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Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry, Sub-technique T1552.002 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
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More details about tickets and our CFP can be found <a href='https://na.eventscloud.com/attackcon6'>here</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="row flex-grow-1 flex-shrink-0"> <!-- main content elements --> <!--start-indexing-for-search--> <div class="sidebar nav sticky-top flex-column pr-0 pt-4 pb-3 pl-3" id="v-tab" role="tablist" aria-orientation="vertical"> <div class="resizer" id="resizer"></div> <!--stop-indexing-for-search--> <div id="sidebars"></div> <!--start-indexing-for-search--> </div> <div class="tab-content col-xl-9 pt-4" id="v-tabContent"> <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="v-attckmatrix" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="v-attckmatrix-tab"> <ol class="breadcrumb"> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/">Home</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/techniques/enterprise">Techniques</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/techniques/enterprise">Enterprise</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item"><a href="/techniques/T1552">Unsecured Credentials</a></li> <li class="breadcrumb-item">Credentials in Registry</li> </ol> <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="v-" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="v--tab"></div> <div class="row"> <div class="col-xl-12"> <div class="jumbotron jumbotron-fluid"> <div class="container-fluid"> <h1 id=""> <span id="subtechnique-parent-name">Unsecured Credentials:</span> Credentials in Registry </h1> <div class="row"> <div class="col-md-8"> <!--stop-indexing-for-search--> <div class="card-block pb-2"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-header collapsed" id="subtechniques-card-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#subtechniques-card-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="subtechniques-card-body"> <h5 class="mb-0" id ="sub-techniques">Other sub-techniques of Unsecured Credentials (8)</h5> </div> <div id="subtechniques-card-body" class="card-body p-0 collapse" aria-labelledby="subtechniques-card-header"> <table class="table table-bordered"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Name</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/001/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.001"> T1552.001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/001/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.001"> Credentials In Files </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td class="active"> T1552.002 </td> <td class="active"> Credentials in Registry </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/003/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.003"> T1552.003 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/003/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.003"> Bash History </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/004/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.004"> T1552.004 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/004/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.004"> Private Keys </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/005/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.005"> T1552.005 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/005/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.005"> Cloud Instance Metadata API </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/006/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.006"> T1552.006 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/006/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.006"> Group Policy Preferences </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/007/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.007"> T1552.007 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/007/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.007"> Container API </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/008/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.008"> T1552.008 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1552/008/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1552.008"> Chat Messages </a> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> </div> </div> <!--start-indexing-for-search--> <div class="description-body"> <p>Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.</p><p>Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-1') id="scite-ref-1-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018."data-reference="Pentestlab Stored Credentials"><sup><a href="https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="0" aria-describedby="qtip-0">[1]</a></sup></span></p><ul><li>Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code></li><li>Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code></li></ul> </div> </div> <div class="col-md-4"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"> <div class="row card-data" id="card-id"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">ID: </span>T1552.002 </div> </div> <!--stop-indexing-for-search--> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Sub-technique of: </span> <a href="/techniques/T1552">T1552</a> </div> </div> <!--start-indexing-for-search--> <div id="card-tactics" class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The tactic objectives that the (sub-)technique can be used to accomplish">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Tactic:</span> <a href="/tactics/TA0006">Credential Access</a> </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The system an adversary is operating within; could be an operating system or application">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Platforms: </span>Windows </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="Additional information on requirements the adversary needs to meet or about the state of the system (software, patch level, etc.) that may be required for the (sub-)technique to work">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">System Requirements: </span>Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys. </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Contributors: </span>Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Version: </span>1.1 </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Created: </span>04 February 2020 </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Last Modified: </span>15 October 2024 </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="text-center pt-2 version-button live"> <div class="live"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Permalink to this version of T1552.002" href="/versions/v16/techniques/T1552/002/" data-test-ignore="true">Version Permalink</a> </div> <div class="permalink"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Go to the live version of T1552.002" href="/versions/v16/techniques/T1552/002/" data-test-ignore="true">Live Version</a><!--do not change this line without also changing versions.py--> </div> </div> </div> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="examples">Procedure Examples</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table table-bordered table-alternate mt-2"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Name</th> <th scope="col">Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/software/S0331"> S0331 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/software/S0331"> Agent Tesla </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/software/S0331">Agent Tesla</a> has the ability to extract credentials from the Registry.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-2') id="scite-ref-2-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Walter, J. (2020, August 10). Agent Tesla | Old RAT Uses New Tricks to Stay on Top. Retrieved December 11, 2020."data-reference="SentinelLabs Agent Tesla Aug 2020"><sup><a href="https://labs.sentinelone.com/agent-tesla-old-rat-uses-new-tricks-to-stay-on-top/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="1" aria-describedby="qtip-1">[2]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/groups/G0050"> G0050 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/groups/G0050"> APT32 </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/groups/G0050">APT32</a> used Outlook Credential Dumper to harvest credentials stored in Windows registry.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-3') id="scite-ref-3-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018."data-reference="Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017"><sup><a href="https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-cobalt-kitty-apt" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="2" aria-describedby="qtip-2">[3]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-4') id="scite-ref-4-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018."data-reference="Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017"><sup><a href="https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="3" aria-describedby="qtip-3">[4]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/software/S1022"> S1022 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/software/S1022"> IceApple </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/software/S1022">IceApple</a> can harvest credentials from local and remote host registries.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-5') id="scite-ref-5-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="CrowdStrike. (2022, May). ICEAPPLE: A NOVEL INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES (IIS) POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK. Retrieved June 27, 2022."data-reference="CrowdStrike IceApple May 2022"><sup><a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/crowdstrike-iceapple-a-novel-internet-information-services-post-exploitation-framework.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="4" aria-describedby="qtip-4">[5]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/software/S0194"> S0194 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/software/S0194"> PowerSploit </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/software/S0194">PowerSploit</a> has several modules that search the Windows Registry for stored credentials: <code>Get-UnattendedInstallFile</code>, <code>Get-Webconfig</code>, <code>Get-ApplicationHost</code>, <code>Get-SiteListPassword</code>, <code>Get-CachedGPPPassword</code>, and <code>Get-RegistryAutoLogon</code>.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-1') id="scite-ref-1-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018."data-reference="Pentestlab Stored Credentials"><sup><a href="https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="0" aria-describedby="qtip-0">[1]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/groups/G1039"> G1039 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/groups/G1039"> RedCurl </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/groups/G1039">RedCurl</a> used <a href="/software/S0349">LaZagne</a> to obtain passwords in the Registry.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-6') id="scite-ref-6-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Group-IB. (2020, August). RedCurl: The Pentest You Didn鈥檛 Know About. Retrieved August 9, 2024."data-reference="group-ib_redcurl1"><sup><a href="https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/red-curl/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="5" aria-describedby="qtip-5">[6]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-7') id="scite-ref-7-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Group-IB. (2021, November). RedCurl: The Awakening. Retrieved August 14, 2024."data-reference="group-ib_redcurl2"><sup><a href="https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/red-curl-2/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="6" aria-describedby="qtip-6">[7]</a></sup></span> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/software/S0075"> S0075 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/software/S0075"> Reg </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/software/S0075">Reg</a> may be used to find credentials in the Windows Registry.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-1') id="scite-ref-1-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018."data-reference="Pentestlab Stored Credentials"><sup><a href="https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="0" aria-describedby="qtip-0">[1]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/software/S0266"> S0266 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/software/S0266"> TrickBot </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/software/S0266">TrickBot</a> has retrieved PuTTY credentials by querying the <code>Software\SimonTatham\Putty\Sessions</code> registry key <span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-8') id="scite-ref-8-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019."data-reference="TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019"><sup><a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="7" aria-describedby="qtip-7">[8]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/software/S0476"> S0476 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/software/S0476"> Valak </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/software/S0476">Valak</a> can use the clientgrabber module to steal e-mail credentials from the Registry.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-9') id="scite-ref-9-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Reaves, J. and Platt, J. (2020, June). Valak Malware and the Connection to Gozi Loader ConfCrew. Retrieved August 31, 2020."data-reference="SentinelOne Valak June 2020"><sup><a href="https://assets.sentinelone.com/labs/sentinel-one-valak-i" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="8" aria-describedby="qtip-8">[9]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="mitigations">Mitigations</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table table-bordered table-alternate mt-2"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Mitigation</th> <th scope="col">Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1047"> M1047 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1047"> Audit </a> </td> <td> <p>Proactively search for credentials within the Registry and attempt to remediate the risk.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1027"> M1027 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1027"> Password Policies </a> </td> <td> <p>Do not store credentials within the Registry.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1026"> M1026 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1026"> Privileged Account Management </a> </td> <td> <p>If it is necessary that software must store credentials in the Registry, then ensure the associated accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id="detection">Detection</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table datasources-table table-bordered"> <thead> <tr> <th class="p-2" scope="col">ID</th> <th class="p-2 nowrap" scope="col">Data Source</th> <th class="p-2 nowrap" scope="col">Data Component</th> <th class="p-2" scope="col">Detects</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0017"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0017">DS0017</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0017">Command</a> </td> <!-- Add first data component here --> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0017/#Command%20Execution">Command Execution</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.</p><p>Analytic 1 - Commands indicating credential searches in the registry.</p><p><code> (index=security sourcetype="powershell" EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="<em>reg query</em> /f password /t REG_SZ /s*")</code></p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0009"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0009">DS0009</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0009">Process</a> </td> <!-- Add first data component here --> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0009/#Process%20Creation">Process Creation</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor newly executed processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as <a href="/software/S0075">Reg</a>, and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.</p><p>Note: Pseudocode Event IDs are for Sysmon (Event ID 1 - process create) and Windows Security Log (Event ID 4688 - a new process has been created). The Analytic looks for command-line instances of searching the Windows Registry for insecurely stored credentials. This can be accomplished using the query functionality of the <a href="/software/S0075">Reg</a> system utility, by looking for keys and values that contain strings such as "password". In addition, adversaries may use toolkits such as聽<a href="/software/S0194">PowerSploit</a> in order to dump credentials from various applications such as IIS. Accordingly, this analytic looks for invocations of reg.exe in this capacity as well as that of several PowerSploit modules with similar functionality.</p><p>Analytic 1 - Credentials in Files & Registry</p><p><code>(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688")<br />CommandLine="<em>reg</em> query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s<em>" ORCommandLine="reg</em> query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s" ORCommandLine="<em>Get-UnattendedInstallFile</em>" ORCommandLine="<em>Get-Webconfig" ORCommandLine="</em>Get-ApplicationHost<em>" ORCommandLine="</em>Get-SiteListPassword<em>" ORCommandLine="</em>Get-CachedGPPPassword<em>" ORCommandLine="</em>Get-RegistryAutoLogon*" </code></p><p>Analytic 2 - New processes with parameters indicating credential searches.</p><p><code> (index=security sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4688 CommandLine="<em>reg query</em> /f password /t REG_SZ /s<em>") OR(index=sysmon sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 CommandLine="</em>reg query<em> /f password /t REG_SZ /s</em>")</code></p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0024"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0024">DS0024</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0024">Windows Registry</a> </td> <!-- Add first data component here --> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0024/#Windows%20Registry%20Key%20Access">Windows Registry Key Access</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor for unexpected windows registry key being accessed that may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.</p><p>Analytic 1 - Unauthorized access to registry keys associated with credentials.</p><p><code> ndex=security sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" EventCode=4663 ObjectType="Registry" (ObjectName="<em>password</em>" OR ObjectName="<em>credential</em>")| eval AccessType=case( AccessMask="0x1", "Read", AccessMask="0x2", "Write", AccessMask="0x3", "Read/Write", AccessMask="0x4", "Delete", true(), "Unknown")</code></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id="references">References</h2> <div class="row"> <div class="col"> <ol> <li> <span id="scite-1" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-1" href="https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/" target="_blank"> netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-2" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-2" href="https://labs.sentinelone.com/agent-tesla-old-rat-uses-new-tricks-to-stay-on-top/" target="_blank"> Walter, J. (2020, August 10). Agent Tesla | Old RAT Uses New Tricks to Stay on Top. Retrieved December 11, 2020. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-3" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-3" href="https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-cobalt-kitty-apt" target="_blank"> Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-4" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-4" href="https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf" target="_blank"> Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-5" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-5" href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/crowdstrike-iceapple-a-novel-internet-information-services-post-exploitation-framework.pdf" target="_blank"> CrowdStrike. (2022, May). ICEAPPLE: A NOVEL INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES (IIS) POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK. Retrieved June 27, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> </ol> </div> <div class="col"> <ol start="6.0"> <li> <span id="scite-6" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-6" href="https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/red-curl/" target="_blank"> Group-IB. (2020, August). RedCurl: The Pentest You Didn鈥檛 Know About. Retrieved August 9, 2024. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-7" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-7" href="https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/red-curl-2/" target="_blank"> Group-IB. (2021, November). RedCurl: The Awakening. Retrieved August 14, 2024. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-8" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-8" href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/" target="_blank"> Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-9" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-9" href="https://assets.sentinelone.com/labs/sentinel-one-valak-i" target="_blank"> Reaves, J. and Platt, J. (2020, June). Valak Malware and the Connection to Gozi Loader ConfCrew. Retrieved August 31, 2020. </a> </span> </span> </li> </ol> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <!--stop-indexing-for-search--> <!-- search overlay for entire page -- not displayed inline --> <div class="overlay search" id="search-overlay" style="display: none;"> <div class="overlay-inner"> <!-- text input for searching --> <div class="search-header"> <div class="search-input"> <input type="text" id="search-input" placeholder="search"> </div> <div class="search-icons"> <div class="search-parsing-icon spinner-border" style="display: none" id="search-parsing-icon"></div> <div class="close-search-icon" id="close-search-icon">×</div> </div> </div> <!-- results and controls for loading more results --> <div id="search-body" class="search-body"> <div class="results" id="search-results"> <!-- content will be appended here on search --> </div> <div id="load-more-results" class="load-more-results"> <button class="btn btn-default" id="load-more-results-button">load more results</button> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="row flex-grow-0 flex-shrink-1"> <!-- footer elements --> <footer class="col footer"> <div class="container-fluid"> <div class="row row-footer"> <div class="col-2 col-sm-2 col-md-2"> <div class="footer-center-responsive my-auto"> <a href="https://www.mitre.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="MITRE"> <img src="/theme/images/mitrelogowhiteontrans.gif" class="mitre-logo-wtrans"> </a> </div> </div> <div class="col-2 col-sm-2 footer-responsive-break"></div> <div class="footer-link-group"> <div class="row row-footer"> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/engage-with-attack/contact" class="footer-link">Contact Us</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/legal-and-branding/terms-of-use" class="footer-link">Terms of Use</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/legal-and-branding/privacy" class="footer-link">Privacy Policy</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/changelog.html" class="footer-link" data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="top" data-html="true" title="ATT&CK content v16.1
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