System Binary Proxy Execution, Technique T1218 - Enterprise

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class="jumbotron jumbotron-fluid"> <div class="container-fluid"> <h1 id=""> System Binary Proxy Execution </h1> <div class="row"> <div class="col-md-8">  <div class="card-block pb-2"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-header collapsed" id="subtechniques-card-header" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#subtechniques-card-body" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="subtechniques-card-body"> <h5 class="mb-0" id ="sub-techniques">Sub-techniques (14)</h5> </div> <div id="subtechniques-card-body" class="card-body p-0 collapse" aria-labelledby="subtechniques-card-header"> <table class="table table-bordered"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Name</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/001/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.001"> T1218.001 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/001/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.001"> Compiled HTML File </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/002/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.002"> T1218.002 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/002/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.002"> Control Panel </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/003/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.003"> T1218.003 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/003/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.003"> CMSTP </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/004/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.004"> T1218.004 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/004/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.004"> InstallUtil </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/005/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.005"> T1218.005 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/005/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.005"> Mshta </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/007/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.007"> T1218.007 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/007/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.007"> Msiexec </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/008/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.008"> T1218.008 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/008/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.008"> Odbcconf </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/009/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.009"> T1218.009 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/009/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.009"> Regsvcs/Regasm </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/010/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.010"> T1218.010 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/010/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.010"> Regsvr32 </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/011/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.011"> T1218.011 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/011/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.011"> Rundll32 </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/012/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.012"> T1218.012 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/012/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.012"> Verclsid </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/013/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.013"> T1218.013 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/013/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.013"> Mavinject </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/014/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.014"> T1218.014 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/014/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.014"> MMC </a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/015/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.015"> T1218.015 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/techniques/T1218/015/" class="subtechnique-table-item" data-subtechnique_id="T1218.015"> Electron Applications </a> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> </div> </div>  <div class="description-body"> <p>Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-1') id="scite-ref-1-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022."data-reference="LOLBAS Project"><sup><a href="https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="0" aria-describedby="qtip-0">[1]</a></sup></span> Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.</p><p>Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as <code>split</code> to proxy execution of malicious commands.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-2') id="scite-ref-2-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Torbjorn Granlund, Richard M. Stallman. (2020, March null). split(1) — Linux manual page. Retrieved March 25, 2022."data-reference="split man page"><sup><a href="https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/split.1.html" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="1" aria-describedby="qtip-1">[2]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-3') id="scite-ref-3-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="GTFOBins. (2020, November 13). split. Retrieved April 18, 2022."data-reference="GTFO split"><sup><a href="https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="2" aria-describedby="qtip-2">[3]</a></sup></span></p> </div> </div> <div class="col-md-4"> <div class="card"> <div class="card-body"> <div class="row card-data" id="card-id"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">ID: </span>T1218 </div> </div>  <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Sub-techniques: </span> <a href="/techniques/T1218/001">T1218.001</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/002">T1218.002</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/003">T1218.003</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/004">T1218.004</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/005">T1218.005</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/007">T1218.007</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/008">T1218.008</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/009">T1218.009</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/010">T1218.010</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/011">T1218.011</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/012">T1218.012</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/013">T1218.013</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/014">T1218.014</a>, <a href="/techniques/T1218/015">T1218.015</a> </div> </div>  <div id="card-tactics" class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The tactic objectives that the (sub-)technique can be used to accomplish">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Tactic:</span> <a href="/tactics/TA0005">Defense Evasion</a> </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="The system an adversary is operating within; could be an operating system or application">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Platforms: </span>Linux, Windows, macOS </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"> <span data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="left" title="" data-test-ignore="true" data-original-title="If the (sub-)technique can be used to bypass or evade a particular defensive tool, methodology, or process">ⓘ</span> </div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Defense Bypassed: </span>Anti-virus, Application control, Digital Certificate Validation </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Contributors: </span>Hans Christoffer Gaardløs; Nishan Maharjan, @loki248; Praetorian; Wes Hurd </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Version: </span>3.1 </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Created: </span>18 April 2018 </div> </div> <div class="row card-data"> <div class="col-md-1 px-0 text-center"></div> <div class="col-md-11 pl-0"> <span class="h5 card-title">Last Modified: </span>01 March 2024 </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="text-center pt-2 version-button live"> <div class="live"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Permalink to this version of T1218" href="/versions/v16/techniques/T1218/" data-test-ignore="true">Version Permalink</a> </div> <div class="permalink"> <a data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="bottom" title="Go to the live version of T1218" href="/versions/v16/techniques/T1218/" data-test-ignore="true">Live Version</a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="examples">Procedure Examples</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table table-bordered table-alternate mt-2"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Name</th> <th scope="col">Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/groups/G0032"> G0032 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/groups/G0032"> Lazarus Group </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/groups/G0032">Lazarus Group</a> lnk files used for persistence have abused the Windows Update Client (<code>wuauclt.exe</code>) to execute a malicious DLL.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-4') id="scite-ref-4-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022."data-reference="Lazarus APT January 2022"><sup><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="3" aria-describedby="qtip-3">[4]</a></sup></span><span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-5') id="scite-ref-5-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="Pradhan, A. (2022, February 8). LolZarus: Lazarus Group Incorporating Lolbins into Campaigns. Retrieved March 22, 2022."data-reference="Qualys LolZarus"><sup><a href="https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/02/08/lolzarus-lazarus-group-incorporating-lolbins-into-campaigns" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="4" aria-describedby="qtip-4">[5]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/groups/G1017"> G1017 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/groups/G1017"> Volt Typhoon </a> </td> <td> <p><a href="/groups/G1017">Volt Typhoon</a> has used native tools and processes including living off the land binaries or "LOLBins" to maintain and expand access to the victim networks.<span onclick=scrollToRef('scite-6') id="scite-ref-6-a" class="scite-citeref-number" title="CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024."data-reference="CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024"><sup><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf" target="_blank" data-hasqtip="5" aria-describedby="qtip-5">[6]</a></sup></span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id ="mitigations">Mitigations</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table table-bordered table-alternate mt-2"> <thead> <tr> <th scope="col">ID</th> <th scope="col">Mitigation</th> <th scope="col">Description</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1042"> M1042 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1042"> Disable or Remove Feature or Program </a> </td> <td> <p>Many native binaries may not be necessary within a given environment.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1038"> M1038 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1038"> Execution Prevention </a> </td> <td> <p>Consider using application control to prevent execution of binaries that are susceptible to abuse and not required for a given system or network.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1050"> M1050 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1050"> Exploit Protection </a> </td> <td> <p>Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using using trusted binaries to bypass application control.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1037"> M1037 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1037"> Filter Network Traffic </a> </td> <td> <p>Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1026"> M1026 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1026"> Privileged Account Management </a> </td> <td> <p>Restrict execution of particularly vulnerable binaries to privileged accounts or groups that need to use it to lessen the opportunities for malicious usage.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1021"> M1021 </a> </td> <td> <a href="/mitigations/M1021"> Restrict Web-Based Content </a> </td> <td> <p>Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id="detection">Detection</h2> <div class="tables-mobile"> <table class="table datasources-table table-bordered"> <thead> <tr> <th class="p-2" scope="col">ID</th> <th class="p-2 nowrap" scope="col">Data Source</th> <th class="p-2 nowrap" scope="col">Data Component</th> <th class="p-2" scope="col">Detects</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0017"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0017">DS0017</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0017">Command</a> </td>  <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0017/#Command%20Execution">Command Execution</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor executed commands and arguments that may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services.</p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0022"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0022">DS0022</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0022">File</a> </td>  <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0022/#File%20Creation">File Creation</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.</p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0011"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0011">DS0011</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0011">Module</a> </td>  <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0011/#Module%20Load">Module Load</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.</p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0029"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0029">DS0029</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0029">Network Traffic</a> </td>  <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0029/#Network%20Connection%20Creation">Network Connection Creation</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. </p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0009"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0009">DS0009</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0009">Process</a> </td>  <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0009/#OS%20API%20Execution">OS API Execution</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor for API calls that bypass process and/or signature based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. </p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datacomponent datasource" id="uses-DS0009-Process Creation"> <td></td> <td></td> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0009/#Process%20Creation">Process Creation</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.</p> </td> </tr> <tr class="datasource" id="uses-DS0024"> <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0024">DS0024</a> </td> <td class="nowrap"> <a href="/datasources/DS0024">Windows Registry</a> </td>  <td> <a href="/datasources/DS0024/#Windows%20Registry%20Key%20Modification">Windows Registry Key Modification</a> </td> <td> <p>Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values that may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services.</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <h2 class="pt-3" id="references">References</h2> <div class="row"> <div class="col"> <ol> <li> <span id="scite-1" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-1" href="https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria" target="_blank"> Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-2" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-2" href="https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/split.1.html" target="_blank"> Torbjorn Granlund, Richard M. Stallman. (2020, March null). split(1) — Linux manual page. Retrieved March 25, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-3" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-3" href="https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/" target="_blank"> GTFOBins. (2020, November 13). split. Retrieved April 18, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> </ol> </div> <div class="col"> <ol start="4.0"> <li> <span id="scite-4" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-4" href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/" target="_blank"> Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-5" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-5" href="https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/02/08/lolzarus-lazarus-group-incorporating-lolbins-into-campaigns" target="_blank"> Pradhan, A. (2022, February 8). LolZarus: Lazarus Group Incorporating Lolbins into Campaigns. Retrieved March 22, 2022. </a> </span> </span> </li> <li> <span id="scite-6" class="scite-citation"> <span class="scite-citation-text"> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" name="scite-6" href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf" target="_blank"> CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024. </a> </span> </span> </li> </ol> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div>   <div class="overlay search" id="search-overlay" style="display: none;"> <div class="overlay-inner">  <div class="search-header"> <div class="search-input"> <input type="text" id="search-input" placeholder="search"> </div> <div class="search-icons"> <div class="search-parsing-icon spinner-border" style="display: none" id="search-parsing-icon"></div> <div class="close-search-icon" id="close-search-icon">×</div> </div> </div>  <div id="search-body" class="search-body"> <div class="results" id="search-results">  </div> <div id="load-more-results" class="load-more-results"> <button class="btn btn-default" id="load-more-results-button">load more results</button> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div class="row flex-grow-0 flex-shrink-1">  <footer class="col footer"> <div class="container-fluid"> <div class="row row-footer"> <div class="col-2 col-sm-2 col-md-2"> <div class="footer-center-responsive my-auto"> <a href="https://www.mitre.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="MITRE"> <img src="/theme/images/mitrelogowhiteontrans.gif" class="mitre-logo-wtrans"> </a> </div> </div> <div class="col-2 col-sm-2 footer-responsive-break"></div> <div class="footer-link-group"> <div class="row row-footer"> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/engage-with-attack/contact" class="footer-link">Contact Us</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/legal-and-branding/terms-of-use" class="footer-link">Terms of Use</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3 col-footer"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/legal-and-branding/privacy" class="footer-link">Privacy Policy</a></u> </div> <div class="px-3"> <u class="footer-link"><a href="/resources/changelog.html" class="footer-link" data-toggle="tooltip" data-placement="top" data-html="true" title="ATT&CK content v16.1Website v4.2.1">Website Changelog</a></u> </div> </div> <div class="row"> <small class="px-3"> © 2015 - 2025, The MITRE Corporation. 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