you could be wrong. When I ascribe a pain to myself, I don't use any such evidence. I don't find out that I am in pain by observation, nor can I be wrong. But that is not because there is some other fact about my pain, accessible only to me, which I consult in order to establish what I am feeling. For if there were this inner private quality, I could misperceive it; I could get it wrong, and I would have to find out whether I am in pain. To describe my inner state, I would also have to invent a language, intelligible only to me&#160;– and that, Wittgenstein plausibly argues, is impossible. The conclusion to draw is that I ascribe pain to myself not on the basis of some inner quale but on no basis at all.<sup id="cite_ref-61" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-61"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>58<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></p></blockquote> <p>In his book <i>On Human Nature</i>,<sup id="cite_ref-Scruton_2017_62-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Scruton_2017-62"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>59<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> Scruton poses a potential line of criticism to this, which is that while Wittgenstein's private language argument does disprove the concept of reference to qualia, or the idea that we can talk, even to ourselves, of their nature; it does not disprove their existence altogether. Scruton believes that this is a valid criticism, and this is why he stops short of actually saying that qualia do not exist, and instead merely suggests that we should abandon the concept. However, he quotes Wittgenstein in response: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."<sup id="cite_ref-Scruton_2017_62-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Scruton_2017-62"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>59<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> </p> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="History">History</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=30" title="Edit section: History"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236090951" /><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="/wiki/Leibniz%27s_gap" title="Leibniz&#39;s gap">Leibniz's gap</a></div><p> Leibniz's passage in <a href="/wiki/Monadology" title="Monadology">Monadology</a> describing the <a href="/wiki/Explanatory_gap" title="Explanatory gap">explanatory gap</a> goes as follows:</p><blockquote><p>It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which depends on it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is, by figures and motions. And, supposing that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we might enter it as into a mill. And this granted, we should only find on visiting it, pieces which push one against another, but never anything by which to explain a perception. This must be sought, therefore, in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine.<sup id="cite_ref-63" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-63"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>60<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup></p></blockquote> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="See_also">See also</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=31" title="Edit section: See also"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1266661725">.mw-parser-output .portalbox{padding:0;margin:0.5em 0;display:table;box-sizing:border-box;max-width:175px;list-style:none}.mw-parser-output .portalborder{border:1px solid var(--border-color-base,#a2a9b1);padding:0.1em;background:var(--background-color-neutral-subtle,#f8f9fa)}.mw-parser-output .portalbox-entry{display:table-row;font-size:85%;line-height:110%;height:1.9em;font-style:italic;font-weight:bold}.mw-parser-output .portalbox-image{display:table-cell;padding:0.2em;vertical-align:middle;text-align:center}.mw-parser-output .portalbox-link{display:table-cell;padding:0.2em 0.2em 0.2em 0.3em;vertical-align:middle}@media(min-width:720px){.mw-parser-output .portalleft{margin:0.5em 1em 0.5em 0}.mw-parser-output .portalright{clear:right;float:right;margin:0.5em 0 0.5em 1em}}</style><ul role="navigation" aria-label="Portals" class="noprint portalbox portalborder portalright"> <li class="portalbox-entry"><span class="portalbox-image"><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/Socrates.png/18px-Socrates.png" decoding="async" width="18" height="28" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/Socrates.png/27px-Socrates.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/Socrates.png/36px-Socrates.png 2x" data-file-width="326" data-file-height="500" /></span></span></span><span class="portalbox-link"><a href="/wiki/Portal:Philosophy" title="Portal:Philosophy">Philosophy portal</a></span></li></ul> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1184024115">.mw-parser-output .div-col{margin-top:0.3em;column-width:30em}.mw-parser-output .div-col-small{font-size:90%}.mw-parser-output .div-col-rules{column-rule:1px solid #aaa}.mw-parser-output .div-col dl,.mw-parser-output .div-col ol,.mw-parser-output .div-col ul{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .div-col li,.mw-parser-output .div-col dd{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}</style><div class="div-col" style="column-width: 30em;"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Binding_problem" title="Binding problem">Binding problem</a>&#160;– Unanswered question in the study of consciousness</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Blockhead_(thought_experiment)" title="Blockhead (thought experiment)">Blockhead (thought experiment)</a>&#160;– Hypothetical computer system postulated by Ned Block</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Chinese_room" title="Chinese room">Chinese room</a>&#160;– Thought experiment on artificial intelligence</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Eliminative_materialism" title="Eliminative materialism">Eliminative materialism</a>&#160;– Philosophical view that some states of mind, as commonly understood, do not exist</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</a>&#160;– Position on the mind–body problem</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Epistemic_injustice" title="Epistemic injustice">Epistemic injustice</a>&#160;– Injustice related to knowledge</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Form_constant" title="Form constant">Form constant</a>&#160;– Recurringly observed geometric pattern</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Further_facts" title="Further facts">Further facts</a>&#160;– Philosophy idea</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ideasthesia" title="Ideasthesia">Ideasthesia</a>&#160;– Phenomenon in which concepts evoke sensory experiences</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Innatism" title="Innatism">Innatism</a>&#160;– Belief that the human mind is born with knowledge</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Indeterminacy_(philosophy)" title="Indeterminacy (philosophy)">Indeterminacy (philosophy)</a>&#160;– describing the shortcomings of definition in philosophy<span style="display:none" class="category-wikidata-fallback-annotation">Pages displaying wikidata descriptions as a fallback</span></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Leibniz%27s_gap" title="Leibniz&#39;s gap">Leibniz's gap</a>&#160;– Philosophical problem</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Lived_experience" title="Lived experience">Lived experience</a>&#160;– Phenomenological concept</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem" title="Mind–body problem">Mind–body problem</a>&#160;– Open question in philosophy of how abstract minds interact with physical bodies</li> <li><a href="/wiki/New_mysterianism" title="New mysterianism">New mysterianism</a>&#160;– Philosophical position on the mind-body problem</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Open_individualism" title="Open individualism">Open individualism</a>&#160;– Philosophical view that a single subject embodies all individuals</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Process_philosophy" title="Process philosophy">Process philosophy</a>&#160;– Philosophical approach</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Self-awareness" title="Self-awareness">Self-awareness</a>&#160;– Capacity for introspection and individuation as a subject</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Self-reference" title="Self-reference">Self-reference</a>&#160;– Sentence, idea or formula that refers to itself</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Synesthesia" title="Synesthesia">Synesthesia</a>&#160;– Neurological condition involving the crossing of senses</li> <li><a href="/wiki/Veil_of_perception" class="mw-redirect" title="Veil of perception">Veil of perception</a>&#160;– Debate in the philosophy of mind<span style="display:none" class="category-annotation-with-redirected-description">Pages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets</span></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Vertiginous_question" title="Vertiginous question">Vertiginous question</a>&#160;– Philosophical argument by Benj Hellie</li></ul></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Explanatory_notes">Explanatory notes</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=32" title="Edit section: Explanatory notes"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1239543626">.mw-parser-output .reflist{margin-bottom:0.5em;list-style-type:decimal}@media screen{.mw-parser-output .reflist{font-size:90%}}.mw-parser-output .reflist .references{font-size:100%;margin-bottom:0;list-style-type:inherit}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns-2{column-width:30em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns-3{column-width:25em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns{margin-top:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns ol{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .reflist-columns li{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}.mw-parser-output .reflist-upper-alpha{list-style-type:upper-alpha}.mw-parser-output .reflist-upper-roman{list-style-type:upper-roman}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-alpha{list-style-type:lower-alpha}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-greek{list-style-type:lower-greek}.mw-parser-output .reflist-lower-roman{list-style-type:lower-roman}</style><div class="reflist"> <div class="mw-references-wrap"><ol class="references"> <li id="cite_note-17"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-17">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">See <a href="/wiki/Identity_(philosophy)#Metaphysics_of_identity" title="Identity (philosophy)">metaphysical identity</a> and <a href="/wiki/Modal_logic#Alethic_logic" title="Modal logic">necessity</a></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-18"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-18">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">The premise of the thought experiment.</span> </li> <li id="cite_note-21"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-21">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">For an explanation of conceivability, see Levine, 1999,<sup id="cite_ref-Levine-1999_19-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Levine-1999-19"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>17<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup> Chalmers, 2003,<sup id="cite_ref-Chalmers-2003_20-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Chalmers-2003-20"><span class="cite-bracket">&#91;</span>18<span class="cite-bracket">&#93;</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page: 105–106">&#58;&#8202;105–106&#8202;</span></sup> or <a href="/wiki/Philosophical_zombie" title="Philosophical zombie">philosophical zombie</a>.</span> </li> </ol></div></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="References">References</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=33" title="Edit section: References"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Citations">Citations</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=34" title="Edit section: Citations"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1239543626" /><div class="reflist"> <div class="mw-references-wrap mw-references-columns"><ol class="references"> <li id="cite_note-1"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-1">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1238218222">.mw-parser-output cite.citation{font-style:inherit;word-wrap:break-word}.mw-parser-output .citation q{quotes:"\"""\"""'""'"}.mw-parser-output .citation:target{background-color:rgba(0,127,255,0.133)}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-free.id-lock-free a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Lock-green.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited.id-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration.id-lock-registration a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Lock-gray-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription.id-lock-subscription a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Lock-red-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg")right 0.1em center/12px no-repeat}body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-free a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription a,body:not(.skin-timeless):not(.skin-minerva) .mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon a{background-size:contain;padding:0 1em 0 0}.mw-parser-output .cs1-code{color:inherit;background:inherit;border:none;padding:inherit}.mw-parser-output .cs1-hidden-error{display:none;color:var(--color-error,#d33)}.mw-parser-output .cs1-visible-error{color:var(--color-error,#d33)}.mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{display:none;color:#085;margin-left:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-left{padding-left:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-right{padding-right:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .citation .mw-selflink{font-weight:inherit}@media screen{.mw-parser-output .cs1-format{font-size:95%}html.skin-theme-clientpref-night .mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{color:#18911f}}@media screen and (prefers-color-scheme:dark){html.skin-theme-clientpref-os .mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{color:#18911f}}</style><cite id="CITEREFKriegel2014" class="citation book cs1">Kriegel, Uriah (2014). Kriegel, Uriah (ed.). <i>Current controversies in philosophy of mind</i>. New York, NY: Routledge. p.&#160;201. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-415-53086-6" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-415-53086-6"><bdi>978-0-415-53086-6</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Current+controversies+in+philosophy+of+mind&amp;rft.place=New+York%2C+NY&amp;rft.pages=201&amp;rft.pub=Routledge&amp;rft.date=2014&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-415-53086-6&amp;rft.aulast=Kriegel&amp;rft.aufirst=Uriah&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-2"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-2">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1126788409">.mw-parser-output .plainlist ol,.mw-parser-output .plainlist ul{line-height:inherit;list-style:none;margin:0;padding:0}.mw-parser-output .plainlist ol li,.mw-parser-output .plainlist ul li{margin-bottom:0}</style><div class="plainlist" style="display:inline;"><ul style="display:inline;"><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;;display:inline; margin:0;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFDamasio2000" class="citation book cs1">Damasio, Antonio R. (2000). <i>The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness</i>. A Harvest book. San Diego, CA: Harcourt. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-15-601075-7" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-15-601075-7"><bdi>978-0-15-601075-7</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=The+feeling+of+what+happens%3A+body+and+emotion+in+the+making+of+consciousness&amp;rft.place=San+Diego%2C+CA&amp;rft.series=A+Harvest+book&amp;rft.pub=Harcourt&amp;rft.date=2000&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-15-601075-7&amp;rft.aulast=Damasio&amp;rft.aufirst=Antonio+R.&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;;margin-top:.5em;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFEdelmanGallyBaars2011" class="citation journal cs1">Edelman, Gerald M.; Gally, Joseph A.; Baars, Bernard J. (2011). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3111444">"Biology of Consciousness"</a>. <i>Frontiers in Psychology</i>. <b>2</b> (4): 4. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.3389%2Ffpsyg.2011.00004">10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00004</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1664-1078">1664-1078</a>. <a href="/wiki/PMC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMC (identifier)">PMC</a>&#160;<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3111444">3111444</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21713129">21713129</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Frontiers+in+Psychology&amp;rft.atitle=Biology+of+Consciousness&amp;rft.volume=2&amp;rft.issue=4&amp;rft.pages=4&amp;rft.date=2011&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC3111444%23id-name%3DPMC&amp;rft.issn=1664-1078&amp;rft_id=info%3Apmid%2F21713129&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.3389%2Ffpsyg.2011.00004&amp;rft.aulast=Edelman&amp;rft.aufirst=Gerald+M.&amp;rft.au=Gally%2C+Joseph+A.&amp;rft.au=Baars%2C+Bernard+J.&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC3111444&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFEdelman1992" class="citation book cs1">Edelman, Gerald Maurice (1992). <i>Bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind</i>. New York: BasicBooks. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-465-00764-6" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-465-00764-6"><bdi>978-0-465-00764-6</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Bright+air%2C+brilliant+fire%3A+on+the+matter+of+the+mind&amp;rft.place=New+York&amp;rft.pub=BasicBooks&amp;rft.date=1992&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-465-00764-6&amp;rft.aulast=Edelman&amp;rft.aufirst=Gerald+Maurice&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFEdelman2003" class="citation journal cs1">Edelman, Gerald M. (2003). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3139744">"Naturalizing Consciousness: A Theoretical Framework"</a>. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</i>. <b>100</b> (9): <span class="nowrap">5520–</span>5524. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1600-0536.1978.tb04573.x">10.1111/j.1600-0536.1978.tb04573.x</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0027-8424">0027-8424</a>. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3139744">3139744</a>. <a href="/wiki/PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/154377">154377</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:10086119">10086119</a>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230719153241/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3139744">Archived</a> from the original on 2023-07-19<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-19</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Proceedings+of+the+National+Academy+of+Sciences+of+the+United+States+of+America&amp;rft.atitle=Naturalizing+Consciousness%3A+A+Theoretical+Framework&amp;rft.volume=100&amp;rft.issue=9&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E5520-%3C%2Fspan%3E5524&amp;rft.date=2003&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A10086119%23id-name%3DS2CID&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.1600-0536.1978.tb04573.x&amp;rft.issn=0027-8424&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F3139744%23id-name%3DJSTOR&amp;rft_id=info%3Apmid%2F154377&amp;rft.aulast=Edelman&amp;rft.aufirst=Gerald+M.&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F3139744&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFKoch2020" class="citation book cs1">Koch, Christof (2020). <i>The feeling of life itself: why consciousness is widespread but can't be computed</i> (First MIT Press paperback edition 2020&#160;ed.). Cambridge, MA London: The MIT Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-53955-5" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-53955-5"><bdi>978-0-262-53955-5</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=The+feeling+of+life+itself%3A+why+consciousness+is+widespread+but+can%27t+be+computed&amp;rft.place=Cambridge%2C+MA+London&amp;rft.edition=First+MIT+Press+paperback+edition+2020&amp;rft.pub=The+MIT+Press&amp;rft.date=2020&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-262-53955-5&amp;rft.aulast=Koch&amp;rft.aufirst=Christof&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFLlinásLlinás2002" class="citation book cs1">Llinás, Rodolfo Riascos; Llinás, Rodolfo R. (2002). <i>I of the vortex: from neurons to self</i>. A Bradford book (1&#160;ed.). Cambridge, Mass. London: MIT Press. pp.&#160;<span class="nowrap">202–</span>207. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-62163-2" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-62163-2"><bdi>978-0-262-62163-2</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=I+of+the+vortex%3A+from+neurons+to+self&amp;rft.place=Cambridge%2C+Mass.+London&amp;rft.series=A+Bradford+book&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E202-%3C%2Fspan%3E207&amp;rft.edition=1&amp;rft.pub=MIT+Press&amp;rft.date=2002&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-262-62163-2&amp;rft.aulast=Llin%C3%A1s&amp;rft.aufirst=Rodolfo+Riascos&amp;rft.au=Llin%C3%A1s%2C+Rodolfo+R.&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFOizumiAlbantakisTononi2014" class="citation journal cs1">Oizumi, Masafumi; Albantakis, Larissa; Tononi, Giulio (2014-05-08). Sporns, Olaf (ed.). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4014402">"From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0"</a>. <i>PLOS Computational Biology</i>. <b>10</b> (5): e1003588. <a href="/wiki/Bibcode_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Bibcode (identifier)">Bibcode</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2014PLSCB..10E3588O">2014PLSCB..10E3588O</a>. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1003588">10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1553-7358">1553-7358</a>. <a href="/wiki/PMC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMC (identifier)">PMC</a>&#160;<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4014402">4014402</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24811198">24811198</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=PLOS+Computational+Biology&amp;rft.atitle=From+the+Phenomenology+to+the+Mechanisms+of+Consciousness%3A+Integrated+Information+Theory+3.0&amp;rft.volume=10&amp;rft.issue=5&amp;rft.pages=e1003588&amp;rft.date=2014-05-08&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC4014402%23id-name%3DPMC&amp;rft_id=info%3Abibcode%2F2014PLSCB..10E3588O&amp;rft_id=info%3Apmid%2F24811198&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1003588&amp;rft.issn=1553-7358&amp;rft.aulast=Oizumi&amp;rft.aufirst=Masafumi&amp;rft.au=Albantakis%2C+Larissa&amp;rft.au=Tononi%2C+Giulio&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC4014402&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFOvergaardMogensenKirkeby-Hinrup2021" class="citation book cs1">Overgaard, M.; Mogensen, J.; Kirkeby-Hinrup, A., eds. 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Philosophy. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind. Canada: <a href="/wiki/University_of_Waterloo" title="University of Waterloo">University of Waterloo</a>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110508140707/http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/qualia.html">Archived</a> from the original on 2011-05-08<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2010-12-03</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.btitle=Qualia&amp;rft.place=Canada&amp;rft.series=Dictionary+of+Philosophy+of+Mind&amp;rft.pub=University+of+Waterloo&amp;rft.date=2004-05-11&amp;rft.aulast=Eliasmith&amp;rft.aufirst=Chris&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fphilosophy.uwaterloo.ca%2FMindDict%2Fqualia.html&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-4"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-4">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1126788409" /><div class="plainlist" style="display:inline;"><ul style="display:inline;"><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;;display:inline; margin:0;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFPeirce1982" class="citation book cs1">Peirce, Charles S. 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Ditzingen: Reclam. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-3-15-014005-5" title="Special:BookSources/978-3-15-014005-5"><bdi>978-3-15-014005-5</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Identity+and+necessity%3A+englisch%2Fdeutsch+%3D+Identit%C3%A4t+und+Notwendigkeit&amp;rft.place=Ditzingen&amp;rft.series=Reclams+Universal-Bibliothek&amp;rft.pub=Reclam&amp;rft.date=2021&amp;rft.isbn=978-3-15-014005-5&amp;rft.aulast=Kripke&amp;rft.aufirst=Saul+A.&amp;rft.au=H%C3%B6rzer%2C+Gregor+M.&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-29"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-29">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFKripke1977" class="citation cs2">Kripke, Saul A. 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In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> (Summer 2009s&#160;ed.). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230406214709/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/zombies/">Archived</a> from the original on 2023-04-06<span class="reference-accessdate">. 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Interviewed by John Brockman. <a href="/wiki/Edge.org" title="Edge.org">Edge Foundation, Inc.</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20151107054031/http://edge.org/3rd_culture/minsky/">Archived</a> from the original on 2015-11-07<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-19</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Edge.org&amp;rft.atitle=Consciousness+is+a+Big+Suitcase&amp;rft.date=1998-02-26&amp;rft.aulast=Marvin&amp;rft.aufirst=Minsky&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.edge.org%2F3rd_culture%2Fminsky%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-32"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-32">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFKind2020" class="citation book cs1">Kind, Amy (2020-03-17). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315750903/philosophy-mind-basics-amy-kind"><i>Philosophy of Mind: The Basics</i></a>. Routledge. pp.&#160;<span class="nowrap">66–</span>67. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.4324%2F9781315750903">10.4324/9781315750903</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781315750903" title="Special:BookSources/9781315750903"><bdi>9781315750903</bdi></a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:214260059">214260059</a>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230621111730/https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315750903/philosophy-mind-basics-amy-kind">Archived</a> from the original on 2023-06-21<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-22</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Philosophy+of+Mind%3A+The+Basics&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E66-%3C%2Fspan%3E67&amp;rft.pub=Routledge&amp;rft.date=2020-03-17&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A214260059%23id-name%3DS2CID&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.4324%2F9781315750903&amp;rft.isbn=9781315750903&amp;rft.aulast=Kind&amp;rft.aufirst=Amy&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.taylorfrancis.com%2Fbooks%2Fmono%2F10.4324%2F9781315750903%2Fphilosophy-mind-basics-amy-kind&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-33"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-33">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite class="citation book cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/#Obje">"Qualia: The Knowledge Argument"</a>. <i>Qualia: The Knowledge Argument | 4. Objections</i>. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2024.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Qualia%3A+The+Knowledge+Argument&amp;rft.btitle=Qualia%3A+The+Knowledge+Argument+%7C+4.+Objections&amp;rft.pub=Metaphysics+Research+Lab%2C+Stanford+University&amp;rft.date=2024&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fqualia-knowledge%2F%23Obje&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span> <span class="cs1-visible-error citation-comment"><code class="cs1-code">{{<a href="/wiki/Template:Cite_book" title="Template:Cite book">cite book</a>}}</code>: </span><span class="cs1-visible-error citation-comment"><code class="cs1-code">&#124;website=</code> ignored (<a href="/wiki/Help:CS1_errors#periodical_ignored" title="Help:CS1 errors">help</a>)</span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-34"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-34">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite class="citation book cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/#DualViewAbouKnowArgu">"Qualia: The Knowledge Argument"</a>. <i>Qualia: The Knowledge Argument | 5. 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Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2024.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Qualia%3A+The+Knowledge+Argument&amp;rft.btitle=Qualia%3A+The+Knowledge+Argument+%7C+5.+The+Dualist+View+About+the+Knowledge+Argument&amp;rft.pub=Metaphysics+Research+Lab%2C+Stanford+University&amp;rft.date=2024&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fqualia-knowledge%2F%23DualViewAbouKnowArgu&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span> <span class="cs1-visible-error citation-comment"><code class="cs1-code">{{<a href="/wiki/Template:Cite_book" title="Template:Cite book">cite book</a>}}</code>: </span><span class="cs1-visible-error citation-comment"><code class="cs1-code">&#124;website=</code> ignored (<a href="/wiki/Help:CS1_errors#periodical_ignored" title="Help:CS1 errors">help</a>)</span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-amy_kind-35"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-amy_kind_35-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFKind" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Kind, Amy. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/">"Qualia"</a>. <i>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221106032740/https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/">Archived</a> from the original on 6 November 2022<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">6 November</span> 2022</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Qualia&amp;rft.btitle=Internet+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&amp;rft.aulast=Kind&amp;rft.aufirst=Amy&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fiep.utm.edu%2Fqualia%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Chalmers-1995-36"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Chalmers-1995_36-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFChalmers1995" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">Chalmers, D.</a> (1995). "Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia". In Metzinger, Thomas (ed.). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html"><i>Conscious Experience</i></a>. Imprint Academic. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20101121043853/http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html">Archived</a> from the original on 2010-11-21<span class="reference-accessdate">. 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Cambridge: Cambridge university press. p.&#160;101. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-47503-7" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-521-47503-7"><bdi>978-0-521-47503-7</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Subjects+of+experience&amp;rft.place=Cambridge&amp;rft.series=Cambridge+studies+in+philosophy&amp;rft.pages=101&amp;rft.pub=Cambridge+university+press&amp;rft.date=1996&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-521-47503-7&amp;rft.aulast=Lowe&amp;rft.aufirst=Edward+Jonathan&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-38"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-38">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFMaund1975" class="citation journal cs1">Maund, J. B. (September 1975). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0045509100012856/type/journal_article">"The Representative Theory Of Perception"</a>. <i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i>. <b>5</b> (1): <span class="nowrap">41–</span>55. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00455091.1975.10716096">10.1080/00455091.1975.10716096</a>. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0045-5091">0045-5091</a>. <a href="/wiki/S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:146937154">146937154</a>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20240417162311/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-philosophy/article/abs/representative-theory-of-perception/6264ABCF1F376537BB17430B6E1AD28E">Archived</a> from the original on 2024-04-17<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-18</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Canadian+Journal+of+Philosophy&amp;rft.atitle=The+Representative+Theory+Of+Perception&amp;rft.volume=5&amp;rft.issue=1&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E41-%3C%2Fspan%3E55&amp;rft.date=1975-09&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A146937154%23id-name%3DS2CID&amp;rft.issn=0045-5091&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1080%2F00455091.1975.10716096&amp;rft.aulast=Maund&amp;rft.aufirst=J.+B.&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cambridge.org%2Fcore%2Fproduct%2Fidentifier%2FS0045509100012856%2Ftype%2Fjournal_article&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Maund-1995-2003-39"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Maund-1995-2003_39-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1126788409" /><div class="plainlist" style="display:inline;"><ul style="display:inline;"><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;;display:inline; margin:0;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFMaund1995" class="citation book cs1">Maund, Barry (1995). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=lNg9AAAAIAAJ&amp;q=qualia"><i>Colours: their nature and representation</i></a>. Cambridge studies in philosophy (Paperback re-issue, digitally printed version&#160;ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-47273-9" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-521-47273-9"><bdi>978-0-521-47273-9</bdi></a>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20240417162254/https://books.google.com/books?id=lNg9AAAAIAAJ&amp;q=qualia#v=snippet&amp;q=qualia&amp;f=false">Archived</a> from the original on 2024-04-17<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2021-08-15</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Colours%3A+their+nature+and+representation&amp;rft.place=Cambridge&amp;rft.series=Cambridge+studies+in+philosophy&amp;rft.edition=Paperback+re-issue%2C+digitally+printed+version&amp;rft.pub=Cambridge+Univ.+Press&amp;rft.date=1995&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-521-47273-9&amp;rft.aulast=Maund&amp;rft.aufirst=Barry&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DlNg9AAAAIAAJ%26q%3Dqualia&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;;margin-top:.5em;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFMaund2003" class="citation book cs1">Maund, Barry (2003). <i>Perception</i>. Central problems of philosophy. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-7735-2465-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-7735-2465-1"><bdi>978-0-7735-2465-1</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Perception&amp;rft.place=Montreal&amp;rft.series=Central+problems+of+philosophy&amp;rft.pub=McGill-Queen%27s+Univ.+Press&amp;rft.date=2003&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-7735-2465-1&amp;rft.aulast=Maund&amp;rft.aufirst=Barry&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul></div></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-40"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-40">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFPerkins1983" class="citation book cs1">Perkins, Moreland (1983). <i>Sensing the world</i>. Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-915145-75-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-915145-75-1"><bdi>978-0-915145-75-1</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Sensing+the+world&amp;rft.place=Indianapolis%2C+Ind&amp;rft.pub=Hackett&amp;rft.date=1983&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-915145-75-1&amp;rft.aulast=Perkins&amp;rft.aufirst=Moreland&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-41"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-41">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFRyle1949" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Ryle, Gilbert</a> (1949). <i>The concept of mind</i> (Repr.&#160;ed.). Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr. p.&#160;215. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-226-73296-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-226-73296-1"><bdi>978-0-226-73296-1</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=The+concept+of+mind&amp;rft.place=Chicago&amp;rft.pages=215&amp;rft.edition=Repr.&amp;rft.pub=Univ.+of+Chicago+Pr&amp;rft.date=1949&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-226-73296-1&amp;rft.aulast=Ryle&amp;rft.aufirst=Gilbert&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-42"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-42">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFAyerAyer1957" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/A._J._Ayer" title="A. J. Ayer">Ayer, Alfred J.</a>; Ayer, Alfred Jules (1957). <i>The problem of knowledge</i>. Penguin books Philosophy (Reprinted&#160;ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. p.&#160;107. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-14-013547-3" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-14-013547-3"><bdi>978-0-14-013547-3</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=The+problem+of+knowledge&amp;rft.place=Harmondsworth&amp;rft.series=Penguin+books+Philosophy&amp;rft.pages=107&amp;rft.edition=Reprinted&amp;rft.pub=Penguin+Books&amp;rft.date=1957&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-14-013547-3&amp;rft.aulast=Ayer&amp;rft.aufirst=Alfred+J.&amp;rft.au=Ayer%2C+Alfred+Jules&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-43"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-43">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFBall2016" class="citation journal cs1">Ball, Derek (2016). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/from-the-knowledge-argument-to-mental-substance-resurrecting-the-mind/">"From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind"</a>. <i>Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews</i>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Notre+Dame+Philosophical+Reviews&amp;rft.atitle=From+the+Knowledge+Argument+to+Mental+Substance%3A+Resurrecting+the+Mind&amp;rft.date=2016&amp;rft.aulast=Ball&amp;rft.aufirst=Derek&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fndpr.nd.edu%2Freviews%2Ffrom-the-knowledge-argument-to-mental-substance-resurrecting-the-mind%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-44"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-44">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFRobinsonRobinson2004" class="citation book cs1">Robinson, William S.; Robinson, William Spencer (2004). <i>Understanding phenomenal consciousness</i>. Cambridge studies in philosophy (1. publ&#160;ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-83463-6" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-521-83463-6"><bdi>978-0-521-83463-6</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Understanding+phenomenal+consciousness&amp;rft.place=Cambridge&amp;rft.series=Cambridge+studies+in+philosophy&amp;rft.edition=1.+publ&amp;rft.pub=Cambridge+University+Press&amp;rft.date=2004&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-521-83463-6&amp;rft.aulast=Robinson&amp;rft.aufirst=William+S.&amp;rft.au=Robinson%2C+William+Spencer&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-45"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-45">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFSpener2005" class="citation web cs1">Spener, Maja (2005). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/understanding-phenomenal-consciousness/">"Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness"</a>. <i>Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews</i>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.jtitle=Notre+Dame+Philosophical+Reviews&amp;rft.atitle=Understanding+Phenomenal+Consciousness&amp;rft.date=2005&amp;rft.aulast=Spener&amp;rft.aufirst=Maja&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fndpr.nd.edu%2Freviews%2Funderstanding-phenomenal-consciousness%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-46"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-46">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFEdelman1993" class="citation book cs1">Edelman, Gerald Maurice (1993). <i>Bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind</i>. New York: BasicBooks. p.&#160;115. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-465-00764-6" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-465-00764-6"><bdi>978-0-465-00764-6</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Bright+air%2C+brilliant+fire%3A+on+the+matter+of+the+mind&amp;rft.place=New+York&amp;rft.pages=115&amp;rft.pub=BasicBooks&amp;rft.date=1993&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-465-00764-6&amp;rft.aulast=Edelman&amp;rft.aufirst=Gerald+Maurice&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Damasio-47"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Damasio_47-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Damasio_47-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Damasio_47-2"><sup><i><b>c</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFDamasio2000" class="citation book cs1">Damasio, Antonio R. (2000). <i>The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness</i>. A Harvest book (1&#160;ed.). San Diego, CA: Harcourt. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-15-601075-7" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-15-601075-7"><bdi>978-0-15-601075-7</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=The+feeling+of+what+happens%3A+body+and+emotion+in+the+making+of+consciousness&amp;rft.place=San+Diego%2C+CA&amp;rft.series=A+Harvest+book&amp;rft.edition=1&amp;rft.pub=Harcourt&amp;rft.date=2000&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-15-601075-7&amp;rft.aulast=Damasio&amp;rft.aufirst=Antonio+R.&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Llinás-48"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Llinás_48-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Llinás_48-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFLlinásLlinás2002" class="citation book cs1">Llinás, Rodolfo Riascos; Llinás, Rodolfo R. (2002). <i>I of the vortex: from neurons to self</i>. A Bradford book (1&#160;ed.). Cambridge, Mass. London: MIT Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-62163-2" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-62163-2"><bdi>978-0-262-62163-2</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=I+of+the+vortex%3A+from+neurons+to+self&amp;rft.place=Cambridge%2C+Mass.+London&amp;rft.series=A+Bradford+book&amp;rft.edition=1&amp;rft.pub=MIT+Press&amp;rft.date=2002&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-262-62163-2&amp;rft.aulast=Llin%C3%A1s&amp;rft.aufirst=Rodolfo+Riascos&amp;rft.au=Llin%C3%A1s%2C+Rodolfo+R.&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Three_laws-49"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Three_laws_49-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Three_laws_49-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Three_laws_49-2"><sup><i><b>c</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFRamachandranHirstein1997" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="/wiki/Vilayanur_S._Ramachandran" class="mw-redirect" title="Vilayanur S. Ramachandran">Ramachandran, V.S.</a>; <a href="/wiki/William_Hirstein" title="William Hirstein">Hirstein, W.</a> (1997-05-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1997/00000004/f0020005/803">"Three laws of qualia: what neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness"</a>. <i>Journal of Consciousness Studies</i>. <b>4</b> (<span class="nowrap">5–</span>6): <span class="nowrap">429–</span>457. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20181027000719/http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1997/00000004/f0020005/803">Archived</a> from the original on 2018-10-27<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2020-08-30</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Consciousness+Studies&amp;rft.atitle=Three+laws+of+qualia%3A+what+neurology+tells+us+about+the+biological+functions+of+consciousness&amp;rft.volume=4&amp;rft.issue=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E5%E2%80%93%3C%2Fspan%3E6&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E429-%3C%2Fspan%3E457&amp;rft.date=1997-05-01&amp;rft.aulast=Ramachandran&amp;rft.aufirst=V.S.&amp;rft.au=Hirstein%2C+W.&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ingentaconnect.com%2Fcontent%2Fimp%2Fjcs%2F1997%2F00000004%2Ff0020005%2F803&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-50"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-50">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFRamachandranHirstein2001" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="/wiki/Vilayanur_S._Ramachandran" class="mw-redirect" title="Vilayanur S. Ramachandran">Ramachandran, V.S.</a>; <a href="/wiki/William_Hirstein" title="William Hirstein">Hirstein, W.</a> (1 December 2001). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/00000012/1244">"Synaesthesia&#160;– a window into perception, thought, and language"</a>. <i>Journal of Consciousness Studies</i>. <b>8</b> (12): <span class="nowrap">3–</span>34. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200818090750/https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/00000012/1244">Archived</a> from the original on 18 August 2020<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">30 August</span> 2020</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Consciousness+Studies&amp;rft.atitle=Synaesthesia+%E2%80%93+a+window+into+perception%2C+thought%2C+and+language&amp;rft.volume=8&amp;rft.issue=12&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E3-%3C%2Fspan%3E34&amp;rft.date=2001-12-01&amp;rft.aulast=Ramachandran&amp;rft.aufirst=V.S.&amp;rft.au=Hirstein%2C+W.&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ingentaconnect.com%2Fcontent%2Fimp%2Fjcs%2F2001%2F00000008%2F00000012%2F1244&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Dennett-1991-51"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-1991_51-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-1991_51-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFDennett1991" class="citation book cs1">Dennett, D. C. (1991). <i>Consciousness explained</i>. Back bay books (1&#160;ed.). Boston: Little, Brown. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-316-18066-5" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-316-18066-5"><bdi>978-0-316-18066-5</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Consciousness+explained&amp;rft.place=Boston&amp;rft.series=Back+bay+books&amp;rft.edition=1&amp;rft.pub=Little%2C+Brown&amp;rft.date=1991&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-316-18066-5&amp;rft.aulast=Dennett&amp;rft.aufirst=D.+C.&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Dennett-1988-52"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-2"><sup><i><b>c</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-3"><sup><i><b>d</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-1988_52-4"><sup><i><b>e</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFDennett1988" class="citation book cs1">Dennett, Daniel C. (1988). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://cogprints.org/254/">"Quining qualia"</a>. In Marcel, A.; Bisiach, E. (eds.). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web-archive.southampton.ac.uk/cogprints.org/254/"><i>Consciousness in Modern Science</i></a>. Oxford University Press. pp.&#160;<span class="nowrap">42–</span>77. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20231203012324/https://web-archive.southampton.ac.uk/cogprints.org/254/">Archived</a> from the original on 2023-12-03<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-19</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Quining+qualia&amp;rft.btitle=Consciousness+in+Modern+Science&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E42-%3C%2Fspan%3E77&amp;rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press&amp;rft.date=1988&amp;rft.aulast=Dennett&amp;rft.aufirst=Daniel+C.&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F254%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-53"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-53">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFUngerleider1995" class="citation journal cs1">Ungerleider, L. G. 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Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-18</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Science&amp;rft.atitle=Functional+brain+imaging+studies+of+cortical+mechanisms+for+memory&amp;rft.volume=270&amp;rft.issue=5237&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E769-%3C%2Fspan%3E775&amp;rft.date=1995-11-03&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A37665998%23id-name%3DS2CID&amp;rft_id=info%3Abibcode%2F1995Sci...270..769U&amp;rft.issn=0036-8075&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1126%2Fscience.270.5237.769&amp;rft_id=info%3Apmid%2F7481764&amp;rft.aulast=Ungerleider&amp;rft.aufirst=L.+G.&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fpubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2F7481764&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Dennett-2006-54"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-2"><sup><i><b>c</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-3"><sup><i><b>d</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Dennett-2006_54-4"><sup><i><b>e</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFDennett2006" class="citation book cs1">Dennett, Daniel (2006). 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Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-18</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Cognition&amp;rft.atitle=Are+we+explaining+consciousness+yet%3F&amp;rft.volume=79&amp;rft.issue=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E1%E2%80%93%3C%2Fspan%3E2&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E221-%3C%2Fspan%3E237&amp;rft.date=2001-04&amp;rft.issn=0010-0277&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.semanticscholar.org%2FCorpusID%3A2235514%23id-name%3DS2CID&amp;rft_id=info%3Apmid%2F11164029&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1016%2Fs0010-0277%2800%2900130-x&amp;rft.aulast=Dennett&amp;rft.aufirst=D.&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fpubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2F11164029&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-56"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-56">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFChurchland2004" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland">Churchland, Paul</a> (2004). 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Cambridge (Mass.): the MIT press. pp.&#160;<span class="nowrap">163–</span>178. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-62189-2" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-62189-2"><bdi>978-0-262-62189-2</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Knowing+qualia%3A+A+reply+to+Jackson+%28with+postscript+1997%29&amp;rft.btitle=There%27s+something+about+Mary%3A+essay+on+phenomenal+consciousness+and+Frank+Jackson%27s+knowledge+argument&amp;rft.place=Cambridge+%28Mass.%29&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E163-%3C%2Fspan%3E178&amp;rft.pub=the+MIT+press&amp;rft.date=2004&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-262-62189-2&amp;rft.aulast=Churchland&amp;rft.aufirst=Paul&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Drescher-2006-57"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Drescher-2006_57-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Drescher-2006_57-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFDrescher2006" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Gary_Drescher" title="Gary Drescher">Drescher, Gary L.</a> (2006). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=GXrLvcODPtoC&amp;q=gensym"><i>Good and real: demystifying paradoxes from physics to ethics</i></a>. 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Cambridge (Mass.): the MIT press. pp.&#160;<span class="nowrap">77–</span>103. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-62189-2" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-62189-2"><bdi>978-0-262-62189-2</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=What+experience+teaches&amp;rft.btitle=There%27s+something+about+Mary%3A+essay+on+phenomenal+consciousness+and+Frank+Jackson%27s+knowledge+argument&amp;rft.place=Cambridge+%28Mass.%29&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E77-%3C%2Fspan%3E103&amp;rft.pub=the+MIT+press&amp;rft.date=2004&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-262-62189-2&amp;rft.aulast=Lewis&amp;rft.aufirst=D.K.&amp;rft.au=Nagasawa%2C+Yujin&amp;rft.au=Stoljar%2C+Daniel&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-59"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-59">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFMarvin1998" class="citation interview cs1">Marvin, Minsky (1998-02-26). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/minsky/minsky_p4.html">"Consciousness is a Big Suitcase"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Edge.org" title="Edge.org">Edge.org</a></i> (Interview). 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Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-19</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Edge.org&amp;rft.atitle=Consciousness+is+a+Big+Suitcase&amp;rft.date=1998-02-26&amp;rft.aulast=Marvin&amp;rft.aufirst=Minsky&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.edge.org%2F3rd_culture%2Fminsky%2Fminsky_p4.html&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Tye-1991-1995-60"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-Tye-1991-1995_60-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1126788409" /><div class="plainlist" style="display:inline;"><ul style="display:inline;"><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;;display:inline; margin:0;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFTye1991" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Michael_Tye_(philosopher)" title="Michael Tye (philosopher)">Tye, Michael</a> (1991). <i>The imagery debate</i>. Representation and mind series. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-20086-8" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-20086-8"><bdi>978-0-262-20086-8</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=The+imagery+debate&amp;rft.place=Cambridge%2C+Mass.&amp;rft.series=Representation+and+mind+series&amp;rft.pub=MIT+Press&amp;rft.date=1991&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-262-20086-8&amp;rft.aulast=Tye&amp;rft.aufirst=Michael&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li><li style="margin-bottom:.5em; display:block;;margin-top:.5em;"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFTye1995" class="citation book cs1"><a href="/wiki/Michael_Tye_(philosopher)" title="Michael Tye (philosopher)">Tye, Michael</a> (1995). <i>Ten problems of consciousness: a representional theory of the phenomenal mind</i>. Representation and mind. Cambridge, Mass: MIT press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-20103-2" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-262-20103-2"><bdi>978-0-262-20103-2</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Ten+problems+of+consciousness%3A+a+representional+theory+of+the+phenomenal+mind&amp;rft.place=Cambridge%2C+Mass&amp;rft.series=Representation+and+mind&amp;rft.pub=MIT+press&amp;rft.date=1995&amp;rft.isbn=978-0-262-20103-2&amp;rft.aulast=Tye&amp;rft.aufirst=Michael&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul></div></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-61"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-61">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFScruton2005" class="citation web cs1">Scruton, Roger (2005-02-01). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2005/02/01/231672/the-unobservable-mind/">"The Unobservable Mind"</a>. <i>MIT Technology Review</i>. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230719231146/https://www.technologyreview.com/2005/02/01/231672/the-unobservable-mind/">Archived</a> from the original on 2023-07-19<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2023-07-19</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.jtitle=MIT+Technology+Review&amp;rft.atitle=The+Unobservable+Mind&amp;rft.date=2005-02-01&amp;rft.aulast=Scruton&amp;rft.aufirst=Roger&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.technologyreview.com%2F2005%2F02%2F01%2F231672%2Fthe-unobservable-mind%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-Scruton_2017-62"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-Scruton_2017_62-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-Scruton_2017_62-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFScruton2017" class="citation book cs1">Scruton, Roger (2017). <i>On human nature</i>. Princeton Oxford: Princeton university press. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a>&#160;<a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780691168753" title="Special:BookSources/9780691168753"><bdi>9780691168753</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=On+human+nature&amp;rft.place=Princeton+Oxford&amp;rft.pub=Princeton+university+press&amp;rft.date=2017&amp;rft.isbn=9780691168753&amp;rft.aulast=Scruton&amp;rft.aufirst=Roger&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> <li id="cite_note-63"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-63">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite class="citation book cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242204621"><i>Minds, Brains, and Computers: An Historical Introduction to the Foundations of Cognitive Science</i></a>. Blackwell. January 2000.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=book&amp;rft.btitle=Minds%2C+Brains%2C+and+Computers%3A+An+Historical+Introduction+to+the+Foundations+of+Cognitive+Science&amp;rft.pub=Blackwell&amp;rft.date=2000-01&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fpublication%2F242204621&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></span> </li> </ol></div></div> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Other_references">Other references</h3><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=35" title="Edit section: Other references"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <ul><li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFVarious_authors2007" class="citation web cs1">Various authors (19 March 2007). <a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">Chalmers, David</a> (ed.). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070319191131/http://consc.net/online1.html#qualia">"Online collection of papers on qualia"</a>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://consc.net/online1.html#qualia">the original</a> on 2007-03-19.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.btitle=Online+collection+of+papers+on+qualia&amp;rft.date=2007-03-19&amp;rft.au=Various+authors&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fconsc.net%2Fonline1.html%23qualia&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFDennett2023" class="citation web cs1"><a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Dennett, Daniel</a> (28 March 2023). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm">"Quining Qualia"</a>. Cognitive Studies. <a href="/wiki/Tufts_University" title="Tufts University">Tufts University</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.btitle=Quining+Qualia&amp;rft.series=Cognitive+Studies&amp;rft.pub=Tufts+University&amp;rft.date=2023-03-28&amp;rft.aulast=Dennett&amp;rft.aufirst=Daniel&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fase.tufts.edu%2Fcogstud%2Fpapers%2Fquinqual.htm&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFGregory1998" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="/wiki/Richard_Gregory" title="Richard Gregory">Gregory, Richard</a> (19–26 December 1998). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/brainy_mind/brainy-mind.htm">"Snapshots from the Decade of the Brain: Brainy Mind"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/The_BMJ" title="The BMJ">British Medical Journal</a></i>. <b>317</b> (7174): <span class="nowrap">1693–</span>1695. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1136%2Fbmj.317.7174.1693">10.1136/bmj.317.7174.1693</a>. <a href="/wiki/JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25181353">25181353</a>. <a href="/wiki/PMC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMC (identifier)">PMC</a>&#160;<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1114483">1114483</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9857130">9857130</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=British+Medical+Journal&amp;rft.atitle=Snapshots+from+the+Decade+of+the+Brain%3A+Brainy+Mind&amp;rft.volume=317&amp;rft.issue=7174&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E1693-%3C%2Fspan%3E1695&amp;rft.date=1998-12-19%2F1998-12-26&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC1114483%23id-name%3DPMC&amp;rft_id=info%3Apmid%2F9857130&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F25181353%23id-name%3DJSTOR&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1136%2Fbmj.317.7174.1693&amp;rft.aulast=Gregory&amp;rft.aufirst=Richard&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.richardgregory.org%2Fpapers%2Fbrainy_mind%2Fbrainy-mind.htm&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span> Qualia and the sensation of time.</li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFLormand" class="citation web cs1">Lormand, Eric. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/cons/qualia.htm">"<i>Qualia!</i> (Now showing at a theatre near you)"</a> (response to D. Dennett). <a href="/wiki/University_of_Michigan" title="University of Michigan">University of Michigan</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.btitle=Qualia%21+%28Now+showing+at+a+theatre+near+you%29&amp;rft.pub=University+of+Michigan&amp;rft.aulast=Lormand&amp;rft.aufirst=Eric&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww-personal.umich.edu%2F~lormand%2Fphil%2Fcons%2Fqualia.htm&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFRamachandranHirstein1997" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="/wiki/V._S._Ramachandran" title="V. S. Ramachandran">Ramachandran, V.S.</a>; <a href="/wiki/William_Hirstein" title="William Hirstein">Hirstein, W.</a> (1 May 1997). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030806021238/http://www.imprint.co.uk/rama/qualia.pdf">"Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. <i>Journal of Consciousness Studies</i>. <b>4</b> (<span class="nowrap">5–</span>6). Imprint Academic: <span class="nowrap">429–</span>58. Archived from <span class="id-lock-subscription" title="Paid subscription required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/jcs/1997/00000004/f0020005/803">the original</a></span> on 6 August 2003.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Consciousness+Studies&amp;rft.atitle=Three+Laws+of+Qualia%3A+What+Neurology+Tells+Us+About+the+Biological+Functions+of+Consciousness%2C+Qualia+and+the+Self&amp;rft.volume=4&amp;rft.issue=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E5%E2%80%93%3C%2Fspan%3E6&amp;rft.pages=%3Cspan+class%3D%22nowrap%22%3E429-%3C%2Fspan%3E58&amp;rft.date=1997-05-01&amp;rft.aulast=Ramachandran&amp;rft.aufirst=V.S.&amp;rft.au=Hirstein%2C+W.&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ingentaconnect.com%2Fcontentone%2Fimp%2Fjcs%2F1997%2F00000004%2Ff0020005%2F803&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span> Biological perspective.</li> <li><i><b>A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind</b></i> <ul><li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFAlter" class="citation web cs1">Alter, Torin. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20121203144006/http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/ka.html">"The Knowledge Argument"</a>. <i>A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind</i>. <a href="/wiki/Sapienza_University_of_Rome" title="Sapienza University of Rome">University of Rome</a>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/ka.html">the original</a> on 2012-12-03<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2007-01-22</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.jtitle=A+Field+Guide+to+the+Philosophy+of+Mind&amp;rft.atitle=The+Knowledge+Argument&amp;rft.aulast=Alter&amp;rft.aufirst=Torin&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fhost.uniroma3.it%2Fprogetti%2Fkant%2Ffield%2Fka.html&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFRobinson" class="citation web cs1">Robinson, William. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20121203144323/http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/qr.htm">"Qualia realism"</a>. <i>A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind</i>. <a href="/wiki/Sapienza_University_of_Rome" title="Sapienza University of Rome">University of Rome</a>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/qr.htm">the original</a> on 2012-12-03<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2007-01-22</span></span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.jtitle=A+Field+Guide+to+the+Philosophy+of+Mind&amp;rft.atitle=Qualia+realism&amp;rft.aulast=Robinson&amp;rft.aufirst=William&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fhost.uniroma3.it%2Fprogetti%2Fkant%2Ffield%2Fqr.htm&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul></li> <li><i><b><a href="/wiki/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></b></i> <ul><li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFByrne2020" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Byrne, Alex (2020). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/">"Inverted qualia"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>. <a href="/wiki/Stanford_University" title="Stanford University">Stanford University</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Inverted+qualia&amp;rft.btitle=Stanford+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&amp;rft.pub=Stanford+University&amp;rft.date=2020&amp;rft.aulast=Byrne&amp;rft.aufirst=Alex&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fqualia-inverted%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFNida-Rümelin2021" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Nida-Rümelin, Martine (2021). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/">"Qualia: The knowledge argument"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>. <a href="/wiki/Stanford_University" title="Stanford University">Stanford University</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Qualia%3A+The+knowledge+argument&amp;rft.btitle=Stanford+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&amp;rft.pub=Stanford+University&amp;rft.date=2021&amp;rft.aulast=Nida-R%C3%BCmelin&amp;rft.aufirst=Martine&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fqualia-knowledge%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFTye2021" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Tye, Michael (2021). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/">"Qualia"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>. <a href="/wiki/Stanford_University" title="Stanford University">Stanford University</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Qualia&amp;rft.btitle=Stanford+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&amp;rft.pub=Stanford+University&amp;rft.date=2021&amp;rft.aulast=Tye&amp;rft.aufirst=Michael&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fqualia%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul></li></ul> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Further_reading">Further reading</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=36" title="Edit section: Further reading"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <ul><li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite id="CITEREFMroczko-WąsowiczNikolić2014" class="citation journal cs1">Mroczko-Wąsowicz, A.; Nikolić, D. (2014). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/files/34996/fnhum-08-00509.pdf">"Semantic mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. <i>Frontiers in Human Neuroscience</i>. <b>8</b>: 509. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.3389%2Ffnhum.2014.00509">10.3389/fnhum.2014.00509</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/PMC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMC (identifier)">PMC</a>&#160;<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4137691">4137691</a></span>. <a href="/wiki/PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25191239">25191239</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=article&amp;rft.jtitle=Frontiers+in+Human+Neuroscience&amp;rft.atitle=Semantic+mechanisms+may+be+responsible+for+developing+synesthesia&amp;rft.volume=8&amp;rft.pages=509&amp;rft.date=2014&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC4137691%23id-name%3DPMC&amp;rft_id=info%3Apmid%2F25191239&amp;rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.3389%2Ffnhum.2014.00509&amp;rft.aulast=Mroczko-W%C4%85sowicz&amp;rft.aufirst=A.&amp;rft.au=Nikoli%C4%87%2C+D.&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fpublikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de%2Ffiles%2F34996%2Ffnhum-08-00509.pdf&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul> <div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="External_links">External links</h2><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=Qualia&amp;action=edit&amp;section=37" title="Edit section: External links"><span>edit</span></a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></div> <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1235681985">.mw-parser-output .side-box{margin:4px 0;box-sizing:border-box;border:1px solid #aaa;font-size:88%;line-height:1.25em;background-color:var(--background-color-interactive-subtle,#f8f9fa);display:flow-root}.mw-parser-output .side-box-abovebelow,.mw-parser-output .side-box-text{padding:0.25em 0.9em}.mw-parser-output .side-box-image{padding:2px 0 2px 0.9em;text-align:center}.mw-parser-output .side-box-imageright{padding:2px 0.9em 2px 0;text-align:center}@media(min-width:500px){.mw-parser-output .side-box-flex{display:flex;align-items:center}.mw-parser-output .side-box-text{flex:1;min-width:0}}@media(min-width:720px){.mw-parser-output .side-box{width:238px}.mw-parser-output .side-box-right{clear:right;float:right;margin-left:1em}.mw-parser-output .side-box-left{margin-right:1em}}</style><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1237033735">@media print{body.ns-0 .mw-parser-output .sistersitebox{display:none!important}}@media screen{html.skin-theme-clientpref-night .mw-parser-output .sistersitebox img[src*="Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg"]{background-color:white}}@media screen and (prefers-color-scheme:dark){html.skin-theme-clientpref-os .mw-parser-output .sistersitebox img[src*="Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg"]{background-color:white}}</style><div class="side-box side-box-right plainlinks sistersitebox"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1126788409" /> <div class="side-box-flex"> <div class="side-box-image"><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><a href="/wiki/File:Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg" class="mw-file-description"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/99/Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg/40px-Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg.png" decoding="async" width="40" height="40" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/99/Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg/60px-Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/99/Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg/120px-Wiktionary-logo-en-v2.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="512" data-file-height="512" /></a></span></div> <div class="side-box-text plainlist">Look up <i><b><a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Special:Search/qualia" class="extiw" title="wiktionary:Special:Search/qualia">qualia</a></b></i> in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.</div></div> </div> <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1235681985" /><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1237033735" /><div class="side-box side-box-right plainlinks sistersitebox"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1126788409" /> <div class="side-box-flex"> <div class="side-box-image"><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><a href="/wiki/File:Wikibooks-logo-en-noslogan.svg" class="mw-file-description"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/df/Wikibooks-logo-en-noslogan.svg/40px-Wikibooks-logo-en-noslogan.svg.png" decoding="async" width="40" height="40" class="mw-file-element" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/df/Wikibooks-logo-en-noslogan.svg/60px-Wikibooks-logo-en-noslogan.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/df/Wikibooks-logo-en-noslogan.svg/120px-Wikibooks-logo-en-noslogan.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="400" data-file-height="400" /></a></span></div> <div class="side-box-text plainlist">Wikibooks has a book on the topic of: <i><b><a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Consciousness_Studies" class="extiw" title="wikibooks:Consciousness Studies">Consciousness Studies</a></b></i></div></div> </div> <ul><li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/">"Qualia"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Internet_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i> (article). University of Tennessee. <a href="/wiki/ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a>&#160;<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/2161-0002">2161-0002</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&amp;rft.genre=unknown&amp;rft.jtitle=Internet+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&amp;rft.atitle=Qualia&amp;rft.issn=2161-0002&amp;rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iep.utm.edu%2Fqualia%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li> <li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1238218222" /><cite class="citation encyclopaedia cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/">"Qualia"</a>. <i><a href="/wiki/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2021.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&amp;rft.genre=bookitem&amp;rft.atitle=Qualia&amp;rft.btitle=Stanford+Encyclopedia+of+Philosophy&amp;rft.pub=Metaphysics+Research+Lab%2C+Stanford+University&amp;rft.date=2021&amp;rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fqualia%2F&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3AQualia" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul> <div class="navbox-styles"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1129693374">.mw-parser-output .hlist dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist ul{margin:0;padding:0}.mw-parser-output .hlist dd,.mw-parser-output .hlist dt,.mw-parser-output .hlist li{margin:0;display:inline}.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist.inline ul,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl dl,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl ol,.mw-parser-output .hlist dl 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Broad</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Tyler_Burge" title="Tyler Burge">Tyler Burge</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Patricia_Churchland" title="Patricia Churchland">Patricia Churchland</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland">Paul Churchland</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Andy_Clark" title="Andy Clark">Andy Clark</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Dharmakirti" title="Dharmakirti">Dharmakirti</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)" title="Donald Davidson (philosopher)">Donald Davidson</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Fred_Dretske" title="Fred Dretske">Fred Dretske</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Jerry_Fodor" title="Jerry Fodor">Fodor</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Alvin_Goldman" title="Alvin Goldman">Goldman</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Martin_Heidegger" title="Martin Heidegger">Martin Heidegger</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Edmund_Husserl" title="Edmund Husserl">Edmund Husserl</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/William_James" title="William James">William James</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">Frank Cameron Jackson</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher)" title="David Lewis (philosopher)">David Lewis (philosopher)</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_Locke" title="John Locke">John Locke</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Gottfried_Wilhelm_Leibniz" title="Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz">Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Maurice_Merleau-Ponty" title="Maurice Merleau-Ponty">Maurice Merleau-Ponty</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Marvin_Minsky" title="Marvin Minsky">Marvin Minsky</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Thomas Nagel</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Alva_No%C3%AB" title="Alva Noë">Alva Noë</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Derek_Parfit" title="Derek Parfit">Derek Parfit</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Richard_Rorty" title="Richard Rorty">Richard Rorty</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Gilbert Ryle</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Wilfrid_Sellars" title="Wilfrid Sellars">Wilfrid Sellars</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Alan_Turing" title="Alan Turing">Alan Turing</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Michael_Tye_(philosopher)" title="Michael Tye (philosopher)">Michael Tye</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Vasubandhu" title="Vasubandhu">Vasubandhu</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein" title="Ludwig Wittgenstein">Ludwig Wittgenstein</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Stephen_Yablo" title="Stephen Yablo">Stephen Yablo</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Zhuang_Zhou" title="Zhuang Zhou">Zhuangzi</a></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/List_of_philosophers_of_mind" title="List of philosophers of mind">more...</a></i></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Theories</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Behaviorism" title="Behaviorism">Behaviorism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Biological_naturalism" title="Biological naturalism">Biological naturalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism" title="Mind–body dualism">Dualism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Eliminative_materialism" title="Eliminative materialism">Eliminative materialism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Emergent_materialism" title="Emergent materialism">Emergent materialism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">Functionalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Interactionism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Interactionism (philosophy of mind)">Interactionism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism" title="Naïve realism">Naïve realism</a> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Neurophenomenology" title="Neurophenomenology">Neurophenomenology</a></li></ul></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">Neutral monism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/New_mysterianism" title="New mysterianism">New mysterianism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Nondualism" title="Nondualism">Nondualism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Occasionalism" title="Occasionalism">Occasionalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism" title="Psychophysical parallelism">Parallelism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Phenomenalism" title="Phenomenalism">Phenomenalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy)" title="Phenomenology (philosophy)">Phenomenology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">Physicalism</a> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Type_physicalism" title="Type physicalism">Type physicalism</a></li></ul></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">Property dualism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mental_representation" title="Mental representation">Representational</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Solipsism" title="Solipsism">Solipsism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Substance_dualism" class="mw-redirect" title="Substance dualism">Substance dualism</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Concepts</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Abstract_and_concrete" title="Abstract and concrete">Abstract object</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Chinese_room" title="Chinese room">Chinese room</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Creativity" title="Creativity">Creativity</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Cognition" title="Cognition">Cognition</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Cognitive_closure_(philosophy)" title="Cognitive closure (philosophy)">Cognitive closure</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Concept" title="Concept">Concept</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Consciousness" title="Consciousness">Consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">Hard problem of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Hypostatic_abstraction" title="Hypostatic abstraction">Hypostatic abstraction</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Idea" title="Idea">Idea</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Identity_(philosophy)" title="Identity (philosophy)">Identity</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Intelligence" title="Intelligence">Intelligence</a> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Artificial_intelligence" title="Artificial intelligence">Artificial</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Human_intelligence" title="Human intelligence">Human</a></li></ul></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Intentionality" title="Intentionality">Intentionality</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Introspection" title="Introspection">Introspection</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Intuition" title="Intuition">Intuition</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Language_of_thought_hypothesis" title="Language of thought hypothesis">Language of thought</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mental_event" title="Mental event">Mental event</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mental_image" title="Mental image">Mental image</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Template:Mental_processes" title="Template:Mental processes">Mental process</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mental_state" title="Mental state">Mental property</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mental_representation" title="Mental representation">Mental representation</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mind" title="Mind">Mind</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem" title="Mind–body problem">Mind–body problem</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Pain_(philosophy)" title="Pain (philosophy)">Pain</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">Problem of other minds</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Propositional_attitude" title="Propositional attitude">Propositional attitude</a></li> <li><a class="mw-selflink selflink">Qualia</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Tabula_rasa" title="Tabula rasa">Tabula rasa</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Understanding" title="Understanding">Understanding</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Philosophical_zombie" title="Philosophical zombie">Zombie</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Related</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Metaphysics" title="Metaphysics">Metaphysics</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_artificial_intelligence" title="Philosophy of artificial intelligence">Philosophy of artificial intelligence</a>&#160;/&#32;<a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_information" title="Philosophy of information">information</a>&#160;/&#32;<a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_perception" title="Philosophy of perception">perception</a>&#160;/&#32;<a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_self" title="Philosophy of self">self</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Category:Philosophy_of_mind" title="Category:Philosophy of mind">Category</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Category:Philosophers_of_mind" title="Category:Philosophers of mind">Philosophers category</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_Philosophy" title="Wikipedia:WikiProject Philosophy">Project</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_Philosophy/Mind" title="Wikipedia:WikiProject Philosophy/Mind">Task Force</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr></tbody></table></div> <div class="navbox-styles"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1129693374" /><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1236075235" /></div><div role="navigation" class="navbox" aria-labelledby="Consciousness277" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks hlist mw-collapsible autocollapse navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="2"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1129693374" /><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1239400231" /><div class="navbar plainlinks hlist navbar-mini"><ul><li class="nv-view"><a href="/wiki/Template:Consciousness" title="Template:Consciousness"><abbr title="View this template">v</abbr></a></li><li class="nv-talk"><a href="/wiki/Template_talk:Consciousness" title="Template talk:Consciousness"><abbr title="Discuss this template">t</abbr></a></li><li class="nv-edit"><a href="/wiki/Special:EditPage/Template:Consciousness" title="Special:EditPage/Template:Consciousness"><abbr title="Edit this template">e</abbr></a></li></ul></div><div id="Consciousness277" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="/wiki/Consciousness" title="Consciousness">Consciousness</a></div></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Figures</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"></div><table class="nowraplinks navbox-subgroup" style="border-spacing:0"><tbody><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Philosophy</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Alfred_North_Whitehead" title="Alfred North Whitehead">Alfred North Whitehead</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Arthur_Schopenhauer" title="Arthur Schopenhauer">Arthur Schopenhauer</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Brian_O%27Shaughnessy_(philosopher)" title="Brian O&#39;Shaughnessy (philosopher)">Brian O'Shaughnessy</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Charles_Augustus_Strong" title="Charles Augustus Strong">Charles Augustus Strong</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Christopher_Peacocke" title="Christopher Peacocke">Christopher Peacocke</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Colin_McGinn" title="Colin McGinn">Colin McGinn</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Chalmers" title="David Chalmers">David Chalmers</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Papineau" title="David Papineau">David Papineau</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Pearce_(philosopher)" title="David Pearce (philosopher)">David Pearce</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)" title="Donald Davidson (philosopher)">Donald Davidson</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Douglas_Hofstadter" title="Douglas Hofstadter">Douglas Hofstadter</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Edmund_Husserl" title="Edmund Husserl">Edmund Husserl</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Frank_Cameron_Jackson" title="Frank Cameron Jackson">Frank Jackson</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Fred_Dretske" title="Fred Dretske">Fred Dretske</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Galen_Strawson" title="Galen Strawson">Galen Strawson</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/George_Berkeley" title="George Berkeley">George Berkeley</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/George_Henry_Lewes" title="George Henry Lewes">George Henry Lewes</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Georges_Rey" title="Georges Rey">Georges Rey</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Gottfried_Wilhelm_Leibniz" title="Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz">Gottfried Leibniz</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_Eccles_(neurophysiologist)" title="John Eccles (neurophysiologist)">John Eccles</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_Locke" title="John Locke">John Locke</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_Polkinghorne" title="John Polkinghorne">John Polkinghorne</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Joseph_Levine_(philosopher)" title="Joseph Levine (philosopher)">Joseph Levine</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Karl_Popper" title="Karl Popper">Karl Popper</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Keith_Frankish" title="Keith Frankish">Keith Frankish</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Kenneth_M._Sayre" title="Kenneth M. Sayre">Kenneth M. Sayre</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Maurice_Merleau-Ponty" title="Maurice Merleau-Ponty">Maurice Merleau-Ponty</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Max_Velmans" title="Max Velmans">Max Velmans</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Michael_Tye_(philosopher)" title="Michael Tye (philosopher)">Michael Tye</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Martin_Heidegger" title="Martin Heidegger">Martin Heidegger</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ned_Block" title="Ned Block">Ned Block</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Patricia_Churchland" title="Patricia Churchland">Patricia Churchland</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Paul_Churchland" title="Paul Churchland">Paul Churchland</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Philip_Goff_(philosopher)" title="Philip Goff (philosopher)">Philip Goff</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Thomas_Metzinger" title="Thomas Metzinger">Thomas Metzinger</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Thomas_Nagel" title="Thomas Nagel">Thomas Nagel</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/William_Kingdon_Clifford" title="William Kingdon Clifford">William Kingdon Clifford</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/William_Lycan" title="William Lycan">William Lycan</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/William_Seager_(philosopher)" title="William Seager (philosopher)">William Seager</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Psychology</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Carl_Jung" title="Carl Jung">Carl Gustav Jung</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Donald_D._Hoffman" title="Donald D. Hoffman">Donald D. Hoffman</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Franz_Brentano" title="Franz Brentano">Franz Brentano</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Gustav_Fechner" title="Gustav Fechner">Gustav Fechner</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Julian_Jaynes" title="Julian Jaynes">Julian Jaynes</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Kurt_Koffka" title="Kurt Koffka">Kurt Koffka</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Max_Wertheimer" title="Max Wertheimer">Max Wertheimer</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Sigmund_Freud" title="Sigmund Freud">Sigmund Freud</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Wilhelm_Wundt" title="Wilhelm Wundt">Wilhelm Wundt</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/William_James" title="William James">William James</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Wolfgang_K%C3%B6hler" title="Wolfgang Köhler">Wolfgang Köhler</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Neuroscience</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Anil_Seth" title="Anil Seth">Anil Seth</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Antonio_Damasio" title="Antonio Damasio">Antonio Damasio</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Benjamin_Libet" title="Benjamin Libet">Benjamin Libet</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Bernard_Baars" title="Bernard Baars">Bernard Baars</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Christof_Koch" title="Christof Koch">Christof Koch</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Francis_Crick" title="Francis Crick">Francis Crick</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Francisco_Varela" title="Francisco Varela">Francisco Varela</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Gerald_Edelman" title="Gerald Edelman">Gerald Edelman</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Giulio_Tononi" title="Giulio Tononi">Giulio Tononi</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Karl_H._Pribram" title="Karl H. Pribram">Karl Pribram</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Lawrence_Weiskrantz" title="Lawrence Weiskrantz">Lawrence Weiskrantz</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Michael_Gazzaniga" title="Michael Gazzaniga">Michael Gazzaniga</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Michael_Graziano" title="Michael Graziano">Michael Graziano</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Patrick_Wilken" title="Patrick Wilken">Patrick Wilken</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Roger_Wolcott_Sperry" title="Roger Wolcott Sperry">Roger Sperry</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Stanislas_Dehaene" title="Stanislas Dehaene">Stanislas Dehaene</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Steven_Laureys" title="Steven Laureys">Steven Laureys</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Stuart_Hameroff" title="Stuart Hameroff">Stuart Hameroff</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Wolf_Singer" title="Wolf Singer">Wolf Singer</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Others</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Annaka_Harris" title="Annaka Harris">Annaka Harris</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/David_Bohm" title="David Bohm">David Bohm</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Eugene_Wigner" title="Eugene Wigner">Eugene Wigner</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Erwin_Schr%C3%B6dinger" title="Erwin Schrödinger">Erwin Schrödinger</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Marvin_Minsky" title="Marvin Minsky">Marvin Minsky</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Max_Planck" title="Max Planck">Max Planck</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Roger_Penrose" title="Roger Penrose">Roger Penrose</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Susan_Blackmore" title="Susan Blackmore">Susan Blackmore</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Victor_J._Stenger" title="Victor J. Stenger">Victor J. Stenger</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Wolfgang_Pauli" title="Wolfgang Pauli">Wolfgang Pauli</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr></tbody></table><div></div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Theories</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"></div><table class="nowraplinks navbox-subgroup" style="border-spacing:0"><tbody><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">Philosophy of mind</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Anomalous_monism" title="Anomalous monism">Anomalous monism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind" title="Computational theory of mind">Computationalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Double-aspect_theory" title="Double-aspect theory">Double-aspect theory</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Eliminative_materialism" title="Eliminative materialism">Eliminative materialism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Emergentism" title="Emergentism">Emergentism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">Functionalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Idealism" title="Idealism">Idealism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Interactionism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Interactionism (philosophy of mind)">Interactionism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Materialism" title="Materialism">Materialism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism" title="Mind–body dualism">Mind–body dualism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Monism" title="Monism">Monism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">Neutral monism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/New_mysterianism" title="New mysterianism">New mysterianism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Nondualism" title="Nondualism">Nondualism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Panpsychism" title="Panpsychism">Panpsychism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism" title="Psychophysical parallelism">Parallelism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">Physicalism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">Property dualism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Reflexive_monism" title="Reflexive monism">Reflexive monism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Revisionary_materialism" class="mw-redirect" title="Revisionary materialism">Revisionary materialism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Solipsism" title="Solipsism">Solipsism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Type_physicalism" title="Type physicalism">Type physicalism (reductive materialism, identity theory)</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Science</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Attention_schema_theory" title="Attention schema theory">Attention schema theory</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/A_Universe_of_Consciousness#The_Dynamic_Core_Hypothesis" title="A Universe of Consciousness">Dynamic core hypothesis</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Damasio%27s_theory_of_consciousness" title="Damasio&#39;s theory of consciousness">Damasio's theory of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness" title="Electromagnetic theories of consciousness">Electromagnetic theories of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Global_workspace_theory" title="Global workspace theory">Global workspace theory</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Higher-order_theories_of_consciousness" title="Higher-order theories of consciousness">Higher-order theories of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Holonomic_brain_theory" title="Holonomic brain theory">Holonomic brain theory</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Integrated_information_theory" title="Integrated information theory">Integrated information theory</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Visual_masking#Lamme&#39;s_recurrent_feedback_hypothesis_of_visual_awareness_and_masking" title="Visual masking">Lamme's recurrent feedback hypothesis</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Multiple_drafts_model" title="Multiple drafts model">Multiple drafts model</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Orchestrated_objective_reduction" title="Orchestrated objective reduction">Orchestrated objective reduction</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr></tbody></table><div></div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Topics</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Agnosia" title="Agnosia">Agnosia</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Altered_state_of_consciousness" title="Altered state of consciousness">Altered state of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Animal_consciousness" title="Animal consciousness">Animal consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Artificial_consciousness" title="Artificial consciousness">Artificial consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Attention" title="Attention">Attention</a> <ul><li><a href="/wiki/Attentional_control" title="Attentional control">Attentional control</a></li></ul></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Awareness" title="Awareness">Awareness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Binding_problem" title="Binding problem">Binding problem</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Binocular_rivalry" title="Binocular rivalry">Binocular rivalry</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Blindsight" title="Blindsight">Blindsight</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Brain" title="Brain">Brain</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Cartesian_theater" title="Cartesian theater">Cartesian theater</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Consciousness_after_death" class="mw-redirect" title="Consciousness after death">Consciousness after death</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Disorders_of_consciousness" class="mw-redirect" title="Disorders of consciousness">Disorders of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Divided_consciousness" class="mw-redirect" title="Divided consciousness">Divided consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Dual_consciousness" title="Dual consciousness">Dual consciousness (split-brain)</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Experience" title="Experience">Experience</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Explanatory_gap" title="Explanatory gap">Explanatory gap</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Free_will" title="Free will">Free will</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Flash_suppression" title="Flash suppression">Flash suppression</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Hallucination" title="Hallucination">Hallucination</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness" title="Hard problem of consciousness">Hard problem of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Heterophenomenology" title="Heterophenomenology">Heterophenomenology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Higher_consciousness" title="Higher consciousness">Higher consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Illusion" title="Illusion">Illusion</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Introspection_illusion" title="Introspection illusion">Introspection illusion</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Knowledge_argument" title="Knowledge argument">Knowledge argument</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Locked-in_syndrome" title="Locked-in syndrome">Locked-in syndrome</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mind" title="Mind">Mind</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem" title="Mind–body problem">Mind–body problem</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Minimally_conscious_state" title="Minimally conscious state">Minimally conscious state</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Neural_correlates_of_consciousness" title="Neural correlates of consciousness">Neural correlates of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Neurophenomenology" title="Neurophenomenology">Neurophenomenology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Ontology" title="Ontology">Ontology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy)" title="Phenomenology (philosophy)">Phenomenology</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Philosophical_zombie" title="Philosophical zombie">Philosophical zombie</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind" title="Philosophy of mind">Philosophy of mind</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Primary_consciousness" title="Primary consciousness">Primary consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">Problem of other minds</a></li> <li><a class="mw-selflink selflink">Qualia</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Quantum_mind" title="Quantum mind">Quantum mind</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Reentry_(neural_circuitry)" title="Reentry (neural circuitry)">Reentry</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Sakshi_(witness)" title="Sakshi (witness)">Sakshi</a> <ul><li><i><a href="/wiki/Purusha" title="Purusha">Purusha</a></i></li></ul></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Secondary_consciousness" title="Secondary consciousness">Secondary consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Sentience" title="Sentience">Sentience</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Sentientism" title="Sentientism">Sentientism</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Sociology_of_human_consciousness" title="Sociology of human consciousness">Sociology of human consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Soul" title="Soul">Soul</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Stream_of_consciousness_(psychology)" title="Stream of consciousness (psychology)">Stream of consciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Subconscious" title="Subconscious">Subconscious</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Subjective_character_of_experience" title="Subjective character of experience">Subjective character of experience</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)" title="Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)">Subjectivity and objectivity</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Unconscious_mind" title="Unconscious mind">Unconscious mind</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Unconsciousness" title="Unconsciousness">Unconsciousness</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Upanishads" title="Upanishads">Upanishads</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Visual_masking" title="Visual masking">Visual masking</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Von_Neumann%E2%80%93Wigner_interpretation" title="Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation">Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation</a></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Yogachara" title="Yogachara">Yogachara</a></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Works</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"> <ul><li><i><a href="/wiki/A_Universe_of_Consciousness" title="A Universe of Consciousness">A Universe of Consciousness</a></i></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Association_for_the_Scientific_Study_of_Consciousness" title="Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness">Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness</a></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Consciousness_and_Cognition" title="Consciousness and Cognition">Consciousness and Cognition</a></i></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Consciousness_Explained" title="Consciousness Explained">Consciousness Explained</a></i></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Cosmic_Consciousness" title="Cosmic Consciousness">Cosmic Consciousness</a></i></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/How_the_Self_Controls_Its_Brain" title="How the Self Controls Its Brain">How the Self Controls Its Brain</a></i></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Journal_of_Consciousness_Studies" title="Journal of Consciousness Studies">Journal of Consciousness Studies</a></i></li> <li><a href="/wiki/Online_Consciousness_Conference" title="Online Consciousness Conference">Online Consciousness Conference</a></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Psyche_(consciousness_journal)" title="Psyche (consciousness journal)">Psyche</a></i></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/The_Astonishing_Hypothesis" title="The Astonishing Hypothesis">The Astonishing Hypothesis</a></i></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/The_Conscious_Mind" title="The Conscious Mind">The Conscious Mind</a></i></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind" title="The Emperor&#39;s New Mind">The Emperor's New Mind</a></i></li> <li><a href="/wiki/The_Science_of_Consciousness" title="The Science of Consciousness">The Science of Consciousness</a></li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Understanding_Consciousness" title="Understanding Consciousness">Understanding Consciousness</a></i></li> <li>"<a href="/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F" title="What Is It Like to Be a Bat?">What Is It Like to Be a Bat?</a>"</li> <li><i><a href="/wiki/Wider_than_the_Sky" title="Wider than the Sky">Wider than the Sky</a></i></li></ul> </div></td></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div> <ul><li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="Category"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/96/Symbol_category_class.svg/16px-Symbol_category_class.svg.png" decoding="async" width="16" 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