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In this document the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, declares that certain masters in the Parisian Arts Faculty “hold that something is true according to philosophy but not according to the Catholic faith, as if there are two contrary truths, and as if in contradiction to the truth of Sacred Scripture there is a truth in the doctrines of the accursed pagans.” The same proposition may be true and false simulta- neously, true in philosophy and false in theology—such is the condemned doctrine of double truth. Unready to accept this denial of the law of contradiction, which he sees as a device to assert heresy, the bishop then lists 219 condemned errors. The masters of arts are warned not to teach them on pain of excommunication. Although the thirteenth-century Averroist Siger of Brabant, and his contemporary Boethius of Dacia are the only two masters mentioned by name in the con- demnation, the list of heterodox propositions is so broad that it includes doctrines taught by Saint Thomas.</div> <div class="para">In two senses the condemnation represents a crisis in the Western Latin mind. In the narrower sense, it is an attempt on the part of the Parisian Faculty of Theology to stop philosophical speculation in the Fac- ulty of Arts, especially when that speculation abandons the traditional guidance of theology and openly pro- fesses heterodox doctrines. At the time of the orga- nization of the University in 1200, the greater part of Aristotle's works was already available in Latin trans- lation. As the higher of the two faculties, the Faculty of Theology wished to assert its control over the study of these new doctrines, particularly the dangerous ideas found in the libri naturales and the Metaphysics. From the very beginning theologians were suspicious of their contents. In 1210 and again in 1215 the public and private teaching (though not private reading) of Aris- totle's works was banned at the University. Yet the theologians themselves soon began to be impressed with the tremendous power and comprehensiveness of Aristotle's doctrines, and in 1231 Pope Gregory IX decided that Aristotle might be taught at Paris if his errors were first expurgated. With this limited ap- proval, the knowledge of Aristotle increased and by 1243 the commentaries of Averroës became known. Although the ban against an unexpurgated Aristotle was still in effect at the University in the 1240's, it was not always upheld. For example, in 1245 Roger Bacon lectured in the Arts Faculty on the complete Physics and Metaphysics. Nevertheless conflict did not break out between the two faculties, probably because the masters of arts continued to quote Saint Augustine with respect, and to dismiss discreetly any heterodox doctrine of Averroës or Aristotle. When the split finally opened in the 1260's, the cause was not difficult to find. Led by Siger of Brabant, the masters of arts were openly professing heterodox Arabic-Aristotelian con- cepts in disregard of the doctrines of revelation. Thir- <div class="pb">   Page 32, Volume 2</div> teen doctrines, condemned in 1270, were included in the great condemnation of 1277.</div> <div class="para">In the larger sense, the condemnation represents more than the professional rivalry of two faculties. For the theologians were the guardians of the Augustinian tradition which had been dominant in medieval thought up to this time. Augustinianism had made its peace with pagan philosophy by absorbing the spiritual orientation of Neo-Platonism while subordinating it to Christian revelation. The Augustinian universe consists of a static, hierarchically ordered series of beings cul- minating in the Supreme Being who has created all from nothing. Through his omniscience, the Divine Being knows all; through His mercy He provides for all; through His freedom He orders all to His will. The Arabic-Aristotelian view, now championed in the Fac- ulty of Arts, stands in dramatic opposition to this. The universe is moved by the Prime Being, the first of the separated Intelligences. Emanating from this Intelli- gence are the other Intelligences, the heavenly spheres, and finally the earth as the arena of generation and decay. The entire emanation proceeds by an eternal, necessary movement, controlling the Prime Mover Himself. Such a God can only produce an effect similar to Himself: a unique, undifferentiated substance. The multiplicity of effects in the world, then, presupposes the multiplicity of intermediary causes, rather than the direct activity of God. It follows that God acts through the heavenly Intelligences which in turn produce the multiplicity of things on the earth. The Intelligences thus become the immediate causes of earthly effects.</div> <div class="para">Here then we have a dramatic contrast: a free, personal deity as opposed to an impersonal deity moved by necessary causes; a created universe as op- posed to an eternally emanating one; a knowing God as opposed to one who knows only himself; a being who acts directly on the earth as opposed to one who acts through the intermediaries of the Intelli- gences.</div> <div class="para">To illustrate this crisis more concretely and to show the origin of the doctrine of double truth, we must isolate several of the condemned propositions. As we have seen, Aristotle and Averroës held the eternity of the world; it was moved by a Prime Mover who acti- vates necessarily the Intelligences of the heavenly spheres. This denied creation ex nihilo of Genesis, and the freedom and providence of a personal deity. More- over, an eternal movement is constant and absolute, and the nature produced from such a movement ex- hibits the same features: there can be no interruption of the laws of nature. Hence there can be no miracles performed by a personal God or His messengers.</div> <div class="para">In the second place, Aristotelian psychology, at least as interpreted by Averroës, denied the immortality of the individual soul. For Averroës the only immortal soul is a divine intellect which at times unites itself to man. This union produces an “acquired intellect” which gives man the power to know. As the title “acquired” makes clear, this intellect—the only human one which knows—is not intrinsic to man. In other words the intellect for man is not an inherent form but an assisting form. Since the “acquired intellect” is produced only when the vegetative and sensitive functions operate, their cessation at death entails the destruction of the “acquired intellect” and the whole human soul. Only the divine intellect remains and is immortal. It is the one, true intellect for all men. This is the famous doctrine of the unity of the intellect, a doctrine which destroys the Christian concepts of personal immortality, salvation, and resurrection.</div> <div class="para">Finally, other condemned ideas attack the very basis of the Christian religion by asserting that philosophy is the highest wisdom. In contrast, Christianity is pic- tured as containing falsehoods “like all other religions” and is held to be based on myths and fables. Although the notion that philosophy is the supreme wisdom is found in some thirteenth-century thinkers, the idea that Christianity is false or mythical only appears for the first time with John of Jandun in the early fourteenth century.</div> <div class="para">What did the masters of arts actually say in profes- sing these doctrines of the “accursed pagans”? Did they attempt to avoid conflict with revelation by saying that there are two contradictory truths?</div> <div class="para">There is no doubt that the most famous master of arts, Siger of Brabant, taught many of the condemned doctrines. At various stages of his career, he held the unity of the intellect and consequent mortality of the soul, the eternity of the world, and the regularity of natural change prohibiting miraculous interruption. Though his attitude shifted at various times (usually under the pressure of attacks from the Faculty of Theology), he never admitted the possibility of two contradictory truths. Nowhere in his writings does the term “double truth” appear, nor do we ever find the statement of two contrary truths as set down in the 1277 condemnation. On the other hand, there is a good deal of evidence to indicate that Siger upheld the law of contradiction, thus explicitly denying the possibility of a double truth. In his Questions on Metaphysics IV, he says that we cannot maintain contradictory points simultaneously for that is to deny what we affirm. The mind itself, he holds, will not allow adherence to con- tradictory propositions. Even God does not produce such contradictions for He will not make man into an ass. With this explicit acceptance of the law of contra- diction, the problem remains of Siger's acceptance of the teachings of Greco-Arabic philosophy and his si- multaneous insistence on the validity of Christian revelation.</div> <div class="pb">   Page 33, Volume 2</div> <div class="para"> </div> <div class="para">Siger's solution to this problem consists of three different attitudes adopted at various points in his teaching. The first attitude, common throughout his work, is the assertion that faith is true while the doc- trines of Aristotle are merely the conclusions of philos- ophy and reason. The word “truth” always appears associated with faith and in opposition to the teachings of Aristotle and reason. Prescinding from faith, Siger argues, we must investigate nature with Averroës and Aristotle as our guides. Our conclusions, however, are not true but simply the rational deductions of pagan philosophers. In its most radical form, this attitude expresses itself as the reduction of philosophical inquiry to the doctrinal history of previous thinkers. When we proceed philosophically, says Siger, we examine the opinions of the philosophers, not the truth of the matter.</div> <div class="para">But this attitude did not always satisfy him. Time and again we find the assertion that the doctrines of nature are not simply those of Aristotle and Averroës but also the conclusions of reason. Unlike the first attitude which tends to identify reason with the doc- trines of Aristotelians, here reason becomes separated from the philosophers; it produces a knowledge inde- pendent of their teachings. At times the arguments of natural reason appear “almost irrefutable.” Yet faith contradicts them, and we must accept many things on faith which “human reason leads us to deny.” A strict antinomy develops between knowledge and faith: “I know one thing; I believe another,” says Siger. There is an epistemological basis for this attitude. Natural philosophy, according to Siger, presents us only with those laws established by human reason. Because God is above rational laws, it follows that He may interrupt them, not to produce absurdities but to complete the inadequacies of human reason. The truth of faith is not denied by contrary assertions of natural reason because revelation itself derives from a source inacces- sible to human reason.</div> <div class="para">Siger's insistence on the great value of autonomous philosophy and the wisdom it produces leads him to adopt still a third position. Impressed with the nature of philosophy, Siger does not always reserve the word truth for faith alone and he seems at least implicitly to assert a double truth. In the Commentary on the Metaphysics, he says: “The knowledge of truth belongs principally to philosophy because it has for its object the first causes and the first principles—thus the first truths.” And in the Commentary on the De anima, he holds that the knowledge of the soul gained by philos- ophy is important for truth. If philosophy establishes true principles and faith is still true, it seems difficult, in cases of specific doctrinal conflict, to avoid the statement that two contradictory truths actually exist.</div> <div class="para">The solution to this dilemma stems once more from epistemological considerations. The highest truth, Siger holds, can only result from the knowledge of causes in themselves and not as they are inferred from effects; in Siger's language we must have knowledge of causes per se. Now all arguments of reason are generalizations from sense perception which enable us to describe nature not through its own causes but only through effects registered on the mind. When set down into laws, such effects can never provide final certainty because they do not establish the causes per se of the things they purport to describe. This reduces all philo- sophical knowledge to a probable or hypothetical status.</div> <div class="para">In effect Siger has established degrees of certitude. Faith is absolutely certain even though it is not demonstrable to reason. Rational inquiry limited, as it is, to God's effects cannot attain to the causes per se of these effects. For we cannot describe the mode of God's activity per se which in the end is the cause of the principles of nature. Rational demonstrations therefore which appear final and irrefutable are such only within natural limits, and consequently their demonstrative status is only probable. In several places, Siger endorses this probabilism: “We have demon- strated above that the effect of God is eternal; this conclusion is probable but not necessary”; “The argu- ment of Aristotle is probable; it is not necessary”; “Although the argument of the Commentator has probability, it is not true” (Muller, 1938).</div> <div class="para">The second thinker mentioned in the 1277 condem- nation, Boethius of Dacia, adopted essentially the same attitude as Siger. The method of natural philosophy must limit itself to natural causes and principles. On these principles alone, we must accept the eternity of the world, says Boethius. Although these principles hold within the natural order, supernatural principles may suspend them, not by demonstrating their falsity (that is impossible) but by asserting the opposite on grounds of revelation. Again we are faced with relative degrees of certitude rather than the absolute validity of contradictory truths. Even though Boethius praised the life of philosophy in his De summo bono as the pursuit of speculative truth and as the worthiest life for man, we must bear in mind that these concepts are relative to the natural order of philosophy. No- where are they asserted absolutely as the 1277 con- demnation claims.</div> <div class="para">There appears to be no reason to doubt the sincerity of Siger and Boethius in their proclamations of loyalty to the Christian religion. They were not secret atheists or rationalists. Sincere Christians, they were confronted with a dramatic gulf between their deeply held reli- gious beliefs and the conclusions of their philosophical pursuits. They adjusted the conflict by setting the Christian God totally outside the natural order. Then <div class="pb">   Page 34, Volume 2</div> they declared all descriptions of that order, produced by philosophy, to be statements of a limited, probable, and hypothetical nature. The doctrine of double truth or two contradictory truths was imposed on them by their adversaries who, by reading it into their state- ments, hoped to end speculation they considered heretical.</div> <div class="para">The 1277 condemnation effectively ended philo- sophical speculation in the Faculty of Arts until the end of the century. In the fourteenth century, however, the masters of arts were once again allowed to take up the doctrine of the Stagirite and his commentators. On the testimony of two chancellors of the University, Jean Gerson and John Buridan, we learn that the mas- ters of the Faculty of Arts were permitted to consider these doctrines provided they took an oath swearing to uphold the doctrines of revelation. When expound- ing pagan ideas contrary to faith, the Parisian masters had to swear that they would demonstrate the falsity of those views in conflict with faith. In order to do this the masters asserted the necessity of giving a complete exposition of pagan doctrines.</div> <div class="para">The situation can be well illustrated by considering the thought of John Buridan, onetime chancellor of the University, and one of the most influential scholastics of the century. Like Siger, Buridan accepts the mortal- ity of the soul and the eternity of the world as the doctrines of philosophy. Establishing these doctrines, however, requires that we understand the nature of philosophical statements. All such statements are merely probable because philosophical inquiry pro- ceeds by three modes of understanding—experience, memory, and induction—which derive from sense per- ception. Since Buridan grants a realm of final truth above sense perception, it is clear that empirical knowledge does not arrive at ultimate certainty.</div> <div class="para">When we compare the probable philosophical theses of Siger and Buridan, the major difference we discover is the growth in Buridan of a natural philosophy inde- pendent of Aristotle. The tendency of separating reason and nature from the ideas of the philosophers—already apparent in Siger—is much more marked in Buridan. As a result, it is impossible for Buridan to argue that he is merely reporting the opinions of previous philos- ophers. From his many criticisms of Aristotle, it is quite evident that he intends to establish an independent and objective natural science. The assertions of philosophy become the descriptions of nature, and Aristotle him- self is often rejected in the name of natural reason. Nevertheless, Aristotle's authority still stands so high that only when Buridan agrees with the Stagirite does he vigorously defend a philosophical position in sharp opposition to faith.</div> <div class="para">The development of a philosophical probabilism can be seen in Buridan's treatment of creation ex nihilo. Creation out of a void, he holds, must be accepted on faith but the notion that every existing being implies a preexisting being is valid for philosophy. Thus, ac- cording to philosophy, we must hold the eternity of the world which, in turn, throws into question the immortality of the soul. For if the world is eternal and souls immortal, an infinite number of souls will be wandering around the universe. To avoid this absurdity, the logic of natural philosophy demands that we deny the immortality of the soul. On the basis of natural philosophy, arguments for mortality may be derived either from Averroës' view of the unity of the intellect or the Aristotelian Commentator Alexander of Aphro- disias' (fl. 200) view of the corruptibility of individual souls. Buridan chooses the Alexandrist position: the soul is a form educed from the potency of matter, extended to the extension of matter, multiplied in distinct bodies, and finally generated and corrupted. This is the objec- tively correct doctrine of natural philosophy. However, Buridan decides that the doctrine of faith is true: the soul inheres in matter but is eternally immortal after death. For the argument of natural philosophy, he concludes, is only probable and must give way before the irrefutable truths of divine revelation.</div> <div class="para">The most radical Parisian master of the fourteenth century, John of Jandun (d. 1328), continues the tradi- tion of Siger in several ways. Jandun upholds individual mortality on Averroistic grounds, explicitly rejecting the “vile error” of Alexander that the soul actually informs the body. The soul is not created but coeternal with the world. The opposite view of faith, while not demonstrable to reason, is true. God produces this by a miracle not apparent to sense perception: He makes the corruptible soul immortal.</div> <div class="para">In Jandun, the status of natural philosophy is also raised, as in Buridan, to that of an independent, objec- tive description of nature. Thus the doctrines of natural reason, derived ultimately from sense perception, pro- vide philosophic proofs whose demonstrative status is logical not simply historical: these are not merely the proofs of Averroës and Aristotle, but the independent conclusions of reason. Precisely because these laws are derived from rational demonstrations based on sense perceptions, they are not absolutely true. They must be rejected when they conflict with revelation.</div> <div class="para">Despite differences in the interpretation of the doc- trine of the soul, both Buridan and Jandun subscribed to Siger's original division of probable philosophical demonstration vs. absolute revealed truth. A new ele- ment, however, enters with Jandun. We find the first written statements of those condemned propositions of 1277 which spoke of Christianity as full of errors and based on fables and myths. In his Commentary on <div class="pb">   Page 35, Volume 2</div> Aristotle's De anima, Jandun notes that Averroës at- tacks the strength of custom. It is custom alone, says the Commentator, which accounts for the strength of religions. Men come to accept the fables and puerile notions inherent in religious belief only because they have heard them from childhood. And in the Com- mentary on the De caelo et mundo, Jandun notes that Averroës refers to religion in a derogatory sense in his prologue to Aristotle's Physics, Book III. There the Commentator holds that the doctrines of religion are apologies established by religious lawmakers for the control of the common people; these doctrines corrupt necessary principles and are “removed from truth and the human mind.” The Commentator, Jandun adds, is speaking of the Muslim religion, “and if he should speak of our religion he would lie because all things in our religion are true and proved by the miracles of God and the glory of the Creator.” It is important to note that Jandun may be perfectly sincere in this statement. And it is equally important to say that once stated, the notion that religious belief is a human in- vention reinforced by conventional usage would gain increasing currency.</div> <div class="para">We can begin to see this development in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Particularly at the northern Italian Universities, organized without faculties of theology, we find an increasing emphasis not only on independent philosophical speculation but also on philosophical attacks on religious truth. Most thinkers continued to adhere sincerely to the earlier divisions which established for the masters of arts a method distinct from that of theology. But there were some who denied the probable nature of philosophical conclusions, asserting instead the absolute truth of philosophy, and thus turning philosophical criticism against Christianity itself.</div> <div class="para">Perhaps the outstanding example of this develop- ment is Blasius of Parma (d. 1416). Active in Pavia, Padua, and Bologna in the late fourteenth century, Blasius was professor of astronomy, mathematics, and philosophy. He establishes the mortality of the soul by proving that the soul has no function independent of bodily powers. Knowing, the highest function of the soul, depends on the continuous operation of the sensi- tive powers; and the eventual dissolution of the sensi- tive powers carries with it the disruption and disinte- gration of the mind. Since a function independent of the body is the one feature Aristotle had declared as proof of immortality, Blaisius claims that mortality is proved. This proof has Alexandrist features and is not new. But when Blasius announces that mortality is not merely probable but must be accepted absolutely we are in the presence of a new attitude of mind. The development of this stance is worth examining.</div> <div class="para"> Like his predecessors, Blasius sharply separates knowledge and belief. To know something, he declares, is to have arguments based on evidence; to believe something, knowledge is not necessary, and in the case of faith must be set aside. Unlike earlier thinkers he appears to reject the notion of asserting and denying at the same time with different degrees of certitude. We cannot have a probable scientific deduction in conflict with an absolute religious truth. Rather we must choose one or the other. “When you intend to support faith which is believed,” contends Blasius, “you must reject the habit of philosophy which insists on evidence, and where the reverse occurs, you must reject the Christian faith.”</div> <div class="para">The question of course remains: Does Blasius reject Christian faith absolutely or merely as irrelevant to philosophy? Perhaps he is insisting with Jandun that the modes of inquiry proper to faith and reason are radically different and cannot be combined; each must pursue a separate path. From Blasius' discussion of the soul, however, it begins to appear that he favors an absolute rejection of faith. He introduces the notion that the soul can be created by spontaneous generation from waste, as is the case in lower forms of life. The method of arriving at this conclusion is quite as inter- esting as the conclusion itself. Discussing the biblical story of the flood, Blasius points out that all life must have been destroyed when waters covered the earth for forty days. “Nor in this matter,” he warns, “should you believe the tales of women that Noah made an ark in which he placed all the animals” (Maier, 1949). Quite the contrary, all human and animal life was destroyed. Man was created anew from the waste products and the appropriate constellation of the stars. It is from this startling discussion that Blasius concludes that the soul is mortal—produced from matter as other generable and corruptible things. Now this is not a probable doctrine of philosophy: Blasius contends that it must be conceded absolutely.</div> <div class="para">The suspicions raised by the critique of the Bible and the absolute assertion of mortality are confirmed by Blasius' discussion of the origin of religions. The issue is no longer the status of any particular Christian belief but the value of Christianity itself. Following the astrological book De magnis coniunctionibus of Albumazar (805-85), Blasius explains that the diversity of religious belief arises from the conjunction of Jupiter with different planets. These in turn produce the different religious sects. The Jewish sect, for example, is produced from the conjunction of Jupiter with Saturn, while the sect of the Saracens is caused by the union of Jupiter with Venus. And “from the union of Jupiter with Mercury the Christian sect is produced.” Christianity here originates from the same natural <div class="pb">   Page 36, Volume 2</div> forces which produce the other religions. This extreme astrological determinism eliminates free choice in reli- gious matters. Men no longer choose their religions freely; they are naturally inclined to a particular sect by the conjunction of the planets.</div> <div class="para">After some trouble with Church authorities and a forced recantation, Blasius gave a later lecture in which he denied these views. In this lecture he warns that the views of Albumazar are erroneous and false, deny- ing specifically that the conjunctions of Jupiter with the other planets produce the various religions. He insists furthermore that a wise man will supersede the knowledge of the stars in deciding his own religious belief. Despite this denial, obviously produced under pressure from Church authorities, it appears that Blasius accepts all these philosophical doctrines as certain. He criticizes religious doctrines on philo- sophical grounds, attacks biblical miracles, and reverses the traditional degrees of certitude in religion and philosophy. For Blasius truth appears to be on the side of philosophy which claims the privilege of explaining the origin of religion itself as a natural phenomenon. Siger's probable philosophical statements are now transformed into an absolute philosophical certitude, bowing before religious belief and its representatives only out of tactical necessity.</div> <div class="para">The full development of Blasius' doctrines appears in the sixteenth century, which marks the final libera- tion of philosophy from its subordination to revelation. In the Aristotelian tradition most thinkers continued to maintain sincerely the traditional distinctions be- tween probable philosophical statements and absolute religious truth. Some professors in the Italian universities, however, developed the dramatic shift in viewpoint already expressed by Blasius. Reacting quickly to this, the Fifth Lateran Council of 1513 revived the traditional oath of the Parisian masters of arts; it declared that all discussions of philosophical positions opposed to faith had to include both a defense of revelation and a reasoned argument against heterodox notions. The theologians of the Council defended orthodoxy with a proclamation of the im- mortality of the soul as a dogma and the condemnation of three errors: the unity of the intellect, the mortality of the soul, and the idea that such doctrines were true “at least in philosophy.” “Truth does not contradict truth,” said the theologians, echoing the 1277 condem- nation. In the works of the professors of philosophy we do not find the open admission, as the Council charged, of two contradictory truths. But doubtless there were some who were guilty of asserting the absolute truth of philosophy while paying perfunctory obeisance to the “truth” of revelation. An outstanding example of this attitude can be found in the works of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525).</div> <div class="para">Teaching natural philosophy at Padua, Ferrara, and Bologna, Pomponazzi summarizes and reshapes the more radical conclusions of his predecessors in the Aristotelian tradition. Of the philosophical themes we have traced Pomponazzi concerns himself primarily with three: the mortality of the soul, the regularity and universality of natural laws, and the nature of religious doctrine. In his immortality treatises—De immortalitate animae, Apologia, and Defensorium—he proves the mortality of the soul. The proof is original only in the sense that it unites many formerly disparate elements. With Alexander of Aphrodisias, he insists that the soul inheres in the body and is forever bound to its material foundation; the corruption of the material foundation entails the destruction of the soul. With Blasius, he finds that no function of the soul can exist without some relation to bodily powers; for even the highest function of thought is part of an interlocking chain of powers based on corruptible matter. With Scotus, he argues against Thomas Aquinas that the soul cannot simultaneously be an immaterial substance and the act of the body; an immaterial substance is separate and separable from the body while an act is a process perfecting bodily operations. Since Aristotle had always defined the soul as the act of the body, we must hold that it is always bound to the powers it perfects; hence it is mortal, Pomponazzi concludes.</div> <div class="para">In the De incantationibus, Pomponazzi discovers natural causes for “miraculous occurrences.” Cures, visions, and the raising of the dead are all explained in three ways: as human inventions, the effects of occult powers (found in plants, animals, and men), or the results of the activity of the heavenly Intelligences. Miracles are reduced to unusual events which only the trained mind can trace to their natural causes. The clear conclusion is that there are no miracles produced by angels or demons because there are no interruptions of the natural processes of birth, growth, and decay.</div> <div class="para">After Pomponazzi establishes these doctrines as the findings of philosophy and natural reason, he applies the usual distinctions which have been traditional for three centuries. These are the findings of natural rea- son, he says, but they must be suspended by faith. The Church teaches immortality as well as miracles pro- duced by God, demons, and angels. We must accept all this as true, rejecting the conclusions of reason. Although not demonstrable by reason, the truth of faith is superior to the findings of reason. For God, who is the creator of nature, may suspend its principles. In these apologetic statements, Pomponazzi appears to be very close to Siger, Boethius of Dacia, and Buridan.</div> <div class="pb">   Page 37, Volume 2</div> <div class="para"> </div> <div class="para">Closer examination, however, reveals that he follows the path of Blasius. Like Jandun, Pomponazzi knows and lectures on Averroës' prologue to Physics, Book III. In these lectures, he proclaims in the name of the Commentator that “truth is the end of philosophy while the end of the religious lawgiver is neither truth nor falsehood but to make men good and well- behaved.” He takes the precaution, as did Jandun, of associating these views with Averroës, and finally con- demns them as false. But in his own name in his pub- lished works there are striking instances of Pompon- azzi's acceptance of philosophy as absolute truth, and his discovery of a human origin for religious doctrines. Immortality, he comes to state, is an invention of religious lawmakers who proclaim this doctrine “not caring for truth.” Clearly the truth they do not “care for” is the doctrine of mortality as proved by philoso- phy. Demons and angels, which he apparently has accepted as the Church's teaching, he finds were also invented by men “who knew very well that they did not exist.”</div> <div class="para">Finally, Pomponazzi holds that Christianity is not the gift of an eternal God but merely the product of impersonal heavenly forces. These forces, the heavenly Intelligences, produce life-cycles for all religions, in- cluding Christianity. In fact, Christianity itself, he explains, is approaching its death which is why the Intelligences produce so few “miracles” at the present time. If the origin of Christianity is temporally condi- tioned, so are its doctrines. Far from eternal verities, they are the inventions of religious lawmakers who seek to control a bestial human nature through the fear of hell and the hope of heaven. The philosopher who does not need such restraints, Pomponazzi continues, may nevertheless understand their purpose and approve of them for the masses.</div> <div class="para">These doctrines mark the beginning of the end of theological dominance in the West. Philosophy is no longer a collection of probable statements but an abso- lute truth subjecting all doctrines to its powerful anal- ysis. It begins to dislodge theology from its position as queen of the sciences.</div> <div class="para">If we glance briefly over the history we have dis- cussed, we can see that the masters in the Faculty of Arts at Paris initiated a tradition which lasted over four centuries in the universities of Europe among those philosophers who were professionally concerned with Aristotle and his commentators. Refusing to find or to force agreement between pagan doctrines and revelation, the Parisian masters raised, in its most ex- treme form, the problem of the precise relationship of philosophical inquiry to revealed truth. Moreover they did this at a time when revealed truth had the strongest institutional sanctions. The history of the idea of double truth is thus really the history of the rela- tionship of philosophy to theology among professional philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition. By carving out an independent domain of inquiry for philosophy, the earlier thinkers, led by Siger, freed philosophy from the necessity of theological guidance. This made possi- ble its ultimate escape from religious domination. Siger, Boethius of Dacia, Jandun, and Buridan all sin- cerely accepted the one supreme truth of theology. Yet it was probably to be expected that some thinkers in this tradition, confronted constantly with the un- Christian naturalism of Aristotle, would one day pro- claim the Stagirite's doctrines as the highest truth, and turn this truth against theology itself.</div> <div class="para"> BIBLIOGRAPHY </div> <div class="para">The text of the 1277 condemnation is found in H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, Chartularium universitatis pariensus (Paris, 1889), I, 543-55. See also: W. Bentzendörfer, Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit bei Petrus Pomponatius (Tübingen, 1919). G. Di Napoli, L'Immortalità dell'anima nel Rinascimento (Turin, 1963). Pierre Duhem, Système du monde, Vol. V (Paris, 1954). É. Gilson, “La doctrine de la double vérité,” Études de philosophie médiévale (Strasbourg, 1921), pp. 51-69; idem, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955). T. Gregory, “Discussioni sulla `doppia verità,'” Cultura e Scuola, 2 (1962), 99-106. P. O. Kristeller, “Paduan Averroism and Alexandrism in the Light of Recent Studies,” Atti del XII Congresso Inter- nazionale di Filosofia, 9 (1960), 147-55. S. MacClintock, Perversity and Error: Studies on the “Averroist” John of Jandun (Bloomington, Ind., 1956). A. Maier, Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik, Vol. I: Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14 Jahrundert (Rome, 1949), 279-99; Vol. IV: Metaphysische Hintergrunde der spätscholastischen Natur- philosophie (Rome, 1955), 3-45. A. Maurer, “Between Rea- son and Faith: Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi on the Magic Arts,” Medieval Studies, 18 (1956), 1-18. J. P. Muller, “Philosophie et foi chez Siger de Brabant: La Théorie de la double vérité,” Studia anselmiana, 7-8 (1938), 35-50. B. Nardi, Studi su Pomponazzi (Florence, 1965). A. Pacchi, “Sul Commento al `De anima' de G. di Jandun, IV: La Questione della Doppia Verità,” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 15 (1960), 354-75. M. Pine, “Pietro Pomponazzi and the Problem of Double Truth,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 29 (1968), 163-76. L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, Vol. IV (New York, 1934), 64-79; Vol. V (New York, 1941), 94-110. F. Van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant (Brussels, 1938); idem, Aristotle in the West (Louvain, 1955); idem, La Philosophie au XIIIe siècle (Louvain, 1966).</div> <div class="pararight">MARTIN PINE</div> <div class="biblref">[See also Astrology <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-20','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v1-20</a>  ; Certainty <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-43','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v1-43</a>  <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-44','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v1-44</a>  ; Creation <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-68','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v1-68</a>  ; Death and Immortality <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-76','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v1-76</a>  ; Dualism <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-05','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v2-05</a>  ; God <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-29','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v2-29</a>  <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-30','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v2-30</a>  <a href="#" onclick="MM_openBrWindow('/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-31','same','scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=600,height=600')">v2-31</a>  .]</div> </td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"> <div class="footer"> <center> <table border="0" width="80%"> <tr> <td valign="top" align="left" class="small"><a href="/web/20090506110552/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/DicHist/dict.html">The Dictionary of the History of Ideas</a> Electronic Text Center PO Box 400148 Charlottesville VA 22904-4148 434.924.3230 | fax: 434.924.1431 </td><td valign="top" align="right" class="small"> Maintained by: <a href="/web/20090506110552/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/">The Electronic Text Center</a> at the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090506110552/http://www.lib.virginia.edu/">University of Virginia Library</a> © 2003 the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090506110552/http://www.galegroup.com/">Gale Group</a> All Rights Reserved Last Modified: Thursday, May 1, 2003</td> </tr> </table> </center> </div> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td><td> </td><td> </td> </tr> </table> <script src="https://web.archive.org/web/20090506110552js_/http://www.lib.virginia.edu/libtools.js" type="text/javascript"></script></body> </html>